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UNDERSTANDING MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS: A WAY

FORWARD FOR THE PHILIPPINE MARITIME SECURITY

ABSTRACT

With its maritime industry serving as a critical backbone to sustaining the national
economy and development, the Philippines rely on ocean resources with shipping as
the primary mode of inter-island trade and transportation. As maritime security
challenges are becoming more complex and multifaceted, the nation’s security hinges
on strategic approaches to maintaining peace and order in the maritime domain. The
research examines Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) as an essential aspect of
Philippine maritime security. It explores its security and strategic potential in advancing
the Philippine Coast Guard’s (PCG) functions in the protection of lives and property at
sea and in the marine environment. As PCG remains at the forefront of protecting the
country’s marine environment and upholding maritime security, policy
recommendations are made for the Agency to optimize the potential of MDA in
addressing various maritime security challenges.

KEYWORDS: Maritime Domain Awareness; Maritime Security; Maritime Security

Challenges; Philippine Coast Guard; PCG Maritime Strategy; PCG Modernization
Plan; National Coast Watch Center; Common Operating Picture.

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 UNDERSTANDING MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS: A WAY FORWARD FOR
THE PHILIPPINE MARITIME SECURITY

Policy documents play a role in communicating an understanding of nationally

significant concepts, rules, and procedures. This transparency in communication
fosters common understanding among stakeholders and ensures that their
understanding is pinned on the same page.
Understanding on maritime security may be primarily directed by policy documents,
which include the 1994 National Marine Policy (NMP) and the National Security Policy
(NSP) 2023-2028. The NMP contains the basic framework for the management of the
marine sector and the Philippines, being an archipelagic nation entails a distinct way
of safeguarding, preserving, and overseeing the nation’s marine resources and
environment.i However, in thirty years, it has not been updated concurrently with the
developments in the Philippines’ strategic landscape. It is widely acknowledged that
the NMP requires amending and refining to ensure that its provisions address the
country's current maritime security needs.ii

With issues that beset the country from territorial disputes to maritime smuggling,
armed robberies, and piracy, the country’s national security becomes dependent on
effective maritime security. Involving collective efforts and coordination of all
government agencies, institutions, and groups is also crucial to addressing maritime
insecurity more broadly. The NSP explicitly supports this idea by stating that the
government shall harmonize mandates and functions of various agencies relative to
coastal management and maritime security to ensure efficiency and effectiveness in
addressing maritime security threats.iii In this regard, the maritime domain becomes
an essential area that calls for the state’s various maritime-related instrumentalities to
counter any threats and challenges.

The concept of awareness in the maritime domain may be considered to have

emerged after the US was attacked on 11 September 2001. This attack stunned
government officials and triggered the discussion on the risk of terrorism targeting
citizens, and one of the areas that was given emphasis was the maritime domain.iv In
October of 2002, a fifty-foot-long boat arrived in Miami, Florida, and offloaded 220
illegal aliens directly into the heart of downtown. With the US Coast Guard (CG)
supposedly playing a crucial role in preventing these types of incidents, the secretary
of transportation at the time asked “How did they get through?” To this, Admiral Collins
of the USCG replied, “How did they get through what?” implying that there are no
significant barriers to withholding and thoroughly securing ships due to the absence of
particular policies on the maritime domain. With the threat of terrorist attacks still fresh
in the minds of Americans, the arrival of illegal aliens could pave the way for another
unprecedented attack on US soil.v Hence, Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) was
conceptualized and defined as “the effective understanding of anything associated
with the global maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or
environment of the United States.”vi

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Today, this definition has become the basis of various states and international
organizations in terms of understanding their maritime domain. As such, the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) defined MDA as the “effective
understanding of any activity associated with the maritime environment that could
impact upon the security, safety, economy or environment,” a verbatim iteration of the
US definition.vii Although this definition became the basis of other states, their
understanding of their maritime domain and what it entails nuanced into various
interpretations depending on the context in which MDA is used.
Various states have shaped their MDA to cater to their countries’ complex and evolving
security environment but some definitions however may not be exhaustive. The
Philippine notion of MDA, for instance, seems to lack strategic and operational
understanding of the country’s maritime domain per se. While there is an
understanding that maritime security is an important cornerstone of national security,
the definition falls short of reflecting the actual needs and challenges of the country’s
maritime domain. Its MDA definition is still restricted to that of the US and IMO without
the immanent textures evident of the country’s unique archipelagic nature and its
corresponding challenges.
In particular, a key challenge in the country’s MDA is the lack of a Common Operating
Picture (COP), which is instrumental in seamlessly synthesizing different data formats,
time stamping, data storage and retention, data modification, and symbology drawn
from many different sources and maritime-related agencies.viii The development of the
National Coast Watch System and simultaneously the National Coast Watch Center,
while created to serve as an inter-agency MDA center, still lacks the cooperative efforts
from various maritime-related agencies as the center only acts as a forum of
discussion for numerous maritime-related agencies to discuss issues operating under
the principle of “need to know basis” that may be found challenging as the maritime
domain can be considered multidimensional given its scope and depth. There is a
need not only to understand the configurations transpiring on the surface of the water
but also below it and in the air.
The principle creates a constraint among member agencies given the understanding
of their different objectives. However, while it is true that NCWC only follows what EO
57 states, there is a need to develop joint efforts with various maritime-related
agencies and stakeholders to deter threats from impeding the country’s national
interest and security. It should act as an interagency MDA center as threats are not
only exclusive to one aspect but also evolve to become volatile, uncertain, complex,
and ambiguous.
By looking deeper in this context, this paper seeks to shed light on the necessity to
develop an indigenous definition of MDA which encompasses unique concerns in the
maritime domain.

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MDA BY COUNTRIES:
In broad terms, maritime domain awareness involves gaining an understanding of the
position and intention of actors in a given maritime environment. The US National
Maritime Domain Awareness Plan defines MDA as “The effective understanding of
anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety,
economy, or environment of a nation.”ix This definition has been adopted by states but
made necessary changes necessary to fit in their strategic environments. The
following are the states which define MDA in accordance to their circumstances.

Japan
Japan defined the MDA as the “efficient understanding of situations associated with
the oceans while bearing in mind how to handle the effective collection, consolidation,
and sharing of diverse information about the ocean that contributes to maritime
security, ocean environmental protection, marine industry promotion, and science and
technology development.” Mamoru Shinohara, former Ambassador of Japan in Costa
Rica, suggests that this notion aims to achieve an "efficient" comprehension of
maritime affairs, reflecting Japan's determination to utilize its limited resources
optimally. To attain this objective and enhance MDA, the Cabinet Office of Japan (COJ)
has adopted three distinct strategies, namely asset consolidation, information-sharing
system consolidation, and international cooperation consolidation. Japan's
comprehension of MDA recognizes the crucial role of this awareness in preserving
maritime security taking into account the traits of a stratovolcanic archipelago and its
changing security landscape.x
Similarly, Japan has implemented a range of comprehensive plans and programs to
address the requirements of its strategic environment. Japan implemented the Basic
Plan on Ocean Policy (BPOP), which was determined under the Basic Act on Ocean
Policy (BAOP), a national law entered into force in 2007. The primary objective of the
BAOP is to foster the robust growth of Japan's economy and society, enhance the
stability of citizens' livelihoods, and promote the harmonious cohabitation of the
oceans and humanity. The Act helped to elucidate Japan's fundamental position on
ocean policy to establish a new Oceanic State with stakeholders in different marine
sectors taking the responsibility to communicate and cooperate effectively to
strategically advance ocean policy.xi
To this end, the BPOP is designed to complement BAOP in realizing its visions and
objectives. The BPOP is a series of policies observed and revised every five years to
look at the strategic environment of Japan and the associated requirements that come
along with it. However, it was only in the third iteration of BPOP that the MDA was
assessed as a crucial metric for maritime security. Following the third BPOP, the
National Ocean Policy Secretariat (NOPS) issued the document named “The Future
Directions to Strengthen MDA Capacity of Japan.”

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The approaches were categorized into more precise measures, and the creation of
MDA Situational Indication Linkage (MSIL) was identified as one of the specific
measures within the approach to consolidate information-sharing systems. It was
specifically suggested to enhance cooperation with other systems and enhance the
availability of up-to-date and worldwide information. In 2019, MSIL was introduced as
the core framework for improving the MDA, which focuses on global and instantaneous
data processing. Under MSIL, two important features such as integration and
visualization were considered significant in MDA. The merits of integrating maritime
information include the provision of a centralized service and improved data
management, comparing and contrasting the data and its amount while visualization
of data and information helps understand the situation and pave the way for the
leadership to utilize the maritime information efficiently in ensuring MDA.xii
The MDA is an essential tool for ensuring safety and also plays a significant role in
promoting the development of research and technology, the maritime industry, and the
conservation of the marine environment. Although Japan has yet to foresee any
changes in the MDA, the third BPOP will soon end and will be succeeded by the fourth
BPOP. The fourth BPOP places significant emphasis on the role of MDA. This
demonstrates Japan's prioritization of MDA as a crucial element in maritime security
and its significance in ensuring national security.xiii

Indonesia
According to S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Indonesia
identified MDA as “establishing a network of information sharing and analysis among
maritime stakeholders.” Its Coast Guard has been mandated as the main agency to
conduct MDA to enhance understanding of incidents at sea and along coastlines
besides formulating appropriate solutions to mitigate and manage the incidents that
are primarily non-traditional in nature. However, some non-traditional challenges, such
as dealing with the maritime militia, were recognized as ones that should be dealt with
domestically rather than collectively.xiv
In Indonesia, MDA is substantially represented by the BAKAMLA (Badan Keamanan
Laut). The Indonesian Maritime Security Agency was established under Presidential
Decree No. 178 in December 2014 to act as a coordinating body for streamlining
Indonesia’s sprawling MARSEC community into a more coherent whole. It was a
central component of Prime Minister Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo’s plan to reorient the
country’s national interests and root them in a more maritime-centric view of the
world—specifically, by transforming the archipelagic nation into a ‘global maritime
fulcrum’ straddling the Pacific and Indian oceans.xv

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Singapore
In Singapore, MDA is an important aspect of maritime security. The country is a major
hub for international shipping with significant revenue coming from shipping and
storing containers, likely placing significant importance on MDA to ensure the security
and efficiency of its maritime activities. Singapore has a vested interest in the maritime
security of the region and, therefore, is taking the lead in security. With piracy issues
as a major concern to Singapore whose economy is heavily dependent on
international shipping, the establishment of the Information Fusion Center (IFC) and
the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery
against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) promoted and enhanced cooperation to suppress
piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia. Both of these agencies are located in
Singapore. This, being the case, proves Singapore’s commitment to ensuring maritime
security and to the extent regional security. These mechanisms involve cooperation
with neighboring countries, sharing information with international maritime
organizations, utilizing technology for surveillance and tracking, and implementing
policies to enhance maritime safety and security.xvi
In this sense, Singapore is a proven maritime power able to determine its own MDA
as it focuses on regional maritime issues and knows how to address the problem
without any constraints given the success of its various and numerous maritime
security operations. These states showcase how significant MDA is to their maritime
security and significantly to their national security as they continuously look at how the
strategic environment evolves and consider adjustments when necessary.
As abovementioned, these states showcase how MDA is being understood and
operated in their respective domains with consideration of the geopolitical realities
present in their respective security environment.

UNDERSTANDING MDA IN THE PHILIPPINES:

MECHANISMS AND CHALLENGES

The country’s MDA operates within the ambit of IMO’s principle of MDA. Although no
documents or policies explicitly state that the Philippines’s MDA operates within the
ambit of IMO, published articles emphasized how the country understands its MDA.
Through NCWC, MDA encompasses various aspects of the country's territorial waters,
archipelagic waters, and EEZ. MDA is crucial in providing the Philippines with security,
safety, and sustainable use of maritime resources. Achieving awareness of the
maritime domain necessitates the establishment of transparency on maritime activities
and among maritime actors, facilitating the dissemination of visibility and pertinent
knowledge among members of the maritime community.
In light of this, inter-agency cooperation becomes a requisite to attain a minimum
awareness of threats. Through the unity of effort, information and data sharing, and
the participation of maritime stakeholders in simulated scenarios and tabletop
exercises, states can erect an active layered defense designed as a means to detect

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illicit activities, deter threats from taking advantage of the maritime domain, defend the
country's interests, and defeat threats that seek to exploit the state's vulnerabilities.
With the establishment of the National Coast Watch Center (NCWC) in 2012, the
Philippines proved its solidified commitment to ensuring MDA.xvii
The NCWC of the Philippines was established by Executive Order 57 in 2012 to act
as an interagency MDA center.xviii It was set up as a separate organization housed
within the PCG to act as “an electronic maritime eyes and ears capability” for
monitoring the Philippines’ maritime space. The NCWC employs several monitoring
and communication platforms and space-based and terrestrial automatic identification
systems. Through these mechanisms, the NCWC is a national coast watch hub that
compiles pertinent information on the maritime domain and its security. Information
from these platforms shall be coordinated with the maritime community to maintain
awareness and provide an understanding of all maritime activities and discuss and
design plans and operations necessary for maintaining maritime security.

Figure 1. How information is managed in NCWC. Maritime Security Operational Framework. National Coast Watch Center.

The figure above shows how information is managed and processed within the NCWC.
Establishing the NCWC is one of the mechanisms that the country utilizes to collect
information, document, process, and disseminate critical information among Maritime
Law Enforcement agencies. It is designed as a mechanism to address severe maritime
security challenges that threaten not only the Philippines' territorial integrity but also
Filipinos' peaceful existence. Recognizing the intricate and evolving nature of the
security landscape, the country examined the efficacy of adopting a WOG approach
to effectively tackle the prevailing maritime security concerns.xix
However, while the NCWC’s objectives remain noble to the cause of maritime security,
there is no defined meaning of MDA in the country. A key technical challenge is the
development of a Common Operating Picture (COP). According to EO 57 Sec 5.
g, the NCWC is expected to develop a COP to enhance maritime situational
awareness. However, a COP must be drawn from many different sources and
agencies, meaning that the system must be able to seamlessly synthesize different
data formats, time stamping, data storage and retention, data modification, and
symbology. With the COP in place, decision-makers will find themselves a useful tool
to make decisions and take action based on shared, reliable, and trustworthy
information—sometimes called ‘shared understandings’—among many different

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stakeholders. In general, it must reflect a ‘need to share’ principle concerning
information that has come into vogue post 9/11, replacing the previous ‘need to know’
mantra. In other words, MDA systems depend on many different entities and
organizations sharing rather than hoarding information. The creation of NCWS and
NCWC seemed to address the issue of inter-agency cooperation but these
mechanisms only served on the principle of a “need-to-know basis,” which may prove
challenging in developing a COP to ensure the maritime security of the Philippines.xx
As stated above, security challenges are becoming multifaceted and multidimensional
as technology and intelligence become more available in the market. The task of
providing an efficient and effective role in maintaining peace and order in the maritime
domain proves more vital as these challenges can penetrate the country’s security.
Hence, the Philippines’ MDA must be multidimensional as it must comprehensively
mirror configurations transpiring on, below, and above the sea. For instance, the
country has porous borders that make it vulnerable to transnational threats such as
terrorism, piracy, armed robbery at sea, hijacking, kidnapping for ransom, and
smuggling, particularly in its southern "back door.” The Sulu-Celebes Sea is notorious
for being a transit point and destination for terrorists and crime syndicates. A
clandestine operation to enter the Philippines through its waters often occurs. As an
example, foreign terrorist fighters entered Mindanao through the Sulu Archipelago,
supporting the activities of Islamic State-affiliated groups, including the Marawi
Siege.xxi
For this reason, an MDA system must also be able to counter and address security
challenges not only in the maritime domain but also consider ground concerns. An
effective MDA system must possess the foresight and vision to expect that challenges
if not addressed thoroughly, it will affect the stability of the country, and the livelihood
of its people – be it on land or at sea.
In particular, what transpired during the Marawi Siege resulted in civilian casualties
and millions of property damage. The costs incurred during the Battle of Marawi were
reported to be substantial. Diverse perspectives exist regarding the extent of
infrastructure damage; however, aerial footage suggests that significant portions of the
city have been severely impacted by the conflict, resulting in extensive destruction that
has completely leveled entire city blocks. According to the World Bank, the process of
restoring Marawi to its pristine condition may require a period of twenty years.
Nevertheless, the actual cost of the conflict is borne by the inhabitants of Marawi and
the lives of the combatants involved. A total of 165 members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) lost their lives while engaged in combat, while more than 1000
sustained injuries. According to certain reports, more than 1000 militants were killed
during the siege, resulting in the deaths of 47 civilians as well. Over 400,000
individuals were displaced as a result of the conflict. xxii
That being said, if these security challenges were prevented while on the sea with
intelligence being shared among government agencies without constraints, the
outcome might have been prevented or lessened to some extent. Creating a COP will
prove vital in acknowledging the multi-dimension of threats and challenges, in sharing
information, in decision-making to enhance maritime security, and to the extent of

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national security. With maritime threats ubiquitous in the country, complemented by
the ever-evolving security environment, it will be a necessity for the Philippines to
enhance its capabilities and know-how to address these challenges and maintain
stability, peace, and order. Hence, defining maritime domain awareness proves to be
substantial in determining the areas, principles, and nuance of the country’s maritime
domain. As such, creating a COP proves to be a crucial step in the process of defining
and enhancing MDA in the Philippines.
The difficulty of sharing information under the principle of “need to know basis.”
The information needed to make critical decisions often exists but is not available and
correlated by those who might use it. As stated above, the clandestine entry of IS
militants into the country that resulted in the battle of Marawi could have been
addressed had this information been available and shared widely with the maritime
and security communities that understood the threat and acted on it. “We don’t know
what we know,” operating under the presumption of this dials back to the necessity of
“need to share basis.” Shared awareness empowers each player and fosters unity of
effort in dozens of ways, from better informing individual missions and avoiding “blue
on blue” conflict, to drawing on the unconscious knowledge of local experts. Done
properly, it enables each member of the maritime community to use shared data and
knowledge to create a unique picture in support of its own needs and missions. This
enables each to bring the full force of its unique authority, experience, and expertise
to the overall effort.xxiii
Another difficulty directly connects with bureaucracy. The NCWS-NCWC was
established to provide a synchronized and unified strategy towards maritime matters
and activities, recognizing the necessity for a WOG approach in light of evolving
challenges within the intricate security landscape. Unfortunately, the nobility
surrounding the inception of the system, together with the NCWC, has encountered
an internal predicament due to the incomplete realization of the underlying justification
for its existence.xxiv
The prevailing mechanism for developing and carrying out expeditious maritime
security policies is needlessly intricate. The presence of bureaucracy in the
policymaking process in the Philippines hinders the progress of urgent initiatives rather
than facilitating the formulation of policies. Since shifting its focus from internal to
external threats in 2011, the Philippines has adopted a WON and WOG approaches –
from diplomacy to law enforcement, to military action – for maritime security activities.
The government shift is monumental, but its substantive results in the maritime domain
to date have been characterized as “modest.” Moreover, while recognizing that a wider
MDA approach is suitable for the challenges the Philippines faces, NCWS-NCWC may
be inadequate for maritime governance beyond situational awareness capabilities,
notably sovereignty-related and environmental issues. Although the said mechanisms
function as platforms for many agencies to collectively address maritime challenges,
it is acknowledged that these organizations possess distinct missions that could hinder
establishing a cohesive approach toward resolving maritime issues.xxv
According to Ellaine Joy Sanidad, law enforcers face challenges in establishing a
consensus regarding an operational definition of maritime security. While certain

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individuals perceive climate change and marine accidents as issues falling under the
realm of maritime security, others do not. Moreover, a notable deficiency exists in
acknowledging the existence of overlapping functions, leading to unwarranted
allegations of mandates being encroached upon. Certain Maritime Law Enforcement
(MLE) agencies tend to foster an unwarranted sense of stigma towards one another,
engage in competitive behavior to claim credit for successful operations, and attribute
blame to each other in the event of failures.xxvi To address these challenges, it is
imperative for the Philippines to surmount the deficiency in recognizing, prioritizing,
and directing attention toward the role of the WOG system as an important mechanism
in security management.

RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the preceding discussion, it is apparent that maritime stakeholders will
become vital instruments in defining MDA in the Philippines. Using a thorough analysis
of the relevant aspects, this article presents the following recommendations aimed at
optimizing the benefits of the MDA:
Define MDA in the country based on its current realities
One of the vulnerabilities admitted both by the government and security experts during
the Marawi siege was the failure of intelligence agencies to properly assess the
situation resulting in an attack that lasted for months destroying most of the city. As
stated above, the Sulu-Celebes Sea is a transit point for terrorism to enter the country,
with the MDA being substantially defined that considers the consequences to the
mainland if maritime security challenges are not addressed may be a fruitful factor to
prevent threats from being a catastrophe affecting the people and infrastructures alike.
Hence, the Philippine MDA must consider the archipelagic and strategic nature of the
country as different from other states with the viewpoint that adopting IMO’s definition
can only be effective if the country’s MDA is understood through the lenses of the
country’s strategic environment. Similar to the national security as defined in the NSP
2023-2028, MDA should be defined in a similar note.
Furthermore, the centerpiece of an MDA system is the COP. This is the sum of data
and intelligence drawn from many sources and organizations, e.g., data from
commercially operated automatic identification systems (AIS), military or civil radar
tracking, or incident reports from law enforcement agencies. With the NCWC serving
as an inter-agency forum for government maritime stakeholders to coordinate with one
another based on discussing maritime matters but operating under the ambit of the
“need to know basis” principle, it will be challenging to establish a shared
understanding that aligns all member-agencies. Nevertheless, while NCWC proves
useful for the country, the NCWC must create a COP understood by maritime
stakeholders to know the strategic and security relevance of the maritime domain as
well as work under a common goal without constraints that inhibit each from operating
under one presumption. The idea is, that if maritime stakeholders work apart from
others but with the same objectives in mind, the ultimate goal of securing the country

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may be difficult to accomplish but operating under one picture with an end in mind will
pool all available resources from one another that may prove valuable as resources
will be used efficiently and effectively for the accomplishment of goals. Developing a
COP will also prevent maritime stakeholders, particularly members of NCWC from
having overlapping functions.
In summary, the country’s definition of MDA should revolve around these
considerations:
• Archipelagic nature
• Geopolitical realities
• Maritime stakeholders
Clarify relations among maritime stakeholders
In the same vein, it is important for maritime stakeholders, particularly member
agencies of the NCWC, to clearly define their respective missions and objectives to
avoid any duplication of responsibilities that could hinder the attainment of shared
objectives. The proposed development of the COP aims to enable member agencies
to work together towards a shared objective. Nevertheless, it remains crucial to
elucidate their interconnections to ascertain how they will collaborate to ensure the
efficient execution of activities or missions.
Consider operating under the principle of “unity of effort”
If the Philippines is to be successful in its pursuit of maritime safety, security, and
efforts, it needs to harness the abilities of its instrumentalities – its abilities, time, and
resources of maritime agencies to work with one another. Since the EO 57 does not
entail authoritative power to the NCWC to direct any of its member-agency to conduct
operations. Tackling maritime security concerns will pose a considerable difficulty.
Similarly, it is both unattainable and undesirable to imagine a unity of command across
different member agencies and local government entities owing to their distinct
structures, missions, and objectives as well as what EO 57 entails. Rather, it is
recommended to foster a “unity of effort” in pursuit of common goals and interests
through proactive, aggressive information exchange. Sharing data, analysis, operating
pictures, and the like as broadly as possible will provide multiple benefits and help in
addressing multitudes of maritime issues. Further, the notion of “Primus Inter Pares”
can stand as a principle from which the NCWC works. Mindful of the constraints
present with the current EO 57, the NCWC may utilize this notion to capacitate a
certain agency to take the lead and employ the assistance of member agencies
operating under the principle of “unity of effort.”xxvii

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CONCLUSION
Maritime Domain Awareness constitutes a fundamental pillar of maritime security. It
holds a significant role in enhancing the nation's maritime security, which is essential
for maintaining peace and stability across the whole country. It is anticipated that the
MDA will assume greater significance in ensuring that maritime threats and challenges
are duly acknowledged and appropriately addressed. The viability of promoting MDA
lies in maintaining its superior capabilities in gathering and analyzing data, information,
and intelligence and coming up with necessary corrective action designed to address
threats and challenges. But MDA is more vital when it is anchored on the necessities
and strategic nature of the country. The security of the nation is contingent upon the
continued progress of maritime agencies while traversing a substantive and
comprehensive MDA. Given the public's expectation for Philippine maritime agencies
to ensure maritime security, it is imperative that the PCG, Navy, and other relevant
maritime agencies exert maximum effort to work collaboratively in defining the MDA of
the state.

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 THE AUTHORS

JUN KARLO T LAROZA IS A WRITER, SCHOLAR AND RESEARCHER BASED

IN QUEZON CITY, PHILIPPINES. HE IS CURRENTLY TAKING MASTER OF ARTS
IN FOREIGN SERVICE. HE IS A MARITIME SECURITY RESEARCH ANALYST AT
THE COAST GUARD STRATEGIC STUDIES AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
CENTER. HE WORKED AS A TRAINING SPECIALIST AT THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE COLLEGE OF THE PHILIPPINES, WHERE HE WORKED TO
CONCEPTUALIZE, DEVELOP, AND CONDUCT NUMEROUS SEMINARS,
COLLOQUIA, AND WORKSHOPS. HE ALSO SERVES AS A MASTER OF
CEREMONY AND MODERATOR TO VARIOUS LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL
EVENTS. HE PRESENTED HIS PAPER IN THE INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP –
THE TRACK II NETWORK OF ASEAN DEFENSE INSTITUTION (NADI)
WORKSHOP HOSTED BY CAMBODIA.

MARREN ARAÑA ADAN IS A WRITER, EDITOR, AND RESEARCHER BASED

IN VALENZUELA CITY, PHILIPPINES. HE IS CURRENTLY TAKING PH.D.
ANTHROPOLOGY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES DILIMAN. HE IS
A MARITIME SECURITY RESEARCH ANALYST AT THE COAST GUARD
STRATEGIC STUDIES AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS CENTER. HE WORKED
AS A RESEARCH CONSULTANT AT THE UP HIGHER EDUCATION RESEARCH
AND POLICY REFORM PROGRAM. HE IS ALSO A FORMER RESEARCH
FELLOW FOR URBAN THEORIES ACROSS BORDERS BY THE RESEARCH
INSTITUTE ON CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA, A FRENCH RESEARCH
CENTER BASED IN BANGKOK. HE PRESENTED HIS RESEARCH AT
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES ON GEOGRAPHICAL STUDIES,
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, FOLKLORE, EDUCATIONAL
ANTHROPOLOGY, JACQUES DERRIDA’S SIGNATURE EVENT CONTEXT,
AND ELITISM IN CULTURE AND ART. HIS FICTION, ESSAY, AND POETRY
WERE ANTHOLOGIZED IN DIFFERENT BOOKS, PEER-REVIEWED
JOURNALS, AND MAGA/ZINES.

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 EDITORIAL BOARD:
CHAIRMAN OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD

CG RADM GENITO B BASILIO

Director, CGSSIAC

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

CG COMMO VIVIEN JANE E CAY

Deputy Director, CGSSIAC

ASSOCIATE EDITOR

CG CDR NACIELYN C ESQUILLO

Acting Chief of Staff, CGSSIAC

Superintendent, Leadership and Language Institute

EDITORIAL ADVISORS
CG COMMO FERDINAN B PICAR (RET)

Former Chief of Staff, PCG

DR. ADOR R TORNEO

Director, La Salle Institute of Governance (LSIG)

DR. SHERWIN E ONA

Associate Professor, De La Salle University-Manila

DR. BENJAMIN M VALLEJO, JR.

Associate Professor, University of the Philippines-Diliman

LT KARL LYEL LIM, PCGA

Faculty, Far Eastern University- Roosevelt (Rodriguez Campus)

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