Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations

Vol. 22, No. 2, April 2011, 113–126

God and the Trinity in Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī

Maha Elkaisy-Friemuth*

Faculty of Theology, Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium

This article focus on some aspects of al-Rāzī’s concept of God and his refutation of the Trinity.
The first part examines how al-Rāzī understands the essence of God in his last work Al-matālib
al-‘āliya in order to shed light on areas that are particularly problematic for an acceptance of_ the
Christian concept of the Trinity. The second part examines al-Rāzī’s commentary on some key
qur’anic verses which deal with the divinity of Jesus and with the qur’anic version of the
Trinity in his work Mafātīh al-ghayb. The article will offer a brief introduction to the
problems around the authorship _ of this work and focus on some verses that present al-Rāzī’s
refutation of the divinity of Jesus and the concept of understanding God as three distinct
essences. The article particularly focuses on the relation between the logic of his refutation
of the Trinity and his own understanding of the essence of God as in Al-matālib al-‘āliya,
and argues that al-Rāzī’s refutation is closely connected to his rational conception _ of tanzīh.

Keywords: kalām; theology; tafsīr; philosophy; Qur’an commentary; medieval

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī is one of the last encyclopaedic writers on theology in its relationship to
Islamic philosophy, following in the footsteps of Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī.1 Al-Rāzī left a very
_
rich corpus of philosophical and theological works. Although he wrote extensively on philosophi-
cal as well as theological subjects, his style of writing is usually difficult to identify as either theo-
logical or philosophical because he used philosophical terminology widely in his theological
writings. Al-mabāhith al-mashriqiyya and his last work Al-matālib al-‘āliya are usually regarded
_ philosophical writings. Al-Kafrāwī (2004,
as his most important _ 125–6) argues that many of al-
Rāzī’s works are influenced by Ibn Sīnā and that Watt and Majid Fakhry consider al-Rāzī to be a
follower of al-Ghazālī in connecting philosophy with theology. Al-Rāzī commented on many
metaphysical issues raised in Ibn Sīnā’s Al-shifā’ and Al-ishārāt, and criticized his concept of
emanation.2 At a later stage, al-Rāzī adopted many philosophical theories and slowly moved
away from Ash‘arite theology. This also becomes clear when we study his concept of the
attributes of God in his last book, Al-matālib al-‘āliya, where he emphasizes the transcendent
nature of God and criticizes concepts such_ as God’s sitting on a throne, as shown below.
Reading his books chronologically (as arranged by al-Zurkān 1963), we can clearly see the
development of his thought and occasional changes in his ideas, and that his last works clearly
present his final views especially on the subject of the nature of God.
This article will examine his concept of God through his reflections on the question of the
divine attributes and then study his comments on the concept of the Trinity, as it is presented
in the Qur’an, through his great commentary Mafātīh al-ghayb. We notice here similarities
between his explanation of the concept of the Trinity in _ Mafātīh al-ghayb and his explanation
of hulūl, indwelling, in Al-matālib al-‘āliya through his discussion _ of the negative attributes of
_ _
God: God does not assume an incarnate state (hāl) in another and he cannot be united with
any other entity (Rāzī 1999, 2:68–71). In Al-matālib _ al-‘āliya, al-Rāzī develops a kind of philo-
_
sophical theology which presents God as highly transcendent (munazzah), which is similar to the

*Email: maha.elkaisyfriemuth@theo.kuleuven.be

ISSN 0959-6410 print/ISSN 1469-9311 online

© 2011 University of Birmingham
DOI: 10.1080/09596410.2011.560427
http://www.informaworld.com
114 M. Elkaisy-Friemuth

Mu‘tazilite concept of tanzīh and has affinities with the presentation of the negative attributes of
God by philosophers such as Ibn Sīnā (Wolfson 1973). This transcendence of God plays an
important role in al-Rāzī’s explanation of the Trinity in Mafātīh al-ghayb. In addition, his reflec-
_
tion on the question of the knowability of God in Al-matālib al-‘āliya influences his refutation of
_
the concept of the Trinity as it is presented in the Qur’an. Thus al-Rāzī’s study of the nature of
God in Al-matālib al-‘āliya can give us the necessary basis for understanding his refutation
of the Trinity in_ his commentary on the Qur’an in Mafātīh al-ghayb. Moreover, studying the attri-
butes of God and the Christian Trinity together will enable _ us to understand why al-Rāzī sharply
criticized the concept of the Trinity in his Qur’an commentary, especially as he was writing both
works at approximately the same period.
Since the aim of this article is to present al-Rāzī’s final discussion of these issues, we will con-
centrate here on his last two works Al-matālib al-‘āliya and Mafātīh al-ghayb. Al-Zurkān (1963)
argues that these two works were probably _ _
written simultaneously at the end of his life
and that they contain his most important theological and philosophical thinking. Al-matālib
al-‘āliya was intended to be in 10 volumes, but al-Rāzī died after finishing the seventh, which _
he dated 4 Rajab 605 AH (12 January 1209). Al-Zurkān also notes that Ibn Khallikān and
al-Dhahabī wrote that Mafātīh al-ghayb too was unfinished when al-Rāzī died, and Hājji
_ gives the names of those who completed that work, indicating _
Khalīfa in his Al-kashf ‘an al-z.unūn
that he must indeed have written both works simultaneously (Zurkān 1963, 62–6; cf. McAuliffe
1991, 68–71).
This article is ordered as follows: the first section will examine al-Rāzī’s concept of the attri-
butes of God and how he views the relationship between them and God. It will make extensive use
of Al-matālib al-‘āliya which includes his last thoughts on the subject. The following section will
_ question of the knowability of God, which seems to disturb al-Rāzī in his late works,
discuss the
as demonstrated in the opening section of Al-matālib al-‘āliya.3 Having discussed these elements
in al-Rāzī’s understanding of the nature of God,_ I will then examine his views on the Christian
concept of the Trinity. Here I will rely exclusively on his commentary Mafātīh al-ghayb, selecting
some key qur’anic verses, mainly from Surat Āl ‘Imrān, which discusses the _Trinity, and finally I
will draw some conclusions.

I. The nature of God and his attributes

The nature of God is extensively discussed in all religions and opinions on it are frequently a
source of conflict and schism. In Christianity, differences of opinion about the nature of Jesus
gave rise to numerous disputes and conflicts and were the reason for the division of the
Church into Jacobite, Melkite and Nestorian Christians (Thomas 2002, 90–116). The nature of
God is discussed in Islam within the area of the attributes of God, which became one of the prin-
cipal subjects in Islamic studies, and the Mu‘tazilite and Ash‘arite schools differed in their under-
standing of it. Thus, Islam shares with Christianity a deep concern to examine and understand
the nature of God. This caused Muslim theologians, when studying Christian concepts, to concen-
trate on refuting the divinity of Jesus and the Trinity. In this section, however, I will first examine
al-Rāzī’s understanding of God’s attributes in order to pinpoint his position among the various
views of theologians on this issue. Although Goldziher (1912) situates him among the Ash‘arites,
Abrahamov (2002, 212–5) and al-Zurkān (1963, 252–65) consider that al-Rāzī’s late views on
these attributes clearly moved him closer to the Mu‘tazilites’ and the philosophers’ understanding
of the divine attributes, as shown below.
In the Matālib al-Rāzī starts by presenting some arguments for the existence of a divine
power, which is _ necessary for the existence of the world. This divine power is in itself necessarily
existent, wājib al-wujūd. He first defends the view that existence, wujūd, is an attribute that must
 Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 115

be attached to God, against those who deny that it should be considered an attribute on the basis of
that statement: ‘God exists’ is a necessary statement, and so the necessity of his existence should
not be considered an attribute (Rāzī 1999, 1:90–4). Al-Rāzī, conversely, argues here that ‘necess-
arily’ describes the manner of the existence, not the fact of it. Thus, the existence of every existing
thing cannot be said to be ‘necessary’ because there is obviously a time when each thing ceases to
exist and therefore loses the necessity of its existence. Thus the necessity of existence (of a thing
whose existence never ceases) is a qualifier that describes the way in which a thing exists: by itself
or by another. If it exists by itself, it is necessary, but when it exists through another, it is contin-
gent, even if it exists throughout eternity (Rāzī 1999, 1:90). We note here that his discussion
is very similar to Ibn Sīnā’s famous concept of ‘the Necessary Existent’, which becomes in his
philosophy a synonym for God in both his works Al-shifā’ (Ibn Sīnā 1960) and Al-najāt fī al-
hikma al-mantiqiyya wa-al-tabī‘iyya wa-al-ilāhiyya (Ibn Sīnā 1938, 251–3; cf. Wolfson 1973).
_
Thus _
the first attribute of God_ for al-Rāzī is the manner of God’s existence, which is of a necessary
nature (Kafrawi 2004, 125–33). Since God is the only being whose existence is necessary, while
the existence of all other beings is contingent, he must be the source of all existence and therefore
the first cause of all things.
Al-Rāzī continues in this rational manner to add other attributes which must be applied to
God when we describe him as the first cause. But, before resuming his study of the attributes,
he makes here a very important distinction: he explains that Muslim theologians believe that all
existing beings are the same in their essences (dhawāt); the main distinction between them lies in
their holding different attributes. Thus for Muslim theologians God’s essence is different from
other essences by virtue of possessing certain unique attributes. This concept is also well known
among the Sufis, who believe in the saying ‘he who knows himself knows God’, which clearly
declares that humans in their essences are similar to God or have the same essence as God
(Goodman 1992, 164). Al-Rāzī, for his part, believes that this concept is basically wrong.
While he accepts that all beings have essences, he rejects the notion that these essences are
the same in their nature and reality. His main argument here is that, if the essences were the
same by virtue of the reality of their being essences, then the various attributes should also
be the same by virtue of the reality of their being attributes, in which case all attributes of all
essences would be the same (Rāzī 1999, 1:184) – for example, the power or knowledge of
God would be the same as the power or knowledge of humans – which is absurd. He explains
further that the various attributes that come to inhere in these essences would not be able to
change the basic fact that their true reality is one, for the attributes would only be able to
change the manner of the activities of the essences, not their basic nature. We would then
have to believe that all essences are the same, including God’s essence, and only their activities
are different (Rāzī 1999, 1:184–7). For al-Rāzī, in contrast, essences differ in their nature and
reality, and he argues that God’s essence is unique, not by virtue of its unique attributes, but
in itself; it is different from and incomparable to all other essences (Rāzī 1999, 1:184). This
is an important concept for the subject of this article because it means that, even if someone pos-
sesses divine knowledge and divine power, he could never be a god because his essence in its
reality has its distinct nature, and could never be a divine essence. He also believes that human
essences differ from one another and that human souls are divided into different species, each of
which has certain qualities which are influenced by one of the souls of the planets (Rāzī 1999,
1:85–95). It seems that al-Rāzī was influenced in this latter opinion by the philosopher Abū al-
Barakāt al-Baghdādī’s famous work Al-mu‘tabar fī al-hikma. According to al-Zurkān, al-Rāzī
was greatly influenced by Abū al-Barakāt and made good _ use of his Al-mu‘tabar in various
studies (Zurkān 1963, 484–6; cf. Baghdādī 1358, 2:390–1). As a result, the divine essence,
for al-Rāzī, is unique and there is only one of its kind, which is Necessary of Existence
(Kafrawi 2004, 125–7).
116 M. Elkaisy-Friemuth

After establishing his own understanding of the nature of essences, al-Rāzī goes on to consider
the application of various attributes to God. He considers that whatever is necessarily existent is
consequently eternal and everlasting since it never ceases to exist, although the opposite is not
true; i.e., something that is eternal and everlasting need not be necessarily existent. He points
out here that it is possible to argue rationally with the philosophers that there are contingent
beings which can exist eternally because of the eternity of their cause (Rāzī 1999, 1:188–9).
This again moves him far from the Ash‘arite school and demonstrates his philosophical
leaning, for Ash‘arites and most Muslim theologians believe that the only eternal everlasting
being is God; no contingent being is eternal, because all are created ex nihilo. Al-Rāzī’s argumen-
tation for the existence of eternal beings does not differ from Ibn Sīnā’s in his explanation of the
existence of eternal beings beside God (Ibn Sīnā 1938, 224–5; cf. Iskenderoglu 2002, 42–7).
Al-Rāzī presents the various arguments of the mutakallimūn and uncovers their weaknesses by
using arguments such as: if the creator of the world is not eternal, then he must be created, and
his creator would then be either contingent or eternal, and so on without end, which is absurd.
Thus the creator of the world must be eternal and everlasting. Although al-Rāzī used this argument
in Kitāb al-masā’il al-khamsīn (1989), a short work on kalām, he argues in Al-matālib al-‘āliya
that the only guarantee of the eternity of God is that his nature is necessarily existent. _ He does not
consider the mutakallimūn’s argument that God is eternal because ‘He is the creator of the world’
is sufficient. In his opinion, one can argue with the philosophers that the Necessary Existence
(God) could create or emanate a being (intellect) who creates the world. The creator of the
world would then be eternal in the sense that his existence would not have a specific beginning
but be contingent in his nature because his existence would be dependent on another (Rāzī
1999, 1:90–3). Here again al-Rāzī uses Ibn Sīnā’s explanation of emanation and of how the
world came into existence. Ibn Sīnā argues that the world existed as a result of the activities of
the various intellects,4 such that the act of bringing ‘form and matter’ into existence should be
attributed to the intellects rather than directly to God’s activities (Ibn Sīnā 1938, 247; cf. Janssens
1987, 462–3). God stands above the natural system but guarantees its function. Ibn Sīnā also
argues in his theory of ‘essence and existence’ that the source of existence is God while
‘matter and form’ result from the activities of the various intellects (Rahman 1981, 4–6).5 By
using the argument that there are eternal beings beside God and that God’s nature as necessary
existence is unique, al-Rāzī strengthens his earlier argument against the mutkallimūn that essences
are different from each other in their reality and nature, not by virtue of their various attributes.
Following this approach of using philosophical concepts in theological discussion, al-Rāzī
continues to give God many positive epithets, such as powerful (qādir), knowing (‘ālim),
having will, living (hayy), hearing (samī‘) and seeing (basīr). He also lists a number of negative
_ _
attributes which indicate God’s transcendence by asserting his distinction from humankind
(tanzīh). This article will hereafter only concentrate on the negative attributes because this will
help us to understand al-Rāzī’s position on the Christian Trinity.
It is true that al-Rāzī inclined in his study of the negative attributes to the opinion of the Mu‘ta-
zilites and the philosophers, as demonstrated below. He devotes the whole of the second volume
of Al-matālib al-‘āliya and his book Asās al-taqdīs (The basis of holiness; 1993) to discussion of
the negative_ attributes, demonstrating a strong objection to all forms of anthropomorphism, which
he maintained throughout his academic life. We may mention here his early philosophical work
Al-mabāhith al-mashriqiyya, and later his Munaz.arāt, in which he clearly attacked anthropo-
morphism. _ This was one of the reasons why Ibn Taymiyya heavily criticized many of al-Rāzī’s
works and wrote the work Al-radd ‘ala Asās al-taqdīs (the refutation of Asās al-taqdīs), see
al-Zurkān (1963, 68). However, his discussion in Al-matālib al-‘āliya will be used here
because it presents discussion of this issue more philosophically _ and in more detail than does
6
Asās al-taqdīs.
 Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 117

In Al-matālib al-‘āliya al-Rāzī starts by classifying theologians into groups. First, there are
_
those who believe that the material world is the only existing world, which means that God
and his angels exist in a direct relation to this world, and they point out the location of the exist-
ence of God: in heaven or on the throne. On the other hand, there are those who believe that God
does not exist spatially in any way and has no connection to place or time. This is a clear and
radical division. He identifies the Karāmiyya and the Hanbalites as the advocates of the first
group, though when discussing other details, he also includes the Ash‘arites (Rāzī 1999, 2:7).
The Mu‘tazilites, the philosophers and al-Rāzī himself comprise the second group. In their dis-
cussion, the first group depend on the faculty of imagination (wahm or taswīr), while the
_
second are rooted in intellectual and rational proof (tasdīq) (ibid., 7–14).
_
Al-Rāzī argues that it is rationally possible to prove the existence of beings that are immaterial
and are not subject to space (ghayr mutahayyiz). Immaterial beings cannot stand in relation to the
_
world in the sense that one can point to where they are. He then turns to establishing the limitations
of the imaginative faculty in perceiving the reality of the divine attributes by asking: how can we
imagine that God knows, by seeing and hearing, all the details of the events in our material world,
and every person and animal, from his throne? Al-Rāzī, for his part, shows that divine knowledge
cannot be humanly perceived and so these divine attributes cannot be proved either by the imagin-
ation or by the rational intellect. Since these are the only two means by which humans can deduce
anything, they can merely imagine who God may be but can never prove that their imagining
corresponds to the truth about the essence of God. In this way al-Rāzī also proves that God
cannot have a body or be limited to a space or place. He argues that if God is within the world,
the world must consist of endless parts in order to encompass the endless nature of God, and if
he is outside the world, then we must believe in the existence of an endless vacuum to receive
God; and since all the mutakallimūn believe in the finite nature of the world, it is impossible to
point to the nature and mode of existence of God (ibid., 17–22). His proof here depends on the
atomism theory, which shows that al-Rāzī, who argues against atomism in some of his books,
was ambivalent in this respect.
Among the negative attributes are two which are important for this article: that God cannot
assume an incarnate state (hāl) in another and that he cannot be united with any other entity
_
(ibid., 68–9). For the impossibility of incarnation, al-Rāzī just repeats the famous objection put
forward by many before him, notably al-Ghazālī, which runs as follows: if God incarnates in
another then this incarnation is either necessary or temporary. If it is necessary, it expresses a
need for this incarnation which is eternal and makes the place of the incarnation infinite since
God needs it eternally. But if God incarnates only temporarily, how could he change from
being self-sufficient and fully self-autonomous (ghanīy) to be in need and requiring incarnation?
(ibid., 68–70).
In addition, al-Rāzī explains that incarnation could only take place in two respects. The first is a
reason of nature, like the inhering of colour in a body, when the body needs the colour and the colour
needs the body in order to be seen. This expresses mutual need: the body for the colour and the
colour for the body. The second is by the inherence of the accidents of power or knowledge in a
person (following the theological theory of atoms and accidents), in which case the person
would be fully dependent on the inherence of these attributes such that they were incarnate in
the person. Both types of incarnation are inappropriate for God, al-Rāzī declares (ibid.). In these
arguments al-Rāzī relies on the relationship of interdependence between accidents and atoms.
With regard to the impossibility of union (ittihād), al-Rāzī believes that union can only mean
that two become one, which means that one ceases _ to exist and the other exists instead, or that
both cease to exist and a third reality takes their place, or that one substance turns into another,
as water becomes vapour. In all these cases, the essence of the two entities must change. A ques-
tion is addressed to him here: since existence is added to the essence of everything (as he
118 M. Elkaisy-Friemuth

believes), why is it not possible for union to take place between two existences while the two
essences remain unchanged? Al-Rāzī answers that this kind of union cannot be applied to God
because God’s existence is necessary and unique and therefore cannot be united with a contingent
form of existence (ibid., 70). Thus, for al-Rāzī, God’s unique essence and existence cannot incar-
nate or be united with any contingent being because of the absolute difference between him and
all other beings. Some of these arguments are very similar to those put by al-Ghazālī (or pseudo-
Ghazālī) in Al-radd al-jamīl, where they are used in the author’s refutation of the Christian con-
cepts of incarnation and union. The author of Al-radd al-jamīl also argues that the third reality,
which may occur in this form of union and which is identified in this work with Christ, cannot
be identified with God because it must be neither God nor Jesus but a third independent entity
(Ghazālī 1939, 75).7
The most innovative aspect of al-Rāzī’s concept of God so far is that God’s essence is unique
and incomparable.8 Therefore the negative attributes have the role of eliminating all kinds of simi-
larities between God and anything else. For al-Rāzī, this is the meaning of the qur’anic verse
‘nothing is like unto Him’ (Q 42.11). However, he also applies to God several other attributes
that describe the perfection of his acts, such as the divine will, which is demonstrated in the per-
fection of his choices and which demonstrates his knowledge of all things, since he willed each of
them. This puts al-Rāzī back on the side of the mutakallimūn (Rāzī 1999, 2:73).
Having clarified this important feature of al-Rāzī’s understanding of the essence of God, we
turn here to examine how he relates attributes to God. The problem of how the attributes are
related to the essence of God is a bone of contention between the Mu‘tazilites and other theolo-
gical schools. Either the attributes are separate notions that have their own existence and are
neither fully united with God’s essence nor other than it; or the attributes are indeed fully ident-
ified with the essence of God. Al-Rāzī clearly sees the contradiction in the Ash‘arite concept ‘not
Him and not other than Him’ (laysa huwa wa-la ghayrihi), but also realizes clearly the reduction-
ism in the Mu‘tazilite concept, which fully identifies the attributes with the essence of God (God
is knowledgeable in Himself li-nafsihi). He therefore rejects both positions and argues that, if we
can say that God knows or has power, this knowledge and power must exist as two distinctive
attributes. The attribute of knowledge, for example, is a relationship between God and objects
of his knowledge in the world, and he calls this relationship al-‘ilmāniyya (the act by which
the knower knows the object). This act of knowing is not the divine knowledge but a special
relationship (nisba makhsūsa) to the object. The attributes of knowledge, power, will, wisdom,
_ _
and many others, are not the same as the essence, as the Mu‘tzilites believed, neither are they
different notions existing eternally, as the Ash‘arites thought, but, for al-Rāzī, they are different
characteristics existing within the divine essence (1999, 1:142–9). Here, al-Rāzī does not ade-
quately explain how this can be understood without admitting that God’s essence consists of parts.
One issue remains here for discussion, namely, the epistemological question: how can we
know God? In answering this question al-Rāzī first examines the possibility of knowing him
through the faculty of seeing or hearing. The question of the vision of God and whether he
can be seen in Paradise, as the Qur’an declares (Q 75.23), was the subject of extensive debate
between the Mu‘tazilites and the Ash’arites. Al-Rāzī again rejects this possibility and agrees
with the Mu‘tazilites that the two important conditions for seeing something are that the organ
of sight, the eyes, should be healthy, and that the object should be visible. But since God, the
object of the seeing, is immaterial and not defined in a space or place, as explained above,
then sight of him can only be through the rational intellect, in the sense of perceiving the
reality of his existence without actually seeing him. He also adds that, if the conditions for the
vision of God pertained, we would see God at every moment, and we know that this does not
in fact happen (al-Rāzī 1999, 1:54–9). However, al-Rāzī does not want to pass a final judgement
on this issue because prophets have confirmed this vision, and Sufis describe their experience of
 Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 119

it. Thus al-Rāzī clearly recognizes here the limitation of his intellectual speculation, and so gives
room for the possibility of mystery through Sufi experience. Nevertheless, the kind of intellectual
discussion he presents in Al-matālib al-‘āliyya and Mafātīh al-ghayb hardly leaves room for any
form of mystical speculation. His _ acceptance of prophetic_ and Sufi visions here belongs to his
concept of miracles rather than opening a mystical discussion.
Here we reach an important point in this brief study, which is a question al-Rāzī himself asked
at the very beginning of the first volume of Al-matālib al-‘āliyya: can we really know the nature of
the essence of God? Now we realize that al-Rāzī, _ at the end of his life, became very hesitant
concerning the knowability of God. As we noted above, he came to a dead-end when he was com-
pelled to admit the limitations of the human mind. As Abrahamov puts it:
[al-Rāzī admits that] man’s intellect cannot fully attain this knowledge because of its hiddenness.
Thus, if one cannot absolutely know [the reality of] one’s own essence, the more so regarding God
and His attributes. That man has some knowledge of his own essence is proved through the fact
that whoever knows something, necessarily knows that he knows it. But the statement that man
knows his own essence is not clear enough, for what do we mean, asks al-Rāzī, by saying ‘I’.
Does ‘I’ mean the structure of my body, or my body, or an attribute of my structure, or a substance
separated from my body? Intelligent people are perplexed concerning the answer to the question:
what do we mean by saying ‘I’? Now, if concerning one’s own essence there is no clear knowledge,
the more so concerning God’s essence. That is because God’s essence absolutely differs from all the
possible things. Moreover, one is perplexed also regarding the knowledge of the body, and the essence
of time and place. (2002, 217)
In the discussion put forward at the beginning of Al-matālib al-‘āliyya, al-Rāzī declares the limit-
ations of the intellect for knowing the reality of God_ to be the starting place for his study of
al-ilāhiyyāt (divine things), as he names these parts of the book. Although al-Rāzī here uses
many of Ibn Sīnā’s arguments and concepts, he does not present in Al-matālib al-‘āliyya a full
_
philosophical system similar to Ibn Sīnā’s Al-shifā’ or Al-najāt. He also clearly does not arrive
at a mystical concept, as al-Ghazālī did at the end of his period of uncertainty, as he informs
us in Al-munqidh min al-dalāl. This may be related to his firm conviction that God has a
_ all other beings, so that the mystical concept of ‘knowing your
totally different essence from
self is knowing God’ cannot be taken into consideration. There is no doubt that al-Rāzī’s discus-
sion of God’s attributes is influenced by Mu‘tazilite thought in maintaining strict tanzīh and
attacking all forms of anthropomorphism. In accepting the existence of eternal beings, the possi-
bility that God did create directly, and the difficulty of knowing his essence, al-Rāzī becomes
closer to philosophers such as Ibn Sīnā. Nevertheless, in adopting the concept of the different
kinds of essence and the uniqueness of God’s essence, al-Rāzī does build here his own unique
system for understanding the reality of God.

II. Al-Rāzī and the Trinity

After this brief summary of al-Rāzī’s understanding of the nature of God, we turn now to examine
his view of the way Christians thought of God in a Trinitarian manner. The only work in which
al-Rāzī presents a study on Christian thinking is Mafātīh al-ghayb, in the context of providing
commentary on the qur’anic view and understanding of _ Christianity. Thus, we must bear in
mind that this study does not present all his views on the Trinity but rather his view on what
the Qur’an says about it. However, in his comments on the Trinity we note that he may have
had firsthand knowledge of the Bible and some apocryphal books, though nowhere does
he quote directly from the New Testament or other biblical books. However, Sabine Schmidtke
argues that al-Rāzī made good use of some arguments in Ibn Rabban al-Tabarī’s Kitāb al-dīn
_
wa-al-dawla, and transmitted some of his arguments on the prophecy of Muhammad, as
Schmidtke explains: “al-Rāzī” adduced some biblical passages containing predictions of the
120 M. Elkaisy-Friemuth

Prophet Muammad which he had gleaned from “Ibn Razīn” al-Tabarī, as he explicitly states
_
(hākadhā nuqila ‘an Ibn Razīn al-Tabarī). Schreiner correctly identified him as Ibn Rabban
_
al-Tabarī (2009, 106). Thus, al-Rāzī no doubt knew the polemical writings of Ibn Rabban and
_
al-Ghazālī’s (or pseudo-Ghazālī’s) Al-radd al-jamīl, as noted above.
Concerning the methodology of Mafātīh al-ghayb, we note that al-Rāzī usually divides his
writing into different topics, masā’il, and _produces for each mas’ala several arguments: he
gives first the various opinions of the different theological groups and finally presents his own
view (McAuliffe 1991, 69).
His treatment of Christian concepts such as the Incarnation and the Trinity is usually con-
nected with his philosophical argument against any form of anthropomorphism, and is therefore
to some extent disappointing. However, this very fact shows that he is primarily defending philo-
sophy against religious dialectic arguments that fail to use demonstrative proofs, rather than
specifically criticizing Christianity.
Before presenting his commentary on the Trinity, we should give here a short note on Mafātīh
al-ghayb. Also known as Al-tafsīr al-kabīr, Mafātīh al-ghayb is one of the most detailed works on_
_ popular among theologians. However, Ibn
the Qur’an. It enjoys a good reputation and has proved
Taymiyya made his famous criticism: ‘It has everything except commentary’, while others
replied: ‘It has everything and commentary’ (Zurkān 1963, 46). The most problematic issue
about it, however, is that many historians, such as Ibn Khallikān, Ibn Shabīh and al-Dhahabī
inform us that al-Rāzī died before finishing Mafātīh al-ghayb and there is no reliable information
on where he stopped. Al-Zurkān mentions that some _ historians give Sūrat al-Anbiyā’ as the point
where al-Rāzī ended his commentary, but a recent study published in the Arabic journal Al-H ajj
by ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Ma‘lamī shows that there are 25 sūras of the Qur’an on which al-Rāzī_ did
_
not comment, which implies that he did not write his commentary by working systematically
through the Qur’an, but rather followed the subjects that interested him. I have also come to
this opinion when reading some parts of it, as will be shown below. Hājji Khalīfa in his Al-
_
kashf ‘an al-z.unūn mentions that the work was completed by two of al-Rāzī’s students, Shams
al-Dīn al-Khiyūbī and Nijm al-Dīn al-Qumūlī (Zurkān 1963, 62–6).
In my own reading in Mafātīh al-ghayb, I have noticed that some of his commentaries on
various verses make strong usage of_ philosophical arguments, while in other places the philosophi-
cal argument is very weak and a traditional position is adopted. In dealing with the question of the
Incarnation, for example, al-Rāzī talks about the impossibility of the Necessary Existence having
any direct relationship with contingent beings in the sense of indwelling or union, similar to his
discussion in Al-matālib al-‘āliyya, while in other places in Mafātīh al-ghayb his arguments
_
against Christian beliefs _
are similar to those of the theologians. Sometimes one feels that the
editor had the intention of bringing al-Rāzī back into line with mainstream theologians.
As an example, here is the argument around the word kun (Be!) in Q 3.59: ‘The similitude of
Jesus before Allah is as that of Adam; he created him from dust, then said to him: “Be” and he
was’9 (Rāzī 2003, 8:70–2). The author here produces a long discussion as to whether the creation
of Adam took place before or after the word kun was uttered, clearly recalling the theologians’
belief that the word kun in itself had divine power, which demonstrates that God really speaks
and that his speech consists of miraculous words. Al-Rāzī interprets the word kun in a metapho-
rical way to denote the appearance of things after being in the possible phase of existence, as
implied in Q 2.117 (2003, 4:26–32). In addition, in interpreting Q 3.59, the author refers to the
creation of Satan and the angels from fire and light respectively, confirming the mutakallimūn’s
belief that all beings were created from material substance. In his commentary on Q 2.30 (2003,
2:159–61), however, al-Rāzī gives different views about the nature of the angels, inclining to the
philosophical position, as in Al-matālib al-‘āliyya, and although in this long discussion he
presents the subject using theological_ terminology, nowhere does he refer to the exact material
 Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 121

from which angels or devils are created. Thus there is no doubt that Mafātīh al-ghayb was written
by different authors. Unfortunately al-Rāzī does not tell us which parts of the_ Qur’an he commen-
ted on in his Mafātīh al-ghayb, and neither do the other contributors reveal exactly which parts
they added, but the _difference in authors may account for the philosophically-oriented and the
theologically-oriented styles of commentary.
We have seen above in al-Rāzī’s view on the attributes of God in Al-matālib al-‘āliyya, which
expresses his latest view, that he uses philosophical analysis as the basis for_his discussion, so it is
difficult to accept that, during the same period, he also relied on opposing theological arguments
on an issue such as the essence of God. Thus, it is possible to use here a criterion which may help
us to distinguish al-Rāzī’s voice, namely his usage of philosophical arguments along the lines of
his views in Al-matālib al-‘āliyya and in many places in Mafātīh al-ghayb itself.10 We shall
therefore concentrate _ here on his commentary on Sūrat Āl ‘Imrān _ (Q 3), which I believe
comes from al-Rāzī’s pen.
Al-Rāzī starts his commentary on Sūrat Āl ‘Imrān by quoting a long passage from Ibn Ishāq’s
_
Sīra. Ibn Isāq mentions the story of the Najrān Christians who came to negotiate with Muhammad
about the situation of the Christian communities. Ibn Ishāq claims that God revealed Sūrat Āl
_
‘Imrān in this context in order to give an accurate understanding of Christianity. Al-Rāzī here
accepts this claim and comments: ‘Know that the debate on what is the true religion was the
core task of the prophets, so the claim of the Hashawiya that rational inquiry in religion is not
approved, is certainly false’ (2003, 7:149–52). _ Having established that rational argument is
necessary to establish correct belief, al-Rāzī starts immediately to comment on verse 2: ‘Allah.
There is no god but He – the Living, the Self-Subsisting, Eternal.’ This opening, he insists, is con-
sidered to have been revealed against the Christian belief in the sonship of Jesus. He argues here
that, since God is always living as a Necessary Existence and self-subsisting, this nature cannot be
connected with the nature of a contingent being. In addition, Jesus cannot be a god because God,
as described here, is always living and Jesus, according to the Christians, died on the cross. God is
also self-subsisting while Jesus was dependent on eating and drinking to sustain his life (ibid.,
152). He also explains that the nature of God as the Necessary Existence must have no parts
because his existence would depend on the existence of his parts and in this sense he would
not be self-sufficient, which is a key characteristic of the Necessary Existence. This is the only
explanation of ‘the Living, the Self-Subsisting, Eternal’.11
This opening demonstrates already the method al-Rāzī will use in his refutation of the Trinity.
Before resuming this task, however, we note here his interest in giving extensive details of the
family of Jesus, his mother and grandmother, mentioned in Q 3.35–45. He describes at length
Hanna’s wish to have a child and her commitment to send this child (Mary) to serve in the
Jewish temple, the story of Mary living in the temple, the annunciation and the details of her
relationship with Zacharias and his wife (2003, 8:22–46). This story is mentioned by several com-
mentators, the earliest reference being in a short version in Muqātil ibn Sulaymān (d. 150 AH), and
we also find the same story mentioned by al-Tabarī (d. 360 AH),12 but he gives its different parts
_
in the form of various Hadiths. Other commentators also mention the story as it is given here by al-
Rāzī, although none of them says how the story reached them.13 But why was al-Rāzī providing
all these details of the story here? An answer may be that, since he has declared at the beginning of
his commentary on Sūrat Āl ‘Imrān that this sūra was revealed in the context of the debate with the
Christians of Najrān and that his main concern here is to provide proof that Jesus is not the son of
God, it is important to provide some indications of Jesus’ earthly life and details about his family
in order to emphasize his humanity.
After this short introduction, we now turn to al-Rāzī’s refutation of the Trinity in more detail.
Key verses where the commentary shows al-Rāzī’s understanding of the Trinity are Q 3.45,
39, 48. I shall start our discussion here with Q 3:45: ‘Behold! the angels said: “O Mary! Allah
122 M. Elkaisy-Friemuth

giveth thee glad tidings of a Word from Him.”’ The annunciation to Mary by the angels here is, for
al-Rāzī, no more important than that to Zacharias in Q 3.39 and certainly in both cases foretells the
birth of a prophet (Rāzī 2003, 8:46). Elsewhere (on Q 2.25) he explains that bishāra is an event or
news which brings happiness and he suggests that this was brought to Mary and Zacharias by
Jibrīl (ibid., 46–7). The description of Jesus as a ‘Word from God’ is important here and
appears in two other places: Q 4.171 and Q 3.39: ‘[Allah] doth give thee glad tidings of
Yahya, witnessing the truth of a Word from Allah’ (Q 3.45) (see ibid., 34–6). The infant John,
Yahya, recognized Jesus in the womb of his mother as the Word from God. Christians no
doubt understand the ‘Word from God’ here to refer to the second hypostasis (uqnūm) in the
Trinity, but Muslim commentators, including al-Rāzī, for the most part, interpret the ‘Word’ as
the word kun which God uses in bringing creation into existence. Although Muqātil ibn Sulaymān
does not interpret it in this way in Q 3.39 or Q 3.45, his commentary on Q 4.171 (‘Christ Jesus the
son of Mary was [no more than] an apostle of Allah, and His Word, which He bestowed on Mary’)
does give this interpretation, saying that the ‘word of God’ here is the word kun, which he used to
create Jesus in Mary’s womb.14 The author of Al-radd al-jamīl uses the same argument in
explaining this verse (Sweetman 1967, 305) and al-Tabarī gives this explanation when comment-
ing on all three verses. Al-Rāzī follows them, adding _ details on the basis of his medical
knowledge: in the case of Jesus, the absent sperm of a father is replaced by the power of God,
which is metaphorically expressed in the word kun. But here we need to examine how al-Rāzī
understands the importance of the word kun, so we shall examine here his commentary on Q
2.116–7 (‘They say: “[Allah] hath begotten a son”: Glory be to Him – Nay, to Him belongs all
that is in the heavens and on earth: everything renders worship to Him. To Him is due the
primal origin of the heavens and the earth: When He decreeth a matter, He saith to it: “Be”,
and it is’) (Rāzī 2003, 4:26–32). The word kun in itself, al-Rāzī explains, is powerless because
when we utter it we experience nothing, so the power of creation is the power of God and not
the power of the word, as some Muslim theologians believe. This power is expressed metaphori-
cally; kun here demonstrates creation out of nothing (creation through ibdā‘). Thus Jesus as ‘a
word from God’ and kun are both used here metaphorically to demonstrate the mysterious
divine power of creation. The description of Jesus as ‘a word from God’ can only be a literary
and metaphorical way of expressing the replacement of the earthly father by divine power. The
word kun itself, he insists, should only be taken here as a literary metaphor (majāz adabī) and
he thus erases any mystery connected with the word itself. He continues to explain that the
expression, ‘a word from him’, in Q 3.39 and Q 3.45 should be understood metaphorically
because the preposition ‘from’ (minhu) means literally a part of him, which obviously cannot
be said of God. God’s unique unity does not have parts, and so the expressions ‘a word from
him’ or ‘a Spirit from him’ (rūh minhu) should be understood as meaning min ‘ind Allāh
(given from God) (ibid., 47). _
The creation of Jesus without a human father, al-Rāzī explains, should not be taken as evi-
dence of a certain divinity in him, as the Christians believe, because the Qur’an here reminds
us that Adam was also created without a mother or a father (Q 3.59). However, he also makes
a scientific attempt at understanding creation through the word: sometimes a material substance
appears as a result of a certain psychological situation, such as sweating when we are afraid, or
hearing or seeing something that does not exist as a result of a strong imagination. For the
philosophers, al-Rāzī explains, creation is, in fact, a process of evolution that takes place when
the four elements – water, earth, fire and air – are mixed together under certain conditions.
The formation of a child without a father’s sperm is a possibility that may occur naturally in
certain circumstances, though it usually does not (ibid.).
Similarly, al-Rāzī relates the holy spirit (rūh al-qudus) to Jesus when he comments on Q 2.87
(‘We gave to Jesus the son of Mary Clear [Signs] _ and strengthened him with the Holy Spirit’).
 Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 123

He explains here that the Arabic word for spirit, rūh, comes from riyāh, which means air, and is
the air that we breathe and which causes life. Many _ commentators have _ applied the term Holy
Spirit, which appears in the Qur’an in connection with Jesus in Q 2.87 (Rāzī 2003, 3:170–2)
and Q 2.253 (ibid., 6:174–84), to Gabriel, saying that the use of the word ‘holy’ demonstrates
Gabriel’s rank and closeness to God. In Al-matālib al-‘āliyya, however, al-Rāzī deviates from
the belief of the mutakallimūn about the nature_ of the angels and adopts a more philosophical
understanding of the soul. He believes in the existence of beings whose substance is immaterial
and argues against those Muslim theologians (mutakallimūn) who claim that all contingent
(mumkin) beings and substances must have material existence.15 When referring to the human
soul, he uses the terms rūh and nafs, and believes that nafs is the immaterial human intellect
while rūh is a fine material _substance that mediates between the immaterial nafs and the material
body. Thus_ the Holy Spirit for al-Rāzī has no unique, mysterious nature but is simply used as a
metaphor to refer to angels, and in this case to Gabriel (Elkaisy-Friemuth 2009; cf. Rāzī 1999,
7:15–6).
The last point at which we examine al-Rāzī’s understanding of the Trinity in Sūrat Āl ‘Imrān is
his explanation of Jesus’ ability to create a bird from clay and give it life (Q 3.49: ‘I have come to
you, with a Sign from your Lord, in that I create for you (akhluqu lakum) out of clay, as it were,
the figure of a bird, and breathe into it, and it becomes a bird by Allah’ (see Rāzī 2003, 8:52–6).
Al-Rāzī recognizes here that Jesus is said to ‘create’ (akhluqu lakum) a bird, and clearly sees the
problem. His main goal here, therefore, is to demonstrate that the term ‘create’ is also used
elsewhere in the Qur’an in the sense of to ‘form’ or ‘shape’. To his mind, creating has two mean-
ings: forming/shaping something from a material substance, and creating out of nothing (ibdā‘);
the former can be attributed to humans while the latter applies only to God. The breathing of life
into the bird is a miracle, he explains, which here is specific to Jesus alone. However, it takes place
through the power of life which is given from God, expressed in ‘by Allah’. He also emphasizes
that miracles are signs from God to support the divine message and to demonstrate the prophet-
hood of the prophet, but they do not indicate the prophet’s own ability or divinity.
Before concluding, we should refer here to al-Rāzī’s explanation of Q 5.73 (‘They do blas-
pheme who say: Allah is one of three in a Trinity: for there is no god except One Allah. If
they desist not from their word [of blasphemy], verily a grievous penalty will befall the blasphe-
mers among them’). Al-Rāzī here says that it is not wrong to say that ‘God is the third of three’
because in Q 58.7 God says that he is a fourth of four or a fifth of five (2003, 12:51–2), but when
we read Q 5.73 in relation to Q 5.116 (‘O Jesus the son of Mary! Didst thou say unto men,
“Worship me and my mother as gods in derogation of Allah?”’) the problem becomes clear.
Al-Rāzī explains that the ‘three’ in the ‘third of three’ is a trinity consisting of Mary, Jesus and
God. It is this kind of thinking about God that is problematic. Al-Rāzī here asks a rhetorical
question: how can the Qur’an say that the trinity is God, Jesus and Mary when this is not the
Trinity that Christians believe in? Al-Rāzī answers that Christians believe Jesus and Mary
performed miracles by their own powers and not through the power of God, and this is tantamount
to claiming that they both have divine power.
In conclusion, al-Rāzī’s comments on the above selected verses on the Trinity demonstrate
primarily the rational, philosophical way in which he interpreted the Qur’an. Although he pre-
sented all the relevant opinions and sometimes adopted the comments of earlier commentators,
he analysed them further within a more rational, scientific discussion. His treatment of the
Christian concepts referred to above does not demonstrate a real interest in refuting Christian
thought, though he is very critical of Christianity, but is rather an exercise in rationality. His under-
standing of the Trinity is very much tied to his concept of tanzīh, the transcendence of God, which
developed over the course of his academic life from an Ash‘arite position towards Mu‘tazilism
and finally to a strong philosophical tendency in Al-matālib al-‘āliyya and Mafātīh al-ghayb.
_ _
124 M. Elkaisy-Friemuth

His uncompromising philosophical methodology led him to believe in the unknowability of God,
as demonstrated above. His Mafātīh al-ghayb was composed in this final period of his life, and
so the parts of this work that come_ from his own pen are heavily influenced by philosophical
theology, although he died before the project was completed. His writing on Christian concepts
is mainly concentrated in this period and is therefore heavily influenced by his understanding of
tanzīh. His refutation of the Trinity here does not differ much from his refutation of anthropo-
morphism and traditional theology, first published in Asās al-taqdīs and then summarized and
expressed in more philosophical terms in Al-matālib al-‘āliyya. Indeed his rejection of the
_
Christian Trinity was also seen as a part of his refutation of the Sufi concepts of indwelling
and union. Although al-Rāzī at the end of his life inclined towards believing God is unknowable,
which is also a feature of Gnostic Sufism, his discussion of this concept in Al-matālib al-‘āliyya is
very philosophical and does not open the door to mystery or spiritual insight. His_ discussion of
the Trinity was thus brief, and demonstrates an unwillingness to leave any room for mysterious
events.

Acknowledgement
This article was first given as a paper at the Sixth Mingana Symposium, held in Birmingham, UK,
16–19 September 2009.

Notes
1. Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muhammad b. ‘Umar b. al-Husayn Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī was born in Rayy in 544/1149
_
and, like many scholars _
in the medieval period, he travelled extensively to various towns in Persia.
Finally he settled in Herat (Persia) where he enjoyed the favour and admiration of ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Khwār-
izmī and worked in his court. It seems that al-Rāzī was unfortunate in being surrounded by several
enemies, one of whom was his own brother, which made him ask his students, before he died in
Herat in 606/1209, to hide the location of his tomb (Zurkān 1963, 15–25).
2. He found no logical basis for the concept that the One can produce only one entity, which is considered
one of the basics of the Neoplatonic concept of emanation (see Kafrāwī 2004, 125–33).
3. For the details of this discussion, see Abrahamov (2002).
4. These intellects are immaterial beings that exist eternally with God but are contingent in the sense that
their existence is dependent on God. They are also called angels (cf. Ibn Sīnā 1935).
5. See Ibn Sīnā (1938, 267). He says: ‘Form is not enough for the existence of matter but the form is only a
part of the cause.’ (See also Burrell 1986, 60; and Elkaisy-Friemuth 2006, 86–9.)
6. Al-Saqqā, the editor of Asās al-taqdīs, demonstrates that al-Rāzī is here attacking Al-tawhīd wa-ithbāt
sifāt al-Rabb (Tawhīd and proving the attributes of God), by Muhammad ibn Ishāq ibn Khazima_ (d. 311
_
_AH). Al-Rāzī here_ discusses all the qur’anic verses and Hadiths_ that Ibn Khazima used in his book to
prove that God must have a body and be related to place and time. In Asās al-taqdīs al-Rāzī refutes each
of the following: the possibility of pointing to God in terms of direction; that Adam was created in the
image of God; that God is a person; that the term nafs can be applied to God; understanding the term al-
samad in Q 112; seeing and meeting God in the last day; the descent of God to this world; that God
_can laugh; and, finally, that God has limbs. Al-Rāzī explains that whoever approves these anthropo-
morphisms must be deemed an unbeliever (kāfir). At the end of Asās al-taqdīs al-Rāzī declares that
he considers himself to be closer to the Mu‘tazilites in this respect, while differing from them in his
understanding of the positive attributes of God (Rāzī 1993, 226–7).
7. Since we do not have the exact dates of the writing of Al-radd al-jamīl, it is not clear here whether al-
Rāzī borrowed from it, but it does seem that these kinds of arguments against the incarnation and union
were quite popular among theologians at the time.
8. This is somehow a consequence of Ibn Sīnā’s two concepts of the ‘Necessary Existence’ and ‘the
essence and existence’. Nevertheless, I believe that he is here more influenced by Abū al-Barakāt al-
Baghdādī, because he considers that the different human essences are influenced by the souls of the
planets nufūs falakiyya, a theory which Abū al-Barakāt adopted.
9. Unless otherwise stated, all translations of qur’anic verses are taken from Yūsuf ‘Alī (1989).
 Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 125

10. An example of comments that are not al-Rāzī’s is the discussion of the Trinity in the commentary on Q
4.171–2, which runs: ‘Say not “Trinity”: desist: it will be better for you: for Allah is one Allah. Glory be
to Him: [far exalted is He] above having a son. To Him belong all things in the heavens and on earth.
And enough is Allah as a Disposer of affairs. Christ disdaineth nor to serve and worship Allah, nor do the
angels, those nearest [to Allah]: those who disdain His worship and are arrogant, – He will gather them
all together unto Himself to [answer].’ In my opinion, the commentary on these two verses is not typical
of al-Rāzī because in verse 172 (‘Christ disdaineth not to serve and worship Allah, nor do the angels’)
the author of Mafātīh al-ghayb comments by comparing Jesus with the angels and ranking the angels
_
higher than him because ‘they can see the Preserved Tablets and they carry God’s throne’ (http://
www.altafsir.com/Tafasir.asp?tMadhNo=1&tTafsirNo=4&tSoraNo=4&tAyahNo=171&tDisplay=yes&Us
erProfile=0&LanguageId=1). This comment is unlikely to have come from al-Rāzī’s pen because in Sūrat
Taha (Q 20.5) he gives a long explanation of the words ‘al-Rahmān is firmly established on the throne’, cri-
_
ticizing heavily the anthropomorphic approach that interprets _the throne as a material earthly throne (http://
www.altafsir.com/Tafasir.asp?tMadhNo=1&tTafsirNo=4&tSoraNo=20&tAyahNo=5&tDisplay=yes&Use
rProfile=0&LanguageId=1). Thus it is impossible that he would, in another verse, claim that the angels were
in a higher rank than Jesus because they carried the throne.
11. Cf. Sūrat al-Baqara (Q 2.116–17): ‘They say: “[Allah] hath begotten a son”: Glory be to Him. – Nay, to
Him belongs all that is in the heavens and on earth.’ He provides a philosophical argument against the
concept of the sonship of Jesus. He believes that ‘to Him belongs all that is in the heavens and on earth’
is the key to understanding ‘They say: “[Allah] hath begotten a son.”’ Here we need to understand, he
insists, the transcendent nature (tanzīh) of God in order to provide the evidence that God cannot have
been connected to a son in any form of relationship except in the metaphorical sense (majazī) (Rāzī
2003, 4:26–32).
12. See Qur’an interpretation by al-Tabarī and Muqātil online: http://www.altafsir.com/Tafasir.asp?
_
tMadhNo=0&tTafsirNo=1&tSoraNo=3&tAyahNo=35&tDisplay=yes&UserProfile=0&LanguageId=1
(accessed 16 December 2010).
13. There is a strong possibility that the story reached them through the Gospel of James (one of the Nag’
Hammadi gospels), which gives details different from those in the canonical gospels and similar to the
story given by Muslim commentators.
14. http://www.altafsir.com/Tafasir.asp?tMadhNo=0&tTafsirNo=67&tSoraNo=4&tAyahNo=171&tDisplay=
yes&UserProfile=0&LanguageId=1.
15. In contrast, al-Rāzī, while he seems to adopt the atomist theory, believes that human and animal bodies
function through the inherence of a soul, which he regards as an independent substance. He considers
that the theologians are mistaken in thinking that whatever exists in an immaterial form would be
equivalent to God, and therefore considering it to be in association with God. Al-Rāzī argues here
that having an immaterial nature does not automatically correspond to being equivalent to God,
because sharing a negative attribute with God (such as having no material body) does not mean
sharing all his other positive attributes, such as omnipotence or omniscience. Moreover, two species
under one genus may share many attributes, but nevertheless they are not totally identical (see
Elkaisy-Friemuth 2009).

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