SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 255262. January 18, 2023.]

ALDRIN TORRES y DAVID , petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Special First Division, issued a
Resolution dated January 18, 2023 which reads as follows: HTcADC

"G.R. No. 255262 (Aldrin Torres y David vs. People of the

Philippines). — This is an Appeal by Certiorari 1 seeking to reverse and set
aside the October 4, 2019 Decision 2 and the January 15, 2021 Resolution 3
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 41989. In that case, the CA
affirmed the March 23, 2018 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 134 (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 15-1566 finding Aldrin Torres y
David (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 9
(f) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8484, 5 otherwise known as the Access Devices
Regulation Act of 1998.
The Antecedents
On May 6, 2015, petitioner was charged with violation of Sec. 9 (f) of
R.A. No. 8484 in an Information which reads:
On the 4th of May 2015, in the City of Makati, the Philippines,
accused not being in the business or employment that deals with the
manufacture, issuance or distribution of access device-making or
altering equipment, with intent to defraud, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without authority of law,
possess[,] have in his custody and control one piece of an
unauthorized pin pad cover with improvised camera and an
unauthorized card reader slot, a skimming device containing a card
[reader] with memory storage capability, with intent to defraud, in
violation of the aforesaid law and to the damage and prejudice of
complainant Bank of the [Philippine Islands].
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
During arraignment on May 19, 2015, petitioner pleaded not guilty to
the said charge. 7 After pre-trial was terminated, trial on the merits ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
As synthesized by the CA, the version of the prosecution is as follows:
On May 4, 2015, at around 4:13 in the morning, the security
personnel of the 7th Security and Investigation Service, Inc. (7th
Security, for brevity), the agency providing security services for the
Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI, for brevity), received a phone call
 from the BPI Security Operations Center (BPI-SOC, for brevity)
informing them about the presence of a skimming device at the BPI
Automated Teller Machine (ATM, for brevity) situated in the SGV
Building II, along Ayala Avenue, Makati City. At once, 7th Security's
personnel, consisting [of] Bonifacio T. Rosales (Rosales, for brevity),
Freddie T. Cabatauan (Freddie, for brevity), Pacifico A. Alpes (Alpes,
for brevity), Segundo S. Favila (Favila, for brevity), Orlando T.
Cabatauan (Orlando, for brevity) and Leopoldo R. Caluya (Caluya, for
brevity), proceeded to the location of the ATM and conducted a
surveillance in the area.
CAIHTE

At around 6:20 in the morning on the same day, after more or

less two (2) hours of surveillance, Torres arrived and transacted with
the said ATM. While using the ATM, Rosales and his companions
noticed that Torres behaved suspiciously as he kept looking around
as if to check if he was being watched. Shortly thereafter, Torres
removed the card reader and the Personal Identification Number (PIN,
for brevity) pad cover, with an attached camera (skimming devices,
for brevity) from the ATM and exited the booth.
As Torres stepped outside the booth, he was seen by Rosales
and company carrying the said skimming devices. As he was in the
act of putting the PIN pad cover inside his bag, Rosales approached
Torres and informed the latter that they (Rosales and his colleagues)
were members of the Rapid Deployment Force of BPI. Thereafter,
Rosales restrained Torres and placed him under citizen's arrest for
violation of RA 8484. However, Torres resisted his arrest and
struggled to get free, which caused the card reader to be dislodged
from his hand and his bag containing the PIN pad cover to fall on the
floor. It was at this point that Rosales and company took possession
of the skimming devices and held on to them until the police arrived
at the scene.
Thereafter, an inventory was conducted and Torres was brought
to the Anti-Fraud and Commercial Crimes Unit (AFCCU, for brevity) of
the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG, for brevity) in
Camp Crame, Quezon City, Metro Manila. There, the card reader, PIN
pad cover with camera, and the bag of Torres were all turned-over to
the authorities. Subsequently, the abovementioned Information was
filed against Torres. 8
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, the version of the defense, as summarized by the
CA, is as follows:
Torres claims that he is a project-based employee of the
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT, for brevity) and that
he resides in San [Antonio] Village, Makati City. Accordingly, he works
at the second (2nd) floor of the Ramon Cojuangco Building, along
Makati Avenue, Makati City.
On May 4, 2015, at around 6:20 in the morning, Torres, while
on the way to work, alighted from a passenger jeepney in front of the
SGV Building II, along Ayala Avenue, Makati City, in order to withdraw
money from the BPI ATM booth located therein. aScITE

As he inserted his ATM card in one of the ATMs, Torres noticed

 that the card reader thereof was wobbly and loose. Concerned of the
machine's condition, Torres began surveying the area for any
personnel of BPI or someone to whom he could report the matter.
However, as it was still early in the day, Torres was not able to find
anyone. Despite this, Torres then went on with his transaction. As he
was waiting for his cash to be dispensed, he noticed a suspicious man
outside the ATM booth who was squatting and looking intently at him.
After the shady individual noticed that Torres was also looking at him,
the former then made a hand-signal and stood up.
After his ATM card was ejected by the machine, Torres noticed
that an object, which he would later on discover to be a skimming
device, fell off from the card reader slot of the ATM. Apprehensive
that the information obtained by the dislodged skimming device
would be used by the persons who installed the same, to the
prejudice of other bank customers and himself, Torres picked up the
card reader slot, went out of the ATM booth and approached the
security guard stationed at the entrance of the SGV Building II
entrance (sic) in order to report the incident. However, before
reaching the SGV security guard, he came across one of the
personnel of 7th Security, who asked him regarding the identity of the
object he was carrying. Torres then realized that the said individual
was the same suspicious person who kept on looking at him while he
was withdrawing from the ATM. Torres would eventually identify the
said man as Rosales. But since the latter was not wearing any uniform
or identification card at the time, Torres paid Rosales no mind and
attempted to walk away.
This prompted the other personnel of 7th [S]ecurity, who were
nearby, to step in and restrain Torres. Fearful of the intentions of
Rosales and his companions, Torres started shouting for help from
the SGV security guard nearby but the latter was told by the 7th
[S]ecurity personnel not to meddle. Rosales then informed Torres that
they were arresting him for possessing an illicit device. Thereafter,
Rosales and his companions confiscated the card reader that fell off
the ATM. One of the companions of Rosales also removed the PIN pad
cover from the said ATM and both devices (card reader and PIN pad
cover) were laid down on the floor. The group of Rosales then tried to
browbeat Torres into admitting ownership of the said illicit device but
the latter insisted on his innocence. Moreover, despite Torres's
requests that the CCTV footage of the said ATM booth be reviewed by
the 7th [S]ecurity personnel, the same fell on deaf ears. 9
DETACa

The RTC Ruling

In its March 23, 2018 Decision, the RTC found petitioner guilty as
charged. The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Aldrin Torres is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of R.A. 8484 (f)
(sic) otherwise known as the "Access Device Regulations Act of 1998"
and is hereby directed to suffer imprisonment of ten (10) years as
minimum and eleven (11) years as maximum of prision mayor with a
fine of ten thousand pesos (Php10,000.00).
SO ORDERED. 10
 The RTC held that petitioner failed to rebut the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses, which established that the skimming devices were in
his actual possession at the time of the incident. The RTC opined that since
R.A. No. 8484 is a special law, good faith or lack of intent to commit a crime
on the part of petitioner is totally immaterial. 11
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the
RTC in its June 22, 2018 Order. 12
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its October 4, 2019 Decision, the CA denied the appeal of petitioner.
The fallo of which states:
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated
March 23, 2018 of the Regional Trial [Court,] Branch 134 of Makati
City, National Capital Judicial Region in Criminal Case No. 15-1566,
which convicted herein accused-appellant Aldrin Torres y David for
the crime of Violation of Section [9(f)] of Republic Act No. 8484, is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 13 HEITAD

The CA held that, contrary to petitioner's claim, the BPI did not willfully
suppress the CCTV footage of the incident. As such, the adverse presumption
provided for in Sec. 3 (e), Rule 131 14 of the Rules of Court does not arise
here. 15 Moreover, the object evidence was properly authenticated by a
competent witness and under the chain of custody rule no less. 16 Finally,
the CA held that the prosecution was able to successfully establish the guilt
of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. 17
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied
by the CA via its January 15, 2021 Resolution.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
In its September 14, 2021 Resolution, 18 the Court initially denied
outright the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner. The
dispositive portion states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 4, 2019
Decision and January 15, 2021 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 41989 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioner Aldrin Torres y David is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
for violation of Section 9(f) of Republic Act No. 8484, otherwise known
as Access Devices Regulation Act of 1998, and is SENTENCED to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years as
minimum to eleven (11) years as maximum. He is likewise ORDERED
to PAY a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).
The petitioner's counsel is hereby required to SUBMIT, within
five (5) days from notice hereof, an updated MCLE Compliance
number and date of its issuance, the date of issuance of compliance
submitted having been dated December 8, 2017.
SO ORDERED. 19
 Unfazed, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 20 dated March 4,
2022 before the Court. In its Resolution 21 dated July 20, 2022, the Court
reinstated the petition and required respondent People of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), to file its Comment. aDSIHc

Issue
The lone issue to be resolved herein is:
Whether the prosecution proved the guilt of petitioner for the
crime of violation of Section 9(f) of R.A. No. 8484 beyond reasonable
doubt.
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in concluding that intent is
immaterial in crimes involving special laws. Otherwise, any random person
can be penalized under the law, if he or she incidentally possesses a device
used for tampering. 22 He also insists that the CA erred in ruling that there
was no willful suppression of evidence on the part of the prosecution. He
claims that the prosecution's failure to present the CCTV footage of the
incident amounts to willful suppression of evidence. 23 Lastly, he claims that
his defense of good faith and untainted character should have been
appreciated. 24
In its Comment, 25 respondent, through the OSG, counters that the
instant petition should be dismissed outright for raising questions of fact
beyond the ambit of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 26 It also argued that
petitioner was caught red-handed by security personnel in the act of
removing the PIN pad cover and card reader from the ATM machine. 27
Respondent also underscored that, even without the CCTV footage, the
prosecution established petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt based on
the testimonies of the witnesses. 28 Finally, respondent highlighted that
access device fraud under R.A. No. 8484 is a mala prohibita crime, hence,
lack of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances. 29
The Court's Ruling
After a further review of the case, the Court finds the petition
meritorious.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must, as a general rule, only
raises questions of law. Parties may only raise issues that can be determined
without having to review or reevaluate the evidence on record. The Court
generally gives weight to the factual findings of the lower courts "because of
the opportunity enjoyed by the [lower courts] to observe the demeanor of
the witnesses on the stand and assess their testimony." 30 ATICcS

The foregoing rule, however, admits of certain exceptions. In Alburo v.

People, 31 the Court enumerated these recognized exceptions, thus:
As an exception to the rule, questions of fact may be raised in a
Rule 45 petition if any of the following is present:
(1) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (2)
when the findings are grounded on speculations; (3) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (4) when the
 judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the factual findings
are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case and its findings are
contrary to the admissions of the parties; (7) when the
Court of Appeals overlooked undisputed facts which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(8) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary
to those of the trial court; (9) when the facts set forth by
the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent; and
(10) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record. 32
In this case, two of the exceptions stated above exist — that the CA
rendered judgment based on a misappreciation of facts and overlooked
undisputed facts, which must be properly considered to arrive at a just
conclusion. Accordingly, the Court may entertain questions of facts in the
present petition.
Access device fraud;
mala prohibita; intent to
perpetrate the prohibited
act
Petitioner was found guilty of violation of Sec. 9 (f) of R.A. No. 8484,
which states: ETHIDa

Section 9. Â Prohibited Acts. — The following acts shall

constitute access device fraud and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(f) Â producing, trafficking in, having control or custody of, or
possessing device-making or altering equipment
without being in the business or employment, which
lawfully deals with the manufacture, issuance, or
distribution of such equipment[.] (Emphasis supplied)
The terms "access device," "counterfeit access device," and "access
device-making or altering equipment" are defined under Sec. 3 of the same
law:
Section 3. Â Definition of terms. — For purposes of this Act,
the terms:
(a) Â Access Device — means any card, plate, code, account
number, electronic serial number, personal identification
number, or other telecommunications service, equipment,
or instrumental identifier, or other means of account
access that can be used to obtain money, good, services,
or any other thing of value or to initiate a transfer of funds
(other than a transfer originated solely by paper
instrument);
(b) Â Counterfeit Access Device — means any access device
that is counterfeit, fictitious, altered, or forged, or an
 identifiable component of an access device or counterfeit
access device;
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Â Device Making or Altering Equipment — means any
equipment, mechanism or impression designed or primarily
used for making or altering or reencoding an access device
or a counterfeit access device[.]TIADCc

To be liable for violation of Sec. 9 (f) of R.A. No. 8484, the accused
must be in possession of access device and access device making or altering
equipment. Evidently, a violation of Sec. 9 (f) of R.A. No. 8484 is classified
under mala prohibita.
In Dungo v. People , 33 the Court discussed the difference between acts
mala prohibita and mala in se:
Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in
themselves called acts mala in se ; and acts which would not be
wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called acts mala
prohibita. This distinction is important with reference to the intent
with which a wrongful act is done. The rule on the subject is that in
acts mala in se , the intent governs; but in acts mala prohibita , the
only inquiry is, has the law been violated? When an act is illegal, the
intent of the offender is immaterial. When the doing of an act is
prohibited by law, it is considered injurious to public welfare, and the
doing of the prohibited act is the crime itself. 34
Implicit in the concept of mala in se is that of mens rea. Mens rea is
defined as the nonphysical element which, combined with the act of the
accused, makes up the crime charged. Most frequently it is the criminal
intent, or the guilty mind. 35 In ABS-CBN Corp. v. Gozon, the Court held that
crimes mala in se presuppose that the person who did the felonious act had
criminal intent to do so, while crimes mala prohibita do not require
knowledge or criminal intent. 36 It is a general principle in law that in a
malum prohibitum case, good faith or motive is not a defense because the
law punishes the prohibited act itself. 37
In the September 14, 2021 Resolution, the Court stated that "We do
not find error on the part of the CA in concluding that intent is immaterial in
crimes involving special laws." 38 However, a common misconception is that
all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised Penal Code (RPC), while all
mala prohibita crimes are provided by special penal laws. In reality,
however, there may be mala in se crimes under special laws, such as
plunder under R.A. No. 7080, as amended. Similarly, there may be mala
prohibita crimes defined in the RPC, such as technical malversation. 39 cSEDTC

To distinguish mala in se from mala prohibita, the better approach is

the determination of the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act.
If the punishable act or omission is immoral in itself, then it is a crime mala
in se; on the contrary, if it is not immoral in itself, but there is a statute
prohibiting its commission by reasons of public policy, then it is mala
prohibita. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral
turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute. 40

Nevertheless, criminal intent under mala in se and intent to perpetrate

the act under mala prohibita are separate and distinct. Volition, or intent to
commit the act, is different from criminal intent. Volition or voluntariness
pertains to knowledge of the act being done. On the other hand, criminal
intent — which is different from motive, or the moving power for the
commission of the crime — refers to the state of mind beyond voluntariness.
It is this intent that is being punished by crimes mala in se. 41
Indeed, intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act
must be distinguished. Thus, a person may not have consciously intended to
commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the
very nature of things, the crime itself. When an act is prohibited by a law, it
is considered injurious to public welfare, and the performance of the
prohibited act is the crime itself. 42 In intent to commit the crime, there must
be criminal intent, while in intent to perpetrate the act, it is enough that the
prohibited act is done freely and consciously. 43
Accordingly, even if a violation of Sec. 9 (f) of R.A. No. 8484 is amala
prohibita, it must be established that petitioner had the volition or intent to
commit the prohibited act, which is the possession of the device-making or
altering equipment.
In Soledad v. People, 44 which involves a violation of R.A. No. 8484, the
Court used the definition of "possession" under Article 523 of the Civil Code
to determine whether the offender had the intent to commit the prohibited
act, or animus possidendi, under the law: AIDSTE

The trial court convicted petitioner of possession of the credit

card fraudulently applied for, penalized by R.A. No. 8484. The law,
however, does not define the word "possession." Thus, we use the
term as defined in Article 523 of the Civil Code, that is, "possession is
the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right." The acquisition
of possession involves two elements: the corpus or the
material holding of the thing, and the animus possidendi or
the intent to possess it. Animus possidendi is a state of mind, the
presence or determination of which is largely dependent on attendant
events in each case. It may be inferred from the prior or
contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding
circumstances. 45 (Emphasis supplied)
Further, Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 8484 provides for the prima facie evidence
of the intent to defraud:
Section 14. Â Presumption and prima facie evidence of
intent to defraud. — The mere possession, control or custody of:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Â any device-making or altering equipment by any person
whose business or employment does not lawfully deal with
the manufacture, issuance, or distribution of access device;
xxx xxx xxx
(f) Â x x x shall be prima facie evidence that such device or
 equipment is intended to be used to defraud. (Emphasis
supplied)
Notably, before the presumption of intent to defraud arises under R.A.
No. 8484, it must first be established by the prosecution that the offender
had possession, control, or custody of the illicit device under the law. This
bolsters the finding that a person must have animus possidendi of the illicit
device before he or she can be liable under Sec. 9 (f) of R.A. No. 8484.
Hence, even when criminal intent is not required in a mala prohibita
crime, an offender under Sec. 9 (f) of R.A. No. 8484 must, at the very least,
have the animus possidendi of the device-making or altering equipment.
Indeed, while it is not necessary that the prosecution prove that the accused
has an underlying evil intent to violate the law, it must be proved that the
accused had the consciousness, willingness, or desire in possessing the
prohibited equipment. It is not enough that the offender had physical
possession of the said equipment, there must be intent on the part of the
offender to possess the same. SDAaTC

A review of the facts in the instant case shows that the evidence
presented is insufficient to establish the guilt of petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The evidence failed to categorically
show petitioner's intent to possess the card reader slot and PIN pad cover
with an attached camera. The pertinent portions of petitioner's judicial
affidavit, which was offered as his direct testimony before the trial court to
refute the allegations of the respondent are hereto quoted for ready
reference, viz.:
16
QUESTION:
After getting ready with your ATM card what did you do next?
ANSWER:
Sinubukan ko na pong ipasok ang aking ATM card sa unang
machine ngunit mukhang sira po ito dahil ayaw tanggapin ang
aking card.
17
QUESTION:
When the machine refused to admit the card what did you do
subsequently?
ANSWER:
Nag-pasya po akong lumipat sa katabing machine upang doon
subukan mag-withdraw.
18
QUESTION:
Did you notice anything unusual with that (second) machine?
ANSWER:
Sa umpisa po wala naman akong napansin na kakaiba. Ngunit
 nuong ipasok ko na po ang aking ATM card ay napansin ko po na
gumalaw ang card reader slot nito. AaCTcI

19
QUESTION:
Will you please tell us what is this "card reader slot" that you are
referring to?
ANSWER:
Ito po ang parte ng automated teller machine kung saan
ipinapasok ang ATM card.
20
QUESTION:
After noticing the movement in the card reader slot what did you
do?
ANSWER:
Nag-step back po ako at sumilip ng pakanan upang tumingin ng
gwardya na mapagtatanungan kung sira ang card reader slot ng
nasabing (second) machine.
21
QUESTION:
Why did you look on your right side?
ANSWER:
Dahil po andun ang BPI Branch na katabi ng ATM booth. Dahil
bangko po iyon sumilip po ako na baka mayroong gwardya duon.
22
QUESTION:
Were you able to see a guard? acEHCD

ANSWER:
Paglingon ko po ay wala akong nakita. Wala po akong nakitang
gwardya dahil maaga pa nuong mga oras na iyon.
23
QUESTION:
What did you do then?
ANSWER:
Itinuloy ko na po ang aking transaction. Una po ay nag-balance
inquiry muna ako at nag-appear po sa screen ang aking balance
na "P9,520.20." Sumunod po ay inumpisahan ko ng mag-
withdraw ng halagang P6,300.00.
xxx xxx xxx
30
QUESTION:
What happened next, if any?
ANSWER:
Paglabas po ng aking ATM card ay sakto ring may nalaglag sa
desk o patungan ng machine. Kinuha ko na po agad ang aking
ATM card, withdrawal slip at pera at nilagay ko na lahat sa aking
wallet. Ipinasok ko na rin sa aking bag ang aking wallet.
31
QUESTION:
What is this object which fell on the desk of the machine?
ANSWER:
Bagay po ito na nalaglag mula sa card reader slot. Later ko na po
nalaman na ang nalaglag na bagay ay parte ng skimming device
na nakuha diumano sa aking pag-iingat or possession. EcTCAD

xxx xxx xxx

34
QUESTION:
After the object fell, what did you do afterwards?
ANSWER:
Pinulot ko po ang nalaglag na bagay upang i-report sa gwardya.
35
QUESTION:
What made you decide to report it to the guard?
ANSWER:
Nuong mga oras na po na iyon ay buo na sa isipan ko na
mayroong ngang skimming device sa machine. Naisip ko po na
kung iiwanan ko lang ang nahulog na bagay ay baka gamitin ito
ng sindikato laban sa akin at sa mga naunang bank customers na
nag-transact sa nasabing machine.
36
QUESTION:
Were you able to report it to the guard?
ANSWER:
Hindi po. Paglabas ko po ng ATM booth ay lumingon ulit ako sa
katabing BPI branch at nagbakasakali na may makita akong
gwardya. Nakakandado po ang pintuan ng nasabing bangko
nuong mga oras na iyon. Lumingon po ako sa kabilang side at
duon ko na nakita ang guard on duty sa entrance ng SGV
Building. Naisipan ko po na sa kanya na lamang mag-report at
ipakita ang nahulog na bagay. SDHTEC

37
QUESTION:
During all this time, from the time you went out of the ATM booth
and started looking for a guard to whom to report the said
incident, you are holding the said object?
ANSWER:
Opo, sir. Hawak ko po sa aking kaliwang kamay.
38
QUESTION:
What happened subsequently?
ANSWER:
Nakakailang hakbang pa lamang po ako papunta sa gwardya ng
SGV Building ng salubungin ako ng isang lalaki at tinanong ako
ng, "Pare anu iyang hawak mo?"
xxx xxx xxx
40
QUESTION:
What ensued then?
ANSWER:
Dahil hindi naman po siya naka-uniporme at walang suot na
identification ay hindi ko po siya pinansin. Paglagpas ko sa kanya
ay hinawakan na ako ng ilang kalalakihan na kasamahan nito.
xxx xxx xxx
46
QUESTION:
Did they tell you why they held you? HSAcaE

ANSWER:
Tinanong ko nga po sila. Ang sagot po sa akin ni Mr. Rosales ay,
"Citizens Arrest," daw po ang ginagawa nila laban sa akin dahil sa
nahulihan daw po ako ng illegal na bagay.
47
QUESTION:
What transpired next?
ANSWER:
Kinuha po nila ang bitbit kong (nahulog na) bagay at maya't
maya pa ay kinalkal na rin nila ang suot kong sling bag. Wala
silang nakita sa aking bag.
48
QUESTION:
What happened later?
ANSWER:
Maya't maya pa po ay may lumabas na lalaki sa pinanggalingan
kong ATM booth sabay sigaw na, "Andito!" habang bitbit ang
isang bagay na nalaman ko na lamang later on na isang pin pad
cover. 46 (Emphases and underscoring omitted)
As stated above, petitioner testified that after the machine ejected his
ATM card, he noticed that an object, which would later on be discovered as a
skimming device, fell off from the card reader slot of the ATM. He picked up
the card reader slot, went out of the ATM booth and approached the security
guard stationed at the entrance of the SGV Building in order to report the
incident. Accordingly, if his accounts of the events are accurate, petitioner
did not have the intent to possess the items; rather, he had intent to deliver
the items to the proper authorities, who were stationed at the entrance of
the building.AScHCD

On the other hand, Rosales, as the prosecution witness, gave

conflicting testimonies as to whether petitioner was merely holding the illicit
device or was already putting it in his bag when he exited the ATM booth,
viz.:
ATTY. PEREZ:
Q: Â Okay, Mr. Witness, when the accused entered the subject ATM
booth, you testified that you positioned yourselves [in strategic]
locations. You will again confirm that, Mr. Witness?
A: Â We have been there for a long time, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Â May I refer your attention to paragraph 5 of your Sinumpaang
Salaysay, Mr. Witness, where a while ago you affirm (sic) that
"may dumating na isang lalake na may dalang bag na tila ay
nag-transact sa ATM ." Again, do you confirm having said this in
your Sinumpaang Salaysay?
A: Â Yes, sir.
Q: Â So, you will confirm that the accused when he went inside the
ATM booth, he has (sic) with him a bag?
A: Â Yes, sir.
Q: Â Now, Mr. Witness, when the accused went out of the ATM
booth, he has on his hands "bitbit ang Card Reader at PIN Pad
Cover?" (sic) You stated that, Mr. Witness, in paragraph 6 of your
Sinumpaang Salaysay?
A: Â He was about to put inside his bag the pin pad (sic) and card
reader, sir.
Q: Â When he went out, he has (sic) with him on his hands the PIN
Pad Cover and the Card Reader? HESIcT

A: Â Yes, sir, paglabas nya (sic) po, he was about to put it in the
bag. 47
Evidently, in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, Rosales initially stated that
petitioner was carrying the illicit devices with his hands, which would
corroborate that he would be turning these over to the security guard. As
stated by petitioner, if he was the owner of the illegal devices, he would not
openly bring these items out of the ATM booth and expose himself to
possible apprehension. 48 However, when Rosario testified in the trial court,
he changed his statement and recounted that, instead of just holding the
devices in petitioner's hands as he was leaving the ATM booth, he claims
that petitioner was about to put the said devices in his bag. The Court finds
Rosales' explanation to be a mere afterthought to divert from the fact that
petitioner truly had the opportunity to surrender the illicit devices to the
proper authorities.
Indeed, it was not conclusively established that the said illicit items
were definitely inside the bag of petitioner. The prosecution was not able to
rebut the testimony of petitioner that 7th Security did not find the illegal
devices inside the bag he was carrying. 49
Nevertheless, whether or not petitioner was holding the illicit devices,
it is clear that before reaching the SGV security guard, petitioner was
stopped and restrained by the personnel of 7th Security. The OSG
maintained that "[a]s soon as petitioner went out of the booth and was about
to put the device inside his bag, SI Rosales approached petitioner and held
his hand to prevent him from running away. The rest of the security
personnel then rushed to the scene to assist SI Rosales." 50
From the narration of the OSG, petitioner was not given an opportunity
to surrender the devices to the SGV security guard and was already
apprehended by the personnel of 7th Security, who had already prejudged
petitioner as the owner of the illegal items. Aside from the testimony of
Rosales, no other witness who had personal knowledge over the purported
acts of petitioner was presented to prove his volition or intent to perpetrate
the prohibited act.
On another point, according to Rosales, they received an information
from the BPI-SOC at around 4:13 in the morning, stating that a skimming
device was placed at the BPI ATM booth located at the SGV Building. Upon
receipt of the information, Rosales' team proceeded there and waited for a
long time to observe the ATM booth. 51 However, there was no information
on how it was determined beforehand that a skimming device (a card reader
slot) was indeed placed in that ATM booth. Likewise, it is quite perplexing
why they did not have any information as to who they suspected to have
installed said skimming device in the first place and whether that suspected
person resembles petitioner. AcICHD

In addition, even when 7th Security had already received the

information as early as 4:13 in the morning and proceeded to the ATM booth,
they just waited in the vicinity. They did not investigate or examine whether
a card reader slot was indeed attached to the ATM. Even assuming that they
indeed had accurate and reliable information that said skimming device was
attached thereon, the Court finds it odd that they waited for several persons
to transact with the ATM before they even acted. According to Rosales, six
transactions occurred at the ATM before petitioner entered the booth at 6:20
in the morning. 52 Rosales and his team allowed other people's bank
accounts to be subjected to such skimming device before they acted, which
is obviously contrary to their mandate of rendering security services. 53
It is also unclear why Rosales and his team disregarded the previous
persons who entered the booth as suspected owners of the card reader slot
and merely focused on petitioner. Nowhere in the prosecution evidence does
it show that it was petitioner who installed said skimming device when it was
discovered as early as 4:13 in the morning. Again, as confirmed by
petitioner's testimony, he only arrived at the scene by 6:20 in the morning.
54 The prosecution merely surmised that petitioner was the owner of the said
skimming device because he was the one who detached the same from the
ATM. However, as explained above, there could be several reasons why
petitioner removed the card reader slot, such as to protect the security of his
account and deliver the same to the security personnel of the SGV Building.
Notably, the prosecution could have presented the CCTV footage of the
ATM to corroborate and support its allegation that petitioner indeed had the
animus possidendi over the illicit items or to even corroborate that petitioner
was the one who installed the card reader slot and pin pad cover with an
attached camera. However, it did not, and it simply proffered the excuse
that the CCTV at the time of the incident is not functional. 55 Under the
Manual of Regulations for Banks, it is mandated that "each bank shall install,
operate and maintain security devices which are expected to give a general
level of bank protection equivalent, at least, to the standards prescribed
herein," 56 and CCTVs are one of the security devices that should be
installed. 57 Thus, it is highly doubtful that there was no CCTV footage during
that time because banks are required to maintain "CCTV and video recording
system appropriate to deter the commission of bank crimes and assist in the
identification and apprehension of the culprits." 58caITAC

In the September 14, 2021 Resolution of the Court, it was stated that
petitioner's background and knowledge in computer systems and peripherals
betray his claim of innocence. 59 However, after giving a second hard look at
the records of this case, petitioner's profession as a software analysist is not
detrimental to his cause. It is plausible that due to his computer background,
he was wary of the questionable devices in the ATM and removed these
objects so as to turn these over to the security guard, albeit 7th Security did
not give him an opportunity to do so. In addition, even if petitioner has a
background in computer related work, it does not necessarily mean that he
deals with or owns illicit items. 60
Further, the OSG's argument that petitioner should have simply gone
directly to the security guard and reported his observation of the ATM
instead of removing the illicit devices, is misplaced. 61 Unlike the previous
persons who used the ATM machine, it was understandable for petitioner,
with his computer knowledge, to be more wary and proactive in deterring
the suspicious devices on the machine. To the Court's view, it would not be
unnatural for any person, such as petitioner, who was aware of the illegal
devices in the ATM, to immediately remove the same in order to protect his
account information. Again, the 7th Security personnel could have given
petitioner the chance to surrender the illicit devices to the security guard at
the SGV Building, but they failed to do so.
Accordingly, it cannot certainly be determined whether petitioner truly
had the volition or willingness to possess the altering equipment or whether
he only meant to turn over the skimming devices to the SGV security guard.
The component of animus possidendi under Sec. 9 (f) of R.A. No. 8484 is
lacking. Had the personnel of 7th Security waited a few more
seconds, such intent to perpetrate the prohibited act or the volition
of petitioner to possess the altering equipment could have been
conclusively established. However, they did not. They were too hasty
to prejudge petitioner as a criminal offender. And such overzealousness on
the part of 7th Security personnel should not be taken against petitioner.
Equipoise rule;
presumption of
innocence
Faced with two conflicting versions of what transpired during the
incident, the Court is guided by the equipoise rule: where the evidence in a
criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of
innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused. 62 TAIaHE

I n People v. Urzais, 63 the Court explained the equipoise rule, which

essentially upholds the right of an accused to be presumed innocent when
the weight of evidence for an acquittal and conviction are the same, to wit:
The equipoise rule states that where the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which
is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of
moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The
equipoise rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is
evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the
scales in favor of the accused.
The basis of the acquittal is reasonable doubt, which simply
means that the evidence of the prosecution was not sufficient to
sustain the guilt of accused-appellant beyond the point of moral
certainty. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, however, is a burden
particular to the prosecution and does not apply to exculpatory facts
as may be raised by the defense; the accused is not required to
establish matters in mitigation or defense beyond a reasonable
doubt, nor is he required to establish the truth of such matters by a
preponderance of the evidence, or even to a reasonable probability.
It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side
with clarity and persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only
logical and inevitable conclusion. What is required of it is to justify the
conviction of the accused with moral certainty. Upon the
prosecution's failure to meet this test, acquittal becomes the
constitutional duty of the Court, lest its mind be tortured with the
thought that it has imprisoned an innocent man for the rest of his life.
The constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
can be overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 64
The existing and lingering possibility that petitioner did not have
animus possidendi and that he could have turned over the items before the
SGV security guard constitute as reasonable doubt in convicting petitioner
for violation of Sec. 9 (f) of R.A. No. 8484. ICHDca

The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed

innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The
prosecution has the burden to overcome such presumption of innocence,
failing which, the presumption of innocence prevails and the accused should
be acquitted. This, despite the fact that his innocence may be doubted, for a
criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution
and not on the weakness or even absence of defense. If the inculpatory facts
and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with
his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is
not sufficient to support a conviction, as in this case. Courts should bear in
mind that it would be better to set free ten men who might be probably
guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he
did not commit. 65
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The October 4, 2019 Decision
and the January 15, 2021 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 41989 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Aldrin Torres y David is
ACQUITTED of the charge against him for failure of the prosecution to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. cDHAES

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENA

Division Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULO

Deputy Division Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 8-24.

2. Id. at 26-49; penned by Associate Justice Louis P. Acosta and concurred in by

Associate Justices Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela.

3. Id. at 51-52.

4. Id. at 53-61; penned by Acting Presiding Judge Elpidio R. Calis.

5. Entitled "AN ACT REGULATING THE ISSUANCE AND USE OF ACCESS DEVICES,
PROHIBITING FRAUDULENT ACTS COMMITTED RELATIVE THERETO,
PROVIDING PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Approved on February
11, 1998.

6. Rollo, p. 53.
7. Id.

8. Id. at 27-29.

9. Id. at 29-31.

10. Id. at 61.

11. Id. at 59-61.

12. Id. at 62-63.

13. Id. at 48.

14. Section 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are

satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by
other evidence:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced[.]

15. Rollo, pp. 33-35.

16. Id. at 36-40.

17. Id. at 42-48.

18. Id. at 135-139.

19. Id. at 139.

20. Id. at 142-147.

21. Id. at 149-150.

22. Id. at 142-144.

23. Id. at 144-145.

24. Id. at 145-146.

25. Id. at 151-171.

26. Id. at 158-161.

27. Id. at 162-163.

28. Id. at 165.

29. Id. at 166-167.

30. Lapi v. People, G.R. No. 210731, February 13, 2019, 892 SCRA 680, 688 [Per J.
Leonen, Third Division].

31. 792 Phil. 876 (2016) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].

32. Id. at 889.

33. 762 Phil. 630 (2015) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

34. Id. at 658.

35. ABS-CBN Corp. v. Gozon, 755 Phil. 709, 764 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second
Division].

36. Id.

37. Sama v. People, G.R. No. 224469, January 5, 2021 [Per J. Lazaro-Javier, En
Banc].

38. Rollo, p. 136.

39. Dungo v. People , supra at 658-659.

40. Id. at 659.

41. Matalam v. People, 783 Phil. 711, 728 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

42. Sama v. People, supra.

43. Dela Cruz v. People, 776 Phil. 653, 694 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

44. 659 Phil. 324 (2011) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division].

45. Id. at 333.

46. Rollo, pp. 119-123.

47. Id. at 42-43.

48. Id. at 91.

49. Id. at 84-88.

50. Id. at 156.

51. Id. at 54-55.

52. Id. at 55.

53. Id.

54. Id. at 29.

55. Id. at 13-14.

56. Id. at 15.

57. Manual of Regulations for Banks, Chapter 147 — Bank Protection.

https://morb.bsp.gov.ph/147-bank-protection/?
hilite=%27closed%27%2C%27circuit%27.

58. Id.

59. Rollo, p. 136.

60. Id. at 144.

61. Id. at 167.

62. People v. Librias , 795 Phil. 334, 344 (2016) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

63. 784 Phil. 561 (2016) [Per J. Perez, Third Division].

64. Id. at 579-580.

65. Atienza v. People , 726 Phil. 570, 588-589 (2014) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second
Division].