Today is Tuesday, March 05, 2024

Const it ut ion St a t ut es Exec ut ive Issua nc es Judic ia l Issua nc es Ot her Issua nc es Jurisprudenc e Int erna t iona l Lega l Resourc es
AUSL Exc lusive

Republic of t he Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012

RODEL LUZ y ONG, Pet it ioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1 Respondent .

DE C IS IO N

SERENO, J.:

T his is a Pet it ion for Review on Cert iorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside t he Court of Appeals (CA) Decision
in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dat ed 18 February 20112 and Resolut ion dat ed 8 July 2011.

St at ement of t he Fact s and of t he Case

T he fact s, as found by t he Regional Trial Court (RT C), which sust ained t he version of t he prosecut ion, are as
follows:

PO2 Emmanuel L. Alt eza, who was t hen assigned at t he Sub-St at ion 1 of t he Naga Cit y Police St at ion as a t raffic
enforcer, subst ant ially t est ified t hat on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 o’clock in t he morning, he saw t he
accused, who was coming from t he direct ion of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga Cit y, driving
a motorcycle wit hout a helmet ; t hat t his prompt ed him to flag down t he accused for violat ing a municipal
ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; t hat he
invit ed t he accused to come inside t heir sub-st at ion since t he place where he flagged down t he accused is
almost in front of t he said sub-st at ion; t hat while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillant e were issuing a cit at ion t icket
for violat ion of municipal ordinance, he not iced t hat t he accused was uneasy and kept on get t ing somet hing
from his jacket ; t hat he was alert ed and so, he told t he accused to t ake out t he cont ent s of t he pocket of his
jacket as t he lat t er may have a weapon inside it ; t hat t he accused obliged and slowly put out t he cont ent s of
t he pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like t in or met al cont ainer about t wo (2) to t hree (3) inches in size,
including t wo (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; t hat upon seeing t he said
cont ainer, he asked t he accused to open it ; t hat aft er t he accused opened t he cont ainer, he not iced a cartoon
cover and somet hing beneat h it ; and t hat upon his inst ruct ion, t he accused spilled out t he cont ent s of t he
cont ainer on t he t able which t urned out to be four (4) plast ic sachet s, t he t wo (2) of which were empt y while
t he ot her t wo (2) cont ained suspect ed shabu.3

Arraigned on 2 July 2003, pet it ioner, assist ed by counsel, ent ered a plea of "Not guilt y" to t he charge of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. Pret rial was t erminat ed on 24 Sept ember 2003, aft er which, t rial ensued.

During t rial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alt eza and a forensic chemist t est ified for t he prosecut ion. On t he
ot her hand, pet it ioner t est ified for himself and raised t he defense of plant ing of evidence and extort ion.

In it s 19 February 2009 Decision,4 t he RT C convict ed pet it ioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs 5
commit t ed on 10 March 2003. It found t he prosecut ion evidence sufficient to show t hat he had been lawfully
arrest ed for a t raffic violat ion and t hen subject ed to a valid search, which led to t he discovery on his person of
t wo plast ic sachet s lat er found to cont ain shabu. T he RT C also found his defense of frame-up and extort ion to
be weak, self-serving and unsubst ant iat ed. T he disposit ive port ion of it s Decision held:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ y ONG GUILT Y beyond reasonable doubt
for t he crime of violat ion of Sect ion 11, Art icle II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sent encing him to suffer t he
indet erminat e penalt y of imprisonment ranging from t welve (12) years and (1) day, as minimum, to t hirt een (13)
years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of T hree Hundred T housand Pesos (₱ 300,000.00).

T he subject shabu is hereby confiscat ed for t urn over to t he Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for it s proper
disposit ion and dest ruct ion in accordance wit h law.

SO ORDERED.6

Upon review, t he CA affirmed t he RT C’s Decision.

On 12 Sept ember 2011, pet it ioner filed under Rule 45 t he inst ant Pet it ion for Review on Cert iorari dat ed 1
Sept ember 2011. In a Resolut ion dat ed 12 October 2011, t his Court required respondent to file a comment on
t he Pet it ion. On 4 January 2012, t he lat t er filed it s Comment dat ed 3 January 2012.

Pet it ioner raised t he following grounds in support of his Pet it ion:

(i) T HE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF T HE ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS INVALID.

(ii) T HE PRESUMPT ION OF REGULARIT Y IN T HE PERFORMANCE OF DUT Y OF T HE POLICE OFFICER CANNOT

BE RELIED UPON IN T HIS CASE.

(iii) T HE INT EGRIT Y AND EVIDENT IARY VALUE OF T HE ALLEGED SUBJECT SPECIMEN HAS BEEN
COMPROMISED.

(iv) T HE GUILT OF T HE ACCUSED-PET IT IONER WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND T HE REASONABLE DOUBT (sic).7

Pet it ioner claims t hat t here was no lawful search and seizure, because t here was no lawful arrest . He claims
t hat t he finding t hat t here was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued a cit at ion t icket or
charged wit h violat ion of t he cit y ordinance. Even assuming t here was a valid arrest , he claims t hat he had never
consent ed to t he search conduct ed upon him.

On t he ot her hand, finding t hat pet it ioner had been lawfully arrest ed, t he RT C held t hus:

It is beyond disput e t hat t he accused was flagged down and apprehended in t his case by Police Officers Alt eza
and Brillant e for violat ion of Cit y Ordinance No. 98-012, an ordinance requiring t he use of crash helmet by
motorcycle drivers and riders t hereon in t he Cit y of Naga and prescribing penalt ies for violat ion t hereof. T he
accused himself admit t ed t hat he was not wearing a helmet at t he t ime when he was flagged down by t he said
police officers, albeit he had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, t here is legal basis on t he part of t he
apprehending officers to flag down and arrest t he accused because t he lat t er was act ually commit t ing a crime
in t heir presence, t hat is, a violat ion of Cit y Ordinance No. 98-012. In ot her words, t he accused, being caught in
flagrante delicto violat ing t he said Ordinance, he could t herefore be lawfully stopped or arrest ed by t he
apprehending officers. x x x.8

We find t he Pet it ion to be impressed wit h merit , but not for t he part icular reasons alleged. In criminal cases, an
appeal t hrows t he ent ire case wide open for review and t he reviewing t ribunal can correct errors, t hough
unassigned in t he appealed judgment , or even reverse t he t rial court ’s decision based on grounds ot her t han
t hose t hat t he part ies raised as errors.9

First , t here was no valid arrest of pet it ioner. When he was flagged down for commit t ing a t raffic violat ion, he was
not , ipso facto and solely for t his reason, arrest ed.

Arrest is t he t aking of a person into custody in order t hat he or she may be bound to answer for t he commission
of an offense.10 It is effect ed by an act ual rest raint of t he person to be arrest ed or by t hat person’s volunt ary
submission to t he custody of t he one making t he arrest . Neit her t he applicat ion of act ual force, manual
touching of t he body, or physical rest raint , nor a formal declarat ion of arrest , is required. It is enough t hat t here
be an int ent ion on t he part of one of t he part ies to arrest t he ot her, and t hat t here be an int ent on t he part of
t he ot her to submit , under t he belief and impression t hat submission is necessary.11

Under R.A. 4136, or t he Land Transport at ion and Traffic Code, t he general procedure for dealing wit h a t raffic
violat ion is not t he arrest of t he offender, but t he confiscat ion of t he driver’s license of t he lat t er:

SECT ION 29. Confiscat ion of Driver's License. — Law enforcement and peace officers of ot her agencies duly
deput ized by t he Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any violat ion of t his Act or any regulat ions issued
pursuant t hereto, or of local t raffic rules and regulat ions not cont rary to any provisions of t his Act , confiscat e
t he license of t he driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by t he Bureau t herefor which shall
aut horize t he driver to operat e a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding sevent y-t wo hours from t he t ime and
dat e of issue of said receipt . T he period so fixed in t he receipt shall not be ext ended, and shall become invalid
t hereaft er. Failure of t he driver to set t le his case wit hin fift een days from t he dat e of apprehension will be a
ground for t he suspension and/or revocat ion of his license.

Similarly, t he Philippine Nat ional Police (PNP) Operat ions Manual12 provides t he following procedure for flagging
down vehicles during t he conduct of checkpoint s:

SECT ION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accost ing Vehicles While in Mobile Car. T his rule is a general concept
and will not apply in hot pursuit operat ions. T he mobile car crew shall undert ake t he following, when applicable: x
xx

m. If it concerns t raffic violat ions, immediat ely issue a Traffic Cit at ion T icket (T CT ) or Traffic Violat ion Report
(T VR). Never indulge in prolonged, unnecessary conversat ion or argument wit h t he driver or any of t he vehicle’s
occupant s;

At t he t ime t hat he was wait ing for PO3 Alt eza to writ e his cit at ion t icket , pet it ioner could not be said to have
been "under arrest ." T here was no int ent ion on t he part of PO3 Alt eza to arrest him, deprive him of his libert y, or
t ake him into custody. Prior to t he issuance of t he t icket , t he period during which pet it ioner was at t he police
st at ion may be charact erized merely as wait ing t ime. In fact , as found by t he t rial court , PO3 Alt eza himself
t est ified t hat t he only reason t hey went to t he police sub-st at ion was t hat pet it ioner had been flagged down
"almost in front " of t hat place. Hence, it was only for t he sake of convenience t hat t hey were wait ing t here.
T here was no int ent ion to t ake pet it ioner into custody.

In Berkemer v. McCart y,13 t he Unit ed St at es (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at lengt h whet her t he roadside
quest ioning of a motorist det ained pursuant to a rout ine t raffic stop should be considered custodial
int errogat ion. T he Court held t hat , such quest ioning does not fall under custodial int errogat ion, nor can it be
considered a formal arrest , by virt ue of t he nat ure of t he quest ioning, t he expect at ions of t he motorist and t he
officer, and t he lengt h of t ime t he procedure is conduct ed. It ruled as follows:

It must be acknowledged at t he out set t hat a t raffic stop significant ly curt ails t he "freedom of act ion" of t he
driver and t he passengers, if any, of t he det ained vehicle. Under t he law of most St at es, it is a crime eit her to
ignore a policeman’s signal to stop one’s car or, once having stopped, to drive away wit hout permission. x x x

However, we decline to accord t alismanic power to t he phrase in t he Miranda opinion emphasized by

respondent . Fidelit y to t he doct rine announced in Miranda requires t hat it be enforced st rict ly, but only in t hose
t ypes of sit uat ions in which t he concerns t hat powered t he decision are implicat ed. T hus, we must decide
whet her a t raffic stop exert s upon a det ained person pressures t hat sufficient ly impair his free exercise of his
privilege against self-incriminat ion to require t hat he be warned of his const it ut ional right s.

Two feat ures of an ordinary t raffic stop mit igat e t he danger t hat a person quest ioned will be induced "to speak
where he would not ot herwise do so freely," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First , det ent ion of a motorist
pursuant to a t raffic stop is presumpt ively t emporary and brief. T he vast majorit y of roadside det ent ions last
only a few minut es. A motorist ’s expect at ions, when he sees a policeman’s light flashing behind him, are t hat he
will be obliged to spend a short period of t ime answering quest ions and wait ing while t he officer checks his
license and regist rat ion, t hat he may t hen be given a cit at ion, but t hat in t he end he most likely will be allowed to
cont inue on his way. In t his respect , quest ioning incident to an ordinary t raffic stop is quit e different from
st at ionhouse int errogat ion, which frequent ly is prolonged, and in which t he det ainee oft en is aware t hat
quest ioning will cont inue unt il he provides his int errogators t he answers t hey seek. See id., at 451.

Second, circumst ances associat ed wit h t he t ypical t raffic stop are not such t hat t he motorist feels complet ely
at t he mercy of t he police. To be sure, t he aura of aut horit y surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and t he
knowledge t hat t he officer has some discret ion in deciding whet her to issue a cit at ion, in combinat ion, exert
some pressure on t he det ainee to respond to quest ions. But ot her aspect s of t he sit uat ion subst ant ially offset
t hese forces. Perhaps most import ant ly, t he t ypical t raffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x

In bot h of t hese respect s, t he usual t raffic stop is more analogous to a so-called "Terry stop," see Terry v. Ohio,
392 U. S. 1 (1968), t han to a formal arrest . x x x T he comparat ively nont hreat ening charact er of det ent ions of
t his sort explains t he absence of any suggest ion in our opinions t hat Terry stops are subject to t he dict at es of
Miranda. T he similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary t raffic stops prompt s us to hold t hat persons t emporarily
det ained pursuant to such stops are not "in custody" for t he purposes of Miranda.

xxx xxx xxx

We are confident t hat t he st at e of affairs project ed by respondent will not come to pass. It is set t led t hat t he
safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect ’s freedom of act ion is curt ailed to a
"degree associat ed wit h formal arrest ." California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). If a
motorist who has been det ained pursuant to a t raffic stop t hereaft er is subject ed to t reat ment t hat renders
him "in custody" for pract ical purposes, he will be ent it led to t he full panoply of prot ect ions prescribed by
Miranda. See Oregon v. Mat hiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). (Emphasis supplied.)

T he U.S. Court in Berkemer t hus ruled t hat , since t he motorist t herein was only subject ed to modest quest ions
while st ill at t he scene of t he t raffic stop, he was not at t hat moment placed under custody (such t hat he
should have been apprised of his Miranda right s), and neit her can t reat ment of t his sort be fairly charact erized
as t he funct ional equivalent of a formal arrest . Similarly, neit her can pet it ioner here be considered "under arrest "
at t he t ime t hat his t raffic cit at ion was being made.

It also appears t hat , according to Cit y Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violat ed by pet it ioner, t he failure to wear
a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under t he Rules of Court , a warrant of arrest
need not be issued if t he informat ion or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be st at ed
as a corollary t hat neit her can a warrant less arrest be made for such an offense.

T his ruling does not imply t hat t here can be no arrest for a t raffic violat ion. Cert ainly, when t here is an int ent on
t he part of t he police officer to deprive t he motorist of libert y, or to t ake t he lat t er into custody, t he former may
be deemed to have arrest ed t he motorist . In t his case, however, t he officer’s issuance (or int ent to issue) a
t raffic cit at ion t icket negat es t he possibilit y of an arrest for t he same violat ion.

Even if one were to work under t he assumpt ion t hat pet it ioner was deemed "arrest ed" upon being flagged down
for a t raffic violat ion and while await ing t he issuance of his t icket , t hen t he requirement s for a valid arrest were
not complied wit h.

T his Court has held t hat at t he t ime a person is arrest ed, it shall be t he dut y of t he arrest ing officer to inform
t he lat t er of t he reason for t he arrest and must show t hat person t he warrant of arrest , if any. Persons shall be
informed of t heir const it ut ional right s to remain silent and to counsel, and t hat any st at ement t hey might make
could be used against t hem.14 It may also be not ed t hat in t his case, t hese const it ut ional requirement s were
complied wit h by t he police officers only aft er pet it ioner had been arrest ed for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs.

In Berkemer, t he U.S. Court also not ed t hat t he Miranda warnings must also be given to a person apprehended
due to a t raffic violat ion:

T he purposes of t he safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure t hat t he police do not coerce or t rick
capt ive suspect s into confessing, to relieve t he "inherent ly compelling pressures" "generat ed by t he custodial
set t ing it self," "which work to undermine t he individual’s will to resist ," and as much as possible to free court s
from t he t ask of scrut inizing individual cases to t ry to det ermine, aft er t he fact , whet her part icular confessions
were volunt ary. T hose purposes are implicat ed as much by in-custody quest ioning of persons suspect ed of
misdemeanors as t hey are by quest ioning of persons suspect ed of felonies.

If it were t rue t hat pet it ioner was already deemed "arrest ed" when he was flagged down for a t raffic violat ion
and while he wait ing for his t icket , t hen t here would have been no need for him to be arrest ed for a second t ime
—aft er t he police officers allegedly discovered t he drugs—as he was already in t heir custody.

Second, t here being no valid arrest , t he warrant less search t hat result ed from it was likewise illegal.

T he following are t he inst ances when a warrant less search is allowed: (i) a warrant less search incident al to a
lawful arrest ; (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consent ed warrant less
search; (v) customs search; (vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumst ances.15
None of t he above-ment ioned inst ances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest , are applicable to t his
case.

It must be not ed t hat t he evidence seized, alt hough alleged to be inadvert ent ly discovered, was not in "plain
view." It was act ually concealed inside a met al cont ainer inside pet it ioner’s pocket . Clearly, t he evidence was not
immediat ely apparent .16

Neit her was t here a consent ed warrant less search. Consent to a search is not to be light ly inferred, but shown
by clear and convincing evidence.17 It must be volunt ary in order to validat e an ot herwise illegal search; t hat is,
t he consent must be unequivocal, specific, int elligent ly given and uncont aminat ed by any duress or coercion.
While t he prosecut ion claims t hat pet it ioner acceded to t he inst ruct ion of PO3 Alt eza, t his alleged accession
does not suffice to prove valid and int elligent consent . In fact , t he RT C found t hat pet it ioner was merely "told" to
t ake out t he cont ent s of his pocket .18

Whet her consent to t he search was in fact volunt ary is a quest ion of fact to be det ermined from t he tot alit y of
all t he circumst ances. Relevant to t his det erminat ion are t he following charact erist ics of t he person giving
consent and t he environment in which consent is given: (1) t he age of t he defendant ; (2) whet her t he defendant
was in a public or a secluded locat ion; (3) whet her t he defendant object ed to t he search or passively looked on;
(4) t he educat ion and int elligence of t he defendant ; (5) t he presence of coercive police procedures; (6) t he
defendant ’s belief t hat no incriminat ing evidence would be found; (7) t he nat ure of t he police quest ioning; (8)
t he environment in which t he quest ioning took place; and (9) t he possibly vulnerable subject ive st at e of t he
person consent ing. It is t he St at e t hat has t he burden of proving, by clear and posit ive t est imony, t hat t he
necessary consent was obt ained, and was freely and volunt arily given.19 In t his case, all t hat was alleged was
t hat pet it ioner was alone at t he police st at ion at t hree in t he morning, accompanied by several police officers.
T hese circumst ances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrant less search.

Neit her does t he search qualify under t he "stop and frisk" rule. While t he rule normally applies when a police
officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct , which may lead him to believe t hat a criminal act may be afoot ,
t he stop and frisk is merely a limit ed prot ect ive search of out er clot hing for weapons.20

In Knowles v. Iowa,21 t he U.S. Supreme Court held t hat when a police officer stops a person for speeding and
correspondingly issues a cit at ion inst ead of arrest ing t he lat t er, t his procedure does not aut horize t he officer to
conduct a full search of t he car. T he Court t herein held t hat t here was no just ificat ion for a full-blown search
when t he officer does not arrest t he motorist . Inst ead, police officers may only conduct minimal int rusions, such
as ordering t he motorist to alight from t he car or doing a pat down:

In Robinson, supra, we not ed t he t wo historical rat ionales for t he "search incident to arrest " except ion: (1) t he
need to disarm t he suspect in order to t ake him into custody, and (2) t he need to preserve evidence for lat er use
at t rial. x x x But neit her of t hese underlying rat ionales for t he search incident to arrest except ion is sufficient to
just ify t he search in t he present case.

We have recognized t hat t he first rat ionale—officer safet y—is "‘bot h legit imat e and weight y,’" x x x T he t hreat to
officer safet y from issuing a t raffic cit at ion, however, is a good deal less t han in t he case of a custodial arrest . In
Robinson, we st at ed t hat a custodial arrest involves "danger to an officer" because of "t he ext ended exposure
which follows t he t aking of a suspect into custody and t ransport ing him to t he police st at ion." 414 U. S., at 234-
235. We recognized t hat "[t ]he danger to t he police officer flows from t he fact of t he arrest , and it s at t endant
proximit y, st ress, and uncert aint y, and not from t he grounds for arrest ." Id., at 234, n. 5. A rout ine t raffic stop, on
t he ot her hand, is a relat ively brief encount er and "is more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . t han to a
formal arrest ." Berkemer v. McCart y, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973)
("Where t here is no formal arrest . . . a person might well be less host ile to t he police and less likely to t ake
conspicuous, immediat e st eps to dest roy incriminat ing evidence").

T his is not to say t hat t he concern for officer safet y is absent in t he case of a rout ine t raffic stop. It plainly is
1 â w p h i1

not . See Mimms, supra, at 110; Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But while t he concern for officer safet y in t his cont ext
may just ify t he "minimal" addit ional int rusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of t he car, it does not by
it self just ify t he oft en considerably great er int rusion at t ending a full fieldt ype search. Even wit hout t he search
aut horit y Iowa urges, officers have ot her, independent bases to search for weapons and prot ect t hemselves
from danger. For example, t hey may order out of a vehicle bot h t he driver, Mimms, supra, at 111, and any
passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a "pat down" of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable
suspicion t hat t hey may be armed and dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a "Terry pat down" of
t he passenger compart ment of a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion t hat an occupant is dangerous and may
gain immediat e cont rol of a weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even conduct a full
search of t he passenger compart ment , including any cont ainers t herein, pursuant to a custodial arrest , New
York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460 (1981).

Nor has Iowa shown t he second just ificat ion for t he aut horit y to search incident to arrest —t he need to discover
and preserve evidence. Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a cit at ion, all t he evidence
necessary to prosecut e t hat offense had been obt ained. No furt her evidence of excessive speed was going to
be found eit her on t he person of t he offender or in t he passenger compart ment of t he car. (Emphasis supplied.)

T he foregoing considered, pet it ioner must be acquit t ed. While he may have failed to object to t he illegalit y of his
arrest at t he earliest opport unit y, a waiver of an illegal warrant less arrest does not , however, mean a waiver of
t he inadmissibilit y of evidence seized during t he illegal warrant less arrest .22

T he Const it ut ion guarant ees t he right of t he people to be secure in t heir persons, houses, papers and effect s
against unreasonable searches and seizures.23 Any evidence obt ained in violat ion of said right shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While t he power to search and seize may at t imes be necessary
to t he public welfare, st ill it must be exercised and t he law implement ed wit hout cont ravening t he
const it ut ional right s of cit izens, for t he enforcement of no st at ut e is of sufficient import ance to just ify
indifference to t he basic principles of government .24

T he subject it ems seized during t he illegal arrest are inadmissible.25 T he drugs are t he very corpus delict i of t he
crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. T hus, t heir inadmissibilit y precludes convict ion and calls for t he
acquit t al of t he accused.26
WHEREFORE, t he Pet it ion is GRANT ED. T he 18 February 2011 Decision of t he Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
32516 affirming t he judgment of convict ion dat ed 19 February 2009 of t he Regional Trial Court , 5t h Judicial
Region, Naga Cit y, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. RT C 2003-0087, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Pet it ioner
Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby ACQUIT T ED and ordered immediat ely released from det ent ion, unless his cont inued
confinement is warrant ed by some ot her cause or ground.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associat e Just ice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associat e Just ice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associat e Just ice Associat e Just ice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associat e Just ice

AT T E S T AT IO N

I at t est t hat t he conclusions in t he above Decision were reached in consult at ion before t he case was assigned
to t he writ er of t he opinion of t he Court ’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associat e Just ice
Chairperson

C E R T IFIC AT IO N

Pursuant to Sect ion 13, Art icle VIII of t he Const it ut ion and t he Division Chairperson’s At t est at ion, I cert ify t hat
t he conclusions in t he above Decision had been reached in consult at ion before t he case was assigned to t he
writ er of t he opinion of t he Court ’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Just ice

Footnotes
1
T he Pet it ion was originally capt ioned as "Rodel Luz y Ong v. Hon. Court of Appeals, Hon. Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court , Branch 21, Naga Cit y." However, under Sect ion 4, Rule 45 of t he Rules of Court , t he
pet it ion must st at e t he full name of t he appealing part y as t he pet it ioner and t he adverse part y as
respondent , wit hout impleading t he lower court s or judges t hereof eit her as pet it ioners or respondent s.
2
Penned by Associat e Just ice Ricardo R. Rosario and concurred in by Associat e Just ices Hakim S.
Abdulwahid and Samuel H. Gaerlan.
3
Rollo, p. 91.
4
Docket ed as Criminal Case No. RT C 2003-0087; rollo, pp. 90-102.
5
See Sect ion 11, Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or t he Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
6
Rollo, p. 101.
7
Rollo, p. 23.
8
Id. at 96.
9
People v. Saludes, 452 Phil. 719, 728 (2003).
10
Rules of Court , Rule 113, Sec. 1.