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Kant on Newton, genius, and scientific

discovery
a
Bryan Hall
a
Department of Philosophy, Indiana University Southeast, New
Albany, USA
Published online: 30 May 2014.
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To cite this article: Bryan Hall (2014) Kant on Newton, genius, and scientific discovery, Intellectual
History Review, 24:4, 539-556, DOI: 10.1080/17496977.2014.914648
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Intellectual History Review, 2014
Vol. 24, No. 4, 539–556, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17496977.2014.914648
Kant on Newton, genius, and scientific discovery

Bryan Hall*
Department of Philosophy, Indiana University Southeast, New Albany, USA
In the Critique of the Power of Judgment (hereafter referred to as the Critique of Judgment), Kant
defines genius by distinguishing it from science. At the heart of Kant’s distinction is the idea that
scientists possess a rule-governed procedure to generate their discoveries whereas no rule-gov-
erned procedure can fully determine the products of genius. Genius involves a “free correspon-
dence of the imagination to the lawfulness of the understanding” that a rule-governed

procedure could never produce.1 This leads Kant to argue that only artists can be geniuses and
only insofar as they produce beautiful art.2 Although Kant believes that genius can be rationally
reconstructed in terms of a rule-governed procedure, this procedure will always underdetermine
the products of genius. In the Critique of Judgment, Kant offers Isaac Newton as the paradigmatic
example of a “great mind” who was nevertheless not a genius.3 In the Mathematical Principles of
Natural Philosophy (Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica), Newton famously claims
that he does not “feign hypotheses” and describes his scientific discoveries as “deduced from
the phenomena.”4 Given Kant’s characterization of Newton and Newton’s own characterization
of himself, I will argue that the rule-governed procedure Kant has in mind is similar to what con-
temporary philosophers of science call a “logic of discovery,” i.e., a rule-governed procedure
where the discovery is the logical consequence of certain well-established premises.5
If a scientific discovery cannot be explained in terms of a logic of discovery while also
meeting all of Kant’s other criteria for genius, however, then it should be considered an
example of scientific genius by Kant’s own lights. Although I will argue pace Kant that
Newton did possess a logic of discovery for the central conclusions of the Principia, nevertheless,
he did not possess a rule-governed procedure for generating the logic of discovery he used to
establish these conclusions. It is this second-order discovery that makes Newton count as a scien-
tific genius according to Kant’s own criteria for genius.
This paper is divided into three sections. The first section will examine the criteria by which
Kant distinguishes the genius from the scientist in the Critique of Judgment and will argue that
Kant’s standards of “proof” in science are close to those demanded by a logic of discovery.
The second section explains how Newton’s discovery of the true motions of objects from their
apparent motions, in Book III of the Principia, reflects a logic of discovery and so fails to
meet Kant’s conditions for genius. The third section contends that Newton’s discovery of a
new approach toward argumentation in natural philosophy (his logic of discovery) counts as a
second-order scientific discovery that does meet the main criteria for genius that Kant articulates
in the Critique of Judgment.
*Email: hallbw@ius.edu
© 2014 International Society for Intellectual History

540 B. HALL
1. Kant’s theory of genius in the Critique of Judgment

In the Critique of Judgment, there are four explicit criteria used to distinguish geniuses from
scientists:
(1) Genius is a “talent for producing that for which no determinate rule can be given,” i.e.,
genius is original.
(2) While the products of genius are “not themselves the result of imitation [ … they must]
serve others in that way,” i.e., the products of genius are exemplary.
(3) Genius cannot produce “according to a plan and [ … ] communicate to others precepts
that would put them in a position to produce similar products,” i.e., genius is natural.
(4) “By means of genius nature does not prescribe the rule to science but to art, and even to
the latter only insofar as it is to be beautiful art.”6
The term “rule” denotes something different in (4) from what it denotes in (1). In (4), genius is
itself the rule. Genius gives the rule to art through its own beautiful products. These serve as
models to inspire others, similarly disposed, into producing their own beautiful art.7 This ties it
fairly closely to (2) insofar as the products of genius must serve as an example to others. Accord-
ing to (1), however, genius cannot itself be analyzed in terms of rules. In other words, genius can
be a rule, but it is not itself explicable in terms of rules. As (4) suggests, nature gives this rule to
artistic production (insofar as it is beautiful art) but not to scientific production. This distinction,
however, seems to beg the very question at issue, viz. can scientists be geniuses? If it can be shown
that a scientific discovery meets criteria (1)–(3), this will provide good reason for rejecting cri-
terion (4).8 If (4) is rejected, this allows one to take (1)–(3) as individually necessary and
jointly sufficient conditions for genius. If an example of scientific discovery meets (1)–(3),
then it should be considered an example of scientific genius by Kant’s own lights.
What does it mean to say that genius cannot be explained in terms of rules, i.e., how are we to
understand the use of “rule” in the first criterion? Perhaps, genius is a black-box of creativity and
there are no regulations that govern its procedure.9 Kant thinks, however, that artistic production
does possess certain regulations that would extend to genius as a form of artistic production.
When discussing artistic genius, Kant holds that that the production of beautiful art requires
“much science” by which he means “acquaintance with ancient languages, wide reading of
those authors considered to be classical, history, acquaintance with antiquities, etc.”10 Later,
Kant says that “every art presupposes rules which first lay the foundation by means of which a
product that is to be called artistic is first represented as possible.”11 Finally, Kant thinks that
the production of beautiful art requires following certain rules which makes the art “academically
correct” and so “originality of his talent constitutes one (but not the only) essential element of the
character of the genius.”12
Although the products of genius must be made according to rules, there is still a gap between
what the rule-governed procedure dictates and the ultimate product that creativity and originality
occupy. For Kant, the difference between genius and science does not lie in whether one possesses
a rule-governed procedure while the other does not. The difference rather lies in the degree to
which the rule-governed procedures determine their respective products. Whereas genius requires
a gap for originality between what the rules dictate and the eventual product, science requires that
there is no such gap. This is relevant for showing why science would not meet the first condition
for genius mentioned above.
This originality itself, however, still requires an explanation. Kant claims that the genius pos-
sesses “spirit” which is a faculty for producing “aesthetic ideas” through the free-play of the
imagination with the understanding.13 An aesthetic idea is a representation of the imagination,
KANT ON NEWTON, GENIUS, AND SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 541
associated with a concept, but for which no concept is perfectly adequate.14 As Henry Allison puts
it, the genius is someone “who is blessed with the unteachable ability to produce coherent ima-
ginative associations (aesthetic ideas) that are particularly suited to express an underlying
thought.”15 The originality of genius operates under certain constraints (e.g., coherence) and is
directed at a particular goal (expressing aesthetic ideas). Originality must be tempered by
“taste” which constrains the freedom of the imagination through the lawfulness of the understand-
ing without fully determining it.16 This corrective is necessary if the genius is to express aesthetic
ideas rather than “nothing but nonsense.”17 Whereas beautiful art causes a free-play between the
imagination and the understanding in those with taste, spirit causes this free-play in the genius,
assuming she has taste, so as to produce beautiful art. As Kant says, “for beautiful art, therefore,
imagination, understanding, spirit and taste are requisite.”18
Understanding what it means for genius to be original in the first criterion also helps one to
understand what it means for genius to be natural in the third criterion. Spirit cannot be taught. It
is not a rule-governed procedure though its imaginative associations (aesthetic ideas) are nonethe-
less constrained by them (viz. the lawfulness of the understanding). For an aesthetic idea to be
fully determined by a rule-governed procedure is a contradictio in adjecto from Kant’s perspec-
tive, since the production of these ideas requires a free-play between the imagination and the
understanding that is itself undetermined by any rules.
When discussing his second criterion for genius, Kant insists that a product of genius must
serve as a “standard or a rule for judging.”19 Kant seems to mean that beautiful art must serve
as an example according to which other artists judge their own work. There are three different
ways, however, in which other artists can receive the products of genius. First, a school, i.e.,
“methodical instruction in accordance with rules,” can spring up around an artistic genius
where other artists merely “ape” [nachäffen] beautiful art by following the rules that can be
extracted from the products of genius.20 In this case, the rule-governed procedure fully determines
the products of the student who is aping the genius’s products. Second, there is “mannerism”
whereby an artist follows the rule-governed procedure, but also exhibits a degree of originality.
This originality, however, is not sufficient for the products of the mannerist to serve as an
example for others. This could be considered non-exemplary originality.21 Third, the product
of genius can serve as an example through which another genius “is awakened to the feeling
of his own originality.”22 This is what Kant calls “exemplary originality.”23 Ultimately, for an
artistic product to count as a product of genius, Kant thinks that it must inspire another genius
to produce his own beautiful art.24
Why does Kant add this second criterion, i.e., that a product of genius must serve as an
example to guide and inspire others? Clearly, since originality is an essential feature of genius,
a product of genius cannot merely imitate what has come before. Something can, however, be
entirely original while at the same time being nonsense, e.g., when the freedom of the imagination
is unconstrained by taste. Kant wants to preclude the possibility of such inventions counting as
products of genius, which is why he adds this condition. Assuming that nonsense is not exemp-
lary, then the products of genius cannot be nonsense.25
When elaborating on his fourth criterion, Kant holds that genius is a talent for art and not
science since in the latter “rules that are distinctly cognized must come first and determine the
procedure in it.”26 As we now know, this is not an entirely appropriate way to distinguish art
from science even by Kant’s own lights. Rules must determine the procedures of both art and
science, at least to some extent, if either is to be “academically correct.” The appropriate contrast
between artistic and scientific production has to do with the extent to which those procedures are
determined by rules. Whereas following the rules is both necessary and sufficient for scientific
production, according to Kant, beautiful art “cannot be produced by any following of rules.”27
As I will argue below, although Kant is right about some forms of scientific production, his
542 B. HALL
account does not cover all forms of scientific production. Some forms of scientific production are
undetermined by rule-governed procedures while meeting conditions (1)–(3) for genius. At least
for certain forms of scientific production, condition (4) should be rejected.
How should we understand the idea of a rule-governed procedure that fully determines the
products of that procedure? As mentioned above, I believe Kant thinks Newton possesses a
logic of discovery according to which Newton’s discoveries are the logical consequences of
well-established premises. There is no room for spirit when one is following such a logic. This
logic of discovery, furthermore, can be learned by others to reproduce the same discovery (an
important function of the scientific community) or to make new discoveries of their own. This
explains why Newton, in Kant’s mind, would fail both the first and the third conditions for genius.
Kant himself suggests this way of interpreting the difference between what role rules play in
scientific discovery and what role they play in artistic production when he claims that there is no
such thing as a “science of the beautiful.”28 His main reason for rejecting a science of the beautiful
is that the latter would have to be determined “by means of proof.”29 What exactly does Kant
mean by “proof” in this context? Here, it is helpful to look at Kant’s logic lectures. Of the existing
logic lectures, the Dohna-Wundlacken Logic (1792) is chronologically closest to the publication
of the Critique of Judgment (1790). In this series of lectures, Kant claims that there are three parts
of a proof. There is the proof itself, the proposition to be proven, and the relationship between the
two which he understands in terms of consequence where the proof provides the grounds. In other
words, proofs involve the relationship of logical consequence, and Kant even uses the example of
a categorical syllogism to make clear this is the relationship he has in mind.30
In the Critique of Judgment, Kant holds that Newton’s principles of natural philosophy can be
learned since the latter “could make all the steps that he had to take, from the first elements of
geometry to his great and profound discoveries, entirely intuitive not only to himself but to every-
one else, and thus set them out for posterity quite determinately.”31 Given what Kant says about
“proof” in his logic lectures, it seems as if the easiest way to understand the connection between
these steps is in terms of logical consequence.32 If so, then for Kant, Newton’s conclusions in the
Principia should be considered the logical consequence of well-established premises, i.e., as the
result of a logic of discovery. What remains to be determined, however, is whether Newton’s argu-
ments for these conclusions meet the standards of a logic of discovery.33
2. Newton’s argument in the Principia

What exactly is the goal of Newton’s argument in the Principia? Although establishing the law of
universal gravitation (Proposition 7 of Book III) is a valuable conclusion in its own right, it is in
service of a more important goal from Newton’s perspective.34 Newton’s stated aim is to discover
the true motions (the way objects really move within a privileged frame of reference) of objects
from their apparent motions (the way objects appear to move within different frames of refer-
ence).35 Proposition 12 of Book III (though anticipated by the corollaries to Proposition 8) pro-
vides us with a privileged frame of reference within which we can determine the true motions of
objects in the solar system, viz. a heliocentric model.36 Although reconstructing Newton’s com-
plete argument for the determination of true motion in Book III of the Principia falls beyond the
scope of this paper, a brief overview of his argumentative strategy should make clear he is imple-
menting a logic of discovery.
The stages of Newton’s argument tend to exhibit a conditional form where the “if-then” prop-
ositions of his mathematical theory, established in Book I from his laws of motion, serve as “infer-
ence-tickets” in Book III allowing Newton to infer forces from motions, motions from forces, and
net forces from contributing forces.37 Most of Newton’s arguments for specific propositions in
Book III begin by invoking “phenomena,” i.e., patterns exhibited in open-ended bodies of
data.38 By a straightforward application of modus ponens one can infer the consequent of the
mathematical conditional as long as the phenomenon in question instantiates the antecedent.
These mathematical conditionals should be considered the heart of Newton’s rule-governed pro-
cedure in Book III.39
For example, in his argument for Proposition 1 of Book III, Newton notes that Propositions 2
or 3 of Book I allow one to infer from the fact that a body’s orbit obeys the law of areas to the
conclusion that the body is held in its orbit by a force directed toward the center of the
primary body (centripetal force).40 Likewise, Corollary 6 of Proposition 4 of Book I allows
one to infer from the fact that an orbiting body obeys Kepler’s harmonic law to the conclusion
that it is directed toward the central body by a force inversely proportional to the square of its
distance from the central body.41 Since the moons of Jupiter obey the law of areas and
Kepler’s harmonic law according to Phenomenon 1, one can conclude in Proposition 1 of
Book III that the moons of Jupiter are maintained in their orbits by a force directed toward the
center of Jupiter which varies inversely with the square of their distance from the center of
Jupiter.42
Although the above might suggest that Newton’s approach is thoroughly deductive, it should
be noted that induction plays a crucial role. In the General Scholium, Newton says that the prop-
ositions established by deductions from the phenomena are “made general by induction.”43 These
inductive steps, however, do not occur outside the framework of Newton’s deductive argument,
but rather take place squarely within this framework. The way that Newton renders propositions
general is by invoking them as premises in later deductive arguments in conjunction with the
Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy that govern these generalizations.
For example, the argument for Proposition 5 of Book III renders Proposition 4 more general
by showing that there is not only gravitation toward the Earth, but toward all the planets. Since (i)
the motions of the moons orbiting Jupiter, the moons orbiting Saturn, the primary planets orbiting
the Sun, and the Moon orbiting the Earth are effects of the same kind (from Propositions 1–3), and
(ii) the Moon is maintained in its orbit about the Earth by the force of gravity (Proposition 4), and
(iii) same effects have the same causes (from the first and second Rules of Reasoning), the moons
of Jupiter and Saturn are maintained in their orbits and the primary planets are maintained in their
orbits by the force of gravity as well.44
Although this argument establishes gravitation toward Jupiter, Saturn, and the Sun, what
about planets without satellites (e.g., Venus)? Newton recognizes that for planets without
moons, there are no bodies that can be used to measure gravity toward them. He justifies extend-
ing gravity to these planets through the fourth Rule of Reasoning which holds that “propositions
gathered from phenomena by induction should be considered either exactly or very nearly true
notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses, until yet other phenomena make such propositions
either more exact or liable to exceptions.”45 By considering the proposition that there is
gravity toward all the planets as exactly true (i.e., as true of all the planets), Newton is taking
the orbital phenomena as a measure of the features of gravity (inverse-square centripetal force)
for planets generally.46
Returning to Newton’s overall goal, the above might suggest that he considers himself to be
providing an exact theory of the true motions of objects. Newton does not take himself to be offer-
ing an exact theory, however, but rather a way of arguing “more securely” in natural philosophy, a
research strategy that can be adopted by scientists inquiring into the true motions of objects.47
When it comes to the fourth Rule of Reasoning, Newton believes that propositions made
general by induction should be employed as if they were exact only when one can specify
certain circumstances where the proposition would in fact hold exactly.48 At this point, the prop-
osition becomes an idealization, an idealization that allows scientists to search for discrepancies
between theory (idealization) and observation. These discrepancies, in turn, serve as second-order
544 B. HALL
phenomena according to which the theory can be refined to generate even smaller discrepancies.49
These discrepancies may, however, never be eliminated. In fact, Newton admits that an exact
theory of the true motion of bodies might not be possible:
By reason of the deviation of the Sun from the center of gravity, the centripetal force does not always
tend to that immobile center, and hence the planets neither move exactly in ellipses nor revolve twice
in the same orbit. There are as many orbits of a planet as it has revolutions, as in the motions of the
Moon, and the orbit of any one planet depends on the combined motions of all the planets, not to
mention the action of all these on each other. But to consider simultaneously all these causes of
motion and to define these motions by exact laws admitting of easy calculation exceeds, if I am
not mistaken, the force of any human mind.50
Newton’s logic of discovery is aimed at determining the true motions of bodies from their appar-
ent motions. Insofar as this logic of discovery can be viewed as an ongoing research strategy, the
determination of true motion is never complete since this research strategy only aims at ever better
approximations of true motion from apparent motion. In Proposition 12 of Book III Newton expli-
citly admits that the Sun is only approximately the center of mass (and so the gravitational center)
in the solar system. As he says, “the Sun is agitated by a perpetual motion, but never recedes far
from the centre of gravity of all the planets.”51 The approximate nature of Newton’s conclusion,
however, does not undermine the deductive structure of the argument.52 Although Newton’s argu-
ments in Book III proceed from phenomena that hold only quam proxime (insofar as they are gen-
eralizations that fit open-ended sets of data), the arguments are still deductively valid since the
conclusions of these arguments are held to be true only quam proxime as well.53
Even though Newton’s argument contains inductive steps, they occur in the service of an
argument whose overall form is deductive. Following this procedure, I believe one can recon-
struct Newton’s complete argument for the true motion of bodies in such a way that the conclusion
is the logical consequence of certain well-established premises. Newton’s arguments for individ-
ual propositions in Book III follow this template and, once established, these propositions are
invoked as premises in later arguments that support other propositions in Book III. Since the argu-
ment is deductively valid, there is no gap between what the premises dictate and the conclusion
itself that the creativity and originality of genius would need to occupy. If one accepts the pre-
mises, the power of logic compels you to accept the conclusion. Consequently, it would seem
as if Newton’s discovery of true motions from apparent motions fails to meet Kant’s first criterion
for genius.
Newton’s logic of discovery is something that he passed on to others through the publication
of the Principia itself. The idea seems to be: follow my logic of discovery and you too will dis-
cover things that do not require the framing of hypotheses. Thus, Newton’s discovery fails to meet
the third condition for genius insofar as the procedure according to which he discovered the true
motions of objects from their apparent motions could be learned by others to produce discoveries
of their own. Regardless of whether Newton’s approximation of true motion itself served as an
example to inspire others (so meeting Kant’s second condition for genius), insofar as this discov-
ery fails to meet the first and the third conditions of genius, it fails to be an example of scientific
genius.
3. Newton’s scientific genius

Ultimately, what is needed as a counterexample to Kant is a scientific discovery that requires a
natural originality underdetermined by a rule-governed procedure (thus meeting the first and
third conditions), but is also an exemplar (thus meeting the second condition). If we can find
such a counterexample, then it seems as if we would have an instance of scientific genius by
Kant’s own lights. Although I believe Newton’s argument for determining the true motions of
bodies can be reconstructed so that his conclusion in Proposition 12 of Book III can be seen as
the logical consequence of certain well-established premises (pace Kant), nevertheless, he did
not possess a rule-governed procedure for generating the logic of discovery he used to establish
this conclusion.
When it comes to natural originality, one can argue that Newton possessed spirit, especially if
one understands this, as Allison does, in terms of the ability to make imaginative associations
(aesthetic ideas) that express an underlying thought. As mentioned above, Newton’s underlying
methodological thought was that he wanted to find a way of arguing “more securely” in natural
philosophy. I will argue below that his logic of discovery is the result of imaginative associations
between disparate argumentative techniques where these techniques cohere in a very specific way
to achieve his methodological goal of arguing more securely. Although each of these techniques,
taken individually, can be subsumed under concepts of the understanding, the way Newton puts
them together requires the freedom of the imagination. Insofar as Newton’s logic of discovery
offers a way of arguing more securely in natural philosophy, it should be considered an adequate
expression of his “aesthetic idea.”
Traditional approaches to scientific discovery in Newton’s own day tended to either be induc-
tive or hypothetico-deductive. Neither approach, however, adequately captures Newton’s argu-
mentative approach. Although Newton incorporates both approaches into his logic of
discovery, they are modified in imaginative ways that make them far more powerful than
either approach taken individually.
There are aspects of the argument that are inductive, e.g., when Newton inductively general-
izes propositions that were deduced from the phenomena. Even so, for Newton, these inductive
generalizations support the premises of what is otherwise a deductive argument. Besides occur-
ring within the framework of a deductive argument, the inductive steps themselves are also highly
original insofar as they are governed by Newton’s Rules of Reasoning. We have already seen the
role that the fourth Rule of Reasoning plays in insuring that inductive generalizations serve as a
guide for future research. In Proposition 6 of Book III, Newton appeals to the third Rule of
Reasoning which holds that “those qualities of bodies that cannot be intended or remitted
[increased or diminished] and that belong to all bodies on which experiments can be made
should be taken as qualities of all bodies universally.”54 The qualities of bodies that cannot be
increased or diminished count as “constant parameter values.”55 The constant parameter value
that Newton is concerned with in Proposition 6 is the equal ratio of weight to inertial mass for
bodies at an equal distance from the center of a planet. Newton uses different experiments on
diverse phenomena to establish this ratio for bodies at an equal distance from the center of the
Earth.56 He then uses the harmonic law to establish that this same ratio obtains for bodies an
equal distance from the center of other planets (Jupiter and Saturn) as well as the Sun. Since
gravity is responsible for the weight of bodies toward Earth, gravity must be responsible for
the weight of bodies toward the other planets and the Sun as well. The converging measurements
of this parameter using different experiments on diverse phenomena provide strong inductive
support for his generalization of gravity to all the planets.
Notwithstanding the overall deductive form of Newton’s argument, it is important to recog-
nize how different his approach is from the hypothetico-deductive approach common in his day.
At first, this might be difficult to see since the hypothetico-deductive approach also uses “if-then”
statements. A hypothesis serves as the antecedent of a conditional where the consequent is an
observable phenomenon that the hypothesis predicts. Observation of the phenomenon then
counts as evidence in favor of the hypothesis.57 In Newton’s case, however, it is important to
note that the “if-then” propositions of Book I are often the converses of one another such that
one can infer not only a conclusion about force (consequent) from the phenomena of motion
546 B. HALL
(antecedent), but also from this conclusion about force (antecedent) one can likewise infer the
phenomena of motion (consequent). For example, whereas Proposition 2 of Book I allows one
to infer from the fact that a body’s orbit obeys the law of areas to the conclusion that the body
is held in its orbit by a centripetal force, Proposition 1 of Book I allows one to infer from the
fact that a body is held in its orbit by a centripetal force to the conclusion that the body’s orbit
obeys the law of areas. Besides showing how Newton can infer motions from forces in addition
to forces from motions, these “systematic dependencies” are also an advantage of Newton’s argu-
ment over traditional hypothetico-deductive arguments which have only conditional but not
biconditional form. It is also important to note that Newton’s inferences (in these cases) rely
upon modus ponens whereas hypothetico-deductive inferences do not.58
Even though there is a surface similarity between Newton’s mathematical approach and the
mathematical approach of natural philosophers like Galileo and Huygens (viz. proceeding from
mathematical axioms to rigorously demonstrated propositions), there are also important differ-
ences. Whereas Newton takes the “if-then” propositions of his mathematical theory established
in Book I to hold true from the outset of Book III where phenomena first serve as the antecedents
of these mathematical conditionals, Galileo and Huygens begin with mathematical axioms and
then derive phenomena as observable consequences that are intended to provide evidence for
the mathematical axioms. In this way, Galileo and Huygens are clearly operating within the
context of a traditional hypothetico-deductive approach whereas Newton is not.59
One might look at the various thought-experiments Newton uses in his argument in Book III
of the Principia as examples of hypothetico-deductive reasoning that fail to meet the standards
of a logic of discovery since the hypotheses themselves are not generated by a rule-governed
procedure. For example, in Proposition 4 of Book III, Newton asks us to assume (hypothesis)
that the Moon was deprived of its rectilinear motion. From this assumption, Newton goes on to
prove that the force that maintains the Moon in its orbit around the Earth is gravity.60 The
hypothetico-deductive reasoning that Newton uses (deducing consequences about motions or
forces from counterfactual assumptions), however, is very different from the hypothetico-
deductive reasoning that someone like Descartes uses (deducing observable consequences
from metaphysical assumptions) in the Principles of Philosophy and which Newton criticizes
in the General Scholium to the Principia. Whereas Descartes must use creative intuition in
order to generate his purportedly explanatory metaphysical hypotheses about the unobservable
(e.g., his plenum vortices), Newton is simply rearranging facts about observables to generate
counterfactual situations.
This is not to say that Newton’s own deductions from the phenomena do not exhibit creativity.
To the contrary, the ways in which he not only departed from but also improved upon the hypothe-
tico-deductive model seem quite creative. To give a final example, Newton’s approach is far more
resistant to contrary hypotheses than the hypothetico-deductive model. Whereas the hypothetico-
deductive model must countenance any contrary hypothesis that predicts the same phenomena,
for Newton, any contrary hypothesis must meet a certain standard of empirical success, viz. the
predicted phenomena must accurately measure certain parameters (e.g., the equal ratio of
weight to inertial mass in Proposition 6). Unless a contrary hypothesis meets this standard,
there is no reason to think that Newton’s propositions are “liable to exceptions” (fourth Rule
of Reasoning). This is a much higher standard for countenancing contrary hypotheses than the
hypothetico-deductive model demands.61
Although Newton’s logic of discovery in the Principia incorporates both inductive and
hypothetico-deductive reasoning, it cannot be reduced to either one. It both departs from and
improves upon these other forms of reasoning in creative ways. Newton needed spirit to
bridge the significant gap between what these other procedures would dictate and his own
rule-governed procedure in the Principia. His logic of discovery is an imaginative association
of disparate argumentative techniques that expresses Newton’s underlying methodological aim of

arguing more securely in natural philosophy. Although these argumentative techniques can indi-
vidually be subsumed under concepts of the understanding, the way in which Newton associates
them requires imagination since there is no fully determinate rule-governed procedure for associ-
ating these argumentative techniques with one another. Newton’s logic of discovery meets Kant’s
first condition for genius since its creation was underdetermined by any rule-governed procedure
and required an originality that can be characterized in terms of Kant’s conception of spirit.
Likewise, since there was no rule-governed procedure that entailed his logic of discovery, this
rule-governed procedure could not be learned by others to generate their own logics of discovery.
As we have seen, Newton required spirit to create his logic of discovery, and spirit cannot be
taught. Consequently, Newton would seem to meet Kant’s third condition for genius insofar as
creating this logic of discovery depended on a natural talent that could not be passed on to
others through any rule-governed procedure.
Newton also possesses taste insofar as his imaginative association of argumentative tech-
niques is checked by the lawfulness of the understanding insuring that his logic of discovery is
coherent. This coherence can be seen in the way that his logic of discovery is successful in offer-
ing scientists a way of arguing more securely in natural philosophy. Far from being “original non-
sense,” Newton’s logic of discovery is an adequate expression of his “aesthetic idea.” Even
though Newton’s logic of discovery offers scientists a way of arguing more securely, have scien-
tists actually taken advantage of this methodology? In other words, has Newton’s logic of discov-
ery served as an example for others, thus meeting the second criterion for genius? This is a
necessary condition for genius and jointly sufficient with the other two conditions. In the first
section of this paper, I articulated three senses in which a product of genius can serve as an
example for others. (1) Someone might ape the product, i.e., simply follow the rule-governed
procedure extracted from the product without any originality. (2) Someone might follow the
rule-governed procedure but exhibit a kind of originality which is not exemplary for others
(non-exemplary originality). (3) Someone’s own genius might be awoken by the products of
another genius such that it leads the awoken genius to produce their own products that exemplify
genius (exemplary originality).
It is clear that Newton’s logic of discovery has served as an example in sense (1) above.62
When viewed as an ongoing research strategy, other scientists had to adopt Newton’s logic of dis-
covery in order to make their own discoveries. Sometimes following this logic of discovery led to
modifications of Newton’s theory, e.g., Alexis Clairaut updated Newton’s mathematical theory
discovering that there was not, in fact, a discrepancy between Newton’s physical theory and
the precession of the lunar apogee. This was a problem that Newton was unable to solve with
the mathematical resources available to him.63 Sometimes following this logic of discovery led
to Newton’s theory being superseded by another, e.g., Albert Einstein’s general relativity
explained the discrepancy between the precession of Mercury’s perihelion and Newtonian
theory.64 In either case, following Newton’s logic of discovery, understood as an ongoing research
strategy, is how Newton’s theory was modified (Clairaut) or superseded (Einstein). The “discre-
pancies” are second-order phenomena that presuppose taking as exact Newtonian propositions
deduced from the phenomena and made general by induction. Regardless of how revolutionary
the first-order discoveries might be (e.g., Einstein’s theory of general relativity), these first-
order discoveries are predicated on future scientists aping (to use Kant’s term) Newton’s
second-order discovery (i.e., following his logic of discovery understood as a research strategy).65
Although Clairaut and Einstein seem to reflect the first sense in which the products of genius
can be exemplary, Kant himself reflects the second sense. There is an important way in which
Kant can be viewed as a “mannerist” of Newton insofar as he followed Newton’s rule-governed
procedure for scientific discovery while also showing a degree of originality which was not
548 B. HALL
sufficient, in his own procedure, to be exemplary for others. Just as Newton’s logic of discovery,
in the Principia, is aimed at discovering the true motions of bodies from their apparent motions,
Kant’s central argument in the Phenomenology chapter of the Metaphysical Foundations of
Natural Science (1787) aims at the same goal. His argument, furthermore, bears a strong simi-
larity to the argumentative strategy that Newton adopts in Book III of the Principia.66 Just as
Newton begins with apparent motion (phenomena) which are relative motions (e.g., the motion
of the moons of Jupiter relative to Jupiter in Proposition 1 of Book III), so too does Kant
begin with “appearances” of relative motion. Kant attempts to derive true motions from apparent
motions using antecedently established laws of motion in conjunction with these apparent
motions and his modal categories (possibility, actuality, and necessity).67 This is similar to how
Newton tries to establish a privileged frame of reference within which we can determine the true
motions of objects in the solar system (viz. a heliocentric model) from the phenomena of orbital
motion in conjunction with the “if-then” propositions of his mathematical theory and his laws of
motion. Although the idea of synthesizing transcendental principles from the Critique of Pure
Reason (viz. the Postulates of Empirical Thought which deal with the objective application of
the categories of modality) with Newton’s logic of discovery in the Principia was surely original,
to my knowledge, it had little impact on the future of science (non-exemplary originality). Kant’s
synthesis followed a pre-existing rule-governed procedure (Newton’s logic of discovery) and sup-
plemented this procedure in an original way, but failed itself to be exemplary.68
The third sense in which a product of genius can be exemplary is perhaps the most important
from Kant’s perspective. The products of genius can serve to awaken the genius of others to
produce their own products that exemplify genius (exemplary originality). At first blush, this
kind of influence appears easy to see in the history of art. One can talk about the products of Nat-
uralist and Impressionist genius awakening Edvard Munch’s artistic genius where the products of
his genius (e.g., The Scream) served to awaken the genius of the German Expressionists.69
At the same time, however, Kant’s criterion for genius being exemplary in this final sense leads
to a regress problem if being exemplary in this sense is a necessary condition for genius. Under this
view, for any individual A, that individual counts as a genius only if (necessary condition) their
product awakens the genius of another individual B to produce their own product. B counts as a
genius, however, only if (necessary condition) their product awakens the genius of another individ-
ual C to produce their own product (and so on). Since there is no way of determining whether a
product is exemplary in Kant’s third sense (i.e., no way of knowing whether the necessary condition
is met given the regress), there is no way of determining whether an individual is a genius.
There are a variety of ways in which someone might try to respond to this worry. One might
claim that any of the three ways of being exemplary are sufficient (and none necessary) for an
individual to meet the second criterion for genius. In this case, since Newton’s second-order scien-
tific discovery has been shown to be exemplary in senses (1) and (2), this would be sufficient for
Newton to meet the second condition for genius. Assuming that Newton has likewise met the first
and third conditions for genius outlined above, Newton would then count as a genius according to
Kant’s criteria. If one is not yet ready to concede that Newton counts as a genius by Kant’s own
lights, one might insist that the regress can be stopped at any point simply by asking whether the
product is beautiful (since only geniuses produce beautiful art). Both of these responses, however,
seem to ignore what Kant means when he adds the second condition for genius according to
which the products of genius must be exemplary. It seems clear that Kant had sense (3) in
mind when he added this condition. When defining “exemplary originality,” Kant says:
In this way the product of a genius (in respect of that in it which is to be ascribed to genius, not to
possible learning or schooling) is an example, not for imitation (for then that which is genius in it
and constitutes the spirit of that work would be lost), but for emulation by another genius, who is
thereby awakened to the feeling of his own originality, to exercise freedom from coercion in his art in
such a way that the latter thereby itself acquires a new rule, by which the talent shows itself as
exemplary.70
Although the products of genius can be exemplary in senses (1) and (2), it is only sense (3) that is
essential for Kant’s theory of genius. In order for an individual to meet the second necessary
condition for genius (i.e., that her products are exemplary), that individual’s products must be
exemplary in this final sense. Simply determining whether a product is beautiful avoids answering
the crucial question, viz. did the product awaken the genius of another? Answering this question,
of course, leads us back into the regress since the talent that is awoken only counts as genius if the
products of this talent awaken the genius of another (and so on). Is there a way of approaching
Kant’s final sense of how genius can be exemplary such that we can avoid this regress
problem? Paul Guyer suggests that what is distinctive about the third sense of being exemplary
is the fruitful impact that it has on the wider field. As he says:
Thus, Kant’s conception of genius guarantees that the history of art will be one of variety in response
as much as agreement in valuation; constant upheaval in forms of artistic success; and, inevitably great
amounts of waste, academic on the one hand and mannerist on the other.71
In the world of art, when a product of genius is merely aped by the members of the genius’s
school, the results are decidedly second-rate and rather forgettable. Mere mannerism, even if it
possesses a degree of originality, has no lasting impact on the larger artistic world. What really
distinguishes the genius is that her products lead to an upheaval in that world, while still offering
a standard for beauty throughout these upheavals. In the case of art, commentators tend to focus
on what I would consider products of procedures (first-order) rather than procedures themselves
(second-order). Of course, for the artistic genius, there is no procedure that fully determines the
product, but once the beautiful art is produced, rules are extracted from the product which others
either merely follow (first sense of exemplary) or follow to a great extent as the mannerist does
(second sense of exemplary). Since Newton’s genius lies in his second-order discovery of a new
rule-governed procedure (logic of discovery), however, it not only allows for, but makes possible,
constant upheaval of the scientific world at the first-order level. Newton’s theory (first-order
discovery) is not what is most important for this upheaval, but rather his logic of discovery,
understood as a research strategy, that eventually led his theory to be superseded by Einstein’s
own theory. By underpinning and driving these first-order upheavals in science, Newton’s
logic of discovery also serves as a second-order standard for evaluating future scientific research.
In conclusion, it seems as if Newton’s discovery of a new approach for argumentation in
natural philosophy counts as a second-order scientific discovery that meets the first three con-
ditions for genius outlined in section one (original, exemplary, and natural). Contrary to what
Kant claims in the fourth condition, some forms of scientific production should be considered
examples of genius insofar as they fulfill the other three conditions. As we have just seen, by
means of Newton’s genius, nature did prescribe the rule for science (his logic of discovery), a
rule that continues to influence science to this day. Although the approximation of true motion
that Newton’s logic of discovery produced does not count as an example of scientific genius
according to Kant’s criteria, the logic of discovery that Newton produced should count as an
example of scientific genius by Kant’s own lights.
If both artists and scientists can meet Kant’s criteria for genius in the Critique of Judgment,
however, is there any way that Kant can distinguish between scientific and artistic genius
within the context of the Critique of Judgment? I believe that Kant can distinguish between artistic
and scientific genius on the basis of what each form of genius produces and how these products
are received by others.
550 B. HALL
According to Kant, assuming that the artistic genius is appropriately endowed with spirit,
imagination, understanding, and taste, she can produce beautiful art. In others that possess
taste, contemplating this beautiful art produces a free correspondence of the imagination with
the lawfulness of the understanding that can be universally communicated to others similarly dis-
posed.72 This free correspondence is the result of the understanding’s failure to cognize beautiful
art through determining judgments. Determining judgments require that one begin with a general
rule and then subsume a particular under this rule. The problem is that beautiful art cannot be sub-
sumed under general rules (much like genius itself). Instead, the understanding must use reflecting
judgment where one begins with a particular and then imagination searches for a general rule
under which the particular could be subsumed.73 No general rule can determine that the object
is beautiful since such aesthetic judgments always involve a connection to the subject’s feeling
of pleasure, one that is universally communicable in those that possess taste.74
In contrast to beautiful art, the products of scientific genius can be cognized through determin-
ing judgment since the products of scientific genius (at least in the example I have offered) are
themselves rule-governed procedures perfectly in accord with the lawfulness of the understand-
ing. Although the discovery of these rule-governed procedures is not the result of determining
judgment (the originality involved in the discovery would seem to require reflecting judgment),
the rule-governed procedure can itself be understood through determining judgment. Conse-
quently, there is a way of distinguishing between the products of scientific and artistic genius.
The products of scientific and artistic genius need not be (and perhaps never are) of the same
kind. Whereas Newton’s genius lies in his production of a (second-order) logic of discovery, Kant
describes artistic genius in terms of the production of (first-order) beautiful art. Even though Kant
himself rejects the possibility of scientific genius in the Critique of Judgment, it seems there is
nonetheless a way of drawing a Kantian distinction between scientific and artistic genius.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Bernd Buldt, Sorin Costreie, Robert Hanna, Dana Jalobeanu, Walter Ott, Bill Rumsey,
and George E. Smith for their questions and comments on this paper. Thanks also to the anonymous readers
at this journal whose comments were of great value in revising this paper for publication.
Notes
1. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 5:317. All citations to Kant’s work use the Akademie-edition pagination
from Kants Gesammelte Schriften except for those referring to the Critique of Pure Reason for which I
use the standard A/B edition pagination.
2. See Kant, Critique of Judgment, 5:311. It is important to note that Kant did not always deny that
Newton was a scientific genius. In the 1770s through much of the 1780s, the main criterion for
genius seems to be a talent or ability to invent, which both artists as well as scientists share. In Reflec-
tion 778, written between 1772 and 1773, Kant suggests that Newton’s discovery of the law of univer-
sal gravitation exhibited inventiveness and should count as an example of scientific genius
notwithstanding the fact that he “imitated the fall of the apple” (15:340). In Reflection 812, written
between 1769 and 1778, Kant claims that “in mathematics genius actually reveals itself in the inven-
tion of methods” (15:362). Likewise, in Reflection 1510, written between 1780 and 1784, Kant again
suggests that Newton should count as a genius insofar as he invented a “new way” for science (15:826–
827). As we shall see, these last two reflections are wholly consistent with my description of how
Newton’s mathematical natural philosophy exhibits genius. For more on Kant’s early theory of
genius and its relation to science, see Tonelli, “Kant’s Early Theory” and Giordanetti, “Das Verhältnis
von Genie.” The above naturally raises the question of why Kant changed his mind with respect to the
possibility of scientific genius by the time he published Critique of Judgment in 1790. One view is that
Kant’s rejection of scientific genius stemmed from his growing dissatisfaction with the Sturm und
Drang movement in Germany and, in particular, with one of its main figures, Johann Herder. Under
this view, Kant saw Herder as trying to supplant the natural scientist with the artistic genius within the
scientist’s own domain. As one of the principal defenders of enlightenment thinking, it is not surprising
that Kant would strongly disagree with Herder’s view. This led Kant to hold that the domain of genius
and science cannot overlap. If I am right, however, Kant’s response to Herder was ultimately an over-
reaction. For more on this view, see Zammito, Kant’s Critique of Judgment, 136–142. Another sugges-
tion is that Kant was responding to Alexander Gerard’s view that both scientists and artists can be
geniuses insofar as they discover (scientist) or create (artist) things that will be universally accepted
and appreciated. Kant’s view on artistic appreciation, however, is far more complicated, and he dis-
cusses distinct ways in which a product of artistic genius might be received. I will argue below,
however, that the reception of Newton’s new approach toward argumentation in natural philosophy
was equally complex. For more on this view, see Guyer, “Exemplary Originality.” Regardless of
why Kant changed his mind on the possibility of scientific genius in Critique of Judgment, it
should be noted that he again suggests in his 1798 Anthropology that both scientists and philosophers
can be geniuses citing Newton and Leibniz as examples (7:226). This paper, however, will focus pri-
marily on Kant’s view in Critique of Judgment.
3. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 5:308.
4. Newton, Principia, 943.
5. Larry Laudan calls this the “generativist” approach toward scientific discovery and distinguishes it
from the “consequentialist” approach which is hypothetico-deductive. While the former strategy is
well-suited to discovering empirical laws that describe observable phenomena, Laudan argues that
the latter strategy is well-suited for discovering the unobservable mechanisms that explain the obser-
vable phenomena that the empirical laws describe. See Laudan, “Logic of Discovery.”
6. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 5:307–8.
7. Ibid., 5:309.
8. Jeremy Proulx notes that these are the three “basic ways” that Kant defines genius. See Proulx,
“Nature, Judgment and Art.”
9. Both philosophers of science and scientists themselves have, at times, appealed to creative insight
when describing scientific discovery. As an example of the former, Karl Popper thinks that new
ideas in science can only be described as the result of “creative intuition.” See Popper, Logic of Scien-
tific Discovery, 32. As an example of the latter, August Kekulé claimed that a day-dream of Ouroboros
inspired him in his discovery of the ring shape of the benzene molecule. See Kekulé, “Benzolfest:
Rede.” Joke Meheus and Thomas Nickles suggest, however, that anecdotes like this are little more
than hubris, scientists who fancy themselves romantic geniuses. In contrast to the above thinkers,
they argue that scientific discovery is amenable to rational reconstruction. See Meheus and Nickles,
“Creativity and Discovery,” 234. Although I agree with Meheus and Nickles that scientific discovery
is amenable to rational reconstruction, in some cases, creativity will nonetheless play an indispensible
role.
10. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 5:305
11. Ibid., 5:307.
12. Ibid., 5:310.
13. Ibid., 5:314–315.
14. Ibid., 5:316.
15. Allison, Kant’s Theory of Taste, 286.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., 5:320.
19. Ibid., 5:308.
20. Ibid., 5:318
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Could a product of genius be exemplary without actually having any influence on others? One might
think a product is exemplary as long as it adequately expresses an aesthetic idea regardless of its impact
on others. As noted above, if a product adequately expresses an aesthetic idea, this seems sufficient for
it to avoid being “nothing but nonsense.” Since Kant adds the second criterion in order to preclude to
possibility of “original nonsense” counting as the product of genius, based on what he has already said,
maybe he only means that the product adequately expresses an aesthetic idea. Although I believe some-
thing has to adequately express an aesthetic idea in order to be a product of genius, adequately
552 B. HALL
expressing an aesthetic idea is not sufficient for the product to be exemplary. That exemplarity requires
an influence on others is made clear both by Kant’s elucidation of exemplary originality in terms of its
influence on another genius (Kant, Critique of Judgment, 5:318) as well as his earlier claim that the
products of genius must serve as models for others in order to be exemplary (Kant, Critique of Judg-
ment, 5:308). As we will see below, an interesting consequence of this view is that a lack of influence
can prevent an individual from counting as a genius by Kant’s lights.
25. To give a (pseudo) scientific example, a sixteenth-century miller hypothesized that matter was ulti-
mately constituted of a primordial cheese. Although the miller’s speculations were extremely original,
they were equally nonsensical. Even though the miller did not inspire a new school of cheese-based
microphysical investigation (rather only persecution and ultimately execution at the hands of the Inqui-
sition), as I will argue, Newton’s logic of discovery served as an example for generations of natural
philosophers after Newton including Kant himself. See Ginzburg, Cheese and the Worms.
27. Ibid., 5:318.
28. Ibid., 5:304.
29. Ibid., 5:305.
30. See Kant, Lectures on Logic, 24:748. Immediately before his discussion of proof, Kant holds that one
must “carefully distinguish between art and science” (ibid., 24:747). Immediately after his discussion
of proof, he mentions the “bon mot (but is not always true)” of “aesthetic demonstration” (ibid.,
24:749). Likewise, in Critique of Judgment, Kant says if one were to ask the practitioner of a
science of the beautiful for “grounds or proofs,” one “would be sent packing with tasteful expressions
(bons mots).” See Kant, Critique of Judgment, 5:305. Although Kant is clearly concerned with dis-
tinguishing art from science in this section of the Dohna-Wundlacken Logic, it is an ongoing
concern by no means unique to these logic lectures (see, e.g., Kant, Lectures on Logic, 24:116,
747–749, and 811–812).
32. Although Kant does talk about other kinds of proof in Critique of Judgment, proofs based on “rational
inference” (or syllogism) are the only “logically correct” form of proof (Kant, Critique of Judgment
5:463).
33. William Harper notes that Newtonian “deduction” is not limited to logically valid inference, but
describes “any appropriately warranted conclusion inferred from phenomena as available evidence”
which can include induction. In my discussion below, I attempt to remain sensitive to how Newton
incorporates induction into what is otherwise a logically deductive argumentative structure. See
Harper, Isaac Newton’s Scientific Method, 44.
34. For Proposition 7, see Newton, Principia, 810.
35. See Newton, Principia, 414–415. Michael Friedman makes this observation. See Friedman, Exact
Sciences, 141
36. For Proposition 12, see Newton, Principia, 816. For Proposition 8 and its corollaries, see ibid., 811–
815. Both Harper and Steffen Ducheyne take Newton’s argument in Proposition 8 of Book III to be
decisive in establishing his conclusion in Proposition 12. See Harper, “Newton’s Argument,” 193
and Ducheyne, “Argument(s) for Universal Gravitation,” 440–441.
37. George E. Smith describes Newton’s strategy this way using language first coined by Arthur Prior. See
Smith, “Methodology of the Principia,” 143.
38. For the list of phenomena that Newton utilizes in his Book III arguments, see Newton, Principia, 797–
801. I am taking this specific definition of “phenomena” from Harper, Isaac Newton’s Scientific
Method, 50.
39. In addition to these mathematical conditionals, Newton often invokes his laws of motion and his Rules
of Reasoning in Philosophy within the context of his arguments in Book III. These should also be con-
sidered important components of his rule-governed argumentative procedure. For example, Newton’s
third law of motion (to any action there is always an equal and opposite reaction) plays an important
role in his arguments for Propositions 5 and 7 of Book III. See Newton, Principia, 806 and 811. For the
Rules of Reasoning, see ibid., 794–795. Below I will return to the role the Rules of Reasoning play in
Newton’s arguments.
40. The law of areas holds that a line between an orbiting body and its primary body sweeps out equal areas
in equal times. For Propositions 2 and 3 of Book I, see Newton, Principia, 444–448.
41. The harmonic law holds that the periodic time of an orbiting body is as 3/2 power of its distance from
the center of the primary body. For Corollary 6 of Proposition 4 of Book I, see Newton, Principia, 451.
42. Newton draws the same conclusion for Saturn’s moons at the end of his argument for Proposition 1
using Phenomenon 2.
44. See ibid., 805–806. Although I am restating the second rule here instead of both the first and the second
rules, Harper views the second rule (same effects same causes) simply as an implication of the first rule
which cautions against the unnecessary multiplication of causes. See Harper, “Newton’s Argument,”
183.
46. See Harper, Isaac Newton’s Scientific Method, 36–37.
47. Newton, Principia, 589. Here, I am following Smith, “Newton’s Principia Changed Physics.” Harper
endorses Smith’s approach. See Harper, Isaac Newton’s Scientific Method, 45–47.
48. For example, the law of universal gravitation should be taken to hold exactly only when (1) there is
some configuration of the parts of a body such that the macroscopic forces constructed from the
forces of these parts would conform to the law exactly, and (2) there are identifiable circumstances
in which the phenomena from which the law was inferred would hold exactly. See Smith,
“Newton’s Principia Changed Physics,” 374. To put Newton’s approach in Kant’s terms, holding a
proposition as if it were exact is to employ the proposition in a regulative context. What is interesting,
however, is that Newton believes the proposition can be held as if it were exact only if there is a situ-
ation where it would in fact hold exactly. In Kant’s terms, the proposition can be deployed in a regu-
lative context only if there is a situation where the proposition would hold constitutively. For Kant’s
version of the distinction, see Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A671–673/B699–701.
49. These phenomena are second-order since they “presuppose specific theory, and they cease to have any
meaning – they cease to exist – without that theory” (Smith, “Newton’s Principia Changed Physics,”
377). Newton himself deploys this research strategy when trying to explain the non-Keplerian motion
of the Moon. See Newton, Principia, 832–874.
50. Newton, Unpublished Scientific Papers, 281. This quote is from an expanded version of De Motu that
did not become public until 1893.
51. Newton, Principia, 401. Emphasis is mine.
52. Pierre Duhem (and others) point out that there can be no deduction from consistent premises when
what is deduced entails that one of these premises is false. In the case of Newton’s argument for
the law of universal gravitation, however, the application of the law to multi-body gravitational scen-
arios entails that Kepler’s laws of motion are strictly speaking false. See Duhem, Structure of Physical
Theory, 190–195. Smith notes that the approximate nature of Newton’s inferences undercuts this
objection since neither the premises nor the conclusions of his argument hold exactly, but only approxi-
mately. In a very important way, the approximate nature of Newton’s reasoning is what keeps his argu-
ment from undermining itself. See Smith, “Newton’s Principia Changed Physics,” 373.
53. See Smith, “Methodology of the Principia,” 160, and Friedman, Exact Sciences, 148 n19.
54. Newton, Principia, 795. For Newton’s argument for Proposition 6 of Book III, see ibid., 806–810.
55. Harper, Isaac Newton’s Scientific Method, 38. In my discussion of Proposition 6, I am following
Harper.
56. For example, his pendulum experiments establish that the weights of different materials falling from
equal distances in equal times are proportional to their masses, i.e., that the ratio of weight to mass of
these different materials is the same. He then appeals to his moon-test, first introduced in Proposition 4,
to establish the same ratio. I will return to the moon-test again below.
57. For Christian Huygens’s canonical definition of the hypothetico-deductive approach from the Treatise
on Light, see Matthews, Scientific Background, 126–127.
58. Harper makes this point. See Harper, “Newton’s Argument,” 176–177 and Harper, Isaac Newton’s
Scientific Method, 43. It is also important to note that Newton’s inferences (in these cases) rely
upon modus ponens whereas hypothetico-deductive inferences do not.
59. Here I am following Smith’s discussion of the differences between Newton’s approach and Galileo’s
and Huygens’s approaches. See Smith, “Methodology of the Principia,” 143.
60. See Newton, Principia, 803–805. From this hypothesis, we can deduce that the rate at which the Moon
would fall to the Earth because the inverse-square force would agree with the rate at which heavy
bodies actually do fall to Earth due to the force of gravity (15 and 1/12 Paris Feet per second). The
key to this part of the argument comes with Newton’s appeal to the first and second Rules of Reasoning
in Philosophy (Principia, 794–795). Since we already know the force of gravity explains the fall of
heavy bodies toward the Earth and the effect of the inverse-square force on the Moon is the same
as the effect of gravity on heavy bodies, we can infer that this inverse-square force is itself the
554 B. HALL
force of gravity. We can use this insight to identify the forces that maintain the Moon in its orbit around
the Earth in Proposition 3 with the force of gravity in Proposition 4 of Book III.
61. Harper notes three ways in which Newton’s approach is superior to the hypothetico-deductive model:
(1) Newton has a richer conception of “empirical success” (as defined above). (2) Theory-mediated
measurements provide empirical answers to theoretical problems. In the case of Proposition 6, the
measurement is theory-mediated (i.e., assumes Newtonian theory for the purposes of measurement).
Consequently, the converging measurements provide strong evidence for the theory. (3) Newton
accepts theoretical propositions as guides to further research. This is an advantage that Newton’s
approach has over both inductive and hypothetico-deductive approaches. See Harper, Isaac
Newton’s Scientific Method, 43 and 375.
62. Jon Dorling goes so far as to claim that “nearly all theoretical advances in physics since Newton have
depended partly or wholly on the use of arguments of this general form.” See Dorling, “Reasoning
from the Phenomena,” 197. Although I only discuss a subset, Smith enumerates nine ways in
which Newton’s approach in the Principia fundamentally changed physics. See Smith, “Newton’s
Principia Changed Physics.”
63. See Smith, “Newton’s Principia Changed,” 378–379, and Harper, Isaac Newton’s Scientific Method,
191–193.
64. See Smith, “Newton’s Principia Changed Physics,” 385–386. As Harper notes, not all of Newton’s
theory has been superseded. Newtonian calculations in applications of General Relativity to solar
system motions have not yet been replaced by calculations carried out in the framework of Einstein’s
theory. See Harper, Isaac Newton’s Scientific Method, 392–393.
65. As Smith and Harper note, Einstein’s discovery of how to account for the additional 43 arc-seconds per
century of Mercury’s precession requires recovering the Newtonian limit (i.e., the 531 arc-seconds that
Newton’s theory already explained). For Smith, this means that Einstein’s theory cannot undermine the
evidence that supports Newton’s theory (generated by his logic of discovery) otherwise “the specific
value of 43 arc-seconds would be nothing but an artifact of an illusion.” See Smith, “Newton’s Prin-
cipia Changed Physics,” 385. For Harper, Einstein’s theory does not undermine Newton’s standard for
empirical success (articulated by his logic of discovery), but rather does better than Newton’s own
theory by this standard. Harper thinks it is important that Einstein’s discovery required no “question
begging appeal to new standards.” See Harper, Isaac Newton’s Scientific Method, 382. He goes on
to show how modern advances in cosmology continue to reflect Newton’s approach toward argumen-
tation in natural philosophy. All of this provides strong support for the idea that scientists continue to
employ Newton’s logic of discovery up to the present day.
66. Kant, Metaphysical Foundations, 4:554–565. Friedman makes this observation. See Friedman, Exact
Sciences, 141–152.
67. In the case of rectilinear motion, we can either view a body as moving relative to a space or the space
moving relative to the body at rest. Since either description is consistent with the appearance, these are
merely possible motions. In the second stage of the argument, Kant attempts to derive actual motions
from relative motions using antecedently established laws of motion in conjunction with the appear-
ance of circular motion. Finally, Kant uses the equality of action and reaction (third law of motion)
to establish that for the actual motion of one body with respect to another it is necessary that there
be an actual motion of the second body with respect to the first.
68. In this respect, one might contrast Newton’s discovery of a new approach toward argumentation in
natural philosophy with his discovery of the calculus which did not have the impact on future gener-
ations that Leibniz’s version of the calculus had. Although both versions were developed indepen-
dently and were underdetermined by earlier mathematical methods, Leibniz published before
Newton (though Newton had made the discovery before Leibniz). For more on the history of the cal-
culus, see Hall, Philosophers at War.
69. Before his discussion of genius, Kant mentions how ancient mathematicians’ methods of proof cor-
rectly serve as examples to others insofar as others succeed and not imitate the ancients in the devel-
opment of their own methods. The ancient methods “put others on the right path for seeking out the
principles in themselves and thus for following their own often better course” (Kant, Critique of Judg-
ment, 5:283). This suggests that Kant might well embrace the idea that second-order methodological
discoveries (e.g., Newton’s logic of discovery) could be indicative of genius insofar as these discov-
eries awaken the genius of others to make their own second-order methodological discoveries. Within
mathematics, the creation of the calculus is a fine example of just this kind of methodological
influence.
71. Guyer, “Exemplary Originality,” 258.

73. For the general distinction between determining and reflective judgment, see Kant, Critique of Judg-
ment, 5:179–181. Kant uses the term “wit” to refer to reflective judgment in the Anthropology. As he
says, “the faculty of thinking up the universal for the particular is wit (ingenium).” See Kant, Anthro-
pology, 7:201. For Kant’s discussion of how reflection is involved in aesthetic judgments, see the First
Introduction to Critique of Judgment, 20:219–226. See also Kant, Critique of Judgment, 5:256, for a
summary of how aesthetic judgments are not determining.
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Kant on Newton, genius, and scientific

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Kant on Newton, genius, and scientiﬁc discovery

Department of Philosophy, Indiana University Southeast, New Albany, USA

dence of the imagination to the lawfulness of the understanding” that a rule-governed

© 2014 International Society for Intellectual History

1. Kant’s theory of genius in the Critique of Judgment

2. Newton’s argument in the Principia

3. Newton’s scientiﬁc genius

of disparate argumentative techniques that expresses Newton’s underlying methodological aim of

71. Guyer, “Exemplary Originality,” 258.

Cambridge University Press, 2002.

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