India’s unflagging obstinacy; Nuclear Deals and Power Politics;

India’s Agni V Missile: Game Changer?; US Silence Over Indian

Missile Test – OpEd; India's Broken Promise
India’s unflagging obstinacy

Posted on 25. Apr, 2012

by Asif H Raja in Indo-Pakistan

Some of the soldiers buried defending the motherlandBy Brig Asif Haroon Raja

In early hours of the morning on 7 April 2012, an extraordinary avalanche struck

Battalion HQ of 6 NLI regiment located in Gayari sector of Siachen Glacier. 135
officers, JCOs, men and civilians paid out of defence establishment got buried under
1000 meters wide and over 25 meters high landslide. Round the clock rescue operation
is in progress since the day of tragic occurrence despite bad weather and poor visibility.
No stone is being left unturned by more than 500 troops employed in digging and
excavation works. 18 days have passed but so far no luck. Every Pakistani is deeply
anguished over this tragedy.

90 km long and 50 km wide Siachen Glacier situated between Karakorum in the north
and Hindu Kush in the west came into limelight when Indian military launched ground
cum airborne operation codenamed Meghdoot and clandestinely occupied three major
passes Sia La, Gyong La and Bilafond La of the Soltoro Ridge in April 1984. India had
been planning for this venture since 1981. Since the whole of Siachen Glacier was
administratively under Pakistan’s control, it impelled Pak Army to rush forward and
block Indian advance west of Gyong La. Since then both sides are locked up in mortal
combat. Several daring attempts were made by Pak forces to retake captured heights
but failed because India had the advantage of higher ground. India controls about two-
thirds of the glacier in the shape of inverted triangle measuring 3500 sq km, which
encompasses three passes while Pakistan holds the Gyong La Pass, which overlooks
Shyok and Nubra River valleys. Shyok feeds into the Indus. Indians are on a higher
plane and conveniently placed to roll down but impassability of terrain and grit of
Pakistani defenders has kept them restrained.

For 28 years, troops have been serving in that hostile terrain and severe weather
conditions and defending the Motherland. More men have died as a result of terrain and
weather hazards than from enemy action. On the average, 100 casualties take place
on Pakistan side and 180 on Indian side each year. Over 8000 Indian and Pakistani
soldiers have died between April 1984 and April 2012; 5000 suffered by Indian Army
and 3000 by Pak Army. Yet both sides stubbornly hold on to their positions and
continue to fight and die on the roof of the world, which is the highest and costliest. No
soldier in the world would have been put to such harsh test of human endurance and for
so long. Pakistan spends about Rs 15 million a day to maintain a brigade group (4000)
at Siachen Glacier, which makes Rs 450 a month and Rs 5.4 billion a year India spends
Rs 50 million a day, Rs 1.5 billion a month and Rs 30 billion a year to maintain its seven
battalions (7000 troops). India has so far spent $13.5 billion including $3.5 billion
incurred on operation Meghdoot.

So far twelve rounds of negotiations have taken place between the officials of two
archrivals starting 1985 to settle this issue but to no avail. June 17, 1989 talks had
broken the ice and both sides agreed to settle this issue. India consented to demilitarize
Siachen by using the term ‘relocating its forces’ instead of the word ‘withdrawing’, well
away from disputed heights. Future positions were to be determined on ground in
conformity with Simla Agreement. ‘Present positions’ didn’t figure out at all. The
agreement was endorsed by PMs of both countries. However, in the 1992 talks, India at
the behest of Indian military backtracked on the plea that current deployment to be first
authenticated by Pakistan by marking the positions on maps before redeployment could
be carried out.

Obviously Pakistan couldn’t have obliged India since it would have meant legitimizing
Indian aggression in violation of Simla Agreement and giving reason to India to make
illegal claim over it in its future negotiations. India maintained this stance in 1994 talks
as well despite Pakistan having shown flexibility to record existing positions on an
annexure but with a caveat in the main text of the agreement that it would not be
misused by India to lay legal claim over the vacated areas. It is an open secret that
India wants to convert captured territory as a contested region similar to disputed
Kashmir.

Indian military argued that without authentication both on maps and written text, it
would impel Pak Army to capture strategically important Soltoro Ridge, which overlooks
Karakorum Pass, where borders of China, Pakistan and India meet. As such, India
uncompromisingly maintained that demilitarization would take place only when Agreed
Ground Position Line (AGPL) is accepted. Real reason behind the change of heart was
that Indian military didn’t want to lose strategically important Soltoro, which not only
helps India in denying Pakistan-China access to reach other, but also in dominating
Gilgit-Baltistan and safeguarding Tibet. Kargil conflict in 1999 further hardened the
stance of India. Ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC) at the initiative of Pakistan
and recommencement of Composite Dialogue in 2004 leading to several rounds of talks
on all disputes including Siachen up till late 2008 failed to settle any of the disputes
because of India’s unflagging obstinacy.
After Mumbai attacks India stalled the dialogue and refused to renew it till as late as mid
2011 despite Pakistan’s repeated requests. Finally when 12th round of talks on May 30-
31, 2011 took place, Pakistan in all sincerity put forward tangible suggestions. It
proposed joint monitoring of disengagement process, redeployment positions bounded
by Gyong, MJ 9842 and Warshi, preparation of two lists – positions occupied in 1984,
and future deployment positions. India rejected all the proposals and maintained its
inflexible stance that AGPL beyond MJ 9842 must be delineated before demilitarization.
This was altogether contrary to the earlier sequence of disengagement, redeployment
outside the conflict zone and demarcation agreed to in 1989. In order to justify its
inflexibility, India of late has been expressing its growing concerns over increasing
presence of China in Pakistan’s Northern Areas. Indo-western media has been floating
rumors that Chinese have been allowed to set up military bases. This made-up excuse
has given added reason to India to maintain its obstinacy over Siachen issue.

It is crystal clear that India is buying time and is least interested in resolving any of the
core disputes which include Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek and dams on rivers. It
grudgingly agreed to resume talks not to settle outstanding disputes but to promote
trade and enhance cultural cooperation through people-to-people contacts which are
entirely to its advantage. India is keen to consolidate its MFN status to dominate
Pakistani markets, to utilize trade route to Afghanistan and Central Asia via Wagah and
also to secure its hold over Afghanistan. It however wants to derive all these benefits
without ceding anything in return since it is devoid of large-heartedness and intrigue is
in its blood. It seems our leaders are all set to grant unilateral trade concessions to India
since the US wants it that way.

It is surprising that some of the political leaders, pseudo intellectuals, segment of

media, and RAW paid SAFMA and Aman ki Asha having proclivity for India instead of
building pressure on India to vacate its illegal occupation of Soltoro ridge, are holding
both sides equally responsible for the impasse. Some suggested that Pakistan had
been dragging its feet to settle the dispute. Others said Pakistan should agree to record
current ground position on a map. They are trying to create an impression as if Pakistan
was guilty of defending its territory and are pressing our government to carryout
unilateral withdrawal from Siachen. Nawaz Sharif prophesized that he is sure India
would follow suit if Pakistan takes the initiative and withdraws the troops.

Some look at Pakistan’s defence budget with contempt. A myth is in circulation that
Pak military spends much more than Indian military which is untrue. As per SIPRI,
Pakistan defence budget fell from 6.2% of GDP in 1988 to 2.8% in 2009 and that of
India from 3.8% to 2.8% of GDP. Pakistan spent $5.685 billion on defence in 2011 as
against India spending $44.282. India has made an increase of 17% in its 2012/13
defence budget and allocated $40 billion for defence purchases. Probably anti-military
elements have bought the outlandish idea of the US and President Zardari that India
poses no threat to Pakistan. Major threat to Pakistan is from India since over70% of its
military might is focused toward Pakistan. It has the intentions, military and economic
capability and the support of sole super power to opt for a military adventure against
Pakistan whenever opportunity comes its way. Those promoting Indian interests at the
cost of Pakistan’s interests need to be cautioned.

The tragedy that befell upon 6 NLI can also fall upon any of Army unit of Indian military
stationed in a much difficult zone and the disaster could be bigger in magnitude. Gen
Kayani has urged India to hasten the process of demilitarization of Siachen Glacier and
also settle other disputes so that undue loss of human lives and human sufferings on
both sides could be avoided and colossal amounts spent on troop sustenance diverted
toward betterment of people’s lives. India’s response has been cautious and lukewarm
since it is fancying that given the host of intricate problems in which Pakistan is
confronted with, together with Indian sponsored media campaign in the two countries,
Pakistan will be amenable to India’s selfish proposals and would carry out unilateral
withdrawal from Siachen.

Siachen tragedy should be an eye-opener for the leaders of India and Pakistan and a
reminder to the world community to see for itself the cost paid by the forces of two
neighbors chiefly because of expansionist policies pursued by India and also because
of the backup support provided by the US and other world powers. But for mulishness of
India, this tragedy wouldn’t have occurred. While Siachen Glacier is melting fast due to
heavy presence of Indian military, diplomatic ice on Siachen is hardening due to India’s
intransigence. The world must exert full pressure on India to stop sacrificing human
beings at the altar of puffed up egos and vacate the illegally occupied inverted triangle
on Siachen Glacier so that both India and Pakistan could divert the colossal amount
spent on the maintenance of troops towards alleviation of poverty in the two countries.
Pakistanis have not forgotten the unrelenting pressure applied by the US led G-8
countries in 1999 forcing Pakistan to vacate Kargil heights. Why the civilized world is so
hesitant to apply same kind of pressure on India, or it has two set of rules and
principles?

At the April 2012 annual session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, held
in New York, Pakistan again contended that one of the impeding factors behind global
disarmament and non-proliferation efforts was the “pursuit of selectivity, discrimination
and double standards by major powers in the area of non-proliferation, for commercial
and strategic considerations.”

Earlier, at the Nuclear Security Summit, held in late March 2012 in Seoul, South Korea,
Pakistan pleaded for access to nuclear technology for “peaceful uses on a non-
discriminatory basis” assuring the international community that “Pakistan has taken
effective measures ... to enhance nuclear security.”
In demanding access to nuclear technology on a non-discriminatory basis Pakistan was
making a thinly veiled reference to the 2008 US-India civil nuclear deal, contending that
Pakistan “qualifies to become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and
other export control regimes.”

Why is the international community reluctant to grant Pakistan access to nuclear

technology and accord Pakistan membership to nuclear cartels – in particular the
Nuclear Suppliers Group? Pakistan is currently facing a significant crisis in its energy
and water sectors. With 15-20 hours of rolling blackouts, Pakistan clearly needs
alternative sources of energy, which may rightly include access to nuclear energy.

An argument could be made that in recent years the NSG has been bending its own
rules for national security and dubious financial reasons. In a NSG meeting in Vienna in
2008, the United States won special exemptions for its ally, India, that was deemed by
many in the then-Bush neoconservative foreign policy circles to be a reliable ‘hedge’
against a rising China. Being outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as
well as the NSG, India is barred from being sold anything, even civilian nuclear reactors.
But the US used its diplomatic clout at the NSG to allow even the potential export of
enrichment technology needed to make weapons-grade uranium and plutonium.

In response, at the NSG meeting held in New Zealand in 2010, China argued that since
the US opened the door for India, it was going to sell nuclear reactors to Pakistan. This
raised two specious concerns: 1) Can Pakistan be trusted given its record of nuclear
proliferation? And 2) Will the Sino-Pakistan deal undermine the fragile global nuclear
non-proliferation regime?

When we examine both arguments against the power-politics exhibited by the NSG and
the monetary motivations surrounding the US-India Civil Nuclear Deal, it unequivocally
points to the disingenuousness of those self-proclaimed purveyors of global security
and non-proliferation.

The power-politics behind the NSG’s “preferential treatment” of certain states raises
important questions about the ambitious vision that Obama had outlined in his famous
Prague speech on global nuclear disarmament where he proclaimed “America’s
commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapon.” The
selective interpretation of NSG rules clearly does not bode well for the existing anti-
proliferation framework and nuclear disarmament diplomacy.

If anything, the current modus operandi of the NSG is an expression of how hypocritical
much of the present arms control process is. The NPT is the cornerstone of the current
set-up. Signed in 1970 to lock in the five states that had already tested a bomb – the
US, Britain, Russia, China and France – and keep others out, it was also meant to
commit these five countries to gradual disarmament, but that has never really
happened.

Countries, like India, Pakistan and Israel, risked sanctions and refused to sign the
treaty, while others, like North Korea, Syria, and now possibly Iran, joined, but went
ahead with bomb development in secret. When India detonated its first test bomb, in
1974, the NSG was created as a mechanism to bolster the NPT treaty.

But making nuclear weapons exclusive just made them all the more desirable and they
came to be defined by many as a symbol of grandeur almost divorced from any military
purpose. Emerging nations like Pakistan then felt, with its nuclear tests in 1998, that
they had no choice but to do the same in order to be taken seriously at the international
level.

Contemporary nuclear arms control is not being used to make the world a safer place
but to shore up an existing network of dominance. And now that it suits the US to have
a nuclear-capable India as a strategic counter-balance to an increasingly confident
China, suddenly the international protocols governing nuclear trade could be bended.
China, in turn, has seized the opportunity to strengthen its own ally, Pakistan.

Pakistan naturally would like the benefits of being able to undertake civilian nuclear
trade with the international community, despite not being a signatory to the NPT. And so
not surprisingly Islamabad has sought a nuclear pact with Washington along the lines of
the Indian deal, which included safeguards to prevent civilian technology from being put
to military uses. However, the then-Bush administration refused such a nuclear pact
citing Islamabad couldn’t be trusted to abide by the rules given Pakistan’s
“questionable” nuclear proliferation record.

Under the Obama administration, however, the line hasn’t been so clear. When the
Pakistan government reiterated the demand at a ministerial level “strategic dialogue”
with the US, it was again rebuffed. Yet a number of players in the Washington policy
circles have made a case for a civilian nuclear pact with Pakistan, especially as
Islamabad’s support remains crucial to winning the war in Afghanistan. Thus, the
nuclear non-proliferation efforts in South Asia remain subordinated to economic or
geopolitical preferences of leading states, with the discourse on non-proliferation (and
access to nuclear technology) itself being articulated in false binaries about “good”
versus “bad” proliferation.

The writer is a doctoral candidate in the department of political science, University of

Western Ontario.
Nuclear deals and power politics

At the April 2012 annual session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, held
in New York, Pakistan again contended that one of the impeding factors behind global
disarmament and non-proliferation efforts was the “pursuit of selectivity, discrimination
and double standards by major powers in the area of non-proliferation, for commercial
and strategic considerations.”

Earlier, at the Nuclear Security Summit, held in late March 2012 in Seoul, South Korea,
Pakistan pleaded for access to nuclear technology for “peaceful uses on a non-
discriminatory basis” assuring the international community that “Pakistan has taken
effective measures ... to enhance nuclear security.”

In demanding access to nuclear technology on a non-discriminatory basis Pakistan was

making a thinly veiled reference to the 2008 US-India civil nuclear deal, contending that
Pakistan “qualifies to become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and
other export control regimes.”

Why is the international community reluctant to grant Pakistan access to nuclear

technology and accord Pakistan membership to nuclear cartels – in particular the
Nuclear Suppliers Group? Pakistan is currently facing a significant crisis in its energy
and water sectors. With 15-20 hours of rolling blackouts, Pakistan clearly needs
alternative sources of energy, which may rightly include access to nuclear energy.

An argument could be made that in recent years the NSG has been bending its own
rules for national security and dubious financial reasons. In a NSG meeting in Vienna in
2008, the United States won special exemptions for its ally, India, that was deemed by
many in the then-Bush neoconservative foreign policy circles to be a reliable ‘hedge’
against a rising China. Being outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as
well as the NSG, India is barred from being sold anything, even civilian nuclear reactors.
But the US used its diplomatic clout at the NSG to allow even the potential export of
enrichment technology needed to make weapons-grade uranium and plutonium.

In response, at the NSG meeting held in New Zealand in 2010, China argued that since
the US opened the door for India, it was going to sell nuclear reactors to Pakistan. This
raised two specious concerns: 1) Can Pakistan be trusted given its record of nuclear
proliferation? And 2) Will the Sino-Pakistan deal undermine the fragile global nuclear
non-proliferation regime?

When we examine both arguments against the power-politics exhibited by the NSG and
the monetary motivations surrounding the US-India Civil Nuclear Deal, it unequivocally
points to the disingenuousness of those self-proclaimed purveyors of global security
and non-proliferation.
The power-politics behind the NSG’s “preferential treatment” of certain states raises
important questions about the ambitious vision that Obama had outlined in his famous
Prague speech on global nuclear disarmament where he proclaimed “America’s
commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapon.” The
selective interpretation of NSG rules clearly does not bode well for the existing anti-
proliferation framework and nuclear disarmament diplomacy.

If anything, the current modus operandi of the NSG is an expression of how hypocritical
much of the present arms control process is. The NPT is the cornerstone of the current
set-up. Signed in 1970 to lock in the five states that had already tested a bomb – the
US, Britain, Russia, China and France – and keep others out, it was also meant to
commit these five countries to gradual disarmament, but that has never really
happened.

Countries, like India, Pakistan and Israel, risked sanctions and refused to sign the
treaty, while others, like North Korea, Syria, and now possibly Iran, joined, but went
ahead with bomb development in secret. When India detonated its first test bomb, in
1974, the NSG was created as a mechanism to bolster the NPT treaty.

But making nuclear weapons exclusive just made them all the more desirable and they
came to be defined by many as a symbol of grandeur almost divorced from any military
purpose. Emerging nations like Pakistan then felt, with its nuclear tests in 1998, that
they had no choice but to do the same in order to be taken seriously at the international
level.

Contemporary nuclear arms control is not being used to make the world a safer place
but to shore up an existing network of dominance. And now that it suits the US to have
a nuclear-capable India as a strategic counter-balance to an increasingly confident
China, suddenly the international protocols governing nuclear trade could be bended.
China, in turn, has seized the opportunity to strengthen its own ally, Pakistan.

Pakistan naturally would like the benefits of being able to undertake civilian nuclear
trade with the international community, despite not being a signatory to the NPT. And so
not surprisingly Islamabad has sought a nuclear pact with Washington along the lines of
the Indian deal, which included safeguards to prevent civilian technology from being put
to military uses. However, the then-Bush administration refused such a nuclear pact
citing Islamabad couldn’t be trusted to abide by the rules given Pakistan’s
“questionable” nuclear proliferation record.

Under the Obama administration, however, the line hasn’t been so clear. When the
Pakistan government reiterated the demand at a ministerial level “strategic dialogue”
with the US, it was again rebuffed. Yet a number of players in the Washington policy
circles have made a case for a civilian nuclear pact with Pakistan, especially as
Islamabad’s support remains crucial to winning the war in Afghanistan. Thus, the
nuclear non-proliferation efforts in South Asia remain subordinated to economic or
geopolitical preferences of leading states, with the discourse on non-proliferation (and
access to nuclear technology) itself being articulated in false binaries about “good”
versus “bad” proliferation.

The writer is a doctoral candidate in the department of political science, University of

Western Ontario. Email: ali.asim@gmail.com

Copyright © The News International. All rights reserved

No. 074/2012 dated 26 April 2012

India’s Agni V Missile:

Game Changer? By Rajesh Basrur

Synopsis

India’s Agni V missile is said to have profound implications for its security. But its
strategic significance is complex and the picture is at best a mixed one.

Commentary

INDIA’S LAUNCH of the Agni V, an intermediate-range missile close to intercontinental

range, has been widely hailed as a "game changer" and a "milestone" in India’s quest
for security. Now that the applause has died down, it is worth looking a little more
closely at the claim.

In fact, at least three "games" can be identified and the performance is mixed: the first
and most touted game is irrelevant, the second is a winning game, and the third a losing
one.

Deterring China: Inconsequential Game

The main achievement of the Agni V is said to be its enhanced reach. With a range of
5,000 km, it is capable of targeting all of China (read Beijing and Shanghai) from deep
inside Indian territory. But the notion that Beijing and Shanghai must be targeted in
order to deter China is questionable. It involves the untenable assumption that Chinese
leaders will be willing to dispense with smaller but still large cities that are closer to
India. Kunming, with a population of over five million is less than 1,500 km from Kolkata.
Guangzhou, with a population of over 10 million is about 2,500 km from Kolkata. In both
cases, existing intermediate-range missiles with ranges of 2000-3000 km (Agni-II and
Agni-III) fired from the Indian northeast would suffice to cover the distance. One need
only consider whether the Indian government would be willing to disregard the targeting
of Ahmadabad or Jaipur or Patna in a confrontation with China to appreciate the point.
The standard riposte would be to point out that missiles deployed in the northeast would
be "vulnerable" to a first strike. But that does not stand up to scrutiny. No one
contemplating a first strike can be certain of eliminating all of an adversary’s forces,
especially when they are in mobile basing mode. In short, the Agni-V does not change
the deterrence game vis-à-vis China.

Strategic Politics: Winning Game

Ironically, the erroneous notion that the Agni V is a "game changer" does change,
though not radically, another game – that of the US-China-India strategic triangle. It
does so because much that goes by the name of "strategy" boils down to a combination
of perception and interests. Notwithstanding the admonitory finger wagging that
followed India’s 1998 tests, both the United States and China accommodated India. A
key landmark was the changing of US domestic law and the rules of the international
cartel, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to allow nuclear civilian trade with India. The twin
changes in effect recognised the reality of India’s nuclear weapons status because the
agreements incorporated the formal classification of Indian nuclear facilities into civilian
and military. It is hard to imagine that this would have happened without India having
crossed the testing threshold.

The Agni V test has already evoked a similar reaction. Washington and Beijing, in
contrast to 1998, have responded mildly with peace-oriented murmurs. Leading
American experts have welcomed the test as a "major step" in deterring China and
noted that the US is "comfortable with Indian progress in the nuclear and missile fields".
The Chinese response has been varied, from a foreign ministry spokesman’s call for
cooperation between "emerging powers" to a Global Times commentator’s assertion
that China's nuclear power is "stronger and more reliable" and that "India would stand
no chance in an overall arms race with China". Either way, India’s strategic profile has
been enhanced. For better or worse, it will play a more significant role in global strategic
politics.

Security and Deterrence Strategy: A Losing Game

India started down the path of nuclear weapons capability as a reluctant nucleariser.
China’s 1964 test triggered only a relatively limited and low-key research and
development programme; a single test in 1974 was not followed by the building of an
arsenal; and warhead development made a slow, covert beginning circa 1989.
Following the 1998 tests, India announced it would not test again, opted for a
"recessed" non-deployed posture, and foreswore arms racing with its rivals. Since then,
a gap has opened up between its still minimalist posture and a widening programme of
weapons development. The source of this gap is the uncritical adoption of basic
strategic principles from American nuclear-strategic orthodoxy.

In the early years of the Cold War, American nuclear strategy came to rest on the notion
of "assured second-strike capability" enunciated by the RAND analyst Albert
Wohlstetter. The centrepiece of his position was that the United States had to be certain
of responding with a massive retaliatory strike after absorbing a surprise Soviet attack.
This meant building an arsenal characterised by varied capability, high accuracy and
short response time revolving around a nuclear "triad" of land- air- and sea-based
weapons systems. With the Soviet Union adopting a like approach, both powers entered
into an accelerating and wasteful arms race fuelled by fears of vulnerability to each
other.

On the ground, the reality was the opposite. No leader saw an advantage in having
more and better weapons in confrontations with a rival: Washington had a 10: 1
advantage during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, Moscow an even bigger one during
the Sino-Soviet Crisis of 1969. President Kennedy’s primary thought in 1962 was: how
do I avoid the dropping of a single bomb on a single city? In other words, the real-life
working of deterrence rests on the unacceptability of the low probability of a high level of
mass destruction within a short space of time. What deters a potential first striker is the
unknown (and unknowable) risk of a nuclear reprisal, not the certainty of massive
retaliation. To put it plainly, ‘second-strike capability" is strategically meaningless. It
follows that the Agni V, the much-anticipated submarine-launched ballistic missile, and
planned multiple-warhead missiles are already redundant.

India today is doing precisely what the US and the Soviet Union did during the Cold
War: consuming precious resources on an ever-expanding capability that will not add to
security. The fundamental reason for this commitment to a losing game is intellectual:
policymakers do not seem to know what "minimum deterrence" means.

Rajesh Basrur is a Senior Fellow and the Coordinator of the South Asia Programme at
the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological
University. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU, South Spine, Block S4,
Level B4, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798. Tel. No. 67906982, Email:
wwwrsis@ntu.edu.sg, Website: www.rsis.edu.sg.

US Silence Over Indian Missile Test – OpEd

Written by: Imran Ali Sandano

April 25, 2012

Being a rational world power, China is trying to mitigate the risks. It has invested in a
series of ports dotted all across the Indian Ocean, Seychelles, Maldives, Sri Lanka,
Bangladesh, Myanmar and Pakistan. On the other hand it is investing in roads and rail
links, and possibly gas pipelines from Bangladesh, Myanmar and Pakistan. Recipients
of this aid get improved infrastructure, foreign investment and a chance to earn transit
fees from China. In response, China is building alternate trade routes and its goods gain
access to new markets. It is a win-win deal for all except India.

India monitors these Chinese investments with mistrust and as an attempt to encircle it.
Accordingly, in turn, India is boosting its defense budgets, setting up new corps in the
areas bordering China, investing in nuclear submarines and increasing the prowess of
its navy and missile system program.

In this regard, India had successfully launched a missile with nuclear capability and a
range of 3,100 miles, giving it the ability to strike Beijing and Shanghai, and heightening
fears of an Asian arms race. With the launching of the missile (called Agni 5) India joins
a small group of countries with long-range nuclear missile capability, including United
States, France, Britain, Russia, Israel and the China.

India started its missile development program in 1983. It has suffered occasional
setbacks, but last November India tested the Agni 4, which can hit targets up to 22,00
miles away. The last missile will soon be given to the army for operational use; the Agni
1, Agni 2 and Agni 3 were also given to the army. According to Indian government the
Agni 5 weighs about 50 tons, 51 feet long and reached an altitude of about 430 miles in
this test. The Agni 5 will be ready for operational use by 2014.

China’s immediate reaction to the test was subdued. At a regularly scheduled news
briefing, Liu Weimin, a Foreign Ministry spokesman, said that India and China were not
competitors but partners. The two countries should work hard to uphold friendly
strategic cooperation for peace and stability in the region.”

According to Chinese media the missile does not pose a threat in reality; because the
accuracy of the missile’s guidance systems and its 50-ton-plus weight would force the
missile to be launched from a fixed location, which could be the easy target. While India
claims that the missile can be launched from a mobile platform.

It is true that the Chinese missile program is not directed at India, and the Chinese have
reassured India of that, but now the India missile program is clearly directed to China,
which New Delhi hopes will serve as a deterrent against China, its regional rival. But
India should be clear that China’s nuclear power is stronger and more reliable. For the
foreseeable future, India would stand no chance in an overall arms race with China. And
a successful test fire, although a positive sign, does not mean the ballistic missile is
operationally ready. That could still take a few more years of tests.
The launch was reported all over the world, as all eyes were on India. Oddly the United
States didn’t term it as a “threat, violation or provocative act” like it did with North Korea,
showing it has an obvious double standard when it comes to such missile tests. We are
at a complete loss to explain why it is no problem that India is firing a missile, while it is
a problem with North Korea?

The United States, which led the criticism of North Korea’s missile launching, appeared
to warily endorse the Indian missile launching. Mark C. Toner, a State Department
spokesman said that we urge all nuclear-capable states to exercise restraint regarding
nuclear capabilities. India has a solid nonproliferation record and has a “no-first-use”
policy.

The launching comes amid growing international apprehension about the militarization
of Asia and a stepped-up strategic rivalry between the United States and China in Asia.
In March, China announced a double-digit increase in military spending, while India
recently became the world’s top arms buyer, displacing China, in part because China
has increased domestic production of weapons. On Thursday, South Korea also tested
a missile capable of hitting anywhere in North Korea. The US dual policy will increase
militarization in the region which could affect the peace and prosperity of the region.

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About the author:

Mr. Imran Ali Sandano is an author of “Sufism and Peace: A Counter Strategy of
Extremism” book. Currently, he is working as Research Officer at Public Relation
Organization, Rawalpindi, Pakistan. His areas of interest are non-traditional security
issues, Sufism, terrorism, conflict resolution, and nuclear deterrence. Mr. Imran is a
regular writer of different newspapers and weekly magazines. He holds M.Phil degree in
Peace and Conflict Studies from National Defence University Islamabad.

India's Broken Promise

How a Would-Be Great Power Hobbles Itself

Basharat Peer

BASHARAT PEER is the author of Curfewed Night, an account of the conflict in

Kashmir. He is currently working on a new book about Indian Muslims.

India's political and business elites have long harbored a desire for their country to
become a great power. They cheered when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh finalized a
nuclear deal with the United States in 2008. Indian elites saw the deal, which gave India
access to nuclear technology despite its refusal to give up its nuclear weapons or sign
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, as a recognition of its growing influence and power.
And Indian elites were also encouraged when U.S. President Barack Obama
announced, during a 2010 visit to India, that the United States would support India's
quest to gain permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council, which
would put the country on an equal footing with its longtime rival, China. In recent years,
such sentiments have also spread to large segments of the Indian middle class, which,
owing to the country's remarkable economic growth in the past two decades, now
numbers around 300 million. Nearly nine out of ten Indians say their country already is
or will eventually be one of the most powerful nations in the world, an October 2010
Pew Global Attitudes survey revealed.

Symbols of India's newfound wealth and power abound. Last year, 55 Indians graced
Forbes' list of the world's billionaires, up from 23 in 2006. In 2008, the Indian automobile
company Tata Motors acquired Jaguar and Land Rover; last year, Harvard Business
School broke ground on Tata Hall, a new academic center made possible by a gift of
$50 million from the company's chair, Ratan Tata. And in 2009, a company run by the
Indian billionaire Anil Ambani, a telecommunications and Bollywood baron, acquired a
50 percent stake in Steven Spielberg's production company, DreamWorks. Gaudy,
gargantuan shopping malls proliferate in India's cities, and BMWs compete with auto-
rickshaws on crowded Indian roads. Tom Cruise, eyeing the enormous Indian movie
market, cast Anil Kapoor, a veteran Bollywood star, in the most recent Mission:
Impossible sequel and spent a few weeks in the country to promote the film. "Now they
are coming to us," one Indian tabloid gloated.

But even as Indian elites confidently predict their country's inevitable rise, it is not
difficult to detect a distinct unease about the future, a fear that the promise of India's
international ascendance might prove hollow. This anxiety stems from the tense duality
that defines contemporary India, an influential democracy with a booming economy that
is also home to more poor people than any other country in the world.

Of course, staggering poverty and crippling inequality at home do not necessarily

prevent countries from trying to project their power abroad. When India won its
independence, in 1947, it was even poorer than it is today. Yet Jawaharlal Nehru, the
country's founding prime minister, sought to raise India's international profile, providing
significant political support to independence movements in British colonies in Africa and
Asia and helping found the Non-Aligned Movement. Throughout the Cold War, Indian
leaders sought to use their country's victory over British colonialism to inspire other
subject peoples in their own struggles for self-determination -- and, in the process, to
gain more global influence than otherwise might have been possible for an
impoverished country. In this way, India's Cold War-era foreign policies, although
primarily concerned with national interests, contained an element of idealism, and the
country's growing international profile during those early decades of independence
served as a powerful symbol of freedom and autonomy in the Third World.

Over time, however, India has exchanged idealism for realism, as the country's leaders
have gradually abandoned an anticolonial distrust of hegemony and embraced great-
power ambitions of their own. Thus, although India has made admirable progress in
many areas, it is unclear whether an ever-growing Indian role in global affairs
symbolizes anything more than the country's expanding definition of its self-interest. It is
therefore hard to avoid feeling a sense of ambivalence when considering the prospect
of India's ascent, especially when one scrutinizes the poverty, corruption, and inequality
that suffuse Indian life today -- as do two recent, revealing books: Behind the Beautiful
Forevers, by Katherine Boo, and The Beautiful and the Damned, by Siddhartha Deb.

NOT SO BEAUTIFUL

The economic reforms India enacted in the early 1990s and the economic growth they
spurred have pushed more than 100 million Indians above the poverty line and created
a vibrant middle class. But 455 million Indian citizens -- more than a third of the
country's population -- still live on less than $1.25 a day, the subsistence poverty line set
by the World Bank. Images of India's poor are almost a cliché. But the ubiquity of these
depictions obscures the fact that very few of them provide rich, multilayered accounts of
how the country's impoverished millions actually live.

Boo's new book is a welcome exception. An extraordinary work of reportage, Behind the
Beautiful Forevers is the single most illuminating portrait of India's poor, their ambitions,
and the monumental labors they perform and sacrifices they make to escape
destitution. Boo, a staff writer at The New Yorker, has written movingly about poverty
and the unequal distribution of opportunity in the United States. But beginning in 2007,
she spent three years in Annawadi, a Mumbai slum abutting the city's international
airport -- "a stretch where new India and old India collided and made new India late," as
she puts it.

In 1991, a group of about a dozen Tamil migrant workers were hired to repair a runway
at the airport. After completing the job, they decided to settle nearby, hoping to make a
living recycling the seemingly endless piles of scrap metal and garbage generated by
the airport and the construction of luxury hotels adjoining it. "In an area with little
unclaimed space, a sodden snake-filled bit of brushland across the street from the
international terminal seemed like the least-bad place to live," Boo writes. The migrants
cleared the brush, filled the swamp with dry earth, and built shacks on the new solid
ground. The squalid encampment eventually grew to house 3,000 people. Today, the
overwhelming majority of Annawadi's residents are engaged in the informal,
unorganized economy, working off the books without any legal protections or
guarantees of a minimum wage -- as do 85 percent of all Indian workers. They labor in
conditions that are unhygienic and dangerous. But the meager wages they earn allow
them to live above the official poverty level.

Debates about poverty in India often overlook just how hard India's poor work to
improve their conditions. By focusing on individual residents of the slum, Boo draws a
moving portrait of that struggle. Abdul, a teenager who lives in Annawadi, is an expert at
sorting trash and scrap metal and then selling it to recyclers. His days begin early,
arranging screws, nails, and bottle caps into neat piles. By sunset, he has usually sorted
about a dozen sacks of garbage, which he hauls to a buyer in a beat-up three-wheeled
cart. In the years Boo spent observing Abdul, his wages helped his family add a roof to
their shack and pay $450 to have his father treated for lung disease in a private
hospital. Still, Boo notes, Abdul's mother longs for a more hygienic way of life for her
four children: "She wanted a shelf on which to cook without rat intrusions -- a stone
shelf, not some cast-off piece of plywood. She wanted a small window to vent the
cooking smoke that caused the little ones to cough like their father."

These are modest wishes. But they reflect a ubiquitous desire for upward mobility in
India, present at every socioeconomic level. Indeed, among India's middle class, the
desire for more comfort and luxury can be just as strong as, if not stronger than, the
desire of a slum dweller for a clean shelf and a window vent.

INDIA'S GILDED AGE

For the poor and the middle class alike, the dream of upward mobility has collided with
the reality of the growing economic and social inequality that increasingly defines the
country. The contemporary moment in India is akin to the Gilded Age in the United
States. A vast gulf has opened up between the rich and the poor as some Indians --
including robber barons and con artists -- have found ways to profit from the rapid
transformation of a largely agrarian society into a modern economy.

The Indian writer Siddhartha Deb tells this tale with devastating clarity in The Beautiful
and the Damned, a meticulously reported set of essays that sketch the contours of
wealth, inequality, and the new anxieties they have created in India. In Deb's book,
present-day India is personified most vividly by Arindam Chaudhuri, a magazine
publisher and movie producer who, despite being equipped only with an undergraduate
degree from a little-known Indian college run by his own father, transformed himself into
a sought-after business guru and consultant by aggressively recruiting young, ambitious
Indians to enroll in a management-training institute he owns outside New Delhi.
Chaudhuri's ascent has been marred by accusations of fraud: according to India's
University Grants Commission, his institute is not authorized to grant master's degrees,
and most of its graduates wind up working not for top-tier multinational corporations but
rather for Chaudhuri's own various enterprises. Yet with his carefully crafted image of
material success and his gospel of relentless confidence and ceaseless self-promotion,
Chaudhuri remains a figure of reverence among his many devotees -- "an army of
Gatsbys," Deb calls them, "wanting not to overturn the social order but only to belong to
the upper crust."

That goal, however, has become increasingly unrealistic. According to a recent

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development report, inequality in earnings
has doubled in India over the last two decades. In 1990, the top ten percent of earners
made six times as much as the bottom ten percent; today, the top ten percent earns 12
times as much as the bottom ten percent. Consumption in the top 20 percent of Indian
households has increased by around three percent every year during the past decade.
Meanwhile, the annual growth in consumption for the bottom 20 percent has stayed at
one percent.

Chief among the factors that contribute to inequality in India are prejudice and
corruption, both of which undermine meritocratic advancement and stymie upward
mobility. Although economic liberalization has provided socially disadvantaged citizens
with more opportunities than they had in earlier eras, intense discrimination persists
against Indian Muslims and lower-caste Hindus, such as Dalits, or "untouchables." In
2009, the Indian Institute of Dalit Studies, a New Delhi-based research institute,
conducted a study to measure the impact of discrimination on hiring practices. The
authors responded to job openings at Indian companies and multinational corporations
based in India, sending in mock resumés from equally qualified applicants with
identifiably Muslim and lower- and upper-caste Hindu names. Despite the applicants'
identical qualifications, the authors reported, "the odds of a Dalit being invited for an
interview were about two-thirds of the odds of a high caste Hindu applicant. The odds of
a Muslim applicant being invited for an interview were about one-third of the odds of a
high caste Hindu applicant."

ENDURING CORRUPTION

Although those groups on the social margins continue to face the most difficult odds,
frustrations have also begun to mount across a wider spectrum of Indian society, as a
restless, young, educated population finds its expectations thwarted by the corruption
that permeates all levels of government in India. In August and September of last year,
India was convulsed by massive anticorruption protests triggered by a series of
scandals, including the sale of millions of dollars' worth of cell-phone spectrum at below-
market rates to well-connected telecommunications companies and outrageous graft
and fraud in construction contracts for the Commonwealth Games held in New Delhi in
2010. The scandals involved lawmakers; high-profile politicians from the ruling party,
the Indian National Congress; and business tycoons. Inspired by the tactics of India's
founding father, Mahatma Gandhi, a veteran antigraft activist named Anna Hazare went
on a hunger strike. Hazare brought out tens of thousands of largely middle-class
supporters into the streets to demand that the Indian parliament create a powerful
anticorruption body whose leader would have the authority to investigate government
officials, including the prime minister.

The protests released decades of pent-up frustrations over rising inequality and failures
of governance. Not surprisingly, however, the anticorruption law that Hazare and his
team had lobbied for was defeated in a vote in the Indian parliament, whose members
would have been its primary targets. And although Hazare borrowed Gandhian
techniques, the 74-year-old activist is no Gandhi, but a deeply flawed advocate for
change, enamored of such archaic ideas as flogging alcoholics to "cure" them and
chopping off hands as a punishment for corruption. Making matters worse, late last
year, a leading figure in Hazare's movement was herself accused of financial
improprieties. By the beginning of this year, media coverage of the movement had
diminished substantially, popular enthusiasm had dimmed, attendance at Hazare's
gatherings had thinned, and the movement had withered.

Corruption has also proved difficult to root out because it is not simply a matter of the
powerful preying on the weak. As Boo's book reveals, graft and fraud can offer ways for
a poor person to climb the socioeconomic ladder -- a shortcut of sorts. One of the more
ambitious people Boo met in Annawadi was Asha, a woman in her late 30s whose
education ended in the seventh grade. A local politician secured a job for Asha teaching
in a state-run junior high school in the slum, despite the fact that she lacked a college
degree. In return, Asha spent her classroom time solving problems in the slum and
organizing rallies for the politician. In short order, she became a slum boss with access
to other local politicians, police officers, and bureaucrats. In this role, she helped slum
residents receive vital services or find funding for social-service programs. But she was
hardly a model for champions of civil society. By plying police officers with sexual
favors, Asha would persuade them to side with whichever party in a slum dispute was
willing to bribe her. She eventually became rich by partnering with a local government
official to steal federal government money intended for schools for the poor.

Theft of that sort has dire consequences for its victims. In 2010, India spent $28.6 billion
on antipoverty programs. But last year, a World Bank report revealed that 59 percent of
the grain allotted for public distribution to the poor in India does not reach its intended
recipients; instead, it is siphoned off by middlemen and crooked government officials
and then sold on the black market. This is one reason behind the grim precariousness
of life in India. Four hundred and sixty million Indians are between the ages of 13 and
35, and by 2020, the average age in India will be 29. In theory, this so-called youth
dividend should give the country a long-term economic advantage over China, whose
population will ultimately suffer from a predominance of elderly people thanks to China's
one-child policy. But a vast number of the boys and girls who should become part of
India's work force in the coming decades are instead dying of undernourishment.
According to UNICEF, malnutrition is more common in India than in sub-Saharan Africa.
One in every three malnourished children in the world lives in India. More than 2.1
million Indian children die every year before reaching their fifth birthdays; half of those
die within a month of birth.

In a poignant moment in The Beautiful and the Damned, Deb meets an unemployed
accountant looking for a job at one of the hellish factories outside Hyderabad, a center
of India's burgeoning information technology sector. The accountant studied history as a
university student and asks Deb if he has read the work of the Indian economist
Amartya Sen, who has written about hunger and inequality. "You remember what [Sen]
said about famine, that it doesn't necessarily happen because there isn't enough food
but because the powerful take food away from the powerless?" the accountant asks. "It
is still like that in India. Are you going to write that in your book?"

DEMOCRACY OR PSEPHOCRACY?

The democratic system has been a source of great pride for most Indians. Indian
nationalists like to boast that Indians won universal suffrage on independence in 1947,
years before many African Americans could vote freely in the United States. But in
recent months, revelations about rampant corruption and dysfunction in the government
have begun to erode that sense of self-esteem. Once revered for his competence and
personal integrity, Prime Minister Singh has become a figure of ridicule, as many of the
worst scandals have involved his own ministers and allies. National elections will be
held in 2014, and it has long been assumed that if Singh's ruling Congress party
manages to hold on to power, the next prime minister will be the crown prince of the
Gandhi dynasty, Rahul Gandhi. As the party's general secretary, the 41-year-old Gandhi
has significantly increased the youth membership of the party by reaching out to
educated young people who lack what is usually required to enter party politics in India:
personal wealth or connections.

But although he has developed into an able political operator, Gandhi has yet to
articulate a vision of the country's future. Nor does he seem particularly interested in
transforming its dysfunctional political system. Rather, his appeal rests mostly on a
promise to enlarge the system, to make its perks and patronage networks more
accessible to people who have traditionally been left out of the old boys' club of Indian
politics. Nevertheless, Gandhi's efforts to enlarge the Congress party's base have failed
to deliver votes. In early March, the party suffered a devastating defeat in local elections
in India's largest state, Uttar Pradesh, casting doubt on Gandhi's national appeal.
Of course, Gandhi is hardly alone in lacking vision. Today, no Indian politician or
political party inspires public confidence, as the task of governance recedes amid the
ceaseless campaigning and electoral machinations that consume the country's political
classes. The sociologist Ashis Nandy, one of India's most respected public intellectuals,
recently lamented in an interview that India's democracy has devolved into a
"psephocracy" -- a system "totally dominated by electoral victories and defeats," as he
defined it. "The moment you enter office, you begin to think of the next election."

The resulting paralysis is one reason India's rulers have been unable to make progress
on the violent domestic conflicts that have cost thousands of lives and hundreds of
millions of dollars: the occupation of disputed Kashmir, the insurgencies in the
northeast, and the Maoist-led rebellion across the forests of central India. Nor have they
been able to overhaul the country's crumbling infrastructure, increase its agricultural
productivity, expand health care to its most vulnerable citizens, or reform its brutal
police departments and inefficient criminal-justice system.

Beneath all those crises is the growing gap between India's haves and have-nots.
Today, even the world's most advanced democracies are struggling to address the
increasing inequality that imperils social cohesion and effective governance. But unlike
the United States and the countries of Europe, India is still enjoying high rates of
economic growth: seven percent annually, as of last year. India has the opportunity to
spread the benefits of that growth before it is too late.

On the night of August 15, 1947, when India won its independence, Nehru gave a
speech casting the country's mission as a struggle "to bring freedom and opportunity to
the common man, to the peasants and workers of India; to fight and end poverty and
ignorance and disease; to build up a prosperous, democratic and progressive nation,
and to create social, economic and political institutions which will ensure justice and
fullness of life to every man and woman." The economic and political reforms that could
bring today's capitalist India closer to that ideal would no doubt differ significantly from
the socialist path Nehru would have chosen. But his words still serve as an apt reminder
of just how unfulfilled the promise of India remains.

Copyright © 2002-2012 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

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