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//Royal Notes 2022 //

NOTES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I


Atty. Carlo Cruz
Basic Principles
The ONLY TWO (2) instances when it is Constitutionally required for Congress to hold JOINT
SESSION
1. Declare an existence of a state of war (A6 S23 par 1)
2. Canvassing of of Election Results (A7 S4 par4)
Note: No express prohibition for both houses tot meet in a joint session in their
automatic review of the declaration of martial law (political question). Not prohibited. Not
required.
Social Justice Soc Case – Clear drug test. National Elective, qualifications are exclusive hence
unconstitutional. BUT for local or appointative officials, valid because constitution only provides
for minimum requirements.
Citizenship – alies spouses who maries a natural born filipino shall also become a Filipino by
derivative mode, provided that she possess all the qualification and non of the disqualification.
Regalado v. HRET – convicted for libel, moral turpitude, 2 year from service ran for office. Law
provide cannot run until laspe of 5 years from service of sentence.
Phrase “next adjournment thereof” found twice in the consti =
1. Emergency Powers (A6 S23par2) – not tolled by special session. Regular
session only.
2. Ad interim appointment (A7 S16par2) – tolled by special session.
SECULAR = Non Religious
SECTARIAN = Religious
Non-establishment state – state has no business to set-up or supress any religion.
Religious accomodation – benefit is only incidental to the religious sect. The benefits derived
accruies primarily to secular purposes.
 Concientious objector – exception from compliance with state regulations on
the ground of religious freedom. Ground is strict religious compliance.
Poli x Religion x Labor “when the state is called to pass upon acts of morality, it should confine
itself to contemporaneuous secular moral standards not on sectarian standards of morality.
Lemon test –
1. The statute must have a secular legislative purpose
2. Its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion
3. The statute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion
Aglipay v Ruizz – catholic stampt; tourism purpose ; allowed
Peralta – Iglesia centennial; first fully filipino religion; historical purpose; allowed.
Rules on TERM Limits
if given a question on term limits follow these GENERAL RULES:
1. Would there have been an interruption in the consecutive term limits?
2. If YES, is the interruption VOLUNTARY?
3. If NO (involuntary), the effect is that it will not be counted
Montebon v. CA – Vice Mayor on his 3rd consecutive term. Mayor died. VM became mayor. In
the next immediately following election, is he eligible for VM?
Yes. Following the formula, there is an interruption BUT it is not voluntary because it was
by operation of law. Therefore, he can run.
If he runs again for VM how many terms?
THREE (3) TERMS. Fresh term.
Mendoza v. De Leon – Gov A, would have just finished his 3 rd consecutive term and thus will be
barred in the next. B became the governor. Ex-Gov A, organized for a RECALL during B’s
2nd year in office. Note that the incumbent B will be automatically be a candidate pursuant to
LGC.
First question, will you consider A eligible?
YES. The 1 yr period leading to the recall election when A was not governor is
considered an involuntary interruption because of the 3-term limit rule.
Recall Election proceeded. Two scenarios:
If B wins – he will continue to serve the remaining 1 year. Will he be eligible next
election? Of course. 1 term palang eh. But how many terms can he still run – two (2)
More. Because there was no interruption.
If A wins – he will serve the remaining 1 year. How many more terms may A have after
serving that recall term = THREE (3) MORE. A recall term is not a complete term hence
not counted.
---
Here is a 3 consecutive term district rep, A. At the start of his 3 rd consecutive term an election
protest was filed against him by B. Toward the end of his term, let’s say 1 month, he, A, loses
the protest, and therefore ousted. B was placed in his stead and served the remaining 1 month.
First question, in the next following election, is A (the one ousted), eligible?
YES. That term when he was ousted is not counted.
Now, how many terms can he run again?
THREE (3) TERMS. Fresh.
What about B, the one who served the remaining 1 month, that one month is not
counted.
Not counted. Hence A will also have a fresh THREE (3) TERMS
---
District Rep who serves 2 consecutive terms as such. In what should be his 3 rd term, he did not
run. He was nominated by a party-list and thus now serves a a Representive but for a Party list.
(2 terms as district rep, 1 term as Party-list rep). Is is eligible to run in the next immediately
following House election, whether as District Rep / Party-list rep?
NO. The three term limit rule applies to whether district or party-list rep. Applies equally.
Note: The 3-term limit rule applies to the party-list REP, not the Party-list itself.
--
Lataza v. Comelec – Municipal Mayor serving his 3 rd consecutive term. During his
3rd consecutive term, by law, the municipality became/converted to a CITY, providing that the
municipality mayor shall serve as the CITY mayor for the remainder of his term.
In the next local election, in the first CITY election, is he eligible to run?
NO. Two reasons. First, despite the conversion the territory is preserved. Second, the
constituency is also preserved.
--
Naval v. Comelec (2018 Bar Q)– Provincial board member serving on his 5 consecutive term. It
was only on his 6th attempt that he was stopped by the SC. During his 3 rd consecutive term,
there was a law which altered the district; there were 11 municipalities, but 8 of them were
removed from that district, and in their stead, other municipality was attached therewith.
He is not eligible. This involves a question of the application of the three-term limit rule
upon local elective officials in renamed and/or reapportioned districts. A provincial board
member cannot be elected and serv for more than three consecutive terms. The clear
intent of the framers of the Consti was to limit the term to three consectuive elections to
THE SAME POSITION. (p356 Central BQA)
--
There is a Mayor who is on his 3 rd consecutive term. During such, he was placed under
PREVENTIVE suspension by the Ombudsman for 6 mos. It was served. In the next mayoralty
election, can he run?
NO. A preventive suspension is NOT an interruption. The term continues.
--
Talado v. Comelec – here is a 3rd consecutive term governor. During such, he was subjected to
an admin case. He was found guilty. Ombudsman gave PENALTY of suspension. Hence, he
was not able to serve the 3rd term. Can he run again?
YES. The term during which he served the penalty of suspension is not counted. There
is an involuntary interruption here. Thus, he will have a FRESH THREE (3) Consecutive
terms.
If for example, during the first year of his 3 rd term. He was subjected to admin case.
Ombudsman found him guilty and was given the penalty of DISMISSAL which is
immediately executory. He then appealed via rule 43 to CA. During the 3 rd year, appeal
was resolved, reversed the OMB and reinstated him. Is he eligible to run?
YES. The 1 year period when he was out due to his dismissal constitutes as an
involuntary interruption of his service and therefore is not counted. FRESH THREE (3)
Consecutive terms.
Election Law
BAR FAVE
Section 68 Section 78
Nature Petition for Disqualification Petition to deny due course / or to
Cancel COC
Period From filing of COC up to Within 25 days from filing of COC
proclamation
Grounds 2 grounds: 1 ground:
 Election  Deliberately making
offenses (vote a false, material,
buying, over misrepresentation
spending etc) as to one’s
 Permanent eligibility
residence
abroad /
immigrant to a
foreign country
Effects Considered as a bona fide Such disqualification renders the
candidate until disqualified candidacy VOID AB INITIO
Hence, if he won, is considered
a de jure officer until
disqualified
Substitution Substitution allowed NO SUBSTITUTION
NUISANCE CANDIDATE FALLS
HERE.
Who takes over? Rule on Succession applies The other candidate who obtains
the highest vote (2nd placer is not
a proper term)
Fermin v. COMELEC – law provides that deadline for Sec 78 is “within 25 days from filing of
COC” BUT, by mere reso, comelec added the phrase “… but not later than 5 days from deadline
of filing”. SC held ultra-vires. That is an amendment of law.
Under this case, comelec also added a 3rd ground for Sec 68 “non-registration of voter. Also
ultra-vires.
Sec 78 Notes
 Can there be material misrepresentation as to name? NO. Name does not
pertain to eligibility
 Citizenship? Yes
 Age? Yes (What if senator candidate is 64 y/o, alleged she is 50,
misrepresentation? No, qualified nonetheless)
 Residence? Yes
 Registered voter? Yes
 Convicted of libel, 2 years after service, filed candidacy. There is misrep,
because under the law after 5 years palang pwede mag run
 Running for the 4th time in violation of the 3-year term limit rule constitutes misrep
Jalosjos case – candidate suffers from Perpetual Absolute DQ, Comelec EN BANC, motu
proprio disqualified him. Contends procedural defect since it did not undergo comelec division.
SC held NO, Comelec En Banc acting motu proprio on the basis of its administrative powers to
enforce election laws.
Serafica case – underage candidate, withdrew. Substitution was filed. Comelec denied.
Substitition cannot be had on the basis that the coc was void ab initio, COMELEC EN BANC
also acted motu proprio. SC held there was a defect because here, it exercises its quasi-judicial
function, hence case should’ve underwent Comelec divisions first.
Distinction between these two case, in Jalosjos, it was on a basis of a decided case
which the COMELEC is behooved to taked judicial notice. In Serafica, allegation as to
age requires presentation of cert of live birth etc.
SUBSTITUTION
SECTION 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. – If after
the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or
accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person
belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to
replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate
nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office
affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the
election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the
election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election
inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be
voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission. (Sec. 28, 1978 EC)
2 Deadlines
-First Deadline Grounds:
 Death
 DQ
 Withdrawal
-Second Deadline Grounds:
 Death
 DQ
NUISANCE CANDIDATE (NC) RULES
1. In case of a Single-slot position, Vote for NC, not considered STRAY. Shall be
counted in favor of bona fide candidate
2. In case of a Multi-slot position, if NC was voted, but no vote for BF, count in favor
of BF. But if shaded both NC and BF, vote for NC will be considered Stray.
LEGISLATIVE
Vacancy in congress – can only be filled up by special elections. Jurisprudence provides that
cognress cannot be compelled to hold such special elections. Political question. Differentiate
this when the vacancy is in a party-list. In that case PL can nominate a new rep.
TERM – period during which an officer is entitled to hold office
TENURE – period of actual incumbency
Upon acceptance by a legislator of an incompatible office, forfeits his seat, and therefore his
tenure as legislature ends
Saguisag v. Exec Sec – Tax relief under EDCA is challenged arguing that tax exemption is
beyond the treaty-making power of the Pres as it is legislative prerogative. SC held NO. The
liability still exists but the the burden of paying is shifted from the Visiting Forces to the RP-Gov.
De Lima – Senate cannot compel attendance of de lima. She is not within the coercive
jurisdiction of the senate based on separation of powers. Thus 23, majority is 12.
Enrolled bill – upon certification of Senate Pres, Senate Sec, Speaker, and Sec of House of the
bill submitted to the pres. (Case, there was a withdrawal of signature, hence not considered as
enrolled bill anymore.)
SET/HRET – SC does not have appellate jurisdiction over their decisions. But can be subject of
Rule 65 GRADALEJ.
Jurisdiction
Transformation from Candidate to “Member”
 Valid proclamation
 Takes an oath (Before SenPres/Speaker and in Open Session)
 Assumption of office
(See period within which to file but note that a Quo Warranto case may still be filed even
beyond such period considering that Qualifications are continuing requirements e.g.
Citizenship)

Veto on Appropriations (A6 Sec 27 par 2)


 Bolinao case – GAA contends an item of appropriotion, attached to it was
a condition. President approved the appropriation but vetoed the
condition. SC held unconstitutional, approval of the item necessarily
carries with it the approval of the condition. Only Items of appropriation
can be vetoed.
 Macaraig case – Pres vetoed provision in GAA prohibiting him from
transferring saving as authorized to be done by him under the GAA to
items of appropriation which would’ve have been deleted or reduced by
legislative. SC held partial veto was declared invalid. What was vetoed
here was a provision and not an Item in the GAA. Ground here was A6
Sec 27.
BUT! SC scrutinized the provison and held that it is a RIDER as it does not
pertain to any item of appropriation and thus Under A6 SEC 25 par 2. Therefore
Unconstitutional.
EXECUTIVE
Exec Privilege – given to president to withhold information
 Can he extend this privilege to others? Yes
 Blanket order not allowed must be categorically invoked on specific
instance
Civil Liberties Union – Compatible office reqs: must be authorized by law, in ex officio capacity,
related to the primary duty and function of the office, no additional compensation
Alter Ego / Qualified Political Doctrine
1. Manalang – there is LAW designated cabinet secraty to sit as board members og
GOCC. Cab sec reorganized GOCC. One officer complained. Cabsec invoked
alter-ego doctrine arguing that pres has continuing authority to reorganize exec
depts including goccs therefore can also exercise such. SC Rejected. Alter-Ego
doctrine will only apply if it is the president who appointed them there. Here there
is a LAW which appointed them hence doctrine does not apply.
2. 2020 Case. Something about DBM. Sec of DBM was a board member pursuant
to a law. There is a reso which needs approval from DBM. Argues Alter ego
hence no separate approval needed. SC denied. Alter ego doctrine does not
apply.
LOANZON Cases
State’s Immunity from Suit
Phil Textile vs. CA and EA Construction (CAGUIAO) - In the instant case, it is not disputed that
PTRI is an unincorporated national government agency. The PTRI was created in accordance
with R.A. 4086. Hence, being an unincorporated government agency that exercises a
governmental function, ordinarily, the PTRI enjoys immunity from suit. Further, the employees of
PTRI acting in their official capacity likewise enjoy this immunity from suit, as "public officials
may not be sued for acts done in the performance of their official functions or within the scope of
their authority. However, needless to say, the rule on State immunity from suit is not absolute.
The State may be sued with its consent. The State's consent to be sued may be given either
expressly or impliedly.
it is not disputed that PTRI entered into a Contract of Works for the Rehabilitation of Electrical
Facilities of PTRI Main Building and Three Pilot Plants with B.A. Ramirez. It is likewise not
disputed that the cause of action of E.A. Ramirez's Complaint is the alleged breach of the
subject Contract. In other words, PTRI is being sued upon a claim involving liability arising from
a contract. Hence, the general law on the waiver of immunity from suit finds application.
Furthermore, there is implied consent on the part of the State to be subjected to suit when the
State enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to
the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity.
However, not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-
suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its
sovereign functions and another which is done in its proprietary capacity.
In any case, the Court has held that the State's immunity from suit may be shelved when the
Court is convinced that its stubborn observance will lead to the subversion of the ends of
justice.29 Likewise, the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen.
Delegation of Powers
CotesCUP v. Secretary of Education,(CAGUIAO). – The K to 12 Law does not constitute an
undue delegation of legislative power. The law adequately provides the legislative policy that it
seeks to implement. There are the standards to guide the DepEd, CHED and TESDA in carrying
out the provisions of the law, from the development of the K to 12 Basic Education Curriculum,
to the hiring and training of teaching personnel and to the formulation of appropriate strategies
in order to address the changes during the transition period.
Police Power
Pimentel v. LEB – The creation of the LEB is constitutional. LEB has been vested with police
power to prescribe courses to a law degree and has the power to supervise law schools.
Zabal v. Duterte - The 6-month lockdown of the Boracay Island is a valid exercise of police
power.
CotesCUP v. Secretary of Education –K to 12 Law. The State has an interest in prescribing
regulations to promote the education and the general welfare of the people.
Eminent Domain
PNOC Alternative Fuels Corp. v. National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (CAGUIAO) -
Land owned by the government which partakes of patrimonial property may a subject of an
expropriation case
When the power of eminent domain is exercised by an agent of the State and by means of
expropriation of real property, the following limitations must be observed:
1. A valid delegation to a public utility to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property;
2. An identified public use, purpose or welfare for which eminent domain or expropriation
is exercised;
3. Previous tender of a valid and definite offer to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but which offer is not accepted; and
4. Payment of just compensation.
Taxation
MWSS v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Pasay City LBAA et. al, (September 2020),
Lopez, J. - MWSS is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers, and as such,
exempt from payment of real property taxes. The tax exemption that its properties carries,
however, ceases when their beneficial use has been extended to a taxable person. The liability
to pay real property taxes on government-owned properties, the beneficial or actual use of
which was granted to a taxable entity, now devolves on the taxable beneficial user.
Amendments v. Revision
Lambino v. COMELEC– The provisions which the petitioners sought to change were in the
nature of revisions and not amendments. The proposed changes call a transition from a
presidential form of government to a parliamentary form. Here initiative is for revision. The
People’s Initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII is limited to amendments.
The tests to determine if there is an amendment or revision would be the QUALITATIVE TEST
or the QUANTITATIVE test. Any amendment to, or revision of, the Constitution under Sections 1
and 2 of Article XVII shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later ninety days after the approval of such
amendment. (Section 4, Art. XVII)
Citizenship
Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, March 8, 2016,– On equitable grounds, a foundling like Grace
Poe- Llamanzares is considered a natural-born citizen. Note: On 6 May 2022, the President
signed into law R.A.11767 or the Foundling Recognition and Protection Act
So v. Republic – naturalization is not judicial proceceding, does not constitute res judiciata.
In Re: Vicente Ching,– The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly
not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit
of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry.
The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made
generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. The practice of the legal
profession is reserved only for Filipino citizens. Having failed to acquire his Philippine citizenship
within a reasonable time, Ching is precluded from taking his oath as a lawyer
Maquiling v. COMELEC, April 16, 2013, - The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s
foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and
citizenship. However, it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants
the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position. Having failed to
perfect the requirements under R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s proclamation was revoked. Maquiling,
the second placer, was ruled to be the winner of the mayoralty race.
Article 1
Republic v. Province of Palawan (Dec 04, 2018), Tijam, J. - The Provincial Government of
Palawan asserted its claim of forty percent (40%) of the National Government's share in the
proceeds of the Malayampaya –Camago Natural Gas Project. It argued that since the reservoir
is located within its territorial jurisdiction, (In re: Sec 7 Article 10). Local governments shall be
entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national
wealth within their respective areas, in the manner provided by law, including sharing the same
with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits. And Hence, it is entitled to said share under
Section 290 of the Local Government Code. The National Government disputed the claim
arguing that since the gas fields were approximately 80 k.ms from Palawan's coastline [15 km
limit], they are outside the territorial jurisdiction of the province and is within the national territory
of the Philippines. The Court sustained the national government’s claim. (municipal waters only
extend upto 15km)
Article 2
Pangilinan v. Sec. Cayetano, Leonen, J. (March 16, 2021) - By transformation, the Philippines
became a member of the International Criminal Court. On March 15, 2018, the Philippines
announced its withdrawal from the International Criminal Court. On March 16, 2018, it formally
submitted its Notice of Withdrawal through a Note Verbale to the U.N. Secretary-General's Chef
de Cabinet. The Secretary General received this communication the following day, March 17,
2018. Through these actions, the Philippines completed the requisite acts of withdrawal. This
was all consistent and in compliance with what the Rome Statute plainly requires. (moot)
Zabal v. President Duterte (February 12, 2019), Del Castillo, J.: Proclamation No. 475 (closure
of boracay) must be upheld for being in the nature of a valid police power measure. Police
power has been defined as the 'state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare.“ As defined, it consists of
imposition or restraint upon liberty or property in order to foster the common good.
Peralta v. Philippine Postal Corporation (December 4, 2018), Tijam, J.: The printing of the
commemorative stamp by the Philpost in connection with centennial celebration of the INC does
not violate both the principle of separation of church and state and the non-establishment
clause. In a number of cases, the Court has upheld the broadest exercise of religious freedom
without infringing the non-establishment clause. Benevolent neutrality recognizes the religious
nature of the Filipino people and the elevating influence of religion in society; at the same time,
it acknowledges that government must pursue its secular goals. (Lemon Test: 1) The statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; 2) Its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; and, 3) The statute must not foster "an excessive
government entanglement with religion."
Legislative
Jimenez v. Cabangbang- To come under the guarantee, the speech or debate must be one
made "in Congress or in any committee thereof." Publication of an allegedly libelous letter is not
covered by the privilege
Trillanes v. Hon. Marigomen (March 14, 2018), Tijam, J. – This is a libel suit instituted by
Antonio Tiu, a resource person in a senate inquiry, against Sen. Trillanes. Petitioner's
statements in media interviews are not covered by the parliamentary speech or debate"
privilege. Petitioner admits that he uttered the questioned statements, describing private
respondent as former VP Binay's "front" or "dummy" in connection with the so-called Hacienda
Binay, in response to media interviews during gaps and breaks in plenary and committee
hearings in the Senate.[44] With Jimenez as our guidepost, it is evident that petitioner's remarks
fall outside the privilege of speech or debate under Section 11, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. The statements were clearly not part of any speech delivered in the Senate or any
of its committees. They were also not spoken in the course of any debate in said fora. It cannot
likewise be successfully contended that they were made in the official discharge or performance
of petitioner's duties as a Senator, as the remarks were not part of or integral to the legislative
process.
NOTES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Atty. Loanzon
Void for vagueness - “a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. application.”
Judicial Due Process
(1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine
the matter before it;
(2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the
property which is the subject of the proceedings;
(3) the defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard; and
(4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
Administrative Due Process (7 CARDINAL RULES)
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented presented.
3. The decision must have something to support itself.
4. The evidence must be "substantial."
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
Equal Protection – “guarantees equality, not identity of rights”
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
Warrant of arrest Requisites –
1. No warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
2. to be determined personally by the judge
3. after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce and
4. particularly describing the person to be arrested.
Search Warrant Requisites
(1) probable cause is present;
(2)such probable cause mustmustbe determined personally by the judge;
(3)the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and
the witnesses she may produce;
(4)the applicant and the witnesses must testify on the facts personally known to
them ;and
(5)the warrant specifically describes the place to be searchedsearchedand the things to
be seized
The rule on judicial warrants admits of exceptions, namely:
1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2) Search of evidence in plain view;
3) Search of a moving vehicle;
4) Consented warrantless search;
5) Customs search;
6) Stop and Frisk; and
7) Exigent and emergency circumstances
A “stop and frisk” situation, otherwise referred to as the Terry search, takes place a
police officer approaches a person who is acting suspiciously for the purpose of
investigating possible criminal behavior, in line with the general interest of effective
crime prevention and detection. A basic factor considered is that the police officers, with
their personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
Plain view doctrine
(1) law enforcement officers in search of evidence have a prior justification for an
intrusion or are in a position from which they can view a particular area;
(2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and
(3) it is immediately apparent to the officers that the item they observed may be
evidence of a crime, a contraband or is otherwise subject to seizure.
Pp v. Olarte 2019- The first instance in Sec. 5 of Rule 113, on which the subject arrest was
premised, is known as an in flagrante delicto arrest where the accused was caught in the act or
attempting to commit, already committing or having committed an offense. For a warrantless
arrest of in flagrante delicto to be effected, two elements must concur: (a) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.62 Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an in flagrante
delicto arrest constitutionally infirm.63
The concept of in flagrante delicto arrests should not be confused with warrantless arrests
based on probable cause as contemplated in the second instance of Sec. 5 of Rule 113. In the
latter type of warrantless arrest, an accused may be arrested when there is probable cause
which is discernible by a peace officer or private person that an offense "has just been
committed." Here, the offense had already been consummated but not in the presence of the
peace officer or private person who, nevertheless, should have personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested had committed it. More importantly, there is
durational immediacy between the offense that had just been committed and the peace officer
or private person's perception or observation of the accused's presence at the incident or
immediate vicinity. Such is why probable cause is required to justify a warrantless arrest in
cases where the peace officer or private person did not catch or witness the accused in the act
of committing an offense.
"Probable cause" (in the context of warrantless arrests) has been understood to mean a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong to warrant a
cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged.64 While probable cause to justify a warrantless arrest is required only in instances
where the peace officer or private person who was present only at the time when the offense
was committed believes (based on his/her immediate perception) that an offense had just been
committed, some of its yardsticks for determination may be of help in ascertaining whether an
accused is attempting to commit an offense. This is because the probable cause needed to
justify a warrantless arrest ordinarily involves a certain degree of suspicion, in the absence of
actual belief of the arresting officers, that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense based on actual facts.65 And such determination of reasonable
suspicion "must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior."
Under the circumstances, PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar had a reasonable suspicion to arrest
accused-appellant who was seen to have drawn a gun as he was about to enter LBC. Common
sense dictates that police officers need not wait for a serious crime, such as robbery, to be
consummated before they move in and make the arrest because it will definitely endanger the
lives and safety of the public, as well as their own. This is consistent with the jurisprudential
dictum that the obligation to make an arrest by reason of a crime does not presuppose, as a
necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime. Moreover,
even if the firearm drawn turned out to be a replica, the police officers were not expected to
know on sight whether the firearm was genuine or not, considering they had only a split second
to act on any indication of danger. What was necessary was the presence of reasonably
sufficient ground to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime; and
that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained participated in it.68
As a result of the validity of the accused-appellant's warrantless arrest, the incidental search
and seizure of the items in his possession is also valid "to protect the arresting officer from
being harmed by the person arrested and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within
reach."
Pp v. Bringula - Accused -appellant already pleaded not guilty to the crime charged against him
during his arraignment without questioning his warrantless arrest. He actively participated in the
proceedings before the trial court thereafter . In effect, appellant is deemed to have submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court and waived any perceived defect or irregularity that may
have attended his arrest.
People v. Billy Acosta (G.R. No. 238865, January 28, 2019) -To apply the Plain View Doctrine,
the law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position
from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to
eye and hand handand its discovery inadvertent. This requisite is absent since the discovery of
the police officers of the marijuana plants was not inadvertent as it was prompted by Salucana ,
a tipster. Thus, the Court acquitted Acosta.
Dominguez v. People (G.R. No. 235898, March 13, 2019, (CAGUIAO) The Court acquitted
Dominguez. It held that despite the fact that Dominguez can no longer question the validity of
his arrest , it is crystal clear that the sachet of shabu seized from him during the warrantless
search is inadmissible in evidence against him. There being no warrantless search incidental to
a lawful arrest or seizure of evidence in plain view, the theshabu purportedly seized from
Dominguez is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous
tree tree. As the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti delicti of the crime charged,
Dominguez must be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.
Prior restraint and subsequent punishment
Prior restraint is the review and restriction of speech prior to its release.
Thus, it precludes governmental acts that required approval of a proposal to publish;
licensing or permits as prerequisites to publication including the payment of license
taxes for the privilege to publish; and even injunctions against publication.
Subsequent punishment is punishing the purveyor of the speech after it has been published or
delivered.
Chavez v. Gonzales (G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008) – The state cannot impose any kind
of prior restraint on the release and broadcast of the “Garci tapes.” This impairs the right of the
people to information and constraints the freedom of expression and of the press.
Freedom of Speech and Expression Facial Challenges and Overbreadth Doctrine
General Rule :
A party can question the validity of a statute only if, as applied to him, it is
unconstitutional.
XPN:
FACIAL CHALLENGE
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech.
Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and,
if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law
cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
Facial Challenges are allowed when –
(1) The statute is challenged as applied; or
(2) The statute involves free speech
Content-based and content content-neutral regulations
(1) A content-neutral regulation is merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or
one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards.
(2) content-based restraint or censorship is wher where the restriction is based on the
subject matter of the utterance or speech.
Tests to determine the validity of governmental regulation
Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or a
combination of three tests tests-
(a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which permits limitations on speech once a rational
connection has been established between the speech restrained and the danger
contemplated;
(b) the balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of type of
situation; and
(c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on the premise that speech may be
restrained because there is substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil
the government has a right to prevent. This rule requires that the evil consequences
sought to be prevented must be substantive, “extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high.”
Freedom of Religion
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and
interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent
possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by
laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based
on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
Conscientious objectors are those who refuse to perform a legal duty by reason of
religion freedom. However, specifically, the term applies to those who refuse to perform
military service“ on the grounds of freedom of thought, conscience, or religion.
Liberty of Abode and Right to Travel
Genuino v. De Lima (G.R. No. 197930, Apr 17, 2018) – Respondent argued that one of the
limitations on the right to travel is DOJ Circular No. 41, which was issued pursuant to the rule
rule-making powers of the DOJ in order to keep individuals under preliminary investigation
within the jurisdiction of the Philippine criminal justice system system. The Court held that the
issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41 has no legal basis. It is not a law. Without a clear mandate of
an existing law, an administrative issuance is ultra vires vires. Thus, the Court struck down the
issuance as null and void.
Garcia v. Sandiganbayan (842 Phil. 240, October 17, 2018) -The power to issue HDO is an
inherent power belonging to the courts. The Sandiganbayan did not commit abuse of discretion,
much less grave, in denying the motion for reconsideration and the prayer for the lifting of the
HDO issued against the petitioner. The HDO was validly issued pursuant to the
Sandiganbayan’s inherent powers as a court of justice.
Right to Information
Antolin v. Domondon, G.R. No. 220378, June 30, 2021 For the right to information to be
compellable by mandamus , a petitioner must establish the following requisites. first , the
information sought must be in relation to matters of public concern and public interest; and
second , it must not be exempt by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
RA 6713 recognizes that not all kinds of information in the possession of public officials and
employees may be made available to the public. Thus, while Section 5(e) provides that "[a] ll
public documents must be made accessible to and readily available for inspection by the public
within reasonable working hours," it must be read together with Section 7(c) of RA 6713 which
prohibits public officials and employees from disclosing and misusing confidential information.
Thus, confidential information is exempt from the mandate of making public documents
available for inspection within reasonable working hours.
The Court said that it is not oblivious to petitioner's quest for 23 years to determine for herself
whether she failed the 1997 CPA Board Exams. Regrettably, for petitioner, the balancing of
interests in this case tilts in favor of the need to preserve the confidentiality of the test questions
to protect the integrity of the CPA Board Exams. Thus, petitioner's efforts in this case which
spanned more than two decades must now be put to rest.
Chavez v. PCGG, 360 Phil. 133 (1998) – In this case, the Court said that the following are
some of the recognized restrictions to the constitutional guarantee of the right to information: (1)
national security matters and intelligence information; (2) trade secrets and banking transaction;
(3) criminal matters; and (4) other confidential information.
Thus, the Court in Chavez specifically recognized as exempt from public disclosure the
following information : state secrets regarding military, diplomatic, and other national security
matters; classified law enforcement matters, such as those relating to the apprehension, the
prosecution and the detention of criminals which courts may not inquire into prior to such arrest,
detention and prosecution; and diplomatic correspondence, closed door cabinet meetings and
executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal deliberations of the
Court Court.
Eminent Domain
Rp v. Bunsay (CAGUIAO) CGT, being a tax on passive income, is imposed by the
National Internal Revenue Code on the seller as a consequence of the latter's presumed
income from the sale or exchange of real property. Notably however, the transfer of real
property by way of expropriation is not an ordinary sale contemplated under Article 1458 of
the Civil Code. Rather, it is akin to a "forced sale" or one which arises not from the
consensual agreement of the vendor and vendee, but by compulsion of law
The court deemed it just and equitable to direct the Republic to shoulder the capital gains tax to
preserve the compensation awarded to spouses Bunsay as a consequence of expropriation. To
stress, compension, to be just, must be of such value as to fully rehabilitate the affected owner;
it must be sufficient to make the affected owner whole.
Evergreen Manufacturing Corporation Corporationv. Republic (G.R. No. 218628, Sept. 6, 2017:
The Court defined just compensation in expropriation cases "as the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator.” The Court repeatedly stressed that the true
measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word 'just' is used to modify the
meaning of the word 'compensation' to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the
property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.”
Requisites for the Exercise of Eminent Domain by an LGU
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent
domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property;
2. The power is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the
poor and the landless;
3. There is payment of just compensation based on the fair market value of the property
at the time of taking; and
4. A valid and definite offer was previously made to the owner of the property, but the
offer was not accepted
Rights under Custodial Investigation
Meaning of Custodial Investigation – Liberty is restrained and suspect is under custody of law
enforcers.
People v. Amestuzo, 413 Phil. 500 (2001) -The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987
Constitution, or the so so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is
under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect
taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the
person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line line-up is not part of the custodial
investigatio n; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked
at this stage.
People v. Salvatierra, G.R.No. 104663, Jul 24, 1997 1997- The right to be assisted by counsel
attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during
identification in a police line line-up because it is not part of the custodial investigation process.
This is because during a police line line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the
investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is
interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the line line-up and not the suspect.
People v. Dacanay (CAGUIAO)- During the separate occasions that Antonio was interviewed by
the news reporters, there was no indication of the presence of any police officers within the
proximity who could have possibly exerted undue pressure or influence . As recounted by both
reporters during their testimonies, Antonio voluntarily narrated how he perpetrated the crime in a
candid and straightforward manner, " with no trace of fear, intimidation or coercion in him. him."
The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed appellant. They were not
acting under the direction and control of the police. Appellant's verbal confessions to the
newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution . The Bill of
Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another
individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions
therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents.
People v. Lara, G.R. No. 199877, August 13, 2012 -It is a shopworn doctrine that any objection
involving a warrant of arrest or the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must
be made before he enters his plea , otherwise the objection is deemed waived waived.In
voluntarily submitting himself to the court by entering a plea, instead of filing a motion to quash
the information for lack of jurisdiction over his person, accused accused-appellant is deemed to
have waived his right to assail the legality of his arrest.
Appellant’s assertion that he was under custodial investigation at the time he was identified in a
police line line-up and therefore had the right to counsel does not hold water water. Ingrained in
our jurisdiction is the rule that an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police
line line-up considering that such is usually not a part of custodial investigation. An exception to
this rule is when the accused had been the focus of police attention at the start of the
investigation. The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial
investigation begins and being made to stand in a police line line-up is not the starting point or a
part of custodial investigation.
People v. Feliximinia-- The mantle of protection under Section 12 of Article III covers the period
from the time a person is taken into custody for investigation of his possible participation in the
commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a
crime although not yet in custody.
Right to Speedy Trial and Disposition of Cases
Dela Peña ruling espouses that the following factors must be considered in determining
whether the right to speedy trial or speedy disposition of cases is violated:
(1) the length of delay;
(2) the reasons for the delay;
(3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
(4) the prejudice caused by the delay.“ (LRAP)
Right against Double Jeopardy
For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur:
(1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of
the crime charged;
(2) a court of competent jurisdiction;
(3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and
(4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his
express consent.
An ex post facto law is a law that either:
(1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law that was innocent when
done, and punishes such act; or
(2) aggravates a crime, or makes the crime greater than it was when committed ; or
(3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to
the crime when it was committed; or
(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense; or
(5) assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only, but in effect imposes a penalty or
deprivation of a right for an act that was lawful when done; or
(6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has
become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty.

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