Major Incidents That Shaped Aviation Security

Journal of Transportation Security
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12198-019-00201-2
Major incidents that shaped aviation security
Michal Klenka 1
Received: 28 August 2018 / Accepted: 30 January 2019/

# Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019
Abstract
This article is giving an overview about major incidents in civil aviation, that have
shaped the aviation security policies over the course of time. It begins with industry
threats and security breaches (hijackings and terrorism), the counter measures and
policy decisions are giving an example of changing the aviation security. The article
continues with analysing the impact of 9/11, but also the current threats to civil aviation
and the international efforts in combating them. The objective is to analyse the impact
of the incidents on the evolution of aviation security and find out whether industry has
been reactive or proactive to aviation threat mitigation. This article concludes that the
security methods are reactively implemented, and a proactive attitude of the stake-
holders has to maintain it course towards the aviation security, as we believe the
aviation will have an increasingly part in the future of transportation.
Keywords Aviation security . Airport security . Hijackings . Terrorism
JEL classification K33 . K38
Introduction
The greatest tribute to air transportation, may be the simple fact that it is taken so much
for granted. Any passenger can walk into any scheduled airline service and purchase a
ticket to virtually anywhere on the planet because of the airlines’ intercarrier cooper-
ative programs. The same service is available for freight shipments. The world depends
on it. Unfortunately, there are signs that its infrastructure and security have been
somewhat neglected and taken for granted. Air transportation also symbolizes a sterling
example of applied technology. As technology improves, so must air transportation and
the facilities and equipment that support it. The ability to provide safe air travel and
* Michal Klenka
michal.klenka@euba.sk
1
Faculty of International Relations, University of Economics in Bratislava, Dolnozemská cesta 1/b,
Bratislava 852 35, Slovak Republic
Klenka M.
freight carriage to the industry’s patrons represents a continuous challenge. These

advances in technology must also enable authorities to secure the airport environment
from those that would potentially disrupt it. At the same time, care needs to be taken
that security measures do not delay air cargo to the point where it is non-competitive
with goods shipped via other means of transportation. The global economy depends on
continued and uninterrupted service. Terrorists and other criminal activities threaten
that safe environment.1 The key to being secure in this environment is being ahead of
the threats, not reacting to them after they have already commenced.2 Aviation security
in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO 2017) terminology considers
the prevention of unlawful acts aiming to affect planes or peoples and safeguarding
civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference.3
What factors are involved in assessing of just how much security is needed in a
given situation? First, you have to assess your vulnerability. How easy a target are you?
Is the property exposed, unprotected, accessible, or unguarded? Then, you need to
evaluate the criticality of what you are protecting. What will be the impact if a serious
loss or event occurs? Would it interrupt current operations? Would it have long-range
effects? Third, you need to determine, as best you can, the probability of the serious
loss or event occurring. If the protection is not afforded, is it highly probable that the
loss will occur, or are you protecting against a relatively remote possibility? Fourth, the
cost of protection must be weighed. The burden of risk must be compared to the cost of
the control. As a general rule, the cost of the control should not ordinarily exceed the
value of that which it is designed to protect, although there are obvious exceptions to
this general rule.4
A general understanding of historical events and policy decisions over the course of
time is essential for understanding current aviation security policy in the world and to
determine whether aviation stakeholders have implemented reactive or proactive strat-
egies of aviation threat mitigation or even threat deterrence.
Beginnings
The first recorded hijacking5 occurred on February 21, 1931, in Arequipa, Peru. Armed
revolutionaries approached Byron Rickards and demanded use of his aircraft. The
incident received little attention and never resulted in any international efforts to
combat a potential threat to international aviation.6 The first airline bombing occurred
1
Sweet (2008). Aviation and Airport Security. Terrorism and safety concerns. p. 1–2.
2
Iasiello (2013). Getting Ahead of the Threat: Aviation and Cyber Security. p. 25.
3
ICAO. Security and Facilitation. Security. Available at: https://www.icao.int/Security/Pages/default.aspx
4
Moore (1991). Airport, Aircraft, and Airline Security. p. 49.
5
Hijacking has been characterized as the forcible seizure of any vehicle in transit to commit robbery, extort
money, kidnap passengers, or carry out other crimes. Historically, the term was used to indicate the illegal
taking of property from someone traveling on a public road. In the United States, the term first came to mean
the theft of goods in transit by truck. Eventually, the term hijacking grew to encompass the seizure of ships,
usually for theft and extortion. The concept of hijacking was eventually extended to include the unlawful
taking of airplanes. Currently, hijacking, skyjacking, or air piracy is defined as the forcible commandeering of
an aircraft while in flight. In: Sweet (2008). Aviation and Airport Security. Terrorism and safety concerns. p.
13–14.
6
Sweet (2008). Aviation and Airport Security. Terrorism and safety concerns. p. 55.
in 1933, when a United Airlines Boeing 247 was destroyed en route from Cleveland,
OH, to Chicago, IL, killing all seven individuals on board. At the time of the 1931
hijacking in Arequipa, Peru, and the aforementioned Boeing 247 bombing, there were
no passenger or baggage screening requirements. Passengers arrived at the airport and
boarded the aircraft without any security screening. Regulations addressing these types
of aviation security concerns would not begin until 1971, nearly 40 years later. In the
1940s and 1950s, commercial aviation was still in its infancy and crashes, while not
frequent, still occurred. Airports installed insurance kiosks inside their terminal build-
ings so that passengers could purchase insurance on themselves before departure.
However, criminals used insurance kiosks to commit insurance fraud. At the time,
the forensic abilities of investigators and law enforcement agencies were not always
capable of determining if an airplane crash was an accident or an intentional event. The
airline bombings in 1949 marked the beginning of a series of insurance frauds
involving commercial aircraft. Aircraft-related bombings for insurance scams reached
great significance in 1955 with the bombing of United Airlines Mainliner Flight 629.
Between 1947 and 1953, there were 23 hijackings worldwide. Europeans seeking
various forms of political asylum committed most of these hijackings. In the United
States, between 1930 and 1967, 12 hijackings were attempted; 7 of these attempts
resulted in successful hijackings.7 With the start of the Cold War, defectors from
Eastern European countries viewed hijackings as a means of escaping communist
oppression. Beginning in 1947, sporadic hijackings of flights in Eastern Europe
continued through the 1950s.8 Numerous individuals that attempted to escape across
the Iron Curtain were welcome with open arms by Western European government. Any
attempt to flee perceived Soviet oppression was accepted as legal and praiseworthy
conduct. Of course, the attempts were not viewed from the Eastern bloc countries with
the same perspective.9
Hijackings and terrorism
Fidel Castro’s rise to power coupled with the lack of passenger or baggage screening
requirements in the 1960s and early 1970s established a period of prolific hijackings.
Hijackings became commonplace in the United States in the early 1960s amid growing
tensions between the United States and Cuba. Initially, Cubans had resorted to
hijacking aircraft as a means to escape the Castro regime, but by the early 1960s the
flow had reversed, and airplanes in the United States were being hijacked to Cuba by
Cuban rebels, radical leftist Americans, and fugitives seeking asylum in Cuba.10 More
than 240 hijackings or attempted hijackings were related to flying to or from Cuba
between 1960 and 1974. Something clearly had to be done. It was merely too easy to
board an aircraft and commandeer it. As is often the case, there are two sides to every
story. Many nations and specific groups perceived hijackings as permissible expres-
sions of political viewpoints warranting their support. Some of these nations continue
7
Price and Forrest (2016). Practical Aviation Security. Predicting and Preventing Future Threats. p. 51–52
8
Elias (2010). Airport and Aviation Security. U.S. Policy and Strategy in the Age of Global Terrorism. p. 2
9
10
Elias (2010). Airport and Aviation Security. U.S. Policy and Strategy in the Age of Global Terrorism. p. 2
Klenka M.
to attempt to ignore the criminality of such conduct.11 This increase in hijackings

resulted in the US Congress passing the Anti-Hijacking Act of 1974, mandating
passenger and carry-on baggage screening. Even after the Act went into effect, there
were still 601 hijacks or hijacking attempts involving Cuba between 1974 and 1989.
The years between 1968 and 1973 marked the peak (a rate of more than one every two
weeks) of hijackings and use of antihijacking measures. During that time, the US
Department of Transportation estimated that 364 total hijackings occurred worldwide.12
In July 1983, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) even broadcast radio and
television commercials in English and Spanish in south Florida and New York City.
The commercials warned would-be hijackers that they would face long stays in Fidel
Castro’s jails if they were to hijack an airplane. During May, June and the first three
weeks of July of that year, eight US flights had been hijacked to Cuba. The commer-
cials were an unusual approach to what had become a serious problem.13 The majority
of hijackings throughout this period were for one of three reasons: political asylum,
release of prisoners, or financial gain.
By the end of the 1960s, terrorist organizations in the Middle East began to view
aircraft hijackings as a means of drawing attention to their political causes or to barter
for the release of their comrades. In the Middle East, there were few bombings in the
1960s and 1970s, but when an aircraft was bombed it usually resulted in the complete
loss of the aircraft and all on board. Hijackings in the Middle East occurred less
frequently than what was experienced in the United States, yet they resulted in greater
loss of life and overall destruction. Middle Eastern hijackings focused on extorting the
release of prisoners or on delivering a political message rather than flight to another
country. The first hijacking of a commercial flight in the Middle East was on an
unlikely target – the Israeli airline El Al. On July 23, 1968, three gunmen hijacked
El Al Flight 426 en route from Rome, Italy, to Tel Aviv. These gunmen claimed to be
members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The aircraft was
forced to land in Algiers where negotiations began with the hijackers demanding the
release of certain Arab prisoners. As a result of this hijacking, Israel implemented the
strictest security measures on El Al of any air carrier and also adopted a retaliation
policy toward those groups who seek to harm Israeli citizens. Effective security
measures put in place by the Israelis, and ill feelings toward the United States because
of its policies regarding the Middle East and its support of Israel, resulted in Middle
Eastern terrorist organizations turning their attention to attacking US air carrier flights
operated overseas and international flights bound for the United States, particularly
those with a large number of American and Israeli citizens on board.14 From 1969 to
1970, there were a few other Middle East related hijackings, mostly for extortion or
transportation, along with a couple of airline bombings, but nowhere near the rate of
hijackings that were occurring in the United States during the same period.15
Israel has always been a significant target and will likely remain so. On 31
May 1972 at Lod Airport in Tel Aviv, three Japanese passengers disembarked from
an Air France flight arriving in Israel from Paris and Rome. After proceeding to the
11
12
Price and Forrest (2016). Practical Aviation Security. Predicting and Preventing Future Threats. p. 53–54.
13
Moore (1991). Airport, Aircraft, and Airline Security. p. 5.
14
Elias (2010). Airport and Aviation Security. U.S. Policy and Strategy in the Age of Global Terrorism. p. 3.
15
Price and Forrest (2016). Practical Aviation Security. Predicting and Preventing Future Threats. p. 54–56
baggage pickup area, several terrorists retrieved their bags. Inside the luggage were
grenades and machine guns. The three terrorists began firing the guns and throwing the
grenades randomly throughout the waiting area. The terminal area, however, was
crowded with travellers on a Christian pilgrimage vacation and not the intended target
of Jewish Israelis. Later, the three seemingly regular travellers-turned-terrorists an-
nounced they were members of the Army of the Red Star and claimed the attack was an
act of reprisal. The group was pledged to a Marxist revolution and was heavily
involved in the Palestinian struggle in the Middle East. In 1976, Israeli commandos
executed a raid at Entebbe’s airport where they freed 103 Israeli hostages from a plane
hijacked by Palestinian and German terrorists. The Air France Airbus was originally en
route from Tel Aviv to Paris but had made a stop in Athens. It was forced to fly to
Benghazi, Libya, where it refuelled and proceeded on to Uganda’s Entebbe Interna-
tional Airport. In a bold move, the Israelis decided not to succumb to the terrorists’
demands. They decided on a course of action that turned out to be a spectacular rescue
operation. After successfully flying the 2500 miles to Uganda from Israel, commandos
swiftly took back the hostages with only one Israeli military casualty (Colonel Jonathan
Netanyahu). However, the Israeli’s set the tone for any future attempts on their citizens
or aircraft. They now have some of the most stringent aircraft and airport security
procedures in the world.16
The sine qua non of the hijackings and terrorist acts is the media. Without the
media, the perpetrators would be deprived of their audience, and the show, most
probably, would not go on. BThere is a particular horror attached to transportation
attacks because passengers are in effect helpless in a situation like that^, says
Steven Simon. The airplane provides a capsule container of readymade hostages,
all organized, sitting in rows, strapped into their seats, and totally defenceless.
They represent a good cross section of the population, including women, children,
old people, and citizens of many countries. They will surely command the
attention of the world. The ticket office of a national flag carrier, the embassy,
and the diplomatic office also represents an opportunity to make a forceful
statement against a particular state without going there in person.17
The early 1970s saw a continuing series of aircraft hijackings and both public and
airline officials were eventually forced to recognize the need for balanced, yet more
stringent airport and airline security measures. Another incident is the Dawson’s Field.
On September 6, 1970, teams of Palestinian hijackers departed from three separate
airports with the intent to hijack three aircraft en route from Europe to the United States.
Members of the PFLP intended to land the aircraft at a remote airfield and hold the
passengers’ hostage in an attempt to negotiate the release of other PFLP members held
in jails throughout Europe and in Israel.18 While frequent domestic hijackings through-
out the late 1960s had failed to move policymakers in Washington to take steps to
enhance aviation security, the response in Washington to the Dawson’s Field hijackings
was swift and would come to shape US aviation security policy for years to come. On
September 11, 1970, while hostages remained captive aboard the aircraft parked at
16
17
Moore (1991). Airport, Aircraft, and Airline Security. p. 21; Kaplan (2006) Targets for Terrorists: Post-9/11
Aviation Security. Council on Foreign Relations, 7 Sept. 2006.
18
Klenka M.
Dawson’s Field, President Nixon unveiled a plan to combat air piracy that would lay
the groundwork for the US policy and strategy for aviation security. The plan cantered
on establishing a Sky Marshal Program to place armed guards on high-risk flights,
inspections and electronic screening of passengers at certain large US airports and
overseas stations, and tougher antipiracy laws and international extradition treaties to
bring hijackers to justice and prevent countries from providing them with safe harbour.
The biggest cost driver was a plan to deploy 2500 sky marshals on international flights
at an initial cost of $28 million for the hiring, training, and initial deployment and $50
million per year thereafter to maintain the force. The airline industry had estimated that
it would require a force of 4000 guards to protect all international flights flown by US
carriers, so the plan called for strategically placing sky marshals on high-risk flights. A
small force of 100 guards was immediately deployed on Pan Am and TWA interna-
tional flights on routes considered to be high risk. Deployment of additional armed sky
marshals, however, would have to await additional funding authority from Congress.
At the time of the Dawson’s Field hijackings, the ICAO was already in the process of
drafting a multilateral agreement addressing cooperation among nations to bring
hijackers to justice. In 1963, the Tokyo Convention and in 1970, three months after
the Dawson’s Field hijackings, The Hague Convention were ratified.19
The Sky Marshal Program unfortunately did not work, the program clearly
enjoyed some success, but proved incapable of stopping the continuing attempts
to hijack aircraft. Probably the most embarrassing indication of this was that a
hijacking took place on a flight carrying both a sky marshal and an FBI agent. Early
on was the need to switch primary security efforts from the aircraft to the ground
was recognized.20 Moreover, one risk analysis finds that air marshals and behaviour
detection officers, at a combined cost of nearly $1.3 billion per year, fail to be cost-
effective. However, even with that assumption in place, it appears that neither
program reduces risk enough to justify its high cost. The considerable cost of
screening passengers at the checkpoint is also likely not to be a good investment.21
Once the aircraft is in flight, the hijackers are already on board, and the presence of
agents did little to deter the attempts. It was therefore determined fairly early that
the better security solution was preventive in nature and better pursued on the
ground. Prevention of access to the airport or aircraft was and remains a crucial key
to security. Apparently, that lesson will have to be relearned.22
Criminals and terrorists are highly adaptive and imitative. In 1971, when D. B.
Cooper parachuted out of an airplane he had just hijacked and held for ransom, 19 other
parachute-from-an-airplane hijacking attempts followed. Boeing, the manufacturer of
the aircraft experiencing the parachute hijackings, installed the Cooper Vane, which
prevented the rear air stairs from being lowered in flight, thus eliminating the ability of
a hijacker to parachute to safety. The Cooper Vane did not stop hijackings but rather
motivated hijackers to develop new tactics. When improvements in passenger and
baggage screening made boarding concealed guns and grenades more difficult, hi-
jackers discovered alternative methods, such as having cleaning and catering personnel
19
Elias (2010). Airport and Aviation Security. U.S. Policy and Strategy in the Age of Global Terrorism. p. 4–6.
20
Moore (1991). Airport, Aircraft, and Airline Security. p. 8–9.
21
Stewart and Mueller (2018). Risk and economic assessment of U.S. aviation security for passenger-borne
bomb attacks. p. 17.
22
bring weapons and explosives on board aircraft. Strategies such as positive passenger –
baggage matching have prevented bombers from checking a bag with a bomb hidden
inside without personally boarding the aircraft. In response, terrorists adjusted their
strategies and recruited suicide bombers who were willing to die for their cause, or they
placed bombs inside the suitcases of unsuspecting passengers.23
Beginning in January 5, 1973, all passengers boarding flights in the US had to pass
through metal detectors and allow inspection of their carry-on items. Despite predic-
tions that airline passengers would not tolerate the hassle and some opposition on the
grounds that mandatory screening violated Constitutional privacy rights, passengers fed
up with hijackings took the measures largely in stride and recognized the inconvenience
as a necessary measure to protect airline flights.24 The installation of metal detectors at
airports increases the probability of detecting and apprehending potential hijackers or
saboteurs. Theoretically the high risk of being apprehended decreases the potential
threat and the stringent penal sanction that may apply consequent to such apprehension
compound the ominous quality of the preventive means taken.25
Aviation was not safe from the world of Bnarco-terrorism^ as demonstrated in 1989
when an Avianca B-727 was destroyed en route from Bogota to Cali, Colombia, killing all
107 people on board, including 5 police informants. Medellin cartel drug lord Pablo
Escobar may have orchestrated the bombing as part of a campaign to eliminate informants,
police, and politicians. The bombing brought attention to the already heated drug war
between the Colombian government and the drug cartels.26 Aviation was, and often still is,
the drug smuggler’s transportation mode of choice. The golden age of drug trafficking by
air began in the 1970s with drug mules flying on a daily basis into the US from Colombia
and elsewhere in Latin America. Unfortunately, the aviation security community was
woefully unprepared to deal with the ever-increasing tide of illicit drug smuggling.27
In one of the most infamous hijacking scenarios, two Lebanese Shi’ite Muslim
terrorists, calling themselves members of the Hezbollah, boarded TWA Flight 847
departing Athens, Greece, on 14 June 1985. The Boeing 727 was scheduled to fly to
Rome when in mid-air, two hijackers seized the aircraft. The hijackers diverted the aircraft
to Beirut, Lebanon. There, some hostages were exchanged for fuel, and the airplane was
flown to Algiers, Algeria then back to Beirut after releasing additional hostages.28 Making
the flight even more noteworthy was the capability of mass media to bring the episode in
real time to the viewing audience. The hijacking became an event on the evening news for
several weeks, with stirring images of terrorists leaning out the cockpit window threat-
ening the pilot with a gun. BWe’ve got a hijack,^ announced the second officer aboard
TWA Flight 847 from Athens to Rome. Those chilling words began one of the most
famous hijackings in the history of aviation. At its conclusion, this hostage crisis spanned
thousands of miles of airspace, involved several governments, directly affected the
operations at three major airports, turned a flight attendant into a folk hero, resulted in
the death of a US serviceman, and gave rise to Hezbollah.29 At a news conference, former
23
24
25
Abeyratne (2010). Aviation Security Law. p. 13.
26
Price and Forrest (2016). Practical Aviation Security. Predicting and Preventing Future Threats. p. 60.
27
Gerstein (2017). Drug Trafficking by Air: The Lessons for Aviation Security.
28
29
Klenka M.
President Reagan announced that any retaliation would be risky and chastised the Greek
government for lax security procedures. Meanwhile, the British and Italian Ambassadors
to Lebanon, as well as the Syrians, declared they were involved in negotiations; while
Reagan considered forcing the Lebanese to close the Beirut airport if diplomatic moves
failed. The incident received global attention. Even the Russians jumped into the act.
Soviet spokesman, Vladimir Lomeiko condemned the hijacking, but suggested that the
United States created the conditions that foster terrorism.30
On December 21, 1988, a bomb exploded on board Pan Am flight 103, a Boeing
747 en route from London to New York, killing all 244 passengers and 15
crewmembers on board and another 11 people in the town of Lockerbie, Scotland,
when debris rained down onto their homes. Investigation revealed that the bomb
consisted of a small quantity of Semtex plastic explosive that was placed with baggage
in the forward cargo hold of the jumbo jet. The bomb is believed to have been hidden in
a Toshiba radio cassette player contained inside a suitcase that was transferred onto the
airplane in Frankfurt, West Germany through the interline baggage transfer system. The
bomb was likely detonated by a barometric trigger device as the airplane reached an
altitude of 31,000 ft. In the months prior to the Pan Am 103 bombing, intelligence
information suggested that an attack against an aviation target operating in Europe was
imminent.31 Responsibility was originally thought to fall on the PFLP because of radio
cassette bombs discovered in their prior bombings. Many intelligence analysts were
convinced that the Iranians were retaliating for the accidental shooting down of one of
their commercial carriers by an American naval ship. The latest evidence, however,
indicates Muammar Khaddafi. The Lockerbie incident also raised the issue of
passenger-baggage reconciliation. In 1988, Pan American was x-raying all interline
bags rather than identifying and physically searching unaccompanied interline bag.32
Also, as a direct consequence of the Lockerbie tragedy, the FAA instructed the airlines
to rigorously apply positive passenger bag match procedures that had been made
mandatory on international flights as part of stepped up security measures implemented
following the TWA 847 hijacking in 1985.33 However, even FAA administrator T.
Allan McArtor admitted that the new procedures would not have detected the plastic
explosive that brought down Pan Am Flight 103.34
Relatively calm 1990s
By 1990, a decade of deadly terrorist attacks on aviation ended. This period was
followed by more than 10 years of relative calm in global aviation security. With the
lack of any significant or successful attacks in the United States and on the aviation
security system, travellers and some within the aviation security community slipped
into a false sense of security. The mid-1990s did bring a few notable attacks and
incidents, some on aviation and some that were not directly related to aviation but still
affected aviation policy. On February 26, 1993, Ramzi Yousef and co-conspirators
30
31
32
33
34
carried out the bombing of the World Trade Centre (WTC) using an ammonium nitrate
and fuel oil bomb that was packed into a rented truck which they parked in an
underground garage under the north tower (Tower One).35 The attack on the WTC,
Murrah Federal Building, and a similar vehicle bomb attack on the US Air Force
Khobar Tower barracks in Saudi Arabia acted as the catalysts for the 300-ft rule, which
was put into place at US airports in 1995. The 300-ft rule creates a clear zone around
airport terminals and air traffic control facilities where vehicles are not allowed to park
or be unattended. The distance was based on a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
and Explosives blast analysis. This rule caused major problems for airport operators
around the country, because most airports were not designed naturally with a 300-ft
buffer. As part of this rule’s enforcement, authorities rapidly positioned barricades
around the airport and officials towed vehicles within 300 ft of terminal buildings
and checked the vehicles using canine explosive detection teams. Airport revenues also
suffered as travellers moved to offsite parking locations or had friends and associates
drop them off at the airport. Operation Bojinka was actually a series of terrorist attacks
planned to occur in 1995. The attacks included the bombing of 12 US airliners over the
Pacific Ocean, a plot to assassinate both Pope John Paul II and President Bill Clinton,
and a plot to crash a Cessna general aviation aircraft filled with explosives into CIA
headquarters. The key player in the Bojinka plots was the mastermind behind the 1993
bombing of the WTC, Ramzi Yousef.36
On July 17, 1996, TWA Flight 800 departed JFK International Airport in New York
bound for Paris. Shortly after take-off, the Boeing 747 crashed off the coast of Long
Island, NY. Although the crash was determined not to be caused by a bomb or missile
strike, it did result in significant changes to the US aviation security system. Within
moments after the crash, dozens of security experts were on TV resolute in their
conviction that the crash was the result of a terrorist attack, either a bombing or a
surface-to-air missile. This theory was further supported when investigators found
residue from explosives of the same type that had been used in a previous bombing.
After a 16-month investigation, the FBI concluded that the explosives residue was left
from a canine security training exercise and that the surface-to-air missile some
witnesses said they spotted was most likely a trail of fuel igniting as the aircraft
exploded. Eventually, the National Transportation Safety Board investigators would
suspect a faulty centreline fuel tank issue as the cause of the explosion. In the length of
time it took to ascertain that the crash was not related to a security incident, the US
government took action as if it were a security issue. President Bill Clinton soon
established the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, led by Vice
President Al Gore and commonly referred to as the Gore Commission.37 The Gore
Commission recommended improvements to security, not just to combat familiar
threats such as explosives, but also to defend against emerging threats such as biolog-
ical and chemical weapons and shoulder-fired missiles. The Gore Commission also
asserted that Baviation security should be a system of systems, layered, integrated and
working together to produce the highest possible levels of protection.^ The notion of a
layered, integrated systems approach to aviation security has become a core principle
35
36
37
Klenka M.
for the present-day aviation security strategy. The Gore Commission’s final report38
issued a total of 31 specific recommendations to improve aviation security.39 In the area
of safety the Commission believes that the principal focus should be on reducing
the rate of accidents. Moreover, in the area of security the threat against civil
aviation is changing and growing and the Commission recommends committing
greater resources to improving aviation security, and, what we think is very
important, to work more cooperatively with the private sector and local authorities
in carrying out security responsibilities.40
9/11
Prior to the tragic events, there were clues; however, they were not adequately
connected to prevent the attacks. In the April–May timeframe the government learned
that Usama bin Laden’s network was targeting the United States. In July 2001, the FBI
advised law enforcement agencies of threats to US interests overseas and domestically.
Additionally, the Phoenix FBI office notified Washington that men of Middle Eastern
heritage were attending flight schools in Arizona and that it was likely that Bin Laden
was involved. About a month later, the CIA formally told the President that al-Qaeda
operatives could be targeting the US aviation industry.41
On the morning of September 11, 2001, 18 operatives from the al-Qaeda terrorist
network hijacked four commercial airliners over the continental US. Two of the
airliners struck the north and south towers of the WTC in New York City. Another
airliner struck the side of the Pentagon in Washington, DC. The fourth airliner was
retaken by the passengers and crashed in a field near Shanksville, PA.42 The federal
response to those attacks would come to shape aviation security policy and strategy in
the United States. Following the attacks, the Bush Administration and Congress
pondered and debated the best course of action for preventing future terrorist attacks
against aviation and terrorist attacks using aircraft to target key facilities and infrastruc-
ture within the United States and made sweeping changes designed to strengthen
aviation security and restore the confidence of the American people. Following the 9/
11 attacks, the federal government made considerable changes to aviation security
including the federalization of the screening workforce, 100% screening of checked
baggage for explosives, significantly expanded lists of individuals to be denied aircraft
boarding or subject to additional screening, deployment of large number of air marshals
to protect flights, the creation of a program to arm airline pilots, and the hardening of
cockpit doors, to name a few key initiatives. Despite the considerable cost and effort
devoted to passenger airline security following the 9/11 attacks, some critics continue
to raise concerns that significant weaknesses remain, and these weaknesses may be
readily exploited by terrorist groups seeking to carry out aircraft hijackings and
bombings. While policy debates in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks have focused most
38
Available at: https://fas.org/irp/threat/212fin~1.html
39
40
WHITE HOUSE COMMISSION ON AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY (1997). Final Report to
President Clinton.
41
42
heavily on the security of passenger airline operations and threats originating from
terrorists accessing the aviation system as commercial airline passengers, these various
other threat scenarios have also been considered extensively in policy debate. These
threats and the existing vulnerabilities in the aviation system that they attempt to exploit
have no simple solutions. Since 9/11, policymakers have been faced with difficult
choices over implementing effective security measures while at the same time being
mindful of potential impacts on the aviation industry, an industry that places a high
value on the speed and efficiency of operations.43
Two particular changes in airline security are important: the federalization of
passenger screening operations, and the requirement that airports screen all checked
baggage for explosives. These two changes are the most visible federal regulatory
responses to the 9/11 attacks related to improving airline security. The Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) made three important changes in an effort to improve
the efficiency of security screening operations. First, at least initially, TSA increased
staffing to help reduce waiting time in security lines. Prior to 9/11, there were about
16,200 private security screeners employed at US airports, nearly all of whom were
screening passengers. By the end of 2002, TSA had hired 56,000 screeners for both
passenger and baggage screening. Second, TSA increased the compensation of
screeners, offering higher wages and better benefits. Perhaps as a result, turnover
among security screeners plummeted. Third, TSA increased training for screeners
(prior to 9/11 averaged about twelve hours, post 9/11 more than a hundred hours).
Unlike passenger screening, no general system for screening checked baggage was in
place prior to 9/11, and only 5 % of checked bags were screened. TSA has configured
the baggage screening process in three different ways. In most airports, passengers first
check-in at the ticket counter, and then take their baggage to a screening area, where it
is screened using either explosion detection systems or explosion trace detection
machines. In the majority of remaining airports, passengers first have their baggage
screened and then proceed to the ticket counter to check-in. In each of these cases, if the
electronic screening technology indicates the presence of explosives or other prohibited
items, then additional manual screening is done, which takes time and recently has
prompted many complaints of theft or destruction of passengers’ property. Several
surveys conducted since 9/11 have found that passengers are willing to accept some
additional inconvenience and/or higher prices in order to feel more secure. Moreover,
these surveys support TSA claims that the security measures implemented since 9/11
increase passengers’ confidence in the safety of air travel. Increased confidence in
airline security may result in increased demand for air travel.44
Security became in many ways totally reactive and arguably continues to be.
Authorities were reacting to the horrific hijackings at the end of the 1960s and early
1970s and the monumental event of 11 September 2001. It is safe to say the aftermath
of the hijackings has changed the face of aviation for years to come. Airports are by
their very function open and public places and therefore all that more difficult to
protect. Today, the threat extends from the airport facilities, the aircraft, and use of
43
Elias (2010). Airport and Aviation Security. U.S. Policy and Strategy in the Age of Global Terrorism. p. 41–
42.
44
Blalock et al. (2006). The Impact of Post 9/11 Airport Security Measures on the Demand for Air Travel. p.
5–8.
Klenka M.
the aircraft as a weapon to even more horrific possibilities.45 New and emerging threats
to civil aviation are a constant cause for concern to the aviation community. Grave
threats such as those posed by the carriage of dangerous pathogens on board, the use of
cyber technology calculated to interfere with air navigation systems, and the misuse of
man portable air defence systems are real and have to be addressed with vigour and
regularity. ICAO has been addressing these threats for some time and continues to do so
on a global basis. Since the events of 11 September 2001 took place, the most critical
challenge facing international civil aviation remains to be the compelling need to
ensure that the air transport industry remains continuous and its consumer is assured
of sustained regular, safe and secure air transport services.46
Current threats
The use of a surface-to-air missile against a civilian aircraft has occurred several times
in the course of aviation’s history. Surface-to-air missiles are a legitimate threat to
today’s commercial airliners. Since 1938, there have been approximately 80 incidents
related to shooting down a commercial airliner. The first shooting after 9/11 of
MANPADs on a commercial airliner that was not associated with a war occurred on
November 28, 2002. Al-Qaeda operatives shot two SA-7 shoulder-launched surface-to-
air missiles at an Israeli-flagged Arkia commercial airliner as it departed Mombasa,
Kenya, with 271 passengers on board. Both missiles missed, and the Israeli government
responded by equipping its El Al Airline fleet with antimissile flare-defence systems.
The November 22, 2003, shooting of a surface-to-air missile into a DHL cargo aircraft
as it departed Baghdad, Iraq, again focused US attention to the threat of MANPADs.47
Policymakers have also raised considerable concerns that, faced with increased security
measures at airports and on-board aircraft, terrorists may carry out attacks against
civilian passenger aircraft using shoulder-fired missiles and other standoff weapons
capable of downing a large transport aircraft. In response to this threat, the State
Department has engaged in an intensified effort to reduce worldwide stockpiles of
these weapons, and a program was established within the Department of Home-
land Security to explore the use of military antimissile technology on civilian
aircraft.48 Since the events of 11 September 2001, there have been several
attempts against the security of aircraft in flight. These threats have ranged from
shoe bombs to dirty bombs to explosives that can be assembled in flight with
liquids, aerosols and gels. In every instance the global community has reacted
with pre-emptive and preventive measures which prohibit any material on board
which might seemingly endanger the safety of flight.49
In August 2004, explosives carried onboard by terrorists brought down two Russian
airliners. The bombers were two Chechen women who boarded separate flights at
Russia’s Domodedovo International Airport with explosives concealed in their braziers.
This incident is now referred to as the BBlack Widows.^ The X-ray machines and metal
45
46
47
48
49
detectors used in Russia are similar to those used in the United States for many years
and cannot detect many of the current explosives in use by terrorist organizations today.
After the 2004 attack, Russia installed body imaging devices into their security
checkpoints, but the bomb detonated in the public area of the terminal, prior to the
checkpoints. Numerous other suicide bomb attacks had previously taken place through-
out Moscow prior to the airport bombing. After this incident, Russia required travellers
to remove bulky clothing, shoes, and belts for X-rays, and subjected passengers to a
profiling interview to identify higher-risk travellers requiring additional scrutiny. In
2015, while en route to St. Petersburg, Metrojet Flight 9268 crashed off Egypt’s Sinai
Peninsula, killing all 224 people on board. Daesh took credit for the downing and
published a photo of an improvised explosive device that incorporated a pop can.
On August 9, 2006, authorities in Great Britain arrested 21 individuals suspected of
plotting to detonate liquid explosives onboard several commercial aircraft departing
from the United Kingdom and bound for the United States. One controversial strategy
to determining what items or materials should be restricted is not to take away items
from travellers that could potentially be made into explosives. Laptop computers and
cell phones could be used as timing and power devices, but they are also necessary
tools for today’s business traveller. The solution to this security risk is to improve the
screening process to be able to handle the profile of today’s business and recreational
flier, not take away every object that could possibly be used to trigger a bomb or as a
weapon. The London bomb plot presented a slightly new threat to airport security,
liquid-based explosives. Therefore, new security measures that do not inhibit the safe
flow of passengers must be developed. Passenger and carry-on checkpoint screening
practices must be upgraded with effective procedures and better equipment. The
establishment of profiling methods should reduce the number of people receiving
additional scrutiny. A continuing investment to improve security systems to be able
to defeat existing and developing threats is a better long-term strategy, which will help
avoid temporary solutions, such as carry-on baggage restrictions, that disrupt the
transportation system.
On March 8, 2014, Malaysia Flight 370 disappeared while en route from Kuala
Lumpur to Beijing, somewhere (it is believed) over the Indian Ocean. A few pieces of
the aircraft have been found, washing up on shore in Australia, but the search continued
for more evidence of what happened to the flight. Some have speculated that the
aircraft may have been hijacked or sabotaged, but not enough evidence exists to come
to any conclusions about why the airplane crashed. All 239 people, along with the
majority of the aircraft itself, remain missing. On July 17, 2014, Malaysia Airlines
Flight MH17, was hit by a surface-to-air missile en route from Amsterdam to Kuala
Lumpur. The aircraft was flying over a region in conflict in the Ukraine. All 283
passengers, including 80 children and 15 crew members, were killed. While this
incident is not an aviation security incident in the pure sense of the term, since the
airline essentially flew over a war zone and it was apparently not the intent of those
firing the weapon to take down a civilian airliner, it did serve as a lesson to the industry
about safe routes for aircraft to fly.50
Airports face many of the same security risks as airliners, including threats posed by
terrorist bombings and chemical or biological attacks. Airports also face a particular
50
Klenka M.
risk from potential shooting incidents, particularly in public spaces prior to security
screening checkpoints. Airline ticket counters and queues at security screening check-
points are considered especially vulnerable locations to such attacks, as are curb side
drop-off and pick-up locations and ground transportation staging areas located near
airport terminals. Also, possible chemical and biological or radiological and nuclear
attacks against airports are seen as a growing threat in the age of global terrorism. Because
major commercial airports play a critical role in travel and commerce and handle large
volumes of travellers, they are likely to be viewed as highly attractive targets to terrorist
groups, particularly among those groups that have historically targeted components of the
air transportation system. Security risk in the airport environment can be assessed in terms
of threats, vulnerabilities, and potential consequences. As a nexus for air travel, a
commercial passenger airport faces a number of security threats, including direct threats
to airport facilities and building occupants, as well as threats to aircraft operating at the
airport. These threats include threats within the passenger terminal, both prior to and
beyond the security screening checkpoints.51
International efforts to combat the problems related to air hijacking and terrorism
have been mixed. Some states have matched or exceeded the efforts of the Unites
States, most notably those in Europe and Israel. Other states may recognize the threat
but be totally unable to finance any improvement measures. Still others totally disre-
gard the need for adequate security measures and tend to make air travel to and from
those states potentially dangerous. Additionally, efforts to enforce and adequately make
use of existing international treaties will also only progress when the international
community is forced to recognize the need. Unfortunately, different commitment levels
on the part of the signatories often limit the effectiveness of international treaties.
Divergent interpretations of provisions, various attitudes toward the particular treaty,
and the difficulty in appropriately enforcing them also affect the outcome of each effort
to utilize the treaties. Overall, countries diverge in perception of the threat. Exposure to
a particular threat also differs, and levels of international attention to fluctuating sets of
circumstances often change.52 International treaties including the Tokyo, Hague, Mon-
treal and Beijing conventions all remain hallmarks of international efforts to combat
terrorism. Unfortunately, years of cooperation have proved that once the treaties are in
effect, they often fail to be effective. Nations react depending on the attitude of each
nation, all of whom can still exercise their own sovereignty over suspected terrorists,
regardless of the language in the existing treaties. Efforts will likely continue to fine-
tune the treaties as the need arises.53
During our research a proactive approach in aviation security stood out. It was
passenger profiling and the behaviour pattern recognition. Martin Aggar described
passenger profiling as a rapid risk analysis based on suspicious signs in a passenger’s
documentation, itinerary, appearance, or behaviour. Profiling has been successfully
used to identify and deter terrorist attacks and to apprehend drug smugglers, money
launderers, petty thieves, and illegal immigrants. The first objective in profiling is to
determine the absence of the normal and the presence of the abnormal (through
document inspections, behaviour observations, etc.). Aggar further stated that Bit is a
51
52
53
complete waste of time and money and plays into the terrorists’ hands to subject all
passengers to a detailed bag and body search when clearly, if they have not been duped,
99.99 percent pose no threat to the flight^. The behaviour pattern recognition (BPR)
excludes the racial element and uses behaviour clues to identify potential terrorists
during passenger screening.54 The Israeli aviation security system is often considered
the best in the world, and it is profiling that makes it such.55 Rafi Ron says if BPR is
widely implemented it will Badd a very important security layer to our aviation
[system].^ The technique involves first identifying passengers exhibiting suspicious
behaviour, such as wearing heavy clothing on a warm day, excessive sweating, or
using a pay phone in areas with cell phone reception. Individuals identified in this
way are then selected for targeted interviews with a law enforcement officer who is
trained to detect signs that a passenger is concealing something. Ron describes these
interviews as Bfriendly conversations;^ most are only a few minutes long. Most of
the passengers questioned like this are allowed to continue on their travels; the few
passengers who arouse an officer’s suspicions are subjected to an hour-long inter-
rogation and search.56 Philip Baum writes that Bprofiling techniques are used at
airports by every other security agency with great success. It can help determine,
intelligently, which technology to use on which passenger.^ Scott Horton pushes for
profiling that focuses on relevant data-gathering such as how a passenger bought
his/her ticket, their past travels, their recent actions, and so on. BA very complex
sophisticated profiling program is one of the most effective measures you could use
and should be used,^ Horton stresses. Stephen Flynn also advocates behavioural
profiling. BPeople’s behaviour is a much better indicator^ of their intentions. Flynn
warns against a system that relies on a single protocol: BIt goes back to a basic rule
of counterinsurgency: Don’t do things in rote and predictable ways, because
terrorists can figure out how to evade it.^ Flynn recommends greater emphasis on
training of airport security officials and for them to be able to tailor inspections
based on professional judgment. In 2010 the TSA launched a campaign BIf You See
Something, Say Something^ to raise public awareness of threats and emphasize the
importance of reporting suspicious activity.57
In general, behavioural analysis is a technique intended to help the professionally
trained security staff to spot passengers acting unusually and target them for a further
search. Behaviour analysis is often seen as a more appropriate alternative to racial and
similar profiling. However, as discussed, behavioural analysis is a type of profiling; these
terms are often used synonymously. In addition, although this technique is seen as
separate from racial, ethnical, religious and other types of profiling, all these profiling
types are often used in combination, making it difficult to separate one from another. The
core idea is that all passengers are interviewed individually by trained security agents who
all are elite and highly trained. Questions can be asked during the entire time a person is at
the airport. Not only actual verbal responses, but body language and facial expressions are
54
Price and Forrest (2016). Practical Aviation Security. Predicting and Preventing Future Threats. p. 288–
289.
55
Enerstvedt (2017). Aviation Security, Privacy, Data Protection and Other Human Rights: Technologies and
Legal Principles. p. 262.
56
Kaplan (2006). Targets for Terrorists: Post-9/11 Aviation Security. Council on Foreign Relations, 7
Sept. 2006.
57
Bajoria (2010). The Debate Over Airport Security. Council on Foreign Relations, 2 Dec. 2010.
Klenka M.
assessed, and other criteria play roles too. The exact criteria are not publicly available, but
in addition to behavioural patterns, considerations include the ethnicity, religion, nation-
ality, travel information, and intelligence. With reference to the Israeli profiling pro-
gramme, it has a declared 100% success rate, since no aircraft has been hijacked at an
Israeli airport and no Israeli aircraft has been hijacked in over 40 years. Profiling helped,
for instance, to prevent the attempted bombing of an El Al flight from London to Tel Aviv
in 1986. At the same time, Israeli behaviour analysis techniques are criticized for
disproportionally targeting young Arab men and being simply a form of racial, religious,
and national profiling. Thus, it can be questioned whether the success is the result of
behaviour analysis or the use of racial, religious, and national profiling – apparently, a
combination. All this can easily flag innocent people as suspicious, resulting in following,
detaining, questioning and searching innocent persons.58
At present and in the near future, the most effective and safest security way is
combination of regular measures, such as X-ray screening, visual examination, inspection
by removing the bottle lids, restriction on carrying liquids, etc. ICAO temporary security
control guidelines provide a uniform operation mode of liquids screening, which is
helpful to the unification of international civil aviation security standard.59 ICAO Secre-
tary General Dr. Fang Liu remarked, that Bit is ICAO’s view that the highest-priority
threats requiring our vigilant focus today are improvised explosive devices (IEDs) carried
by passengers, landside security in public airports, cyber-attacks on mission-critical air
transport systems, and the potential for malicious deployments of Remotely-Piloted or
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (RPAS/UAS).^60 The last mention can cause an awful lot of
havoc. On January 22, 2019 flights in and out of Newark airport, near New York, were
suspended temporarily after reports of a drone being aloft nearby. On January 8, 2019
Heathrow, London’s biggest airport, also shut briefly because of a drone sighting. And in
the busy run-up to Christmas London’s second airport, Gatwick, was closed for more than
36 h after drones were spotted flying near its runway. Airport incursions are not the only
danger posed by drones. A growing number of close drone encounters are being reported
by airline pilots. Airport operators also need to be careful about electronic countermea-
sures, warns Iain Gray. According to him signal-jamming can block the link between a
drone and its operator or overwhelm a GPS-based navigation system. But unless such
jamming is carried out carefully it might also damage an airport’s sensitive radio and
navigation equipment, and the instruments on aircraft. If every plane at an airport had to
be checked to ensure it was safe to fly after electronic countermeasures were deployed,
that would cause extensive delays in resuming operations.61
Conclusion
The airline industry is one the fastest industries to upgrade their security. Security
became in many ways totally reactive and arguably continues to be. However,
58
Enerstvedt (2017). Aviation Security, Privacy, Data Protection and Other Human Rights: Technologies and
Legal Principles. p. 262–265.
59
60
ICAO (2018). Priorities for security, environment, privatization and gender parity raised as ICAO
Secretary General addresses IATA AGM.
61
THE ECONOMIST (2019). Thankfully, the technology to combat rogue drones is getting better.
implementing new aviation security methods has traditionally been reactive rather than
proactive. Those charged with protecting the aviation industry must adopt a philosophy
of sustained proactive improvement. Therefore, aviation security practitioners must not
stop moving forward in implementing proactive forms of security, because our foes are
committed to their cause and the stakeholders must be exceedingly committed to ours,
but we must also not ignore existing and successful strategies to attack aviation, or else
terrorists and criminals will continue to exploit identified weaknesses until the method
of attack is no longer successful.62
Hijacking an aircraft greatly appealed to extortionists and terrorists with a cause that
they sought to publicize. The incidents were accomplished to achieve both political and
personal gains and were successfully used as a dramatic method of attempting to
enforce demands. The sensationalism of an aircraft being blown up or captive hostages
huddled in an aircraft cabin was an assured draw for the cameras.63 As hijackings
continued to increase thought the time, authorities explored the options available to
them to combat it. The regulations have repeatedly been amended to accommodate
innovations in technology and to close previously missed loopholes. All sorts of
alternatives to improve the program have been openly discussed over the years. Some
have been adopted and some quickly and thankfully discarded. Eventually the public
came to recognize that some drastic measures were required. Repeated instances of
hijacking over the years have proven time and time again that aircraft and airports are
public, accessible, and somewhat easy targets for terrorists. They seek to publicize their
cause and are guaranteed instant media coverage for their efforts. Politically volatile
regions continue to produce emotionally driven terrorists who feel their actions are
justified. Some very tragic results have been viewed by millions of people exposed to
the media frenzies that follow major incidents. No geographic region has escaped the
problem. However, responses from governments have varied from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. There is no question that additional hijackings or other forms of attacks
will plague the aviation industry.64
As the above the historical analysis and discussion demonstrates, the major incidents
in aviation showed the reactive approach from the stakeholders in implementing new
security measures. Moreover, some of the countermeasures were not so successful, i.e.
the Sky Marshall Program, but we can see that the industry and also the authorities
came up with several of them that prevented from happening again, i.e. the Cooper
Vane, positive passenger and baggage matching, screening of passengers and baggage,
300 ft buffer zone for vehicles from terminal buildings, etc. We agree with other authors
on maintaining the proactive attitude towards the aviation security. Raising aviation
security baseline by implementing new, stronger screening procedures might concern
civil right groups, but most passengers are willing to accept some additional inconve-
nience in order to feel more secure. The passengers’ confidence in the safety and
security of air travel has increased, which may result in increased demand for air travel.
We believe that incidents will some form continue in the near future as people are
resourceful if they are committed to a cause, but the aviation community has to take
pre-emptive and preventive measures or react swiftly and effectively to given situations
62
63
64
Klenka M.
and reduce the damage. The behaviour pattern recognition or profiling is a politically
loaded word and experts stand deeply divided on the issue, but this might be a step in
the right direction towards proactive measures. Finally, the future efforts at analysis will
also have to consider the possibility of threats in cyber space. This discussion revealed
several issues that we will further follow, our hope is that this research will spark new
initiatives and discussions on this important topic.
Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and
institutional affiliations.
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Blalock G, Kadiyali V, Simon DH (2006) The impact of post 9/11 airport security measures on the demand for
air travel. J Law Econ, Forthcoming Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1007534. Accessed 25 Jan 2019.
Elias, B. (2010). Airport and Aviation Security. U.S. Policy and Strategy in the Age of Global Terrorism.
Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
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in/intradgca/intra/icao%20annexes/an17_cons.pdf. Accessed 25 Jan 2019.
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Major Incidents That Shaped Aviation Security

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Major Incidents That Shaped Aviation Security

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Journal of Transportation Security

Major incidents that shaped aviation security

Received: 28 August 2018 / Accepted: 30 January 2019/

Keywords Aviation security . Airport security . Hijackings . Terrorism

JEL classification K33 . K38

freight carriage to the industry’s patrons represents a continuous challenge. These

Hijackings and terrorism

to attempt to ignore the criminality of such conduct.11 This increase in hijackings

Relatively calm 1990s

Abeyratne R (2010) Aviation security law. Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg

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