New medievalism is a term used by Hedley Bull in The Anarchical Society to describe the erosion of state sovereignty in the

contemporary globalised world. This has resulted in an international system which resembles the medieval one, where political authority was exercised by a range of non-territorial and overlapping agents, such as religious bodies, principalities, empires and city-states, instead of by a single political authority in the form of a state which has complete sovereignty over its territory. Bull argues that the contemporary international system is evolving into one with multiple and overlapping sources of power. Processes characterising this "new medievalism" include the increasing powers held by regional organisations such as the European Union, as well as the spread of sub-national and devolved governments, such as those of Scotland and Catalonia. These challenge the exclusive authority of the state. Private military companies, multinational corporations and the resurgence of worldwide religious movements (e.g. Political Islam) similarly indicate a reduction in the role of the state and a decentralisation of power and authority. More recently, Anthony Clark Arend argues in his 1999 book,Legal Rules and International Society, that the international system is moving toward a "neo-medieval" system. He claims that the trends that Bull noted in 1977 had become even more pronounced by the end of the Twentieth Century. Arend argues that the emergence of a "neo-medieval" system would have profound implications for the creation and operation of international law.

The English School of international relations theory (sometimes also referred to as Liberal Realism, the International Society school or the British institutionalists) maintains that there is a 'society of states' at the international level, despite the condition of anarchy (that is, the lack of a global ruler or world state). The English school stands for the conviction that ideas, rather than simply material capabilities, shape the conduct of international politics, and therefore deserve analysis and critique. It thus can be seen as a via media between realism and liberalism/cosmopolitanism[1] but also has independent elements that clearly distinct it from these theories.

International System, International Society, World Society

[edit] International System The English school starts with the realist assumption of an international system that forms as soon as two or more states have a sufficient amount of interaction. It underlines the English school tradition of realism and Machtpolitik (power politics) and puts international anarchy at the centre of International Relations Theory.[1] [edit] International Society Hedley Bull, however, argued, that states share a certain common interest (usually the "fear of unrestricted violence"[2] ) that lead to the development of a certain set of "rules". He thus defined the international system as

a group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements.[3] These rules are maintained by a set of institutions: war, the great powers, diplomacy, the balance of power, and international law, especially in the mutual recognition of sovereignty by states. Since these rules are not legally binding and there is no ordering institutions, speaking of norms would probably be more appropriate. States that respect these basic rules form an international society. Brown and Ainley therefore define the international society as a "norm-governed relationship whose members accept that they have at least limited responsibilities towards one another and the society as a whole"[4]. States thus follow their interests, but not at all costs. [5] There are differing accounts, within the school, concerning the evolution of those ideas, some (like Martin Wight) arguing their origins can be found in the remnants of medieval conceptions of societas Christiana, and others such as Hedley Bull, in the concerns of sovereign states to safeguard and promote basic goals, especially their survival. Most English School understandings of international society blend these two together, maintaining that the contemporary society of states is partly the product of a common civilization - the Christian world of medieval Europe, and before that, the Roman Empire - and partly that of a kind of Lockean contract. [edit] World Society Based on a Kantian understanding of the world, the concept of world society takes the global population as a whole as basis for a global identity. However, Buzan also argued that the concept of World Society was the "Cinderella concept of English school theory", as it received almost no conceptual development.[1]

[edit] Reexamination of traditional approaches

A great deal of the English School of thought concerns itself with the examination of traditional international theory, casting it as Martin Wight did in his 1950s-era lectures at the London School of Economics into three divisions (called by Barry Buzan as the English School's triad, based on Wight's three traditions): 1. Realist (or Hobbesian, after Thomas Hobbes) and thus the concept of international system 2. Rationalist (or Grotian, after Hugo Grotius), representing the international society 3. Revolutionist (or Kantian, after Immanuel Kant) representing world society. In broad terms, the English School itself has supported the rationalist or Grotian tradition, seeking a middle way (or via media) between the 'power politics' of realism and the 'utopianism' of revolutionism. Later Wight changed his triad into a four part division by adding Mazzini (see: Martin Wight, Four Seminal Thinkers in International Theory: Machiavelli, Grotius, Kant, and Mazzini).

The English School is largely a constructivist theory, emphasizing the non-deterministic nature of anarchy in international affairs that also draws on functionalism and realism.

[edit] Internal divisions

The English School is often understood to be split into two main wings, named after two categories described by Hedley Bull:

The pluralists argue that the diversity of humankind - their differing political and religious views, ethnic and linguistic traditions, and so on - is best contained within a society that allows for the greatest possible independence for states, which can, in their forms of government, express those differing conceptions of the 'good life'. This position is expressed most forcefully by the Canadian academic Robert Jackson, especially in The Global Covenant (2001). The solidarists, by contrast, argue that the society of states should do more to promote the causes of human rights and, perhaps, emancipation - as opposed to the rights of states to political independence and non-intervention in their internal affairs. This position may be located in the work on humanitarian intervention by, amongst others, Nicholas Wheeler, in Saving Strangers (2000).

There are, however, further divisions within the school. The most obvious is that between those who argue that the school's approach should be historical and normative (such as Robert Jackson or Tim Dunne) and those who think it can be methodologically 'pluralist', making use of 'positivist' approaches to the field (like Barry Buzan and Richard Little).

[edit] Affinities to others

The English School does have affinities:

The pluralists have drawn from the classical 'political realism' of Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan The pluralists have also been influence by the underpinnings of Reinhold Niebuhr's Christian Realism. The solidarist have drawn from realist writers, such as Stanley Hoffmann.

Contemporary English School writers draw from a variety of sources:

from structural 'neorealism' of Kenneth Waltz, in the case of Barry Buzan; from social constructivism of Alexander Wendt, in that of Tim Dunne; from 'critical theorists', in that of Andrew Linklater; and even from the 'post-structuralism' of Michel Foucault, in the case of James Der Derian.

[edit] History
The 'English-ness' of the school is questionable - many of its most prominent members are not English - and its intellectual origins are disputed. One view (that of Hidemi Suganami) is that its roots lie in the work of pioneering inter-war scholars like the South African Charles Manning, the founding professor of the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics. Others (especially Tim Dunne and Brunello Vigezzi) have located them

in the work of the British committee on the theory of international politics, a group created in 1959 under the chairmanship of the Cambridge historian Herbert Butterfield, with financial aid from the Rockefeller Foundation. Both positions acknowledge the central role played by the theorists Martin Wight, Hedley Bull (an Australian teaching at the London School of Economics) and John Vincent. The name 'English School' was first coined by Roy Jones in an article published in the Review of International Studies in 1981, entitled "The English school - a case for closure". Some other descriptions - notably that of 'British institutionalists' (Hidemi Suganami) - have been suggested, but are not generally used. Throughout the development of the theory, the name became widely accepted, not least because it was developed almost exclusively at the London School of Economics and Oxford University.

Hedley Bull's The Anarchical Society has become a classic International Relations text in the United Kingdom since it was first published in 1977. Its name in large part describes Bull's thesis: the current system of states is anarchical in that there is no higher level of authority over states, each state having ultimate sovereignty over its citizens within its borders; and the system forms a society in that there are certain "common rules and institutions" (25) which provides order to the international arena. Neither statement seems very novel to a student of International Relations; indeed, it seems to be an overview of the common neo-realist/neoliberal position. The Anarchical Society's value seems to be that it was one of the first books to comprehensively present such ideas in a book that most of all helps one to analyze world politics from many angles - albeit always from a neo-realist/neo-liberal perspective. Having said that, The Anarchical Society can be rather boring for the International Relations student for the main reason that Bull says little that is new, at least in hindsight. In fact, Bull's statements don't seem that profound at all, and in many cases he seems to be saying the obvious (but this may be like reading Isaac Newton and saying that inertia seems to be common sense.) Perhaps my worst complaint is that, in painting a picture of his world, Bull sets forth definitions that he has carefully constructed so that his world will fit his definitions. It is inevitable that the world fit Bull's theory because of the way Bull has constructed his definitions.

Part 1: The Nature of Order in World Politics

One doesn't have to go much further than the concept of an "anarchical society" to find the point of Bull's work. Reminiscent of Kant (if I can remember back five years ago), Bull first sets out to define each of the terms he is working with - Bull seems consciously intent on forming a classic-to-be from the very start. He spends pages discussing exactly what is meant by order, both in general and referring to the international sphere. It is here that he makes an important distinction between a system of states and a society of states. An international system simply means that there are states which have contacts and dealings with each other (9). An international society, on the other hard, while presupposing an international system, share a set of rules an institutions (13). Bull's point then is simple: although the modern system of states are anarchical in that no hierarchical level of sovereignty exists above that of each state, the states do to some extent form a society with common rules and institutions, although this society "is always in competition with the elements of a state of war and of... conflict," and one should not think that "international society were the sole or [even] the dominant element" (49).

Part 2: Examining Order in the Contemporary International System

After some further discussion on exactly how the states system has evolved and an explanation of how rules are formed and used, Bull turns to "Part Two: Examining Order in the Contemporary International System," in which he simply looks closer at certain rules and institutions (the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war, and the great powers) contribute to modern international order. Having made his point, this section is simply supportive and seems to almost be a distinct discussion. The student of International Relations

will find this reading useful, again not because of its novelty or profoundness, but because of its analysis. Here are some items I found important and/or interesting:

The Balance of Power and International Order

Bull makes a distinction between general and local balances of power, and dominate and subordinate balances of power (98). A balance in the international system is a recent idea, originating in 15th century Italy (101). The chief function of the balance of power is to preserve the system of states (103, 111). The current balance of power doesn't share a common culture, as did the 18th and 19th century European balances of power (110). I would ask, since the latter ended up more in something like a community, why couldn't the former do the same, with more of a homogenous culture?

International Law and International Order

"States obey international law in part because of habit or inertia; they are, as it were, programmed to operate within the framework of established principles" (133). That gives credence to the notion that international relations are at least in part socially constructed, and it makes for interesting thoughts about social conditioning in general. The presence of international law in our current system of states is very much a product of the current system evolving from Western Christendom and its system of laws and values (137).

Diplomacy and International Order

Bull cites Nicolson as holding that the New Diplomacy of "open covenants" is OK, but "openly arrived at" is not always preferable, because it precludes secret or confidential negotiations (169). This sounds exactly like what Abba Eban says in Diplomacy for the Next Century.

War and International Order

Bull notes that we currently see states at war as an alternative to states at peace, but when the power to make war was first confined to states, the alternative to war was "more ubiquitous violence" (179). In other words, when states were first given the sole right to wage war, war was thought to actually reduce the violence present in the previous medieval setting. Interesting. Bull thinks that if war would have broken out between the US and the USSR, if would have been for security reasons. This is in contrast to Halliday, who thinks it would have been because of ideological reasons (188). I wonder if Raymond Aron's idea of "slowing down of history" came before Fukuyama's "end of history" phrase, and if one of them was playing on the phrase of the other (190). Bull feels that, "The balance of power remains a condition of the continued existence of the system of states...". He also points out the relative rise of civil wars after 1945.

The Great Powers and International Order

Bull states that, "...just as during the Cold War period the general character of any country's foreign policy was determined by its attitude to the first two" (198). Since The Anarchical Society was written in the 1970's during a period of detente, does Bull think the Cold War is over at this point? Bull describes the various ways in which great powers can contribute to order, but he clarifies (?) that this is not necessarily what great powers actually do, or even what they should do - it is rather what they could do (201). I'm not sure what this clears up... Bull makes the distinction among dominance (the "habitual use of force by a great power against the lesser states" it has control over without regard to their sovereignty), primacy (clear one-way influence and control without threat of military force or violation of sovereignty, such as the US and the other NATO members), and hegemony (between dominance and primacy, involving control with force or threat of force that isn't habitual, such as the former Soviet Union and the Eastern European states) (207). Bull notes that the hegemony of the USSR has kept "territorial disputes" - like those between Poland and Russia, Poland and East Germany, Hungary and Rumania, of which the world has heard nothing in the post-1945 era" held in check and has prevented them "from reaching the surface of conscious political activity" (212). With the fall of the Soviet Union, have these territorial disputes have come to the surface? Is hegemony over an area analogous to a state keeping its internal disputes in check through the state's laws? Although Bull claimed earlier that, "The contribution of the great powers to international order derives from the sheer facts of inequality of power as between the states that make up the international system" (199), he asserts that, "the great powers cannot formalize and make explicit the full extent of their special position." He claims (somewhat contradictorily) that "international society is based on the rejection of a hierarchical ordering of states," so if the great powers are to "make explicit" that they have special rights and duties "would be to engender more antagonism than the international order could support" (221). This is quite paradoxical; he seems to be saying that the great powers have inequality of power, which contributes to the international system, but that making these inequalities explicit would undermine international order. I'm not sure if this is correct.

Part 3: Alternative Paths to World Order

Bull's last section, "Alternative Paths to World Order," is very insightful. This section is more closely linked to the first and helps not only to reaffirm that an international society exists, it goes on to essentially claim (again using Bull's own specially-made definitions, of course) that the current international society should exist for some time; Bull sees no contenders that have a chance of taking its place in the near future. Although Bull presents several alternatives to the current order, the ones presented below are certain ones I felt were particularly interesting for my essay, "Changing Times: Alternatives to the Balance of Power as a Basis for International Order," and the following is quoted from that essay, after which I present various other thoughts I had on this section.

A Disarmed World

The balance of power depends on violence or the threat of violence by one or more states in the system to counteract another state's rise in power. This assumes on both sides the presence of weapons. For one state to become any sort of threat by expansion assumes that the state has the ability of aggression. To counteract this expansion, the other state(s) must also be armed. Removing this variable, then, has the consequence of making a balance of power meaningless, because there would be no military power to balance (226). In the real world, as Bull notes, any complete disarmament of the world is not an option. Even if it were somehow possible to destroy all weapons on a worldwide level (which possibility would seem odd, given that individual states cannot even eliminate certain weapons within their own borders), violence would still be possible, if only on a "primitive level" ( 227). Each state would still have the ability to increase its relative threat, if only by growing more trees from which to make clubs.

World Government
Somewhat more realistic is the option of a higher entity to which all the states in the world would be subject. This could either present itself as a loose confederation of states entering into an agreement of cooperation, or the states could be fashioned in a similar manner to the structure of the United States, in which each state has some autonomy but power over the entire system is consolidated in one geographical area... [S]tates could then afford to be altruistic without fear of being taken advantage of, as either the worldwide legal system would prevent misuse or coordinate the altruistic process in the first place. Analogous to farmers in Oklahoma sending hay to feed the Texas cows during the drought of 1998, states would be free from a threat of aggression from other states, allowing them to freely exercise altruistic intentions. The formation of a world government is a more plausible alternative, since it is evident that such formations have taken place on a smaller scale throughout history. Indeed, governments can be formed in several ways, mostly through conquest or consent. Herein lies a problem: plausibility does not necessarily begat probability, or even desirability. If we are seeking an alternative to the violence present or implied in a balance of power, a world government by conquest is hardly acceptable. On the other hand, the probability of the current system of states voluntarily forming a world-wide government seems as low now as it did to Bull in 1977 (253).

A New Mediaevalism
Another alternative to the balance of power is to revert to the worldwide situation that was found immediately before the rise of the current international system of states. In the Middle Ages, the West was organized by multiple layers of authority, each of which shared sovereignty with the others. These layers of sovereignty were overlapping and were not supreme; authority was shared among rulers, the vassals beneath them, and the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor above ( 245). A secular alternative to such an organization, in which multiple governments share authority over a geographical area, might be possible today. Such a crisscrossing of authority could result in a more stable world system, reducing the inherent trend of violence between powers, since these powers would in many cases share authority (246). This alternative is even more plausible than the others, since already it can be seen that governments are becoming

interdependent in economics and technology, the United Nations is now a familiar part of world affairs, and Non-Governmental Organizations are increasingly prevalent. For these reasons, Bull admits that to a secular "neo-mediaeval order" being possible (255), although he doubts whether it would be inherently more orderly than the current balance of power situation (246). One other similar alternative which Bull seems to immediately dismiss is that of "pairs and groups of states - the pairs and groups which Karl Deutch calls 'pluralistic securitycommunities' - among which there have been not only long periods of peace, but also long periods in which neither party has seriously expected that disputes would be resolved by resort to force" (273). Just as it is unthinkable that the United States would go to war with Canada or (in modern times) Great Britain, other states could conceptually form similar "pluralistic security-communities" in which violence would simply not be an option - it would indeed be unthinkable. Such configurations are plausible, already existing within the present states system, and should immediately make one question why in these areas armed conflict is not accepted by the parties involved. One would expect great interest in such a system that not only promises an alternative to balance of power politics but has even shown itself to exist in the contemporary states system. Bull however, while granting that the concept of this scenario being extended on a worldwide basis may "offer hope," he quickly qualifies his statement by asserting that "we have no present reason to expect that... such a vision will be realized" (274). How can Bull claim that a world government would impede on the rights and liberties of an individual (245) when a world government could conceptually be no different than a modern state, except that its boundaries encompass the earth? How does an individual's liberties change based upon the existence or nonexistence of other states? Bull seems to sometimes needlessly duplicate alternative international systems in the discussion (245, 254). Bull recognizes that the current state system is connected with modern technology and communication (251). Bull says that, even if Western Europe formed some sort of super-state, that would only be a regional phenomenon (257). Why couldn't that eventually spread to the entire world? Bull's (and Brzezinski's) recognize that the initial feelings brought about by "technological unification" is that of feelings of fragmentation (263, 270). Bull rejects the idea of "pluralistic security-communities" (273). But we can now see signs of a conducive environment for them. Bull argues that economically less-well-off states are holding onto their "statehood" to keep a larger system from further exploiting them economically. I think this absurd. For example, if Pakistan and Bangladesh were thinking purely in terms of economics, they would not have split away from India and Pakistan, respectively (281). Bull seems to want to claim the state system to be superior regardless. If alternative system is unlikely, he readily states it. But if a situation is unlikely in the states system, he holds onto the possibility: "We have no reason to assume that this will happen," he says, speaking about

the states system promoting worldwide economic well-being, but maybe, "this now so delicate plant, will survive and grow" (282). Bull recognizes a forming global culture, at least among the elite (305). Bull does present some ideas that even today (in 1999) are actively being investigated in International Relations, such as the presence of order without rules through conditioning (52). Bull at times sets out his view of history, such as his notion that states' ideas of justice evolved from individual ideas of justice (79). Bull comments about current events, such as his contention that the current United Nations Charter places international order at a higher priority than human rights (85). Throughout, you will find his viewpoint very much in neorealist camp, especially in his assumption that states are the main actors on the international stage (78, 81), although his idea of international society seems firmly neo-liberal. The Anarchical Society is therefore a major work not in its novelty but its extensiveness. It would not be incorrect to say that it is biased. It is true that some things are ignored. Sometimes it seems to twist a few facts a bit, and an (many) other places it seems monotonous and pointless. But its examination of the international system is useful and has its place in the evolution of international relations theory. Should you read it in an International Relations course? Maybe. On one hand, it's a classic, so your professors will be discussing it, especially in the UK. On the other hand, you're bound to pick up some of the book's major ideas in other later works. If you have the time, go ahead and read it so you can say you have. Make sure you read Part 1, skim Part 3, and skip around to sections that interest you in Part 2. And feel free to switch to something else when it gets boring. Domestic analogy is an international affairs term coined by Professor Hedley Bull.[1] Domestic analogy is the idea that states are like a "society of individuals". The analogy makes the presumption that relations between individuals and relations between states are the same. [2] The domestic analogy is used when aggression is explained as the international equivalent of armed robbery or murder. A person can look at international affairs like a society of people, except there is no police, and every conflict threatens the structure as a whole with collapse.[3] In his famous book Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer uses the term to explain what is a just and unjust war