BrisMUN ‘18

INTRODUCTION
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has been one of the most controversial and
secretive societies the modern world has encountered. The actions of the Kim dynasty
consistently captures international headlines as a cruel and corrupt dictatorship. The country
continues to hold a position as one of the most insular foreign policies, provoking countries
with mixed signalling about its military might.1 Kim Jong-Un, North Korea’s current Supreme
Leader, has pressed vehemently against the challenges he perceives from adversaries, both
foreign as well as domestic, in order to promote his nation’s self-interest.2 The North Korean
regime has shown time and time again that it will stop at nothing to maintain its power and
portray itself as a strong and prosperous nation.

Today, the worry over North Korea extends well beyond its substantial conventional
firepower—its asymmetric gains in chemical, biological, nuclear, and cyber warfare
capabilities have given rise to a new set of complexities that frustrate international accord.
Over the past two decades, North Korean provocations have elicited strong rhetorical
responses from the international community that have not been matched by the tangible
responses of the UNSC, which have tended ultimately to settle on incremental additions to
existing sanction measures.

The inability of previous U.N. action to prevent North Korea reaching the cusp of becoming a
nuclear weapons power is evidence of the international community’s relatively weak leverage
over Pyongyang, a situation arising from the constellation of strategic forces influencing
the Korean Peninsula and neighbouring regional states; the absence of economic linkages
between the DPRK and the primary sanctions-sender state in the USA; and North Korea’s
commitment to a nuclear weapons capability as the foundation of its medium-term economic
development strategy, its institutional governance structure and associated ideological
commitments.3

So how does the UNSC move forward in responding to the multifaceted dilemma that is the
Question of the DPRK?

1 Son, S. A. (2018) North Korea’s Human Rights Insecurity: State Image Management in the
Post-UN COI Era. Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, 5: 138–149. doi: 10.1002/app5.219.
2 Cagney, B., & Wong, E. (2017). System Dynamics as a Foreign Policy Tool to Resolve the
North Korean Dilemma. Industrial and Systems Engineering Review, 5(2), 145-152.
3 White, N. D. (2015). The relationship between the UN Security Council and General Assem-
bly in matters of international peace and security.

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CONTENTS
Introduction2

History4
Chosŏn dynasty (1392 – 1910) 4
Japanese and Manchurian Invasions (1592 – 1800s) 4
Japanese Occupation and Influence (1870s – 1919) 4
Division and Korean War (1945–1953) 5
Divided Korea (1953-present) 5

Committee Scope 7
Chapter VI 7
Chapter VII 7
Chapter VIII 8
Chapter XII 8
Military Staff Committee 8
Presidency 8

Context / Issues 10
Humanitarian Issues  10
Security Considerations 13
Rogue State 13

Previous Actions 18
UN Resolutions and Membership 18
Sanctions 18
Considered Approaches to the Issue 22

QYSBATA24
Security Council 24
Topic24

QARMA 25

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HISTORY
“Those that fail to learn from history, are doomed to repeat it.”
- Winston Churchill

Chosŏn dynasty (1392 – 1910)

The Chosŏn dynasty, also called Yi dynasty, was the last and longest-lived imperial dynasty
(1392–1910) of Korea. Founded by Gen. Yi Sŏng-gye after a coup, who established the
capital at Hanyang (present-day Seoul), the kingdom was named Chosŏn for the state of the
same name that had dominated the Korean peninsula in ancient times. The regime is also
frequently referred to as the Yi dynasty, for its ruling family.

General Yi established close relationships with the neighbouring Ming dynasty (1368–1644) of
China, which considered Korea a client state, and Chinese cultural influences were very strong
during this period. Chosŏn’s administration was modelled after the Chinese bureaucracy, and
Neo-Confucianism was adopted as the ideology of the state and society.1

Japanese and Manchurian Invasions (1592 – 1800s)

In 1592, Korea was invaded by Japan. Although Chinese troops helped repel the invaders, the
country was devastated.2 This was followed by the invasion of north-western Korea in 1627 by
the Manchu tribes of Manchuria, who were attempting to protect their rear in preparation for
their invasion of China.

Many cultural assets were lost, and the power of the central government was severely
weakened. Internal conflicts within the royal court, civil unrest, and other political struggles
plagued the nation in the years that followed. Internal politics were bitterly divided and
settled by violence.

By the reigns of King Yŏngjo (1724–76) and King Chŏngjo (1776–1800), the country had largely
recovered from the destruction of the wars. With an increased use of irrigation, agriculture
was in a prosperous condition, and a monetary economy was burgeoning. In an effort to solve
administrative problems, a school of learning called Silhak, or “Practical Learning,” arose.3

Japanese Occupation and Influence (1870s – 1919)

Beginning in the 1870s, Japan steadily forced Korea out of China’s sphere of influence
and into its own. In 1895, Empress Myeongseong was killed, with Japanese involvement
in the assassination. In 1905, Japan forced Korea to sign the Eulsa Treaty making Korea a
protectorate, and in 1910 annexed Korea, although international scholars consider neither
legally valid.

1 Kang, D. C. (2007). Stability and hierarchy in East Asian international relations, 1300–1900
CE. In The balance of power in world history (pp. 199-227). Palgrave Macmillan, London.
2 Ibid.
3 https://www.britannica.com/topic/Silhak

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The massive nonviolent March 1st Movement of 1919 manifested Korean resistance to the
Japanese occupation.4 Thereafter the Korean independence movement, coordinated by the
Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea in exile, operated mainly in neighbouring
Manchuria, China and Siberia.

Division and Korean War (1945–1953)

North Korea’s origins as a nation-state began at the end of World War II in 1945, after US-led
troops secured the southern part of the Korean peninsula while Soviet-led troops occupied
the area north of the 38th parallel. Crafted by two US military officers on August 14, 1945,
the line dividing Korea in half was merely intended to form temporary occupational zones.5
However, the emergence of the Cold War added considerable significance to the infamous
38th parallel, as both the US and the USSR wanted to strengthen their own influence on the
peninsula.

Distrust between the two former allies as well as the need to bolster their nascent foreign
powers prevented both the US and USSR from deciding on a single unifying leader for all of
Korea. As a result, the USSR selected Kim Il-Sung as the leader of the north, while the United
Nations General Assembly, urged by the US, pushed for the inauguration of the Republic of
Korea, free elections, and a constitutional framework in the south.6 In 1948, when the powers
failed to agree on the formation of a single government, this partition became the modern
states of North and South Korea.

The Korean War arguably began when North Korean troops pushed into South Korea on June
25, 1950, and it lasted until 1953 (though the causes and timing for the beginning of the war is
hotly disputed).7 The three-year conflict in Korea, which pitted communist and capitalist forces
against each other, set the stage for decades of tension among North Korea, South Korea and
the United States. It has also helped set the tone for Soviet-American rivalry during the Cold
War, profoundly shaping the world we live in today.

Divided Korea (1953-present)

Due to Soviet Influence, North Korea established a communist government with a hereditary
succession of leadership, with ties to China and the Soviet Union. Kim Il-sung became the
supreme leader until his death in 1994, after which his son, Kim Jong-il took power. Kim
II-Sung constructed his own version of communism referred to as ‘Juche’, an ideology that
combines theories of Marx and Lenin into North Korean Politics, and emphasises self-reliance.
Kim Jong-il’s son, Kim Jong-un, is the current leader, taking power after his father’s death in
2011.

Under his reign the government remains a closed off and one party government. While
elections are held, there is always only one candidate on the ballot and these elections are not

4 http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/March_First_Movement
5 Fry, M. (2013, August). National Geographic, Korea, and the 38th Parallel. Retrieved
from National Geographic: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/08/130805-kore-
an-war-dmz-armistice-38-parallel-geography/
6 Pruitt, S. (2013, April). What You Need to Know About North Korea. Retrieved from Histo-
ry: http://www.history.com/news/what-you-need-to -know-about-north-korea
7 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/01/world/asia/korean-war-history.html

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confidential. Their citizens are categorised in 51 categories based by loyalty to regime.8

In regards to economics, after the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991, the North Korean
economy went on a path of steep decline, and it is currently heavily reliant on international
food aid and trade with China.

North Korea is presently a member state of the UN, officially accepted in 1991.

8 https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Peoples_Republic_of_Korea_1998.pdf

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COMMITTEE SCOPE
The Security Council mandate can be most clearly found under Chapter V of the United
Nations Charter, in which the phrase “maintenance of international peace and security”
represents the primary task of the Council, and it is the decisions of the Council that all
Members of the United Nations agree to in accordance with the Charter and specified under
Article 25. To explain the responsibilities of the Council, Article 24 (2) specifically refers to
Chapter VI , Chapter VII , Chapter VIII , and Chapter XII. Additionally, the duties of the Council
extend to annual and special reports to the General Assembly for consideration.
Typical Security Council resolutions will conclude their preambulatory clauses with the
appropriate Chapter they are acting under. This not only determines the nature of the issue
being resolved, but also the severity and degree to which the Council has made its decisions.

Chapter VI9

The responsibilities of the Council under ‘Chapter VI: Pacific Settlement of Disputes’ primarily
tasks the Security Council with calling upon parties to settle their disputes by,
“negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice” - Article 33
In relation to this, the Council is also tasked to investigate disputes which may escalate to
international friction, whether that be from their own volition, or submitted to them by
Member States. From these disputes, the Council may then propose recommendations under
Article 36 for appropriate measures for Parties to undertake, whilst taking into consideration
that legal disputes should be referred to the International Court of Justice.

Chapter VII10

Most commonly referenced in resolutions involving intervention, ‘Chapter VII: Action with
Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression’ can be
regarded as one of the Council’s most forceful mandates.

The primary responsibility of the Council within this Chapter in Article 39, is the determination
of instances which constitute threats to peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression.
Article 41 then allows the Council, if the situation is determined to constitute the
aforementioned, non-violent means of effecting their decision, this being “complete or partial
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other
means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations”.

If these non-violent responses would be inadequate, or proven to be inadequate, Article 42

then permits the Council to take action by air, sea, or land such as demonstrations, blockades,
or operation by air, sea, or land forces of Member States. To elaborate this further, Article
43 then specifies that to pursue these operations, Member States must sign and ratify
agreements with the Council in which these agreements, “govern the numbers and types of
forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and
assistance to be provided”.

9 http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vi/index.html
10 http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html

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If Member States believe that the measures taken by the Council could present special
economic problems, they have the right to consult the Council to resolve those problems
under Article 50, and very clearly under Article 51, Member States reserve the right to self-
defence in the absence of measures from the Council to maintain international peace and
security.

Chapter VIII11

This Chapter, primarily referring to Regional Arrangements, suggests that under Article 52,
regional arrangements or agencies seek to maintain international peace and security, and
the peaceful settlement of local disputes prior to raising the issue with the Security Council
and that at no time should regional arrangements or agencies exercise enforcement actions
without the authorisation of the Council.

Chapter XII12

At its inception, the international system required the Council to oversee the International
Trusteeship System to facilitate decolonisation of territories. In the present day, however, this
Chapter has largely lost its relevance to the Council’s duties, in very much the same way that
the Trusteeship Council has not been in operation for over two decades.

Military Staff Committee

Article 47 of Chapter VII outlines the establishment of the Military Staff Committee which
advises and assists the Council with questions pertaining to the military requirements of the
Councils duties. This committee consists of the Chiefs of Staff of the Permanent Members,
and in instances in which they require, the participation of other Member States.

Please note: If the BrisMUN ’18 Security Council wishes to authorise any missions or military
activities, in any resolutions, they need to empower the Military Staff Committee to provide
the Council with a detailed brief of the requirements to for a prospective operation. For
instance:

“Authorises the establishment of a U.N. Peacekeeping Operation in Oman, and requests the
Military Staff Committee to provide the Council within fourteen (14) days of logistics and
operational requirements of such an operation;

Notes that the U.N. Peacekeeping Operation in Oman pertaining to Clause XYZ, will be
responsible for... [responsibilities listed here in subclauses]”

Presidency

Found under Article 30 of Chapter V, the Council is tasked to adopt a method of electing a
President. The characteristics of the President of the Council is to embody the principles of
neutrality and impartiality.13 This means that delegates which are assuming the short-lived
Presidency of one month are required to act in their office-bearing position, as well as being

11 http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-viii/index.html
12 http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-xii/index.html
13 Pursuing National Interests: The 1992 British Presidency of the UN Security Council and the
Soviet Permanent Seat http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2012.00508.x/full

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a national representative, with clear distinctions of which role they are representing, usually
announced prior to their speech in sessions.

Whilst the official duties of the President pertain to administrative and procedural matters, for
the purposes of the Security Council at BrisMUN ‘18:

• The Presidency will be a rotating position, with one delegate receiving the President
placard beside their country’s at any one time, with no delegate having the Presidency
more than once.

• Delegates with the Presidency will have the opportunity to raise a motion to make a
Presidential Statement, this motion will be considered the most disruptive, and if passed,
may not be proposed again during their term as President.

• The President will be the representative of the Council for Press Conference. (The
implications of this mechanism will be outlined further in the BrisMUN ’18 Security Council
Rules of Procedure).

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CONTEXT / ISSUES
Humanitarian Issues

Human Rights Violations

The DPRK is perceived as a human rights violator of such magnitude that an unsubstantiated
document from the U.S. government published stated that DPRK ‘state leadership perceives
most international norms of human rights, especially individual rights, as illegitimate, alien
social concepts subversive to the goals of the State and party’.14 According to limited data
available, there are, for instance, no rights to privacy, with individuals constantly subject to
surveillance at home and in the community. Household surveillance exists for preventative
health purposes and could possibly be also used for political surveillance.15

The government represses all forms of freedom of expression and opinion; it does not
allow any organised political opposition, independent media, free trade unions, civil society
organisations, or religious freedom. The regime totally controls all media organs. Most North
Koreans have no access to media sources other than the official media. Anyone attempting
to assert their rights faces brutal punishment.16 Failing to show sufficient reverence for the
country’s leaders is a serious offence.

There appears to be no prospect of appreciable change at least in the near future. The reports
paint a grim picture of human rights conditions, and frequently stress two general categories
of major abuse:

1. A total denial of political, civil, and religious liberties: the regime’s list of proscribed
offenses is extensive, and severe punishments are established by North Korean laws and
the constitution.

2. Severe physical abuse meted out to citizens who violate laws and restrictions: the
U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea published a lengthy report in 2003,
describing a system of concentration camps, organized like the Soviet “gulag” system, that
houses an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 inmates, including many political prisoners.17

The United Nations confirmed these findings. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on the DPRK
(Special Rapporteur) states that despite legislative improvements, there are continued reports
of violations of basic freedoms such as security of the person, humane treatment, and
justice.18

14 ‘U.S. Department of State: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Country Report on Human
Rights Practices for 1998’, mimeo from Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 26 Feb.
1999, published on <http://www.reliefweb.int>, p. 1.
15 Author’s interview, CARITAS Hong Kong representative, Pyongyang, April/May 1998.
16 https://www.amnesty.org.uk/north-korea
17 The U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, The Hidden Gulag: Exposing
North Korea’s Prison Camps, 2003.
18 See “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the DPRK, Vitit
Muntarbhorn.”

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Food Shortages

The DPRK began experiencing a food shortage of increasing severity beginning in the early
1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting cut-off of economic benefits
North Korea had received from the communist bloc. Disastrous floods in the summer of
1995 plunged the country into a severe famine that by some estimates was responsible for
600,000 to two million deaths, approximately 5 to 10 percent of North Korea’s population.19
Some argue food shortages are inextricably linked to the regime itself, in part because food
distribution favours the ruling elite and military and is tied to the government’s ongoing
broader political and military motivations.20

In September 1995, North Korea appealed for international food assistance, contradicting its
national ideology of ‘Juche’. Shortly thereafter, the United Nations World Food Program (WFP)
moved into North Korea, and its activities there gradually expanded to become at one point
the WFP’s largest single-country operation. Until 2005, the U.S. was by far the largest donor to
the WFP’s North Korea operation. China and South Korea provided — and continue to provide
— even larger amounts of food bilaterally to North Korea.21

By 2005 the WFP estimated that nearly half of North Korea’s 24 million people did not have
enough to eat and that more than a third of the population was chronically malnourished.22 A
new report published by the World Food Program and other U.N. institutions, detailing food
insecurity in the world in 2016 as a whole, says the following about the situation in North
Korea: 4.4 million people (or 17 percent of the North Korean population as a whole) are in a
state of “crisis, emergency, and famine” and 5.6 million (or 22 percent of the population) live in
a “stressed” situation when it comes to food.23

North Korean Refugees

The international instruments that provide protection to refugees include the 1951 United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) and the 1967
Protocol to that Convention. Parties to the Refugee Convention have an obligation to abide by
the principle of “non-refoulement,” which means that:

“No contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” 24

19 Andrew Natsios, The Great North Korean Famine (U.S. Institute of Peace: Washington, DC,
2001), especially chapters 1 and 2.
20 U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, “Hunger and Human Rights: ThePolitics
of Famine in North Korea,” by Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland, 2005.
21 For more information, see CRS Report RS21835, U.S. Assistance to North Korea: FactSheet
by Mark Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs.
22 WFP News Release, “6.5 Million Vulnerable North Koreans Still in Desperate Need of
Food Aid,” January 27, 2005
23 https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/un-10-million-face-food-insecurity-in-north-korea-what-
does-that-really-mean/
24 Text of the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Chapter 1,
Article 33.1. The issue of non-refoulement is considered part of customary international law.

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China and South Korea are parties to the Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol; North
Korea is not a party to either instrument.

North Koreans have been crossing the border into China, many in search of refuge, since the
height of North Korea’s famine in the 1990s. The State Department estimates that 30,000-
50,000 North Korean refugees currently live in China (some non-governmental organizations
estimate the number is closer to 300,00025) and believes those who are repatriated may face
punishment ranging from a few months of “labour correction” to execution. A number of
reports also document the difficult conditions faced by North Koreans who remain in China.
The plight of the North Koreans focuses attention not only on those seeking refuge and their
refugee status, but also points to the factors driving their decision to leave, primarily food
shortages, deteriorating humanitarian conditions, and human rights violations.

China and South Korea especially want to avoid a massive outflow of refugees, which they
believe could trigger the instability or collapse of North Korea. North Korean refugees seeking
resettlement often transit through other Asian countries, raising diplomatic, refugee, and
security concerns for those governments.26 South Korea, as the final destination of the vast
majority of North Koreans, struggles to accommodate new arrivals.

25 Margesson, R., Chanlett-Avery, E., & Bruno, A. (2007, September). North Korean refugees in
China and human rights issues: International response and US policy options. LIBRARY OF CON-
GRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE.
26 Ibid.

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Security Considerations

Rogue State

The assumption that the North Korean state and its leadership are fundamentally outside the
pale of the global community underpins the terminology sometimes used to describe North
Korea as a ‘rogue state’. From this perspective, the DPRK is motivated by malevolence and
belligerence and its leadership’s foreign and domestic policies can be ascribed to evil intent.
Internationally, this frames North Korea as ready to make war upon its neighbours, perhaps
even to attack the U.S. itself and, in pursuit of these offensive aims, is constantly engaged in
a furtive arms build-up. This perspective underlies much of the U.S. foreign policy community
and is exemplified in an unsourced United States Institute for Peace publication.27

North Korean politics is viewed, in this way, as ‘mad’ in the sense of a tendency to an
often inexplicable non-compliance with international norms and because it is irrational in
its apparent refusal to follow optimal preference-maximizing behaviour. North Korea is
therefore seen unpredictable in its domestic and foreign policy behaviour. For these reasons,
negotiating with North Korea i fraught with danger as DPRK negotiators cannot be trusted to
behave in the way that conventional diplomacy requires; nor can they be trusted to honour
outcomes of agreements reached.28 However, this approach is, arguably, a poor guide for
policy-makers. It fails to grasp the complexity of North Korean politics and their rapidly
changing nature. An alternative approach may accept a rationality on behalf of the DPRK and
seek to explore the context and motivation for changes in DPRK policy.

Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Development

Information about North Korea’s CBW capability is incomplete. Unlike nuclear tests, which
generate seismic signatures, and missile launches, CBW acquisition, production, and testing
can be hidden in legitimate industrial infrastructure. What information is available has
changed over the years and has come from various sources, some of which are indirect and
difficult to validate and are shrouded by the North Koreans’ skill at denial and deception.29

The belief remains that North Korea has a varied and robust chemical weapons arsenal.
The consensus view is that North Korea initiated its work on chemical weapons in the 1960s
and began producing them in volume in the early 1970s. Most estimates indicate that North
Korea’s chemical weapons arsenal contains nerve agents, blister agents, blood agents,
choking agents, and riot-control agents. Estimates of the amount of North Korea’s stockpile
of chemical weapons range from 2,500 to 5,000 tons. This figure has not changed in over
a decade.30 Delivery methods are believed to include artillery projectiles, various types of
rockets, aircraft, ballistic missiles, and naval weapons systems.31

27 Mistrust and the Korean peninsula: dangers of miscalculation, special report (Washington
DC: United States Institute for Peace, Nov. 1998), p. 2.
28 Noland, ‘Why north Korea will muddle through’, quotes on pp. 105 and 107 respectively.
29 Parachini, J. V. (2018). Assessing North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Capabili-
ties and Prioritizing Countermeasures.
30 Elisa D. Harris, “Threat Reduction and North Korea’s CBW Programs,” The Nonproliferation
Review, Fall-Winter 2004. See also Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, “Potemkin or real? North Korea’s
biological weapons program,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 18, 2017.
31 International Crisis Group, 2009; See also Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Chemical
Warfare Capabilities,” 38 North, October 10, 2013.

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The recent killing of Kim Jong-Un’s half-brother, Kim Jong Nam, with some form of VX nerve
agent in Malaysia’s Kuala Lumpur airport provides further information about the prominence
of North Korea’s chemical arsenal.32 Assassinating a regime adversary in such a public place
with a chemical warfare agent may have been meant to send a message to the international
community about the regime’s chemical weapons arsenal and its willingness to use it. There
are many ways to carry out assassinations, and countries have assassinated people with
chemicals and toxins in the past. However, the use of this exotic military warfare agent VX
amid tensions on the Korean peninsula could also have been a signal by the regime that it has
capabilities short of nuclear weapons and is prepared to use them.

Nuclear and Missile Testing

North Korea’s reliance on nuclear weapons development is derived from a perceived need
to defend itself in the face of external hostility, even though doing so necessitates taking
serious knocks to its already dubious reputation. Nonetheless, with nuclear capacity in place,
the regime is granted special status as a nuclear power, which is valued not just as a form of
physical strength, but as a means to command attention. North Korea’s state news agency has
said its nuclear weapons program demonstrates its ‘dignity and honour, prestige and might’,
as well as its position as a ‘responsible nuclear weapons state’.33

“The entire mainland of the U.S. is within the range of our nuclear weapons and the nuclear
button is always on the desk of my office,” said North Korean leader Kim Jong-un during
his 2018 New Year’s address. Clearly, using rhetoric such as this, the topic of North Korea’s
nuclear capacity has captured the ongoing concern of the international community.

The problem, however, runs deeper than inflammatory remarks. North Korea has conducted
six nuclear weapon tests to date. Its first experimental blast took place more than a decade
ago as Pyongyang continues to try and join the handful of nuclear weapons states.

International commentary following North Korea’s nuclear testing has been consistently
condemnatory. Then-U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry (2016) called their fifth test on
September 9th 2016 “a grave threat to... international peace and security... as destabilizing
as it is unlawful.”34 The Japanese government lodged a “serious protest” against North Korea,
with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (2016) calling the test “totally unacceptable.”

The South Koreans held emergency meetings, with the government calling on the North “to
immediately abandon its nuclear weapons and missile programs.”35 Commentators have
argued for the need to get China to put pressure on its unruly neighbour, 36 while the Chinese
registered their usual, mild displeasure at the test.37

32 Doug Bock Clark, “The Untold Story of Kim Jong-nam’s Assassination,” GQ, September 25,
2017.
33 Cha V (2012) The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future. Random House, London.
34 www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2017.1317328?src=recsys
35 Ibid.
36 Klingner, Bruce. 2016. “With North Korea’s 5th Nuclear Test, Time for Obama to Pressure
China.” The Daily Signal, September 9. http://dailysignal.com/2016/09/09/with-north-koreas-fifth-
nuclear-test-time-for-obama-to-pressure-chinese-to-help-sanction-north-korea/.
37 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on September 9,
2016.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, September 9. http://www.fmprc.
gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1396294.shtml.

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The U.S.’ fundamental position on the North Korean nuclear program (what is known as
“CVID,” or the demand for Complete Verifiable Irreversible Denuclearization) has effectively
remained unchanged. As Then-U.S. President Barack Obama (2016) put it, “the United States
does not, and never will, accept North Korea as a nuclear state.”38

The ‘Nuclear Issue’ is said to be entrenched in the priorities of the regime. Nicholas Eberstadt
writes that ‘The North Korean regime is the North Korean nuclear problem, and unless its
intentions change, which is unlikely, that problem will continue as long as the regime is in
place.’39

But given the incentives facing North Korea and all other parties to the conflict, are policies
such as CVID realistic? Will the right combination of incentives and threats encourage North
Korea to abandon its nuclear program? Currently, the two Koreas remain in active tension
with parties on both sides of the divide having access to nuclear weapons – a matter that calls
for even more pragmatic leadership.

38 Ibid.
39 Nicholas Eberstadt, ‘Hastening Korean reunification’, Foreign Affairs 76: 2, 1997, p. 88, em-
phasis in original.

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Cyber Attacks

The DPRK’s involvement in major hacking offensives appears to be growing.40 The regime’s
cyber operations are largely clustered within the Lazarus Group umbrella. Also known as
HIDDEN COBRA by the U.S. government, Lazarus Group has conducted operations since at
least 2009, when they launched a DDoS attack on U.S. and South Korean websites utilizing the
MYDOOM worm. Until 2015, Lazarus Group cyber activities primarily focused on South Korean
and U.S. governments and financial organizations, including destructive attacks on South
Korean banking and media sectors in 2013 and the highly publicized attack on Sony Pictures
Entertainment in 2014.

Beginning in 2016, researchers discovered a shift in North Korean operations toward attacks
against financial institutions designed to steal money and generate funds for the Kim regime.
Researchers from the U.S. cybersecurity firm Recorded Future say a new hacking campaign
targeting South Korean cryptocurrency exchange, Coinlink, employed the same malware code
used in the 2014 attack on Sony Pictures and the global WannaCry attack.41

Many security researchers have concluded that North Korea was likely behind the WannaCry
attack, which quickly unfurled across the globe in 2017 to infect more than 300,000
computers in 150 countries.42 Considered unprecedented in scale at the time, WannaCry
knocked British hospitals offline, forcing thousands of patients to reschedule appointments
and disrupted infrastructure and businesses around the world. The country has repeatedly
denied responsibility for WannaCry and called other allegations about cyber-attacks a smear
campaign.

By 2017, North Korean actors had also jumped on the cryptocurrency bandwagon. The first
known North Korean cryptocurrency operation occurred in February 2017, with the theft of
$7 million (at the time) in cryptocurrency from South Korean exchange Bithumb.43 By the end
of 2017, several researchers had reported additional spear phishing campaigns against South
Korean cryptocurrency exchanges, numerous successful thefts, and even Bitcoin and Monero
mining. North Korea also utilized Bitcoin for the global WannaCry ransomware attack in 2017,
forcing victims to pay ransom in Bitcoin.44

Outside of the May WannaCry attack, the majority of North Korean cryptocurrency operations
have targeted South Korean users and exchanges, but analysts at the Insikt group expect
this trend to change in 2018.45 They assess that as South Korea responds to these attempted
thefts by increasing security (and possibly banning cryptocurrency trading) they will become
harder targets, forcing North Korean actors to look to exchanges and users in other countries
as well.
Witnessing North Korean cyber-attacks and its seemingly rudimentary infrastructure, people
have raised many questions about its involvement in cyber-warfare. How can a country

40 https://www.businessinsider.com.au/north-korea-lazarus-group-behind-cryptocurrency-cy-
ber-attack-wannacry-sony-2018-1?r=US&IR=T
41 https://www.businessinsider.com.au/sony-cyber-hack-timeline-2014-12
42 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-northkorea/u-s-blames-north-korea-for-wan-
nacry-cyber-attack-idUSKBN1ED00Q
43 https://www.recordedfuture.com/north-korea-cryptocurrency-campaign/
44 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-bitcoin/uproar-over-crackdown-on-crypto-
currencies-divides-south-korea-idUSKBN1F10YG
45 Ibid.

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 Security Council

like North Korea pose such serious cyber threats? Some skeptics argued that the computer
security industry exaggerated North Korea’s cyber capabilities and the magnitude of the
threats for the promotion of their business. With these questions in mind, there is a growing
need to assess North Korea’s cyber capabilities and the reality of the threat correctly.

17
BrisMUN ‘18

PREVIOUS ACTIONS
UN Resolutions and Membership

The first ever resolution that the Security Council passed on the DPRK regarded its aggression
against the South in the Korean War in 1950, in which the Council declared a breach of
peace and accordingly demanded the cessation of hostilities. Followed by Security Council
resolutions 83, 84, and 85, the committee established a unified command under the U.S. to
assist the South and determined that North Korea presented a threat to international peace
and security.

The Council’s resolutions concerning the war culminated in Security Council Resolution 90 in
which the Korean War was removed from the agenda of the Council.
The most recent Council resolution concerning North Korea was passed on 22 December
2017, as Resolution 2397 was in response to the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile
launch on 28 November. This resolution primarily concerned itself with the strengthening of
sanctions. The resolution further limited the import of refined petroleum, and banned the
export of food, machinery, electrical equipment, earth and stones, wood, and vessels from
North Korea, and prohibited the export to North Korea of industrial equipment, machinery,
transport vehicles, and industrial metals.

Sanctions

Since 1993, all Council resolutions which have concerned North Korea have been related to its
nuclear ambitions and its participation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Resolution 825
urged them to reconsider their decision to withdraw from the Treaty, and Resolution 1695
marked the first instance of sanctions imposed against the North for ballistic missile testing in
2006.

Resolution 1695 solely prevented the export or transfer to North Korea of missile and missile-
related items, materials, goods and technology for its missile or WMD programs.

Later in 2006, in Resolution 1718, a Sanctions Committee on North Korea was established,
in addition to a Panel of Experts. These sanctions required Member States to prevent any
direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to North Korea through their territories or by
their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their
territories. Items prohibited included:

“Any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft,
attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United
Nations Register on Conventional Arms, or related materiel including spare parts, or items as
determined by the Security Council [or the Sanctions Committee]” - S/RES/1718 Paragraph 8 (a)
(i)

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“All items, materials, equipment, goods and technology as set out in the lists in documents
S/2006/814 (page 7 onwards)46 and S/2006/815 (page 11 onwards)47 … also taking into
account the list in document S/2006/816 (page 2 onwards)48 as well as other items, materials,
equipment, goods and technology, determined by the Security Council or the Committee, which
could contribute to DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass
destruction- related programmes” - S/RES/1718 Paragraph 8 (a) (ii)

Luxury goods - S/RES/1718 Paragraph 8 (a) (iii).

The sanctions also required Member States to prevent the procurement of items in (a) (i) and
(a) (ii) from North Korea and prohibited transfers to North Korea of,

“technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture,

maintenance or use of the items in subparagraphs (a) (i) and (a) (ii) above” - S/RES/1718
Paragraph 8 (c).

A further requirement of Member States was the freezing of funds, financial assets, and
economic resources of persons or entities determined by the Council or the Sanctions
Committee who are related to North Korea’s nuclear-related, other weapons of mass
destruction-related and ballistic missile- related programmes (S/RES/1718 Paragraph 8 (d))
and prevention of entry or transit of individuals determined by the Council or Sanctions
Committee who are supporters, promoters, or complicit in North Korea’s policies nuclear,
ballistic missile, and weapons of mass destruction-related programs, including their family
members (S/RES/1718 Paragraph 8 (e)).

Under Paragraph 9, the freezing of financial assets or resources excluded those determined
by States to be necessary for basic expenses, extraordinary expenses. These exclusions
would be notified to the Sanctions Committee and would be permitted exclusion if within five
working days after the notification, the Committee does not make a negative decision. Basic
expenses were specified to be,

“payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance
premiums, and public utility charges, or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional
fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, or
fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of
frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources” - S/RES/1718 Paragraph 9 (a).

Under Paragraph 10 of the same resolution, exemptions to the travel restriction would
be determined on a case-by-case basis by the Sanctions Committee of travel justified
on humanitarian grounds, religious obligations, or would further the objectives of the
resolution.

These sanctions were strengthened in Resolution 1874 in 2009, which added that North Korea
would cease export of, and Member States would cease export, or transfer of,

46 http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/NKOREA%20S2006%20814.PDF
47 http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/NKOREA%20S2006%20815.PDF
48 http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/NKorea%20S2006%20816.pdf

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BrisMUN ‘18

“all arms and related materiel, financial transactions, technical training, advice, services or
assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms or materiel” -
S/RES/1874 Paragraph (9) & (10).

Paragraph 10 of Resolution 1874 also required Member States to notify the Sanctions
Committee with at least five days’ notice prior to selling, supplying, or transferring small arms
or light weapons to North Korea.

In 2013, in response to the 12 December 2012 satellite launch by North Korea, the Security
Council under Resolution 2087 further extended the sanctions list of North Korean individuals
and groups, as well as the materials prohibited from being transferred to or from North
Korea, those being INFCIRC/254/Rev.11/Part 149, INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 250 and S/2012/94751.

In response to the nuclear test on 12 February 2013, Resolution 2094 extend the list of
sanctioned goods, and further clarifies that the responsibilities of Member States under the
Security Council authorised sanctions extend to:

• Brokering or other intermediary services (Paragraph 7)

• Individuals or entities involved in, or assisting in the evasion of sanctions or violations of

them (Paragraph 8)

• The prohibition of opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or offices of North Korean banks
or joint ventures by North Korean banks they have information that provides reasonable
grounds to believe that these activities could contribute to North Korea’s nuclear or
ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by resolutions (Paragraph 12)

• The prohibition of their own financial institutions opening representative offices,

subsidiaries, or banking accounts in North Korea if they have similar information as
mentioned above (Paragraph 13)

• Not providing public financial support for trade with North Korea if support could
contribute to North Korea’s nuclear of ballistic missile programs or other prohibited
activities (Paragraph 15)

• Inspection of all cargo within or transiting that originated from, destined for, or brokered
or facilitated by North Korea (Paragraph 16)

• Denial of permission to aircraft take off, landing, or flight within their territory if the
aircraft contains prohibited items (Paragraph 18).

In 2016, the Council then passed further sanctions on individuals and items in response to the
6 January nuclear test under Resolution 2270. These sanctions declared that any items except
food or medicine would be prohibited if a State determines that it could directly contribute
to the developing of North Korea’s armed forces (Paragraph 8) unless the State determines

49 https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/sites/www.un.org.sc.suborg/files/infcirc_254_rev.11_part1.pdf
50 https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/sites/www.un.org.sc.suborg/files/infcir_c254_rev.8_part2.pdf
51 http://undocs.org/S/2012/947

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 Security Council

it would be exclusively used for humanitarian purposes and not for generating revenue
(Paragraph 9 (a)).

In response to the July 2017 missile testing, the Council in Resolution 2371 would then extend
sanctions again to additional individuals and entities, the export of seafood, and lead and lead
ore.

After the sixth nuclear test in September of 2017, the Council passed Resolution 2375
strengthening sanctions to natural gas condensates and liquids, textiles, quotas on refined
petroleum and crude oil, issuing of visas. The mandatory requirement to inspect vessels
however did not receive Council authorisation to use force on vessels that refused inspection.
Instead, vessels that refuse inspection would have their assets frozen, be denied port access,
or de-registered.

The Panel of Experts, primarily tasked with assisting the Sanctions Committee and the
Security Council has had its duration extended in Resolutions 1928, 2050, 2141, 2207, and
2345 into 2018.

Six-Party Talks

Mentioned throughout the Council resolutions, the Six-Party Talks were several multilateral
negotiations held since 2003 with China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the
United States in attendance. In 2009, North Korea ceased participation, despite aspirations of
continuing those talks evident in its progressive iteration in Council resolutions.

In September 2005 during its fourth round of talks, it was hoped that progress had finally
be achieved when in a unanimous affirmation, North Korea declared it would abandon its
nuclear weapons program and realign with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty52 whilst
allowing IAEA monitors to re-enter the State, in exchange for food and energy assistance.53

During its fifth round of talks in February 2007, progress was reached after the previous
round was stalled due to US sanctions on Banco Delta Asia in Macau.54 On February 13, North
Korea agreed to a 60-day plan for its shutting down of Yongbyon nuclear facilities in exchange
for 50,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil whilst the US committed to removing North Korea from its
list of state sponsors of terrorism. The IAEA then confirmed in June 2007 that the 5-megawatt
Yongbyon reaction had been shut down.

In April 2009, after several delays in implementation of agreements and lack of consensus
during six-party sessions, North Korea test-fired Taepo Dong-2, from which the Security
Council passed Resolution 1718 which strengthened sanctions. A day after on 14 April, North
Korea announced that it would no longer participate in six-party talks and would no longer
commit to its previous agreements.

South Korea’s Sunshine Policy

As President Kim Dae-jung assumed the presidency of South Korea in February 1998, he
carried out his own vision of peaceful coexistence and phased unification between the two

52 https://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm
53 https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/six-party-talks-north-koreas-nuclear-program
54 https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/6partytalks

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BrisMUN ‘18

Koreas. His peace initiative has been better known as the sun-shine policy, deriving its name
from Aesop’s fable in which sun and wind competed to strip off a gentleman’s coat (he took
off the coat in response to warm sunshine rather than strong wind). President Kim firmly
believed that in order to reduce tension on the peninsula and induce behavioural changes in
the North, the first task should be to convince the regime that its external environment was
benign.

The proponents of engagement have sold the engagement policy vigorously. They claim that
throughout the sunshine period, economic and social exchanges expanded, the heads of the
two adversaries agreed to take necessary measures to ease political and military tension, and
the North did not provoke the South militarily in any serious manner after the summer of
2002.55 Simply put, they argue that engagement worked in the past and it will work again.

However, others argue that if the ultimate goal of the sunshine policy was to help Pyongyang
launch domestic reforms to boost its lethargic economy, to pacify the North Korean
leadership by exposing it to the benefits of economic exchanges, and to bring about political
reconciliation between North and South, it failed. Further, they would dispute whether it led
to any meaningful changes in North Korea’s domestic policies or significant modifications in
its belligerent foreign policies.56 In these respects, the sunshine policy fell far short of fulfilling
its promises. Throughout his campaign to be the new president of South Korea, the now
President Moon Jae-in pledged to revive the sunshine policy of engagement with North Korea,
championed by former liberal presidents Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and Rho Moo-hyun (2003-
04, 2004-08).

Considered Approaches to the Issue

Intervention

While the U.N. Charter obliges U.N. members to promote respect for human rights and
asserts as a primary purpose of the Organization, it also recognizes the doctrine of non-
intervention. Thus, Article 2, Paragraph 7, of the U.N. Charter states that “nothing in the
Charter authorizes the United Nations to interfere in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state.”57

Because of the traditional approach towards human rights as a matter exclusively within
the domestic jurisdiction of sovereign states, Article 2(7) has been viewed by some as an
obstacle to the implementation of the human rights provisions of the Charter. States accused
of human rights violations cite this provision in response to criticisms by other states (or
international organizations) relating to human rights conditions within their borders.

However, many advocates argue that there is substantial justification for state responsibility
for the protection of the human rights of individuals and for some level of “interference”
by the international community on behalf of those whose rights have been infringed.
Increasingly, protection of populations affected by conflict within a country is seen as partly
the responsibility of the international community.

55 Keun-shik Kim,“Moon Jae-in Chŏngbuwa Nambukkwankye Chŏngsanghwa,”[InKorean]

Institute for Far Eastern Studies Hyŏnan Chindan, No. 60, May 19, 2017,
56 Kim, I. (2017). No More Sunshine: The Limits of Engagement with North Korea. The Wash-
ington Quarterly, 40(4), 165-181.
57 www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/46-51/46-51_12.pdf

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 Security Council

Some observers have more recently argued that the DPRK government is a threat to its own
people and that North Korea has violated its responsibility to protect its own citizens from
crimes against humanity. They suggest that action by the international community and the
U.N. Security Council is warranted.

Unification

Attempts at reunification have a dark history, referenced frequently as an instigating factor

of the Korean war. Kim Il-Sung became obsessed with reunifying the Koreas under the rule
of communism. With considerable military support from the USSR, North Korea prepared for
war to unify the peninsula by force. The result of that action has been considered above.
Nonetheless, the topic of unification still remains popular. A survey found that the South
Korean public believed that North Korea’s nuclear program (37.2%) and inter-Korean
cooperation for reunification (20.6%) are the two most important issues for PRC-ROK
relations.58

The topic has been a pressing one of late considering the recent unification of the North and
South Koreans’ Winter Olympics team. Kim’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, was at the opening ceremony
with North Korea’s nominal head of state, 90-year-old Kim Yong Nam. They were part of an
extraordinary diplomatic push by the North aimed at using the Olympics to ease tensions
with Seoul and bolster unity between the two Koreas after a year that has been marked by
escalating fears of war and increasing angry rhetoric between Pyongyang and Washington.59

Yet, unification may still be an elusive dream yet. One reason for this is attributed to Chinese
interests in North Korea. Although Beijing publicly supports the denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula and peaceful Korean unification, its core geostrategic interest is said to lie in
maintaining the current status quo with North Korea as a crucial buffer state.60 Reunification
of the North and South, presumably under the governance of South Korea, means China loses
that buffer zone and faces the U.S. Forces Korea immediately at its border, as well the likely
massive inflow of North Korean refugees. Only by supporting the regime in Pyongyang can
China avert such a daunting outcome.

As a result, these diverging interests have led China to apply pressure on North Korea to
rein in its nuclear weapons program and appease other countries, on the one hand, but also
provide oil and other political and economic aid to North Korea so as to prevent the regime’s
collapse, on the other hand.

58 “South Koreans and Their Neighbors,” Asan Institute for Policy Studies, April 19, 2014
<http://en.asaninst.org/contents/south-koreans-and-their-neighbors-2014>
59 http://time.com/5141298/winter-olympics-opening-ceremony-north-south-korea/
60 Kim, E., & Cha, V. (2016). Between a Rock and a Hard Place: South Korea’s Strategic Dilem-
mas with China and the United States. asia policy, 21(1), 101-121.

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BrisMUN ‘18

QYSBATA
(Questions You Should Be Able To Answer)

Security Council

• What are the most relevant Articles of the UN Charter for Security Council action?

• Under what Chapter does the Security Council act to create sanctions?

• What other actions are within the power of the Security Council to take on the issue?

• What actions are NOT within the power of the Security Council to take on the issue?

• What motions would you raise if you held the Presidency for the very first BrisMUN ’18
Security Council committee session?

Topic

• What surrounding nation-states have had the most influence on the Korean peninsula and
why?

• Why did North and South Korea separate?

• What is the current North Korean regime’s foreign policy (as far as we can know)?

• Were the Six-Party Talks successful?

• Is the ‘Sunshine Policy’ an effective foreign policy?

• In what ways has North Korea participated in the U.N. previously?

• What were the most impactful UNSC resolutions on the responsibility of states’ actions
towards the DPRK?

• What are the major successes and failures of previous sanctions?

• What is the status of relations between North Korea and every other current Security
Council sitting member?

• What is the status of relations between North Korea and the country you are
representing?

• Should North Korea be treated as a rational actor or a rogue state?

• Should North and South Korea be reunified?

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 Security Council

QARMA
(Questions A Resolution Must Answer)

• Should any nation be condemned for breaching previous UNSC resolutions?

• Is there any recent action by North Korea that warrants an extension, or cut-back, of the
sanctions program, or other retributive measures?

• Should more pressure be put on North Korea generally to pursue Nuclear Non-
Proliferation? If so, how would you create this pressure?

• Is there enough evidence to condemn North Korea for CBW development and use? If so,
what should be done in response?

• Should there be regulation of testing weaponry near the North Korean peninsula?

• Should any new aid be recommended to deliver to North Korea?

• Should the U.N. intervene in North Korea?

• What strategies are available to respond to, and/or counter, cyber-attacks by the North
Korean regime?

• Is a ‘rewards-based system’ or a ‘punishment system’ overall more effective in dealing with

North Korea?

25