Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
A sweetheart cannot be forced to have
sex against her will. Definitely, a man
cannot demand sexual gratification from a
fiancee and, worse, employ violence upon
her on the pretext of love. Love is not a
license for lust. (People v Dreu, GR
126282, June 20, 2000)
The sweetheart theory is considered an
incommonly weak defense because its
presence does not automatically negate
the commission of rape. The gravamen of
the crime of rape is sexual congress of a
man with a woman without her consent.
Hence, notwithstanding the existence of a
romantic relationship, a woman cannot be
forced to engaged in sexual intercourse
against her will. (GR 168448)
The sweetheart defense must be proven
by compelling evidence: first, that the
accused and the victim were lovers; and
second, that she consented to the alleged
sexual relations. The second is as
important as the first, because this court
has held often enough that love is not a
license for lust. (People Olesco v GR
174861, April 11, 2011)
As has been consistently ruled, “a Love
affair does not justify rape, for the beloved
cannot be sexually violated against her
will. Love is not a license for
lust.” (People v Bisora, GR 21894, June 5,
2017)
Conspiracy exist when 2 or more
persons come to an agreement
regarding the commission of a crime
and decide to commit it. Proof of a prior
meeting between perpetrators to discuss
the commission of the crime is not
necessary as long as their concerted acts
reveal a common design and unity of
purpose. In such case, the act of one is
the act of all. Here, the 3 men
undoubtedly acted in concert as they went
to the house of Norberto together, each
with his own firearm. It is therefore, no
longer necessary to identify and prove that
it is the bullet particularly fired from
appellant’s firear m that killed the
children. (People v Jugueta, GR 202124,
April 5, 2016)
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An accused who pleads a justifying
circumstance under Article 11 admits
to the commission of acts which would
otherwise engender criminal liability.
However, he asserts that he is justified
in committing the acts. In the process of
proving a justifying circumstance, the
accused risks admitted the imputed acts,
which may justify the existence of an
offense were it not for the exculpating
facts. Conviction follows if the evidence for
the accused fails to prove the existence of
justifying circumstances. (Velasquez v
People, GR 195021, Mar 15, 2017)
In a complex crime, 2 or more crimes
are actually committed, however, in the
eyes of the law and in the conscience of
the offender they constitute only 1
crime, thus, only one penalty is
imposed. There are 2 kinds of complex
crime. The first is known as compound
crime, or when a single act constitutes 2
or more grave or less grave felonies while
the other is known as complex crime
proper, or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other. The
classic example of the first kind is when a
single bullet results in the death of 2 or
more persons. A different rule governs
where separate and distinct acts result in
a number killed. Deeply rooted is the
doctrine that when various victimes expire
from separate shot, such acts constitute
separate and distinct crimes. (People v
Nelmida, GR 184500, Sep 11, 2012)
If the components of complex crime or
special complex crime are alleged in 2
different informations, the accused
shall be convicted of separate crimes so
as not to violate his right to be inform
of the nature of the crime charged
against him. In cases of splitting of
special complex crime or complex by
alleging its components in 2 information,
the accused cannot be convicted of: (1)
special complex crime of robbery with
homicide but separate crimes of robbery
and homicide (People v Legaspi, GR
92167-68, July 14, 1998); (2) Qualified
caranapping but separate crimes of simple
car napping and homicide (People v
Paramil, 2000, People v Peridas and Dela
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
Cruz, 2002); or (3) compound crime of
murder and frustrated murder but
separate crimes of murder and frustrated
murder (People v Umawid, GR 208719,
June 9, 2014); or (4) special complex
crime of kidnapping with rape but
separate crimes of kidnapping and rape
(People v Cilot, GR 208410, Oct 19, 2016).
In sum, in recognizing his constitutional
right, the accused was prejudiced since he
was penalized for 2 crimes instead of one.
His right under the Constitution was
respected but his right to the benefit of Art
48 of the RPC on complex crim was
sacrificed. The rule on splitting of special
complex crime and complex crim should
be re-examined by the SC if the
application thereof will prejudice the
accused.
Pursuant to Art 69, the privileged
mitigating circumstance of incomplete
self-defense reduces the penalty by 1 or 2
degrees than that prescribed by law. For
this purpose, the accused must prove
the existence of the majority of the
elements for self-defense, but unlawful
aggression, being an indispensable
element, must be present. Either or both
of the other requisites may be absent,
namely: reasonable necessity of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. (People v Dulin, GR
171284, June 29, 2015)
The crowded situation in any small house
would sometimes be held to minimize the
opportunity for committing rape, but it
has been shown repeatedly be experience
that many instances of rape wer e
committed not in seclusion but in very
public circumstances. Cramped spaces of
habitation have not halted the criminal
from imposing himself on the weaker
victim, for privacy is not a hallmark of the
crime of rape. Rape can be committed in
a cramped dwelling despite the
probable presence of other occupants
because seclusion is not an element of
the crime. Its commission can be
established by circumstancial evidence
even if the victime, being the sole witness,
was rendered unconcsious during its
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commission. (People v Nuyok, GR 195424,
June 15, 2015)
While we agree with private respondent
that the gravamen of violation of BP 22
is the issuance of worthless checks that
are dishonered upon their presentment
for payment, we should not apply penal
laws mechanically. We must find if the
application of the law is consistent with
the purpose of and reason of the law. It is
not the letter alone but the spirit of the
law also gives it life. The creditor having
collected already more than a sufficient
amount to cover the value of the checks
for payment of rentas, via auction sale, we
find that holding the debtor’s president to
answer for a criminal case under BP 22 2
years after said collection, is no longer
tenable nor justified by law or equitable
considerations. (Griffith v CA, 379 SCRA
94, 106, 2002)
The mere act of issuing a worthless
check, even if merely as an
accommodation, is covered by BP 22.
The agreement sorrounding the issuance
of dishonored checks is irrelevant. (LBP v
Ramon Jacinto, GR 154622, Aug 3, 2010)
A sum of money received by an employee
on behalf of an employer is considered to
be only in the material possession of the
employee. The material possession of an
employee is adjunct, by reason of his
employment, to a recognition of the
juridical possession of the employer. So
long as the juridical possession of the
thing appropriated did not pass to the
employee-perpetrator, the offense
committed remains to be theft,
qualified or otherwise. Hence, the
conversion of personal property in the
case of an emplyee having material
possession of the said property constitutes
theft, whereas in the case of an agent
whom both material and juridical
possession have been transferred,
misappropriation of the same property
constitutes estafa. (Benabaye v People, GR
203466, Feb 25, 2015)
Whether the offense committed is
serious or slight oral defamation
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
depends not only upon the sense and
grammatical meaning of the utterances
but also upon the special circumstances
of the case, like the social standing or the
advanced age of the offended party. The
gravity depends upon (1) the expressions
used; (2) the personal relations of the
accused and the offended party; and (3)
the special circumstances of the case, the
antecedents or relationship between the
offended party and the offender, which
may tend to prove the intention of the
offended at the time. In particular, it is a
rule that uttering defamatory words in the
heat of anger, with some provocation on
the part of the offended part constitutes
only a light felony. (Ramos v People, GR
226454, Nov 20, 2017)
Today, we simply cannot be stuck to
the Maria Clara stereotype of a demure
and reserves Filipino woman. We should
stay away from such mindset and accept
the realities of a woman’s dynamic role in
society today; she who has over the years
transformed into a strong and confidently
intelligent and beautiful persons, willing to
fight for her rights. Records show that the
victime was watching beauty pageant
when she went to the restroom to relieve
herself. However, Amarela dragged her
under a makeshift stage where she was
raped. The victim managed to escape and
hid in another house where she was raped
by Rancho. In acquitting the 2, the SC
noted the discrepancies in the testimony
of the victim in court and in her affidavit,
like how she was raped by Amarela when
she admitted that the place was dark and
sorrounded by trees. The hight court said,
“we have hinged on the impression that no
young Filipino of decent of repute would
publicly admit that she has been sexually
abused, unless that is the truth, for it is
her natural instinct to protect her honer
(Woman’s Honor Doctrine).” “But in this
day and age, such misconception would
not only put the accused at an unfair
disadvantage, but creates a travesty of
justice.”
SC declared as unconstitutional the
prohibition against plea bargaining in
Sec 23 of RA 9165 for being contrary to
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the rule-making authority of the SC.
Since the provision on plea bargaining is
procedural, Congress cannot through
legislation prohibit plea bargaining
because the procedural rules made by the
SC allows it. (Estipona v Lobrigo, GR
226679, Aug 15, 2017)
The fraternal contract should not be
signed in blood, celebrated with paid,
marred by injuries, and perpetrated
through suffering. That is the essense of
RA 8049 or the Anti-Hazing Law of 1995.
(Dungo v People, GR 209464, July 1,
2015)
A defendant has no constitutional right
to plea bargain. The acceptance of an
offer to plead guilty is not a demandable
right but depends on the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, which
is a condition precedent to a valid plea of
guilty to a lesser offense that is
necessarily included in the of fense
charged. The reason for this is that the
pr osecutor has full contr ol of the
prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is
to always prosecute the proper offense,
not any lesser or graver one, based on
what the evidence on hand can sustain.
(Estipona v Lobrigo, GR 226679, Aug 15,
2017)
If there are 2 persons kidnapped and
killed, the accused is liable for 2 counts of
kidnapping with homicide. Where the
person kidnapped is killed in the course
of the detention, regardless of whether
the killing was purposely sought or was
merely an afterthought, kidnapping and
murder or homicide can neither be
complexed nor be treated as separate
crimes, but shall be punished as a
special complex crime of kidnapping
with homicide. If as a consequence of
illegal detention, the victim was raped and
then killed, the crime committed is a
special complex crime of kidnapping with
homicide. Rape will be considered as
component of this special complex crim.
Where the kidnapped victim is rape and
killed, rape is not an aggravating
circumstance but just a component of
this special complex crim of kidnapping
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
with homicide. (People v Larrañaga, GR
138874-75, Feb 3, 2004)
Consent is immaterial in cases under RA
7610 where the offended party is below 12
years of age. However, consent of the
child is material and may even be a
defense in child prostitution or sexual
abuse where the child is 12 years of age
or above. Such consent may be implied if
the prosecution failed to prove that
money, profit or any other consideration,
or coercion or influence is the reason why
the child engaged in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with the offender.
(People v Tulugan, GR 227363, Mar 12,
2019)
A common misconception is that all mala
in se crimes are found in the RPC, while
all mala prohibita crimes are provided by
special penal laws. The better approach
to distinguish between mala in se and
mala prohibita crimes is the
determination of the inherent
immorality of the penalized act. If the
punishable act or omission is immoral in
itself, then it is a crime mala in se; on the
contrary, if it is not immoral in itself, but
there is a statute prohibiting its
commission by reasons of public policy,
then it is mala prohibita. There may be
mala in se crimes under special laws such
as plunder under RA 7080 and child
abuse under RA 7610. Similary, there may
be mala prohibita crimes defined in the
RPC such as technical malversation.
Malversation is malum in se and a
culpable felony, which can be
committed by means of dolo and culpa.
Hence, public officers, who commits
malversation, can be held liable for
violation of Sec 3e of RA 3019 for causing
damage to the government through
evidence bad faith (Dolo) or gross
inexcusable malversation (Culpa). (Pajaro,
GR 167860-65, June 17, 2008)
Technical malversation is malum
prohibitum which can be committed
without dolo and culpa. hence, public
officers, who commits technical
malversation may not be held liable for
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violation of Sec 3e of RA 3019 unless
additional circumstances manifest
partiality, evidence bad faith and gross
inexcusable negligence. Using tobacco
fund to finance the regular operations of
the municipality, which are not in
accordance with the law creating such fin
constitutes technical malversation.
However, it was held that the mere act of
using government money to fund a project
which is different from what the law states
you have to spend it dor does not fall
under the definition of manifest partiality
nor gross ineqxcusable negligence. It must
always be remembered that manifest
partiality and gross inexcusable
negligence are not elements in the crime of
technical malversation (Villarosa v
Ombudsman, GR 221418, Jan 23, 2019)
In a criminal case in which the offended
party is the State, the interest of the
private complainant or the private
offended party is limited to the civil
liability arising therefrom. If a criminal
case is dismissed by the trial court or if
there is an acquittal, an appeal of the
criminal aspect may be undertaken,
whenever legally feasible, only by the
State through the solicitor general. As a
rule, only the Solicitor General may
represent the People of the Philippines on
appeal. The private offended party or
complainant may not undertake such
appeal. While a private prosecutor may
be allowed to intervene in criminal
proceedings on appeal in the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court, his
participation is subordinate to the
interest of the People, hence, he cannot
be permitted to adopt a position
contrary to that of the Solicitor
General. To do so would be tantamount to
giving the private prosecutor the direction
and control of the criminal proceeding,
contrary to the provisions of law. In this
case, respondent was convicted of eight (8)
counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for
which he was imposed the penalty of fine
instead of imprisonment pursuant to
Administrative Circulars No. 12-2000 and
13- 2001. Thus, the penalty of fine and
the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment
in case of nonpayment thereof pertain to
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
the criminal aspect of the case. On the
other hand, the indemnification for the
face value of the dishonored checks refers
to the civil aspect of the case.
Consequently petitioner could not appeal
the imposition of fine as penalty which
was not even questioned by the People
through the OSG. (People v Alapan, GR
199527, Jan 10, 2018)
In relation to Republic Act. No. 5465
which amended Article 39 of the RPC,
discusses the rationale behind the
necessity for expressly imposing
subsidiary imprisonment in the judgment
of conviction.
x x x no penalty shall be executed except
by virtue of a final judgment. As the fact
show that there is no judgment sentencing
the accused to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvent to pay
the fine imposed upon him, because the
said subsidiary imprisonment is not stated
in the judgment finding him guilty, it is
clear that the court could not legally compel
him to serve said subsidiary imprisonment.
(People v Fajardo)
Indeed, Administrative Circular No.
13-2001 provides that "should only a fine
be imposed and the accused be unable
to pay the fine, there is no legal
obstacle to the application of the
Revised Penal Code provisions on
subsidiary imprisonment." However, the
Circular does not sanction indiscriminate
imposition of subsidiary imprisonment for
the same must still comply with the law.
Here, the judgment of conviction did not
provide subsidiary imprisonment in case
of failure to pay the penalty of fine. Thus,
subsidiary imprisonment may not be
imposed without violating the RPC and the
constitutional provision on due process.
(People v Alapan, GR 199527, Jan 10,
2018)
As a general rule, a police officer, who
receives gift from a person as a token of
generosity, may be held criminally
liable under Sec 7d of RA 6713, which
punishes public officials and employees,
who shall solicit or accept, directly or
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indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor,
entertainment, loan or anything of
monetary value from any person in the
course of their official duties or in
connection with any operation being
regulated by, or any transaction which
may be affected by the functions of their
office.
Under Sec 3d of RA 6713, “receiving
any gift” includes the act of accepting
directly or indirectly, a gift from a
person other than a member of his
family or relative as defined in this Act,
even on the occassion of a family
celebration or national festivity like
Christmas, if the value of the gift is
neither nominal nor insignificant, or
the gift is given in anticipation of, or in
exchange for, a favor. If the value of the
gift is nominal or insignificant, or the gift
is not given in anticipation of, or in
exchange for, a favor, the police officer,
who received such gift, is not liable under
RA 6713. Thus, respondent Lilia (together
with 11 other employees of Branch 28 to
purchase lechon for their christmas)
cannot be held liable under RA 6713
because the governor’s gift, aside from
being unsolicited, was also nominal or
insignificant in value; and not given in
aniticipation of, or in exhange for, a favor.
The receipt of the gift does not fall within
the ambit of Sec 7d of RA 6713, in relation
to Secs 3c and d. Sec 14 of RA 3019
recognizes as lawful receipt of unsolicited
gift of insignificant value given as a token
of gratitude.
If a Chinese fishing vessel deliberately
bump a Filipino vessel in the West
Philippine Sea covered by the exclusive
economic zone of the Phil, and as a
consequence, several fishermen died,
the Phil’s jurisdiction over the crime of
murder cannot be based on the theory
that the Phil has sovereignty over the
zone. The Phil has no sovereignty over the
200 miles eez but only sovereign right to
fish and exploit the natural resources in
the zone. This sovereign right is not
equivalent to sovereignty. Other principles
must be used to justify its jurisdiction
over murder committed within the zone
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
such as flag state rule or passive
personality principle.
Accused is liable for the wrongful axt
done although it differs from the
wrongful act intended. Here, accused
consciously poured hot cooking oil from a
casserole on CCC, consequently injuign
AAA (3 years old) and BBB (2 months old)
buring their skins and faces. He is liable
for child abuse involving physical injury
although there is no intent to degrade,
debase or demean the intrinsic worth and
dignity of AAA and BBB as human beings
(such acts not alleged in the information).
The intention of the accused is merely ro
inflict injury on CCC but because of
aberratio ictus or mistake of blow, AAA
and BBB were also injured. Hence, he is
libale for child abuse against AAA and
BBB although it differs from the wrongful
act intended (physical injuries on CCC).
This is not a compound crime of physical
injuries and child abuse since the latter is
an offense punishable under special laws,
and hence, it cannot be made a
component of a complex crime. (Patulot v
People, GR 235071, Jan 7, 2019)
Article 4(1) involves intentional
felonies. Hence, abberatio ictus, praeter
intentionem and error in personae involve
mistake but not a result of culpa.
The accused here was specifically charged
of committing acts which are prejudicial to
the child’s development and which
demean the intrisic worth and dignity of
the child as human being. He saw the
victim and his companions hurting his
minor daughters. Angered, accused struck
minor-victim at the back with his hands
and slapped his face. Since the accused
committed the act at the spur of the
moment, they are perpetrated without
intent to debase his “intrinsic worth
and dignity” as a human being, or to
humiliate or embarass him. Without
such intent, the crim committed is not
child abuse under RA 7610 but merely
slight physical injuries. (Bongalon v
People, GR 169533, Mar 20, 2013)
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Under Article 89 of the RPC, amnesty
totally extinguishes criminal liability, the
penalty for the crime and all its effects.
However, if the granting of benefit under
amnesty proclamation is subject to a
condition, the criminal extinction will
only occur upon the happening of the
condition and not upon the issuance of
the proclamation by the President or
concurrance of Congr ess. Amnesty
proclamation no. 76, dated June 21, 1948
issued by President Quirino, granted
amnesty to huks, who have committed the
rebellion subject to the condition that they
must present themselves with all their
arms to the authorities within 20 days
from the date of concurrence by the
Congress. Compliance with the condition
as determined by the amnesty commission
or the court shall extinguish his criminal
liability. (Tolentino v Catoy, GR L-2503,
Dec 10, 1948)
Amnesty proclamation issued by a
former presindent under express
authority of the Constitution and
concurred in by the Congress has the
nature, force, effect and operation of a
law. Hence, an incumbent president
cannopt unilaterally revoke the bilateral
acts of the former President and Congress
in making an amnesty proclamation.
Same as a law, amnesty proclamation can
only revoke by concurrent actions of the
President and Congress. Moreover,
amnesty extinguishes the criminal liability
of the amnesty beneficiary. Hence,
revocation made after criminal extinction
will noit prejudice the amnesty
beneficiary. (People v Macadaeg, GR
L-4316, May 28, 1952). However, the
president can nullify the decision of the
Department of National Defense for failure
to file application for amnesty as an
express precondition to the granting of the
benefit under an amnesty proclamation
and failure to admit his guilt. But the
nullification is subject to judicial review. If
the court finds that the amnesty
beneficiary made an application and
admitted his guilt therein and the
department of national defense properly
approved the application, it may reverse
the decision of the Presindent on ground
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of grave abuse of discretion tantamount to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction. The
proper approval of the amnesty
application extinguishes the criminal
liability of the applicant for the crim
covered by the proclamation.
Stealthing is the removal of condom by
the man during sex without consent of
the woman. In our country, there is no
crime of stealthing in the book of
statutes. Moreover, stealthing is not
equivalent to rape since lack of consent as
an element of this crime pertains to sex
and not to the removal of the condom.
However, if the woman expressly and
categorically required the use of
condom as a condition to sex, and
made it clear that she would not give
her consent to a condomless sexual
intercourse, stealthing may constitute
fraudlent machination. But absolute
lack of consent must be shown to make
the man liable for rape through
fraudulent machination. If the woman
failed to resist the continued sex, or
register a strong objection upon knowing
that the man already removed the condom
from his penis, rape must be ruled out.
Rape is a serious crime, which is
punishable by reclusion perpetua. Hence,
the acts committed by the accused must
be clearly within the contemplation of the
statute on rape; otherwise, he must be
acquitted of rape pased on the pro reo
principle.
Under RA 10627 "Anti-Bullying Act of
2013”, bullying refers to any severe or
repeated use by 1 or more students of a
written, verbal or electronic expression, or
a physical act or gestur e, or any
combination thereof, directed at another
student that has the effect of actually
causing or placing the latter in a
reasonable fear of physical or emotional
harm or damage to his property; creating
a hostile environment at school for the
other student; infringing on the rights of
the other student at school; or materially
and substantially disrupting the education
process or the orderly operation of a
school. Howeber, RA 10627 does not
punish bullying as a crime. It merely
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requires the schools to adopt
mechanism to address bullying and to
report bullying incidents to the police
authorities. However, bullying may
constitute a crime punishable under
the RPC such as physical injuries,
unjust vexation, threat or coercion. If
the unjust vexation or threat is committed
with the ise of communication or
information technology, the penalty for
this crime shall be upgraded 1 degree
higher because of Sec 6 of RA 10175. In
sum, the crime committed is cyber unjust
vexation or cyber threat.
There are 3 requirements on inventory
and photographing of confiscated
dangerous drugs, to wit: (1)
immediateness - the inventory and
photograph of the confiscated drugs shall
be made immediately by the apprehending
officers after seizure and confiscation
thereof; (2) place of inventory and
photographing - made at the place where
the seach warrant is served, or at the
nearest police station or the nearest office
of the apprehending officers in case of
warrantless seizures; (3) three witness -
made in the presnece of accused or person
from whom such items were confiscated
seized, or his representativeg or counsel,
elected public official AND a representative
of the National Prosecution Service OR the
media.
Non-compliance with the requirements
shall not render void and invalid the
seizures and custody over dangerous
drugs provided that the following
requisites are present: (1) the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team; and (2)
there is a justifiable ground for the non-
compliance of such requirement. The
following are justifiable grounds for failure
to comply with the 3-witness rule: (1) the
attendance of elective official and media or
NPS representative was impossible
because the place of arrest was a remote
area; (2) the safety of these required
witnesses during the inventory and
photograph of the seized drugs was
threatened by an immediate retaliatory
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action of the accused or any person acting
for and in his behalf; (3) the elected
official themselves were involved in the
punishable act sought to be apprehended;
(4) earnest efforts to secure the presence
of these required witnesses within the
period required under Art 125 of the RPC
prove futile through no fault of the
arresting officers, who face the threat of
being charged with arbitrary detention; or
(5) the time constraints and urgency of the
anti-drug operations, which often rely on
tips of confidential assets, prevented the
law enforcers from obtaining the presence
of the required witnesses even before the
offenders could escape.
The police officers must in the sworn
statements state their compliance with
the requirements of Sec 21 of RA 9165
or the justification for non-compliance
thereof and steps taken to preserve the
integrity of the confiscated dangerous
drugs; otherwise, the investigating
fiscal must not immediately file the
case before the court. Instead, he must
refer the case for further preliminary
investigation. If the investigating fiscal
diled the case despite such absence, the
court may exercise its discretion to either
reguse to issue a commitment order (or
warrant of arrest) or dismiss the case
outright for lack of probable cause. (People
v Lim, GR 231989, Sep 4, 2018)
Under RA 7432 as amended RA 9994, a
senior citizen or elderly refers to any
resident citizen of the Phil at least 60
years old. Thus, on the 60th birthday of a
resident citizen, he becomes a senior
citizen under the law. However, the
concept of seniority in criminal law is
different under RA 7432. Under Art
13(2) of the RPC, the mitigating
circumstance of seniority is present if
the accused is over 70 years of age.
Thus, on his 70th birthday, an offender is
not yet a senior citizen; he becimes a
senior citizen after his 70th bithday.
However, it must be noted that seniority
as a mitigating circumstance can only be
considered if the offender is over 70 years
of age at the time of the commission of the
crime, and not at the time of the
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promulgation of the decision. (People v
Reyes, GR 177105-06, Aug 12, 2010) The
penalty imposable to a senior citizen shall
be reduced. There is nothing in the RPC or
in any other laws that exempt a senior
citizen from criminal liability. A senior
citizen is entitled to privileges under the
law, custom and tradition. However,
committing a crime is not a privilege to
which a senior citizen is entitled. But if
the accused is suffering from senility
amounting to insanity at the time of
the commission of the crime, he is
exempt from criminal liability due to
the circumstnace of insanity and not
seniority.
There are 2 kinds of exempting
circumstance, to wit: general exempting
circumstance and specific exempting
circumstances. General exempting
circumstances can be appreciated in
ANY CRIME even if punishable under
special law in favor of ANY OFFENDER,
whether principal, accomplice or
accessory. They are those listed in Article
12 of the RPC such as insanity and Sec 6
of RA 9344 on minority. The following are
specific exempting circumstances:
relationship in favor of accessory by
destroying or concealing the body,
instrument or effects of the crime or by
helping the principal to escape under
certain conditions; or (Art 20) in theft,
malicious mischief or swindling; (Art 332)
exceptional circumstance in favor of one
who inflicted slight or less serious physical
injuries upon his spouse or daughter; (Art
247) minority in prostitution, sniffing
rugby, mendicancy, or status offense e.g.
parental disobedience, curfew violation or
truancy; and (Secs 57 and 58 of RA 9344)
being a trafficked victim in prostitution,
working without permit, rebellion or any
other crime committed in relation to
trafficking in person or in obedience to the
order made by the trafficker in relation
thereto (Sec 17 of RA 9208).
Grave threat and light threat can be
committed orally or in writing. Other light
threat of the first form is committed with
the use of weapon. Other light threat of
the second form and third form must be
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
made orally. Grave threat can be
committed with or without demand for
money or imposition of condition. Light
threat must be committed with demand
for money or imposition of condition.
Other light threat must be committed
without demanding money or imposing
condition. In grave threat and other light
threat of the first or second form, the
offender threatens to inflict a wrong
constituting a crime. In light threat and
other light threat of the third form,
offender threatened to inflict a wrong not
constituting a crime. The SC (in division)
said that light threat and other light
threats under Art 283 and 285, the wrong
threatened does not amount to a crime,
while grave threat under Art 282, the
wrong threatened constitute a crime
(Caluag v People, GR 171511, Mar 4,
2009). According to Justice Reyes, the
word “not” in the definition of other
light threat under Art 285 (2) is a
mistake because the Spanish text
thereof used words “constituya delito”
which words when translated into
English means “constituting crime.”
Also, the SC en banc said that orally
threatening another in the heat of anger
with some harm constituting a crime is
other light threat under Art 285 (2).
(People v Medrano, GR L-24364, Feb 22,
1968). Moreover, other light threats under
Art 285 (1) involves threat with a weapon.
Such threat with a weapon amounts to a
threat to inflict harm constituting a crime
such as physical injuries or homicide.
Hence, it is submitted that the Caluag
case is not controlling. It cannot abandon
the principle in Medrano where the SC is
sitting en banc.
Having sexual intercourse with an
offended party through force, threat, or
intimidation is rape under Article 266-A of
the RPC. Having sexual intercourse with
a mentally retaded person is equivalent
to having sexual intercourse with a
person through intimidation. If the
information alleged intimidation as a
mode of raping the victim, but the
evidence merely proves her mental
retardation, the accused can be convicted
of rape through intimidation under Art
NMacmac
266-A(a). (People v Balatazo, GR 118027,
jan 29, 2004) If the information alleged
the victim of rape is demented, but the
evidence merely proves her mental
retardation, the accused cannot be
convicted of rape of demented person
under Art 266-A(d) unless the accused
failed to raise the mistake in the
information as an objection. (People v
Ventura, GR 205230, Mar 12, 2014)
Having sexual intercourse with a
demented person is rape under Article
266-a(d). Mentally retarded person is
not a demented person. (People v Caoile,
GR 203041, June 5, 2013)
Mental retardation is within the
contemplation of deprivation of reason.
Having sexual intercourse with the
offended party, who is deprived of
reason, is rape under Art 266-A(b) of the
RPC. Hence, having sexual inercourse
with idiot, imbecile, feebleminded or
person with borderline intelligence is rape
of a person deprived of reason under Art
266-A(b). (People v Butiong; People v
Bayrante, GR 188978, June 13, 2012)
Having sexual intercourse with the
offended party, who is under 12 years
of age, is statutory rape under Article
266-A (d). The words “age” includes
chronological age and mental age.
Hence, having sexual intercourse with
idiot, imbecile or feebleminded is statutory
rape under Art 266-A(d). (People v
Daniega, GR 212201, June 28, 2017.
However, having sexual intercourse
with a person with borderline
intelligence is not statutory rape
because his mental age is above 12
years. Mental retardation includes (a)
idiot, whose mental age is 2-year old
because is IQ is 0-19; (b) imbecile, whose
mental age is 7-year old because his IQ is
20-49; (c) moron or feebleminded, whose
mental age is 12-year old because his IQ
is 50-69 and (d) a peson with borderline
intelligence because his IQ is 70-89
(People v Butiong; People v Bayrante, GR
188978, June 13, 2012)
Under Sec 5(b) of RA 7610, when the
chold exploited in prostitution or
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subjected to sexual abuse is under 12
years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted for rape or acts of
lasciviousness under the RPC. For
purpioses of Sec 5(b), there is no
difference between the actual age and
mental age. Thus, idiot, imbecile and
feebleminded is covered by this Provision
(People v Pusing, GR 208009, July 11,
2016). However, person suffering from
borderline intelligence is not within the
contemplation of Sec 5b because his
mental age is above 12 years.
Under Article 12 of RPC, an imbecile is
exempt from criminal liability. In
exempting circumstance of imbecility,
what is important is the mental age of the
accused, and not his chronological age. If
an imbecile is exempt from criminal
liability, it follows that an idiot, whose
mental age is lower than an imbecile is
also exempt. However, the exempt
circumstance of imbecility cannot be
considered if the accused is
feebleminded or suffering from
borderline intelligence because their
mental age is higher than an imbecile. But
a feebleminded is entitled to mitigating
circumstance of mental illness (People v
Nuñez; People v Formigones, GR L-3246,
Nov 29, 1950)
In exempting circumstance of minority
under Sec 6 of RA 9344 (15 years of age
or under at the time of commission of
offense exempt from criminal liability),
what is important is the chronological
or actual age of the accused, and not
his mental age. A child is deemed to be
15 years of age on the day of the 15th
anniversary of his/her birthdate. Here,
the actual age of the accused is 18 years
old and mental age is 9 years old. The
exempting circumstance of minority was
not appreciated because the accused is
not a minor. (People v Roxas, GR 200793,
June 4, 2014)
Rape under RPC and sexual abuse under
Sec 5 of RA 7610 are 2 separate crimes
with distinct elements. (People v Udang,
SC in division GR 210161, Jan 10, 2018).
The “force, threat or intimidation” or
NMacmac
“deprivation of reason or
unconsciousness” required in RPC is not
the same as the “coercion or influence”
required in RA 7610. Consent is
immaterial in the crime of sexual abuse
because the mere act of having sexual
intercourse with a child subjected to
sexual abuse is already punishable by
law. Howeber, consent exonerates an
accused from rape. Sexual abuse is
punished by a special law while rape is a
felony under RPC. Thus, charging the
accused with rape and with sexual abuse
in case the offended party is a child 12
years old and above, will not violate the
right of the accused against double
jeopardy. In sum, if the child is exactly
12 years of age, the sexual offender can
be prosecuted for 2 crimes of sexual
abuse under RA 7610 and rape or acts
of lasciviousness under the RPC
without violating the rule on double
jeopardy. However, if the child is below
12 years of age, the sexual offender can
be prosecuted for a single crime, and
that is, rape or acts of lasciviousness
under the RPC. Under Sec 5 of RA
7610, if the child subject to sexual
abuse is under 12 years of age the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted for
rape or acts of lasciviousness under the
RPC.
The offender cannot be accused of both
crimes, rape under RPC and sexual
abuse under RA 7610 (sexual
intercourse without consent of the
victim), for the same act because his
right against double jeopardy will be
prejudiced (People v Abay, SC en banc,
GR 177752, Feb 24, 2009). Same as in
statutory rape, consent of the child in
sexual abuse obtained through coercion or
influence is not recognized by law. Since
they are the same character, the accused
cannot be prosecuted for both crimes. It is
submitted that Abay case is still
controlling. The Udang case which is
merely sitting in division cannot abandon
Abay case.
If the female consents to have sexual
intercourse with the accused, but then
withdraws her consent BEFORE
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
penetration, and the act is accomplished
by force, it is rape (People v Butiong, GR
168932, Oct 19, 2011). However, if the
female tacitly consents to have sexual
intercourse with the accused, but then
withdraws her consent in the course of
sexual intercourse because she felt
pain, and the act is not rape. (People v
Tionlic, GR 212193, Feb 15, 2017).
Under Art 9 of the RPC as amended by
RA 10951(An Act Ajusting the Amount
or Value of Property and Damage on
which a Penalty is Based. And the Fines
imposed in the RPC), felonies are
classified into grave, less grave and
light felonies. Grave felonies are those to
which the law attaches the capital
punishment or penalties which any of
their periods are afflictive (reclusion
perpetua, temporal, prision mayor, or fine
exceeding 1.2M). Less grave felonies are
those which the law punishes with
penalties which in their maximum period
are correctional (prision correccional,
arresto mayor or a fine not less than 40k
but not exceeding 1.2 M). Light felonies
are those infractions of law or the
commission of which the penalty of
arresto menor or a fine not exceeding
40k (exactly 40k) or both is provided.
However, under Article 26, a fine not
less than 40k (exactly 40k) but not
exceeding 1.2M shall be considered a
correccional penalty (where light felony
can be punished by a correccional
penalty). If the issue is prescription of
penalty, Article 26 on classification of
penalty shall apply. (People v Yu Hai, GR
L-9598, Aug 15, 1956). Under Article 92,
the prescriptive period of correccional
penalty is 10 years. Under Art 26, a fine
exactly 40 shall be considered as
correctional penalty because fine is not
less than 40k. Hence, the period of
prescription of this penalty is 10 years.
Under Article 90, the prescriptive period of
a light felony is 2 months. Under Art 9, a
crime punishable by a fine exactly 40k is a
light felony because it is not exceeding
4ok. Hence the period of prescription for
this crime is 2 months.
NMacmac
Article 320 of the RPC as amended by RA
7659 and Sec 5 of PD 1613 prescribes a
single penalty for arson if death results as
a consequence of the commission thereof.
Thus, there is no complex crime of
arson with homicide under Article 48 of
the RPC because the crime of arson
absorbs the resultant death. (People v
Abayon, GR 204891, Sep 2016) If the
main objective is the burning of the
building or edifice, but death results by
reason or on occassion of arson, the
crime is simply arson, and the resulting
homicide is absorbed. (People v Malngan,
GR 170470, Sep 26, 2006) However, SC
convicted the accused of destructive arson
with homicide under Article 320 which
punishes arson where death resulted as a
consequence thereof (People v Villacorta,
GR 172468). SC en banc described
destructive arson with homicide under
Article 320 as a special complex crime
(People v Jugueta, GR 202124, April 5,
2016). Whether the crime is described as
simple arson, arson resulting to death or
special complex crim of arson with
homicide, homicide shall not be
considered as a separate crime. Arson,
regardless of its description, will absorb
homicide and is punishable under Sec 5
of PD 1613 and Art 320 of RPC, both of
which prescribes a grave penalty where
arson is committed with a resulting
death.
The single larceny rule, which is a
specie of delito continuado principle,
presupposes that the several acts
committed under a single criminal
impulse violated a single penal
provision. Hence, the single larceny rule
is not applicable since cattle rustling and
theft are punishable under different laws.
Compound crime is a single act
consists or 2 or more grave or less
grave felonies. Since carnapping
involving the taking of truck and cattle
rustling involving the taking of horses are
not felonies, they cannot be made
components of a compound crime.
There is nothing in Article 134 of RPC and
RA 9374 which states that rebellion and
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
terrorism are mutualy exclusive of each
other or that they cannot co-exist together.
RA 9372 does not expressly or
impliedly repeal Art 134. And while
rebellion is on the of the predicate
crimes of terrorism, one cannot absorb
th eother as they have different
elements. (Lagman v Medeldea, GR
231658, July 4, 2017) However, rebellion
is a predicate of terrorism, hence, the
latter absorbs the former. Under Sec 49
of RA 9372, when a person has been
prosecuted under a provision of this
Act, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction and after the
accused had pleaded to the charge, the
acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
another prosecution for any offense or
felony which is necessarily included in
the offense charged under this Act. Sec
49 has adopted the rule on double
jeopardy which is not compatible with the
Lagman case on non-mutually exclusive
rule.
When an offense proven by evidence
necessarily included in the offense
charged in the information, both crimes
shall be considered as identical.
Identical offenses are required to apply
the variance rule (Sec 4, Rule 120) and
the rule on double jeopardy. If the 2
crimes are subject to the doctrine of
absorption, they are identical. Teason or
rebellion absorbs murder because the
latter is an indispensable means to
commit the former. In such, since the
murder is an indispensable means to
commit treason or rebellion, the former
shall be considered as a mere ingredient of
the latter. If the information alleged
murder, but the evidence established the
crime of rebellion since the killing of the
victim is made in furtherance of rebellion,
the court can convict the accused of the
lesser crime of rebellion because of the
variance rule. If the accused are convicted
for rebellion under the first information,
they cannot be convicted of murder under
the second information for the killing the
victim in furtherance of rebellion because
NMacmac
of double jeopardy rule (People v
Manglallan; People v Avila; People v
Yuzon, 1957). Treason was not proven
because the evidence fails to satisfy the 2-
witness rule. Accused was convicted of
murder which is necessarily included in
the charge of treason because of the
variance rule (People v Cantos, GR
L-1661, 1949). If the accused is convicted
for treason under the first information, he
cannot be convicted for murder under the
second information involving killing a
guerilla, which act constitutes giving aid
and comfort to the Japanese enemy in
adherence thereof, because of the rule on
double jeopardy (People v Labra, 1948). If
2 crimes are components of a special
complex crime or complex crime, they
are identical. Hence, variance rule or rule
on double jeopardy may apply. Murder is
a component of the special complex crime
of robbery with homicide. If the
information alleged special complex crime
of robbery with homicide with treachery,
but the evidence merely established the
treacherous killing but not the robbery,
the court can convict the accused of the
crime of murder, which is necessarily
included in the charge of robbery with
homicide. If the court did not apply the
variance rule and acquitted the accused
for robbery with homicide, the accused
cannot be prosecuted for homicide, which
is necessarily included in the charge of
robbery with homicide because of the rule
on double jeopardy.
Cuadrilla Theory. Cuadro means four
and in Robbery in Band, there must be at
least 4 armed men. Members of a band
who committed rape during robbey are
liable for robbery with rape but those
unawate of the rape are not liable. If
homicide was committed, those unware
could be liable for Robbery with Homicide.
These cuadrilla theory apples to all special
complex crime, not only to robbery in
band.
Kidnapping is a continuing crime.
Anybody who agreed and contributed
while kidnapping is going on can be held
liable as a conspirator.
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
Non-identical offenses are needed to
apply the rules on substitution of
information (Sec 14, Rule 110). Theft
and estafa through misapproriation are
not identical. Hence, variance rule is not
applicable. If the information alleged
estafa through misapproriation, but the
evidence established theft because the
possession of the accused for being an
employee of the complainant is merely
physical, the court cannot apply the
variance rule because theft proven by
evidence does not necessarily inclde or is
not necessarily included in the charge of
estafa. Hence, the court must acquit the
accused for the crime of estafa charged in
the information. (Chua-Burce v CA, GR
109595, 2000) . However, the court
applying the rile on substitution can
dismiss the case for estafa and order
the filing of new information for theft
(People v Yusay, 1927). Filing of new
information to charge the accused the
proper offense as directed by the proper
court or on the sole initiative of the
prosecution is not a violation of the rule
on double jeopardy since estafa under old
information and theft inder the new
information are not identical (US v Vitog,
GR L-12817, 1917).
RA 10592 which took effect on Oct 10,
2013 authorized the credit of
preventive imprisonment and revision
of good-conduct time allowance of
persons deprived of liberty. That all
prisoners wh are already serving their
sentence or unergoing preventive
imprisonment may qualify for the
reduction of their sentence even before
Oct 10, 2013. The law expanded the
application CGTA for prisoners even
during preventive suspension,
increased the number of days for GCTA,
allowed additional deduction of 15 days
each month for time allowance for
study, teaching or mentoring service,
and expanded the special time
allowance for loyalty even during
preventive suspension.
Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege.
There is no crime when there is no law
punishing the same.
NMacmac
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.
The act cannot be criminal where the
mind is not criminal.
Actus me invito factus non est meus
actus. An act done by me against my wull
is not my act.
Doctrine of Pro Reo. Whenever a penal
law is to be construed or applied and the
law admits of 2 interpretations, one
lenient to the offender and one strict to
the offender, that interpretation which is
lenient or favorable to the offender will be
adopted.
Lex Prospicit, Non Respicit. The law
looks forward, never backward.
The Phils observe the English Rule.
French Rule. Matters happening on board
a merchant vessel while in the territorial
waters of another country are justiciable
only by the courts of the country to which
the vessel belongs. Unless their
commission affects the peace and security
of the territory or the safety of the state is
endangered. English Rule. Matters
happening on board a merchant vessel
while in the territorial waters of another
country are justiciable only by the courts
of the country where the vessel is. Unless
they merely affect things within the vessel
or they refer to the internal management
thereof.
Mens Rea. It is the criminal intent or evil
mind. In theft, the mens Rea is the taking
of the property belonging to another with
intent to gain. General Criminal Intent.
Is presumed from the mere doing of a
wrong act. Specific criminal intent. Is
not presumed because it is an ingredient
or element of a crime. It must be alleged in
the information and must be established
and proven. Proof of specific intent is
reqyired to produce the crime such as in
frustrated and attempted robbery or
homicide.
A consul is not entitled to the
privileges and immunities of an
ambassador or minister. Consuls, vice-
consuls and other commercial
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
representatives of foreign nation are not
diplomatic officers. Consuls are subject to
the penal laws of the country where they
are assigned. (Minucher v CA, GR 142396,
Feb 11, 2003)
Light felonies are punishable only when
they are consummated. Only the
principals and their accomplices are made
liable for the commission of light felonies.
Accessories are not libale for the
commission of light felonies (Art 19).
Article 7 provides that light felonies are
punishable in all stages when
committed against persons or property.
However, if the offender is only an
accomplice and there are 2 ore more
mitigating circumstances without any
compensating aggravating circumstance,
the appropriate penalty will be 2 degress
lower. That the penalty lower than arresto
menor is public censure. There is no 2
degrees lower than arresto menor.
Mistake in blow (aberratio ictus). A
person directed the blow at an intended
victim, but because of poor aim, that blow
landed on somebody else. In aberratio
ictus, the intended victim and the actual
victim are both at the scene of the crime.
(A, shot at B, but because of lack of
precision, hit C instead). There are two
crimes committed: (1) Against the
intended victim: attempted stage of the
felony; and (2) Against the actual victim:
the consummated or frustrated felony, as
the case may be. It may give rise to a
complex crime under Art. 48 since it
results from a single act. Mistake in
identity (error in personae). The
offender intends the injury on one person
but the harm fell on another. In this
situation the intended victim was not at
the scene of the crime. There are only two
persons involved: the actual but
unintended victim, and the offender. If
punished with same penalties: no effect. If
punished with different penalties, the
lesser penalty shall be imposed in its
maximum period (it becomes a mitigating
circumstance). EXC: If the acts committed
shall also constitute an attempt of
frustration of another crime, if thhe law
prescribes a higher penalty for either the
NMacmac
latter offense, the penalty provided for the
attempt or frustrated crime shall be
imposed in the maximum period. Error in
Personae and Aberatio Ictus are NOT
valid defenses under the “Transfer
Intent” doctrine: the law transfers the
criminal intent to the actual victim.
Injurious consequences are greater
than that intended (praeter
intentionem). The injury is on the
intended victim but the resulting
consequence is so grave a wrong than
what was intended. It is essential that
there is a notable disparity between the
means employed or the act of the offender
and the felony which resulted. (A, without
intent to kill, struck the victim on the
back, causing the victim to fall down and
hit his head on the pavement. But The
fact that several wounds were inflicted on
B is hardly compatible with the idea that
he did not intend to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed.) Praeter
intentionem is a mitigating
circumstance particularly covered by
paragraph 3 of Art. 13.
Mistake of fact is the misapprehension of
facts on the part of the person who caused
injury to another. He is not, however,
criminally liable. It is necessary that had
the facts been true as the accused
believed them to be, the act is justified
(e.g. under Article 11, paragraph 1; self-
defense). Moreover, the offender must
believe that he is performing a lawful act.
Mistake of fact is a defense only in
intentional felonies.
Proximate Cause does not require that
the offender needs to actually touch
the body of the offended party. Hence, if
a man creates in another person’s mind
an immediate sense of danger, which
causes such person to try to escape, and,
in so doing, the latter injures himself, the
man who creates such a state of mind is
responsible for the resulting injuries. It is
important that there be no efficient
intervening cause. If Cruz acquired
severe tetanus infection from the stabbing,
then the symptoms would have appeared
a lot sooner than 22 days later. The
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infection of Cruz’s stab wound by tetanus
was an efficient intervening cause. There
had been an interval of 22 days between
the date of the stabbing and the date
when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro
Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe
tetanus infection. Hence, the proximate
cause of Cruz’s death is the tetanus
infection, and not the stab wound (People
v Villacorta, 2011); If, indeed, the victim
had incurred tetanus poisoning out of the
wound inflicted by A, he would not have
lasted two months. What brought about
tetanus to infect the body of B was his
working in his farm using his bare hands.
Because of this, the SC ruled that the act
of B of working in his farm where the soil
is filthy, using his own hands, is an
efficient supervening cause which relieves
A of any liability for the death of B. A, if at
all, is only liable for physical injuries
inflicted upon B (Urbano v IAC, 1988)
Death is presumed to be the natural
consequence of physical injuries
inflicted, when the following facts are
established: 1. That the victim at the time
the physical injuries were inflicted was in
normal health. 2. That death may be
expected from the physical injuries
inflicted. And 3. That death ensued within
a reasonable time.
There is no impossible crime of
kidnapping. The essence of an impossible
crime is the inherent impossibility of
accomplishing the crime or the inherent
impossibility of the means employed to
bring about the crime. And the act
performed would be an offense against
persons or property which should not
constitute a violation of another provision
of RPC.
The difference between attempted/
frustrated crime and impossible crime
is that in attempted/frustrated crime,
the means are sufficient and adequate
but the intended crime was not
produced. In impossible crime, means
employed is either inadequate or
ineffectual. In attempted or frustrated,
accomplishment is prevented by the
intervention of certain cause or accident in
NMacmac
which the offender had no part. In
impossible crime, intent cannot be
accmplished because it is inherently
impossible or because the means
employed is inadequate or ineffectual.
An impossible crime is a formal crime.
It is either consummated or not
consummated at all. There is therefore
no attempted or frustrated impossible
crime.
The penalty imposed for impossible
crime shall be that of arresto mayor or
a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos.
To teach the offender a lesson because of
his criminal perversity. Although
objectively, no crime is committed, but
subjectively, he is a criminal. An
impossible crime is a crime of last resort if
he cannot be punished under some other
provision of the RPC.
Were it not for the fact that the check
bounced, she would have received the face
value thereof, which was not rightfully
hers. Therefore, it was only due to the
extraneous circumstance of the check being
unfunded, a fact unknown to the accused
at the time, that prevented the crime from
being produced. The thing unlawfully taken
by the accused turned out to be absolutely
worthless, because the check was
eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam
had received the cash to replace the value
of said dishonored check (Jacinto v. People,
G.R. No. 162540, July 2009).
Jerry and Buddy are liable for the so-called
impossible crime because, with intent to
kill, they tried to poison Jun and thus
perpetrate murder, a crime against
persons. Jun was not poisoned only
because the would-be killers were unaware
that what they mixed with the food of Jun
was powdered milk, not poison. Criminal
liability is incurred by them although no
crime resulted, because their act of trying
to poison Jun is criminal.
Phases of Felony: Subjective Phase.
That portion of execution of the crime
starting from the point where the offender
begins up to that point where he still has
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control over his acts. If the subjective
phase has not yet passed, the felony
would be a mere attempt. If it already
passed, but the felony is not produced, as
a rule, it is frustrated. Objective phase.
The offender has performed until the last
act and is no longer in control of its
natural course.
Olarte, Ario, and Pasquin guilty of
Frustrated Homicide. All the elements of
frustrated homicide are present. First, their
intent to kill is manifested by the weapon
used which is a pointed sharp object.
Second, the victim suffered numerous fatal
wounds, but he did not die due to the
timely medical assistance given to him.
Third, none of the qualifying circumstances
for murder is present.
A, a doctor, conceived the idea of killing his
wife B, and to carry out his plan, he mixed
arsenic with the soup of B. Soon after
taking the poisonous food, A suddenly had
a change of heart and washed out the
stomach of B. A also gave B an antidote. A
is not liable for furstrated parricide. The
cause which prevented the consummation
of the crime was not independent of the will
of the perpetrator. It cannot be considered
attempted parricide, because A already
performed all acts of execution. A can only
be liable for physical injuries.
''Intent to kill cannot be automatically
drawn from the mere fact that the use
of firearms is dangerous to life." Rather,
"Animus interficendi must be established
with the same degree of certainty as is
required of the other elements of the
crime. The inference of intent to kill
should not be drawn in the absence of
circumstances sufficient to prove such
intent beyond reasonable doubt. When the
intent to kill is lacking, but wounds are
shown to have been inflicted upon the
victim the crime is not frustrated or
attempted homicide but physical injuries
only.(Etino vs. People,G.R. No.
206632,Feb. 14, 2018)
Attempted Felony. There is an attempt
when the of fender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt
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acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the
felony, by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. The word directly,
emphasizes the requirement that the
attempted felony is that which is
directly link ed to th e overt act
performed by the offender not the
felony he has in his mind.
Indeterminate offense. It is where the
purpose of the offender in performing an
act is not certain. Its nature and relation
to its objective is ambiguous. For example,
before he could do anything, he was
already apprehended by the household
members, the act of entering alone is not
yet indicative of robbery and although he
may have planned to do so. Instead, he
may be held liable for trespassing.
In case of killing, whether parricide,
homicide or murder, the killing will be in
the frustrated stage if the injury sustained
is fatal, sufficient to bring about death
but death did not supervene because of
the immediate medical intervention. If the
wound inflicted was not fatal, the crime is
only in its attempted stage because the
offender still has to perform another act in
order to consummate the crime (People v.
Gutierrez, G.R. No. 188602, February 4,
2010).
There can be an attempted stage in the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs under
Sec 26 of RA 9165. The identity of the
buyer and seller are present. The seller
was Rolando while the buyers would be
the officers. The corpus delicti was also
established however, there was no
delivery because they immediately
introduced themselves as police
officers therefore; the consummated
sale of the drugs was aborted by the act
of the police introducing themselves and
arresting Rolando. Hence, the crime
committed is only attempted illegal sale of
dangerous drugs (People v. Rolando Laylo
y Cepres, G.R. No. 192235, July 6, 2011).
Even though there was conspiracy, if a
co-conspirator merely cooperated in
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the commission of the crime with
insignificant or minimal acts, such that
even without his cooperation, the crime
could be carried out as well, such co-
conspirator should be punished as an
accomplice only. (People v. Niem, G.R.
No. 521, December 20, 1945). EXC: When
the act constitutes a single indivisible
offense.
Mere knowledge, acquiescence to, or
approval of the act, without
cooperation (active, moral assistance or
exerting moral ascendancy) or at least,
agreement to cooperate, is not enough
to constitute a conspiracy. EXC: When
he is the mastermind in a conspiracy. If
he is a mastermind, he does not have to
be in the scene of the crime to be co-
conspirator.
The mere conspiracy is the crime itself.
This is only true when the law expressly
punishes the mere conspiracy. Examples:
Conspiracy to commit treason, conspiracy
to commit rebellion. EXC: If one of the
traitors/rebels actually commits treason/
rebellion, conspiracy loses its juridical
personality and it becomes a mode to
commit a crime. When the conspiracy is
only a basis of incurring criminal
liability, there must be an overt act
done before the co-conspirators become
criminally liable.
On the appointed day, Arturo was
apprehended by the authorities before
reaching the alley. When Juan shot Joel as
planned, he was unaware that Arturo was
arrested earlier. Arturo, being one of the
two who devised the plan to murder Joel,
thereby becomes co-principal by direct
conspiracy. What is needed only is an overt
act and both will incur criminal liability.
Arturo's liability as a conspirator arose
from his participation in jointly devising the
criminal plan with Juan, to kill Joel and it
was pursuant to that conspiracy that Juan
killed Joel. There being a conspiracy, the
act of one is the act of all. Arturo, therefore,
should be liable as a co-conspirator.
Unlike evident premeditation, there is no
requirement for conspiracy to exist that
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there be a sufficient period of time to elapse
to afford full opportunity for meditation and
reflection. Instead, conspiracy arises on the
very moment the plotters agree, expressly
or impliedly, to commit the subject felony
(People v. Carandang et al., G.R. No.
175926, July 6, 2011).
When there is conspiracy, the fact that
the element of the offense is not
present as regards one of the
conspirators is immaterial. EXC: In
parricide – the element of relationship
must be present as regards the offenders;
In murder – where treachery is an element
of the crime, all offenders must have
knowledge of the employment of the
treachery at the time of the execution of
the act.
The liability of the conspirators is only
for the crime agreed upon. EXC: The
other crime was committed in their
presence and they did not prevent its
commission; When the other crime is the
natural consequence of the crime planned;
When the resulting crime was a composite
crime or a special complex crime.
Implied Conspiracy. The offenders acted
in concert in the commission of the crime.
Their acts are coordinated or synchronized
in a way indicative that they are pursuing
a common criminal objective, and they
shall be deemed to be acting in conspiracy
and their criminal liability shall be
collective, not individual. But evident
premeditation cannot be appreciated,
absent any proof showing how and
when the plan to kill the victim was
hatched or the time that elapsed when it
was carried out.
They "performed specific acts with
closeness and coordination as to
unmistakably indicate a common purpose
and design"to ensure the death of Cesario.
(G.R. No. 177751. December 14, 2011)
In order to hold someone criminally liable
for implied conspiracy, in addition to
mere presence, there should be overt
acts that are closely-related and
coordinated to establish the presence of
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common criminal design and
community of purpose in the
commission of the crime.
Overlapping conspiracy. It depicts a
picture of a conspirator in the first level of
conspiracy per forming acts which
implement, or in furtherance of, another
conspiracy in the next level of which the
actor is not an active party (People v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 158754, August
10, 2007).
Chain conspiracy in dangerous drugs.
There are series of overlapping
transactions which are construed to
involve only one overall agreement. The
different transactions are considered the
links in the overall agreement, which is
considered the chain. However, the
transactions will only be considered links
in a chain if each link knows that the
other links are involved in the conspiracy
and each link has a vested interest in the
success of the overall series of
transactions (US v. Bruno, 308 U.S. 287,
December 4, 1939). There is successive
communication and cooperation in much
the same way as with legitimate business
operations between manufacturer and
wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer,
and then retailer and consumer (Estrada
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965,
February 26, 2002).
Wheel or circle conspiracy on plunder.
There is a single person or group called
the “hub,” dealing individually with two or
more other persons or groups known as
the “spoke” and the rim that encloses the
spokes is the common goal in the overall
conspiracy (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002).
A head or chief of office cannot be held
criminally liable as a conspirator simply
on the basis of command responsibility.
All heads of offices have to rely to a
reasonable extent ‘on their subordinates
and on the good faith of those who
prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter
into negotiations. (Arias v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81563 December
19, 1989).
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Proposal is true only up to the point
where the party to whom the proposal
was made has not yet accepted the
proposal. Once the proposal is
accepted, a conspiracy arises.
Conspiracy and proposal to commit a
felony are not punishable because they
are mere preparatory acts. Except in cases
in which the law specifically provides a
penalty thereof, i.e. Treason, rebellion and
coup d’etat
A continued crime is NOT a complex
crime. It is a single crime, consisting of a
series of acts but arising from one
criminal resolution. Here, the offender is
impelled by a SINGLE CRIMINAL
IMPULSE but committed a series of acts
at about the same time in about the
same place and all the overt acts
violate one and the same provision law.
e.g. theft of 13 cows belonging to different
owners committed by the accused at the
same place and at the same time. It is
different from Transitory crime, also
called, “moving crime” is a concept in
criminal procedure to determine the
venue. It may be instituted and tried in
the court of the municipality, city, it
province where any of the essential
ingredients thereof took place.
A complex crime exists when two or
more crimes are committed but they
constitute only one crime in the eyes of
the law. Here, there is only one
criminal intent; hence, only one
penalty is imposed. Thus, there should
only be one information charging a
complex crime. Compound crime — when
a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies (Art 48,
RPC). The single act of A in firing a shot
caused the death of two persons, arising
from one bullet, who were standing on the
line of the direction of the bullet. A
complex crime was committed. Complex
crime proper -– when an offense is the
necessary means for committing the
other (Art. 48, RPC). Both or all the
offenses must be punished under the
same statute (RPC).
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Special complex crime or composite
crime -– one in which the substance is
made up of more than one crime, but
which, in the eyes of the law, is only a
single indivisible offense. Only one
penalty is specifically prescribed for all the
component crimes which are regarded as
one indivisible offense. Examples: Rape
with Homicide, Kidnapping with Homicide,
Robbery with Homicide, Kidnapping with
physical injuries, Kidnapping with rape,
Robbery with arson, Robbery with rape,
Robbery with physical injuries, Qualified
piracy when piracy is accompanied by
murder, homicide, physical injuries or
rape. As distinguished from ordinary
complex crime which is made up of two or
more crimes being punished under
distinct provisions of the RPC but alleged
in one information either because they
were brought about by a single felonious
act or because one offense is a necessary
means for committing the other offense or
offenses. The penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed and in its
maximum period.
NO COMPLEX CRIME. When one offense
is committed to conceal the other; When
one crime is an element of the other, for in
that case, the former shall be absorbed by
the latter. Occupation of real property or
usurpation of real rights in property(Art.
312, RPC); Kidnapping (Art. 267, RPC);
When the crime has the same elements as
the other crime committed; Search
warrants maliciously obtained(Art. 129,
RPC) in relation to perjury; When one of
the offenses is penalized by a special law;
In continued crimes; Special complex
crimes; Where the intent is really to
commit the second crime but the first act
although also a crime is incidental to the
commission of the crime.
Estafa and falsification of private
documents have the same element of
damage. Thus, there is no complex crime
of estafa through falsification of private
document.
There can be no complex crime proper
if the other crime is punishable by a
special law. To be a complex crime proper
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both crime must be punished under the
RPC.
A light felony CANNOT be complexed
with a grave or less grave felony. It is
either treated as a separate offense or
considered absorbed in the grave or less
grave felonies.
Reckless imprudence is a single crime, its
consequences on persons and property are
material only to determine the penalty.
Reckless imprudence under Art. 365 is
a single quasi-offense by itself and not
merely a means of committing other
crimes such that conviction or
acquittal of such quasi-offense bars
subsequent prosecution for the same
quasi-offense, regardless of its various
resulting acts (Ivler v. San Pedro, G.R. No.
172716, November 17, 2010).
There can be a complex crime of coup
d’état with rebellion if there was
conspiracy between the offender/s
committing the rebellion. This is
possible because the offender in coup
d’état may be any person or persons
belonging to the military or the national
police or a public officer, whereas rebellion
does not so require. The crime of coup
d’état may be committed singly, whereas
rebellion requires a public uprising and
taking up arms to overthrow the duly
constituted government. Since the two
crimes are essentially different and
punished with distinct penalties, there is
no legal impediment to the application of
Art. 48 of the RPC.
Coup d'état can be complexed with
sedition because the two crimes are
essentially dif fer ent and distinctly
punished under the RPC. Sedition may
not be directed against the government or
be non-political in objective, whereas coup
d'état is always political in objective as it
is directed against the government and led
by persons or public officer holding public
office belonging to the military or national
police.
Recidivism and Reiteracion are generic
aggravating circumstances which can be
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of fset by mitigating circumstances.
Recidivism – the offender at the time of
his trial for one crime shall have been
previously convicted by final judgment of
another embraced in the same title of the
RPC. It increases the penalty to its
maximum period. Reiteracion – the
offender has been previously punished for
an offense which the law attaches an
equal or greater penalty or for two or more
crimes to which it attaches a lighter
penalty. The previous and subsequent
offenses must not be embraced by the
same Title of the RPC. Includes offenses
under special law.
Habitual delinquency and Quasi-
Recidivism are special aggravating
circumstances which cannot be offset by
mitigating cir cumstance. Habitual
delinquency— the offender within the
period of 10 years from the date of his
release or last conviction of the crimes of
serious or less serious physical injuries,
robbery, theft, estafa or falsification, is
found guilty of any of the said crimes a
third time or oftener (Art. 62, RPC). Quasi-
recidivism — Any person who shall
commit a felony after having been
convicted by final judgment before
beginning to serve such sentence or while
serving such sentence shall be punished
by the maximum period prescribed by law
for the new felony. (Art. 160). It is a
special aggravating circumstance which
may be offset by special privileged
mitigating circumstances not by ordinary
mitigating circumstances.
For purposes of quasi-recidivism under
Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, it
will be appreciated whether the crime for
which an accused is serving sentence at
the time of the commission of the offense
charged, falls under said Code (RPC) or
under a special law (People v. Peralta, et.
al., G.R. No. L-15959, October 11, 1961).
There is not the slightest intimation in the
text of article 160 that said article applies
only in cases where the new offense is
different in character from the former
offense for which the defendant is serving
the penalty. Hence, even if he is serving
sentence for homicide and was later found
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to be guilty of murder, Article 160 applies
(People v. Yabut, G.R. No. 39085,
September 27, 1933).
As quasi-recidivism cannot be offset by
ordinary mitigating circumstances. Quasi-
recidivism is a special aggravating
circumstance which imposes the maximum
of the penalty for the new offense. Article
160 specifically provides that the offender
“shall be punished by the maximum period
of the penalty prescribed by law for the
new felony.” Notwithstanding, therefore,
the existence of mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender and plea of guilty, the
imposition of the supreme penalty is in
order (People v. Alicia and Bangayan, G.R.
No. L-38176, January 22, 1980).
Convict can be a habitual delinquent
without being a recidivist when two of
the crimes committed are NOT
embraced in the same title of the Code.
When the offender is a recidivist and at
the same time a habitual delinquent, the
penalty for the crime for which he will be
convicted will be increased to the
maximum period, unless offset by a
mitigating circumstance. After
determining the correct penalty for the
last crime committed, an added penalty
will be imposed in accordance with Art.
62. In sum, total penalties refer to the
penalties: 1. For the last crime of which he
is found guilty; and 2. Additional penalty.
Additional penalties for habitual
delinquency. 1. Upon 3rd conviction –
Prision correctional in its medium and
maximum periods; 2. Upon 4th conviction –
Prision mayor in its minimum and medium
p e r i o d s ; 3 . U p o n 5 th o r a d d i t i o n a l
conviction – Prision mayor in its maximum
period to Reclusion temporal in its
minimum period. The total penalties must
not exceed 30 years. (Art. 62) The
imposition of additional penalty for
habitual delinquency is constitutional
because it is neither an ex post facto
law nor an additional punishment for
former crimes. It is simply a
punishment on future crimes, the
penalty being enhanced on account of the
criminal propensities of the accused
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(People v. Montera, G.R. No. 34431, August
11, 1931).
Quasi-recidivism and reiteracion
cannot co-exist. Quasi-recidivism refers
to a situation where the second crime is
committed DURING the service of
sentence for the first crime. Reiteracion
refers to a situation where the second
crime is committed AFTER service of
sentence for the first crime. As to
reiteracion, the law says “previously
punished.”
The said aggravating circumstance of
"reiteracion" requires that the offender
against whom it is considered shall have
served out his sentences for the prior
offenses. Here all the accused were yet
serving their respective sentences at the
time of the commission of the murder.
However, the special circumstance of quasi-
recidivism was correctly considered against
all the accused who were at the time of the
commission of the offense were
undoubtedly serving their respective
sentences (People v. Layson, et. al., G.R.
No. L-25177, October 31, 1969).
Death penalty is not abolished. It is
only prohibited to be imposed. In lieu of
the death penalty, the following shall be
imposed: 1. Reclusion perpetua -when the
law violated makes use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC;
or 2. Life imprisonment -when the law
violated does not make use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC.
For the purposes of determining the
proper penalty due to the presence of
mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, or due to the nature of
the participation of the offender, death
remains in the statute, and it shall be
r eckoned with. However, the
corresponding civil liability should be
the civil liability corresponding to
death.
RA 10158, otherwise known as “An Act
Decriminalizing Vagrancy”.
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If the viewing of pornographic materials
is done privately, there is no violation
of Art. 201. What is protected is the
morality of the public in general. The law
is not concerned with the moral of one
person. PD 969, which amended Art. 201,
also states that ‘where the criminal case
against any violation of this decree results
in an acquittal, the obscene or immoral
literature, films, prints, engravings,
sculpture, paintings or other materials
and articles involved in the violation shall
nevertheless be forfeited in favor of the
government to be destroyed.” Clearly, the
provision directs the forfeiture
of all materials involved in violation of the
subject law even if the accused was
acquitted. In this case, the destruction of
the hard disks and the software used in
any way in the violation of the subject law
addresses the purpose of minimizing if not
eradicating pornography (Nograles v.
People, G.R. No. 191080, November 21,
2011).
In Grave Scandal, the highly scandalous
conduct should not fall within any
other article of the RPC. Thus, this
article provides for a crime of last resort.
The sexual intercourse with the 11-yr old
girl constitutes statutory rape. Though the
act was carried out in a public place,
criminal liability for grave scandal cannot
be incurred because the conduct of Y is
punishable under another article of the
RPC.
In Alarms and Scandal, the acts of the
offender do not necessarily scandalize the
public, but his acts produce alarm or
danger to the public. The purpose is to
disturb public peace. In Grave Scandal, on
the other hand, the acts of the offender
are highly scandalous in such a manner
as it offends decency and good customs.
Although it does not disturb public peace,
such conduct or act must be open to the
public view.
A defendant who falsely testified in his
own behalf in a criminal case can be
guilty of false testimony favorable to
the defendant only apply if the defendant
voluntarily goes upon the witness stand
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and falsely imputes to some other person
the commission of a grave offense. If he
merely denies the commission of the crime
or his participation therein, he should not
be prosecuted for false testimony.
False testimony in favor of a defendant
need not directly influence the decision
of acquittal and it need not benefit the
defendant. The intent to favor the
defendant is sufficient.
The witness who gave false testimony
against the accused is liable even if his
testimony was not considered by the
court. Defendant must be sentenced to
at least a correctional penalty or a fine
or shall have been acquitted. Thus, if
arresto mayor is imposed, Art. 180 (False
testimony against defendant) is not
applicable.
The classification in determining
whether the testimony is in favor or
against the accused is significant in
order to determine when the
prescriptive period begins to run: 1. In
Favor – right after the witness testified
falsely, the prescriptive period commences
to run because the basis of the penalty on
the false witness is the felony charged to
the accused regardless of whether the
accused was acquitted or convicted or the
trial has terminated. 2. Against – period
will not begin to run as long as the case
has not been decided with finality because
the basis of the penalty on the false
witness is the sentence on the accused
testified against it. When the accused is
acquitted, there is also a corresponding
penalty on the false witness for his false
testimony (Boado, 2008).
Subornation of Perjury. It is committed
by a person who knowingly and willfully
procures another to swear falsely and the
witness suborned does testify under the
circumstances rendering him guilty of
perjury. Subornation of perjury is not
expressly penalized in the RPC, but the
person who induces another to commit
a perjury may be punished under Art.
183, in relation to Art. 17, as a
principal by inducement to the crime of
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perjury while the one induced is liable
as a principal by direct participation.
False testimony is given in the course of
judicial proceeding. It contemplates actual
trial. Perjury, on the other hand, is any
willful and corrupt assertion of falsehood
on material matter under oath (or
executed an affidavit upon a material
matter) and not given in judicial
proceedings. There is perjury even during
the preliminary investigation.
In perjury, the sworn statement or
affidavit containing the falsity is
required by law and made before a
competent officer, authorized to
receive and administer oath. The
statement need not actually be required. It
is sufficient that it was authorized by law
to be made (People v. Angangco, G.R. No.
L-47693, October 12, 1943).
Good faith or lack of malice is a defense
in perjury. Mere assertion of falsehood is
not enough to amount to perjury. The
assertion must be deliberate and willful.
Three forms of breach of oath or duty:
(1) Misfeasance — Improper performance
of some act which might be lawfully done.
Ex: Knowingly rendering unjust judgment,
rendering unjust interlocutory order or
Malicious delay in the administration of
justice; (2) Malfeasance — Performance of
some act which ought not to be done. Ex:
Direct or indirect bribery; (3) Nonfeasance
— Omission of some act which ought to be
performed. Ex: Dereliction of duty in the
prosecution of offenses (Art. 208, RPC).
Direct Bribery
If the act or omission amounts to a
crime, it is not necessary that the
corruptor should deliver the
consideration or the doing of the act.
Mere promise is sufficient. The moment
there is a meeting of the minds, even
without the delivery of the consideration,
even without the public officer performing
the act amounting to a crime, bribery is
already committed on the part of the
public officer. Corruption is already
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
committed on the part of the supposed
giver. If the act or omission does not
amount to a crime (but the act must be
unjust), the consideration must be
delivered by the corruptor before a
public officer can be prosecuted for
bribery. Mere agreement is not enough to
constitute the crime because the act to be
done in the first place is legitimate or in
the performance of the official duties of
the public official.
Moral turpitude can be inferred from
the third element: The offender takes a
gift with a view of committing a crime
in exchange.
That act which the offender agrees to
perform or which he executes be
connected with the performance of his
official duties. If the act agreed to be
performed is so foreign to the duties of the
office as to lack even color of authority,
there is no bribery.
If the public official accepted the
consideration and turned it over to his
superior as evidence of corruption, the
offense is attempted corruption only
and not frustrated. The official did not
agree to be corrupted.
If the victim actually committed a
crime and the policeman demanded
money so he will not be arrested, the
crime is bribery. But if no crime has been
committed and the policeman is falsely
charging him of having committed one,
threatening to arrest him if he will not
come across with some consideration, the
crime is robbery.
Prevaricacion. No gift was promised or
received in considereation for refraining to
prosecute offenses. In direct bribery, The
officer refrained from doing something
which was his official duty to do so in
consideration of a gift promised or
received.
No impossible crime when money given
is fake. It is not the consideration that
determines the crime. In direct bribery,
the consideration is the promise.
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Indirect bribery
It is the crime of any public officer who
shall accept gifts offered to him by reason
of his office. If the public officer does
not accept the gift, this crime is not
committed but the offeror is guilty of
Corruption of Public Officials under Art.
212.
If he accepts the gifts, it is
consummated. There must be a clear
intention on the part of the public
officer to take the gift offered and he
should consider the property as his own
for that moment. Mere physical receipt
unaccompanied by any other sign,
circumstance or act to show such
acceptance is not sufficient to convict
the officer. There is no attempted or
frustrated indirect bribery because it is
committed by accepting gifts offered to the
public officer by reason of his office.
In direct bribery, there is agreement
between the public of ficer and the
corruptor. The public officer is called upon
to perform or refrain from performing an
official act. In indirect bribery, there is no
agreement between the public officer and
the corruptor. The public officer is not
necessarily called upon to perform any
official act. It is enough that he accepts
the gifts offered to him by reason of his
office.
The crime involved in qualified bribery
is a heinous crime (a crime punishable
by reclusion perpetua and/or death).
The public officer need not receive a gift or
present because a mere offer or promise is
sufficient.
Under Art 217 of the RPC as amended
by RA 10951, the penalty for
malversation involving an amount of
not exceeding 40k is only prision
correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, which is now
probationable. Her e, accused was
convicted of malversation involving the
amount of 11, 300 and sentence to suffer
a non-probatiobable penalty of 11 yeards,
6 months and 21 days. THe judgment
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became final. SC said that when
exceptional circumstances exist, such as
the passage of RA 10951 imposing
penalties more lenient and favorable to the
accused, the court shall not hesitate to
direct the reopening of a final and
immutable judgment, the objective of
which is to correct not so much the
findings of guilt but the applicable
penalties to be imposed. Not only must
petitioner’s sentence be modified
respecting the settled rule on the
retroactive effectivity of favorable laws, she
may even apply for probation (Hernan v
Sandiganbayan, GR 217874, Dec 5, 2017).
But a petition for habeas corpus which is
within the contemplation of the words
“original petition” is not the proper
remedy for a convicted prisoner, who has
already served the maximum penalty
prescribed by RA 10951 for the crime for
which he was serving sentence.
If the value of thing stolen is 3.2
Million or more, there are 3 matters
that should be considered in the
imposition of penalty for qualified
theft, to wit: (1) the principal penalty
under Article 309 (prision mayor in its
minimu and medium periods to be
applied in its maximum period); (2)
incremental penalty (1 year for ever
1Million in excess of 2.2 Million) under
Art 309; and (3) the graduation of
penalty by 2 degrees under Art 310. If
the value of the thing stolen is qualified
theft is 3.2Million or more but less than
4.2 Million, prision mayor in its minimum
and medium periods shall be graduated 2
degress higher, and that is, reclusion
temporal in its medium and maximum
periods. This penalty is applied in its
maximum period, which has a range of 18
yrs, 2 months and 21 days to 20 yrs.
Since there 1Million in excess of
2.2Million, the court shall imposed 1 year
incremental penalty. The court may
sentence the accused to suffer a penalty of
20 years of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Hence, qualified theft if the
value of the property is not more than
4.2 Million is bailable. If the value of the
thins stolen in qualified theft is over 4.2
Million, the prescribed penalty is
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maximum period of reclusion temporal in
its medium and maximum periods, which
has a range of 18 years, 2 months and 21
days to 20 years and incremental penalty
of 2 years or more. The combination of the
principal penalty and incremental penatly
shall always exceed 20 years. In qualified
theft, the rules that the maximum
penalty cannot exceed 20 years is not
applicable. By reason thereof, the court
shall sentence the accused to suffer
reclusion perpetua. Hence, qualified
theft if the value of property is more
than 4.2 Million is not bailable. (San
Diego v CA; People v Cruz, GR 200081,
June 8, 2016).
Malversation (217) - Malversation by
appropriating, misappropriating or
permitting any other person to take public
funds or property
If the public officer has no authority to
receive the money for the Government,
the crime committed is estafa, not
malversation (US v. Solis, G.R. No.
2828, December 14, 1906), since he
cannot be considered an accountable
officer in that situation. An accountable
public officer, within the purview of Art.
217 of the RPC, is one who has custody or
control of public funds or property by
reason of the duties of his office.
“Appropriation” does not necessarily
mean appropriation to one’s personal
advantage but rather, every attempt by
one person to dispose of the property of
another without right. (Tabuena vs.
Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332m
February 17, 1997). An accountable
public of ficer may be convicted of
malversation even if there is no direct
evidence of misappropriation and the only
evidence is that there is shortage in his
accounts which he has not been able to
explain satisfactorily. (Quizo vs.
Sandiganbayan, 149 SCRA 108)
The law does NOT require that a written
demand be formally made to constitute
a prima facie presumption of
malversation. The failure of a public
officer to have duly forthcoming any
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public fund or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie
evidence that he has put such missing
funds or property to personal uses
(Candao v. People, G.R. Nos. 186659-710,
October 19, 2011). The presumption could
be overcome by satisfactory evidence of
loss or robbery committed by a person
other than the accused (US. v. Kalingo,
G.R. No. 11504, February 2, 1917).
Considering that the shortage was duly
proven, retaliation against the BIR for not
promoting him does not constitute a
satisfactory or reasonable explanation of
his failure to account for the missing
amount (Cua v. People, G.R. No. 166847,
November 16, 2011).
Crime of malversation can be
committed by negligence. All that is
necessary for a conviction is sufficient
proof that the accused accountable officer
had received the funds or property, and
did not have him in his possession when
demand therefor was made without any
satisfactory explanation of his failure to
have them upon demand.
Mayor Malonzo asked Mesina about the
said funds and Mesina denied receiving it.
During investigation, Mesina’s vault was
opened for cash count, thereafter Mesina
admitted that he collected the Patubig
Collection but kept the money in his vault.
Mesina feigned ignorance of having
received the patubig collection when he
phoned Baclit to tell her that he did not
receive the collection (Mesina v. People,
G.R. No. 162489, June 17, 2015).
It is not necessary that there is damage
to the government; it is not an element
of the offense. The penalty for
malversation is based on the amount
involved, not on the amount of the damage
caused to the Government.
When an accountable public officer, in
good faith makes a wrong payment
through honest mistake as to the law or
to the facts concerning his duties, he is
not liable for malversation. He is only
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civilly liable (People v. Elvina, G.R. No.
7280, February 3, 1913).
The return of the money malversed is
merely a mitigating circumstance. It
cannot exempt the accused from criminal
liability (People v. Velasquez, G.R. No.
47741, April 28, 1941).
If the falsification is resorted to for the
purpose of hiding or concealing the
malversation, the falsification and
malversation shall be separate offenses
(People v. Sendaydiego, G.R. No.
L-33254, January 20, 1978). No
complex crime is committed for complex
crimes require that one crime is used to
commit another.
Estafa is committed by a private person or
even a public officer who acts in a private
capacity. Deals with private property.
Committed by personal misap-propriation
only. Malversation is committed by an
accountable public officer. Deals with
public funds or property. May be
committed without personal
misappropriation, as when the
accountable officer allows another to
misappropriate the same.
Malversation (218) - failure of
accountable officer to render accounts
The article does not require that there
be a demand that the public officer
should render an account. It is sufficient
that there is a law or regulation requiring
him to render account and he fails to so
for a period of 2 months after such
accounts should be rendered.
It is not essential that there be
misappropriation. If there is
misappropriation, he would also be liable
for malversation under Art. 217.
Petitioner Lumauig is liable to the crime of
failure of accountable officer to render
accounts under Article 218 of the Revised
Penal Code. Prior demand to liquidate is
not a requisite for conviction under Article
218 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 218
consists of the following elements: that the
offender is a public officer, whether in the
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service or separated therefrom; that he
must be an accountable officer for public
funds or property; that he is required by
law or regulation to render accounts to the
Commission on Audit, or to a provincial
auditor; and that he fails to do so for a
period of two months after such accounts
should be rendered. Nowhere in the
provision does it require that there first be a
demand before an accountable officer is
held liable for a violation of the crime.
(Aloysius Dait Lumauig v People Of The
Philippines)
Malversation (219)
The act of leaving the Philippines must
not be authorized or permitted by law
to be liable under this Article 219. If the
act of leaving the country is authorized by
law, public officer cannot be convicted
under this Article.
Malversation (220) - technical
malversation
In the absence of a law or ordinance
appropriating the public fund allegedly
technically malversed, the use thereof
for another public purpose will not
make the accused guilty of violation of
Art. 220. In technical malversation, the
public officer applies public funds under
his administration not for his or another’s
personal use, but to a public use other
than that for which the fund was
appropriated by law or ordinance.
The authorization given by DBM is not an
ordinance or law contemplated in Art. 220
(Abdulla v. People, G.R. No. 150129, April
6, 2005).
Criminal intent is not an element of
technical malversation. The law
punishes the act of diverting public
property earmarked by law or ordinance
for particular public purpose to another
public purpose. The offense is mala
prohibita. Hence, malice or criminal intent
is completely irrelevant (Ysidoro v. People,
G.R. No. 192330, November 14, 2012).
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Even if the application made proved to
be more beneficial to the public than
the original purpose for which the
amount or property is appropriated,
there is still technical malversation.
Damage is not an essential element of
technical malversation.
Simple malversation. The crime
committed is simple malversation if the
funds had been appropriated for a
particular public purpose, but the same
was applied to private purpose.
In technical malversation, offender derives
no personal gain or benefit. Public fund or
property is diverted to another public use
other than that provided for in the law. In
Malversation, generally, the offender
derives personal benefit. Conversion is for
the personal interest of the offender or of
another person. In both crimes, Offenders
are accountable public officers.
Malversation (221) - Failure to make
delivery of public funds or property
The refusal to make delivery must be
malicious. Where an official stenographer
retained some stenographic notes and
failed to turn over the same upon demand
as he was still going to transcribe the
same, he was held not to have violated
this article (People v. Jubila, CA, 38 O.G.
1796).
Malversation (222)
A private person may also commit
malversation under the following
situations: (1) conspiring with an
accountable public officer in committing
malversation; (2) an accomplice or
accessory to a public officer who commits
malversation; (3) private person is made
the custodian in whatever capacity of
public funds or property; or (4) when he is
constituted as the depositary or
administrator of funds or property seized
or attached by public authority.
The word administrator used does not
include judicial administrator
appointed to administer the estate of a
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
deceased person because he is not in
charge of any property attached,
impounded or placed in deposit by public
authority. Conversion of effects in his
trust makes him liable for estafa.
AA was designated custodian of the
distrained property of RR by the BIR. He
assumed the specific undertakings which
included the promise that he will preserve
the equipment. Subsequently, he reported
to the BIR that RR surreptitiously took the
distrained property. Did AA become a
public officer by virtue of his designation as
custodian of distrained property by the
BIR? A: NO. To be a public officer, one
must: 1. Take part in the performance of
public functions in the government, or in
performing in said government or in any of
its branches public duties as an employee,
agent or subordinate official, or any rank or
class; and 2. That his authority to take
part in the performance of public functions
or to perform public duties must be by: a.
Direct provision of the law, or b. Popular
election, or c. Appointment by competent
authority (Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 116033, February 26, 1997).
Estafa
Estafa with unfaithfulness or abuse of
confidence under Art. 315 (1)a.
Offender has an onerous obligation to
deliver something of value, he alters its
substance, quantity, or quality and
damage or prejudice is caused to
another. Where the accused is bound by
virtue of a contract of sale, payment
having been received to deliver first class
of rice (e.g. milagrosa) but delivered an
inferior kind, or that he bound himself to
deliver 1000 sacks but delivered less than
1000 because the other sacks were filled
with different materials, he is guilty of
estafa with unfaithfulness or abuse of
confidence by altering the quantity or
quality of anything of value by virtue of an
obligation to do so.
Estafa with unfaithfulness or abuse of
confidence under Art. 315 (1)b.
Misappropriation or conversion of (or
denial of such receipt) money, goods, or
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other personal property is received by
the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of, or to
return. Demand made by the offended
party to the offender is not necessary
when there is evidence of
misappropriation of the goods by the
defendant.
The accused’s mere failure to turn over
the thing delivered to him in trust
despite demand and the duty to do so
does not constitute estafa under Art.
315 par 1 (b). The essence of estafa under
Art. 315 (1) (b) of the RPC is the
appropriation or conversion of money or
property received, to the prejudice of the
owner thereof. The failure to account,
upon demand, for funds or property
held in trust is a mere circumstantial
evidence of misappropriation. If the
accused is able to satisfactorily explain his
failure to produce the thing delivered in
trust, he may not be held liable for estafa.
(Filadams Pharma, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No.
132422, March 30, 2004).
A money market transaction partakes
of the nature of a loan, and non-
payment thereof would not give rise to
criminal liability for estafa through
misappropriation or conversion. In
money market placements, the unpaid
investor should institute against the
middleman or dealer, before the ordinary
courts, a simple action for recovery of the
amount he had invested, and if there is
allegation of fraud, the proper forum
would be the SEC (Sesbreno v. CA, G.R.
No. 84096, January 26, 1995).
Rosa cannot be held criminally liable for
estafa. Although she received the jewelry
from Victoria under an obligation to return
the same or deliver the proceeds thereof,
she did not misappropriate it. In fact, she
gave them to Aurelia specifically to be
returned to Victoria. The misappropriation
was done by Aurelia, and absent the
showing of any conspiracy between Aurelia
and Rosa, the latter cannot be held
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criminally liable for Aurelia's acts. (BAR
1999)
Estafa with unfaithfulness or abuse of
confidence under Art. 315 (1)c. The
paper with the signature of the offended
party is in blank, delivered it to the
offender, above the signature of the
offended party, a document is written by
the offender without authority to do so,
and the document so written creates a
liability of, or causes damage to, the
offended party or any third person.
Estafa by means of false pretenses or
fraudulent acts under Article 315 (2)a.
Using fictitious name; Falsely pretending
to possess power, influence, qualifications
etc; By means of other similar deceits.
Estafa by means of false pretenses or
fraudulent acts under Article 315 (2)b.
Altering the quality, fineness, or weight of
anything pertaining to his art or business.
Estafa by means of false pretenses or
fraudulent acts under Article 315 (2)c.
Pretending to have bribed any government
employee, without prejudice to the action
for calumny which the offended party may
deem proper to bring against the offender.
Estafa by means of false pretenses or
fraudulent acts under Article 315 (2)d.
postdating a check or issuing a check in
payment of an obligation (not pre-existing)
contracted at the time the check was
issued, lack of sufficiency of funds to
cover the check and damage to the payee.
The accused must be able to obtain
something from the offended party by
means of the check he issued and
delivered. Thus, if A issued a check in
favor of B for a debt he has incurred a
month or so ago, the dishonor of the
check for insufficiency of funds in the
bank does not constitute Estafa.
The check must be genuine. If the check
is falsified and is encashed with the bank
or exchanged for cash, the crime is estafa
thru falsification of a commercial
document.
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Good faith is a defense. The payee’s
knowledge that the drawer has no
sufficient funds to cover the postdated
checks at the time of their issuance
negates estafa.
The fact that the accused was not the
actual maker of the check cannot be a
defense. That the appellant who only
negotiated directly and personally the
check drawn by another is guilty of estafa
because he had “guilty knowledge that
at the time he negotiated the check,
the drawer has no sufficient
funds.” (Garcia v. People, G.R. No. 144785,
September 11, 2003).
Estafa through false pretense made in
writing is only a simple crime of estafa,
not a complex crime of estafa through
falsification.
Estafa through fraudulent means under
Article 315 (3)a. Deceit was employed to
make the offended party sign the
document, and prejudice was caused. A
induced an illiterate owner who was
desirous of mortgaging his property for a
certain amount, to sign a document which
he believed was only a power of attorney
but in truth it was a deed of sale. A is
guilty of Estafa under par. 3(a) and the
damage could consist at least in the
disturbance in property rights (U.S. v.
Malong, GR. No. L-12597, August 30,
1917).
Estafa through fraudulent means under
Article 315 (3)b. Resorting to some
fraudulent practice to insure success in a
gambling game
Estafa through fraudulent means under
Article 315 (3)c. Offender removed,
concealed or destroyed any court record,
office files, documents or any other papers
with intent to defraud another. When a
lawyer, pretending to verify a certain
pleading in a case pending before a court,
borrows the folder of the case, and
removes or destroys a document which
constitutes evidence in the said case, said
lawyer is guilty of estafa under par. 3(c).
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Novation theory contemplates a situation
wherein the victim’s acceptance of
payment converted the offender’s criminal
liability to a civil obligation. It applies
only if there is a contractual
relationship between the accused and
the complainant.
Novation is not a mode of extinguishing
criminal liability for estafa. But it may
bar prosecution as long as it occurs
prior to the institution of criminal
action in court. In order that novation of
contract may relieve the accused of
criminal liability, the novation must take
place before the criminal liability is
incurred. The criminal liability for estafa
already committed is not affected by the
subsequent novation of contract, for it is a
public offense which must be prosecuted
and punished by the State (Milla v. People,
G.R. No. 188726, January 25, 2012).
A, intending to redeem certain jewels gave
the pawnshop tickets to B, her servant so
that the latter might take care of them
temporarily. One week later, B met C, who
got the tickets and refused to return them
alleging that the tickets were of no value
notwithstanding the demands made by B.
Later, C redeemed the jewels without the
knowledge and consent of A or B. What
crime did C commit? A: The complex crime
of theft and estafa, because the former is a
necessary means to commit the latter. C,
with intent to gain, took the pawnshop
tickets without the consent of either A or B.
This is theft. By redeeming the jewels by
means of the pawnshop tickets, he
committed estafa using a fictitious name
(People v. Yusay, G.R. No.L-26957,
September 2, 1927).
Conviction for estafa under par. 2(a) of
Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does
not bar a conviction for illegal
recruitment under the Labor Code. The
offense of illegal recruitment is malum
prohibitum where the criminal intent of the
accused is not necessary for conviction,
while estafa is malum in se where the
criminal intent of the accused is crucial
for conviction. It follows that one’s
acquittal of the crime of estafa will not
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necessarily result in his acquittal of the
crime of illegal recruitment in large scale,
and vice versa (People v. Ochoa, G.R. No.
173792, August 31, 2011).
Swindling a minor (317). It is not
essential that there is actual proof of
deceit or misrepresentation. It is
sufficient that the offender takes
advantage of the inexperience or emotions
of the minor.
Removal, Sale or Pledge of Mortgaged
Property (319). Selling or pledging of
personal property already pledged or
mortgaged is committed by the mere
failure to obtain the consent of the
mortgagee in writing even if the offender
should inform the purchaser that the
thing sold is mortgaged. To constitute
estafa (316), it is sufficient that the real
property mortgaged be sold as free, even
though the vendor may have obtained the
consent of the mortgagee in writing.
The laws on arson in force today are PD
1613 (Simple Arson) and Art. 320, as
amended by RA 7659 (Destructive
Arson). The nature of Destructive Arson is
distinguished from Simple Arson by the
degree of perversity or viciousness of the
criminal offender.
The slightest discoloration of a part of a
building is consummated arson. But
when a person who intends to burn a
structure by collecting and placing rags
soaked in a gasoline and placed them near
the wall of the building but who was
discovered as he was about to set fire to
the rags is liable for attempted arson.
Malicious mischief is the willful
damaging of another’s property by any
act not constituting arson or crimes of
destruction due to hate, revenge or
mere pleasure of destroying.
The hitting of the back portion of the CRV
by B was clearly deliberate. The act of
damaging the rear bumper of the CRV does
not constitute arson or other crimes
involving destruction. When the Vitara
bumped the CRV, B was venting out his
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anger and hate as a result of a heated
encounter between him and A (Taguinod v.
People, G.R. No.185833, October 12, 2011).
Mario admitted that he deliberately
demolished Julita's nipa hut but he,
however, contends that the third element of
the crime of malicious mischief, i.e., that the
act of damaging another's property be
committed merely for the sake of damaging
it, is not present. He maintains that the
demolition of the nipa hut is for the purpose
of safeguarding the interest of his
employer. Mario’s conviction for malicious
mischief must be sustained. As to the third
element, Mario was not justified in
summarily and extra-judicially demolishing
Julita’s nipa hut. As it is, Mario proceeded,
not so much to safeguard the lot, as it is to
vent out his anger and express his disgust
over the “no trespassing” sign he placed
thereon. Indeed, his act of summarily
demolishing the house smacks of his
pleasure in causing damage to it (Valeroso
v. People, G.R. No. 149718. September 29,
2003).
ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES
Those circumstances which must be taken
into consideration as aggravating or
mitigating according to the nature and
ef fects of the crime and the other
conditions attending its commission. (1)
Relationship; (2) Intoxication; and (3)
Degree of Instruction and Education of the
offender.
Relationship. When the offended party is
the: 1. Spouse; 2. Ascendant; 3.
Descendant; 4. Legitimate, natural, or
adopted Brother or Sister; 5. Relative by
affinity in the same degree of the offender;
and 6. Other relatives included by
Analogy to ascendants and descendants.
e.g. Stepparents. Exempting: In case of
an accessory who is related to the
principal within the relationship
prescribed in Article 20 except Art 19 (1) -
by profiting themselves or assisting the
offender to profit by the effects of the
crime. In Art 247, A spouse will not incur
criminal liability if less serious physical
injuries or slight physical injuries was
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inflicted after having surprised his or her
spouse or paramour or mistress
committing actual sexual intercourse (or
parents with their daughter under 18
living with them and their seducer). Under
Art. 332, in the crime of theft, malicious
mischief and swindling or estafa, there is
no criminal liability if the offender is
related to the offended party (widowed
spouse, spouse, ascendant or descendant,
or relatives by affinity in the same line,
brother or sister living together).
Mitigating: In trespass to dwelling. In
cases of infanticide (RPC, Art. 255) and
abortion (RPC, Art. 258), the killing or
abortion to conceal dishonor is a
mitigating circumstance. In infanticide,
the concealment made by the maternal
grandparents is mitigating. Relationship is
mitigating in the crimes of Robbery (RPC,
Arts. 294-302), Usurpation (Art. 312),
fraudulent insolvency (Art. 314) and
Arson. Aggravating: In rape, relationship
is aggravating when a stepfather or father
raped his step/own daughter.
Intoxication. When a person is under the
influence of liquor, his exercise of will
power is impaired and his resistance to
evil is lessened (People v. Tambis, G.R. No.
124452, July 28, 1999). Under RA 9262
(Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act of 2004), raising
defenses as being under the influence
of alcohol, any illicit drug or any other
mind-altering substance shall not be
appreciated (Sec. 27, RA 9262).
The moment intoxication is shown to
be habitual or intentional to the
commission of the crime, the same will
immediately aggravate, regardless of
the crime committed. The habit should
be actual and confirmed. It is unnecessary
that it be a matter of daily occurrence.
Degree of Instruction and Education.
Test of Lack of Instruction as a
mitigating circumstance is not
illiteracy alone, but rather lack of
sufficient intelligence. If the offender is
a lawyer who committed rape, the fact that
he has knowledge of the law will not
aggravate his liability; But if a lawyer
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
committed falsification, that will aggravate
his criminal liability if it be proven that he
used his special knowledge as a lawyer
and he took advantage of his learning in
committing the crime. High degree of
instruction or education is aggravating
when the offender avails himself of his
learning in commission of the crimes.
Absolutory causes. Those where the act
committed is a crime but for reasons of
public policy and sentiment there is no
penalty imposed. Ex: Spontaneous
desistance in attempted felonies (RPC, Art.
6, par. 3). Accessories in light felonies (RPC,
Art. 16). Accessory is a relative of the
principal, except when he has profited or
assisted in profiting from the effects of the
crime (RPC,Art. 20).
The grounds for total extinguishment of
criminal liability (RPC, Art. 89) and
express pardon or marriage of the
accused and the victim in crimes
against chastity (RPC, Art. 344) NOT an
absolutory causes. An absolutory cause
prevents criminal liability from attaching
or arising from the acts of the accused.
Art. 89 which speaks of extinguishment of
criminal liability presupposes that the
accused was deemed criminally liable;
otherwise there would be no liability to
extinguish.
Only public officers or private
detectives may commit instigation. If
the one who made the instigation is a
private individual, not performing a public
function, both he and the one induced are
criminally liable, the former as principal
by inducement and the latter as principal
by direct participation.
Entrapment is not an absolutory cause.
Entrapment does not exempt the offender,
nor mitigate his criminal liability.
Decoy solicitation is not prohibited by
law. It does not invalidate a buy-bust
operation. The criminal act was done at
the solicitation of the decoy or poseur-
buyer seeking to expose his criminal act.
NMacmac
LIBEL
Libel is a public and malicious imputation
of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition,
status, or circumstance tending to cause
the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a
natural or juridical person, or to blacken
the memory of one who is dead.
In order to maintain a libel suit, it is
essential that the victim be identifiable
although it is not necessary that he be
named. It must be shown that at least a
third person could identify him as the
object of the libelous publication (Borjal v.
CA, G.R. No. 126466 January 14, 1999). It
is enough if by intrinsic reference the
allusion is apparent or if the publication
contains matters of description or
reference to facts and circumstances from
which others reading the article may know
the person alluded to, or if the latter is
pointed out by extraneous circumstances
so that those knowing such person could
and did that he was the person referred to
(Diaz v. People, G.R. No. 159787, May 25,
2007).
The intention or meaning of the writer
is immaterial. It is the meaning that the
words in fact conveyed on the minds of
persons of reasonable understanding,
discretion and candor, which should be
considered.
It must be directed at a natural or
juridical person, or one who is dead.
There is no question that the broadcasts
were made public and imputed to AMEC
defects or circumstances tending to cause it
dishonor, discredit and contempt. Rima
and Alegre’s remarks are libelous per se.
Taken as a whole; the broadcasts suggest
that AMEC is a money-making institution
where physically and morally unfit
teachers abound. Every defamatory
imputation is presumed malicious. Rima
and Alegre failed to show adequately their
good intention and justifiable motive in
airing the supposed gripes of the students.
As hosts of a documentary or public affairs
program, Rima and Alegre should have
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
presented the public issues free from
inaccurate and misleading information
(Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc. v. Ago
Medical and Educational Center-Bicol
Christian College of Medicine, G.R. No.
14199, January 17, 2005).
It is not necessary that the libelous article
must be published; communication of
the defamatory matter to some third
persons is sufficient. It is not required
that the person defamed has read or
heard about the libelous remark. What
is material is that a third person has read
or heard the libelous statement - for a
man’s reputation is the estimate in which
others hold him, not the good opinion
which he has of himself.
If the statement is sent straight to a person
for whom it is written there is no
publication of it. It could not be said,
however, that there was no publication
with respect to Fe. While the letter in
question was addressed to “Mr. Cerelito &
Fe Alejandro,” the invectives contained
therein were directed against Cerelito only.
Writing to a person other than the
person defamed is sufficient to
constitute publication, for the person
to whom the letter is addressed is a
third person in relation to its writer
and the person defamed therein
(Dolores Magno v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 133896, January 27, 2006).
Doctrine of Fair Comment. The doctrine
of fair comment means that while in
general every discreditable imputation
publicly made is deemed false, because
every man is presumed innocent until his
guilt is judicially proved, and every false
imputation is deemed malicious,
nevertheless, when the discreditable
imputation is directed against a public
person in his public capacity, it is not
necessarily actionable. In order that
such discreditable imputation to a
public official may be actionable, it
must either be a false allegation of fact
or a comment based on a false
supposition. If the comment is an
expression of opinion, based on
established facts, then it is immaterial
NMacmac
that the opinion happens to be
mistaken, as long as it might
reasonably be inferred from the facts
(Borjal v. CA, G.R. No. 126466 January
14, 1999). But any attack upon the private
character of the public officers on matters
which are not related to the discharge of
their official functions may constitute
Libel.
Statements made in the course of
judicial proceedings are absolutely
privileged. This absolute privilege
remains regardless of the defamatory
tenor and the presence of malice if the
same are relevant, pertinent or
material to the cause in hand or
subject of the inquiry. The newsletter
qualified as a communication made bona
fide upon any subject-matter in which the
party communicating has an interest. The
controversial statements were made in the
context of a criminal complaint against
Alcantara, albeit for other, separate acts
involving greed and deceit, and were
disclosed only to the official investigating
the complaint. Liberally applying the
privileged communication doctrine, these
statements were still relevant to the
complaint under investigation because,
like the averments therein, they also
involved Alcantara’s alleged deceitfulness
(Alcantara v. Ponce, G.R. No. 156183,
February 28, 2007).
Multiple Publication Rule in Libel A
single defamatory statement, if published
several times, gives rise to as many
offenses as there are publications. For
purposes of Art. 360 of RPC, as amended,
every time the same written matter is
communicated such communication is
considered a distinct and separate
publication of libel. (Soriano v.
Intermediate Apellate Court, 167 SCRA
222).
Malice (in fact) is not presumed in the
following: (1) Private communication
made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral or social,
duty; (2) Fair and true report, made in
good faith, without any comments or
remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
other official proceedings which are not of
confidential nature, or of any statement,
report, or speech delivered in the exercise
of their functions.
Article 360 includes not only the
author or the person who causes the
libelous matter to be published, but
also the person who prints or publishes
it. Proof of knowledge of and participation
in the publication of the offending article
is not required, if the accused has been
specifically identified as “author, editor, or
proprietor” or “printer/publisher” of the
publication With regard to a publication in
which a libel is printed, not only is the
publisher but also all other persons who
in any way participate in or have any
connection with its publication are liable
as publishers (Fermin v. People, G.R. No.
157643, March 28, 2008).
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Republic Act No. 4363, is
explicit on which court has jurisdiction to
try cases of written defamations: The
grant to the Sandiganbayan of
jurisdiction over offenses committed in
relation to public office, similar to the
expansion of the jurisdiction of the
MTCs, did not divest the RTC of its
exclusive and original jurisdiction to
try written defamation cases regardless
of whether the offense is committed in
relation to office (People v. Benipayo,
G.R. No. 154473, April 24, 2009).
The venue of libel cases where the
complainant is a private individual is
limited to only either of two places,
namely: 1) where the complainant
actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense; or 2) where
the alleged defamatory article was
printed and first published. If the
circumstances as to where the libel was
printed and first published are used by
the offended party as basis for the venue
in the criminal action, the Information
must allege with particularity where the
defamatory article was printed and first
published, as evidenced or supported by,
for instance, the address of their editorial
or business of fices in the case of
NMacmac
newspapers, magazines or serial
publications. This pre-condition becomes
necessary in order to forestall any
inclination to harass. The same measure
cannot be reasonably expected when it
pertains to defamatory material appearing
on a website on the internet as there
would be no way of determining the situs
of its printing and first publication. To
credit the premise of equating his first
access to the defamatory article on the
website in Makati with “printing and first
publication” would spawn the very ills that
the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC
sought to discourage and prevent
(Bonifacio et al v. RTC Makati, G.R. No.
184800, May 5, 2010).
Proof of truth is admissible in any of
the following: 1. When the act or
omission imputed constitutes a crime
regardless of whether the offended party is
a private individual or a public officer. 2.
When the offended party is a government
employee, even if the act or omission
imputed does not constitute a crime,
provided, it is related to the discharge of
his official duties. Probable cause for
belief in the truth of the statement is
sufficient.
Proof of truth is NOT enough. It is also
required that the matter charged as
libelous was published with good motives
and for justifiable ends.
Libelous remarks or comments on
matters privileged, if made with malice
in fact, do not exempt the author and
editor. The author or the editor of a
publication who distorts, mutilates or
discolors the official proceedings reported
by him, add comments thereon to cast
aspersion on the character of the parties
concerned, is guilty of libel,
notwithstanding the fact that the
defamatory matter is published in
connection with a privileged matter (U.S. v.
Dorr, G.R. No. 1049, May 16, 1903; Reyes,
2008).
Slander. It is a libel committed by oral
(spoken) means, instead of in writing. Also
defined as the speaking base and
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
defamatory words which tend to prejudice
another in his reputation. Grave slander
when it is of a serious and insulting
nature.
Marco cannot file a case for grave oral
defamation. If at all, he may file a case for
light slander. In the case of People v.
Laroga (40 O.G. 123), it was held that
defamation in political meeting when
feelings are running high and people
could not think clearly, only amount to
light slander. (BAR 1990)
Intriguing against Honor, the source of
the defamatory utterance is unknown and
the offender simply repeats or passes the
same, without subscribing to the truth
thereof. In slander, offender made the
utterance, where the source of the
defamatory nature of the utterance is
known, and offender makes a
republication thereof, even though he
repeats the libelous statement as coming
from another, as long as the source is
identified.
Incriminating an Innocent Person,
committed by performing an act by which
the offender directly incriminates or
imputes to an innocent person the
commission of a crime. Limited to the act
of planting evidence and the like. In
perjury by making false accusation, the
gravamen of the offense is the imputation
itself, falsely made, before an officer.
Giving of false statement under oath or
the making of a false affidavit.
Impudence and Negligence (Art 365).
Paragraph 5 of Article 365, Revised Penal
Code, expressly states that in the
imposition of the penalties, the courts
shall exercise their sound discretion,
without regard to the rules prescribed in
Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code
(Mariano v. People, G.R. No. 178145, July
7, 2014).
It is the inexcusable lack of precaution
or conscious indifference to the
consequences of the conduct which
supplies the criminal intent in Article
365. The limiting element in the last
NMacmac
paragraph of Article 365 of the RPC, which
imposes the penalty next higher in degree
upon the offender who “fails to lend on the
spot to the injured parties such help as
may be in his hands to give.”, according to
case law, (a) is dependent on the means in
the hands of the offender, i.e., the type
and degree of assistance that he/she, at
the time and place of the incident, is
capable of giving; and (b) requires
adequate proof. (Gonzaga v. People, G.R.
No. 195671, January 21, 2015).
Q: While X was driving his car, he noticed
that something was wrong in the
accelerator. He drove his car under tha
house of A which is made of light
materials.Upon opening the hood of his car,
he smelled gasoline from under the ar. He
lighted his lighter to see what was wrong.
All of a sudden the car was set aflame. The
fire spread to the house of A. To save
himself, A jumped from the window and
suffered serious physical injuries. B, wife
of A, failed to get out of the house and was
burnt to death. C, the son of A and B
suffered slight physical injuries when he
got out of the house. The motorcycle of C
was destroyed. What crime did X commit?
A: X committed Reckless Imprudence
resulting to Homicide (for the death of B),
Arson (for the burning of the house),
Serious Physical Injuries (for the injuries
sustained by A), and Damage to property
(for the destruction of motorcycle of C).
There is only one criminal information to be
filed because grave or less grave felonies
resulted from single act of imprudence.
When X lighted his lighter despite smelling
gasoline, he omitted that degree of care or
caution to prevent injury or damage to
another. The several crimes must be
included in one information for
Reckless Imprudence.However, with
respect to the slight physical injuries
sustained by C, resulting from the
single act of imprudence does not
constitute a complex crime. Another
information for Reckless Imprudence
resuting in Slight Physical Injuries must be
filed against X (Reodica v. Court of
Appeals, July 1998, 292 SCRA 87). Light
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
felonies cannot be complexed with grave
and less grave felonies.
SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
ANTI-CARNAPPING LAW RA 10883
Carnapping is the taking, with intent to
gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to
another without the latter’s consent, or by
means of violence against or intimidation
of persons, or by using force upon things.
Punishable acts: 1. Carnapping (Sec. 3, RA
10883); 2. Concealment of Carnapping
(Sec. 4, RA 10883); 3. Defacing or
Tampering with Serial Numbers of Motor
Vehicle Engines, Engine Blocks and
Chassis (Sec 14, RA 10883); 4. Identity
Transfer (Sec 15, RA 10883); 5. Transfer of
Vehicle Plate without Securing the Proper
Authority from the Land Transportation
Office (LTO) (Sec 16, RA 10883); 6. Sale of
Second Hand Spare Parts Taken from a
Carnapped Vehicle (Sec 17, RA 10883).
Even if the car was taken by means of
violence or intimidation the crime is
carnapping (RA 6539) and not robbery
(People v. Bustinera, G.R. No. 148233,
June 8, 2004).
While the nature of Pedro’s possession of
the taxi was initially lawful as he was
hired as a taxi driver and was entrusted
possession ther eof, his act of not
returning it to its owner transformed the
character of the possession into an
unlawful one. (People v. Bustinera, G.R.
No. 148233, June 8, 2004).
"Body-building" is a job undertaken on a
motor vehicle in order to replace its entire
body with a new body (Sec. 2(a), RA
10883).
Unlawful taking. The taking of the motor
vehicle without the consent of the owner,
or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force
upon things. It is deemed complete from
the moment the offender gains possession
of the thing, even if he has no opportunity
NMacmac
to dispose of the same (People v. Lagat,
G.R. No. 187044, September 14, 2011).
“Motor vehicle" is any vehicle propelled
by any power other than muscular
power using the public highways, except
road rollers, trolley cars, street-sweepers,
sprinklers, lawn mowers, bulldozers,
graders, fork-lifts, amphibian trucks, and
cranes if not used on public highways,
vehicles, which run only on rails or tracks,
and tractors, trailers and traction engines
of all kinds used exclusively for
agricultural purposes. Trailers having any
number of wheels, when propelled or
intended to be propelled by attachment to
a motor vehicle, shall be classified as
separate motor vehicle with no power
rating (Sec. 2(e), RA 10883).
ANTI-CHILD ABUSE LAW RA 7610, AS
AMENDED
It is inconsequential that sexual abuse
under RA 7610 occurred only once.
Sec. 3(b) of RA 7610 provides that the
abuse may be habitual or not. Hence,
the fact that the offense occurred only
once is enough to hold Garingarao liable
for acts of lasciviousness under RA 7610
(Garingarao v. People, G.R. No. 192760,
July 20, 2011).
RA 7610 recognizes the existence of a
male prostitute as a victim and not just
an offender. Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group,
indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children
exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse (Sec. 5, RA 7610).
Sec 10a of RA 7610 punishes 4 distinct
acts, to wit: (1) child abuse, (2) child
cruelty, (3) child exploitation and (4)
being responsible for conditions
prejudicial to the child’s development.
The prosecution need not prove that the
acts of child abuse, child cruelty and child
exploitation have resulted in the prejudice
of the child because an act prejudicial to
the development of the child is different
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
from the former acts. (Patulot v People, GR
235071, Jan 7, 2019)
Child abuse punishable under Sec 10a of
RA 7610 is defined under Sec 3a. It refers
to the maltreatment, whether habitual or
not, of the child which includes any of the
following: (1) Pyschological and physical
abse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and
emotional maltreatment; (2) any act by
deeds or words whichd ebases, degrades
or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity
of a child as a human being. Child abuse
involving physial injury under Sec 3a1
is a crime independnet from child
abuse involving act of debasing,
degrading or demeaning under Sec 3a2.
In child abuse involving infliction of
physical injury, intent to debase, degrade
or demean the child is not an element
thereof.
Child abuse includes maltreatment,
whether habitual ornot, of the child.
Maltreatment includes psychological
and physical abuse (Sec 3) or infliction
of physical injury. Child abuse includes
disciplinary acts by the father such as
belting, pinching and stangulating his 8-yr
old child, which caused her to limb or by
teacher such as slamming him on the floor
which caused him to lost consciousness
(Lucido v People, GR 217764, Aug 7,
2017; Rosaldes v People, GR 173988, Oct
8, 2014). Intent to discipline student is
not a defense since Article 233 of the
Family Code prohibits the infliction of
corporal punishment by teacher
(Rosaldes v People)
Child abuse includes commission of
acts or uttering words which debases,
degrades or demeans the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human
being (Sec 3) such as uttering
statements “putang ina Mong bata ka
namumuro ka na sa akin at susunugin
ko yong pamilya mo. (Jumaquino v
Villarosa, GR 165924, Jan 19, 2009)
Uttering “putaing ina mo” to the minors in
the heat of anger is not child abyse. It is a
common enough expression in the dialect
that is often employed, not really to
slander, but ather to express anger or
NMacmac
displeasure.(Escolano v People, GR
226991, Dec 10, 2018) Thus, threatening
to release her dog to chase and bit the
minors made in the heat of anger is not
child abuse. Accused merely intended that
they stop their rude behavior. Absence of
any intention to degrade the dignity of
minors, accused is only liable for other
light threats.
The law on prescription fixes periods
within which a criminal case can be filed
in the prosecutor’s office for preliminary
investigation or in court for trial. If the
crime is punishable under the RPC such
as murder, robbery or libel, Article 90
on prescriptive period apploes. If the
crime is punishable under the special
law such as BP 22, and RA 10175 on
cyber crime, Act 3326 applies. Under
Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period for a
crime under special law punished by
imprisonment for 6 years or more is 12
years. Most of the penalties under Sec 8 of
RA 10175 prescribes for cyber crimes
such as cybersex defined under Sec 4
thereof are imprisonment of more than 6
years. Hence, as a general rule the
prescriptive period for cyber crime
under Sec 4 is 12 years.
Attempted Child Abuse. The mere fact
that you are in a company of a minor who
is not a relative and 10 years older in a
restaurant, cafe, hotel or a room together.
ANTI-CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW RA 9775
“Grooming” refers to the act of preparing
a child or someone who the offender
believes to be a child for sexual activity or
sexual relationship by communicating any
form of child pornography (Sec. 3(h), RA
9775). Grooming includes online
enticement or enticement through any
other means.
“Pandering” is the act of offering,
advertising, promoting, representing, or
distributing through any means any
material or purported material that is
intended to cause another to believe that
the material or purported material
contains any form of child pornography,
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
regardless of the actual content of the
material or purported material (Sec. 3(j),
RA 9775).
“Luring” refers to the act of
communicating, by means of a computer
system, with a child or someone who the
offender believes to be a child for the
purpose of facilitating the commission of
sexual activity or production of any form
of child pornography (Sec. 3(i), RA 9775).
Syndicated child pornography is
committed when it is carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one
another (Sec. 5, RA 9775).
A child shall refer to: a. BELOW 18 years
of age; or b. OVER 18 years of age but is
unable to fully take care of himself/herself
from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation
or discrimination because of a physical or
mental disability or condition (Sec. 3(a)Par.
1, RA 9775). Also refer to: 1. A person,
regardless of age, who is presented,
depicted or portrayed as a child as defined
herein; 2. Computer-generated, digitally or
manually crafted images or graphics of a
person who is represented or who is made
to appear to be a child as defined herein
(Sec. 3(a), Par. 2, RA 9775).
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
RA 3019, AS AMENDED
All public officers which include elective
and appointive officials and employees,
permanent or temporary, whether in the
classified or unclassified or exempt
service, receiving compensation, even
nominal from the government.
A public officer charged under Sec. 3 (b)
[“directly or indirectly requesting or
receiving any gift, present, share,
percentage or benefit, for himself of for any
other person, in connection with any
contract or transaction between the
government and any other party, wherein
the public officer in his official capacity has
to intervene under the law”] of R.A. 3019
may also be charged simultaneously or
successively for the crime of direct
NMacmac
bribery under Art. 210 of the Revised
Penal Code because two crimes are
essentially different and are penalized
under distinct legal philosophies. Violation
of Sec. (b) of R.A. 3019 is a malum
prohibitum, the crime under Art. 210 of
the Code is a malum in se.
Whereas the mere request or demand of
a gift, present, share, percentage or
benefit is enough to constitute a
violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019,
acceptance of a promise or offer or
receipt of a gift or present is required
in direct bribery. Moreover, the ambit of
Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is specific. It is
limited only to contracts or transactions
involving monetary consideration where
the public officer has the authority to
intervene under the law. Direct bribery, on
the other hand, has a wider and more
general scope: (a) performance of an act
constituting a crime; (b) execution of an
unjust act which does not constitute a
crime and (c) agreeing to refrain or
refraining from doing an act which is his
official duty to do. (Merencillo v. People,
G.R. Nos. 142369-70, April 13, 2007).
Sec. 3(e) of RA No. 3019 punishes the
giving by a public officer of
unwarranted benefits to a private party.
In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the
lawmakers opted to use “private party”
rather than “private person” to describe
the recipient of the unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference for a
reason. A private person simply
pertains to one who is not a public
officer while a private party is more
comprehensive in scope to mean either
a private person or a public officer
acting in a private capacity to protect
his personal interest. When Mayor
Adalim was transferred from the provincial
jail and was detained at Ambil, Jr.’s
residence, they accorded such privilege to
Adalim, not in his official capacity as a
mayor, but as a detainee charged with
murder. Thus, for purposes of applying
the provisions of Section 3(e), RA No.
3019, Adalim was a private party (Ambil
Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 175457, July 6,
2011).
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
Sec. 3(e) of RA No. 3019 punishes the
act of causing any undue injury to any
party, including the Government. The
term “undue injury” has a meaning akin
to that civil law concept of actual damage
(Guadines v. Sandiganbayan and People,
G.R. No. 164891, June 6, 2011).
Proof of the extent or quantum of
damage is not essential. It is sufficient
that the injury suffered or benefits
received can be perceived to be substantial
enough and not merely negligible. Under
the second mode of the crime defined in
Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 therefore,
damage is not required. In order to be
found guilty under the second mode, it
suffices that the accused has given
unjustified favor or benefit to another, in
the exercise of his official, administrative
or judicial functions (Alvarez v. People,
G.R. No. 192591, June 29, 2011)
ANTI-HAZING LAW RA 8049
“Hazing” is an initiation rite or practice
as a prerequisite for admission into
membership in a fraternity, sorority or
organization by placing the recruit,
neophyte or applicant in some
embarrassing or humiliating situations or
otherwise subjecting him to physical or
psychological suffering or injury (Sec. 1,
RA 8049).
There is no allegation that the
purported acts were employed as a
prerequisite for admission or entry into
the organization. Failure to aver this
crucial ingredient would prevent the
successful prosecution of the criminal
responsibility of the accused, either as
principal or as accomplice, for the
crime of hazing (People v. Bayabos, G.R.
No. 171222, February 18, 2015).
Any person charged shall not be entitled
to the mitigating circumstance that there
was no intention to commit so grave a
wrong (Sec. 4, RA 8049).
The presence of any person during the
hazing is prima facie evidence of
participation therein as principal, UNLESS
NMacmac
he prevented the commission of the acts
punishable therein.
The following are liable as ACCOMPLICE:
a. The owner of the place where the hazing
is conducted, when he has actual
knowledge of the hazing conducted therein
but failed to take any action to prevent the
same from occurring; and b. The school
authorities including faculty members
who consent to the hazing or who have
actual knowledge thereof, but failed to
take any action to prevent the same from
occurring (Sec. 4, RA 8049).
ANTI-PIRACY AND ANTI-HIGHWAY ROBBERY
PD 532 (BAR 2001)
To sustain a conviction for highway
robbery, the prosecution must prove
that the accused were organized for the
purpose of committing robbery
indiscriminately. If the purpose is only a
particular robbery, the crime is only
robbery, or robbery in band if there are at
least four armed men (People v. Mendoza,
G.R. No. 104461, February 23, 1996;
Filoteo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
79543, October 16, 1996).
ANTI-PLUNDER ACT RA 7080, AS AMENDED
“Plunder” is a crime committed by a
public officer by himself or in connivance
with members of his family, relatives by
af finity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons,
by amassing, accumulating or acquiring
ill-gotten wealth through a combination or
series of overt acts in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least P50
million (Sec. 2, RA 7080, as amended by
RA 7659).
There must be combination or series of
the means or similar schemes in Sec. 1
(d) of RA 7080. As defined in Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan (2001), a combination and
a series require at least two overt
criminal acts in the aggregate amount or
total value of at least P50,000,000.00.
Thus, if there is only one transaction, the
crime of plunder is not committed,
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regardless of the amount amassed by the
public officer.
The corpus delicti of plunder is the
amassment, accumulation or
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth valued
at not less than P50,000,000.00. The
failure to establish the corpus delicti
should lead to the dismissal of the
criminal prosecution (Macapagal-Arroyo,
G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016).
The legislative declaration in RA No.
7659 that plunder is a heinous offense
implies that it is a malum in se. For
when the acts punished are inherently
immoral or inherently wrong, they are
mala in se and it does not matter that
such acts are punished in a special law,
especially since in the case of plunder the
predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.
Indeed, it would be absurd to treat
prosecutions for plunder as though they
are mere prosecutions for violations of the
Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of
an ordinance against jaywalking, without
regard to the inherent wrongness of the
acts (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
148560, November 19, 2001).
In order to prove the predicate act of
raids of the public treasury, there is a
requirement of personal benefit on the
part of the main plunderer or his co-
conspirators by virtue of their plunder.
As a result, not only did the Prosecution
fail to show where the money went but,
more importantly, that GMA and Aguas
had personally benefited from the same.
Hence, the Prosecution did not prove the
predicate act of raids on the public
treasury beyond reasonable doubt.
(Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 220598, July
19, 2016)
ANTI-SEXUAL HARASSMENT RA 7877
The gravamen of the offense in sexual
harassment is not the violation of the
employee’s sexuality but the abuse of
power employed by the employer
(Philippine Aeolus Automotive United
Corportation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 124617,
April 28, 2000).
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While the provision states that there must
be a “demand, request or requirement of a
sexual favor” it is not necessary that the
demand, request or requirement of a
sexual favor be articulated in a categorical
manner. It may be discerned, with equal
certitude, from the acts of the offender.
Likewise, it is not essential that the
demand, request or requirement be
made as a condition for continued
employment or for promotion to a
higher position. It is enough that the
respondent’s acts result in creating an
intimidating, hostile or offensive
environment for the employee (Domingo
v. Rayala, G.R. No. 155831, February 18,
2008). The personnel manager is in a
position to grant or not to grant a favor (a
job) to the applicant. Under the
circumstances, inviting the applicant for
dinner or dancing creates a situation
hostile or unfriendly to the applicant's
chances for a job if she turns down the
invitation (Sec. 3(a)(3), RA 7877).
Three-fold liability rule. An act of sexual
harassment may give rise to civil,
criminal, and administrative liability on
the part of the offender, each proceeding
can proceed independently of the others
(Domingo v. Rayala, G.R. No. 155831,
February 18, 2008). The civil, criminal,
and administrative action shall prescribe
in 3 years.
“Safe Streets, Workplaces, and Public Spaces Act of
2017” Republic Act No 11313
An act that seeks to penalize catcalling
and other street-based harassment. The
new law is an expansion of the Anti-
Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 — which
only covers sexual harassment committed
by people with authority in the workplace,
schools, and training institutions. The
new law seeks to include those
committed in public places and towards
members of the LGBT community.
The anti-street harassment law seeks to
penalize (Bastos/rude culture - senator
hontiveros) unwanted comments,
gestures, and actions forced on a person
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in a public place without their consent,
and directed at them because of their
actual or perceived sex, gender, gender
expression or sexual orientation and
identity. Actions considered as sexual
harassment include unwanted cursing,
wolf-whistling, cat-calling, leering, sexist,
homophobic or transphobic slurs,
persistent requests for someone’s name,
number or destination after clear refusal,
persistent telling of sexual jokes, use of
sexual names, comments and demands,
flashing, public masturbation, groping,
and stalking, among others.
Stalking refers to a conduct directed at a
person involving the repeated visual or
physical proximity, non-consensual
communication, or a combination thereof
that cause or will likely cause a person to
fear for one’s safety, or the safety of
others, or to suffer emotional distress.
Online harassment is defined by the law
as the "use of information and
communication technology in
terrorizing and intimidating victims
through physical, psychological, and
emotional threats.” Forms of online
sexual harassment and penalties for each
are as follows: Unwanted sexual
misogynistic, transphobic, homophobic,
and sexist remarks and comments online
whether publicly or through direct and
private messages; Invasion of victim's
privacy thr ough cyberstalking and
incessant messaging; Uploading and
sharing without the consent of the victims,
any form of media that contains photos,
voice, or video with sexual content;
Unauthorized recording and sharing of
any of the victim's photos, videos, or any
information online; Impersonating
identities of victims online or posting lies
about victims to harm their reputation;
Filing false abuse reports to online
platforms to silence victims. Offenses
committed here shall be
imprescriptible.
First-time offenders in all categories
are required to attend a Gender
Sensitivity Seminar conducted by the
Philippine National Police in coordination
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with the local government unit and the
Philippine Commission on Women (PCW).
Acts that are legitimate expressions of
indigeneous culture and tradition as well
as breastfeeding in public shall not be
penalized.
ANTI-TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ACT RA 9208,
AS AMENDED BY RA 10364
Trafficking in Persons under Sec. 3(a) and
4 of RA 9208 is not only limited to
transportation of victims, but also
includes the act of recruitment of victims
for trafficking. The crime of recruitment
fo r pro stitu tio n also co nstitutes
trafficking (People v. Lalli et al., G.R. No.
195419, October 12, 2011).
The past sexual behavior or the sexual
predisposition of a trafficked person
shall be considered inadmissible in
evidence for the purpose of proving
consent of the victim to engage in sexual
behavior, or to prove the predisposition,
sexual or otherwise, of a trafficked person
(Sec. 17-B, RA 9208 as amended by RA
10364). The consent of a victim of
trafficking to the intended exploitation
shall be irrelevant where any of the means
set forth in Section 3(a) of this Act has
been used [recruitment, obtaining, hiring,
pr oviding, of fering, transportation,
transfer, maintaining, harboring, or
receipt of persons with or without the
victim’s consent or knowledge, within or
across national borders by means of
threat, or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception,
abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the
person, or, the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the
consent] (Sec. 17-B, RA 9208 as amended
by RA 10364).
ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND
THEIR CHILDREN ACT RA 9262
Violence against women and their
children. Refers to any act or a series of
acts committed by ANY PERSON against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or
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against a woman with whom the person
has or had a sexual or dating relationship,
or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family
abode, which result in or is likely to result
in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty (Sec. 3(a), RA 9262).
A man cannot be a victim under this
Act. He should resort to the appropriate
provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
The victim of RA 9262 is a woman with
whom the offender has or had marital,
sexual or dating relationship and her
children. The supreme court said that
the use of the gender-neutral word
“person” who has or had a sexual or
dating relationship with the woman
encompasses even lesbian
relationships. (Garcia v Drilon, GR
179267, June 25, 2013)
"Violence against women and their
children" refers to any act or a series of
acts committed by any person against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or
against a woman with whom the person
has or had a sexual or dating relationship,
or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family
abode, which result in or is likely to result
in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not
limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that
include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which
is sexual in nature, committed against a
woman or her child. It includes, but is
not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of
lasciviousness, treating a woman
or her child as a sex object,
making demeaning and sexually
suggestive remarks, physically
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attacking the sexual parts of the
victim's body, forcing her/him to
watch obscene publications and
indecent shows or forcing the
woman or her child to do
indecent acts and/or make films
thereof, forcing the wife and
mistress/lover to live in the
conjugal home or sleep together
in the same room with the
abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to
cause the victim to engage in any
sexual activity by force, threat of
force, physical or other harm or
threat of physical or other harm
or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or
omissions causing or likely to cause
mental or emotional suffering of the
victim such as but not limited to
intimidation, harassment, stalking,
damage to property, public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and
mental infidelity. It includes causing or
allowing the victim to witness the
physical, sexual or psychological abuse
of a member of the family to which the
victim belongs, or to witness
pornography in any form or to witness
abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or
unwanted deprivation of the right to
custody and/or visitation of common
children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that
make or attempt to make a woman
financially dependent which includes,
but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or
preventing the victim from
engaging in any legitimate
profession, occupation, business
or activity, except in cases wherein
the other spouse/partner objects
on valid, serious and moral
grounds as defined in Article 73 of
the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation
of financial resources and the right
to the use and enjoyment of the
conjugal, community or property
owned in common;
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money
or properties or solely controlling
the conjugal money or properties.
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
Victim-survivors who are found by the
courts to be suffering from battered
woman syndrome DO NOT incur any
criminal and civil liability notwithstanding
the absence of any of the elements for
justifying circumstances of self-defense
under the Revised Penal Code (Sec. 26, RA
9262).
The law explicitly prohibits
compromise on any act constituting
the crime of violence against women.
Thus, in Garcia v. Drilon, the Court
declared that: Violence, however, is not a
subject for compromise. A process which
involves parties mediating the issue of
violence implies that the victim is
somehow at fault. While AAA filed her
application for a Temporary Protection
Order (TPO) and a Permanent Protection
Order (PPO) as an independent action and
not as an incidental relief prayed for in a
criminal suit, the instant petition cannot
be taken outside the ambit of cases falling
under the provisions of R.A. 9262.
Perforce, the prohibition against
subjecting the instant petition to
compromise applies (BBB,* v. AAA*, G.R.
No. 193225, February 9, 2015).
In order to be classified as a battered
woman, the couple must go through the
battering cycle at least twice. (People v.
Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15,
2004).
3 Phases of Cycle of Violence: 1.
Tension-Building Phase - minor battering
occurs - it could be verbal or slight
physical abuse or another form of hostile
behavior; 2. Acute battering incident -
characterized by brutality, destructiveness
and, sometimes, death. The battered
woman deems this incident as
unpredictable, yet also inevitable; 3.
Tranquil, loving or (at least nonviolent)
phase - the couple experience profound
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relief. On one hand, the batterer may
show a tender and nurturing behavior
towards his partner. On the other hand,
the battered woman tries to convince
herself that the battery will never happen
again (People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981
January 15, 2004).
BOUNCING CHECKS LAW BP 22
In order to create the prima facie
presumption that the issuer knew of
the insufficiency of funds, it must be
shown that he or she received a notice
of dishonor and within five banking
days thereafter, failed to satisfy the
amount of the check or arrange for its
payment. It is only then that the drawer
may be held liable for violation of the
subject law. In order to be punished for
the acts committed under B.P. 22, it is
required there under that not only should
the accused issue a check that is
dishonored but likewise the accused has
actually been notified in writing of the fact
of dishonor. (Cabrera v. People, G.R. No.
150618, July 24, 1989)
The presumption or prima facie
evidence as provided in this section
cannot arise, if such notice of
nonpayment by the drawee bank is not
sent to the maker or drawer, or if there
is no proof as to when such notice was
received by the drawer, since there
would simply be no way of reckoning the
crucial 5-day period (Lim Lao v. CA, G.R.
No. 119178, June 20, 1997; Resterio v.
People, G.R. No. 177438, September 24,
2012).
Note: In estafa by postdating or issung
check in payment of an obligation (not pre-
existing) when offender has no funds in the
bank or his funds were not sufficient to
cover the amount of the check, drawwer is
given 3 days to make arrangements of
payment after r eceipt of notice of
dishonour.
If the payee presented the check for
payment on the 96th day after its due date
and it bounced, even if the payee sends a
written notice of dishonor to the drawer,
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the payee would not be entitled to a
presumption that the drawer had
knowledge that he has no funds when the
check was issued. Under Sec. 2 of B.P.
22, the said presumption can only be
utilized during the 90-day period.
BP 22 does not cover manager’s check
because of its peculiar character and
general use in the commercial world, it is
as good as the money it represents and is
therefore deemed as cash. (1 FESTIN, pp.
145)
A stolen check cannot give rise to a
violation of B.P. 22 because the check
is not drawn for a valuable
consideration. Such checks were not
made to apply to a valid, due and
demandable obligation. This, in effect, is a
categorical ruling that the fact from which
the civil liability of respondent may arise
does not exist (Ching vs Nicdao, GR
141181, April 27, 2007).
A and B agreed to meet at the latter’s
house to discuss B’s financial problems. On
his way, one of A’s car tires blew up.
Before A left the meeting, he asked B to
lend him money to buy a new spare tire. B
had temporarily exhausted his bank
deposits leaving a zero balance.
Anticipating, however a replenishment of
his account soon, B, issued a postdated
check with which A negotiated for the new
tire. A, who negotiated the unfunded check
of B in buying a new tire for his car, may
only be prosecuted for estafa if he was
aware at the time of such negotiation that
the check has no sufficient funds in the
drawee bank; otherwise, he is not
criminally liable. B, who accommodated A
with his check, may nevertheless be
prosecuted under B.P. 22 for having issued
the check, knowing at the time of issuance
that he has no funds in the bank and that
A will negotiate it to buy a new tire, i.e. for
value. B may not be prosecuted for estafa
because the facts indicate that he is not
actuated by intent to defraud in issuing the
check negotiated. Obviously, B issued the
postdated check only to help A. Criminal
intent or dolo is absent.
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Under Sec. 1, Par. 1 of B.P. 22, it is
implied that when the stop payment
order is with a valid reason, there can
be no violation of B.P. 22.
Notwithstanding receipt of an order to
stop payment, the drawee shall state in
the notice that there were no sufficient
funds in or credit with such bank for the
payment in full of such check, if such be
the fact (Sec. 3, BP 22).
When guarantee checks were issued for
the lease of certain equipment but later
their equipment was pulled out, the
drawer is not liable. In the case of Magno
v. CA, G.R. No. 96132, June 26, 1992, the
accused issued a check of warranty
deposit for lease of certain equipment.
Even knowing that he has no funds or
insufficient funds in the bank, he does not
incur any liability under B.P. 22, if the
lessor of the equipment pulled out the
loaned equipment. The drawer has no
obligation to make good the check because
there is no more deposit or guaranty.
The law does not distinguish the
currency involved under B.P. 22.
Foreign checks, provided they are either
drawn and issued in the Philippines,
though payable outside thereof are within
the coverage of said law (De Villa v. CA,
G.R. No. 87416, April 8, 1991).
Double recovery is not allowed by the law.
Settled is the rule that the single act of
issuing a bouncing check may give rise
to two distinct criminal offenses:
estafa and violation of B.P. 22.
However, the recovery of the single
civil liability arising from the single act
of issuing a bouncing check in either
criminal case bars the recovery of the
same civil liability in the other criminal
action. While the law allows two
simulataneous civil remedies for the
offended party, it authorizes recovery in
only one. In short, while two crimes arise
from a single set of facts, only one civil
liability attaches to it (Rodriguez v. Hon.
Ponferrada, G.R. Nos. 155531-34, July 29,
2005).
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COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
RA 9165 WITH IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS
The crime of conspiracy to commit
possession of dangerous drugs does not
exist. Simply put, the circumstance of
conspiracy is not appreciated in the crime
of possession of dangerous drugs under
Sec. 11, Article II of RA 9165 (Posiquit v.
People, G.R. No. 193943, January 16,
2012).
If a person is caught selling or pushing
dangerous drugs and after his arrest,
they found SIMILAR dangerous drugs in
his body, the person may be charged of
two offenses and convicted of two
offenses also: one for illegal sale and one
for illegal possession.
In the crime of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, the delivery of the illicit drug to
the vendee and the receipt by the seller
of the marked money consummate the
illegal transaction. What matters is the
proof that the transaction or sale actually
took place, coupled with the presentation
in court of the prohibited drug, the corpus
delicti, as evidence (People v. Amaro, GR
No. 207517, June 1, 2016).
Is the presentation of informant
necessary in the prosecution for illegal
sale of dangerous drugs? In People v.
Andaya, the confidential informant was
not a police officer but he was designated
to be the poseur buyer himself. The State
did not present the confidential
informant/poseur buyer during the trial to
describe how exactly the transaction
between him and Andaya had taken place.
There would have been no issue against
failur e to pr esent the confidential
informant/poseur-buyer except that none
of the members of the buy-bust team had
directly witnessed the transaction, if any,
between Andaya and the poseur buyer due
to their being positioned at a distance at
the moment of the supposed transaction.
The presentation of the confidential
informants as witnesses for the
Prosecution in those instances could be
excused because there were poseur buyers
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who directly incriminated the accused. In
this case, however, it was different,
because the poseur buyer and the
confidential informant were one and the
same. Without the poseur buyer's
testimony, the State did not credibly
incriminate Andaya (People v. Andaya,
G.R. No. 183700 October 13, 2014).
The absence of actual or completed
payment is irrelevant, for the law itself
penalizes the very act of delivery of a
dangerous drug, regardless of any
consideration. Payment of consideration
is likewise immaterial in the distribution
of illegal drugs (People v. Yang G.R.
148077, February 16, 2004).
“Transport” as used under the
Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to
mean: “to carry or convey from one
place to another.” The essential element
of the charge is the movement of the
dangerous drug from one place to another.
Since the accused was arrested inside a
car, when the car was not in transit such
that the car was parked and stationary,
then there is no transportation. The
conclusion that the accused transported
the drugs merely because he was in a
motor vehicle when he was accosted with
the drugs has no basis and is mere
speculation. It is the responsibility of the
prosecution to prove the element of
transport of dangerous drugs, namely,
that transportation had taken place, or
that the accused had moved the drugs
some distance (San Juan v. People G.R.
177191, May 30, 2011).
The very act of throwing away the
sachet, the contents of which were
later determined to be shabu,
presupposes that accused-appellant had
prior possession of it (Castro v. People,
G.R. No. 193379, August 15, 2011).
An accused may only be convicted of a
single offense of possession of
dangerous drugs if he or she was caught
in possession of different kinds of
dangerous drugs in a single occasion. If
convicted, the higher penalty shall be
imposed, which is still lighter if the
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accused is convicted of two (2) offenses
having two (2) separate penalties. This
interpretation is more in keeping with the
intention of the legislators as well as more
favorable to the accused (David v. People,
G.R. No. 181861, October 17, 2011).
Constructive possession exists when
the drug is under the dominion and
control of the accused or when he has
the right to exercise dominion and
control over the place where it is found.
The prosecution must prove that the
accused had knowledge of the existence
and presence of the drugs in the place
under his control and dominion and the
character of the drugs (Del Castillo v.
People, G.R. No. 185128, January 30,
2012).
If Paolo Ollero was caught in possession
of any equipment, instrument,
apparatus and other paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs, he is liable for
Possession of Equipment, Instrument,
Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs under Sec. 12 of RA
9165 and may also be liable for Use of
Dangerous Drugs under Sec. 15 of the
same law since possession of equipment,
instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs is
prima facie evidence that the possessor
has smoked, consumed, administered to
himself, injected, ingested or used a
dangerous drug and shall be presumed to
have violated Sec. 15 of the law.
Possession of dangerous drugs
constitutes prima facie evidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi
sufficient to convict an accused in the
absence of a satisfactory explanation of
such possession. Thus, the burden of
evidence is shifted to the accused to
explain the absence of knowledge or
animus possidendi (Buenaventura v.
People, G.R. No. 171578, August 8, 2007;
People v. Buntuyan, G.R. No. 206912,
September 10, 2014).
Use of Dangerous Drugs. “Use” is any act
of injecting, intravenously or
intramuscularly, of consuming, either by
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chewing, smoking, snif fing, eating,
swallowing, drinking or otherwise
introducing into the physiological system
of the body, and of the dangerous drugs
(Sec. 3(kk), RA 9165). He was
apprehended for the use and was found to
be positive for use of any dangerous
drugs; and no other dangerous drug was
found in his possession. Use of
Dangerous Drugs under Sec. 15 of RA
9165 shall not be applicable where the
person tested is also found to have in
his/her possession such quantity of any
dangerous drug provided for under
Section 11 of the same Act, in which
case the provisions stated therein shall
apply (Sec. 15, RA 9165).
“Cultivate or Culture” is any act of
knowingly planting, growing, raising, or
permitting the planting, growing or
raising of any plant which is the source
of a dangerous drug (Sec. 3(i), RA 9165).
The land or portions thereof and/or
greenhouses on which any of said plants
is cultivated or cultured shall be
confiscated and escheated in favor of the
State, unless the owner can prove that he
has no knowledge of such cultivation or
culture despite the exercise of due
diligence on his part.
The only purpose for treating with
ultra-violet powder the buy-bust money
to be used in the actual buy-bust
operation is for identification, that is, to
determine if there was receipt of the buy-
bust money by the accused in exchange
for the illegal drugs he was selling (People
v. Unisa y Islan, G.R. No. 185721
September 28, 2011). The failure of the
police officers to use ultraviolet powder on
the buy-bust money is not an indication
that the buy-bust operation was a sham.
“The use of initials to mark the money
used in a buy-bust operation has been
accepted by the courts” (People v.
Amansec, G.R. No. 186131, December
14, 2011).
Pamela, a high school student, was caught
using shabu inside the campus of the
school she is attending. All school heads,
supervisors and teachers are deemed
persons in authority and empowered to
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apprehend, arrest or cause the
apprehension or arrest of any person
who shall violate any of the said
provisions of Article II of Dangerous Drugs
Act, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court (Sec. 44, IRR of RA
9165). They shall be deemed persons in
authority if they are in the school or
within its immediate vicinity, or even
beyond such immediate vicinity if they are
in attendance at any school or class
function in their official capacity as school
heads, supervisors, and teachers (Sec. 44,
IRR of RA 9165).
COMPREHENSIVE LAW ON FIREARMS AND
AMUNITION PD 1866, AS AMENDED BY RA 8294
AND RA 10591
The failure to deliver the firearm or
ammunition within six (6) months after
the death or legal disability of the
licensee shall render the possessor
liable for illegal possession of the
firearm. Upon the death or legal disability
of the holder of a firearm license, it shall
be the duty of his/her next of kin, nearest
relative, legal representative, or other
person who shall knowingly come into
possession of such firearm or
ammunition, to deliver the same to the
FEO of the PNP or Police Regional Office,
and such firearm or ammunition shall be
retained by the police custodian pending
the issuance of a license and its
registration (Sec. 26, RA 10591).
A permit to carry firearms outside of
residence shall be issued by the Chief of
the PNP or his duly authorized
representative to any qualified person
whose life is under actual threat or his/
her life is in imminent danger due to the
nature of his/her profession, occupation
or business. The burden is on the
applicant to prove that his/her life is
under actual threat by submitting a
threat assessment certificate from the
PNP (Sec. 7, RA 10591).
Professionals that are considered to be in
imminent danger due to the nature of
their profession, occupation or business
a. Members of the Philippine Bar; b.
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Certified Public Accountants; c. Accredited
Media Practitioners; d. Cashiers, Bank
Tellers; e. Priests, Ministers, Rabbi,
Imams; f. Physicians and Nurses; g.
Engineers; and h. Businessmen, who by
the nature of their business or
undertaking, are exposed to high risk of
being targets of criminal elements (Sec. 7,
RA 10591).
Only small arms may be registered by
licensed citizens or licensed juridical
entities for ownership, possession and
concealed carry. Small arms are firearms
intended primarily designed for individual
use or that which is generally considered
to mean a weapon intended to be fired
from the hand or shoulder, which are not
capable of fully automatic bursts of
discharge (Sec. 3(dd), RA 10591).
A light weapon shall be lawfully acquired
or possessed exclusively by the AFP, PNP
and other law enforcement agencies
authorized by the President in the
performance of their duties.
Private individuals who already have
licenses to possess Class-A light
weapons upon the effectivity of RA
10591 shall not be deprived of the
privilege to continue possessing the
same and renewing the licenses
therefor, for the sole reason that these
firearms are Class “A” light weapons.
Class A Light weapons – referring to self-
loading pistols, rifles, and carbines
submachine guns, assault rifles and light
machine guns not exceeding caliber
7.62MM which have fully automatic mode.
Accused can be simultaneously charged
for violation of RA 10591 and BP 881.
In RA 10591, the burden to prove the
negative allegation that the accused has
no license or permit to carry a firearm lies
with the prosecution. In BP 881, the
burden to adduce evidence that the
accused is exempt from COMELEC Gun
Ban lies with the accused (Abenes v. CA,
G.R. No. 156320, February 14, 2007)
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW ACT 4103, AS
AMENDED
Purpose. To uplift and redeem valuable
human material, and prevent unnecessary
and excessive deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness (People v.
Ducosin, G.R. No. L-38332, December 14,
1933).
Indeterminate sentence applies
mandatorily to violations of both the
RPC and special laws where
imprisonment would exceed one (1)
year, and where the penalty is divisible
(Sec. 1, Act 4103).
The term minimum refers to the duration
of the sentence which the convict shall
serve as a minimum to be eligible for
parole. The term maximum refers to the
maximum limit of the duration that the
convict may be held in jail. The
deter mination of the minimum and
maximum terms is left entirely to the
discretion of the trial court, the exercise of
which will not be disturbed on appeal
unless there is a clear abuse (People v.
Medroso, G.R. No. L-37633 January 31,
1975).
If a prisoner, even if already served the
minimum sentence but the Board of
Indeterminate Sentence found out that
he is not fit for release on parole, he
shall continue to serve until the end of
the maximum term. Prisoner on parole is
entitled to final release and discharge if
during the period of surveillance such
paroled prisoner shall: 1. Show himself to
be a law-abiding citizen; and 2. Not violate
any law (Section 6 of the indeterminate
Sentence Law). When the paroled prisoner
shall violate any of the conditions of his
parole, he may be: 1. Rearrested; and 2.
Thereafter, he shall serve the remaining
unexpired portion of the maximum
sentence for which he was originally
committed to prison (Sec. 8 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law).
Penalty is Imposed by RPC:
1. The Maximum Term – is that which in
view of the attending circumstances
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could be properly imposed under the
RPC.
2. The Minimum Term – is within the
range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the RPC.
Penalty is Imposed by SPL:
3. Maximum Term – must not exceed the
maximum term fixed by said law.
4. Minimum Term – must not be less than
the minimum term prescribed by the
same.
An agonizing and protracted trial having
come to a close, the judge found A guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and
imposed on him a straight penalty of six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor. the
public prosecutor objected to the sentence
on the ground that the proper penalty
should have been twelve (12) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal. the
defense counsel chimed in, contending that
application of the indeterminate sentence
law should lead to the imposition of a
straight penalty of six (6) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional only. None of
the contentions is correct because the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act 4103, as
amended) has not been followed. The
imposition of penalty for the crime of
homicide, which is penalized by
imprisonment exceeding one (1) year and is
divisible, is covered by the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. The said law requires that
the sentence should reflect a minimum term
for purposes of parole, and a maximum
term fixing the limit of the imprisonment.
Imposing a straight penalty is incorrect.
Bruno was charged with homicide for
killing the 75-year old owner of his
rooming house. The prosecution proved
that Bruno stabbed the owner causing his
death, and that the killing happened at 10
in the evening in the house where the
victim and Bruno lived. Bruno, on the
other hand, successfully proved that he
voluntarily surrendered to the authorities;
that he pleaded guilty to the crime
charged; that it was the victim who first
attacked and did so without any
provocation on his (Bruno's) part, but he
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prevailed because he managed to draw his
knife with which he stabbed the victim.
The penalty for homicide is reclusion
temporal. Bruno was entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstances of
incomplete self-defense and the presence
of at least two ordinary mitigating
circumstances (voluntary surrender and
plea of guilt) without any aggravating
circumstance under Art. 69 and 64(5) of
the RPC respectively, which lowers the
prescribed penalty for homicide which is
reclusion temporal to prision correccional.
The problem provides that the defense was
able to prove that it was the man who first
attacked Bruno; therefore, there was
unlawful aggression. But there was no
provocation coming from Bruno, therefore,
there was a lack of sufficient provocation.
So two elements of self-defense are
present. The 3rd element of self-defense
is absent because based on the facts
proven by Bruno, although it was the man
who attacked Bruno first, he prevailed
upon the man because he made use of a
knife and stabbed the man. While the man
attacked Bruno by means of his fist, it is
not reasonably necessary for Bruno to
make use of a knife in killing the man. So
what we have is an incomplete self-
defense. Under paragraph 1 of Article 13,
in case of incomplete self-defense, if aside
fr om unlawful aggr ession, another
element is present but not all, we have a
privileged mitigating circumstance.
Therefore, this incomplete self-defense
shall be treated as a privileged mitigating
circumstance. The prosecution was able to
prove that the man is 75 years old. Would
you consider the aggravating
circumstance of disrespect of age? No.
Even if Bruno killed the said 75 year-old
man, there was no showing in the problem
that he disrespected the age of the man.
Would you consider nighttime as an
aggravating circumstance? No. Even if the
problem says that the crime was
committed at 10 in the evening, it did not
say whether the house was lighted or not.
There was also no showing that the
offender deliberately sought nighttime to
commit the crime. Would you consider
dwelling? No. In the said dwelling both
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Bruno and the victim are residing.
Therefore, dwelling is not an aggravating
circumstance because both of them are
living in the same dwelling. It cannot be
said that when Bruno killed the man, he
disrespected the dwelling of the said man.
Therefore, we have no aggravating
circumstance present. Take note that
Brunowas able to pr ove voluntary
surrender, voluntary plea of guilt, and
then we have an incomplete self-defense
— a privileged mitigating circumstance.
Applying these conclusions, we have two
(2) ordinary mitigating circumstances with
one (1) privileged mitigating circumstance
and with no aggravating circumstance.
How do we compute the penalty? Bruno
should be sentenced to an indeterminate
sentence penalty of arresto mayor in any
of its period as minimum to prision
correccional in its medium period as
maximum.
1. Consider first the Privileged Mitigating
Circumstance. Whenever there is a
privileged mitigating circumstance
present, apply it first before computing
the penalty. In this example, since we
have incomplete self-defense, you have
to lower the penalty by one degree
because it is a privileged mitigating
circumstance. Thus, instead of
reclusion temporal, it will become
prision mayor.
2. Consider the Ordinary Mitigating
Circumstance. So now, there are two
ordinary mitigating circumstances with
no aggravating circumstance. Article
64 provides that when there are two
mitigating with no aggravating, lower
the penalty by one degree. Therefore, if
you lower it by one degree, it is now
prision correccional.
3. Determine the Maximum Sentence
after considering all justifying,
exempting, mitigating, and aggravating
circumstances, if any. You have
already applied everything so it will
become prision correccional in its
medium period.
4. Determine the minimum term of the
sentence. You go one degree lower and
that is arresto mayor. Therefore,
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
arresto mayor in its medium period (or
any period in the discretion of the
court) is the minimum term of the
sentence.
Persons disqualified from availing the
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law. The Indeterminate sentence law
shall NOT apply to persons:
1. Convicted of: a. An offense punishable
with death penalty, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment b. T reason,
conspiracy or proposal to commit
treason c. Misprision of treason,
rebellion, sedition, espionage d. Piracy;
2. Habitual delinquents;
3. Those who shall have escaped from
confinement or evaded sentence;
4. Granted conditional pardon by the
Chief Executive and shall have violated
the term (condition) thereto;
5. W h o s e m a x i m u m t e r m o f
imprisonment does not exceed one
year;
6. Who are already serving final judgment
upon the approval of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law (Sec. 2, Act 4103).
Although the penalty prescribed for the
felony committed is death or reclusion
perpetua, if after considering the
attendant circumstances, the
imposable penalty is reclusion
temporal or less, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law applies. Recidivists, who
are not habitual delinquents, are
entitled to the benefit of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (People v.
Jaranilla, G.R. No. L-28547, February
22, 1974)
PROBATION LAW PD 968, AS AMENDED
Probation. It is a disposition under which
a defendant, after conviction and
sentence, is released subject to conditions
imposed by the court and to the
supervision of a probation officer(Sec. 3(a),
PD 968).
An order placing defendant on
probation is not a sentence but a
suspension of the imposition of
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sentence. It is not a final judgment but
an "interlocutory judgment" in the nature
of a conditional order placing the
convicted defendant under the supervision
of the court for his reformation, to be
followed by a final judgment of discharge,
if the conditions of the probation are
complied with, or by a final judgment if
the conditions are violated(Bala v. Hon.
Martinez, G.R. No. L-67301, January 29,
1990)
Probation is a mere privilege and its
grant rest solely upon the discretion of
the court. It is exercised primarily for the
benefit of the organized society and only
incidentally for the benefit of the accused.
The grant of probation is not automatic or
ministerial (Bernardo v. Balagot, G.R. No.
86561, November 10, 1992).
Probation shall be denied if the court
finds that: a. The offender is in need of
correctional treatment that can be
provided most effectively by his
commitment to an institution; b. There is
an undue risk that during the period of
probation the of fender will commit
another crime; or c. Probation will
depreciate the seriousness of the offense
committed(Sec. 8, PD 968).
When a judgment of conviction
imposing a non-probationable penalty is
appealed or reviewed, and such
judgment is modified through the
imposition of a probationable penalty,
the defendant shall be allowed to apply
for probation based on the modified
decision before such decision becomes
final. The application for probation based
on the modified decision shall be filed in
the trial court where the judgment of
conviction imposing a non-probationable
penalty was rendered, or in the trial court
where such case has since been re-raffled.
The filing of the petition for probation
is a waiver by the accused of his right
to appeal the judgment of conviction.
The accused shall lose the benefit of
probation should he seek a review of the
modified decision which already imposes a
probationable penalty(Sec. 4, PD 968 as
amended by RA 10707).
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Arnel Colinares was found guilty of
frustrated homicide by the RTC. On appeal,
the CA affirmed his conviction. On petition
for review, SC ruled that he was only guilty
of attempted homicide, which penalty is
“probationable”. Is Colinares now entitled
to apply for probation upon remand of the
case to the lower court, even after he has
perfected his appeal to a previous
conviction (frustrated homicide) which was
not “probationable”? A: YES. What is clear
is that, had the RTC done what was right
and imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of
two years and four months maximum, he
would have had the right to apply for
probation. Arnel did not appeal from a
judgment that would have allowed him to
apply for probation. He did not have a
choice between appeal and probation.
While it is true that probation is a mere
privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the
right to such privilege; he certainly does not
have. What he has is the right to apply for
that privilege. If the Court allows him to
apply for probation because of the lowered
penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to
decide whether or not to grant him the
privilege of probation, taking into account
the full circumstances of his case (Colinares
v. People, G.R. No. 182748, December 13,
2011).
Probation may be granted whether the
sentence imposes a term of imprisonment
or a fine only(Sec. 4, PD 968 as amended
by RA 10707).
An order granting or denying probation
shall not be appealable (Sec. 4, PD 968 as
amended by RA 10707).Hence, if granted,
the remedy is a Motion for
Reconsideration and if denied, a petition
for certiorari.
Disqualification to avail the benefits of
the probation law: 1. Sentenced to serve
a maximum term of imprisonment of more
than six (6) years; 2. Convicted of any
crime against national security; 3. Who
have previously been convicted by final
judgment of an offense punishable by
imprisonment of more than six (6) months
and one (1) day and/or a fine of more than
one thousand pesos (P1,000.00); 4. Who
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have been once on probation under the
provision of this Decree; 5. Who are
already serving sentence at the time the
substantive provisions of this Decree
became applicable pursuant to Section 33
hereof; 6. If he perfected an appeal from
the judgment of conviction (Sec. 4, PD 968
as amended by RA 10707); 7. If he is
convicted of violation of Election
offenses(Sec. 264, BP 881); or 8. Any
person convicted for drug trafficking or
pushing under RA 9165 regardless of the
penalty imposed (Sec. 24, RA 9165).
In multiple prison terms, those
imposed against the accused found
guilty of several offenses should not be
added up, and their sum total should not
be determinative of his disqualification
from probation since the law uses the
word “maximum” not “total” term of
imprisonment (Francisco v. CA, et. al,
G.R. No. 108747, April 6, 1995).
Period of probation. 1. The period of
probation of a defendant sentenced to a
term of imprisonment of not more than 1
year shall not exceed 2 years, and in all
other cases, said period shall not exceed 6
years. 2. When the sentence imposes a
fine only and the offender is made to serve
subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, the period of probation shall
not be less than nor be more than twice
the total number of days of subsidiary
imprisonment.
The mere expiration of the period for
probation does not, ipso facto,
terminate the probation. Probation is
not co-terminus with its period, there
must be an order from the Court of final
discharge, terminating the probation. If
the accused violates the condition of the
probation before the issuance of said
order, the probation may be revoked by
the Court (Bala v. Martinez, G.R. No.
L-67301, January 29, 1990).
Effects of termination of probation: 1.
Case is deemed terminated. 2. Restoration
of all civil rights lost or suspended. 3.
Totally extinguish his criminal liability as
to the offense for which probation was
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
granted (Sec. 16, PD 968 as amended by
RA 10707)
Sanctions imposed if the probationer
commits any serious violation of the
conditions of probation: 1. The court
may issue a warrant for the arrest of a
probationer. 2. If violation is established,
the court may: a. Revoke his probation;
OR b. Continue his probation and modify
the conditions thereof. This order is not
appealable. 3. If probation is revoked, the
probationer shall serve the sentence
originally imposed.
Pardon is exercised individually by the
President when the person is already
convicted. Probation is exercised
individually by the trial court within the
period for perfecting an appeal. In both
cases, the civil liability of the offender is
not extinguished.
RA 11362 “Community Service Act”
introduced a new provision on
community service, and that is, Article
88-a of the RPC. It is the policy of the
State to promote restorative justice and
decongest jails by authorizing the court in
its discretion to require community service
in lieu of service in jail for offenses
punishable by arresto menor (1 day to 30
days) or arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day
to 6 months). Community serivce is not a
penalty but a mode of serving the penalty
of arresto menor or mayor. Article 88-a
provides:
“ x x x by rendering community service in
the place where the crime was committed,
under the such terms as the court shall
determine, taking into consideration the
gravity of the offense and the
circumstances of the case, which shall be
under the supervision of a probation officer:
Provided, that the court will prepare an
order imposing the community service,
specifying the number of hours to ber
worked and the period withing which to
complete the service. The order is then
referred to the assigned probation officer
who shall have responsibilty of the
defendant.
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The defendant shall likewise undergo
rehabilitative counseling under the social
welfare and development officer of the city
or municipality concernedwith the
assistance of DSWD. In requiring
community service, the court shall consider
the welfare of the society and the
reasonable probability that the person
sentenced shall not violate the law while
rendering the service.
Community service shall consist of any
actual physical activity which inculcates
civil consciousness, and is intended
towards the improvement of a public work
or promotion of a public service.
If the defendant violates the terms of the
community service, the court shall order
his/her re-arrest and the defendant shall
serve the full term of the penalty, as the
case may be, in jail, or in the house of the
defendant as provided under Article 88.
However, if the defendant has fully
complied with the terms of the community
service, the court shall order the release of
the defendant unless detained for some
other reason.
The privilege of rendering community
service in lieu of service in jail shall be
availed of only once.”
Article 89 of the RPC enumerates the
modes of criminal extinction such as
death, pardon and amnesty. The only
thing extinguisged by the death of the
offender is his criminal liability. His death
did not extinguish the crime (People v Go,
GR 168539, Mar 25, 2014). Pardon looks
forward and abolishes or forgives the
punishment. Death and Pardon merely
extinguish the criminal liability of the
offender but not the crime itself.
However, amnesty completely
extinguishes the penalty and all its
effects. It looks backward and abolishes
and puts into oblivion the offense itself. In
sum, amnesty extinguishes not only the
criminal liability of the offender but also
the crime itself. Under Sec 16 of PD 968
as amended by RA 10707, final discharge
of the probationer extinguishes his
criminal liability but the effect of such
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discharge is similar to death or pardon,
and not to amnesty. Since the previous
crime covered by probation is not
extinguished by the discharge of the
probationer, the same shall be
considered for purposes of determining
if the accused is a recidivist in
committing the second crime, which is
embraced in the same title.
The invocation of amnesty is in the
nature of a plea of confession and
avoidance, which means that the pleader
admits the allegation against him but
disclaims liability therefor on account of
intervening facts whicg, if proved, would
being the crime charged within the scope
of the amnesty proclamation. Amnesty
presupposes the commission of a crime
and when an accused maintains that he
has not committed a crime, he cannot
have any use for amnesty (Vera v People,
GR L-18184, 1963).
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE PD 1829
Purpose. The purpose of the law is to
discourage public indifference or apathy
towards the apprehension and
prosecution of criminal offenders. It is
necessary to penalize acts which obstructs
or frustrates or tend to obstruct or
frustrate the successful apprehension and
prosecution of criminal offenders.
Some Punishable Acts: 1. Preventing
witnesses from testifying in any criminal
proceeding or from reporting the
commission of any offense or the identity
of any offender/s by means of bribery,
misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation,
force or threats; 2. Altering, destroying,
suppressing or concealing any paper,
record, document, or object, with intent to
impair its veracity, authenticity, legibility,
availability, or admissibility as evidence in
any investigation of or official proceedings
in, criminal cases, or to be used in the
investigation of, or official proceedings in,
criminal cases; 3. Harboring or concealing,
or facilitating the escape of, any person he
knows, or has reasonable ground to
believe or suspect, has committed any
offense under existing penal laws in order
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to prevent his arrest, prosecution and
conviction; 4. Publicly using a fictitious
name for the purpose of concealing a
crime, e vad in g p r osecu tion o r th e
execution of a judgment, or concealing his
true name and other personal
circumstances for the same purpose or
purposes;
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was charged
for rebellion. Subsequently, he was
charged under PD 1829, for allegedly
accommodating Col. Gregorio Honasan by
giving him food and comfort in 1989. The
complaint states that “knowing that Col.
Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen.
Enrile did not do anything to have
Honasan arrested and apprehended.”
While the complaint was filed, a charge
of rebellion against Sen. Enrile was
already instituted. Sen. Enrile could
not be separately charged under PD
1829, as this is absorbed in the charge
of rebellion already filed against Sen.
Enrile (Enrile v. Hon. Admin., G.R. No.
93335, September 13, 1990).
CYBERCRIME PREVENTION ACT RA 10175
Cyber-squatting. The acquisition of a
domain name over the internet in bad
faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation,
and deprive others from registering the
same, if such a domain name is: i. similar,
identical, or confusingly similar to an
existing trademark registered with the
appropriate government agency at the
time of the domain name registration; ii.
identical or in any way similar with the
name of a person other than the
registrant, in case of a personal name;
and; iii. acquired without right or with
intellectual property interests in it.
Cybersex. The willful engagement,
maintenance, control, or operation,
directly or indirectly, of any lascivious
exhibition of sexual organs or sexual
activity, with the aid of a computer
system, for favor or consideration.
Child Pornography. The unlawful or
prohibited acts defined and punishable by
Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-Child
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
Pornography Act of 2009, committed
through a computer system: Provided,
That the penalty to be imposed shall be (1)
one degree higher than that provided for
in Republic Act No. 9775. Child
pornography committed online as to
which, charging the offender under
both Section 4(c)(2) of RA 10175 and
RA 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography
Act of 2009 is VOID and
UNCONSTITUTIONAL (Disini v. Secretary
of Justice, GR No. 203335, February 18,
2014).
One of the cyber crimes defined under Sec
4 of RA 10175 is cyber libel. Sec 8 of RA
10175 presribes penalties for all vyber
crimes under Sec 4 except cyber libel.
Hence, an offender, who committed libel
through the internet, cannot be
prosecuted for cyber liber under Sec 4
simply because there is no penalty
under Sec 8 for committing it.
However, liber through the internet is
still punishable under Art 355 of the
RPC. Sec 6 of RA 10175, using
information or communication technology
in committing a crime will upgrade the
penalty for it by 1 degree. In sum, one,
who committed libel through the internet,
shall be prosecuted for liber under the
RPC with the qualifying circumstance
under RA 10175. He cannot be prosecuted
for cyber liber under Sec 6 since this
provision does not define a crime but
merely provides a modifying circumstance
that will adjust the penalty for a crime
punishable under the RPC. Since an
offender in committing internet libel
can only be prosecuted for libel under
the RPC, Art 90 on prescription applies.
Under this provision, the crime for libel
shall prescribe in 1 year. The offended
party must file a complaint for libel with
the prosecutor’s office for preliminary
investigation within 1 year from the time
the offended party discovered the
commission of libel.
One, who hacks his neighbor’s internet
access by cracking his wi-fi password, is
liable for cybercrime of illegal access.
Inter net connection is part of the
computer system, accessing of which
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without a right is punishable as a
cybercrime under RA 10175. Moreover,
the hacker can be held liable for theft.
Personal property the taking of which is
an element of theft includes intangible
property. (Laurel v Abrogar, GR 155076,
Jan 12, 2009) Thus, accessing wireless
internet connection without consent of the
person to whom it belongs constitutes
unlawful taking. The hacker can also be
held liable for the crime of access
device fraud under RA 8484 "Access
Devices Regulation Act of 1998." But
RA 10515 “Anti-Cable Television and
Cable Internet Tapping Act of 2013”,
which punishes interception of cable
internet system, is not applicable since
a wifi internet connection is a cableless
internet system. When RA 10515 was
enacted, the use of wireless internet
system was not yet widespread in the Phil.
Hence, interception of wireless internet
system was not included in the law.
HUMAN SECURITY ACT RA 9372
The provisions of Republic Act No. 4200
(Anti-Wire Tapping Law) to the contrary
notwithstanding, a police or law
enforcement official and the members
of his team may, upon a written order
of the Court of Appeals, listen to,
intercept and record, with the use of any
mode, form, kind or type of electronic or
other surveillance equipment or
intercepting and tracking devices, or with
the use of any other suitable ways and
means for that purpose, any
communication, message, conversation,
discussion, or spoken or written words
between members of a judicially
declared and outlawed terrorist
organization, association, or group of
persons or of any person charged with
or suspected of the crime of terrorism
or conspiracy to commit terrorism.
Surveillance, interception and recording of
communications between lawyers and
clients, doctors and patients, journalists
and their sources and confidential
business correspondence shall not be
authorized(Sec. 7, RA 9372).
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RPC: Rebellion or Insurrection, Coup d’etat,
Murder, Kidnapping and serious illegal
detention, crimes involving destruction,
piracy in general and mutiny in the high
seas or Phil waters. SPL: Anti-hijacking
law, anti-piracy and highway robbery law,
law on arson, atomic energy regulatory and
liability act of 1968, toxic substances and
hazardous and nuclear waste control act of
1990, Decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal
and Unlawful Possession, Manufacture,
Dealing In, Acquisition or Disposition of
Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives. The
abovementioned act must: 1. Sow and
create a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace; 2. Coerce the government to
give in to an unlawful demand (Sec. 3,
RA 9372).
Absorption Principle in Terrorism When
a person has been prosecuted under a
provision of this Act, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal
charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction and after the accused
had pleaded to the charge, the acquittal of
the accused or the dismissal of the case
shall be a bar to another prosecution for
any offense or felony which is necessarily
included in the offense charged under this
Act (Sec. 49, RA 9372).
Terrorism Financing Prevention and
Suppression Act of 2012
SEC. 4. Financing of Terrorism. – Any
person who, directly or indirectly, willfully
and without lawful excuse, possesses,
provides, collects or uses property or
funds or makes available property, funds
or financial service or other related
services, by any means, with the unlawful
and willful intention that they should be
used or with the knowledge that they are
to be used, in full or in part: (a) to carry
out or facilitate the commission of any
terrorist act; (b) by a terrorist
organization, association or group; or (c)
by an individual terrorist, shall be guilty of
the crime of financing of terrorism and
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua and a fine of not less
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than Five hundred thousand pesos
(Php500,000.00) nor more than One
million pesos (Php1,000,000.00).
Any person who organizes or directs
others to commit financing of terrorism
under the immediately preceding
paragraph shall likewise be guilty of an
offense and shall suffer the same penalty
as herein prescribed.
For purposes of this Act, knowledge or
intent may be established by direct
evidence or inferred from the attendant
circumstances.
For an act to constitute a crime under this
Act, it shall not be necessary that the
funds were actually used to carry out a
crime referred to in Section 3(j - terrorist
acts).
SEC. 5. Attempt or Conspiracy to Commit
the Crimes of Financing of Terrorism and
Dealing with Property or Funds of
Designated Persons. – Any attempt to
commit any crime under Section 4 or
Section 8 under this Act shall be penalized
by a penalty two degrees lower than that
prescribed for the commission of the same
as provided under this Act.
Any conspiracy to commit any crime
under Section 4 or Section 8 of this Act
shall be penalized by the same penalty
prescribed for the commission of such
crime under the said sections.
There is conspiracy to commit the offenses
punishable under Sections 4 and 8 of this
Act when two (2) or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission
of such offenses and decided to commit it.
SEC. 6. Accomplice. – Any person who,
not being a principal under Article 17 of
the Revised Penal Code or a conspirator as
defined in Section 5 hereof, cooperates in
the execution of either the crime of
financing of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit the crime of financing of terrorism
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
by previous or simultaneous acts shall
suffer the penalty one degree lower than
that prescribed for the conspirator.
SEC. 7. Accessory. – Any person who,
having knowledge of the commission of
the crime of financing of terrorism but
without having participated therein as a
principal, takes part subsequent to its
commission, by profiting from it or by
assisting the principal or principals to
profit by the effects of the crime, or by
concealing or destroying the effects of the
crime in order to prevent its discovery, or
by harboring, concealing or assisting in
the escape of a principal of the crime shall
be guilty as an accessory to the crime of
financing of terrorism and shall be
imposed a penalty two degrees lower than
that prescribed for principals in the crime
of financing terrorism.
SEC. 8. Prohibition Against Dealing with
Property or Funds of Designated Persons.
– Any person who, not being an
accomplice under Section 6 or accessory
under Section 7 in relation to any property
or fund: (i) deals directly or indirectly, in
any way and by any means, with any
property or fund that he knows or has
reasonable ground to believe is owned or
controlled by a designated person,
organization, association or group of
persons, including funds derived or
generated from property or funds owned
or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a
designated person, organization,
association or group of persons; or (ii)
makes available any property or funds, or
financial services or other related services
to a designated and/or identified person,
organization, association, or group of
persons, shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua and a fine of not less
than Five hundred thousand pesos
(Php500,000.00) nor more than One
million pesos (Php1,000,000.00).
SEC. 9. Offense by a Juridical Person,
Corporate Body or Alien. – If the offender
is a corporation, association, partnership
or any juridical person, the penalty shall
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be imposed upon the responsible officers,
as the case may be, who participated in,
or allowed by their gross negligence, the
commission of the crime or who shall have
knowingly permitted or failed to prevent
its commission. If the offender is a
juridical person, the court may suspend or
revoke its license. If the offender is an
alien, the alien shall, in addition to the
penalties herein prescribed, be deported
without further proceedings after serving
the penalties herein prescribed.
Anti-Fencing Law of 1979
Fencing is a crime involving moral
turpitude. Actual knowledge of the fact
that the property received is stolen
displays the same degree of malicious
deprivation of one’s rightful property as
that which animated the robbery or theft
which by their very nature, are crimes of
moral turpitude (Dela Torre v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 121592, July 5, 1996).
To be liable for fencing, the offender buys
or otherwise acquires and then sells or
disposes of any object of value which he
knows or should be known to him to
have been derived from the proceeds of
the crime of robbery or theft (Caoili v.
CA, G.R. No. 128369, December 22, 1997).
Mere possession of any good, article, item,
object, or anything of value which has
been the subject of robbery or thievery
shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.
For a charge of fencing to prosper, it
must first be established that the
article subject of the alleged “fencing”
has been derived from the proceeds of
the crime of theft or robbery. That the
suspect is engaged in the buy and sell of
used garments, which are in the nature of
personal property. In civil law, possession
of personal or movable property carries
with it a’ prima facie presumption of
ownership. The presumption of
“fencing” arises only when the article
or item involved is the subject of a
robbery or thievery (Sec. 5, PD 1612).
Fencing is not a continuing offense.
Jurisdiction is with the court of the place
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where the personal property subject of the
robbery or theft was possessed, bought,
kept, or dealt with. The place where the
theft or robbery was committed is
inconsequential (People v. Hon. De
Guzman, G.R. No. 77368, October 5,
1993).
Anti-Electricity and Electric
Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage
Act of 1994
“Section 5. Incentives. – An incentive
scheme by way of a monetary reward in
the minimum amount of Five thousand
pesos (P5,000) shall be given to any
person who shall report to the NPC or
police authorities any act which may
constitute a violation of Section 3 thereof.
The Department of Energy (DoE), in
consultation with the National Power
Corporation (NPC), shall issue the
necessary guidelines for the proper
implementation of this incentive scheme
within thirty (30) days from the effectivity
of this Act.”
Relatedly, Section 1, Rule IV of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of
the said law provides:
“Section 1. Incentive Scheme. – An
incentive scheme by way of a monetary
reward in the minimum amount of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000) shall be given to
any person who shall report to the NPC or
police authorities any act which may
constitute a violation of Section 2, Rule II
hereof. The Department of Energy (DoE),
in consultation with the NPC, shall issue
the necessary guidelines for the proper
implementation of this incentive scheme
within thirty (30) days from the effectivity
of RA 7832.”
It is clear from the cited provision that
an incentive scheme by monetary
award shall be given to any person who
shall report to the NPC or police
authorities any act, which may
constitute a violation of Section 3 of
the said act or the theft of electric
power transmission lines and materials.
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“SEC. 2. Illegal Use of Electricity. – It is
hereby declared unlawful for any person,
whether natural or juridical, public or
private, to:
(a) Tap, make or cause to be made any
connection with overhead lines, service
drops, or other electric service wires,
without previous authority or consent
of the private electric utility or rural
electric cooperative concerned;
(b) Tap, make or cause to be made any
connection to the existing electric
service facilities of any duly registered
consumer without the latter’s or the
electric utility’s consent or authority;
(c) Tamper, install or use a tampered
electrical meter, jumper, current
reversing transformer, shorting or
shunting wire, loop connection or any
other device which interferes with the
proper or accurate registry or metering
of electric-current or otherwise results
in its diversion in a manner whereby
electricity is stolen or wasted;
(d) Damage or destroy an electric meter,
equipment, wire or conduit or allow
any of them to be so damaged or
destroyed as r to interfere with the
proper or accurate metering of electric
t current; and
(e) Knowingly use or receive the direct
benefit of electric service obtained
through any of the acts mentioned in
subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) above.”
“SEC. 7. Penalties. – (a) Violation of
Section 2 – The penalty of prision mayor or
a fine ranging from Ten thousand pesos (P
10,000) to Twenty thousand pesos (P
20,000) or both, at the discretion of the
court, shall be imposed on any person
found guilty of violating Section 2 hereof.
(b) Violation of Section 3 – The penalty of
reclusion temporal or a fine ranging from
Fifty thousand pesos (P 50,000) to One
hundred thousand pesos (P 100,000) or
both, at the discretion of the court, shall
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be imposed on any person found guilty of
violating Section 3 hereof.
(c) Provision common to violations of
Section 2 and Section 3 hereof – If the
offense is committed by, or in connivance
with, an officer or employee of the power
company, private electric utility or rural
electric cooperative concerned, such
officer or employee shall, upon conviction,
be punished with a penalty one (1) degree
higher than the penalty provided herein,
and forthwith be dismissed and
perpetually disqualified from employment
in any public or private utility or service
company and from holding any public
office.”
Swindling by Syndicate (PD 1689)
“Section 1. Any person or persons who
shall commit estafa or other forms of
swindling as defined in Article 315 and
316 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, shall be punished by life
imprisonment to death if the swindling
(estafa) is committed by a syndicate
consisting of five or more persons formed
with the intention of carrying out the
unlawful or illegal act, transaction,
enterprise or scheme, and the
defraudation results in the
misappropriation of money contributed by
stockholders, or members of rural banks,
cooperative, "samahang nayon(s)", or
farmers association, or of funds solicited
by corporations/associations from the
general public.
When not committed by a syndicate as
above defined, the penalty imposable shall
be reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua if the amount of the fraud
exceeds 100,000 pesos.”
In relation to the above, the elements
of syndicated estafa as defined under
Section 1 of PD 1689 are: (a) estafa or
other forms of swindling as defined in
Articles 315 and 316 of the Revised
Penal Code is committed; (b)
the estafa or swindling is committed by
a syndicate of five or more persons; and
(c) defraudation results in the
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misappropriation of moneys
contributed by stockholders, or
members of rural banks,
cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)," or
farmers' associations, or of funds
solicited by corporations/associations
from the general public.
The special law is typically invoked by
those who fall prey to the too-good- to-be-
true promises of a Ponzi scheme, wherein
the purported investment program offers
impossibly high returns and pays these
returns to early investors out of the
capital contributed by later investors.
Here, using Multitel as their conduit,
Baladjay and her more than five (5)
counselors employed deceit and falsely
pretended to have the authority to solicit
investments from the general public when,
in truth, they did not have such authority.
The deception continued when Baladjay's
counselors actively solicited investments
from the public, promising very high
interest returns starting at five percent
(5%) per month. Convinced of Baladjay's
and her counselors' promise of lucrative
income, the private complainants were
then enticed to invest in Multitel. However,
unknown to them, the promised high-
yielding venture was unsustainable, as
Multitel was not really engaged in any
legitimate business. Eventually, Baladjay
and her cohorts ran away with the private
complainants' money causing them
damage and prejudice. Clearly, all the
elements of Syndicated Estafa obtain in
this case, considering that: (a) more than
five (5) persons are involved in Multitel's
grand fraudulent scheme, including
Baladjay and her co-accused - who
employed deceit, false pretenses and
representations to the private
complainants regarding a supposed
lucrative investment opportunity with
Multitel in order to solicit money from
them; (b) the said false pretenses and
representations were made prior to or
simultaneous with the commission of
fraud; (c) relying on the false promises and
misrepresentations thus employed, private
complainants invested their hard-earned
money in Multitel; and (d) Baladjay and
her co-accused defrauded the private
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
complainants, obviously to the latter's
prejudice (People v Baladjay, 2017).
Accused-appellant insists that the
prosecution failed· to prove the element of
defraudation because no suf ficient
evidence was presented to prove that he
"personally, physically and actually
performed any 'false pretenses' and/or
'fraudulent representations' against the
private complainants." The Court does not
agree. The evidence adduced by the
prosecution established the existence of
conspiracy among the accused in
committing the crime charged. They
started by forming the partnership. All of
them had access to MMG Holding's bank
accounts. They composed the Members of
the Board of Directors that manage and
control the business transactions of MMG
Holdings. Without the participation of
each of the accused, MMG Holdings could
not have solicited funds from the general
public and succeeded to perpetrate their
fraudulent scheme. Hence, each of them is
a co-conspirator by virtue of indispensable
cooperation in the fraudulent acts of the
partnership. It was not necessary for the
prosecution to still prove .that accused-
appellant himself "personally, physically
and actually per for med any 'false
pretenses' and/or 'fraudulent
representations' against the private
complainants (People v Mateo, 2017).
Anti-Illegal Numbers Games Law
The RA 9287 plugged holes left by PD
1602 which addressed video Karera
machines only, the Act increased
penalties for those involved in illegal
numbers games and made no change to
the penalties of those involved in other
illegal gambling activities.
Illegal numbers games are defined as all
forms of illegal gambling such as but
not limited to Cockfighting, Jueteng,
Masio, Last Two, Jai Alai, and Horse
Racing that includes bookie operations
and game fixing, Numbers, Bingo, non-
government issued Lotteries and any
other games of chance. It also states that
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any game of chance or game of skill that is
not in compliance and licensed by their
respected regulatory agencies are
considered illegal (PD 1602, as amended
by RA 9287).
RA 9287 does not affect legally licensed
gambling or domestic casinos within
the Philippines unless they are
participating in illegal activities.
“Sec. 4. Possession of Gambling
Paraphernalia or Materials. - The
possession of any gambling paraphernalia
and other materials used in the illegal
numbers game operation shall be deemed
prima facie evidence of any offense
covered by this Act.”
“Sec. 8. Immunity from Prosecution. - Any
person who serves as a witness for the
government or provides evidence in a
criminal case involving any violation of
this Act, or who voluntarily or by virtue of
a subpoena testificandum or duces tecum,
produces, identifies, or gives testimony
shall be immune from any criminal
prosecution, subject to the compliance
with the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 1732, otherwise known as Decree
P r o v id in g Im m u n ity fr o m Cr imin a l
Prosecution to Government Witnesses and
the pertinent provisions of the Rules of
Court.”
“Sec. 11. Informer's Reward. - Any person
who, having knowledge or information of
any offense committed under this Act and
who shall disclose the same which may
lead to the arrest and final conviction of
the offender, may be rewarded a certain
percentage of the cash money or articles of
value confiscated or forfeited in favor of
the government, which shall be
determined through a policy guideline
promulgated by the Department of Justice
(DOJ) in coordination with the
Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) and the National
Police Commission (NAPOLCOM).”
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Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001
The original law is R.A. 9160. This law has
actually undergone several amendments
already.
The trigger for the current amendment is
what happened to RCBC. The money was
funneled to RCBC, it was withdrawn and
then it was used in Casinos. They were
able to trace the money to RCBC but after
that, they were not able to trace the
money anymore once it was used in the
casinos because casinos are not covered
persons for anti-money laundering.
Because of that, Congress had to amend
the law and in the 2017 amendment,
Casinos are now considered as covered
persons.
“SEC. 4. Money Laundering Offense. ︎
Money laundering is committed by any
person who, knowing that any monetary
instrument or property represents,
involves, or relates to the proceeds of any
unlawful activity:
(a) transacts said monetary instrument or
property;
(b) converts, transfers, disposes of, moves,
acquires, possesses or uses said
monetary instrument or property;
(c) conceals or disguises the true nature,
source, location, disposition,
movement or ownership of or rights
with respect to said monetary
instrument or property;
(d) attempts or conspires to commit
money laundering offenses referred to
in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c);
(e) aids, abets, assists in or counsels the
commission of the money laundering
offenses referred to in paragraphs (a),
(b) or (c) above; and
(f) performs or fails to perform any act as
a result of which he facilitates the
offense of money laundering referred to
in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) above.”
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Suspicious or covered transactions per
se are not money laundering offenses,
it just triggers a reporting requirement.
Money Laundering is a criminal offense
where the person must have knowledge
that the money is a proceed from an
unlawful activity, and knowing that the
money relates to or is a proceed from an
unlawful activity (a-f).
“SEC. 2. Section 3B-(1) of the same Act is
further amended to read as follows:
(i) ‘Unlawful activity’︎︎ refers to any act or
omission or series or combination
thereof involving or having direct
relation to the following: xxx 1-34 xxx”
If your criminal act is not among the
list, even if you transact with the
proceeds, that is not a money
laundering offense. There is only a
money laundering offense if the proceeds
comes from the 34 acts under Section 3i.
A person who transacts with the
proceeds from an anti-money
laundering act need not be convicted
for the unlawful activity before he can
be held liable for money laundering
offense as provided in Sec. 6.
“Section 6(a) of the same Act is hereby
amended to read as follows:
SEC. 6. Prosecution of Money
Laundering. –
“(a) Any person may be charged with and
convicted of both the offense of money
laundering and the unlawful activity as
herein defined.
“(b) The prosecution of any offense or
violation under this Act shall proceed
independently of any proceeding relating
to the unlawful activity.”
Anti-Wire Tapping Act
Sections 1 and 4 of the Anti-Wiretapping
Act, states that it shall be unlawful for any
person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or
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spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or
by using any other device or arrangement,
to secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone
or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described. These
sections also provide that it shall also be
unlawful for any person, be he a
participant or not in the act or acts
penalized in the next preceding sentence,
to knowingly possess any tape record, wire
record, disc record, or any other such
record, or copies thereof, of any
communication or spoken word secured
either before or after the effective date of
this Act in the manner prohibited by this
law; or to replay the same for any other
person or persons; or to communicate the
contents thereof, either verbally or in
writing, or to furnish transcriptions
thereof, whether complete or partial, to
any other person.
“Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any
person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or
by using any other device or arrangement,
to secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone
or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.”
The aforestated provision clearly and
unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the
parties to any private communication
to secretly record such communication
by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the
party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than
or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statute's
intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier
"any". Consequently, even a (person) privy
to a communication who records his
private conversation with another without
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the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as
a violator” under this provision of R.A.
4200. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the
acts of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the
devices enumerated therein. The mere
allegation that an individual made a secret
recording of a private communication by
means of a tape recorder would suffice to
constitute an offense under Section 1 of
R.A. 4200 (Ramirez v CA, 1995).
The Supreme Court, in the case
of Salcedo-Ortanez vs. Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 110662, 04 August 1994), held
that unless there is a clear showing that
both parties to the conversation allowed
its recording, the recording is illegal and
may subject the person who made the
recording to the penalties provided under
Republic Act No. 4200.
Where the conversation was recorded
using a mobile phone, whether the
recording is video or only audio, the best
evidence that both parties to the
conversation allowed its recording should
be found in the recorded conversation
itself. This is the import of the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of Salcedo-
Ortanez, where the party who is recording
or is presenting the recording, must
establish a “clear showing” that both
parties to the conversation allowed its
recording.
It also does not matter where the
recording was done. Whether the
conversation was made in the confines of
a private space such as a house or private
room, or in a public place, such as a park
or restaurant, the audio or video recording
of a conversation, done without the
consent of both parties, is still illegal and
punished under the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
This was the intent of the lawmakers,
when R.A. 4200 was enacted. Senator
Tañada clarified that “it is the
communication between one person
and another person — not between a
speaker and a public (Congressional
Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12,
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
1964). He also said that the law is a
complete ban on recorded conversations
taken without the authorization of all the
parties.
Moreover, the Supreme Court, in the cases
of Mamba vs. Garcia (G.R. No. 93833,
28 September 1995), and Office of the
Court Administrator vs. Floro (G.R. No.
RTJ-99-1460, 31 March 2006), ruled that
the recorded conversation between a
judge and other persons, done in the
judge’s chambers, is illegal, without the
consent of all the parties. Note should
be made that the Supreme Court classified
the judge’s chambers as a public place.
Finally, it is settled in Philippine law and
jurisprudence that due to the inherent
illegality of a video or audio recording,
done without the consent of both parties
to the conversation, the recorded
conversation cannot be used in any
proceeding, used by either party against
the other, nor can be the basis of any
case, claim or right.
Anti-Torture Act of 2009
“SEC. 8. Applicability of the Exclusionary
Rule; Exception. — Any confession,
admission or statement obtained as a
result of torture shall be inadmissible in
evidence in any proceedings, except if the
same is used as evidence against a person
or persons accused of committing torture.”
“SEC. 13. Who are Criminally Liable. —
Any person who actually participated or
induced another in the commission of
torture or other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment or
who cooperated in the execution of the act
of torture or other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment by
previous or simultaneous acts shall be
liable as principal.
Any superior military, police or law
enforcement officer or senior government
official who issued an order to any lower
ranking personnel to commit torture for
whatever purpose shall be held equally
liable as principals.
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The immediate commanding officer of the
unit concer ned of the AFP or the
immediate senior public official of the PNP
and other law enforcement agencies shall
be held liable as a principal to the crime of
torture or other cruel or inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment for
any act or omission, or negligence
committed by him/her that shall have led,
assisted, abetted or allowed, whether
directly or indirectly, the commission
thereof by his/her subordinates. If he/she
has knowledge of or, owing to the
circumstances at the time, should have
known that acts of torture or other cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment shall be committed, is being
committed, or has been committed by his/
her subordinates or by others within his/
her area of responsibility and, despite
such knowledge, did not take preventive or
corrective action either before, during or
immediately after its commission, when
he/she has the authority to prevent or
investigate allegations of torture or other
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
or punishment but failed to prevent or
investigate allegations of such act,
whether deliberately or due to negligence
shall also be liable as principals.
Any public officer or employee shall be
liable as an accessory if he/she has
knowledge that torture or other cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment is being committed and
without having participated therein, either
as principal or accomplice, takes part
subsequent to its commission in any of
the following manner:
(a) By themselves profiting from or
assisting the offender to profit from the
effects of the act of torture or other
cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment;
(b) By concealing the act of torture or
other cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment and/or
destroying the effects or instruments
thereof in order to prevent its
discovery; or
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(c) By harboring, concealing or assisting
in the escape of the principals in the
act of torture or other cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment or
punishment: Pr ovided, That the
accessory acts are done with the abuse
of the official’s public functions.”
“SEC. 15. Torture as a Separate and
Independent Crime. — Torture as a crime
shall not absorb or shall not be absorbed
by any other crime or felony committed as
a consequence, or as a means in the
conduct or commission thereof. In which
case, torture shall be treated as a separate
and independent criminal act whose
penalties shall be imposable without
prejudice to any other criminal liability
provided for by domestic and international
laws.”
“SEC. 16. Exclusion from the Coverage of
Special Amnesty Law. — In order not to
depreciate the crime of torture, persons
who have committed any act of torture
shall not benefit from any special amnesty
law or similar measures that will have the
ef fect of exempting them from any
criminal proceedings and sanctions.”
“SEC. 17. Applicability of Refouler. — No
person shall be expelled, returned or
extradited to another State where there
are substantial grounds to believe that
such person shall be in danger of being
subjected to torture. For the purposes of
determining whether such grounds exist,
the Secretary of the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) and the Secretary of the
DOJ, in coordination with the Chairperson
of the CHR, shall take into account all
relevant considerations including, where
applicable and not limited to, the
existence in the requesting State of a
consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or
mass violations of human rights.”
“SEC. 18. Compensation to Victims of
Torture. — Any person who has suffered
torture shall have the right to claim for
compensation as provided for under
Republic Act No. 7309: Provided, That in
no case shall compensation be any lower
than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00).
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Victims of torture shall also have the right
to claim for compensation from such other
financial relief programs that may be
made available to him/her under existing
law and rules and regulations.”
“SEC. 22. Applicability of the Revised
Penal Code. — The provisions of the
Revised Penal Code insofar as they are
applicable shall be suppletory to this Act.
Moreover, if the commission of any crime
punishable under Title Eight (Crimes
Against Persons) and Title Nine (Crimes
Against Personal Liberty and Security) of
the Revised Penal Code is attended by any
of the acts constituting torture and other
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
or punishment as defined herein, the
penalty to be imposed shall be in its
maximum period.”
Data Privacy Act
“SECTION 25. Unauthorized Processing of
Personal Information and Sensitive
Personal Information. — (a) The
unauthorized processing of personal
information shall be penalized by
imprisonment ranging from one (1) year to
three (3) years and a fine of not less than
Five hundred thousand pesos
(Php500,000.00) but not more than Two
million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) shall be
imposed on persons who process personal
information without the consent of the
data subject, or without being authorized
under this Act or any existing law. AaITCH
(b) The unauthorized processing of
personal sensitive information shall be
penalized by imprisonment ranging from
three (3) years to six (6) years and a fine of
not less than Five hundred thousand
pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than
Four million pesos (Php4,000,000.00)
shall be imposed on persons who process
personal information without the consent
of the data subject, or without being
authorized under this Act or any existing
law.”
“SECTION 26. Accessing Personal
Information and Sensitive Personal
Information Due to Negligence. — (a)
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
Accessing personal information due to
negligence shall be penalized by
imprisonment ranging from one (1) year to
three (3) years and a fine of not less than
Five hundred thousand pesos
(Php500,000.00) but not more than Two
million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) shall be
imposed on persons who, due to
negligence, provided access to personal
information without being authorized
under this Act or any existing law.
(b) Accessing sensitive personal
information due to negligence shall be
penalized by imprisonment ranging from
three (3) years to six (6) years and a fine of
not less than Five hundred thousand
pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than
Four million pesos (Php4,000,000.00)
shall be imposed on persons who, due to
negligence, provided access to personal
information without being authorized
under this Act or any existing law.”
“ SECTION 27. Improper Disposal of
Personal Information and Sensitive
Personal Information. — (a) The improper
disposal of personal information shall be
penalized by imprisonment ranging from
six (6) months to two (2) years and a fine
of not less than One hundred thousand
pesos (Php100,000.00) but not more than
Five hundred thousand pesos
(Php500,000.00) shall be imposed on
persons who knowingly or negligently
dispose, discard or abandon the personal
information of an individual in an area
accessible to the public or has otherwise
placed the personal information of an
individual in its container for trash
collection.
(b) The improper disposal of sensitive
personal information shall be penalized by
imprisonment ranging from one (1) year to
three (3) years and a fine of not less than
One hundred thousand pesos
(Php100,000.00) but not more than One
million pesos (Php1,000,000.00) shall be
imposed on persons w ho know ingly or
negligently dispose, discard or abandon
the personal information of an individual
in an area accessible to the public or has
otherwise placed the personal information
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of an individual in its container for trash
collection.”
SECTION 28. Processing of Personal
Information and Sensitive Personal
Information for Unauthorized Purposes. —
The processing of personal information for
unauthorized purposes shall be penalized
by imprisonment ranging from one (1) year
and six (6) months to five (5) years and a
fine of not less than Five hundred
thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not
more than One million pesos
(Php1,000,000.00) shall be imposed on
persons processing personal information
for purposes not authorized by the data
subject, or otherwise authorized under
this Act or under existing laws.
The processing of sensitive personal
information for unauthorized purposes
shall be penalized by imprisonment
ranging from two (2) years to seven (7)
years and a fine of not less than Five
hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00)
but not more than Two million pesos
(Php2,000,000.00) shall be imposed on
persons processing sensitive personal
information for purposes not authorized
by the data subject, or otherwise
authorized under this Act or under
existing laws.
SECTION 29. Unauthorized Access or
Intentional Breach. — The penalty of
imprisonment ranging from one (1) year to
three (3) years and a fine of not less than
Five hundred thousand pesos
(Php500,000.00) but not more than Two
million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) shall be
imposed on persons who knowingly and
unlawfully, or violating data confidentiality
and security data systems, breaks in any
way into any system where personal and
sensitive personal information is stored.
SECTION 30. Concealment of Security
Breaches Involving Sensitive Personal
Information. — The penalty of
imprisonment of one (1) year and six (6)
months to five (5) years and a fine of not
less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(Php500,000.00) but not more than One
million pesos (Php1,000,000.00) shall be
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 Campanilla 2019; UST-GN 2019; Others
imposed on persons who, after having
knowledge of a security breach and of the
obligation to notify the Commission
pursuant to Section 20 (f), intentionally or
by omission conceals the fact of such
security breach.
SECTION 31. Malicious Disclosure. — Any
personal infor mation controller or
personal information processor or any of
its officials, employees or agents, who,
with malice or in bad faith, discloses
unwarranted or false information relative
to any personal information or personal
sensitive information obtained by him or
her, shall be subject to imprisonment
ranging from one (1) year and six (6)
months to five (5) years and a fine of not
less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(Php500,000.00) but not more than One
million pesos (Php1,000,000.00).”
“SECTION 32. Unauthorized Disclosure. —
(a) Any personal information controller or
personal information processor or any of
its officials, employees or agents, who
discloses to a third party personal
information not covered by the
immediately preceding section without the
consent of the data subject, shall be
subject to imprisonment ranging from one
(1) year to three (3) years and a fine of not
less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(Php500,000.00) but not more than One
million pesos (Php1,000,000.00).
(b) Any personal information controller or
personal information processor or any of
its officials, employees or agents, who
discloses to a third party sensitive
personal information not covered by the
immediately preceding section without the
consent of the data subject, shall be
subject to imprisonment ranging from
three (3) years to five (5) years and a fine
of not less than Five hundred thousand
pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than
Two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00).”
“SECTION 33. Combination or Series of
Acts. — Any combination or series of acts
as defined in Sections 25 to 32 shall make
the person subject to imprisonment
ranging from three (3) years to six (6)
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years and a fine of not less than One
million pesos (Php1,000,000.00) but not
more than Five million pesos
(Php5,000,000.00).”
“SECTION 34. Extent of Liability. — If the
offender is a corporation, partnership or
any juridical person, the penalty shall be
imposed upon the responsible officers, as
the case may be, who participated in, or
by their gross negligence, allowed the
commission of the crime. If the offender is
a juridical person, the court may suspend
or revoke any of its rights under this Act.
If the offender is an alien, he or she shall,
in addition to the penalties herein
prescribed, be deported without further
proceedings after serving the penalties
prescribed. If the offender is a public
official or employee and he or she is found
guilty of acts penalized under Sections 27
and 28 of this Act, he or she shall, in
addition to the penalties prescribed
herein, suffer perpetual or temporary
absolute disqualification from office, as
the case may be.”
“SECTION 35. Large-Scale. — The
maximum penalty in the scale of penalties
respectively provided for the preceding
offenses shall be imposed when the
personal information of at least one
hundred (100) persons is harmed, affected
or involved as the result of the
abovementioned actions.”
“SECTION 36. Offense Committed by
Public Officer. — When the offender or the
person responsible for the offense is a
public officer as defined in the
Administrative Code of the Philippines in
the exercise of his or her duties, an
accessory penalty consisting in the
disqualification to occupy public office for
a term double the term of criminal penalty
imposed shall be applied.”
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