Soil Dynamics and Earthquake Engineering 22 (2002) 1199–1208

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Lifelines earthquake vulnerability assessment: a systemic approach

S. Menonia,*, F. Pergalanib, M.P. Bonib, V. Petrinib
a
Dipartimento di Architettura e Pianificazione, Politecnico di Milano, via Bonardi 9, 20133 Milano, Italy
b
Dipartimento di Ingegneria Strutturale, Politecnico di Milano, p.le Leonardo da Vinci 32, 20133 Milano, Italy

Abstract
This study aimed at developing a model to evaluate lifelines seismic vulnerability, considering physical, functional, and organizational
factors as deeply interconnected one to the other. The resulting assessment tool consists of a set of parameters measuring the response
capacity of lifelines exposed to earthquakes.
The notion of systemic vulnerability is the underlying frame of the proposed evaluation method: what can be measured is how prone is a
system to damage or failure not only as a consequence of some kind of physical damage occurring to one of its components, but also as the
indirect effect of some physical, functional, or organizational failure suffered by other systems.
The assessment tool has been applied in Regione Lombardia, Italy, providing as a final output recommendations for prioritizing and taking
actions to reduce the potential of magnified effects as a consequence of lifelines interruption in earthquakes aftermath.
q 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Seismic vulnerability; Lifelines; Emergency planning; Reconstruction planning

1. Introduction resulted in new responsibilities loaded on local govern-

Studies concerning lifelines response to earthquakes
have noticeably developed in the 90s, especially in Japan
and in the United States. Analyses accuracy has certainly
benefited from the large amount of data that have been
systematically gathered in recent disasters, which affected
densely populated metropolitan areas [1 –6].
Besides more technical aspects referring to physical
features of nodes and networks, a greater attention has been
paid to mutual interactions among lifelines, recognizing
their intra-dependent and inter-dependent character. Fur-
thermore, secondary and indirect consequences on the
economy and on society in general due to services
interruption have been investigated too [7,8].
In Europe and in Italy in particular, seismic studies have
been focusing much more on hazard assessment as well as
on the vulnerability of traditional housing, with fewer
attempts to analyze the consequences of natural disasters on
utilities networks. In recent years something has changed,
not only within utilities managing companies, but also with
local and regional governments. Italian institutions have
undergone a quite radical decentralizing process, which
* Corresponding author. Address: Dipartimento di Scienze del Terrio,
Politecnico di Milano, via Bonardi 3, 20133 Milano, Italy. Tel.: þ 39-02-
2399-5423; fax: þ 39-02-2399-5435.
E-mail address: menoni@mail.polimi.it (S. Menoni).
0267-7261/02/$ - see front matter q 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
PII: S 0 2 6 7 - 7 2 6 1 ( 0 2 ) 0 0 1 4 8 - 3
ments, some of which lack the technical and financial
capabilities necessary to manage the entire cycle of
activities needed for preventing severe damage and for
mitigating disasters’ effects on the population.
In this fast evolving context, the Regione Lombardia
administration has promoted a study on lifelines vulner-
ability to earthquakes, wishing to draw upon more than 10
years of continuative research exchange with scientific
institutions in the field of seismic risk. This work has been
divided in two parts: the first aiming at building a
conceptual framework and testing it in the most seismic
areas of the region, the second—still under way—attempt-
ing to produce complete earthquake scenarios involving
lifelines disruption. The present paper will reflect the
development and the results achieved in the first part.
2. Methodology
Specific approaches are required to assess lifelines
seismic vulnerability, in order to account for some of their
particular features: utilities are made of multiple com-
ponents—linear pipes, substations, control centers, power
generating systems—obeying to highly hierarchical func-
tions and it is therefore impossible to isolate single parts and
analyze them separately one from the other. They depend
1200 S. Menoni et al. / Soil Dynamics and Earthquake Engineering 22 (2002) 1199–1208
from each other in such a manner that inter- and intra-
dependency have been recognized as one of their most
prominent characteristic.
Finally lifelines are connected with the external environ-
ment: the latter can be viewed as a source of induced
damage (as in the case of collapsing buildings or landslides),
but also as end-user of utilities like water, electricity, gas,
and communication.
This research aimed at developing a model to assess
lifelines seismic vulnerability, considering physical, func-
tional, and organizational factors as deeply interconnected
one to the other. The resulting assessment tool consists of a
set of parameters measuring the performance of lifelines
exposed to earthquakes in a given region.
The notion of systemic vulnerability is the underlying
frame of the proposed evaluation method: what can be
measured is how prone is a system to damage or failure not
only as a consequence of some kind of physical damage
occurring to one of its components, but also as the indirect
effect of some physical, functional, or organizational failure
suffered by other systems.
In this regard, as lifelines are highly hierarchical, the
consequence of failure in crucial components or parts of the
system has been devoted higher attention in the framework.
The model accounts also for lifelines inter-dependency,
which can be either physical (lines laid in the same corridor
running below roads) or functional (for example electrical
power is vital for many other utilities: communication
networks, control devices, water pumping stations, etc.)
[5,9].
Urban and regional systems depend on lifelines at
different degrees, according to their specific needs as
service users and also depending upon the considered
disaster phase. This is the reason why distinct assessments
matrices have been developed addressing separately the
emergency and the reconstruction periods. While in the first
minimal lifelines performance is crucial to guarantee
victims assistance and rescue activities, return to normalcy
at acceptable costs becomes the new priority in the
reconstruction stage. In each matrix, thresholds of good
and bad performance as well as weights expressing
parameters importance have been set according to the
different priorities identified in the two phases [10 –13].
The general framework to assess lifelines vulnerability in
the emergency has been reported in Table 1: functional,
organizational and physical vulnerabilities are grouped,
respectively, in the first, second, and third columns.
Functional factors explain lifelines malfunctioning due
to a variety of reasons, many of which are not physical. Each
lifeline is a hierarchical system: if crucial nodes fail, the
service they provide in normal time will inevitably cut many
customers off. Those nodes are, for instance, stations
transforming high into medium or into low gas pressures,
energy power stations, water reservoirs, etc.
Organizational factors that are considered in Table 1 may
consistently hamper search and rescue activities.
Communication systems provide an enlightening example
in this regard: the most frequent problem encountered in the
first hours following the impact of a disaster is lines
overloading. Another important organizational parameter to
assess coordination among those involved in emergency
management is the number of companies managing lifelines
or even the same lifeline in a given area. A few big firms are
able to control interactions emerging among their lifelines
and others and are therefore more likely to sign protocols
and mutual agreements for joining operations whenever
needed. When the number of companies is large, this kind of
spontaneous protocols are much more difficult to reach, and
therefore coordination tasks become really demanding for
local and governmental authorities.
Also with respect to physical vulnerability, lifelines are
highly intra- and inter-dependent systems: conducts and
lines can be damaged by collapsing houses or bridges or by
landslides and riverbanks, the movement of which can be
triggered by earthquakes.
The rows in Table 1 are grouped in three main blocks: in
the first, factors related to lifelines performance are
considered, in the second siting situations are examined.
For example sewers can pollute water when conducts are
broken and leaks or infiltration become more probable. The
last group of rows indicates how vulnerable urban and
regional systems (other than lifelines) are to the interruption
of services like electricity, water, gas, and communication.
The form to assess lifelines vulnerability during
reconstruction contains those elements that are more
relevant to recovery. Physical vulnerability is not con-
sidered any more, as ruptures are supposed to have already
occurred once emergency is over, while functional and
organizational aspects still remain important. This time,
however, the focus of the assessment concerns inter- and
intra-dependency that may hamper quick recovery. In
organizational terms for instance, coordination with public
administrations and with institutions in charge of financial
aid and support for reconstruction becomes as crucial as the
coordination among lifelines managing companies.
3. Vulnerability analysis and evaluation procedure
The vulnerability assessment procedure requires a
number of steps to be followed in order to obtain the final
result, consisting of a normalized score assigned to each
lifeline and of an evaluation of other urban systems
vulnerability to lifelines disruption. Both assessments
should be carried out for the emergency and the reconstruc-
tion phases.
As an example, the water system forms are shown in
Tables 2 and 3: they refer to the parameters to be analyzed to
understand the water system expected behavior during
emergency operations and in the reconstruction phase.
In the first block factors related to water system
performance are shown. Reading the form by rows, in
 S. Menoni et al. / Soil Dynamics and Earthquake Engineering 22 (2002) 1199–1208 1201
Form to assess lifelines seismic vulnerability in emergency phase
Table 1
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Table of seismic vulnerability analysis of water system in emergency phase
Table 2
Table 3
Table of seismic vulnerability analysis of water system in reconstruction phase

S. Menoni et al. / Soil Dynamics and Earthquake Engineering 22 (2002) 1199–1208

1203
1204 S. Menoni et al. / Soil Dynamics and Earthquake Engineering 22 (2002) 1199–1208

Table 4
Table of seismic vulnerability evaluation for water system in emergency phase
 S. Menoni et al. / Soil Dynamics and Earthquake Engineering 22 (2002) 1199–1208 1205

the first line parameters such as the potential for water
contamination due to nearby polluting plants (FUN P1), or
the potential for pipes and conducts ruptures due to
vulnerable elements (buildings [14], river banks, landslides
(PHY P1)) are considered.
In the second row, water system vulnerability to the
rupture of other services (for example electrical power) is
represented (FUN P2), as well as organizational problems
related to the lack of coordination with other lifelines
managing companies (ORG P2), or the physical vulner-
ability induced by other connected systems, like bridges and
viaducts (PHY P2).
In the last row of the first block, other parameters are
analyzed: the number of springs or tanks is crucial to
determine how many alternative sources can be used to fill
aqueducts (FUN P3), the availability of personnel and
material is important to guarantee fast repairs (ORG P3),
while joints, pipes materials, tanks structure are among the
most important factors to assess the physical fragility of
water utilities (PHY P3).
Moving to the second block of rows, in the first line the
capacity to access potential broken pipes and plants is
considered (FUN S1) as well as organizational factors
(ORG S1) like the coordination between civil protection
officers and companies in charge of roads maintenance and
the availability of maps showing alternative roads to be used
in case the main one is not practicable. In the second line of
the same block, potential contamination due to infiltration
from sewages (FUN S2) or the potential for explosions
provoked by nearby gas conducts (PHY S2) is examined.
The last block of rows refers to the regional vulnerability
to water service interruption, which may have rather severe
effects on hospitals and fire brigades (FUN R1), and can also
induce accidents in dangerous plants, if the latter do not
have enough storage in autonomous tanks (FUN R2).
Communication skills to make people aware of existing
risks and of efforts to bring the water service back are
among the most important organizational factors to be
assessed in this block (ORG R1).
A very similar survey path has been developed in Table
3, related to the reconstruction phase. Most of the
parameters in this case aim at forecasting the time needed
for temporary or final repairs and for establishing efficient
cooperation protocols among companies distributing water
locally and regionally, as well as with other lifelines
managing companies, public administration sectors, etc.
For each parameter included in the matrices, at least two
or more classes of roughly good or bad present conditions
have been established, on the basis of literature and post-
earthquakes reports [1 – 5], and the most critical class has
been identified.
The evaluation step of the developed procedure consists
of a weighed sum of factors providing as a final result a
vulnerability score. In order to carry out this procedure,

Table 5
Table of regional seismic vulnerability evaluation in emergency phase

Parameter Classification Most critical Weight Lifelines vulnerability

class coefficient
General Specific

p
Presence of gas systems in Yes/no Yes 3 3 High; p2 medium; p1 low
settlement
p
Dependence of risk plants on Presence of pump stations Yes/no No 3 3 High; p2 medium; p1 low
water systems self-contained
Yes/no maintenance No
p
Dependence of risk plants on Presence of generators Yes/no No 3 3 High; p2 medium; p1 low
power systems self-contained
Yes/no anchored No
Yes/no fuel No
p
Dependence of strategic ser- Presence of tanks self- Yes/no No 2 3 High; p2 medium; p1 low
vices on water systems in contained
emergency phase Yes/no maintenance No
p
Dependence of strategic ser- Presence of generators Yes/no No 2 3 High; p2 medium; p1 low
vices on power systems in self-contained
emergency phase Yes/no anchored No
Yes/no fuel No
p
Dependence of strategic ser- Presence of risk plants Yes/no No 1 3 High; p2 medium; p1 low
vices on gas systems in self-contained
p
emergency phase Alternative for risk zones 1/2/ . 2 1 2 3 High; p2 medium; p1 low
Presence of heliport Yes/no No
p
Degree of effectiveness of Communication code Yes/no No 2 3 High; p2 medium; p1 low
communications among stra- Leased lines Yes/no No
tegic services Priority Yes/no No
Total points
1206 S. Menoni et al. / Soil Dynamics and Earthquake Engineering 22 (2002) 1199–1208

Fig. 1. Seismic vulnerability index for the analyzed lifelines in emergency phase.
 S. Menoni et al. / Soil Dynamics and Earthquake Engineering 22 (2002) 1199–1208 1207

Fig. 2. Seismic vulnerability map of water system in emergency phase.

the elements surveyed in the analytical forms have been
split in two parts, the first considering the performance
and siting vulnerability of each lifeline, the second aimed
at assessing the degree of other urban and regional
systems vulnerability to utilities interruption. Both forms
have been developed for the emergency and the
reconstruction phases.
The water system performance and siting vulnerability
evaluation matrix, in emergency phase, is shown in Table 4.
Each parameter is assigned to classes of vulnerability
according to what has been surveyed using the analytical
form described earlier (Xi ; equal to 0 in non-critical
situations, equal to 1 for the most critical class). Besides
the weight Wi translating how important is each parameter
in the final evaluation (3 is assigned to very important
parameters), another coefficient ðCi Þ has been inserted in the
Eq. (1) to calculate the vulnerability score of each lifeline
part. This coefficient accounts for the hierarchical position
of the lifeline part to be assessed
X
n It is then possible to carry out crossed comparisons
V¼ Xi Wi Ci ð1Þ
i¼1
Urban and regional systems degree of dependence on
lifelines in the emergency phase can be seen in Table 5.
The Eq. (2) provides the vulnerability score
X
n
Vt ¼ Xti Wti Cti ð2Þ
i¼1
where the Cti coefficient represents urban and regional
systems degree of dependency on lifelines systems.
For the reconstruction phase the evaluation procedure
follows the same procedure.
The application of this procedure provides a vulnerability
index to each lifeline. In order to compare lifelines, scores
have to be normalized. The normalized scale has been then
subdivided into intervals, ranging from low vulnerability
intervals, 0 –0.2, to medium, 0.2– 0.4, 0.4 –0.6 medium –
high, 0.6 –0.8 high, to very high levels, 0.8 –1.0. Lifelines
with a final score comprised in the higher part of the scale,
are in a rather critical condition, while lifelines obtaining a
low score seem capable of resisting to earthquakes impact.
among lifelines systems and among subareas within the
region of interest.
1208 S. Menoni et al. / Soil Dynamics and Earthquake Engineering 22 (2002) 1199–1208
4. Application
The method that has been described insofar was tested,
for the emergency phase, in the Brescia Province (Lombar-
dia Region, Italy), where most seismic municipalities of
Lombardia are located [15].
This large area has been subdivided in three zones,
homogeneous as far as their geographical and urban features
are concerned: the conurbation of Brescia and its immediate
surroundings, the municipalities in the northern part of the
lake coast (Salò), subject to the highest seismic intensities,
and the plain areas south to the Garda lake and to Brescia
(Desenzano).
Following the procedure described in the previous
paragraph, as a first step the characteristics of the
lifelines systems in the area have been surveyed and the
analytical forms filled with the acquired information. Not
all the necessary data were available: anyway forms have
been filled, though more satisfactorily for water, power
and road systems.
Secondly, the vulnerability index has been calculated
(the results are shown in Fig. 1). It has been decided to
assign final scores to the entire municipality and not to
individual lines, because of lacking or incomplete
information as mentioned earlier.
Despite this limitation, first results can be considered
nevertheless significant and may be used as a decision
support tool. Those results show that the most vulnerable
area is that of Salò, threatened by several landslides,
which may obstruct the only main road and the networks
running beneath.
The vulnerability assessment of the urban and regional
systems to lifelines failure has been also performed,
confirming that the Salò area is the most critical also as far
as facilities needed for emergency operations are concerned.
In the whole province, water, sewage, and gas systems
are the most vulnerable, confirming what has been reported
in past earthquakes. In Fig. 2, the water system vulnerability
is represented, the darker colors corresponding to higher
scores.
5. Conclusion
The comprehensive model that has been developed for
assessing lifelines seismic vulnerability addresses not only
physical factors, but also organizational and functional. A
systemic approach has been adopted, searching for vulner-
able elements raising within each utility system and
between the latter and the external environment.
The assessment procedure leads to a double result: a
judgment on the intrinsic quality/fragility of each lifeline
system and a judgment on the degree of vulnerability of
other urban and regional systems to lifelines failure. It is
therefore possible to compare lifelines with respect to their
relative vulnerability, to analyze the degree of
autonomy/dependency of other systems on lifelines to
compare different areas within a larger region, identifying
the most critical situations.
The model has been constructed in such a way to provide
the largest number possible of outputs, in order to open a
wide range of alternative options for preventive action
either to mitigate the disaster impact in the emergency stage
or to bring back the system to normalcy as quickly as
possible in the recovery phase.
Acknowledgments
The Regione Lombardia, Milano, Italy, funded this
research. The authors are grateful to lifelines service
suppliers for the data and information.
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