Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 1989 by the American Psychological Association, In<

1989, Vol. 57, No. 6,1000-1012 0022-3514/89/SOO.l

Some Social Mechanics of Group Decision Making: The Distribution of

Opinion, Polling Sequence, and Implications for Consensus

James H. Davis, Tatsuya Kameda, Craig Parks,

Mark Stasson, and Suzi Zimmerman
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

The first study extrapolated earlier findings (Davis, Stasson, Ono, & Zimmerman, 1988) that the
critical fourth voter in six-person mock juries evenly divided between guilty- and not-guilty-inclined
jurors (3, 3) were significantly influenced by the preceding sequence (guilty or not-guilty faction
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voting first) and timing of a straw poll. Results implied that both procedural variables would have an
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effect on jury verdict distributions, but their magnitude was surprisingly low, especially for sequence.
Experiment 2 focused only on sequential voting in (4,2) groups in which sequential voting by major-
ity-minority factions first was again observed to influence critical individuals, although the effect was
sharply mediated by the "leniency bias." The additional empirical parameter estimates permitted a
more comprehensive exploration of probable verdict consequences. Results showed that group-level
decisions, under the particular conditions studied, remained counterintuitively robust against sig-
nificant social influence pressures observed at the individual level, and familiar from numerous
studies of conformity and minority influence. Discussion emphasized conceptual hazards associated
with inferring group-level actions from individual member behavior.

The importance of the social mechanics whereby interper-
sonal interaction is managed during group consensus seeking
can be documented in part by the existence of fixed procedures
and rules for many formally constituted groups. Some of these
decision-making bodies use general standards (e.g., "Roberts
Rules of Order"), while others, including courtroom trials, have
their own particular guidelines (e.g., see Carrington & Babcock,
1977; Cound, Friedenthal, & Miller, 1974). However, most
group decision environments are necessarily mixtures of for-
mal and informal, norm-dependent consensus management
mechanisms.
The importance of procedural mechanisms seems especially
evident in group decision environments for which social im-
plications are important, members initially possess disparate
decision preferences, potential conflict accompanies the search
for agreement, and member concern about outcomes is substan-
tial. Petit juries, tenure committees, resource allocation panels,
legislative study commissions, and promotion boards are but a
few of the societal referents that come easily to mind—groups
whose deliberations are important and sensitive, perhaps in-
tense, and thus subject to considerable concern about proce-
dural fairness. While each such group is typically unique and
devoted to acting in confidence, the consensus management
mechanisms are well known and can be studied systematically
Portions of this work were completed while James H. Davis was a
Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.
Special gratitude is due for financial support provided by National Sci-
ence Foundation Grant BNS-8700864.
Tatsuya Kameda is now at the University of Tokyo, and Mark Stasson
is now at Virginia Commonwealth University.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to James
H. Davis, Department of Psychology, University of Illinois, 603 East
Daniel Street, Champaign, Illinois 61820.
in one way or another. For example, the need to manage the
expression of members' decision preferences is common to vir-
tually all consensus-seeking groups. The effects of different pro-
cedures for regulating opinion publication, aggregation, and so
forth are, with a few exceptions, generally unstudied, despite
their apparent importance.
Attention will be confined here to a widely used consensus
aid, the straw poll. While vocal expression or a show of hands
can be simultaneous, it is also possible to carry out a sequential,
member-by-member poll (sometimes called a "roll-call" vote).
The two procedures have quite different implications, as will be
shown. A poll can be taken by name, order of seating, seniority,
or something else. The exact procedure may be specified for-
mally in advance, established during deliberation, or a preroga-
tive of a chair. Regardless of origin, it seems that the particular
form of polling (e.g., when and how the actual vote takes place)
has considerable potential for influencing member votes or po-
sitions. For example, it may be important to decide at what
point in the deliberation period a poll is called or allowed, and
with which member a roll call is to begin, given that everyone
does not vote simultaneously.
Polls and Individual Preferences
Recent research (Davis, Stasson, Ono, & Zimmerman, 1988)
has demonstrated that both the timing and the particular se-
quence of preceding roll-call votes (in contrast to a simulta-
neous show of hands) significantly influenced mock juror ver-
dict preferences during deliberation following a simulated trial.
More specifically, they found that the fourth voters in six-person
mock juries composed to be evenly divided (3,3) between mem-
bers inclined to vote guilty (G) and not guilty (NG) were influ-
enced by the preceding faction's votes. Moreover, guilty sayers
were more likely to be influenced (by a prior not-guilty se-
quence; NG NG NG, G G G) than were not-guilty sayers (by a

1000
 SOCIAL MECHANICS-GROUP DECISION
preceding guilty sequence; G G G, NG NG NG). This asymme-
try in interpersonal influence is similar to the "leniency bias"
(MacCoun & Kerr, 1988) that apparently reflects a "defendant
protection norm" (Davis, Stasser, Spitzer, & Holt, 1976); not-
guilty majorities have greater power than guilty majorities in
establishing group-level consensus. However, Davis et al. (1988)
found that this directional bias observed in individual opinion
change, although consistent with widely shared cultural norms
that value the two types of errors differently (e.g., "better that
the guilty be acquitted than the innocent be convicted"), was
sensitive to vote timing (viz., whether a poll was taken early or
late in the discussion period). Counternormative preference
change (not guilty to guilty) was fairly likely at an early poll in
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response to a contrary preceding sequence, but was not ob-
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served to occur later, suggesting perhaps that discussion had in-
creased norm salience and an awareness of contrary opinions.
However, norm-consistent change (guilty to not guilty) was
more likely later than earlier, again suggesting the importance
of normative factors that may have been emphasized in discus-
Group-Level Decisions
Variables observed to affect individual cognitive and social
behavior are often regarded as similarly influencing group level
behavior—even to the point of direct extrapolation of research
results from the former to the latter. (See Davis, Bray, & Holt,
1977, for relevant examples in which empirical phenomena ob-
served in jurors were routinely inferred to characterize juries.)
The general conceptual problems associated with such infer-
ences and the theoretical issues involved in predicting group
outcomes from individual performance have been discussed
elsewhere (e.g., Davis, 1982). It is sufficient here to note that
intuitive individual-to-group extrapolations can be seriously in
error when railing to recognize the contribution of interper-
sonal interaction on further member opinion change and the
effects of only the vote aggregation rule on final group out-
comes. The obvious solution, to investigate groups directly,
runs into the difficulty that r-person groups, in contrast to indi-
viduals, increase the required number of subjects by a factor of
r, subjects are expensive, and in many ways.
Group-level verdict distributions were predicted (Davis et al.,
1988) within each of the four straw poll conditions formed by
early-late polling and guilty-not guilty initial sequences using
a version of the Social Decision Scheme Model (Davis, 1973,
1982). Also, data-guided assumptions about the way six-person
groups composed of members that were evenly divided between
guilty and not guilty, respectively (r, , r 2 ) = (3, 3), changed as a
result of the experimental manipulations. Predictions indeed
varied substantially with individual input from each sequence-
timing condition, but group decisions observed subsequently
were less variable and agreed poorly with predictions. Available
data were not sufficient to clarify whether subsequent discus-
sion attenuated the straw poll effects; assumptions were incor-
rect concerning the subsequently forming distinguishable dis-
tributions of preferences (e.g., (4, 2), (2, 4), etc.); or the magni-
tude of individual-level effects was, after all, simply insufficient
to produce much group level consequence.
In general, intuition alone is rarely able to establish whether
opinion change among individual members is of significant
1001
magnitude, or manifest at all, at the group consensus level; a
great many social phenomena can intervene. For example, Tin-
dale and Nagao (1986) showed that relatively small opinion-
biasing effects arising from juror selection procedures had a sur-
prisingly strong potential for influencing jury outcomes (i.e.,
exaggerating rather than moderating the consequences of group
interaction).
Overview
Experiment 1 reported below is a simulation using a varia-
tion of the Social Decision Scheme Model (Davis, 1973, 1982;
and see Stasser, Kerr, & Davis, in press) that presents an im-
proved, less constrained model for extrapolating from the indi-
vidual results reported by Davis et al. (1988) to general group
decision making and illustrates how a thought experiment can
be useful in addressing such extrapolation problems, encum-
bered as they so often are by sparse data. (See Davis & Kerr,
1986, for a discussion of inference problems associated with
the limited data typically available from group decision-making
studies, and selected examples of thought experiments as an aid
to generalization in such environments.) Experiment 2 was de-
signed to replicate Davis et al. (1988) in part and to extend the
earlier research to groups unevenly divided at the outset; a (4,
2) opinion distribution was included in Experiment 2 in order
to address the notion of both majority and minority factions
in connection with the effects of sequential polling procedures
studied earlier.
(Thought) Experiment 1
In general, an r-person group must choose among A 1( A 2 ,
. . . , A, mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternatives. There
are ra = C(n + r - 1; r) = (n + r - 1 )\/r\(n - 1)! distinguishable
ways that members (who are not distinguishable otherwise) can
array themselves over the n distinguishable decision alterna-
tives. (That is, m is the number of (n + r - 1) things taken rat a
time, and! denotes a factorial.) The value of m increases rapidly
with n and r, and the prospect of adequate samples for actual
empirical study of each distinguishable distribution quickly di-
minishes. (If we were to treat people as also distinguishable, i.e.,
keep track of particular individuals as well as alternatives, then
the number of possible distributions is even larger, namely, if.)
For example, even if we restrict ourselves to r = 6 and n = 1,
there are still m = 7 distinguishable distributions. If each of
these arrays of opinion were for some reason equally likely, the
probability, TT,, of the j'th array is 1/m. If groups are formed
randomly, v, = C(r, rn, ra)p,'n Pin, a binomial probability,
where p = (pt, p2) is the probability of guilty and not guilty
votes, respectively, for individuals, and (r^, ra) is the rth distin-
guishable distribution of members preferring guilty and not
guilty, respectively. For example, suppose that the guilt prefer-
ence distribution for individuals is p = (.80, .20); then for the
former case, JT/ = 1/7 = . 143, for all ;'; and, for the latter case, u-,
varies with i—for example, tr4 = P(3, 3) = .082, a fairly rare
distinguishable distribution. If the research sample contains 25
replicates of a six-person mock jury, 6(25) = 150 total subjects
would be required; however, the expected number of groups
with a particular opinion distribution would only be T,(25). For
the important (3,3) distribution, ir4(25) = .082(25) « 2 for the
 1002 DAVIS, KAMEDA, PARKS, STASSON, ZIMMERMAN

Table 1
Relative Frequencies of Opinion Changes for Group Members in Different Positions of the
Voting Sequences for Different Experimental Conditions (Sequence Order and Vote Timing)

Member position in sequence

First three Critical fourth Last two

Experimental x, X2 yi y-L Z2
condition (G) (NG) (G) (NG) (G) (NG)

Guilty first
Early .846 .154 .316 .684 .050 .950
Late .442 .558 .000 1.000 .059 .941
Not guilty first
Early
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.050 .950 .733 .267 .846 .154

Late
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.059 .941 .467 .533 .442 .558

Note. Adapted from Davis, Stasson, Ono, and Zimmerman (1988).

randomly sampled case, and .143(25) ss 4 for the equiprobable
case. Obviously, the sample size for any one array of opinion
can be perilously small, although the total number of subjects
is large by usual behavioral research standards. Indeed, Davis
et al. (1988) composed groups with just the (3, 3) distribution
to focus available subjects specifically on that opinion array—a
preference distribution in which a single preference change
could produce majority-minority factions.
Now, guided by empirical estimates of individual opinion
change under the conditions of the earlier study (the straw poll
sequence and timing manipulations described above), we pro-
pose to explore group-level outcomes by predicting consensus
verdicts under various plausible assumptions about the nature
of the subsequent consensus process. We will restrict our atten-
tion for now to the potential voting sequences (G G G, NG NG
NG) and (NG NG NG, G G G) that possess an obvious special
interest from among the 26 = 64 that are possible. We will con-
sider the two sequences to be separate cases, and will treat first
one and then the other. (A more general model would include
the possibility that different conditions might produce se-
quences with different probabilities, and define a probability
distribution across the possible voting sequences. We will not
develop that possibility here, but note in passing that for such a
model IT, would no longer be a binomial probability.)
We assume for now that the (r 4i , rn) = (3, 3) distinguishable
distribution is a special case such that a sequential poll is taken
for this opinion distribution, but for no other. (Frustration and
attempts to break a deadlock revealed in discussion might moti-
vate such a procedure for this preference distribution.) Thus,
in the (3,3) case we have a public poll that influences individual
opinion change, but acts differently on guilty and not-guilty say-
ers. More specifically, in groups where a sequential poll is taken,
the differently inclined fourth voters change at a special rate,
depending on whether a guilty or not-guilty sequence precedes
them, as well as with the timing of the poll. The other members
(three initial voters with a different initial preference and two
succeeding voters with an initial preference similar to the criti-
cal voter) are assumed to change at the rates of their respective
preference sayers who vote simultaneously. Obviously, these are
minimal working assumptions consistent with the poll-induced
preference changes observed (Davis et al., 1988) to date among
individual voters; no data are yet available on other initial pref-
erence distributions.
Method
Transition probabilities. It is possible to formulate the foregoing no-
tions of interpersonally induced opinion change as transitions of groups
from one state (opinion distribution) to another—more specifically, as
the following transition matrix, S. (See Davis et al., 1976; Kerr, 1982;
and Stasser & Davis, 1981, for discussions of transition matrices rele-
vant to this application.)
(6,0) (5,1) (4,2) (3,3) (2,4) (1,5) (0,6)
(6,0) ' 1.0
(5,1) 1.0
c _ (4, 2) 1.0
S
~(3,3) •S4S
(2,4) 1.0
(1,5) 1.0
(0,6)
(1)
where [i,3] is the probability of a group moving from the ith (pre-poll)
to/lh (post-poll) state (distinguishable distribution), and Z,[ss] = 1.00.
For example, the probability of a group moving from a (3,3) state to (5,
1) is [s,2], the i/th entry of S. (For convenience, blank entries are .00.)
The entries of S have been fixed by hypothesis, except for the row vector,
s*. = (S4i,*«, • • .,.547), which must be estimated. The data set currently
available to provide empirical guidance is in the form of a one-time,
member-by-member poll that may be conditioned on a member's pri-
vate, posttrial vote that had been taken earlier. These data, given in Ta-
ble 1, are from Davis et al. (1988), but are arrayed differently than in the
original report. The values reported in Table 1 are estimates (observed
relative frequencies) of three categories of conditional probabilities
available from that study: (a) The probability, Xi, of a guilty vote by a
member of the initial segment (voters 1,2, and 3), given an initial prefer-
ence of guilty (and x2 = 1 - x,); (b) the probability, y,, of a guilty vote
by the critical fourth voter, given an initial preference of not guilty (and
yi = 1 - y<); and (c) the probability, z,, of a guilty vote by a member of
the final segment (voters 5 and 6), given an initial preference of not
guilty (and z2 = 1 - z,). While the foregoing obviously applies to the
guilty-first sequence (G G G, NG NG NG), the same rationale applies
to the reflection (NG NG NG, G G G), the not-guilty-first sequence.
Estimates of the raw vector s< from S (Equation I) were obtained
from the assumptions discussed earlier and by noting the following. Ob-
 SOCIAL MECHANICS-GROUP DECISION 1003

Table 2
Estimates of Transition Probabilities from (3, 3) to All Other States
for Each of Several Polling Conditions

Entries in s4> from S

condition (6,0) (5,1) (4,2) (3,3) (2,4) (1,5) (0,6)

Guilty first
Early .000 .019 .223 .491 .225 .038 .002
Late .000 .000 .011 .114 .336 .384 .154
Not guilty first
Early .000 .004 .074 .502 .339 .075 .005
Late .000 .001 .018 .132 .344 .366 .138

Note. Calculated from data reported by Davis, Stasson, Ono, and Zimmerman (1988).
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serve that (a) (3,0), (2,1), (1,2), and (0,3) are the four possible opinion
outcomes for the initial segment members, following the poll; (b) (1,0)
and (0, 1) are the same for the fourth member, and (c) (2, 0), (1, I),
and (0, 2) are the same for the remaining final segment members. The
probabilities of each state occurring within each of the three categories
are given by the binomial probabilities,
1 1st seg.] =
= I rkl , ria\x,'t\x^^
where the sum is taken over all terms for which (ru, r H ) + (r w , r«) +
('ii, rn) = dji, 02). (A fully comprehensive treatment would, of course,
generalize Equation 3 for all s,y, i, j = 1, 2, , . . , m, and for all « and
r, but such a development is better guided by at least some additional
parameter estimates from further polling observations, using additional
opinion arrays, such as Experiment 2 below.)
Group decision. For randomly assembled /--person juries, the initial
probability vector, »0 = (TTO, , ir02 *m), for describing the probabil-
(2a) ity of occurrence of the initial distinguishable distributions of guilt pref-
erences, (r, 0), (r,, r - r,),..., (0, r) may be obtained from

it. subj.] (2b)

(4)

n , ra I final seg.] = I rn , ra jr,rnz/o. (2c)

Finally, we may note that the probability of going from (3, 3) to (fy ,
'li>J= 1,2, ...,m = 7, is the sum of all of those terms that are products
of probabilities from Equations 2a, 2b, and 2c above, for which the cor-
responding elements of the coefficients sum to the elements of (rfl , fy).
That is, in general, the probability of the group moving from state (3,
3)to(r,,,r fl )isgivenby
(3)
for given values of p. Here, r = 6, and values of p will be assigned as
discussed below.
The post-poll vector, »», is calculated from
ir* (5)
where the entries of S are defined by Equation 1. (Recall that although
only the group initially distributed as (3, 3) was subject to straw poll
influences, those members could then change as provided by the transi-
tion matrix S.) The critical row vector, &,., in S was calculated using the
empirical estimates of (Xi, Xz), (y\, y-i), and (z,, z3) from Table 1 and
Equation 3. Results are given in Table 2.
The group verdict distribution is the vector P = (P,, P2, PI), repre-
senting the probabilities of guilty, not guilty, and hung outcomes, re-
spectively, and is given by

Tables
Idealized and Empirically Estimated Social Decision Scheme
Matrices for Six-Person Mock Juries

Distinguishable D2: Strong majority asymmetrical

distributions D,: Idealized 2/3 majority (observed)'

(6,0) ' 1.00 .00 .00 • - i.oo .00 .00 •

(5,1) 1.00 .00 .00 .82 .00 .18
(4,2) 1.00 .00 .00 .47 .11 .42
(3,3) .00 .00 1.00 .14 .00 .86
(2,4) .00 1.00 .00 .00 1.00 .00
(1,5) .00 1.00 .00 .00 1.00 .00
(0,6) . .00 1.00 .00 . . .00 1.00 .00 .

" From Davis, Holt, Spitzer, and Stasser (1981).

 1004 DAVIS, KAMEDA, PARKS, STASSON, ZIMMERMAN

1
3 MAJORITY. OTHER WISE HUNG(IDEAUZED)
i.oo
- G -1st, E A R L Y

' G -I" LATE

GUILTY NOT
GUILTY • N G - 1st, E A R L Y

0. «: CL
' NG -1st, LATE

I
o"

I
5 .50
%
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This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

HUNG
*

.00 50 100 .50 100 .50 100

INITIAL PROBABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL VOTING GUILTY, p,

"STRONG" MAJORITY. ASYMMETRICAL (OBSERVED EARLIER)

l.OO

GUILTY

I .50

HUNG

00 50 I 00 \ 00 50 1 00

INITIAL PROBABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL VOTING GUILTY, p,

Figure 1. Simulations showing the probability of an outcome (conviction, acquittal, and hung) as a function
of the probability that an individual votes for guilty. (Juries in the top panels are assumed to operate on the
idealized notion of consensus established by a two-thirds majority [otherwise hung], and in the bottom
 SOCIAL MECHANICS-GROUP DECISION 1005

P = »*D, as well as the asymmetry described earlier. The latter necessar-

= iroSD, (6)
where D is the social decision scheme matrix that summarizes the con-
sensus process as an array of conditional probabilities. The yth entry is
the conditional probability, [rfj,], that the group will choose or experi-
ence the jth outcome, given the ith distinguishable distribution at the
time of action. The stochastic matrix, D, may be denned a priori by
theory or some conjecture from conventional wisdom, or estimated
from data in rare circumstances. (See Davis, 1973,1982; and Stasser et
al., in press, for a more detailed discussion of this general approach.)
Two different social decision scheme matrices were used for the illus-
tration at hand: One is a typical idealized (two thirds) majority rule
from conventional wisdom and has been used in previous research; the
other was estimated empirically by Davis, Holt, Spitzer, and Stasser
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This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
ily includes any biases and asymmetries, norm-governed or oth-
erwise, that characterize actual interpersonal behavior. As far
as we know, Figure 2 is the first picture of the overall, systematic
implications of the leniency bias for consensus decisions, pro-
jected over the full range of individual guilt preference, .00 ^
p, & 1.00.
The overall effects of straw polling in (3,3) groups are partic-
ularly evident in the middle panels, displaying acquittal proba-
bilities, and only to a slightly lesser extent in the panels showing
the hung distributions. Poll timing, and to a lesser extent se-
quence, appear to play a role in final outcomes over a wide range
of juror guilt preferences, assuming the poll to be decisive. That
is, considering randomly assembled juries as a whole (aimed at

(1981), and shows the asymmetry ("leniency bias") characteristic of the achieving the widely sought cross-section of the community),
defendant protection norm, as discussed earlier. Both are theoretically but assuming that only the evenly divided groups take polls with
interesting in that the idealized version captures what laymen and pro- the effects observed in earlier samples, the likelihood of acquit-
fessionals alike mean by a (2/3) majority rule, and the estimated version tal is quite different, depending on the timing and, to a lesser
reflects, within sampling error, the less tidy character of empirical
extent, poll sequence. A guilty-first voting sequence taken early
events within the given context (see Table 3).
seems particularly likely to create a different climate and even-
tual outcome than a not-guilty-first sequence occurring later. In
Results general, the timing factor apparently has a substantial influence,
and interacts with the particular sequence (i.e., guilty or not
Transition probabilities. The direct implications for faction
guilty). Such effects are perhaps most striking in the bottom
change of the straw polling results we have been discussing are
half of Figure 1; the asymmetry of the curves portrayed there
suggested by inspection of Table 2. There is an evident tendency
reflects the effects of the leniency bias at the consensus level,
for early-polled juries to remain evenly divided (a tendency even
since the entries of D used here (see Table 3) were actually esti-
more marked when the not-guilty sayers go first), but for later
mated from observed data. Timing and sequence effects are
polled juries to redistribute themselves, especially in the direc-
most evident in the not guilty and hung panels. Note too that
tion of leniency. Such a display is a useful aid to inferring cons-
the locus of effects in the first two panels is in the region where
quences of the results reported by Davis et al. (1988) and re-
p, < .50—that is, where there is relatively little sentiment for a
summarized in Table 1. However, implications for group-level
guilty verdict among jurors; however, the probability of a hung
decisions are the focus, and we thus turn to predictions (simula-
jury, and large effects due to timing or sequence, is highest when
tions) of final outcome distributions.
p, £ .50, and these effects show a pronounced asymmetry in
Outcome distributions. The outcome consequences of the
the hung panel.
straw polling in evenly split groups (i.e., (3, 3) arrays) were eval-
It is important to recall that the preceding results were gener-
uated over all values of p = (p,, P2), substituting opinion change
ated from relatively simple interpersonal process assumptions
estimates from each experimental condition (Table 2) appropri-
that are only occasionally exactly correct in practice—in partic-
ately in S, and calculating P from Equation 6. The results (ver-
ular, that only (3, 3) divided groups take polls. Jury verdict pre-
dict distributions, given separately for conviction, acquittal,
dictions as outlined here may thus be underestimates of effects
and hung outcomes) are presented as a function of p,, the prob-
from the polling variables we have considered. Consequently, it
ability of an individual preferring a guilty verdict in Figure 1;
is important to replace assumptions about other distinguish-
the role of the two rather different social decision scheme matri-
able distributions with estimates from empirical data where
ces (given earlier in Table 3) can be assessed by comparing the
possible.
upper and lower panels of Figure 1. The results of Figure 1 can
be contrasted with expected verdict distributions without the
intervening straw poll effects in the (3, 3) groups (i.e., P = ir<>D),
which are displayed in Figure 2.
Experiment 2
The graphs of Figure 2 provide a baseline that shows verdict
projections as before, but for juries that did not take polls. Experiment 2 was designed to provide information about the
Moreover, inspection of Figure 2 permits direct comparison of effects of sequential polling in groups with unequal opinion fac-
expected effects due to the tidy, idealized notions of "majority tions at the outset, under conditions described earlier—video
rules" from conventional wisdom with the untidy observed presentation of an assault trial and six-person mock juries in
"majorities" that show less-than-perfect power over minorities which a straw poll was taken during deliberation. However,

panels juries are assumed to follow an asymmetrical and imperfect majority scheme estimated from earlier
research data [see Table 3], The various graphs were calculated using parameter estimates from various
experimental conditions reported by Davis, Stasson, Ono, and Zimmerman [1988], and the model de-
scribed in Experiment 1.)
 DAVIS, KAMEDA, PARKS, STASSON, ZIMMERMAN

NOT • IDEAL'il
MAJORITY
GUILTY
'OBSERVED
ESTIMATE

HUNG
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1.00 .50 I i)0

INITIAL PROBABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL VOTING GUILTY, p,

Figure 2. Simulations showing the probability of an outcome (conviction, acquittal, and hung) as a function
of the probability that an individual votes for guilty. (Graphs show the simple effects of the two social
decision schemes [Table 3, idealized and estimated], without other influences.)

sample sizes needed for parameter estimation again discour-
aged exhaustive study of all possible distinguishable distribu-
tions over all possible timing and sequence manipulations. (For
similar reasons, conditions in which groups took no polls at all
were not included, restricting comparisons to sequence effects
against the baseline of simultaneously voting members.) More-
over, groups that are not evenly divided necessarily increase
subject demands dramatically, if voting sequences in both direc-
tions were to be exhaustively studied after the fashion of (3, 3)
groups in Davis et al. (1988).' Thus, we elected to explore only
one polling time (early), and only the guilty-majority distribu-
tion, (4, 2), largely because of the importance one must attach
to its potential for inducing counternormative opinion change
(relative to the normatively more powerful (2, 4), not-guilty-
majority array), as discussed in connection with the leniency
bias. However, voting sequences in both directions were in-
cluded; that is, either the majority saying guilty voted first, or
the minority saying not guilty voted first. Necessarily, a corre-
sponding condition in which members of (4, 2) groups voted
simultaneously was also included. The use of the early, in con-
trast to the late, timing for the poll not only allowed exploration
of conditions favorable to the normatively less acceptable deci-
sion, but had produced the less powerful effects in the earlier
study—a conservative strategy.
As described above, there exist ample empirical and concep-
tual reasons to anticipate majority influence on the fifth voter
in the sequence (G G G G, NG NG). However, the opposite
sequence (NG NG, G G G G) is also of interest here. Minority
influence might also be enhanced by sequential voting in which
the minority is first, in contrast to simultaneous voting. In fact,
it seems that studies in the "minority influence" tradition have
routinely used sequential voting within a poll, with the minor-
ity members rating colors prior to the majority members rating
the same stimuli (Doms, 1983). (Originally, Moscovici &
Faucheux, 1972, stressed the role of consistency and resolute-
ness of judgments by a minority over several trials (polls) in
influencing majority members' judgments. Subsequently, mi-
nority influence notions were developed into a more elaborate
conception with societal and political implications; for exam-
ple, see Mugny, 1980, and Moscovici & Mugny, 1983, for im-
portant discussions of such phenomena as the role of minorities
in innovation.) Our interest was confined strictly to factions de-
fined by verdict preference; no personal or social qualities were
1
More specifically, if the voting sequence for both four-person major-
ities (4, 2) and (2, 4) were to be manipulated such that both possible
(consistent) sequences for each distinguishable distribution were to be
studied, there would not be two experimental conditions as in the (3,3)
groups (G G G, NG NG NG and NG NG NG, G G G), but rather/our
sequence conditions: (G G G G, NG NG) and (G G, NG NG NG NG),
and (NG NG NG NG, G G) and (G G, NG NG NG NG). In passing, it
is worth noting that an exhaustive investigation of all consistent se-
quences for all distinguishable distributions would require (12)(6)
X (25) = 1,800 subjects, allowing only 25 replicates for each sequence,
and a modest requirement of two experimental conditions (e.g., early
and late timing of a poll) would increase subject requirements to 3,600.
A truly comprehensive study of all possible voting sequences in six-
person groups in each of only two experimental conditions, a sample
of only 25 replicates for each sequence, would require (26X25X6X2) =
19,200 subjects.
 SOCIAL MECHANICS-GROUP DECISION
attributed to a minority faction beyond those associated with
deliberation and votes.
To provide a benchmark, the design of Experiment 2 allowed
the replication of at least some findings from Davis et a). (1988).
Thus, simultaneous-voting and (3, 3) guilty-first sequence con-
ditions were included.
Method
Subjects and design. A total of 780 students (333 males and 447
females) enrolled in an introductory social psychology course partici-
pated as part of a class exercise. Each subject served for slightly less than
an hour on each of two occasions, 2 days apart.
The design was an incomplete factorial, 2 [Polling: Simultaneous and
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Sequential] X 2 [Composition: (4,2) and (3, 3,)], where (G G G G, NG
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
NG) and (NG NG, G G G G) sequences were nested under the (4, 2)
composition; (G G G, NG NG NG) was the only sequence nested under
the (3, 3) composition. This set of group compositions and sequences
was selected because of its potential for allowing at least partial replica-
tion of earlier findings and for extending to theoretically interesting
cases the range of parameters actually estimated from empirical data.
Of course, other composition-sequence conditions are interesting, but
the number of subjects that would have been required seriously con-
strained the number of experimental conditions.
Materials and procedure. The mock trial of a defendant accused of
assault with intent to kill (used earlier by Davis et al., 1988) occupied
about 25 min of the first session. After viewing the videotape, including
the judge's charge (Illinois pattern instructions), each subject assumed
the role of a juror, and responded privately to a questionnaire requesting
(a) a listing of information important to a personal guilt preference
(open ended); (b) a guilty-not guilty decision; (c) a judgment of cer-
tainty about the preference (7-point scale); and (d) an estimate of the
likelihood that the defendant was actually guilty, 0 % , . . . , 100%. (Items
(a) and (d) stimulated subject interest but provided no additional infor-
mation; these data were not analyzed further.)
Prior to the second session, 2 days later, subjects were randomly as-
signed to groups, subject to the composition constraint—(4,2) and (3,
3). Subjects left over were asked to respond privately and individually a
second time. (However, it is important to remember that the latter sam-
ple was now hardly a random assembly of individuals. Raw guilt rates
were thus not interpretable, but change rates were unconfounded.) As
many as 20 to 40 subjects viewed the videotape at the first session, and
served as the pool for the second session. The use of separate and inde-
pendent laboratory suites and experimenters at the second session pre-
cluded variations in the number of subjects studied at a session from
becoming a factor.
Shortly after being seated and instructed by means of an intercom on
the second occasion, each jury was polled. The poll thus occurred prior
to discussion. In the simultaneous conditions each member voted, si-
multaneously, by holding up a card indicating guilty or not guilty. In the
sequential conditions, jurors were polled by seat number, one through
six. Although ostensibly seated at random, each person had been as-
signed a seat appropriate to the sequence for that experimental condi-
tion. In all cases, a member-by-member tally of votes was recorded by
the individual in seat number one, using a large sheet of paper affixed
to the wall.
Juries then deliberated to a unanimous decision, or were declared
hung if they were unable to reach a verdict by the end of the hour. Fi-
nally, each juror completed a postgroup questionnaire that contained
all of the items of the previous questionnaire, except the open-ended
questions, and included a variety of questions eliciting personal reac-
tions to the trial and other jurors. Variations in the number of groups
assigned to each experimental condition (see Table 4) were due to
chance events and not related to condition; 130 six-person groups
served in the study.
1007
Individuals who were not assigned to groups gave a personal opinion
after a brief period of reflection, and completed as many questionnaire
items as were applicable. Finally, all subjects in all conditions were de-
briefed, thanked, and dismissed.
Results and Discussion
Critical voters. The relative frequency of verdict preference
change was calculated for each critical voter (that member in
the straw poll sequence who was confronted with a consistent
string of contrary votes); these data, along with the change rates
among members voting simultaneously but occupying the same
seat in their respective groups, are reported in Table 4. It is evi-
dent by inspection that simultaneously voting members
changed little or not at all, essentially replicating similar find-
ings from the early poll in Davis et al. (1988). Both the (3, 3)
and (4, 2) simultaneously polling groups were fairly stable over
occasions, and the relatively small changes among the guilty and
not-guilty sayers in the (4,2) groups were approximately equal.
In all three sequential polling conditions the rate of change
among critical subjects exceeded that of corresponding subjects
who merely voted publicly in the simultaneous conditions. (Un-
derlines and asterisks in common are intended to facilitate com-
parisons within Table 4, described below.) First, note that the
critical (fourth) not-guilty sayers in the (3, 3) groups who were
preceded by guilty sayers changed votes (.294) significantly
more often (p = .011, Fisher's Exact Test) than their simulta-
neously voting counterparts (.000), essentially replicating the
early voters reported by Davis et al. (1988). Also, critical
(fourth) not-guilty-inclined voters in the (4, 2) groups changed
at the rate of. 188, substantially larger than the rate of their si-
multaneously voting counterparts, .034, a fairly improbable
chance difference (p — .068, Fisher's Exact Test).2 Moreover,
there is obviously no evidence from the data in Table 4 for an
increment in influence for four preceding voters in contrast to
three, and a somewhat smaller preference change rate for the
former is seemingly anomalous.3 The anomaly disappears with
refined samples, and the insignificant increment in influence of
three- over four-person majorities offers no support for the no-
tion of a monotonic increase in influence with majorities larger
than three (e.g., Gerard, Wilhelmy, & Conolley, 1968), although
such effects are likely to be context dependent to a degree.
The critical (third) voter in the (NG NG, G G G G) sequence
was significantly (p = .033, Fisher's Exact Test) influenced
2
However, when groups of inconsistent voters were removed (i.e., the
nine sequential groups and six simultaneous groups in which one or
more of the jurors did not vote as they had previously indicated), the
change rates for the critical voter in the remaining (consistent) groups
revealed an even larger, .261 and .000, respectively, and highly signifi-
cant difference (p = .011, Fisher's Exact lest). However, we chose not
to emphasize experimental samples refined in this way, since the more
robust approach was used initially by Davis, Stasson, Ono, and Zim-
merman (1988) in that their sample data were not purged of inconsis-
tent subjects.
' The use of refined samples in which inconsistent initial segment
voters had been purged (as described in Footnote 2) removed the anom-
alous result obtained with the raw samples reported in Table 4. That is,
the refined change rate of .231 for the critical voter in (G G G, NG NG
NG) was now marginally less than the corresponding value of .261 for
the critical voter in (G G G G, NG NG).
 1008 DAVIS, KAMEDA, PARKS, STASSON, ZIMMERMAN

Table 4
Relative Frequency of Preference Changes for Occupants of Critical
Seats in Each Experimental Condition

Experimental conditions

Simultaneous voting Sequential voting

GGG, GGG'G, GGG, GGGG, NGNG,

NGNGNG NGNG NGNGNG NGNG GGGG

.036*
.000 .034 .294 .188 .233
(22) (29) (17) (32) (30)

Note: The relative frequency of change pertains to the sequence member correspondingly underlined or
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asterisked in the column heading as appropriate. Sample sizes are in parentheses. In Davis et al. (1988) the
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baserate of simultaneous voters was estimated by pooling all of those who had initially voted in a similar
direction, whereas a more stringent baseline was used here—based only on the change occupants of the
same physical location (seat) as the critical subject in the sequential conditions.

(.233) to change verdict preference, in contrast to the rate of so closely replicated those reported in Davis et al. (1988), pa-
change among simultaneous voters (.036), and this change oc- rameter estimates from both studies were used without regard
curred after only two preceding contrary votes. Note that the to source, in order to base more cells of the transition matrix,
direction here is normatively consistent, whereas those opinion S, Equation 1, on actual empirical estimates than possible in
changes described in the preceding paragraph were counternor- Experiment 1 . Thus, imagine the case in which not only do (3,
mative (in the sense of moving against the defendant protection 3) groups take straw polls as before, but now the groups with
norm). Thus, notions of critical sequence size or the relative other distributions also poll, except for the unanimous groups
power of "local majorities-minorities" must be evaluated in (6, 0) and (0, 6). This new transition matrix, S, is given in Equa-
terms of social-normative factors in conjunction with task vari- tion 7. In applications to follow, S was calculated separately for
ables, and not simply on the basis of numbers of adherents, size guilty-first and not-guilty-first sequences.
of opposing factions, and so forth. Moscovici (1976) has made
(6,0) (5,1) (4,2) (3,3) (2,4) (1,5) (0,6)
much the same argument. Indeed, it may not be too strong to
(6,0)
suggest that much research and argument over the "conformity
(5,1) $25 £tt S27
effect," without qualification due to cultural, task, and immedi- c= (4,2) $32 «37
ate social-environmental factors, has caused much conceptual (3,3) S,2 S47

mischief over the years. (2,4)

Group action. The influence of interpersonal interaction on (1,5) •SS2 •563

individual member opinion, including position-publicizing (0,6)

procedures, is obviously an important object of study. Indeed,
most studies of majority (see Allen, 1965, 1975) and minority
influence (see Moscovici, Mugny, & Van Avermaet, 1985) focus
strictly on individual-level behavior, albeit in the midst of sev-
eral people. However, many groups exist primarily to make con-
sensus decisions (such as juries), and many, perhaps most, ex-
planations of why groups act as they do stress the individual
member's behavior and changes in member opinion during so-
cial interaction. (For example, see Dion, Baron, & Miller, 1970,
for theoretical accounts of choice shifts, a group-level phenome-
non, that exclusively emphasize changes in individual prefer-
ences.) Consequently, we undertook extrapolations of the pre-
ceding results to decision-making groups that potentially pos-
sessed a full range of possible opinions—that is, groups
composed randomly, with no constraints on faction size. How-
ever, unlike Experiment 1, where early and late pollings were
investigated separately, only the effects of an early polling were
pursued.
We assumed that critical members in the sequence changed
preference at the rates observed in Experiment 2, and members
of initial and final segments changed at the rate observed for
members with similar preferences voting simultaneously. Since
(early) opinion change rates for the (3, 3) groups observed here
(7)
The row vector, s4., remained the same as in Experiment 1,
but estimates of s2., . . . , 8 4 . were calculated using Equation 2,
and assumptions about conditions that were not directly inves-
tigated. Entries for s3. were calculated directly from the (4, 2)
conditions of this study, but were calculated indirectly for 85.
(the (2,4) states). That is, not-guilty-first savers in the (2,4) case
were assumed to be influential after the fashion of the leniency
bias documented earlier in that the initial segment, critical sub-
ject, and final segment change rates of (NG NG NG NG, G G)
were treated after the fashion of (NG NG NG, G G G) in the
(3, 3) condition and Table 1 (a 4:1 majority is as powerful as
a 3:1 majority); (G G, NG NG NG NG) was assumed to be
inefficacious (since a 2:1 majority is below the generally ac-
cepted majority threshold of three and is also in the counternor-
mative direction), leaving the group in the (2, 4) state. Finally,
the minority member of (5,1) guilty first was assumed to change
at the rate of the fifth member of the (4,2) guilty first discussed
above; however, the not-guilty-first sequence (NG, G G G G G)
was assumed inefficacious for obvious reasons, leaving the
group in the (5, 1) state. The (1,5) distribution similarly saw
the guilty first as ineffective, whereas the not-guilty-first groups
 SOCIAL MECHANICS-GROUP DECISION 1009

Table 5
Transition Matrices, S, for Guilty- and Not-Guilty-First Sequential Polls

From/to (6, 0) (5,1) (4,2) (3,3) (2,4) (1,5) (0,6)

Guilty first
(6,0) r i.ooo .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000"
(5,1) .081 .426 .347 .122 .022 .002 .001
(4,2) .005 .116 .478 .310 .090 .010 .000
(3,3) .000 .019 .223 .491 .225 .038 .002
(2,4) .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000
(1,5) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000
(0,6) L .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 J

Not guilty first

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(6,0) •i.ooo .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000-1

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(5,1) .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000

(4,2) .001 .045 .457 .368 .137 .015 .001
(3,3) .000 .004 .074 .502 .339 .075 .005
(2,4) .001 .001 .009 .111 .564 .283 .033
(1,5) .001 .001 .001 .016 .155 .622 .207
(0,6) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000.

were calculated to act like the (2, 4) not-guilty-first groups
above. The results are given in Table 5.
Extrapolations using the above assumptions and parameter
estimates were calculated over the range of individual input pos-
sible, .00 ^ PJ ^ 1.00, by means of Equations 4-7, and plotted
as a function of the probability of a guilty preference, p,. Re-
sults are displayed in Figure 3.
Inspection suggests that a guilty-first polling sequence can in-
deed be expected to produce guilty verdicts more frequently
than the reverse sequence, at least for the idealized majority,
which has no leniency bias to counter such a procedural influ-
ence. However, the effect is very small; indeed, the difference in
the two curves, regardless of direction, is very small everywhere.
Moreover, when the estimated social decision scheme showing
the leniency bias is included (lower panels of Figure 3), the
effect, if anything, is reversed. The differences in acquittal prob-
abilities between the two sequences are likewise surprisingly
small, and the region of maximum difference in all panels de-
pends on the particular region ofpi considered.
In short, the significant influence of polling sequence on indi-
vidual member preferences, which appeared intuitively to be
fairly substantial across two studies, does not have very large
projected effects at the level of group consensus. The magnitude
of individual opinion change seems approximately comparable
to results typically obtained in majority-minority influence
studies in which individual response sequence is so often an
integral but largely unemphasized element of experimental
technique. However, it seems that despite the apparent impor-
tance of such data at the individual level, the implications for
consensus decisions at the group level may not be so momen-
tous. The individual-group relationship is not straightforward.
Of course, the minimally interactive environment of typical
conformity and minority influence experiments are sufficiently
different from those used here that absolute comparisons are
hazardous.
Finally, there were no systematic differences between the two
factions evident to casual observers during interaction or at de-
briefing. Although experimental conditions precluded obtain-
ing more systematic observational data, earlier research (Davis
et al., 1988) reported that members, whether inclined to guilty
or not guilty, rated not-guilty sayers as significantly more per-
suasive than guilty sayers.
General Discussion
Phenomena associated with public change in an individual's
response (e.g., choice, preference, opinion, and judgment) are
of fundamental importance to many areas of social behavior
but especially relevant to understanding group consensus ac-
tions. Achievement of a consensus decision in an initially dispa-
rate group implies that some members have changed their opin-
ions or at least acquiesced (the operational distinction may of-
ten be ambiguous). The conditions that foster member
preference change have been accorded considerable attention,
and, indeed, most theoretical explanations of group decision
making have stressed the role of individual member position
change—as noted above for popular theoretical accounts of
choice shifts. While the content of discussion must generally
be accorded the major role in group member opinion change,
structural factors can also be influential. Indeed, the original
demonstrations by Asch(1956;see Allen, 1965,1975), showing
how a majority can influence a minority of one, were exciting
partly because of their simplicity; individual judgments were
public, but these groups did not interact otherwise. Similarly,
the demonstration that over time (judgment trials) a minority
under similarly minimal interaction conditions, and without a
consensus orientation, could influence members of a majority
completed the picture; reciprocal influence among factions was
now an obvious research focus, although reciprocity has always
been a necessary feature of task-oriented groups working to
achieve consensus. (See summaries of minority influence by
Moscovici & Faucheux, 1972; Moscovici & Mugny, 1983.)
The structural factor of interest here was a straw poll—a pro-
cedure for publicizing member preferences that, in general, can
take many different forms. Earlier research (Davis et al., 1988)
demonstrated that mock juries evenly divided (3, 3) between
 1010 DAVIS, KAMEDA, PARKS, STASSON, ZIMMERMAN

2/3 MAJORITY. OTHERWISE HUNG (IDEALIZED)

i.oo
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oo .50 1.00 .50 1.00 SO 1.00

INITIAL PROBABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL VOTING GUILTY, p,

"STRONG" MAJORITY, ASYMMETRICAL (OBSER VED EARLIER)

i oo _

HUNG

00 50 1 00 50 1.00 .50 I 00

INITIAL PROBABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL VOTING GUILTY, p,

Figure 3. Simulations showing the probability of an outcome (conviction, acquittal, and hung) as a function
of the probability that an individual votes for guilty. (Juries in the top panels are assumed to operate on the
idealized notion of consensus established by a two-thirds majority [otherwise hung], and in the bottom
 SOCIAL MECHANICS-GROUP DECISION
guilty and not-guilty preferences showed that not only are the
critical fourth voters significantly influenced by the preceding
sequence of differently inclined voters, but the effect is asym-
metric; the not-guilty sayers are more influential than the guilty
sayers, consistent with the leniency bias observed in consensus
decisions (MacCoun & Kerr, 1988). Moreover, the sequence
effect interacts with poll timing in a way that again suggests the
action of the defendant protection norm; social norms can be-
come salient during discussion, and thus are more likely to
guide actions later than earlier.
However, it is prudent to remember that expressed prefer-
ences, conversational musings, and so on are, like votes during
a straw poll, subject to various interpretations by observers and
other members alike. An expressed preference, or preference
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change, may be (a) insincere (a strategic calculation that is itself
designed to influence events); (b) sincere but highly unstable
(based on little or inaccurate information, confused reasoning,
etc.); (c) sincere and highly stable (a consequence of a well-de-
veloped cognitive structure, powerful motive, etc.); or (d) an ac-
cident, due to misunderstood instructions or the like. At pres-
ent, we have no means of distinguishing among the various pos-
sibilities, but must keep in mind that there is a certain
conceptual ambiguity associated with the public expression of
preference (and perhaps private positions as well). Although
characteristic of virtually all social research, the issue seems
especially salient in circumstances where the expression or vote
was admittedly made for information and not binding. Indeed,
the poll itself can become a mechanism for inducing change en
route to the final consensus—our major focus.
Experiment 1 extrapolated such findings to verdicts of ran-
domly formed juries but assumed that only the (3, 3) groups
took a poll (a procedural device that might aid in resolving an
apparent deadlock). The effects of both polling sequence and
timing were evident in the extrapolations, but polling sequence
produced a puzzlingly small effect. Since polling can arguably
arise in any divided group, Experiment 2 pursued two goals: (a)
the replication and extension of polling effects observed in
Davis et al. (1988); and (b) with these additional parameter esti-
mates, a more comprehensive extrapolation to randomly
formed groups that addressed all possible distinguishable distri-
butions of preferences. However, the huge sample sizes required
of exhaustive empirical parameter estimates dictated some con-
straints. Only guilty-first sequences in (3, 3) groups and both
sequences in (4, 2) groups were observed, along with simulta-
neously voting in (3, 3) and (4, 2) groups. Moreover, only an
early polling was used because of its potential for counternor-
mative influence, the most conceptually compelling option.
Findings for critical subjects were very similar to results from
our earlier research, even to the magnitude of change rates for
those conditions exactly replicated. Individual voting can be
significantly influenced by the preceding pattern of votes, and
the "magic number three," familiar from the Asch paradigm,
became "two" in the not-guilty-first (4,2) groups. Armed with
social value, normatively consistent sequences can apparently
panels juries are assumed to follow an asymmetrical and imperfect majority scheme estimated from earlier
research data [see Table 3]. The two graphs were calculated using parameter estimates from the data of
Experiment 2, and the more general model.)
1011
be shorter and still have influence comparable to longer, coun-
ternormative sequences.
The thought experiment extrapolating the polling results to
randomly formed groups (all group distributions possible) sug-
gested that the small effects of sequence at the group level, as
inferred by Davis et al. (1988) were not much enhanced by re-
laxing the constraint that only (3, 3) groups took polls. More-
over, it is intuitively likely that even much larger member change
rates would still produce relatively small sequence-related
differences at the group level. The small magnitudes evident in
Figure 3 for all pt are rather surprising final consequences of
what is a sizeable (and in other contexts widely celebrated)
effect at the level of individuals.
Once more, there is a clear demonstration that individual-
level results may not accurately forecast group outcomes. Un-
fortunately, the costly subject requirements of group research
create a serious obstacle to routine empirical verification of in-
ferences stimulated by data from individual subjects. One con-
sequence of this cost seems to have been the practice of re-
searching individuals on some question of interest and discuss-
ing the results in terms of group behavior, often with the
justification that groups "obey a majority principle anyway."
(See the review of empirical research on juries by Davis et al.,
1977, for examples of this tendency to treat results from jurors
as directly applicable to juries, including counterintuitive re-
sults from familiar majority decision processes.)
Part of the problem is that combinatorial processes (such as
those that underlie the pooling and aggregating of member pref-
erences, solutions, votes, etc.) are difficult to treat by informal
inferences; counterintuitive outcomes are commonplace.
Clearly, the need for empirical research on groups is unlikely to
abate, and the subject costs associated with adequate samples
are unlikely to decline. In the end, there can be no substitute
for data, but thought experiments like those reported here can
aid in evaluating empirical results; data gathered from individ-
uals were informative but potentially misleading without fur-
ther exploration of implications through simulation. (See Davis
& Kerr, 1986, for a more extensive discussion of thought experi-
ments.)
Finally, it is perhaps important to emphasize the value of
group consensus processes being fairly resistant to procedural
perturbations of the sort studied here, such as conformity pres-
sures (while recognizing that even the modest effects displayed
in Figure 3 may be judged non-negligible in some contexts).
After numerous reports of group problem-solving inefficiency,
group susceptibility to various decision-making biases, and the
like (see summaries by Davis, 1969, 1982), a heretofore unsus-
pected robustness against certain procedural influences during
group consensus achievement is heartening. Of course, it is im-
portant to keep in mind that we have considered only a few of
the possibilities here, namely consistent sequences of two, three,
or four in only a few faction orders. Further work that addresses
more or even all of the 26 possible sequences of six-person voters
should provide a better appreciation of sequence effects.
 1012 DAVIS, KAMEDA, PARKS, STASSON, ZIMMERMAN
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Received December 14, 1988
Revision received June 19, 1989
Accepted June 20, 1989 •