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Editorial: The Invasion of Grenada 30 Years on—A

Retrospective

Peter Clegg & Gary Williams

To cite this article: Peter Clegg & Gary Williams (2013) Editorial: The Invasion of
Grenada 30 Years on—A Retrospective, The Round Table, 102:2, 121-126, DOI:
10.1080/00358533.2013.764094

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The Round Table, 2013
Vol. 102, No. 2, 121–126, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2013.764094

Editorial: The Invasion of Grenada 30

Years on—A Retrospective

Revolution, Invasion and Legacy

The overthrow of Eric Gairy by the Marxist-Leninist New Jewel Movement (NJM) in
March 1979 was the result of a coincidence of several factors. The 1970s had seen the
political awakening of many young Grenadians, influenced by the ideas of the Black
Power movement and the allure of Marxist-Leninism’s alternative to the capitalist path
of development. The final and most important factor was the autocratic and repressive
rule of Eric Gairy, who had dominated Grenadian politics for nearly 30 years, which
had increasingly alienated many people. Unrest and violence had surrounded Grenada’s
transition to independence in 1973–74 and fraudulent elections in 1976 deprived the
opposition coalition of victory. Gairy’s fraudulent victory convinced the main opposi-
tion party, the NJM, that he would never relinquish power and that a non-constitutional
solution would be necessary and justified. Ironically, it was a visit by two United States
officials from the Bureau for Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives and US Cus-
toms to Grenada on 12 March 1979 investigating gunrunning from the US by NJM
sympathisers that triggered the coup. The investigation clearly implicated senior NJM
members, and Gairy’s police planned to arrest them once the US officials had com-
pleted their visit.
After decades of Gairy’s rule the revolution promised much; the NJM leader and
now Prime Minister Maurice Bishop announced on the radio that ‘all democratic free-
doms, including freedom of elections, religious and political opinion, will be fully
restored to the people ... [T]his revolution is for work, for food, for decent housing and
health services, and for a bright future’ (Bishop, 1983, p. 25). This was heady stuff and
the revolution undoubtedly created a wave of expectation among the majority of
Grenadians who yearned for something better than life under Gairy. However, what
they got was a Marxist-Leninist People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG) that had no
intention of restoring the democratic freedoms promised by Bishop and instead took
Grenada down a totalitarian path. Although the revolution did have its positives—
improved education opportunities, better health care, economic growth and large-scale
tourist investments (the Point Salines International Airport)—they were outweighed by
the negatives: refusal to hold elections, close alignment with the Communist bloc
countries, detention of hundreds of people without trial or charge, and closing down
non-government newspapers.
By its fourth year the revolution appeared to be running out of steam as the
economic situation deteriorated and the government had become increasingly detached
from the people. As the PRG Central Committee turned in on itself in the summer of
1983, Bishop was the focus of their attention—the quality of his leadership and failure

Ó 2013 The Round Table Ltd

122 Editorial

to place the party on a firm Marxist-Leninist footing were criticised. The proposed
solution was joint leadership between Bishop and his Deputy Prime Minister Bernard
Coard. Whether this was part of a long-term strategy by the ambitious Coard unwilling
to stay in Bishop’s shadow forever or a creative but unfeasible solution to a perceived
problem is debatable, but whichever explanation is preferred it set the ball rolling for
the implosion of the revolution.
Bishop initially agreed to the joint leadership proposal, but subsequently changed his
mind. There was no going back though and the Coard faction denounced Bishop,
placed him under house arrest and expelled him from the party. The crisis might have
ended there, but for ordinary Grenadians this had come as a complete shock. Bishop
was the charismatic leader and epitomised the revolution; Coard was the unpopular
hardcore ideologue to whom the public had never warmed. Hence, when crowds of
Bishop supporters freed him from house arrest and he led them to Fort Rupert, the
Coard faction felt that they had to respond and sent armoured personnel carriers to
retake the Fort. In the ensuing melee between 30 and 40 Bishop supporters were killed
and Bishop and seven colleagues were executed by firing squad.
The events of ‘Bloody Wednesday’, 19 October 1983, horrified the region and
Grenada’s Eastern Caribbean neighbours quickly agreed that a military solution was the
only appropriate course of action in the circumstances. Naturally they did not have the
capacity to act and so as the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) they
issued an invitation to the US to participate in an operation to remove the newly
installed Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) in Grenada. Washington had been con-
cerned about the unrest and particularly about the safety of American citizens. Hence,
the OECS’s invitation found a willing ear in Washington as it coincided with US inter-
ests. President Ronald Reagan authorised a military operation to ensure the safety of
US nationals, restore democratic government, and eliminate current and prevent further
Cuban intervention in Grenada. Operation Urgent Fury lasted just over a week and
involved approximately 7,000 troops. It was a predictably one-sided battle, but as the
US General in charge admitted, ‘we got a lot more resistance than we expected’
(Jaroslovsky, 1983, p. 1).
The dramatic events of October 1983 have left a deep scar on the Grenadian psyche.
In 2006, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission reported that ‘the heart of the nation
is still bleeding’ and concluded that there was a ‘lack of will and desire, and even bla-
tant refusal on the part of many—those who have done wrong ... and those who have
been wronged—to actually forgive and forget’ (p. 53). The renaming of Point Salines
International Airport as the Maurice Bishop International Airport in 2009 was contro-
versial. When the last members of the ‘Grenada 17’ convicted for the murder of Bishop
and his colleagues were released in September 2009 it was clear that bitterness and
divisions linger and emotive issues such as the whereabouts of the bodies of Bishop
and his colleagues remain unresolved. In a newspaper interview after his release, Coard
said that on 19 October ‘the whole thing got out of hand’ and that ‘what happened was
vengeance. It was nothing we ordered. And it can never be justified. It was a moment
of revenge. Pure and simple. But every one of us in the leadership take moral and
political responsibility for what happened’ (Pantin, 2009). The release of the 17 repre-
sented an important step in moving forward. As one Grenadian Senator, a former NJM
member, Chester Humphrey stated, ‘It’s the end of one chapter, not the completion of
the book, as Grenada tries to build a future by not living in the past’ (BBC Caribbean,
 Editorial 123

2009). However, for those who lived through it, the revolutionary years cast a long sha-
dow over Grenada, and 30 years on, it does not look as though it will be lifted in the
near future.

Invasion or Intervention?
One question that faced us from the outset was the terminology we should use for the
title of the special issue to describe the action taken by the US, the OECS, Barbados
and Jamaica. In the initial call for papers we used the term ‘invasion’ rather than ‘inter-
vention’—believing the former to be an accurate term to describe what took place.
However, almost immediately we were contacted by various people—some of whom
had been involved in or experienced the removal of the RMC in Grenada—suggesting
that the more benevolent term of ‘intervention’ should be employed. Consequently, we
gave further consideration to what the title should be for this issue. As Cynthia Weber
(1995, p. 13) argues ‘... international relations ... is an arena for the contestation of
meanings’. Indeed, many publications on Grenada have used ‘intervention’ rather than
‘invasion’.1
On reflection, however, our decision to retain the term ‘invasion’ was influenced by
the illegality of the action. The invasion was not justified under Article 8 of the OECS
Treaty or Articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations (UN) Charter that deal with the right
of collective self-defence and the maintenance of peace and security. In terms of collec-
tive self-defence, there appeared to be no imminent danger from Grenada to her neigh-
bours and the evidence suggests that no longer-term threat existed. Further, it is very
difficult to argue that Grenada itself was at risk from external aggression. As for the
maintenance of peace and security, there was no UN authorisation, no serious break-
down in law and order and violation of human rights, and no attempt to find a peaceful
settlement. Also, Article 8 of the OECS Treaty requires that decisions be unanimous.
However, the vote for action was not unanimous as Grenada was not present. Other
arguments that have been suggested to justify legally the intervention, for example the
invitation by Grenada’s Governor-General to intervene and the provision of humanitar-
ian assistance, also lack credibility. So it can be argued that the action was not permissi-
ble under international law. An indication of the international community’s disquiet
came when the UN General Assembly passed a resolution strongly criticising the
invasion by 108 votes to nine.
One stated goal of the US—that of securing the safety of its students at St George’s
Medical University—did have some basis in international law. As Karin von Hippel
(2000, p. 47) argues ‘International law does allow a state a limited right of intervention
to safeguard its citizens’. However, the US action should have been much more limited,
and OECS involvement would not have been necessary. Further, the actual operation to
rescue the students has been called ‘rather pathetic’ (Beck, 1993, p. 33). A first group
of students was not rescued until the day after the invasion began; while a second—ini-
tially unknown—group of students was not evacuated until day four. As a consequence,
this is another aspect of the invasion that does not provide sufficient legal cover for the
invasion.
Notwithstanding, we do have sympathy for the view that the invasion was the
‘triumph of a greater right’ (Seaga, 2009, p. 51). With the US concerned that its
124 Editorial

medical students could be taken hostage by the RMC, strong support for action in Gre-
nada and the Caribbean, the RMC’s lack of remorse and political bankruptcy, Grenada’s
subsequent return to democracy and the chance to undermine Cuban internationalism,
the invasion could be seen in a positive light. However, these considerations should not
obscure the fact that the invasion was not justified under international law—so we have
retained ‘invasion’ in the title. Ultimately, we feel that ‘intervention’ reflects a longer
tradition of political, diplomatic and economic American policy in the region and
understates the military nature of the ‘invasion’ in Grenada. Notwithstanding, we recog-
nise the differences of opinion on this matter, and therefore we did not ask the contribu-
tors to use ‘invasion’. Some authors do use the term (e.g. Cotman, Grenade and Hart),
whereas others (Gay, Kelly and Kurze) prefer ‘intervention’.

The Articles
This edition of The Round Table contains a range of papers analysing both the domestic
and international impact of Grenada’s revolution and the US invasion four years later.
Two articles consider the revolutionary government’s early period in power and its
attempts to consolidate its rule. One considers the procurement of weapons and the
PRG’s shifting foreign policy preferences, while the other analyses the early attempts
by both the government and opposition to shape public opinion on the revolution
through the country’s newspapers and their reporting of life in Communist Cuba. The
other two articles analyse developments since the invasion—one in regard to Grenada’s
re-emerging ties with Cuba, the other in relation to Grenada’s fluid party political sys-
tem. The special issue concludes with the personal recollections of several individuals
involved in Grenada during the period 1979–83 that provide some further context to
the issues raised in the preceding articles.
Gary Williams in ‘Ferrets in the Caribbean: Britain, Grenada and the Curious Case of
the Armoured Cars’ considers the politics surrounding Grenadian Prime Minister
Maurice Bishop’s request for arms from the UK. Using recently declassified British
government documents, the article examines London’s deliberations over supplying
armoured cars to Grenada. Despite some initial support for the sale the deal was eventu-
ally blocked. The implications of this were significant, as Williams argues, ‘ultimately,
the delay and refusal of a licence gave Bishop an excellent opportunity to criticise
publicly UK policy and justify his turn to Cuba for military assistance’. The decision
over the Ferrets was the point at which the Foreign and Commonwealth Office recogni-
sed that a strategy to encourage the PRG to move away from Cuba and towards
constitutional rule would not succeed.
Laurie Lambert in ‘The Revolution and its Discontents: Grenadian Newspapers and
Attempts to Shape Public Opinion during Political Transition’ evaluates the role of
newspapers in their efforts to influence public opinion in the early stages of the
Grenada Revolution and the terms in which printed discourses on the revolution were
conceptualised. In particular, the article argues that Cuba functioned as a metonym
through which the revolution was considered by the local media. The article compares
the reporting of two newspapers—the government-run Free West Indian and the
privately owned The Torchlight. Issues including race, gender equality, property owner-
ship, freedom of religious practice, and freedom of travel are examined in relation to
 Editorial 125

capitalism and socialism, and the PRG’s efforts to maintain narrative authority of the
revolution. As Lambert argues, ‘the PRG needed an airtight script for the revolution’;
so in October 1979 the PRG closed The Torchlight and silenced a critical voice.
John Cotman in ‘Coming in from the Cold: Grenada and Cuba since 1983’ continues
the Grenada–Cuba theme, but considers diplomatic relations between the two countries.
The article evaluates briefly the strong relationship between them from 1979 to 1983,
and then the fracturing of ties after the US invasion which lasted until 1992. The
remainder of the article provides a detailed account of the strong rapprochement that
has taken place since then. For Grenada, the reality of a more hostile international
economic climate has been a key consideration in re-establishing strong links with
Cuba. Indeed, the view of all governments since 1993 has been to explore links with
any country that can provide valuable assistance for its development. For Cuba, mean-
while, Grenada is seen as an important partner in its attempts to strengthen its position
in the Americas. As Cotman suggests, ‘the 21st century alliance between St George’s
and Havana validates the strategy of South–South cooperation advocated by Maurice
Bishop’s PRG and NJM over 30 years ago’.
Wendy Grenade in ‘Party Politics and Governance in Grenada: An Analysis of the
New National Party (1984–2012)’ examines party politics and governance in post-revo-
lutionary Grenada, using the case of the New National Party (NNP)—the dominant
political force in Grenada since the mid-1980s. The article is divided into two main sec-
tions: the first considers the vicissitudes of the NNP in terms of both party coherence
and electoral performance, while the second discusses the wider implications for gover-
nance and democracy in Grenada. The article provides a mixed picture of the health of
democracy and electoral politics since the US invasion. As Grenade makes clear, ‘the
US was unable to turn Grenada into a showcase for democracy, as it is a challenge for
small post-colonial developing states simultaneously to consolidate democracy and bal-
ance economic, social and human development in the context of neo-liberalism’.
The special issue concludes with the personal recollections of four people who were
directly involved in Grenadian politics during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Peter
Gay, non-resident UK representative to Grenada from 1978 to 1980, provides an
account of the last months of Eric Gairy’s premiership, his discussions with Bishop and
Coard prior to the revolution, and the early days of the revolution itself. Gay suggests
that deep-seated problems with the PRG were already apparent. John Kelly, British
Resident Representative in Grenada between December 1982 and September 1986,
gives his views on the unravelling of the revolution in early 1983, through to Bishop’s
murder, and the subsequent US ‘intervention’. A complimentary perspective is offered
by Ken Kurze, one of the US diplomats who visited Grenada during the short period of
RMC rule, who provides an account of that time and his fears over the security of the
US medical students if an ‘intervention’ did not take place. Finally, a quite different
view is given by Richard Hart, the PRG’s Attorney-General for much of 1983, through
his diary entries. Hart gives a detailed account of the events leading up to Bishop’s
death, the few days of relative peace that followed, and then the full force of the US
invasion. Hart describes his pride at the local resistance against the American soldiers,
his escape from the island, and his sadness that the revolution had been destroyed by
US imperialism and its Caribbean collaborators.
Owing to limitations of space, two other articles looking at the revolution, the US
invasion and its aftermath could not be accommodated within the special issue. Instead,
126 Editorial

these articles will be published in later general issues of The Round Table. Robert Beck
in ‘The Grenada Invasion, International Law and the Scoon Invitation: A 30-year Retro-
spective’ considers the nature, substance and circumstances of the request for external
assistance that was made by Grenadian Governor-General Sir Paul Scoon. The article
argues that even though Sir Paul genuinely supported ‘Operation Urgent Fury’, his
invitation did not legally justify the operation. Howard Tumber in ‘Journalism and the
Invasion of Grenada 30 Years on’ argues that the US-led invasion of Grenada represents
an important case study of journalism in the frontline because it marked a changing
point in the relationship between journalists and the US administration. The exclusion
of journalists at the time can be conceived of as a test in trying new forms of informa-
tion management. The article explores the tensions experienced between journalists,
government and military officers and the subsequent need to design alternative solutions
to the problem of information coverage in wartime.

Peter Clegg and Gary Williams

Note
1. See, for example, R. Crandall (2009) Gunboat Democracy: US Interventions in the Dominican Republic,
Grenada and Panama. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers; W. Gilmore (1984) The
Grenada Intervention: Analysis and Documentation. London: Mansell Publishing Limited; K. Schoenhals
and R. Melanson (1985) Revolution and Intervention in Grenada. Boulder: Westview Press; and E. Seaga
(2009) The Grenada Intervention: The Inside Story. Kingston, Jamaica: The University of the West
Indies.

References
BBC Caribbean (2009) Last of ‘Grenada 17’ released, 7 September, http://www.bbc.co.uk/caribbean/news/
story/2009/09/090907_grenada_release.shtml, accessed 12 December 2012.
Beck, R. (1993). The Grenada Invasion: Politics, Law and Foreign Policy Decisionmaking. Oxford: Westview
Press.
Bishop, M. (1983). A bright new dawn, March 13, 1979. In B. Marcus & M. Taber (Eds.), Maurice Bishop
Speaks: The Grenada Revolution and Its Overthrow 1979–83. New York, NY: Pathfinder.
Hippel, K. von (2000). Democracy by Force: US Military Intervention in the Post-cold War World. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jaroslovsky, R. (1983) US sees military victory in Grenada despite stiff resistance from Cubans, Wall Street
Journal, 27 October.
Pantin, R. (2009) Exclusive interview with Bernard Coard, Trinidad Express, 13 September, http://www.trini-
dadexpress.com/news/Exclusive_interview_with_Bernard_Coard-115360229.html, accessed 12 December
2012.
Seaga, E. (2009). The Grenada Intervention: The Inside Story. Kingston: University of the West Indies.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report (2006) Grenada: Redeeming the Past: A Time for Healing,
Vol. 1 (St George’s, Grenada: Government Printery).
Weber, C. (1995). Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State and Symbolic Exchange. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.