IPSA,

 World  Congress,  Poznan,  July  2016    

Panel  CS04.68:  Rising  States  and  Established  Powers  in  International  Organizations  

Networking  and  Leadership  in  International  Organizations:  the  

Challenge  of  Migration  
Yves  Schemeil  (France)  
yves.schemeil@sciencespo-­‐grenoble.fr  

 
Abstract:   Migrants   raise   problems   that   are   difficult   to   solve   by   existing   international  
organizations,   since   Middle   Eastern   and   Northern   African   refugees’   latest   movements  
have  been  massive,  rapid,  multichannel,  and  apparently  without  foreseeable  end.  In  such  
a   situation   no   single   institution   can   act   alone,   but   a   majority   of   those   involved   in   this  
sector  first  refused  leadership  by  a  paramount  agency.  Therefore,  the  necessity  to  build  
a  network  is  eventually  conducive  to  severe  competition  between  organizations  in  order  
to  know  who  will  coordinate  operations  on  the  ground.  This  is  true  between  leaders  of  
European   agencies   (e.g.   Frontex,   Schengen,   Europol)   and   global   humanitarian  
organizations:   UNHCR,   IOM   and   even   IMO,   arguing   that   ship   wreckages   are   within   its  
mandate.   Therefore,   the   IOM-­‐IMO   rivalry   is   particularly   insightful   when   looking   for  
explanatory  variables  of  network  building,  such  as  personal  leadership;  sound  collective  
management;   global   constraints;   regime   or   sector   frames;   states’   maneuvers;   or  
conjuncture   and   the   range   of   possible   options.   This   is   a   great   opportunity   to   compare  
personal   and   objective   factors   in   explaining   success   or   failure   when   international  
organizations   try   to   put   themselves   at   the   core   of   a   network.   Addressing   the   issue   of  
power   asymmetry   is   also   promising,   since   beyond   the   front   stage   actors   (European   or  
Southern   and   Eastern   Mediterranean),   Russian   and   Chinese   are   watching   attentively  
and   may   act   within   the   decision-­‐making   process   of   each   non-­‐EU   institution,   provided  
the   conditions   to   weigh   on   migration   policies   worldwide   are   met.   Migrants   raise  
problems  that  are  difficult  to  solve  by  existing  IOs.  
Keywords:  international  organizations,  migration,  network,  leadership,  IOM,  IMO  
 
  
 

This   paper   is   part   of   a   series   of   articles   presenting   our   research   outcomes   about   the  
expansion   of   Intergovernmental   Organizations.   Before   going   further,   it   is   therefore  
necessary  to  sum  up  the  results  achieved  so  far,  and  then  underline  the  ambition  of  the  
current  draft.  Readers  who  already  have  a  clear  view  of  my  explanatory  model  can  just  
skip  part  1,  §1,  and  go  straight  to  §2  on  the  concept  stemming  from  network  theory  or  
even  jump  directly  to  part  2.  In  this  second  part  of  the  paper,  I  start  with  some  insights  
about   how   the   IOM’s   recent   evolution   vindicates   my   hypotheses   on   IOs’   change.   Then,  
the   premises   of   a   full-­‐fledged   network   theory   in   international   studies   are   discussed  
before  the  migration  network  itself  is  presented.  Finally,  the  role  of  the  IOM  (and  IMO)  
leadership  in  the  development  of  networking  strategies  is  (very)  briefly  discussed.          

 
Part  1.  The  predictive  model  
To   make   a   long   story   short,   the   model   connects   international   organizations,   whether  
intergovernmental   or   not,   and   notwithstanding   their   status   (UN   agencies,   Funds,  
Programs,   Frameworks,   Alliances,   Compacts,   etc.),   within   “networks   of  
interdependence”:   since   they   are   unable   to   “perform”   according   to   the   private   sector  
standards,  their  first  goal  is  to  survive  once  their  ends  achieved;  alternatively,  they  must  
find   new   missions   to   fulfill.   Deprived   of   any   enforcement   procedure   (despite   some  
noteworthy   exceptions,   like   the   UNSC   and   the   WTO),   they   mostly   rely   on   peer   review,  
naming   and   shaming   processes,   and   norm   creation   that   may   bring   a   group   of   actors  
enough   determination  to  address   an  unfamiliar  issue.  Resilience  cannot  be  ensured  by  
cautious  inaction:  it  requires  unending  expansion.    
IOs   have   assets   to   survive   dramatic   changes   in   their   environment   (e.g.   the   end   of   the  
Cold  War,  the  emergence  of  a  globalized  financial  capitalism,  the  acceleration  of  climate  
change,  etc.).  As  “complex  hybrids”,  they  find  a  proper  balance  between  the  advantages  
of   being   either   public   or   private   (or   mix),   having   multiple   principals   instead   of   one,  
benefiting  from  a  longer  time  horizon  than  most  national  administrations  or  voluntary  
associations.   They   strike   a   balance   between   professionalization   of   their   tools   and  
dedication   to   a   goal.   They   focused   both   on   the   ordinary   delivery   of   common   goods  
(”exploitation”)   and   the   elaboration   of   scenarios   for   the   future   (“exploration”),   which  
shows   how   “ambidextrous”   they   are.   Due   to   some   inevitable   “slack”,   they   even   have  
enough   resources   to   move   forward   when   incentives   to   change   eventually   aggregate   to  
trigger   their   adaptation   to   a   new   context.   This   means   trespassing   a   peer   organization  
mandate   and   “encroaching”   on   its   jurisdiction,   which   in   turn   raises   problems   of   “mutual  
adjustment”,  coordination  and  collaboration,  if  not  mere  competition  (Schemeil  2013).  

IOs  are  therefore  condemned  to  innovate,  and  pre-­‐empt  new  fields  of  action,  according  
to  new  visions  of  the  common  good,  i.e.  they  must  constantly  enact  new  norms.  In  this  
venture  they  are  not  alone:  the  very  process  through  which  they  try  to  stick  to  the  initial  
division  of  labor  although  their  activities  now  overlap  with  what  peer  organizations  are  
supposed  to  do,  is  conducive  to  multiply  partnerships.  Therefore,  the  process  is  spiraling  
up:   new   involvements   are   conducive   to   new   encroachments,   which   themselves   bring  
about  new  clusters.  Networking  empowers  individual  IOs  and  appeases  their  potential  
conflicts  with  peers,  turning  their  weaknesses  into  strengths.  It  is  a  rational  solution  to  
their  multiple  dilemmas,  as  well  as  a  ways  to  decrease  their  transaction  costs.  Although  
much   more   demanding,   it   may   even   be   easier   to   promote   than   just   collaborating  
occasionally   in   case   of   need,   when   IOs   operating   in   the   same   field   are   constrained   to  
coordinate  their  activities  by  their  member  states  or  a  multilateral  conference.  Finally,  
networking  paves  the  way  to  turn  tensions  born  from  potential  or  actual  encroachment  
into   complementarities:   undesirable   rivalry   is   now   converted   into   a   sound   division   of  
labor.    
As   said,   this   is   a   predictive   model:   notwithstanding   the   idiosyncrasies   that   are   at   the  
roots  of  a  decision  made  within  each  IO,  not  a  single  one  can  discard  rational  solutions  to  
face   the   challenges   of   obsolescence,   sidelining,   or   discord.   The   only   difference   among  
them  is  their  degree  of  collaboration  since  they  can  stop  at  its  threshold  or  go  all  the  way  
down  to  full  participation  into  a  network  of  networks.  

 
Table  1.  A  simplified  model  of  IOs  adaptation  to  change  
 

 
 

In   this   table,   the   explanatory   (independent)   variables   are   circled   in   red;   intervening  
variables,   (control)   in   blue;   the   dependant   variable   (to   be   explained),   in   green.   For  
details  about  the  precise  meaning  of  “innovation”,  or  “overlap”,  as  well  as  “slack”  which  
is  not  mentioned  on  the  graph,  see  Schemeil  2012,  2013.  

What   is   modeled   here   is   this:   IOs   face   the   risks   of   becoming   obsolete   or   sidelined   due   to  
uncontrolled  change  in  their  composition  (staff  and  workforce  mix),  their  membership  
(new  states’  access  may  have  undesirable  effects;  rising  states  may  push  hard  towards  
power   reshuffling),   and   their   strategic   vision   (with   or   without   charismatic   heads,   with  
strong   or   weak   public   service   motivation).   They   are   exposed   to   new   external   challenges  
(including  rival  proactive  IOs’  capabilities  to  take  new  opportunities  and  enhance  their  
mandate,   which   ends   up   in   a   worrying   overlap).   They   must   mobilize   their   own   assets   to  
react,   in   norm   making,   restructuration,   and   self-­‐proclaimed   or   negotiated   mandate  
enlargement.   When   successfully   doing   so,   they   turn   red   tape   into   positive   slack,   slack  
into   innovation,   and   encroachment   into   controlled   overlap.   This   translates   into  
collaborative   frameworks   of   different   sorts.   It   may   end   up   (or   not)   into   the   building   of   a  
new   network   adapted   to   a   new   emerging   field   (like   climate   change,   unknown   virus  
proliferation,   war   crimes,   or   massive   refugees’   waves).   I   call   this   type   of   network   a  
“niche  network”.  When  several  niche  networks  are  in  turn  regrouped  into  a  bigger  one,  
with   some   of   the   agents   positioned   in   most   (if   not   all)   basic   networks,   it   becomes   a  
“complex  network”.  

It   should   be   obvious   to   any   reader   that   the   whole   vocabulary   is   made   of   notions   that  
resemble  accepted  concepts,  such  as  “cooperation”  on  the  one  hand,  and  “international  
regimes”   on   the   other   hand.   If   this   were   only   a   matter   of   word,   I   could   use   “network  
complex”,   coined   after   the   notion   of   a   “regime   complex”,   without   gaining   much  
precision.   To   put   it   briefly,   the   concept   of   networking   does   add   something   to   existing  
notions.  It  implies  vertical  and  horizontal  links  altogether  (and  not  only  one  sort  of  tie);  
density,   frequency,   and   level   of   permanent   interactions   (which   also   exists   in   other  
collaborative  schemes,  although  temporarily);  a  great  number  and  a  large  size  of  nodes,  
cores   and   focuses,   and   a   huge   dimension   of   their   grid   (contrary   to   dyads);   plus,  
heterogeneity  of  its  components,  which  are  far  from  being  “like-­‐units”  (this  is  also  true  
of  an  international  regime  that  nonetheless  applies  only  to  a  particular  sector  whereas  
networks  are  trans  sectors).    

Networks  have  no  definite  borders,  they  cross  the  boundaries  between  an  organization  
and   what   the   literature   calls   its   “environment”   –   as   in   “joint”   ventures   that   address   such  
“trans”   issues.   It   should   be   obvious   to   the   reader   by   now   that   there   is   a   perceptible  
difference   between   the   IAEA   /FAO   network   on   seeds   selection,   for   instance,   and   the  
WTO/WIPO  cooperation  on  intellectual  property  or  the  collaboration  between  the  IOM,  
the   UNHCR,   and   UNICEF   to   promote   migrant   childcare.   Whereas   the   latter   are   all  
involved   in   the   same   field   (IP,   or   humanitarian   affairs),   the   former   operate   in   quite  
distinct  realms  (nuclear  and  food  issues).    
Moreover,   “networking”   goes   beyond   the   concept   of   network:   it   points   out   efforts   that  
eventually  end  up  in  bringing  agents  together  and  maintain  their  proximity  in  the  long  
run.  In  dynamics  and  not  in  statics,  creating,  maintaining  and  developing  a  network  is  an  
endless  endeavor.  However  stabilized  and  consolidated  it  may  be  (and  most  are  far  from  
satisfying  to  the  condition  of  a  stable  equilibrium),  any  network  requires  attention  and  
involvement.  Each  component  must  invest  in  its  resilience,  which  inevitably  transforms  
its  nature,  and  finally  increase  its  scope.  
This   said,   handling   this   concept   is   not   so   easy.   When   trying   to   model   networks   of  
international   organizations   and   predict   the   behavior   of   their   stakeholders,   one   is  
confronted   to   more   formidable   theoretical   obstacles   that   the   ones   faced   during   the  
previous   steps   of   the   modeling   design,   which   showed   how   each   individual   IO   was   a    
“complex   hybrid”,   able   to   be   resilient   without   being   fully   or   constantly   performing.   Let’s  
now  review  these  hurdles  on  our  way  towards  an  exhaustive  theory  of  IOs  networking.  

Is  there  anything  like  a  network  theory  in  IR?  

Let’s   turn   to   vocabulary   again.   Words   are   misleading   because   scholars   may   use   them  
indifferently,   like   “regime”,   “cluster,   and   “network”,   as   well   as   “coordination”,  
“collaboration”   and   “cooperation”.   What   is   also   confusing   is   the   tendency   to   pack  
heterogeneous   types   of   networks   in   the   same   category.   This   is   particularly   visible   in   the  
scholarly  literature  that  focuses  on  “social  networks”  –  which  could  either  be:  (a)  a  set  of  
social   interactions   implying   some   reciprocity   (as   when   participating   to   a   banquet   is   a  
way   to   increase   a   guest’s   social   capital   and   prepare   him   or   her   to   become   a   host);   or   (b)  
the  Face  book  /Instagram/what’s  app  groups  of  customers  and  their  very  particular  way  
to  address  each  other;  and  even  (c)  informal  face-­‐to-­‐face  groups  with  no  leader,  in  which  
strong   and   weak   ties   may   both   matter;   if   not   (d)   what   the   literature   calls   “advocacy  
coalitions”,   “epistemic   communities”,   and   “communities   of   practice”.   Some   of   these  
“clusters”  are  formal  and  others  are  not;  some  are  physical  and  others  are  immaterial;  
some  are  tangible  and  others  are  intangible;  some  are  ephemeral  and  others  enduring;  
and  so  on  and  so  forth.  

One  barrier  to  a  more  encompassing  and  more  precise  explanation  of  networking  as  the  
outcome   of   other   explanatory   factors   is   the   fragmentation   of   scholarship   according   to  
the   topics   addressed,   and   the   disciplines   practiced.   When   viewed   from   brain   or  
computer  science,  sociology  and  political  science  or  organization  studies,  networks  have  
different   perimeters,   structures   and   meanings.   However,   they   have   something   in  
common:   they   are   looking   for   sustainable   and   polycentric   connections   among   three   or  
more   partners   linked   across   heterogeneous   social   spheres,   which   may   spiral   up   and   spill  
over   easily   but   at   their   own   pace,   and   with   no   need   to   intervene.   Exit   dyads,   international  
regimes,  temporary  coalitions,  joint  ventures,  and  merely  collaborative  schemes.    

It   may   be   difficult   to   extrapolate   from   micro   organizational   behavior   to   mega  

organizations,   although   most   studies   in   the   field   are   focused   on   factories,   offices,  
hospitals   or   firms.   If   the   research   question   is   transverse   (“how   organizational   context  
shapes   the   optimal   design   of   coordination?”),   then,   this   obstacle   will   be   overcome  
“where   integrating   diverse   knowledge   is   required   to   solve   novel   problems”   (Young-
Hyman 2016: 3-­‐4)  and  this  can  happen  at  any  level  of  teamwork  and  joint  efforts.  
Before   reaching   the   network   level   (and   then,   in   the   aftermath,   make   a   second   step   from  
“niche  “  to  “complex”  networks)  we  must  show  that,  despite  differences  just  underlined  
in   the   former   §,   collaborative   frameworks   and   networking   operations   have   much   in  
common.  In  other  words,  short  of  the  networking  stage  any  IO  should  discard  insulation  
as   a   strategy,   and   takes   risks   to   be   autonomous   (even   though   allying   with   some  
stakeholders   may   help   in   particular   circumstances).   Then,   it   should   pass   through   the  
successive  stages  of  partnership,  before  reaching  the  penultimate  end  of  the  continuum  
–  symbiosis.  As  for  the  ultimate  step  –  merger  –  it  is  not  an  option  since  it  would  make  
the  network  disappear  to  the  benefit  of  a  unified  and  centralized  whole.    
At  any  moment,  alternative  options  exist:  rather  than  going  ahead  straightforwardly  to  
consolidate   partnerships  and  make  them  more  sustainable,  an  IO  marching  on  this  path  
can   branch   off   and   select   another   goal.   When   trying   to   get   closer   to   a   peer   organization,  
it  may  switch  from  open  conflict  to  smooth  competition,  if  not  full  collaboration.    
The  next  series  of  steps  starts  with  a  choice  between  less  and  more  involving  actions  in  
common   (subcontracting   is   less   equalitarian   than   outsourcing1,   and   the   same   can   be  
said  about  outsourcing  compared  to  bridging;  or  bridging  (a  thin  link)  as  one  step  before  
bonding  (a  thick  tie).    
 

 
 
 
 

Table  2.  Modalities  of  connectedness  among  IOs  

 
 

When  an  IO  makes  a  90°  turn  instead  of  moving  ahead  along  the  continuum,  the  process  
temporarily  stops:  outsourcing,  for  instance,  may  prevent  further  consideration  for  more  
durable   and   solid   relationships   with   one   or   several   peer   organizations,   since   the   very  
egalitarian   division   of   labor   that   existed   before   collaboration   cannot   go   beyond   being  
assigned  a  specific  and  bounded  task.  Delays  and  limits  stem  from  either  stopping  on  the  
way   towards   more   cooperation,   or   branching   off   to   obtain   approximately   the   same  
outcomes  without  paying  the  same  price  in  terms  of  abandons  of  sovereignty.    
Now,   the   core   issue   pointed   out   by   the   graph   is   the   fine-­‐tuned   distinction   between  
coordination,   collaboration,   and   cooperation   (Schemeil   and   Eberwein   2014).   Such  
notions   are   short   of   becoming   concepts   because   scholars   use   them   indifferently,   and  
there  are  good  reasons  to  do  so  –  such  as  the  basic  need  to  oppose  a  whole  category  of  
positive   behaviors   to   the   negative   “conflict”   “competition”,   or   “discord”.   However  
everyone   feels   that   there   are   more   than   nuances   among   these   notions   (competition   is  
                                                                                                               
1  
This   is   consubstantial   to   outsourcing   within   the   same   group   of   organizations,   sometimes   called  
“network”,  as  in  Rafael  Pardo  and  Ruth  Rama,  “Is  the  pro-­‐network  bias  justified?”,  Sage  Open,  July  2013.  
Note  that  in  this  literature  “outsourcing”  and  “subcontracting”  are  somewhat  equivalent,  contrary  to  IOs  
works,  as  in  Cooley,  2013.  
pacific,   conflict   involves   violence,   discord   may   be   limited   in   time   and   space).  
Accordingly,   there   is   no   reason   to   assess   that   nuances   do   not   exist   as   well   as   between  
the  three  collaborative  types  of  behaviors  to  which  I  give  a  specific  role  in  the  process  of  
networking.    
To   better   understand   these   tiny   differences   in   meaning,   let’s   state   that   each   stage  
involves  less  transaction  costs  than  the  next.  Additionally,  let’s  assume  that  each  step  is  
less  volontary  than  the  one  that  follows.  Empirically,  coordination  is  needed  to  avoid  loss  
of  resources,  undesirable  redundancy,  waste  of  time  and  energy  when  two  IOs  work  in  
common  on  the  ground  (the  UNHCR  and  the  IOM  in  refugees  camps);  or  when  several  
IOs  belong  to  the  same  set  of  organizations  (the  UN  system,  the  Bretton-­‐Woods  group,  
etc.);  or  when  they  operate  in  the  same  field  (environmental  and  climatic  IOs,  security  
and   defense   ones,   etc.)2.   To   coordinate   joint   or   parallel   activities   specific   structures   may  
be  required  (like  an  administrative  division  dedicated  to  it).  

When   non-­related   organizations   working   independently   on   different   fields   are  

confronted  to  the  necessity  to  warrant  a  fair  distribution  of  workload  and  to  share  the  
related   spending,   then   each   of   them   has   to   go   a   step   further.   To   guarantee   the  
sustainability   and   durability   of   the   club   and   the   project   to   which   it   collaborates   an   IO  
must   accept   to   pay   non-­‐retrievable   admission   fees.   This   is   visible   in   the   trade   system  
(WTO   +   WIPO   +   UNCTAD)   the   Internet   (ICANN   +   GAC   +   WSIS+   ITU)   or   the   Environment  
(WMO  +  UNEP  +  IPCC  +  CDB).    

Finally,   when   projects   multiply   and   depart   from   each   other   to   such   an   extent   that  
collaboration   becomes   more   and   more   permanent   and   less   and   less   targeted,   then  
cooperation   becomes   unbounded,   unconditional   and   unlimited.   Negative   transaction  
costs   (i.e.   spending)   are   now   fully   converted   into   positive   coordination   costs   (i.e.  
investment).  Agents  in  every  organization  that  contributes  to  collective  action  specialize  
in   tracking   unnecessary   overlap   and   target   common   profits.   Instead   of   an   initial   lump  
sum,   yearly   subscription   payments   are   regularly   budgeted,   while   new   investments   are  
considered  from  time  to  time  when  opportunities  occur.  Negative  slack  is  now  avoided,  
while  positive  slack  leads  to  innovation.  No  IO  externalizes  its  costs  to  any  other  IO  any  
more.   Hence,   branching   off   is   no   longer   tempting.   Examples   of   such   cooperation   are:  
NATO,  the  EU  and  UNDP  when  they  reconstruct  countries  plagued  by  a  recent  civil  war.  
In   short,   coordination   is   cosmetic   and   characterized   by   proximity;   collaboration   is  
reactive  and  turned  towards  avoidance;  coordination  alone  is  truly  proactive,  multilevel,  
and  placed  under  the  shadow  of  the  future.  

We   may   reasonably   consider   that   networking   relies   on   preliminary   cooperation:   it  

actually  starts  when  this  stage  is  reached,  and  only  at  that  time.  In  this  line,  we  shall  now  
see   what   kind   of   additional   specificity   do   network   bring,   before   giving   concrete  
examples  of  the  way  it  works  in  the  migration  field.  

From  collaboration  to  networking  

                                                                                                               
2  
As   described   by   Young-­‐Hyman,   “coordination   between   workers   with   different   sets   of   specialized  
knowledge   is   a   core   challenge   (…)   Complex   and   uncertain   problem   solving   requires   the   continuous  
recombination  of  diverse  knowledge  sets,  and  managers  must  design  task  and  organizational  structures  to  
guide  these  integration  efforts.”  (Young-­‐Hyman  2016).  
To  propel  cooperation  from  a  local  system  of  static  connections  to  an  actual  expanding  
and   self-­‐sustainable   network   what   a   scholar   calls   “the   distribution   of   ownership   and  
governance   rights”   (Young-­‐Hyman   2016)   is   required.   Such   distribution   of   property  
rights  is  frequent  in  “knowledge-­‐intensive  work”  production  units  and  firms3.  This  is  the  
bonus  of  the  network  level:  cooperators  now  have  better  incentives  to  make  cooperation  
work   in   the   long   run,   much   beyond   its   initial   perimeter.   It   is   so   because   they   each  
receive   a   fair   share   of   “governance   rights”   in   spite   of   unequal   endowments   when  
stepping   into   the   network.   Contrary   to   what   happens   in   simpler   cooperative  
frameworks,   none   is   a   veto   player.   However,   eligibility   to   such   rights   implies   duties:  
belonging  to  a  “cluster”  requires  from  each  partner  a  higher  “credibility  of  commitment”  
than   when   they   just   “collaborate”,   even   when   they   do   it   on   a   regular   basis   and   across  
fields  of  competence  (Scholz,  Berardo,  Kile  2008:  393).  
It  must  become  clear  by  now  that  the  concept  of  an  international  network  is  specific  in  at  
least  one  aspect:  the  benefits  of  centralization  within  territorialized  governments  do  not  
need   to   be   brought   from   the   top   of   a   network,   itself   located   above   states   as   a   sort   of  
canopy.  What  is  required  is  only  a  level  of  higher  responsibilities,  which  is  less  a  “center”  
than   a   “core”   or   a   “node”   within   any   set   of   basic   stakeholders   that   are   connected   by  
mutual  ties.    

Conversely,   decentralization   within   social   networks   or   productive   networks   that   at   first  

glance   seemed   rather   autonomous   do   accommodate   some   hierarchy,   since   ownership  
and   governance   rights   cannot   be   distributed   at   the   bottom.   Moreover,   credible  
commitments   to   make   the   network   profitable   will   no   be   expected   from   rank   and   file  
participants   of   the   kind   of   those   who   are   members   of   a   social   network,   be   it   a  
transnational   one   like   Facebook.   Since   international   relations   on   the   one   hand,   and  
either  social  or  productive  clusters  on  the  other  hand  have  no  center,  a  network  is  the  
most  appropriate  level  for  intergovernmental  organizations  activities:    
“a   political   actor   will   seek   densely   clustered   relationships   when   credibility   of  
commitment  imposes  the  greatest  constraint  to  gaining  the  rewards  of  collaboration,  and  
densely   clustered   relationships   will   enable   the   involved   actor   to   collaborate   at   higher  
levels.   Conversely,   an   actor   will   seek   more   extensive,   centrally   located   relationships  
when  search  for  collaboration  opportunities  imposes  the  greatest  constraint,  and  higher  
levels   of   collaboration   will   be   associated   with   actors   in   central   locations   in   the   policy  
arena.”  (Scholz,  Berardo,  Kile  2008:  393)  

When   such   an   upper   level   of   “centrally   located   relationships”   is   “searched”   by  

participants  looking  for  control  over  the  set  of  links  by  which  they  are  themselves  tied,  a  
power   struggle   for   the   control   of   the   redistribution   of   ownership   and   governance   rights  
unfolds.   More   collaboration   implies   more   constraints   and   more   rights,   altogether.   Exit  
the   “cluster”   notion,   which   is   either   shorthand   for   a   loose   use   of   the   word   “network”  
with   little   consideration   for   whom   is   actually   able   to   control   it,   or   a   policy   motto   to  
simplify  donors’  life  in  a  top-­‐down  process  of  funding  (Egger  2015).  
Following  on  this  paradigm,  one  may  distinguish  high-­density  (a  core  set  of  several  units  
that  are  more  connected  to  each  other  than  to  other  member  of  the  network)  and  high  
                                                                                                               
3   Although   we   have   little   insight   about   how   they   actually   contribute   to   performance   since   “prior   research  
offers   little   guidance”(idem),   therefore   we   cannot   rely   on   existing   advances   at   the   micro   level   when  
exploring  the  macro  level.  
centrality   (one   unit   in   particular   is   the   node   through   which   every   connection   passes)  
networks  (Scholz,  Berardo,  Kile  2008:  395).  In  dense  networks,  actors  coalesce  to  fight  
against  shirking  and  free  riding,  and  share  enforcement  costs.  

Do   these   lessons   apply   to   the   migration   and   refugees   field,   especially   in   the  
Mediterranean?  Let’s  answer  to  his  question  in  the  second  part  of  the  paper.  

 
Part  2.  The  Migrants/refugees  network  
Actually,   the   International   Organization   for   Migration   (IOM)   behaves   according   to   the  
assumptions  of  the  explanatory  model.  I’ll  show  it  in  two  steps:  firstly,  I’ll  give  insights  
about   the   adequacy   between   the   evolution   of   this   organization   across   time   and   the  
predictions  of  the  model;  secondly,  I’ll  focus  my  analysis  on  the  network  recently  built  
by  several  collaborative  agencies  and  NGOs  in  the  migrants/refugees  field.      
Instances  of  adaptation  
What   the   model   predicts   is   an   IO’s   unending   quest   for   new   norms,   entailing   the  
designing  of  new  structures  or  substructures,  as  well  as  new  processes,  which  sooner  or  
later  will  encroach  on  another  organization’s  domain  of  statutory  competence.    

Established  in  1951  as  a  successor  to  the  “Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the
Movements of Migrants from Europe” (PICMME),   which   soon   became   “the  
Intergovernmental   Committee   for   European   Migration”   (ICEM),   two   logistics   agencies  
working   at   a   high   pace   to   resettle   European   workers   overseas,   the   IOM   was   initially  
focused   on   making   the   European   supply   and   the   Southern   Mediterranean   demand   meet  
to   boost   postwar   European   reconstruction.   During   this   phase,   it   “assisted   migration”.  
Then   came   the   time   of   imbalance   between   the   desired   “imports”   of   migrants   and   an  
excess  in  “exports”,  which  led  to  “regulate  migration”.  In  implementing  its  mandate,  the  
organization   was   eventually   confronted   to   “forced   migration”,   due   to   smugglers   who  
could   as   well   export   quasi   slaves,   including   sexual   ones,   to   the   West,   than   the   usual  
workforce.   Since   this   did   not   work   according   to   member   states’   wishes   once   they   got  
wealthier,   the   IOM   eventually   moved   towards   the   linkage   between   “migration   and  
development”   in   order   to   stabilize   the   conditions   of   life   of   potential   migrants   in   their  
home  country  turning  its  mandate  upside  down.    
To   fulfill   these   new   functions,   the   IOM   dramatically   increased   its   membership,   its  
funding,  its  projects,  and  its  staff.  Between  1998  and  2016,  membership  increased  from  
67   to   162;   projects   grew   from   686   to   some   two   thousands;   total   spending,   which  
accounted  to  242,2  millions  at  the  beginning  of  the  period  reached  a  1.3  billion  peak  in  
2015,  while  the  staff  increased  from  less  than1100  to  more  than  8000  people.  
Finally,   “As   "The   Migration   Agency"   [note   the   exclusiveness   of   this   article]   IOM   has  
become  the  point  of  reference  in  the  heated  global  debate  on  the  social,  economic  and  
political   implications   of   migration   in   the   21st   century.”   (http://www.iom.int/iom-­‐
history).   It   also   expanded   its   mandate   (from   circumstantial   migration   to   perennial  
development),   overlapped   with   other   organizations   (like   the   UNHCR,   UNICEF,   UNDP,  
UNODC),   and   enacted   new   norms   (handling   migrations   orderly   and   humanly;  
distinguishing   migrants’   heroic   behavior   and   awarding   them   within   the   framework   of  
the   “#MigrantHeroes  »   program.   The   goal   is   to   launch   a   «  social   media   campaign   to  
highlight  the  many  ways  in  which  migrants  contribute  both  to  their  countries  of  origin  
and  their  host  communities.”  Beyond  the  traditional  “meeting  operational  challenges  of  
migration  management”,  it  promoted  the  “human  dignity  and  well-­‐being  of  migrants”;  or  
“social   and   economic   development   through   migration”,   both   expected   to   propel   it   to   the  
high   sphere   of   this   “hot   debate”   where   goals   are   defined   instead   of   remaining   an  
instrument   in   the   hands   of   others.   It   is   no   longer   a   logistical   “office”   whose   usefulness  
was  obvious  for  the  North  but  not  for  the  South,  and  it  may  soon  become  a  full-­‐fledged  
“institution”   concerned   with   global   migration,   from   its   analysis   and   modelization   to  
strategic  planning.    
As  for  overlap,  examples  abound:  in  Yemen,  the  IOM  operates  on  a  field  preempted  by  
the  UN  and  the  HCR  because  it  targets  “refugees”,  “internally  displaced  people”,  and  the  
evacuation  of  “expatriates”  –  three  categories  that  were  not  included  at  all  in  its  initial  
mandate.  It  also  encroaches  on  the  WHO  and  MSF  respective  perimeters:  his  is  obvious  
when   it   sends   a   health   unit   to   a   hospital   in   Aden   (al-­Jumhuriyya)   to   watch   over   the  
stocks   of   drugs   and   their   adequate   distribution   to   patients,   with   two   doctors   and   two  
nurses;  or,  when  it  is  concerned  by  the  shortage  of  water  in  another  public  hospital  (May  
22)   and   in   an   MSF   traumatology   center,   increasing   the   capacity   of   its   water   tanks   and  
renting   additional   lorries   to   convey   edible   water   to   a   governorate   (Al   Dhale’e)   where  
there  is  a  permanent  shortage.        
In  Iraq,  the  IOM  trespasses  the  jurisdiction  of  the  HCR  since  it  gives  assistance  to  people  
displaced  from  violence  in  the  governorate  of  Baghdad,  to  whom  it  distributed  3  500  kits  
of  non  non-­‐food  items  there,  plus  105  000  kits  given  to  vulnerable  internally  displaced  
since   January   2014.   To   this   end,   it   designed   a   new   tool,   the   Displacement   Tracking  
Matrix,  which  was  in  use  afterwards  in  30  countries,  displaying  an  astonishing  capacity  
to  innovate  and  develop  its  own  technology  (a  necessary  ingredient  of  autonomization  
according  to  Ness  and  Brechin  seminal  paper  of  1988).  This  made  possible  for  the  IOM  
the  servicing  of  other  organizations  on  the  ground4.  
In   the   Arabic   peninsula   and   Indian   subcontinent,   the   IOM   met   the   ILO   and   the   Gulf  
Cooperation   Council   in   promoting   “fair   and   ethical   recruitment   practices”   of   migrants  
coming   from   Nepal   and   Kerala   by   their   sponsors   in   the   United   Arab   Emirates.   It   also  
works  with  the  ICRC,  which  is  expert  in  early  warning:  when  victims  of  mistreatment  are  
identified,  the  ICRC  is  relayed  by  the  more  solid  logistics  of  the  IMO.    

From  collaboration  to  networking  

Following  on  the  concept  of  ownership  and  governance  rights  discussed  above,  we  may  
assume  that  international  networks  distribute  such  property  rights  over  a  subfield  or  an  
issue   (say,   refugees   as   a   paramount   challenge,   itself   subdivided   into   several   realms:  
asylum   seekers   accrue   to   the   UNHCR;   victims   of   shipwrecks,   to   FRONTEX,   the   ICRC   and  
IOM;  smugglers  to  UNODC;  and  economic  migrants,  to  the  IOM).    

A   review   of   past   and   existing   partnerships   suffices   to   show   that   despite   frequent  
protests  that  they  are  exception  to  the  rules  of  a  strict  division  of  labor,  they  do  matter.  
                                                                                                               
4   «  As   of   18   August,   IOM   has   distributed   22,157   NFIs,   16,685   World   Food   Programme   (WFP)   food   parcels,  

1,820  UNFPA  Women's  Dignity  Kits  (WDK),  1,513  UNICEF  hygiene  kits,  and  3  World  Health  Organisation  
(WHO)   Type-­‐B   medical   kits   to   IDPs   in   eleven   different   governorates   affected   by   the   Iraq   IDP   Crisis.  »   IOM  
website,  http://iomiraq.net/issues-­‐focus/iraq-­‐idp-­‐crisis  
Definitely,  the  IOM  has  many  partners.  It  works  with  the  UNHCR5,  the  ICRC,  and  the  EU  
with   which   a   “strategic   dialogue   on   global   immigration   studies”   was   launched   in  
February   2016.   It   also   mobilizes   its   membership   to   sponsor   special   operations   and  
programs.   The   Italian   ministry   of   Foreign   Affairs   is   at   the   roots   of   a   partnership   in  
Lebanon   “to   address   the   psychosocial   needs   of   war   and   displacement-­‐affected  
population  and  to  respond  to  emergencies,  a  Psychosocial  Expert  team”  composed  of  six  
experts   (http://www.psychosocialet.net/home.php).   As   for   its   10   programs,   two   of  
them   are   jointly   held   with   partners   (“humanitarian   emergencies”,   with   the   UNHCR;  
“counter-­‐trafficking   in   persons”,   with   UNODC)6.   Most   of   these   partnerships   are  
structured,   e.g.   the   IOM     “Inter-­‐Agency   Coordination   Group   against   Trafficking   in  
Persons”  or  the  UNHCR  Partnership  in  Action  initiative  (PARinAC).  

However,   in   addition   to   the   EU,   the   UN   (HCR)   and   the   ICRC,   the   most   unexpected  
collaboration   links   the   IOM   to   the   IMO.   Although   these   acronyms   are   very   similar,   these  
two   organizations   cover   two   unrelated   fields   (migrants   and   ships).   Their   unlikely  
cooperation   is   engrained   into   their   membership   of   the   same   network.   Actually,  
networks  assign  to  each  stakeholder  specific  responsibilities  in  handling  the  migration  
challenges   with   enough   discretion   (if   not   full   autonomy),   provided   they   can   display  
minimum   efficiency.   To   become   part   of   it,   the   IMO   just   claimed   that   the   wreckage   of  
refugees’  boats  wholly  justified  its  intervention.    
How   come   the   IMO   with   an   eye   on   “migrants”   managed   to   pop   in   this   exclusive   club?  
Well,   it   convened   on   4   and   5   March   2015   a   paramount   conference   at   its   London  
headquarters,  to  which  every  single  stakeholder  was  invited  (including  the  IOM)  arguing  
that  its  concern  about  maritime  safety  included  shipwrecks,  even  the  small  non-­‐reusable  
and  one-­‐way  embarkations  on  which  refugees  tried  to  cross  the  Aegean  or  the  straight  
of   Lampedusa   (far   from   the   big   boats   whose   life   period   could   reach   decades).   Note,  
incidentally,   that   such   a   move   expanded   the   IMO’s   mandate   over   cargos,   sailors,  
passengers,   and   now   refugees.   Additionally,   its   traditional   concern   for   the   shores  
(recently  extended  to  …  the  poles)  and  its  protection  against  pollution  by  ships  allowed  
it  to  focus  on  the  Greek  and  Italian  coasts  where  migrants  used  to  disembark.    
Inaugurating  the  London  conference,  called  the  “High-­‐Level  Meeting  to  Address  Unsafe  
Mixed   Migration   by   Sea”,   IMO   Secretary-­‐General   called   for   coordinated   efforts   to  
safeguard  migrants,  arguing  that:  
“The   international   maritime   search   and   rescue   system   created   through   IMO   instruments  
was  not  designed  to  handle  the  huge  flows  of  migrants  that  are  currently  being  seen  in  
the   Mediterranean.   In   being   compelled   to   embark   these   unsafe   vessels,   migrants   are  
effectively   being   put   into   extreme   danger   as   soon   as   they   leave   shore.   The   fact   that  
                                                                                                               
5  As   said   on   its   website  :   «  In   the   early   1990s,   UNHCR   launched   the   Partnership   in   Action   initiative  
(PARinAC)  to  frame  cooperation  between  the  organization  and  its  partners  and  to  improve  the  working  
relationship  at  regional  and  national  levels.  In  2012  a  similar  initiative  was  conducted  on  a  smaller  scale,  
the   High   Commissioner’s   Structured   Dialogue   with   NGOs   and   IFRC.   UNHCR   and   partners   (including  
InterAction  and  ICVA)  reviewed  the  quality  of  partnership  and  made  recommendations  for  strengthening  
partnership  principles  in  practice.  »  
6  The  7  other  programs  are:  aide  à  la  réinstallation  ;  réparation  pour  les  victimes  ;  gestion  frontalière  de  

l’immigration   ;   aide   au   retour   volontaire;   migration   de   main-­‐d'œuvre   ;   développement   :   formation   des  

migrants  ;  intégration  »    

 
 migrants   are   drowning   within   sight   of   their   would-­‐be   rescuers   is   testament   to   the  
dangers   they   face   and   every   effort   should   be   taken   to   find   safer,   managed   routes   for  
migrants.”  (see  https://youtu.be/KM77QXdvwpw)  

In  this  race  to  be  meaningful  and  helpful  in  migration  affairs,  NGO  are  not  the  latest  to  
side   with   the   IOM.   As   put   on   its   website,   IOM's   collaboration   with   NGOs   is   defined   in  
Article   1(2)   of   its   constitution,   according   to   which   the   Organization   “shall   cooperate  
closely   with   international   organizations,   governmental   and   non-­‐governmental,  
concerned  with  migration,  refugees  and  human  resources  in  order,  inter  alia,  to  facilitate  
the   co-­‐ordination   of   international   activities   in   these   fields.   Such   cooperation   shall   be  
carried  out  in  the  mutual  respect  of  the  competencies  of  the  organizations  concerned.”  
According   to   the   same   source,   “Over   50   NGOs   currently   hold   Observer   status   with   the  
Organization.   IOM   is   actively   encouraging   NGO   participation   at   its   Council   and   the  
International   Dialogue   on   Migration   and   hopes   that   the   trend   towards   increased   NGO  
participation   in   migration   policy   dialogue   will   continue.   Also   at   Headquarters   level,   IOM  
convenes  regular  annual  consultations  and  briefings  for  a  wider  NGO  audience.  Most  of  
the   programmatic   cooperation   between   NGOs   and   IOM,   however,   takes   place   at   field  
level.”  
In  this  quest  for  support  and  help  in  implementing  its  programs,  the  IOM  can  rely  on  a  
UN   structure,   the   Conference   of   Non   Governmental   Organizations   (usually   called  
“CoNGO”),  within  which  one  can  list  an  “NGO  Committee  on  Migration”;  a  “Protection  at  
Sea  Subcommittee”,  a  “Migrants  Children’s  Issues”  group;  and  another  one  centered  on  “  
Unaccompanied  Youth  at  Borders”.  On  the  Mediterranean  shores,  it  works  closely  with  
local   NGOs,   such   as   Borderline   Sicilia   ONLUS   (2008),   which   is   active   in   several   and  
heterogeneous  fields7.  
Therefore,  the  partnership  between  the  IOM  and  the  IMO  or  the  IOM  and  the  HCR  ar  not  
dyadic   partnerships:     they   pass   through   an   extended   network   made   of   NGOs,   INGOs,  
IGOs,  REIs,  etc.  In  the  Mediterranean  region,  this  network  associates  organizations  that  
specialize   on   surveillance,   tracking   “smugglers”   and   clandestine   migrants   (Frontex,  
Schengen,  Borderline  Sicilia);  singling  out  future  “citizens”  (the  European  commission);  
tracking   “victims”   (the   humanitarian   UNHCR,   ECHO,   UNICEF,   Save   the   Children,  
Sant’egidio,  etc.);  or  focusing  on  “passengers”  (IMO,  European  Maritime  Safety  Agency,  
EUNAFVOR,   Triton8).   We   cant   describe   the   migrants   network   in   the   Mediterranean,   as  
follows:  

                                                                                                               
7   Investigating   "Mafia   Capital";   revealing   the   big   business   of   reception   centers   for   migrants   and   asylum  

seekers;  giving  voice  to  their  own  rights  (as  when  migrants  protest  in  Piana  degli  Albanesi  and  Catania);  
tracking   “Racism   and   Xenophobia”   thorough   a   dedicated   observatory;   and,   more   enigmatic,   responding   to  
“aggression  and  devastation  in  Avola  and  Messina”.  
8   “EMSA   (the   European   Maritime   Safety   Agency)   provides   vessel   detection   and   target   activity   detection  

information  derived  from  very  high-­‐resolution  radar  and  optical  satellite  images.  The  following  Integrated  
Maritime  Services  use  Earth  Observation  data:  Maritime  border  control  support  to  FRONTEX  –  monitoring  
of   maritime   borders   particularly   to   support   Member   States   response   to   illegal   trafficking   of   migrants.  
Support  for  EUNAVFOR's  anti-­‐piracy  activities  –  detection  of  non-­‐correlated  vessel  targets  in  the  area  of  
interest.”  
  
Once   established,   such   a   network   tends   to   reproduce   the   process   to   which   individual  
organizations   are   submitted:   it   expands,   and   rules   over   several   networks   (those  
previously   mentioned,   according   to   the   type   of   targets   and   activity).   However,   it   also  
helps   individual   organizations   to   create   their   own   field   of   operations,   like   the   IOM’s  
“Missing   Migrants   Program”   to   identify   lost   persons   long   after   wreckage9   –   a   new  
category  that  enriches  an  already  long  list  of  targets.    
What  remains  to  be  done  is  a  systematic  analysis  of  the  tasks  and  functions  specifically  
assigned  to  this  network,  and  find  out  the  kind  of  network  to  which  it  can  be  attached  (a  
«  niche  »  or  «  complex  »  kind).  
The  IOM  partnership  within  niche  and  complex  networks  
One   thing   is   clear   with   the   association   of   three   keywords   (IOs   +   migrants   +   network):  
scholars   and   practitioners   usually   study   migrants’   social   capital,   as   well   as   the   illegal  
groups   of   smugglers   who   manipulate   them   –   they   do   not   address   the   collaboration   of  
intergovernmental  organizations  to  help  refugees  and  fight  against  trafficking.  This  is  a  
virtually   blank   zone.   Moreover,   the   concept   of   “network”   is   under   theorized   in  
International   studies   and   Organizations   Studies.   Therefore,   explaining   why   IOs  
cooperate  in  the  field  of  migration  and  refugees  is  difficult.  
Secondly,   some   IOs   are   networks   per   se,   before   taking   any   step   towards   collaborating  
with   peers.   For   instance,   the   IOM   local   chiefs   of   mission   (in   the   Middle   East   and   the  
Balkans)   have   their   own   agenda   towards   refugees,   and   their   programs   must   be  
coordinated   at   the   top   by   IMO   staff.   Some   focus   on   reuniting   families;   other,   on   rescuing  
clandestine  people  in  harbors  where  they  had  disembarked,  or  stadiums  in  which  they  
                                                                                                               
9  “Even  following  the  highly  publicized  sinking  within  sight  of  Italy’s  Lampedusa  Island  in  October  2013,  

the  majority  of  the  366  victims  remain  unidentified  more  than  a  year  later.”  (IOM  Website)  

 
are  regrouped;  and  the  last  help  children  to  face  the  reminiscences  of  the  tragedy.  Such  
activities   are   so   heterogeneous   that   they   become   compatible   at   the   headquarters   level  
only.    

Thirdly,  interorganizational  collaboration  often  stops  at  joint  collection  and  processing  
of  data,  common  calls  for  donations,  early  emergency  warning,  etc.  For  instance,    
“new   data   brief   produced   by   IOM’s   Global   Migration   Data   Analysis   Centre   and   UNICEF  
Geneva   Coordination   Cell,   Refugee   and   Migrant   Crisis   in   Europe,   shows   that   children  
make  up  at  least  one  in  five  of  the  870,000  refugees  and  migrants  who  have  crossed  the  
Mediterranean   Sea   so   far   this   year   (2015)   (...)   UNICEF   and   IOM   call   on   states   and  
humanitarian   actors   to   safeguard   children   and   families   making   dangerous   journeys   to  
Europe,   and   to   ensure   adequate   support   is   available   in   destination   countries.”   According  
to   their   joint   statement,   “It   is   crucial   that   information   is   as   accurate   and   timely   as  
possible   to   ensure   adequate   care   for   children   and   their   families.     In   particular,   UNICEF  
and  IOM  stress  the  need  for  socio-­‐demographic  data  to  be  collected  for  all  children  (age,  
sex,  origin)  during  all  registration  processes.”10    

To  move  forward,  a  proactive  and  risk-­‐taking  leadership  is  required.  This  is  the  topic  of  
our  last  section.  

The  role  of  leadership  

When  leadership  is  strong  (i.e.  has  control  over  its  staff)  and  transformative  (i.e.  changes  
the  way  a  problem  is  thought  out),  then  new  means  are  found  to  overwhelm  any  barrier  
to  the  organization  expansion,  and  solve  the  problems  stemming  from  possible  overlap.    
For  instance,  the  current  Head  made  possible  the  invention  of  a  very  useful  instrument,  
called    “tacit acceptance procedure”:
“Through the ‘tacit acceptance’ process, amendments to technical annexes of a convention
come into force after a certain period if a certain number of State parties do not oppose the
adoption of the amendment within that period and it is deemed to have been accepted by
parties who do not oppose the amendment within a time limit. Initially, it was very difficult to
enforce technical regulations in any IMO instruments. This was despite the need for rapid
change in the technical standard coming from the emerging threats to the marine environment
and emerging maritime safety issues. Many of the initial amendments to the IMO instruments
never came into effect because, in most cases, ratification or acceptance of at least two-thirds
of the parties was necessary. This urged IMO to introduce the system of ‘tacit acceptance’ in
the early 1970s. This makes IMO’s legal procedure more efficient and effective. However, the
‘tacit acceptance’ procedures also created a major challenge for least developed countries. Due
to lack of resources and technical expertise, it is very difficult for least developed countries to
keep pace with rapid development in international regulations.”  

The  leadership  should  also  try  to  find  new  partnership,  which  requires  a  special  division  
to   be   established   (the   International   Partnerships   Division   of   the   IOM   just   plays   that  
role).  Its  rationale  and  assignments  are  described  as  follows:      

                                                                                                               
10http://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/press_release/file/IOM-­‐UNICEF-­‐Data-­‐Brief-­‐Refugee-­‐and-­‐
Migrant-­‐Crisis-­‐in-­‐Europe-­‐30.11.15.pdf  

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-­‐and-­‐events/eu-­‐and-­‐iom-­‐strengthen-­‐strategic-­‐dialogue-­‐global-­‐
migration-­‐issues_en  
 The   International   Partnerships   Division   is   responsible   for   monitoring   and   developing  
IOM’s  partnerships  at  the  inter-­‐State  and  inter-­‐agency  levels.  The  Division  supports  and  
promotes   partnerships   with   and   among   governments   with   a   view   to   improving   policy  
coherence   and   cooperative   approaches   to   migration   management.   It   also   facilitates   the  
identification  and  sharing  of  effective  practices  on  a  wide  range  of  migration  issues  with  
a   view   to   assisting   policymakers   and   practitioners   in   their   efforts   to   address   migration  
constructively   and   effectively.   The   Division   develops   and   disseminates   IOM’s  
contributions  to  State-­‐led,  regional  and  global  migration-­‐related  processes,  in  particular  
to  the  Global  Forum  on  Migration  and  Development  and  the  Global  Migration  Group.  The  
Division  also  supports  IOM’s  participation  in  the  regional  consultative  processes  (RCPs)  
as   a   member,   partner,   observer   or   service   provider   at   the   request   of   participating  
governments,  and  serves  as  a  global  focal  point  for  information  on  and  exchange  among  
the   RCPs.   It   also   supports   the   Organization’s   relations   with   governments,  
intergovernmental   organizations,   civil   society   and   other   multilateral   institutions.   It   is  
responsible   for   providing   a   framework   for   consistent   and   effective   cooperation   with  
partner  intergovernmental  organizations,  notably  the  United  Nations.  

Partnerships   provide   an   important   platform   for   advancing   cooperation   on   migration.  

IOM  plays  a  key  role  in  supporting  partnerships  and  the  means  to  collaborate  at  national,  
regional,   and   global   levels   for   better   and   more   effective   migration   management.   IOM  
promotes   informal   dialogues   between   States   and   cooperation   among   agencies,   and  
involves  various  stakeholders,  including  civil  society  and  migrants,  as  both  subjects  and  
agents   of   migration.     In   helping   to   develop   and   strengthen   partnerships   on   migration,  
IOM   provides   substantive,   expert   and   organizational   assistance   to   governments   and  
other  institutions.  

The   Department   of   International   Cooperation   and   Partnerships   (ICP)   is   responsible   for  

supporting   and   coordinating   IOM’s   relations   with   governments,   intergovernmental  
organizations,   civil   society   and   the   media.   ICP’s   functions   necessitate   internal  
partnerships   across   the   respective   departments   at   Headquarters   and   IOM   missions   in  
the  field.  

The   International   Partnerships   Division   (IPD)   within   ICP   is   responsible   for   monitoring  
and   developing   IOM’s   partnerships   at   the   inter-­‐State   and   inter-­‐agency   level,   working  
closely   with   various   units   in   ICP;   the   IOM   Office   of   the   Permanent   Observer   to   the   UN;  
departments  at  IOM’s  Headquarters  and  IOM  Missions  across  the  world.  

Hence,   as   exemplified   by   this   organizational   chart,   partnerships   is   thought   out   and  

formatted   at   every   level   of   the   Organization,   and   branches   have   some   discretion   to  
establish  collaborative  ties.  However,  leadership  is  also  required  to  set  priorities,  target  
specific   IOs,   and   opt   for   a   particular   type   of   relationships   (such   as   outsourcing   or  
specialization).  
 Responding  to  changes  in  the  environment,  each  organization  adapts  its  structures  and  
its  relations  to  the  new  environment.  Within  IOM,  adjustment  was  needed  at  the  top  in  
order  to  bring  this  sort  of  change.  Strategic  planning,  for  instance,  was  launched  in  2007,  
and  accelerated  two  years  later  by  a  new  charismatic  head,  William  Lacy  Swing,  when  he  
established   a   new   structure   (the   Structural   Reform   Team),   to   monitor   reform   and   make  
suggestions   for   a   phased   restructuration   of   the   organization’s   activities,   and   their   best  
possible   decentralization   to   regional   offices.   Here,   the   new   leadership   made   a   great  
difference   in   boosting   the   organization’s   activities,   enhancing   its   outreach,   and   joining  
new  clusters  then  new  networks.  The  same  can  be  said  about  IMO,  whose  former  head,  
the  Japanese  Koju  Sekimizu  (now  replaced  by  a  Korean,  Kitack  Lim),  took  the  imitative  
to  convene  a  paramount  meeting  on  Mediterranean  refugees  and  stepped  in  this  sector  
unexpectedly  (the  more  so  for  organizations  that  were  in  the  past  more  focused  on  Asia,  
as   the   choice   of   their   heads   shows).   The   leaders   were   not   only   reactive   but   also  
proactive.   Their   moves   mattered   much   for   the   survival   of   an   organization,   and   are   of  
course  of  the  essence  when  further  progress  is  a  stake.  
   
Conclusion  

This  paper  brought  several  outcomes.    

Firstly,  it  showed  that  the  IOM  behave  according  to  the  predictive  model  that  was  built  
out  of  empirical  surveys  about  other  IOs  (it  evolved  from  a  temporary  logistical  agency  –  
which  was  not  a  leader  in  the  field  but  a  follower  –  to  the  unavoidable  partner  if  not  rival  
of  several  well-­‐established  and  more  famous  organizations.    
Secondly,   it   multiplied   structures,   norms   and   activities,   as   predicted   by   the   initial   model  
to   such   an   extent   that   some   of   is   operations   seem   quite   estranged   from   it   initial  
mandate.    
Thirdly,  it  built  solid  bridges  with  partner  institutions  (the  UNHCR,  EU,  and  IMO).    

Fourthly,  it  evolved  quite  rapidly  towards  building  a  network  focused  on  Mediterranean  
migration,   which   is   now   more   ambitious   than   collaborative   frameworks   and   simple  
clusters  of  IOs  operating  in  the  field,  and  even  much  stronger  than  international  regimes  
on  the  ground.    
This  trajectory  is  not  only  illustrating  the  automaticity  of  the  mechanisms  predicted  by  
the   theoretical   model;   it   also   shows   that   the   collaborative   trend   is   unavoidable   and  
cannot   be   discarded,   although   its   scope,   pace,   and   outreach   will   eventually   depend   on  
the   leadership   abilities   of   IOs’   heads.   They,   and   they   alone,   can   adopt   the   adequate  
timing   and   launch   bridges   with   new   partners,   from   new   structures   that   were   not  
anticipated   at   creation,   which   are   now   considered   as   strong   demonstrators   of   the  
leadership’s   intents.   Not   every   kind   of   leadership,   though:   the   transformative   leader  
who   change   framing,   timing,   and   vision,   is   by   far   the   best   positioned   to   make   its  
organization  move  towards  partners,  then  merge  into  a  new  network.  
     
 

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Links  
European   Migration   Network:   http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-­‐
affairs/financing/fundings/migration-­‐asylum-­‐borders/asylum-­‐migration-­‐integration-­‐
fund/european-­‐migration-­‐network/index_en.htm  
 

International   Migration:  
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291468-­‐2435