A.S. Dyatlov. Chernobyl.

As It Was

Anatoly Stepanovich Dyatlov was born March 3,1931 in the village Atamanovo of the
Krasnoyarsk region. His father was an invalid of WWI who worked as a buoy-keeper on the
Yenisei River. His mother was a homemaker.
After graduating seventh grade in 1945, he entered the Norilsk Mining and Metallurgy
Technical School electrical engineering department which he completed with honors in 1950.
For three years he worked in Norilsk at one of the enterprises of Minsredmash (Ministry of
Medium Machine Building). From 1953-1959 he studied at the Moscow Engineering and
Physics Institute, from which he also graduated with honors, having received the qualification of
engineer-physicist in the field of automation and electronics.
Per distribution he was sent to the shipbuilding plant Lewinsky Komsomol in the city of
Komsomolsk-on-Amur, where he held the positions of Senior Engineer, Chief of the Physics
Laboratory, and commissioner of nuclear submarine mechanical power plants. In 1973, due to
family circumstances, he transferred to the Chernobyl NPP under construction, where he rose
from the Deputy Chief of the Reactor Shop to the Deputy Chief Engineer of Station Operation.
He was awarded the Badge of Honor and The Labor Red Banner.
During the accident on April 26, 1986 he received a dose of at least 550 REM.
According to the judgment of the USSR Supreme Court, he was recognized as one of the
culprits of the accident and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment to a general regime colony. He
served his term in the settlement of Kryukov in the Poltava oblast.
After numerous appeals from various organizations, and friends, A.D. Sakharov
personally, and E.G. Bonner after his death on October 1, 1990, Dyatlov was released (early
under Article 220 due to illness). Radiation sickness progressed rapidly and despite the help of
German doctors (since 1991 Dyatlov was treated twice a year at the University Hospital of
Munich burn department) on December 13, 1995, Dyatlov died.
Foreword

The accident occurring on April 26, 1986 at Chernobyl NPP, in terms of scale, complexity
and long term consequences, is the largest and most severe catastrophe in the entire world’s
history of atomic energy use.
Large quantities of radioactive material from the reactor core were thrown into the
atmosphere and fell mainly in three large “spots” in The Republic of Belarus, Ukraine, and
western oblasts of Russia. The total area of the contaminated territories (Cesium-137 greater
than 1 Ci/km²) stands at almost 30 thousand km².
The radioactive contamination zones after the Chernobyl catastrophe were formed
depending on the nature of emissions from the damaged reactor, and weather conditions.
During the period of intense emission (April 26 - May 5, 1986) the composition of the flowing
stream of radionuclides varied in strength and type from day to day. In the first three days, the
radioactive clouds moved over to The Republic of Belarus due to weather conditions. By April
30 the wind direction shifted to the south and east. Depending on the masses of air flow,
contaminated with radionuclides, radioactive paths were being formed on the ground. At the
same time, the lightest radioactive particles and gases were rising to the upper layers of the
atmosphere. They precipitated very slowly (from a few months to a year), having managed to
travel around the globe more than once spreading throughout the entire northern hemisphere.
Heavier aerosols stationed themselves in the lower layer of air, from which they descended to
the earth’s surface at different time intervals.
In the first post-accident period (April-May 1986), the radiation conditions were
determined mostly by short-lived radionuclides, mainly Iodine-131. After the decay of the short
and middle lived radionuclides, the radionuclides Cesium-137, Strontium-90, and Plutonium
presented the biggest danger.
For The Republic of Belarus, the consequences turned out to be especially severe.
Here 23% of the territory, which contained 3,678 settlements and 20% of the republic’s
population, was subjected to radioactive contamination.
The total area with a concentration of Cesium-137 contamination greater than 1 Ci/km²
was 3.2% of the European territory of the former USSR, and greater than 0.2 Ci/km² was 23%.
In the Russian Federation, Cesium-137 contamination greater than 1 Ci/km² was recorded in
the territory of 19 oblasts. Bryansk, Tula, Kaluga, Ryazan, and Penza oblasts were the most
contaminated. About 2.3 million people live in Russian Federation territories contaminated with
radionuclides.
Today, 15 years after the catastrophe, there is not a clear unequivocal answer to the
questions: What are the causes, and who is to blame for the accident? Several specialists have
their own opinions. For example Academic A.L. Ilyin in his book “The Realities and Myths of
Chernobyl” p. 79, analyzing the whole chain of events leading up to the accident, suggests that
the main cause of the catastrophe in Unit 4 was primarily in the construction and design defects
of the RBMK reactor, especially the so-called positive steam void coefficient of reactivity built
into this device.
The opinion of a direct participant in the events and Chernobyl Station, will clearly be of
particular value to future generations. Therefore, Nauchtekhlitizdat Publishing House offers its
readers a book written by the former Deputy Chief Engineer of Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant
A.S. Dyatlov. We hope that to many questions, readers will receive the most complete and
comprehensive answers.

V.V. Lomakin
Deputy Director of Safety Assessment of the STNKARB (Kiev. Ukraine)
T.G. Samkharadze
Ch. Editor of the journal "Ecological Systems and Devices", prof., Dr. Tech. Sciences AIN
RF.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
(АЗ) EPS (or AZ) - Emergency Protection System
(АЗМ) EPP - Emergency Protection Signal on Over-Power
(АЭС) NPP - Nuclear Power Plant
(АР) AR - Automatic Regulator
(БЩУ) - Control Room
(ВНИИАЭС) VNIIAES- All-Union Scientific Research Institute for NPP Operation
(ГКНТ) GKNT - State Committee for Science and Technology of the USSR Council of Ministers
(ГЦН) MCP - Main Circulating Pump
(ДП) AA - Additional Absorber
(ИАЭ) IAE - Institute of Atomic Energy
(КМПЦ) MFCC - Multipass forced circulation circuit
(ЛАР) LAR - Local Automatic Regulator
(МАГАТЭ) IAEA - International Atomic Energy Association
(МВТС) - Interdepartmental Science and Technology Council
(МПА) DBA (or MPA) - Design Basis Accident (or Maximum Projected Accident)
(НИКИЭТ) NIKIET - Scientific Research and Design Institute for Power Technology
(ОЗР) ORM - Operating Reactivity Margin
(ОПБ) GSP - General Safety Provisions for Nuclear Power Plants
(ПБР) NSR - Nuclear Safety Regulations for Nuclear Power Plants
(РБМК) RBMK - High Power Channel Type Reactor
(РР) Manual Control
(САОР) ECCS - Emergency Core Cooling System
(СИУР) SIUR - Senior Reactor Control Engineer
(СУЗ) RCPS - Reactor Control and Protection System
(ТВС) - Fuel assembly
(ТВЭЛ) - Fuel Element
(ТГ) TG - Turbine Generator
(УСП) Shortened absorber rods
Part 1: FIVE YEARS LATER
On April 26, at 01:23:40, Shift Manager of Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Unit 4,
Alexander Akimov, gave the order to shut down the reactor by the end of shift for planned
repairs prior to stopping the power unit. The team was given a quiet working atmosphere, the
central control system didn’t register one emergency or warning signal of deviation of reactor
parameters or its support systems. Reactor operator Leonid Toptunov removed the cover from
the EPS button which protects from accidental inadvertent pressing, and pressed the button.
With this signal, 187 RCPS rods started movement down into the core. On the graphic display,
lights lit up the board, and the arrows of the rod position indicators went into motion. Alexander
Akimov, standing half-turned to the reactor controls desk was observing it and also seeing that
the indicating beams of the AR imbalance were “flung left” (his expression), as it should be,
which meant a decrease in reactor power, turned to the security panel from where he was
observing the ongoing experiment.
But what happened next could not have been predicted in your wildest fantasy. After a
slight decrease in reactor power, reactor power suddenly began to rise at an exponential rate,
and emergency signals came in. L. Toptunov shouted about the emergency increase in power.
But there was nothing in his power to do. All he could do, he had already done, he held the EPS
Button, the RCPS rods went to the core. No other means were at his disposal, nor at anyone
else’s. A. Akimov sharply shouted “Scram the reactor!”. He ran up to the controls and
de-energized the electromagnetic drive clutches of the RCPS rods. This action was correct, but
useless. After all, the logic of the RCPS is such that all its elements of logic schemes work
correctly and the rods move into the core. Now it was clear, after depressing the EPS button,
the downward movement didn’t happen, there were no means of rescue. Logic was refused!
Within a short interval, two powerful explosions followed. The movement of the EPS rods
stopped, having gone less than half way. There was nowhere else for them to go.
At 01:23:47 the reactor was destroyed with an acceleration of power on prompt
neutrons. This collapse was the worst possible catastrophe in an energy reactor. No one could
comprehend it, no one was prepared for it, no technical measures for localization of the unit and
station had been stipulated. Nor were there any organizational measures.
Confusion, bewilderment, and complete lack of understanding of what and how it had
happened, briefly took hold of us. Absolutely urgent tasks were now laid before us, the
implementation of which drove out of our heads all other ideas.
Looking back on the past, I don’t know how to say, a long time (more than five years had
passed) or not so long: All still stands before my eyes. With good reason I state that we did all
that was possible in that extreme situation. To do anything more of use was impossible. I
observed no panic, no psychosis. Not a single person abandoned the unit, they left only under
orders. We all came out of this trial with severe health damage, for some - fatal.
It is especially important to mention, they were professional workers, clearly aware of the
danger of the work in that situation. They didn’t flinch. On giving dues to the professional,
courageous, on the brink of self-sacrifice, work of the personnel after the accident, it is
impossible to speak. I do not set the task to trace the origins of such behavior, to explore the
details of the psychology of the state of people in extreme, completely unacceptable conditions.
This is a topic for a good writer. My task is more simple: to show why people found themselves
in such circumstances that they were forced to reveal all of their spiritual qualities. Whether it
was inevitable because of the use of nuclear energy, or other reasons.
Тo speak practically about the past, I will stick strictly to facts. All cited facts I can
corroborate with documentation or indicate where the documents are located. It is all too
serious. The question will affect a huge number of people in several generations. Enough
falsehoods. I do not consider myself to have a writer’s gift and never would have taken up the
pen. But five years have already passed, and a reliable account of the events and their causes
does not exist. It is necessary to fulfill my duty to my lost (It is correct to say killed) colleagues.
By decree of the Office of the Public Prosecutor:
“The criminal prosecution is discontinued regarding Akimov A.F., Toptunov L.F. and
Perevozchenko V.I. on the basis of article 6 par. 8 of the Ukrainian SSR Criminal Procedure
Code on November 28, 1986.”
They too without a doubt would have been tried and imprisoned had they not died. They
already had nothing to say in their defense. For their relatives, there is little to lose, so the
Prosecutor’s Office reminds them: Your son, father, husband is a criminal, remember! A death
grip indeed. It’s true, they didn’t hold on.
No, I did not stay silent all these last 5 years. Neither admitting the guilt of myself nor the
personnel in the explosion of the reactor, I wrote detailed technical bases for it. Where? It’s
easier to say where I didn’t write. It was all useless. Only R.P. Sergenko in his film and the
Ukrainian newspaper “Komsomolsk Banner” gave me the opportunity to speak out some.
Naturally due to the limited nature of time in the film and space in the newspaper, to give a
detailed explanation of such complex problems is not possible. I write and I think, would it work
to print?
It is interesting how it turns out in our blessed country! How does one receive access in
newspapers, magazines when the way to the others is already closed? I don’t know, is it
possible that it’s necessary? Why are there different views on the same problem? Some truth is
the one. I was in Germany, there they found a way to conduct a nearly half-hour tv program, and
printed an essay in the newspaper. And this was without any kind of initiation on my side.
In October 1990 I read the report of a group of specialists from the IAEA released in
1986 from information from Soviet specialists in Vienna about the causes of the Chernobyl
catastrophe. Since the Soviet informants, under the leadership of academic V.A. Legasov, did
not aspire to the truth, in slander of the personnel they resorted to lies, and kept silent on well
known facts. The report of the IAEA specialists contained clear inaccuracies. I sent my remarks
on the report to the director of the IAEA, Mr. H. Blix. And now, this is what the discourse is
about. My comments somehow caught the eye of the editor of the magazine “Nuclear
Engineering”, and in a letter, he invited me to write an article for the magazine which would be
printed in November 1991. Like normal people, they want to learn from others’ mistakes. And
we ourselves don’t want to allow others to “bump their heads”.
In “Ogonyok” I read a partisan (in the sense of a tenacious, unchanging accusation of
the staff) interview with academician A.P. Aleksandrov, then wrote and brought an article to the
editor. I told them not to take my word for it, but showed where they could verify what I had
written. I naturally agreed to any changes to the article as long as it maintained the spirit of
what I had written. They did not print it. They need it, but we don’t. I know there is little space in
“Ogonyok”, but you see, after this they found space for another slanderous fabrication against
the staff for Kevrolev and Asmolov. I affirm: slanderous. And this in 1991!
Of course I can’t say that nothing changes. Contrary to the mighty council of doctors
and academicians, with the power of individual enthusiasts V.P. Volkov, A.A. Yadrikhinsky, and
B.G. Dubovsky, the collectives slowly and with such resistance that it could not be refuted,
reveal the true causes of the catastrophe. No, I am wrong, they are not revealed. They are
cleared for a long time. And the creators of the reactor are cleared shortly after the accident.
The reasons are written in black and white, which previously was not allowed. And now it is still
available only to a small circle. It is required to overcome obstacles. In strange ways doctors
and academics sorted it out. For years they didn’t see the obvious. And still I believe the truth
will come out, and I even believe it won’t be after 50 years, but sooner!
The official version of the causes of the catastrophe on 04/26/86, to this day remaining
unchanged, unequivocally blame the operating personnel. Sight began to get more clear later.
Why it happened is difficult to unequivocally say. I will set forth how I see it. I’ve thought much
about it and there are clear questions, and there are incomprehensible ones.
For the findings of the official agencies on the causes of the catastrophe, everything is
simple. To me it seems that no other conclusions could have been made at that time, because
the investigation was unnaturally given to the creators of the reactor, i.e. the potential culprits,
from the beginning. There wasn’t a person on any commission interested in naming the
reactor’s properties as the cause of the accident. And conversely, directly, indirectly, as a last
corporate resort, everyone was satisfied with the placement of blame on the staff. And above
all, everything is simple and clear. This is how things habitually roll down the track for the Soviet
Union. We have no other reasons for the cause of accidents except for the sloppiness and
illiteracy of the service people. Even if the commissions had come to conclusions based in
reality (after all we can assume this), then it would have been buried for political considerations
and what was announced, made public. No, it could not have been anything else.
The Press. Why in the world did our discerning, meticulous correspondents so
recklessly and unconditionally believe everything? Why were they not suspicious of the
one-sided tendency of selection of commissions? Well of course the commissions are massive,
authoritative and call for no doubt. But you see, there were those who doubted and had
opinions directly counter to the official one. They were ignored. The press was concerned with
one thing: mobbing the staff. From various sides, with various bitterness. Except for two
articles in “The Literary Gazette” explaining what the RBMK is, and reactor related matters, it
seems there was nothing with a different direction of thought. Correspondent M. Odints even
condemns the fact that A. Dyatlov defended himself in court. In our Soviet, unconditionally
righteous court, don’t even dare to defend yourself. But on the other hand, such obvious
mischief is better than a charge from a position of sympathy. So the Chernobyl Chief of Press,
Kovalenko, appears in a talk with a correspondent from “Arguments and Facts”. The man
decided that if he had been put in connection with the press, that he already had an
understanding of reactors. With confidence he says: “In all textbooks and instructions it is
indicated that the reactor cannot explode under any conditions”. And further: “It seems today
that they lived according to the laws and concepts of their time. And then they were sure:
whatever you do with the reactor, an explosion is impossible”. I came across nothing in the
textbooks or instructions that said an explosion of the reactor is impossible under any
circumstances. Moreover, in 1986 he knew of at least five cases of actual explosions in our
country. The RBMK reactor operator clearly knows you cannot do whatever you want with the
reactor. The explosion is not an explosion, but an accident in this case. It will definitely be
difficult. They describe us as idiots, they say, what can you believe from them. It’s true, Dr. O.
Kazachkovsky, conversely called us professionals, balm poured straight onto our souls, with tar.
Yes, a lot of them were exercised at our expense. The staff allowed unpredictable and unlikely
violations. On that, they and the scientists had an inventive mind. And the press reported all
these fabrications well to the public. In fact the conclusion on the causes of the accident,
adopted by the Interdepartmental Science and Technology Council under the chairmanship of
the President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, A.P. Aleksandrov, went to broad technical
circles in the public. But somehow it escaped the attention of the press that the president was
the inventor and scientific leader of the RBMK theme. How does that fit in with let’s say, ethics?
What is there to say about the law?
They suspected incorrectly with the first official version of the causes of the accidents for
RBMK reactors, which blamed nuclear power plant operators. This is understandable. One
only had to look at and interpret the technical measures implemented at the remaining reactors,
and how for them, it began to clear up the technical conditions of the reactor in April 1986. They
understood what they were holding for all those years. But this is the most short-sighted, most
informed (I say that reluctantly) category of people.
To the authorities it seemed that the criminals had been caught, announced and sent to
prison. Everything is in order! Society reacted peculiarly and in the opposite direction from
common sense. The catastrophe brought major consequences, rendering a large area
unusable for a long time. It occurred as a result of operator error. Is it possible to eliminate
further errors? Of course not. Not one person will risk saying yes. No matter how good of
operators you pick up, there can be no guarantee of error free operation. There are thousands
of operators. And if so then the use of atomic energy in general is unacceptable. We know
what it turned out to be. What it will turn into, still awaits to be found out. Is it possible to
foresee such a course of events? Of course, it is the most normal reaction of people. Yes,
anticipation of the social consequences of decisions made was never the strong suit of the
Soviet and party authorities. This was viewed as useless, and therefore never developed. The
propaganda machine was launched, black was white, and if needed, a punitive squad was
ready. No need to think. The Soviet engineering corps, undoubtedly powerful and competent,
to form its own opinion, didn’t have in mind a hunger for complete information. Although, would
it seem to be hiding something if all was reported to the IAEA?
 The position taken by the IAEA specialists deserves a special conversation. In
accordance with Soviet policy, a group of specialists prepared a report for the international
community on the Chernobyl catastrophe consisting of two parts: a small book on the causes of
the accident, and a large one on radiation and medical problems. We won’t touch on the
second part. How the international community was informed in the first part, I will explain in
further detail. Right here we will consider the question without going into details. The reactor
exploded under normal ordinary conditions:
- There were no natural disasters: floods, earthquakes, tunguska or other meteorite;
- There was no sabotage
- There was no terrorism.

Lacking all of the information, IAEA experts were nevertheless informed mainly of the
actual circumstances of the accident and graphic parameters. And in these conditions, the
IAEA experts actually agreed with Soviet informants and also blamed the staff for the explosion.
In this regard, the question arises: Do the experts allow for the possibility of an explosion
(nuclear explosion) of a reactor operated in accordance with standard documents, due to
operator error? If they allow this possibility, then their propaganda on development of nuclear
energy is immoral. Operators make mistakes in the West too.
After the accident I analyzed many times the standard documents accepted in the Soviet
Union on the design of nuclear reactors and found no situation in which a reactor designed in
accordance with NSR and GSP would explode. I didn’t consider natural disasters and
sabotage. It goes without saying, I don’t dare to pretend it was a comprehensive analysis, it
isn’t within the power of one person. But the teams drafting the documents don’t see such
situations, otherwise countermeasures would be provided. Given the qualifications of the IAEA
experts, it wasn’t difficult for them, based on their existing materials, to find the numerous
discrepancies between the reactor design and the standard documents, and come to a
conclusion on its lack of fitness for operation. It wasn’t difficult for them to come to a conclusion
on the violation of instructions given to us (in fact there were none). Under no circumstances
did we blow up a reactor meeting design standards. Apparently dumbfounded by the
information that had fallen on their heads, usually from the Soviet Union obtained by other
means, the experts hurried to put out a report, literally following Soviet informants. Otherwise
nothing can be explained, for example, one such extract from the report:
“This printout shows that too many control rods were withdrawn from the reactor core,
and that it did not have sufficient reactivity margin to meet requirements for shutdown. At this
time, the operator should have shutdown the reactor”.
What is wrong with this and why is it unacceptable for such competent people:
1. There was no printout, it was obtained after the accident. This is carried by the
conscience of the informants.
2. The printout is the position of the rods at the moment 01:22:30. The EPS button was
pressed at 01:23:40. How long did they analyze the printout? You have to look at 211 rods.
Can you do it in time? For the Soviet informants, it’s clear that it’s necessary to discredit the
staff. But why do the experts not even want to think a little? But it is so, here the others are
more serious.
 3. The experts seriously don’t see a contradiction here? “… that it did not have sufficient
reactivity margin to meet requirements for shutdown. At this time, the operator should have
shutdown the reactor.” Suppose we saw on the printout inadequate margin and in accordance
with regulations, with the deviation from parameters, we actuate protection. We still get an
explosion. Would we be pardoned and executed at the same time? So on 04/26/86, we only
pressed the protection button at the end of the job.
4. And most importantly: How to understand that the reactor “did not have sufficient
reactivity margin to meet requirements for shutdown…?” In books on reactors, it is written that
the reactor needs to have reactivity no greater than what is allowed by the reactivity control
mechanisms. This is understandable and in complete agreement with reactor physics. And yet
in the books, not even a hint of some minimum reactivity margin requirement (?!) for safe
shutdown. The fact that the EPS becomes an acceleration device, instead of universal
protection, is not in the RBMK documents: design, regulations, instructions. This became
known after the accident when calculations were performed. The designers of the RCPS rods
gave birth to monsters, Soviet informants to the IAEA following the accident claim that there is
nothing terrible, and surprisingly persuaded the IAEA specialists.
Incomprehensible! The persuasive Soviet informants knew that such a rod construction
was unsuitable for operation: Immediately following the accident, the withdrawal of rods was
limited, and then the rods were replaced with a different design. They had a goal: Convince
them that the inferior staff blew up a good reactor. And they achieved it. Why V.A. Legasov
didn’t receive the title of Hero for this, as V. Gubarev regrets, I don’t understand.
With this attitude, another time they might not be able to lie. There are three dozen
words, but how many carry false information? Other assertions from the IAEA specialists’ report
are of the very same kind. And it went out to the whole world, pouring oil on the heads of the
Soviet informants. Returning for review of the report in 1991, we will find out in the near future
whether or not the IAEA experts will come to a determination to write a report based in reality,
that is worthy of this organization. Of course scientists of different countries continue to show
interest in the Chernobyl catastrophe with the understanding that they are not inclined to accept
anything. But the basis of the research deals with certain aspects, and the experts’ report is
complex, and therefore continues to fulfill a negative role.
It is difficult for a person to resist information that has fallen on him. Information would
be welcome. The Government Commission Report, conclusions of various commissions,
newspapers, magazines, writers… and all winds in one direction, all to one tune. How could
one not believe? Well, one may ask, why would vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers B.E.
Shcherbina say something that wasn’t so? Why should he, the father to fathers (all under his
hand) forget the guilty and blame the innocent? Which means, it is so. Why would another
vice-chairman to the Council of Ministers, G. Vedernikov, so simply say (frankly speaking, lie)
that they removed “all four degrees of protection against the fool”? He doesn’t need it. So they
must have removed them. In the German magazine “Spiegel” Issue No. 29 of 1987 (Appendix
1) under a photo of the defendants: Director Bryukhanov, Deputy Chief Engineer Dyatlov, and
Chief Engineer Fomin is written: “Disorder, Negligence, Carelessness”. True, it is not clear how
this could affect the characteristics of the reactor. Was he offended or something? The filing of
official charges continues to press on peoples’ minds. No, the accident simply couldn’t have
happened. After all, the very same reactors were working. This is by no means an argument,
somehow they just don’t think. They don’t see what’s lying on the surface.
1. Why are materials about the accident classified? Unavailable to this day, while the
reactor is not classified.
2. It doesn’t take an expert to conclude: that whether or not there were personnel errors,
the reactor exploded under ordinary conditions. Which means such a reactor is not fit for
operation.
3. Why in the Soviet Union has not a single accident occurred due to poor equipment?
Well it’s clear, Soviet equipment is the best in the world, although still not perfect. Could I be
mistaken? Here I will try to answer these and other questions.

Part 2: CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

Chernobyl NPP is located not far from the Dnieper River on the Pripyat River. In 1986 it
was a major energy hub with 4 million kW of power. The startup of the first power unit was
September 26, 1977, followed in December 1978, 1981, and 1983 by units 2,3 and 4
respectively. With the construction of the station, a collective of operating personnel formed and
grew. In general, problems with the service personnel didn’t happen, owing to the good
prospects of obtaining an apartment, and location of the station. In the Unit 1 reactor shop,
people generally arrived with similar arrangements of so-called industrial reactors. They formed
the backbone. In the future, this source would be exhausted, but there was already an
opportunity for transferring to work in the unit. The usual problems of a new enterprise were
softened by the gradual placement of units into operation.
The station worked quite satisfactorily. Up to 1986 there was one serious accident, a
rupture of a fuel channel in Unit 1 in 1982. It led to prolonged repairs and considerable
irradiation of repair personnel within normal limits for workers at the station. There was one
incident of contamination of the station territory, a few dozen square meters with a
decontamination solution after washing of the primary system because of a small leak in the
pipeline. The surface layer of soil was removed and buried. On the whole, at the Chernobyl
station, incidents were occurring less than average for nuclear stations in the country. The latest
electrical energy output before the accident was about 28 billion kW-hr/year which ceded only
slightly to Leningrad NPP. But there, they already had an established collective. We had such a
constant movement of personnel and inflow of new people. And in 1985-86, a portion of
experienced operating workers were transferred to the under construction Unit 5. They of
course transferred good employees because:
- The station was one. One side was not given favor. They perfectly understood the
difficulty of the starting period.
 - As a rule, they were transferred with a promotion. In this case, it was inconvenient to
hold a person back.
- And for the heads of the third line (Units 5 and 6) it was their own station employees,
they knew who was who.

It is necessary to state, at the Chernobyl station, technical leaders, and middle managers
were appointed from station employees, not from outside. Something I don’t recall as strange,
excluding the first time. In this are pluses and minuses, but I think overall the positives outweigh
the negatives.
All shift leaders of the unit, and also shift leaders of the shops had worked exclusively at
Chernobyl for at least five years. They were not some kind of idle chiefs, but people, directly
implementing and controlling the technological process. After the accident, all operating
personnel underwent re-examination, understand this, with a passion and were found fit to work.
Here I quote the report of the commission of the State Industrial Energy Supervision Service
from January 4, 1991. “In publications by the Prognoz Psychological Research Laboratory of
the USSR Ministry of Nuclear Power and Industry [4-6]. The analysis showed that differences
between the data on the personalities of the operating personnel at the Chernobyl plant and
those of personnel at other plants were not such as to have been a direct cause of the accident.
As a whole, the Chernobyl personnel in 1986 were characterized as a fairly typical, mature and
stable group of specialists with qualifications regarded in the USSR as satisfactory. They were
no better, but no worse, than the personnel at other nuclear plants.”
And why is it that usual normal operators suddenly tolerate “an extremely improbable
combination of procedure violations and operating conditions” as was presented by the Soviet
informants to the IAEA? Could the combination in the shift on April 26 have all been such
remarkable outliers? And as to whether or not it was too “improbable”? Of course it was, and I
will speak of this further.
One line of the station included two energy units. But practically every unit functioned on
its own, little connection. Basic equipment of the unit: the reactor, two TG’s, and a transformer.

Reactor RBMK-1000

For further understanding, I need to briefly speak on what a nuclear reactor is in general
and the particularities of the RBMK reactor.
The nuclear reactor of the power station is a device for converting nuclear energy into
thermal energy. The fuel in the overwhelming majority of reactors served is low-enriched
uranium. In nature the chemical element uranium is made up of two of its isotopes: 0.7% is the
isotope with an atomic weight of 235, the rest is the isotope with an atomic weight of 238. Fuel
consists only of isotope U-235. Upon capture (absorption) of a neutron, the nucleus of U-235
becomes unstable and by worldly standards instantly breaks into two main unequal parts with
the release of a large amount of energy. In each act of this division (fission), the energy released
from the nucleus is millions of times larger than the combustion of a molecule of oil or gas. In a
large reactor such as Chernobyl, operation at full power “burns” about four kilograms of uranium
per day.
The energy released in each fission of the uranium nucleus is realized as follows: The
main part is in the form of kinetic energy of the fission fragments, which, in the braking process
transfer practically all of their energy to the fuel element of the reactor and its constructive shell
(cladding). The escape of any observable part of the fission fragments beyond the fuel cladding
is inadmissible. If we look at the periodic table, we see that the nuclei of the fission fragments
have a clear excess of neutrons to be stable. Therefore as a result of the chain of beta decays,
undergoing radioactive transformations, they shift according to the table of chemical elements to
the right, arriving at a stable state. This process is accompanied by the emission of beta
particles and beta radiation. Each kind of fragment has its own biography and its own half life. It
is namely the fission fragments that made up the bulk of the radioactive contamination of the
territory at the time of the accident, after the destruction and release during the explosion of the
fuel elements.
During normal reactor operation, beta particles also do not escape beyond the boundary
of the fuel elements and there they lose their energy. Beta radiation for the most part is
absorbed, also in the reactor. After the breakup of the chain reaction with the shutdown of the
reactor, residual heat release from the decay of fission products requires cooling of the fuel
elements for a prolonged time.
With every fission of a uranium nucleus, two to three, on average about two and a half,
neutrons are released. Their kinetic energy is absorbed by the moderator, fuel, and structural
elements of the reactor, then transferred to the coolant.
Only neutrons make it possible to carry out the fission chain reaction of U-235 nuclei. If
one neutron from each fission causes a new fission, then the reaction will maintain the same
level of intensity.
The bulk of the neutrons are released immediately upon fission. These are prompt
neutrons. A small portion, about 0.7%, after a short interval of time, seconds and tenths of
seconds, are delayed neutrons. They make it possible to control the intensity of the uranium
fission reaction and regulate reactor power. Otherwise the existence of energy reactors would
stand to be problematic, only an atomic bomb. The remaining part of fission energy is instant
beta radiation, emitted directly from the fission, and energy of the neutrino, which we can neither
catch nor see.
Usually in energy reactors, naturally occurring uranium is not used, but is slightly
enriched with the U-235 isotope. But still the majority is U-238 because a considerable amount
of neutrons are absorbed by it. The U-238 nucleus after absorbing a neutron, is unstable and
after double beta decay becomes chemical element Plutonium-239, which can also fission upon
absorption of thermal neutrons, like U-235. The properties of plutonium as a fuel differ from
uranium and with sufficient accumulation after prolonged operation of the reactor, the physics of
the reactor change slightly. Ejected from the accident, plutonium also contributes its own share
to the contamination of the territory. Moreover, there is no hope in its decaying away (the half life
of Plutonium-239 is more than 24,000 years), but only migration deep into the earth. Other
isotopes of plutonium are also present. Properties of Uranium-235:
- It splits with the absorption of a thermalized (low energy) neutron;
- With it is emitted a large amount of energy;
- The release of neutrons with its fission, is necessary for the self-sustaining reaction.

Uranium-235 represents the basis for the creation of atomic energy reactors.
Nearly all reactors in NPPs work with thermal neutrons, i.e. neutrons with low kinetic
energy. Neutrons after fission of uranium or plutonium undergo a slowing-down stage, diffusion
and capture in the nuclei of fuel and construction materials. A portion of the neutrons escape
beyond the boundary of the core - leakage. At the same time, many fissions are occurring, and
as a result, in an operating reactor there is always a large number of neutrons present, which
make up the neutron flux, and neutron field. Burnout of the fuel nuclei occurs slowly, therefore,
in a sufficiently long span of time, the amount of fuel in the reactor can be considered
unchanged. Then the number of neutrons absorbed in the fuel, and therefore the number of split
nuclei and the amount of received energy will be directly proportional to the neutron flux in the
core. In fact the job of the operators comes down to the measurement and maintaining neutron
flux as required to maintain reactor power.
If the fission neutrons are conditionally broken up into successive generations
(Conditionally in the following because - since the fission occurs uncoordinated, this would be
analogous to the movement of an unorganized crowd, and not to the march of an army column),
with the number of neutrons in generations No 1, No 2, and so on, being equal to the number of
neutrons in every generation, reactor power will be constant. Such a reactor is called critical.
The effective multiplication factor is equal to the ratio of the number of neutrons in the next
generation to the previous, which when they are the same, is equal to 1. With the effective
multiplication factor greater than 1, the number of neutrons and power increase continuously - a
supercritical reactor. The higher the effective multiplication factor, the higher the rate of rise in
power, and moreover power rises with respect to time not linearly, but exponentially. In operation
as a rule, the value of the effective multiplication factor (Keff) is not used, but instead the value
of the so-called reactivity (ρ) which for Keff differs slightly from 1. With sufficient accuracy it is
presented as equal to (Keff-1). In normal operations the operator deals with the reactor, super
criticality or positive reactivity which amounts to less than one-tenth of one percent. With high
reactivity, the rate of rise in power becomes too great, dangerous for the integrity of the reactor
and its support systems. All energy reactors have automatic Emergency Protection, stopping
the reactor upon a large rate of power increase. In the RBMK reactor, EPS actuates at a rate of
rise in power of two times in 20 sec.
The big moment. With the fission of the uranium nuclei approximately 0.7% of the
neutrons are born not at the time of the fission, but with a short delay. They enter into the total
number of neutrons of a given generation and by this, increase the lifetime of that generation of
neutrons. The delayed neutron fraction is usually denoted as β. If excess (positive) reactivity
reaches (or exceeds) the value of β, then the reactor becomes critical on prompt neutrons
alone, the rate of replacement of generations which is large, is determined by slowing down
time and diffusion of neutrons and therefore the rate of rise in power is very high. In this case
there is no protection, only destruction of the reactor can interrupt the chain reaction. So it was
on April 26 1986 at Unit 4 of Chernobyl NPP. Actually, because of accumulation of plutonium in
the core, and the differences in properties between prompt and delayed neutrons in the RBMK
reactor, the value of β-effective was not 0.7% but 0.5%.
The RBMK-1000 reactor is a graphite moderated, water cooled, channel type reactor. A
fuel assembly is made up from 36 three and a half meter long fuel elements. The fuel elements
with the help of spacing bars, fastened to a central carrier rod, are stationed on two circles: on
the inner are 6 elements, and on the outer 12 elements.
Each assembly is composed of two layers stacked lengthwise. With this arrangement,
the core has a height of seven meters. Each fuel element is made of uranium dioxide (UO₂)
pellets placed in an airtight tube made from a zirconium niobium alloy. Unlike shell type reactors,
where all fuel assemblies are settled in a common shell, designed for full operating pressure, in
the RBMK reactor every assembly is placed in a separate fuel channel, representing its own
tube with a diameter of 80mm.
The core of the RBMK reactor is 7m high with a diameter of 11.8m and is comprised of
1,888 graphite columns, each with central openings where channels are installed. Of this
number, 1,661 are fuel channels with fuel assemblies, the rest are RCPS channels where 211
neutron absorbing rods are placed and 16 control sensors. RCPS channels are evenly
distributed throughout the active zone in radial and azimuthal directions.
From below, the coolant which is normal water under high pressure, is supplied to the
fuel channels, cooling the fuel elements. The water is partially evaporated and in the form of a
steam-water mixture from above is directed to the drum-separators, where steam is separated
and enters the turbine. Water from the drum-separators, with help from the MCP, is again
submitted to the entrance of the fuel channels. Steam, after its work in the turbines, is
condensed and returned to the coolant system, thus closing the circuit of the water circulation.
If we accept the construction of the core as given, let’s see where the fission neutrons
go. A portion of the neutrons exit beyond the boundary of the core and are irretrievably lost. A
portion of the neutrons are absorbed by the moderator, coolant, construction materials and the
nuclei of fission products. These are non-useful losses of neutrons. The rest are absorbed by
fuel. To maintain a constant power, the amount of neutrons absorbed by fuel also must be
unchanging. As a result of the release from each fission of fuel nuclei, two and a half (on
average) neutrons are produced per one leak or capture by non fuel materials. We can lose one
and a half neutrons. This will be a critical reactor.
Such a reactor still cannot work for the following reason: with the fission of uranium is
formed the nuclei of different chemical elements and among them is a considerable amount of
Xenon with an atomic weight of 135, which possesses a large neutron absorption cross section.
With a rise in reactor power, the production of Xenon starts, and the reactor stalls. So it was with
the first American reactor. E. Fermi calculated the neutron absorption cross section for Xenon
and jokingly said that its nucleus comes out to be the size of an orange.
For compensation of this and other effects, fuel in the reactor is loaded in excess, such
that with constant neutron leakage, and their absorption by non-fuel materials, the portion
absorbed by the fuel is increased. In order for such a reactor to not have a constant rise in
power, so called reactivity control mechanisms are introduced into the core, containing materials
which intensively absorb neutrons. Methods of compensation can vary, we will look only at
examples in the RBMK.
Housed in the RCPS channels, are rods containing a strong neutron absorber - Boron,
which helps with the necessary balance of neutrons, and as a result, reactor power is
maintained. If an increase in power is necessary, a portion of the rods are completely or partially
removed from the core. As a result the fraction of neutrons absorbed by the fuel is increased,
and upon reaching the required power level, rods are again inserted into the core. As a rule, the
new position of the control rods is not identical to the initial. It depends on the change in
reactivity of the core from the power change - the power coefficient of reactivity. If a decrease in
power is necessary, rods are inserted into the core, i.e. adding negative reactivity, the reactor
becomes subcritical and power starts to decrease. Reactor power is stabilized at a new power
level with a change in rod position. This is all carried out by the AR (Automatic Regulator). The
operator changes the level of power demand with the push of a button, and the rest is done
automatically. It is true that in the case of the RBMK reactor this is not completely so, and
sometimes not at all so. The operator must intervene to correct the work of the regulator in order
to establish an energy release in one part of the core or another.
In a newly constructed reactor, the fuel channels are loaded with fresh unburned fuel
assemblies. If all 1,661 channels were loaded with assemblies, then the multiplication factor
would be so great, that to extinguish it with the available control rods would be impossible.
Therefore about 240 of the fuel channels are loaded with special neutron absorbing rods instead
of fuel assemblies. And furthermore, a few hundred absorbers are placed in openings of the
central supporting rods of the fuel assemblies. As fuel burns out, these absorbers are gradually
removed and replaced by fuel assemblies. Upon the extraction of all absorbers, maintaining the
necessary reactivity in the core is accomplished by replacing the most burned out assemblies
with fresh ones. This is the steady state refueling regime.
In the RBMK reactor, fuel assemblies are replaced with the reactor at power by a special
loading and unloading machine. At this time the core contains completely burned out, partially
burned out, and fresh assemblies. The burned out ones can be replaced with fresh ones. The
number of control and protection rods is calculated for this mode.
Every RCPS rod introduces some reactivity, which depends on its location in the core
and the shape of the neutron field. In the RBMK reactor, the reactivity of the rods can be
acceptably measured by considering the effectiveness of one rod as conditionally equal to
0.05%. As already explained, the greater its positive reactivity, the greater the rate of rise in
reactor power. The rate of decrease in power is also greater with a larger introduction of
negative reactivity.
As a result of limit violations and system malfunctions, the necessity to quickly shut down
the reactor to avoid damage arises. Therefore the number of RCPS rods should always be in
excess to bring the reactor to a state with the necessary subcriticality. When the reactor is in a
critical state (critical doesn’t mean catastrophe, but that its multiplication factor is equal to 1 and,
accordingly, reactivity is equal to 0), it is obligatory to have some number of minimum rods
withdrawn from the core and ready for immediate insertion into the core for interruption of the
fission chain reaction. And the more rods withdrawn from the active zone, the greater the
confidence that the reactor, if necessary, will be shut down quickly with great subcriticality. This
is true for all reactors, designed in accordance with required standards and safety regulations.
In all reactors, there is one method or another to insert reactivity control mechanisms,
necessary for maneuvering power. For example, with a forced partial reduction in power, the
amount of Xenon is temporarily increased (we say that the reactor is poisoned with Xenon), with
the increase in the amount of neutron absorbers it is necessary to compensate with the
withdrawal of some of the operational extractable absorbers. Otherwise the reactor will have to
be shutdown, awaiting the decay of Xenon.
In the RBMK reactor, during operation, some of the RCPS rods are located partially or
fully in the core and neutralize (compensate for) some of the excess reactivity. Now we will
clarify the concept of Operating Reactivity Margin (ORM).
Operating reactivity margin is the amount of positive reactivity a reactor would have with
all of the RCPS rods withdrawn.
Like in normal reactors, the RBMK reactor reactivity margin is also necessary for the
maneuvering of power. After an accident in 1975 in Unit 1 of the Leningrad NPP, a minimum
reactivity margin of 15 rods was determined for the RBMK based on the necessity of regulation
of energy output in the core. But after the Chernobyl accident, what was found was complete
nonsense, absurdity. With a small margin, EPS doesn’t stop, but speeds up the reactor. The
smaller the reactivity margin, the greater the nuclear danger of the RBMK?! Understand that our
reactor is not like others!
There are no reactors with such properties. One could understand if EPS could not itself
handle the trip of the reactor, but that EPS itself sped up the reactor - such a nightmare couldn’t
happen even in sleep.
Like ORM, in text, the steam void coefficient of reactivity and power coefficient of
reactivity will often be mentioned. We will clarify these concepts.
Let’s say the reactor is operating at some power with an unchanging coolant flow. In the
fuel channel water heats up to boiling and becomes steam. As it advances in the channel, more
water taking heat from the fuel elements turns into steam. Thus, in the stable mode we have at
the boundary of the active zone a certain amount of steam content. Now we increase the power
of the reactor. The amount of heat grows, and consequently, there will be more water vapor in
the core. How does this affect reactivity in the core, increase or decrease? It depends on the
ratio of moderator nuclei to fuel in the core. Water, as it turns out, is also a neutron moderator,
like graphite and with an increase in the steam content in the core, comes less water. The
designers, apparently, due to economic reasons, chose a ratio of moderator nuclei to fuel nuclei
in the RBMK such that complete transformation of water into steam led to an increase in
reactivity of five-six β.
What’s scary about this? For example, with the rupture of an 800 mm. diameter coolant
pipe, voiding sets in within a couple seconds and the slow-moving EPS wouldn’t be able to
handle the released reactivity. An explosion happens, like on April 26. That was not all. With
increasing power, the temperature of the fuel always rises and this leads to decreasing
reactivity. In the RBMK reactor with a change in power, in general two factors have an effect on
reactivity: the negative effect of the fuel temperature, and the positive effect of steam. They
together make up the fast power coefficient of reactivity - the change in reactivity per one
megawatt (or kilowatt) change in power. Other effects on reactivity change are dependent on
power: the temperature effect of graphite, and reactor poisoning with Xenon, although they have
a considerable magnitude, they appear with a long delay and don’t have an effect on the
dynamics. In a properly constructed reactor, the power coefficient should be negative. That
means that with some kind of perturbation that increases reactivity, will start an increase in
power, and this leads to a decrease in reactivity and power stabilizing, albeit at a new higher
level. The RBMK’s power coefficient was positive across a large range of power, in violation of
requirements of regulatory documents. This directly affected the occurrence of the accident on
April 26.

Part 3: PROGRAM
Its complete name: “Test Program for Turbogenerator No. 8 of the Chernobyl Nuclear
Power Plant in a Rundown Regime with the Plant Internal Load”
There was nothing remarkable in the program, it was a usual program, written normally.
The notoriety it received was only in connection with the accident that occurred with its
implementation. There was in no way any technical connection between the accident and the
Program, their tie lies purely with coincidence and unconscientious investigators. If there had
occurred in the last minutes before the start of the test, an automatic trip on any signal (You
don’t really believe the commissions and free writers; that we blocked protection - they were all
in operation for the mode of power at 200MW), then the accident would have happened just the
same. Had the accident occurred because of this program, then everything is simple. Prohibit
conducting the test on other reactors and there is no more problem. But it is not so.
To critics of the Program.
“The tests under the Program cannot be considered purely electrical, they are complex,
they affect the entire unit.'' And who considered them to be purely electrical? Have they
themselves come up with or asked who? You don’t have to look any further than the signatures
below the program, therefore the question answers itself. If the tests were purely electrical, then
what were the signatures of the reactor, turbine, and thermal automation shops for?
Coordination of the Program. Here is what the Gospromatom-Energonadzor commission
writes in 1991:
“Such tests should be classified as complex unit tests and should be approved by the
General Designer, the Chief Design Engineer, the Scientific Manager and the regulatory body.
However, regulations NSR-04-74 and GSP-82, which were in force at the time of the accident,
did not require the plant managers to obtain approval for such tests from the aforementioned
organizations.”
 I thought it was important to agree on the order, which I told the Chief Engineer.
Coordination with external organizations is the expertise of the station’s Technical Department
and the Chief Engineer. I was satisfied with the signatures that were there.
The nuclear accident happened, and the Program wasn’t coordinated with the station’s
Nuclear Safety Department.
But the introduction of excess reactivity occurred by no means as a result of
implementation of the Program. The above named commission writes about this:
“An initial coolant flow rate through the reactor which was higher than the nominal rate
was a thermal-hydraulic characteristic of the planned mode. Furthermore, the steam quality was
at a minimum for subcooling of the coolant to just below boiling point at the core inlet. Both
these factors proved to be directly related to the scale of effects manifested during the tests.”
In other words, in the opinion of the commission, conducting the Program, if not the
cause of the accident, still had an effect. This is not so. When the coolant flow was greater than
nominal, there were no incidents with the reactor. And in general, the whole design ideology and
their bases of compiled operational documents, including regulations, prescribes flow “no less
than” and nowhere “no more than”. Having reviewed all documents, the commission found no
deviations of parameters from normal, there were none right up to pushing the EPS button. But
coolant flow at that time was already equal to normal. And the subcooling of the coolant was
what it was, personnel do not regulate it. So as for the assertion of the commission, there is no
basis. And the difference in the effects of reactivity (for example, had six pumps been running) is
like this: a man drowned at a depth of 100 meters, if only it had been 90…
This example shows that even people who largely disown the false accusations of
personnel on this forbidden barrier being overstepped, by establishing the discrepancies
between the reactor and the NSR and GSP in the report, still cannot deny the stereotypical
personnel accusing wording. And this is encountered in the report more than once.
Security measures. The hobby of all critics. And what is the second part of the Program
all about? According to it, equipment for not only the adequate cooling of the unit, but also for
operation of the reactor at power, is connected to backup power. No reactivity effects exceeding
the magnitude associated with normal operation were expected with the Program, and would
not be connected to its performance. Naturally, operators involved with it used all operational
documentation.
Power level. Per the Program, power level was to be 700-1000 MW. Prior to its
performance, our power was 200 MW. Why was this? I will discuss that further. But what a bone
we have thrown into the teeth of our accusers. And still they continue to chew. Even the Soviet
informants to the IAEA were brought to sin. They, being poor and tempted with the chance to
pour mud on the personnel, under the leadership of V.A. Legasov, in front of the entire world,
lied that Regulations prohibited operation less than 700 MW. Why did they do it? Simply
because after the accident it became clear that low power for the RBMK-1000 reactor was the
most dangerous. So, what would we do without academics and doctors? We have to get out
ahead of them. Who would suspect such a reliably viewed person of a lie?
There are programs for which power level has significance. For instance, testing of the
main safety valves at low power is not allowed, since with the opening of the valves, primary
system pressure starts to decrease rapidly and damages the MCPs. For the program of TG
rundown, power level doesn’t have any significance, and with the start of the test we were going
to shut down the reactor (see section 2.12 of the Program). In accordance with station
Instructions, power should be indicated in the composition of the programs. In the composition
of the program it was not clear what we would be doing immediately before the test, and
established 700-1000 MW as the maximum, not the minimum power. When power fell with the
transfer of the regulator, there was no need to raise it. And for a normal reactor, performance in
accordance with the NSR and GSP didn’t matter. We violated nothing, despite all the allegations
of the commission and informants.
Isolation of the emergency core cooling system. This topic exhausted itself long ago. As
far back as 1986 the G.A. Shasharin commission established the lack of any connection
between this fact and the origin or development of the accident. Presently only academic A.P.
Aleksandrov continues to cultivate this topic. We wish him luck. Informants in the IAEA argued
that with the isolation of ECCS, the possibility of reducing the scale of the accident was lost.
Without explanation here, I will cite an excerpt from the commission’s report by N.A.
Shteynberg:
“Thus, the possibility of reducing the scale of the accident was not lost because of the
disconnection of ECCS, but in principle was absent in specific conditions on 04/26/86.”
Running eight MCPs. We violated nothing with this, there are instructions in such modes.
There are no technical reasons preventing parallel operation of the pumps with continuous
recirculation and with decreasing speed, energized from the coasting down generator. As soon
as the pump head is reduced, the pump will be disconnected by its protection. Nothing differs
from a usual pump stop.
I will explain other comments of Program critics in the course of this text. I’m sure that in
light of the occurrence of the accident, writing the Program now, nothing significant would be
added, just as nothing was removed. Well, they would add some extracts from Regulations or
Instructions.

Part 4: AS IT WAS
April 26 1986. The ill-fated day. It broke the lives of many people the day of, and after.
What is there to say of my life? Deeply broken and divided into two completely different parts.
After being practically healthy and spending only three or four days on the sick list in the
previous years, I became an invalid. After being a trustworthy law-abiding person, I became a
criminal. And finally, after being a free citizen, I became a convicted citizen. That is what they
call convicts today. In what refined mind did such an unnatural combination of words arise? Y.
Feofanov, in the newspaper “Izvestia” after analysis of recently accepted human rights laws was
forced to state: “While alas for us the word citizen is still closer to the word arrest” How many
citizens are indeed incarcerated?
In the end, the memory apparently for a more clear cut separation of the two parts of life,
practically wiped the events of April 25. Troubling recollections remain, however the events
related to the accident, that is the memory that is fixed in place, clearly and without omission.
All confirmation is shown either by eyewitnesses, or by readings of the instruments.
So I recall nothing about what happened at the station the evening of April 25. I always
walked to and from work, four kilometers each way. It totaled 200 kilometers per month. Add
100 kilometers of regular jogging, and it’s completely sufficient to maintain a normal body. But
most importantly perhaps in walking, is the preservation of the nervous system. You walk,
disconnected from any unpleasant thoughts. The idea to add speed came to mind. Oh how
nerves proved useful later. Walking and running were simply necessary in those living
conditions. We somehow don’t have normal working measures. And even more so in
construction enterprises. I got to participate in the assembly, startup, and operation of all four
units at Chernobyl NPP in positions of Deputy Chief of the Workshop, Chief of the Reactor
Workshop, and Deputy Chief Engineer. At minimum a ten hour work day including working
Saturdays, hectic times and Sundays. But this was not exhausting. Half a year after the startup
of Unit 4, all were adjusted and regular work improved, although I still didn’t leave work before
six in the evening, and this was normal. There was an opportunity to be involved in the
updating or drafting of technical information, which an engineer cannot do without reading.
Unrealistic plans and unreasonable demands were physically draining and exhausting
the soul of the labor organization.
Not once in the press has it been reported regarding Chernobyl NPP, that because of
early commissioning, the construction and assembly were poor quality. I don’t know. I arrived at
the station in September of 1973. In the canteen building was a slogan about the startup of Unit
1 in 1975. It ran long and the five was re-written as a six. In actuality the startup of the first
energy-unit of ChNPP was September 26 1977. The second unit in December 1978, but it must
be assumed its deadline was shifted due to delays in the startup of the first. This also affected
the two following units. The early commissioning was not talked about. It’s interesting that until
December 31, to talk aloud of the impossibility of the startup within that year was not allowed.
Then the emissary arrives and the composition of new unrealistic plans and schedules begins.
The emissary compiled, signed, and left. And here is where the anxiety first begins due to rigid
control of schedule implementation, which is impracticable from the moment of composition.
Strict operational meetings, night call-ins to work. Inevitable lag arises, control subsides, normal
work starts. Until the next arrival of the director.
I have never understood the point of these recurring interjections. To me it seems they
bring only harm. If a fixed unrealistic deadline is implemented, an honest worker for some time
attempts to accomplish it. Then all recognize the impossibility, and this allows an unscrupulous
worker to intentionally not complete their own feasible task. This has been observed repeatedly.
The benefit of these dressing downs is the same as that of the practically constant slogan: “We
give all strength to the startup of Unit No. .” A normal person smirks - I give all strength,
then what?
 I think V.T Kizima and installers N.K Antoshnuk, A.I. Zayats, V.P. Tokapenko didn’t take
all these visits seriously, although they didn’t show it. They themselves were able to say to
anyone how and when things will really be done. In general I think the installers are not subject
to AIDS. They already have immunity against any external garbage - whether its origin is
biological or psychological. Otherwise, such working conditions could not be sustained for such
a long time.
Here it is appropriate to say that the assembly of ChNPP per Soviet criteria was
implemented satisfactorily. Despite the large number of welded junctions in the primary system
piping, I recall only one cracked seam in any major piping, and that was found to be attributable
to the hardness of the construction accompanied by an unsatisfactory compensation for thermal
expansion. The assembly and installers have no relation to the accident on April 26.
I came to the station from the shipyard, where I participated in the commissioning of
submarines. There also, not everything went smoothly. Night shifts and continual shifts of 24
hours or more. I have a memory, a sort of anecdote. We’re sitting, playing Preferans in the
hotel at the delivery base. Later in the evening V. Buyanski, a mechanic, arrives and turns to
the military acceptance representative:
“We debugged the system, you have to accept it now”
“I can’t Victor, I’m sick.
“It’s urgently necessary, the prize is shining. I have a ride”
“Alright then.” - They went.
A minute later the military rep. returned and admitted that he did have an illness -
hemorrhoid irritation. Buyanski offered him a comfortable ride on the back of a motorcycle. This
of course was not going to happen. We rode on a bus.
At the station, in no way could I understand why for an operator, it was necessary to
constantly know how many valves are mounted on which piping and how many meters of piping
there were. I just need the whole piping with supports, suspension, and other accessories.
Then with this it’s possible to begin some sort of adjustment to work. It’s not that this knowledge
is useless, but detrimental because it distracts from necessary work which no one can do for
me. But to the corner, or around the corner, let the installer know that it needs to be prepared in
a way that works.
The cult of knowledge to the finest detail, the cult of “having the goods” is elevated to
undeserved heights which replaces real working competence of the workers. Except for reports
to higher authorities, more often than not such information was not necessary. The head takes
a sheet of paper and writes on a particular form what information he needs. Someone else
requires a different form. To account for all of these requests with our general computerization
and help requires a lot of time.
And schedules. It turns out they can be compiled for several different purposes, and all
of this without the basis of provisions for workforce, materials, and equipment. Only on the
basis of the time period called for by the chief who had arrived. Needless to say, they were not
adhered to. In addition to Unit 2, there were ten different commissioning schedules for the
remaining units. The head of Glavatomenergo, Nevsky, arrives and a schedule for
commissioning of the piping systems appears. The schedule is compiled in June, and in August
on the basis of the scheduled startup date, the primary system MFCC is already flushing.
Welding is crucial for the piping system with a diameter of 800mm, only a few welders are
certified. Each technological weld takes seven days. And what is interesting, Nevsky, an
installer in the not so distant past, couldn’t see that these terms were unrealistic. The Central
Committee worker, Marin, a former electrician, arrives, and it seems the schedule is already
compiled for something else - the setup of electric valves, and so on.
But like I already said, they were not taken seriously, perhaps even by the sponsors
themselves. Construction took its own course. Builders and installers adapted themselves to
be somewhat impromptu. For me at first this was unusual. At my previous work, this was not
the case. We read the report of Admiral Rickover, the father of American submarines, and they
were faced with many problems while building boats. Undoubtedly they also arose for us. But
excluding the first two or three boats, the schedule was adhered to. The term for complex
testing of the power plant is decided, that means there will be a shift of no more than a week.
And in the end, the deadline was adhered to. It is difficult to imagine such an unreal personal
perception of reality with the observed reality, like it was during construction of the station. Here
are two examples - here and there.
On one boat which was practically ready for testing, ion exchange resin from the shore
filter fell into the reactor core. I had to replace the fuel in the reactor. The head arrived, they
sorted it out and moved the deadline for the quarter. There were no conversations of: You
yourself messed up. Try to make it up yourself. You have five more months ahead of you…
The second: They say, B.E. Shcherbina, the first representative of the Government
commission, arriving after the explosion at Chernobyl station, was forced to compile a schedule
for the restoration of the unit by fall of 1986. Otherwise he wouldn’t have been named
Phantasmagoria.
It’s true that for people of my level, there was no clarity with the deadline for the startup
of the energy units of ChNPP. The duration of construction isn’t even that different from the rest
of the world. Not one unit met the originally announced deadline, but they received an award for
the timely startup of seemingly everything. What the secret is here, I don’t know. Maybe in the
order of bonus payments, maybe there’s some schedule unknown to non-leading people. We
have both options.
Most of the troubles during construction were caused by technical decisions on changes
in design conditions. They were accepted for various reasons. After the beginning construction
of RBMK reactors at the Leningrad NPP, a Government Decree was adopted on the
construction of the same power plants at Kursk and Chernobyl. Without waiting for the startup
and trial run of the RBMK reactors, they were launched in a series. An RBMK reactor cannot be
called equipment, but rather a structure. To transport the main metal structures on a road is not
possible, they are assembled and welded on the grounds of the station from factory prepared
parts. For major products, ten or more sets is already a series, and smaller products both for
the reactor and auxiliaries, fall into the category of non-standard equipment. These are the
supports and hangers for the piping connected to the reactor itself and technological transport
equipment intended for transport around the fuel building: fuel, radioactive material, fuel
assemblies loaded into and unloaded from the reactor etc. For the handling of spent fuel, it is
extremely radioactive, but that is not necessary to explain now. Fresh fuel is only weakly
radioactive and presents no particular danger, but still requires careful and accurate handling to
avoid even the slightest damages that may not present themselves the first time in operation,
but later will announce themselves loudly.
Leningrad NPP, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry for Intermediate Sized Machinery
(Minsredmash), was designed by its organizations at its factories outfitted with modern
equipment. Kursk and Chernobyl stations belonged to the Ministry of Energy and Electrification
(Minenergo). In the government resolution it was decreed that non-standard equipment for the
four units of the first lines of these stations would be manufactured by the same factories as for
Leningrad. But for Minsredmash the resolution was not a decree even in the time when the
government was still slightly obeyed. They say you have your own factories, so perform the
drawings we give you. I was at some of the Minenergo factories for auxiliary equipment -
outfitted at the level of rather poor workshops. To entrust them with the manufacture of
equipment for the reactor shop is the same as a carpenter being forced to do the job of a joiner.
So the manufacture of each unit suffered. Something could have been done, that something
was never there. Characteristically, here it was really stagnant. Minenergo for several years had
not modernized any of its factories to produce its not so complex equipment.
With the construction of the first unit arose the question regarding the manufacture of the
supports and hangers for piping connected to the reactor. The Minsredmash factory refused to
make them for us. I don’t know who decided on direct contracts with the Minenergo factories to
manufacture them. I won’t say that I sabotaged this plan, but I didn’t believe in the construction
of a reactor with household means, so I didn’t go out of my way to help the plan. I was happy to
hear from the Chief Engineer V.P. Akinfiev, that I would be moved away from this project, and
more so that I wouldn’t be involved. After some time Akinfiev said to me with reproach “It has
been decided that you are no longer involved.” We had prepared some elementary parts. I
replied “We’re biting off more than we can chew.” As expected, nothing came of this venture
until it was placed on firm ground. Director V.P. Bryukhanov, at that time did not know reactors,
and was not accustomed to the culture of their handling. For a long time he considered the
reactor to be more simple than the turbine. There were attempts, which Bryukhanov supported,
to call the Senior Reactor Control Engineer the Reactor Control Engineer (with a reduction in
salary), while leaving the title of the turbine operator as Senior Turbine Control Engineer. So I
ironically said of course, the turbine makes 3000 revolutions per minute, and the reactor only
one revolution per day with the earth. Reactor Operators and Turbine Operators - They are
neither senior engineers, nor subordinate engineers. You see, in order for us to have the ability
to pay for the really difficult work, they have to invent job titles. Only slowly did V.P. Bryukhanov,
a competent engineer, realize that the reactor is not just a blank piece of iron. I believe the
accident at Unit 1, with the break of the fuel channel and the release of the fuel assembly into
the graphite layer, was particularly impressive. Chief Engineer V.P. Akinfiev, until his arrival at
the station, had worked on similar reactors and at that time knew the RBMK reactor better than
anyone else at the station. Why he made such a decision is hard to say. Maybe because he
used to work at Minsredmash, where they had the ability. They said they wouldn’t do it - so they
agreed. Somehow the factory manufacturing equipment for Leningrad Station alluded to a lack
of X-ray film for control. Ikarus from the ministry sent a bus loaded with film to the factory. And
what about Minenergo? In 1981 the station was already running, producing billions of real
kilowatt-hours of electricity, and didn’t even have a decent minibus. Somehow we had to catch
yugoslav busses at the Kiev airport, they creaked, rattled and were blown north and south by
the wind. Shameful.
There were a lot of questions about piping because of the lack of materials. You think
ten times before writing or signing a technical decision on deviation from the project. Generally
speaking this leads to deterioration and bitterness of the soul. And it continued like this from
one unit to the next for ten years. Only after the fourth unit did I sigh with relief when only one
concern remained - operation. True, the continuing construction at the station of units 5 and 6
made itself known. Operations personnel went there, but this was natural and caused no
spiritual protest. And to the staff, one new unit with the other four didn’t cause any particular
problems. The influx of new people was a time for preparation as well. After a lot of time
observing, I believe that: after one year, an operating worker begins to meet his job
requirements in full measure, and after two, he can be confidently relied upon. Further, how
much it takes to hold a person in a given position depends on the individual. Many don’t strive
for change at all and faithfully carry out their duties. Among these, it’s necessary to make sure
you’re not missing those lacking interest or indifferent. This is bad.
A large portion strive for advancement. This desire is understandable and deserves
encouragement. Usually they are fine workers, continually expanding their horizons, accurate
and thorough.
The dangerous category is people with big ambitions, not supported by a strong
technical knowledge. In their minds they are squeezed and bypassed, they get offended by
everything, and start to act recklessly. Such people are not suitable for operational work, or any
other kind of work.
By 1986, Units 3 and 4 already had a backbone of operations personnel, although about
20% of those had been working in their given positions for a year, since people had already
started transferring to the fifth unit. It is quite possible to work with such personnel, but…
Don’t let it seem strange if I say that the work of the Deputy Chief Engineer for Operation
and the preceding, Chief of the Shop, is associated with considerable expenses and physical
strength.
Equipment at nuclear power plants is located throughout the premises. You can’t see it
all with a glance, you must walk. I remember after the launch of the first unit I had decided to
inspect all the equipment on a daily basis. This turned out to be impossible to do in half a day.
You can’t spend more time on inspection than on working with people and documents, and even
half a day is a lot. The starry-eyed intention had to be abandoned, I had to schedule the
inspections around everything else. I still got to walk a lot, go to workplaces, and talk with the
staff - a leak would appear somewhere, a pump was vibrating, something was taken out of
service for repairs etc.
I liked the work, it suited me fine. On unit startups and shutdowns, it was always 24
hours or more from start to finish. And even that brought me satisfaction when the work was
finished. Health allowed me to work continuously for thirty hours. I'm not an operator, they are
not allowed to do so.
Without false modesty I can say, I knew my job well. The reactor and its service
systems, I knew thoroughly. I crawled in all spaces more than once. Some I didn’t know as well
as others, but still sufficiently.
 The institute assisted me in mastering general engineering disciplines: mathematics,
physics, mechanics, thermodynamics, and electronics. With these fundamentals, it is possible
to learn most of the mechanisms and processes encountered at the station. I knew practically
all instructions and system diagrams well. Of course, not the diagrams of individual devices,
there is not enough time in a human life. The process for the composition of instructions and
diagrams was as follows: Contractors and sometimes our own shop workers composed draft
versions and brought them to me. After review and comments I gave the go ahead to print, and
if there were a lot of comments I asked for a second review. Then I would read the final version.
Just doing this you already have a strong knowledge of so much. Here, clearly the question
arises - What kind of knowledge are you talking about when the reactor didn’t respond with
basic nuclear safety? More on this conversation below. For now I quietly went to work confident
in the reliability of our equipment. Here it's necessary to visit two points.
G. Medvedev in “Chernobyl Notebook” writes that they, experienced operators (we agree
with his title), always felt the sharp edge separating them from an accident. I can not imagine
how every day you can go to work with fear. This is some kind of masochism in the technical
field. It is impossible for a normal person to be in fear for several hours daily. The normal psyche
of this test will not stand. No nerves need to have a rope.
And the second is about the reliability of the reactor. Here, the personnel, believing the
reactor to be reliable, operated it inappropriately, like they wanted, like a cabinet etc. Of course
we considered it to be reliable, considered EPS reliable. Who would work otherwise? But the
RBMK reactor is a complex device, difficult to manage, requiring maximum concentration and
attention, this much was clear to any young SIUR, not to mention other engineering and
technical workers. The operator learns about many other situations during training, that for an
RBMK reactor, can result in significant accidents. Clearly they aren’t comparable to April 26,
this wasn’t an accident, but a catastrophe. Not one operator had a thought about freely
handling the reactor. For the everyday people of the Earth, what happened on April 26 was an
accident. For an operator, an accident is simply tripping the reactor without any kind of damage
to it or even any systems. If there is any damage due to the fault of the operator (to clarify, the
kind of damage that is useless and uninteresting to people who hear about it), then this will ruin
the thoughts of a career for a long time for that operator. Newspapers print information: how
many reactor trips and forced power reductions occurred. This is completely useless to people.
The reactor trips on automatic protection when a parameter deviates or a component fails, this
is a normal occurrence to prevent damage. For the station of course, this is abnormal. It is a
loss due to underproduction of electricity, and if this causes consumer restrictions, then a fine.
Inhabitants of the Earth need information only about accidents, usually related in one way or
another to destruction, radioactive release beyond the station boundary or inside the building
itself, or to the contamination of areas not intended for radioactive material. And another
category of incidents that don’t lead to a shutdown, or power reduction that are usually not
referred to as accidents, but lead to contamination of station territory, not to mention beyond its
boundaries. These are what the public should be informed about. Everything else to the
population is uninteresting to know about. If there are frequent trips, leadership personnel are
moved around and with a transition into private hands, the station will go bankrupt. Order will
be imposed one way or another.
 Many people ask whether or not I had any premonition of trouble. No, none. And
frankly speaking, I don’t much believe in premonitions. Various seemingly definitive cases of
this quoted in the press are not convincing. You need to know more about these people. If a
person has always done things one way, if he is not subject to changes or doubts in his actions,
but then suddenly deviates from the ways that always kept him safe, then it’s worth considering.
But if there is a huge worm of doubt, and he changes his mind dozens of times on whether or
not to go somewhere, then is it worth talking about? I. Leva and A. Volodya flew from
Komsomolsk-on-Amur for a holiday. In Khabarovsk they had a layover to transfer to a plane for
Moscow, and went to a restaurant. Volodya got drunk, they messed around and missed their
flight which then crashed near Irkutsk. What was this, a premonition? No. For Volodya this
was a common occurrence. Now if Leva had gotten drunk, then that could be cause to
consider.
No, I did everything that night the same as always. I arrived at the office, called the unit
to find out the status. I had a smoke, changed clothes, and like always dropped by Unit 3 first to
find out how things were. And only after that went to Unit 4.
Unit 4 would need to be shut down on April 25 in coordination with transmission for
preventative maintenance. By mid-day, reactor power had been reduced to 50% and one of the
two TGs had been shutdown. The load dispatcher prohibited further reduction until evening
when maximum electricity consumption had passed and gave permission to continue at 23:00
on April 25. Nothing noteworthy happened at this time. There were normally scheduled pauses
on shutdowns for inspections and testing per standard procedures.
There is perhaps only one fact worth noting from this day. Following the reduction in
reactor power, production of the fission product poison Xenon began, and accordingly, the
reduction in ORM. There are other factors that affect reactivity, however, poisoning usually
dominates. Minimum reactivity margin calculated by the unit computer was 13.2 rods, which is
less than the 15 rods allowed by regulations. Along with this it was noted that due to a
calculation error, the computer didn’t take into account the reactivity compensation of 12 AR
rods located in intermediate positions in the active zone. They more than made up for the 1.8
rod deficiency. Then the reactor started to be poisoned and at 23:00 April 25, reactivity margin
was 26 rods with reactor power at 50%, one TG (#8) in operation, all parameters normal.
To give a more holistic take on the depiction of the events on the unit, I will describe the
events and conversation without explanation of the physical processes and motivations of the
personnel’s actions. I will describe without hiding or adding the sequence, repeatedly verified by
the record of the control system and the operating log of the group of employees of the
Scientific and Technical Center of the USSR State Nuclear Power Authority for the report of the
commission of this organization “On the causes and circumstances of the accident at Chernobyl
NPP Unit 4 on April 26,1986” from 01/01/1991. This data does not differ from that previously
given in the technical reports, it is just the most detailed. A full chronological list of events is laid
out in Attachment 2, here are just the main ones.
- 23:10 April 25 after authorization from the load dispatcher, the reductions in reactor
power and the operating turbine load were resumed.
- 24:00 April 25 during shift turnover, conditions were as follows: Reactor Power 750 MW
thermal, ORM 24 rods, all parameters within regulation.
 Before shift turnover I spoke with the offgoing unit shift manager, Y. Tregub, and
oncoming unit shift manager, A. Akimov. All that remained was to measure vibration of the
turbine at no load, and conduct the experiment “TG rundown program”. No questions arose.
Vibration measurements are conducted on every shutdown for maintenance, everything was
clear. And in preparation for the upcoming experiment A. Akimov had no questions. He saw it
was still April 25.
After that I left the Unit 4 control room to inspect the places of interest to me before the
shutdown. I always did this. Firstly, defects more readily appear when conditions are changed,
secondly with power reduced, you can more closely inspect the higher dose areas. Of course I
wasn’t afraid to work in the radiation zone, but I tried not to receive unnecessary dose. You’re
not allowed to receive your annual dose limit or you will be excluded from work in the zone until
the end of the year.
I returned to the control room at 00:35. The time was set to the chart recorder for reactor
power. From the door I saw operator L. Toptunov, unit shift manager A. Akimov, and trainees V.
Proskuryakov and A. Kudryavtsev looking over the reactor control panel. I don’t remember,
maybe someone else. I went up and looked at the instruments. Reactor power was 50 -70 MW
thermal. Akimov said that when switching from LAR to AR with side ion chambers reactor
power had dropped to 30 MW. Now they’re trying to raise power. This didn’t excite or alert me
at all. This was by no means out of the ordinary. I allowed the continued increase and stepped
away from the console.
G.P Metlenko and I discussed preparation for the TG Rundown Program and marked up
the work execution in his copy of the program. A. Akimov approached and suggested we not
raise power to 700 MW as written in the TG Rundown Program, but instead limit it to 200 MW. I
agreed with him. The Chief Deputy of the turbine shop R. Davletbaev said that primary system
pressure was decreasing and that we may need to stop the turbine. I told him that power was
currently increasing and pressure should stabilize. Davletbaev also conveyed the request of the
Kharkov Turbine Factory representative, A. F. Kabanov to measure turbine vibration during a
free coast down, i.e. turbine speed coasting down with the generator unloaded. But this was
delaying the job and I refused him saying: “We are shutting down the reactor during the
experiment. Try to raise speed up from the current measurement of about 2000 rpm, a couple
more should suffice.”
At 00:43 the reactor EPS signal to trip the reactor if both TGs tripped, was blocked. A
little earlier the turbine trip EPS setpoint on decreasing pressure in the drum separators (of the
primary system) had been reduced from 55 atmospheres to 50.
At 01:03 and 01:07 the seventh and eighth MCPs were started in accordance with the
Program.
A. Akimov reported that we were ready to continue with the experiment.
I gathered the participants for instructions on who would be looking for what, and actions
in the event of failures, except for the reactor operator. He cannot leave during such conditions.
All went to their designated positions. In addition to the watch operators at that time, in the
control room for the experiment were electrical workers Suryadney, Lisyuk, and Orlenko, and
Palamarchuk from startup commissioning, Chief Deputy of the Turbine Shop Davletbaev,
previous shift managers Y. Tregub and S. Razin, Chief of the Reactor Shop V. Perevozchenko,
and trainees Proskuryakov and Kudryavtsev.
Unit conditions: Reactor power 200 MW, feed pumps and four of the eight MCPs are
powered from TG #8. All other components are supplied from reserve power. All parameters
are normal. The Control System objectively registered no warning signals for the reactor and
systems.
To register some electrical parameters in spaces outside the control room, a loop
oscilloscope was installed, it was switched on by a command “Oscilloscope on” over the phone.
At the brief it was established that with this command, steam to the turbine would be
simultaneously shut off.
The DBA button is depressed - A contingency button to begin the rundown of the
generator excitation system. The EPS-5 button is pressed to trip the reactor.
Akimov gave the command to Toptunov.
At 01:23:04, the control system registered the closure of the stop valves, isolating steam
from the turbine. This began the TG coast down experiment. With the decreasing generator
speed following the isolation of the steam supply to the turbine, also comes the decrease in
frequency of the electrical current, speed, and flow rate of the circulation pumps powered by the
coasting generator. Flowrate of the other four pumps increases slightly, but total flow rate of the
coolant is reduced by 10-15% for 40 seconds. With this, positive reactivity is added to the
reactor, AR steadily holds reactor power, compensating for this reactivity. Until 01:23:40, no
changes in parameters of the unit are noted. The coast down is going smoothly. The control
room is quiet, no conversation.
I heard some conversation and turned to see reactor operator L. Toptunov talking with A.
Akimov. I was ten meters away from them and didn’t hear what Toptunov said. Sasha Akimov
made the order to trip the reactor and made a hand gesture like pushing a button. He again
turned to the security panel he had been observing.
There was nothing alarming about their behavior, calm conversation, a calm team. This
is confirmed by G.P. Metlenko and A. Kukhar, the electrical shop master who had just entered
the control room.
Why Akimov delayed the reactor trip command, you won’t find out now. In the first days
following the accident we still communicated, until we were separated to individual hospital
rooms, and I could have asked, but then and even more so now, I didn’t attribute any
importance to this - the only difference would be that the explosion would have happened 36
seconds earlier.
At 01:23:40 the EPS button was pushed to trip the reactor at the end of the job. This
button is used in emergency as well as normal situations. All 187 control rods went into the
active zone, and by all belief, should have stopped the chain reaction.
But at 01:23:43 alarms for excess power, and decreasing reactor period (high rate of
power increase) came in. With these alarms, the EPS rods should go into the core, but they
should have already gone in from pressing the EPS-5 button. Other emergency signals and
alarms that appeared were “increasing power”, and “increasing primary system pressure”.
 At 01:23:47 - an explosion that shook the whole building, and after another 1-2 seconds,
in my subjective opinion, an even more powerful explosion. The EPS rods stopped without
making it even half way. And that was it.
During such a business-like, everyday situation, the ChNPP Unit 4 RBMK-1000 reactor
was blown up by an emergency protection button (!?!?). Going forward I will try to show that an
explosion of this reactor required no special conditions. If I can’t achieve this, it is only because
of my inability to intelligibly express myself. There are no other reasons, now everything that
happened is clear.
After the account of the events at Unit 4 on April 26 1986 as perceived by eyewitnesses,
some explanation is necessary as to what happened with the reactor and its systems, why
personnel took the actions they did, whether or not and why any violations occurred. You see,
according to the officially announced version, it is only the staff who appear to be at fault. The
reactor, if not great, was probably still a good one. Only with an improbable combination of
violations of procedure and rules did it explode. An entire team of authors, twenty people with
all kinds of scientific degrees, claims that the operating personnel committed unpredictable
violations in the magazine “Atomic Energy”. Many of which our scientists (what scientists?) have
discussed with the staff, only here not a single word from the staff is given. And thus far, five
years after the catastrophe, not one major publishing organization, neither newspaper, nor
magazine, has printed anything I have written. I wrote only in response to the recurring
fabrications and slander. I pointed out where what I had written could be verified, understanding
that a prisoner’s word alone could not be trusted. Unlike the doctor, not to mention the
academician, in which they have full trust. Only in the Kiev newspaper “Komsomolsk Banner”,
thank you to them, was there anything that was openly on our side.
There were quite a few things left to do for the oncoming shift at Unit 4 the night of April
26. They needed to reduce electrical load on the generator, measure turbine vibration at idle
speed, and conduct the experiment “TG Rundown Program”. When I left the control room,
apparently due to some miscommunication between Shift Manager B. Rogozhkin and A.
Akimov, instead of only reducing load on the generator and leaving reactor power at 420 MW,
they began to reduce it. At that time the reactor was being controlled by the so-called LAR
power with in-core detectors. This regulator made life for the operator considerably easier at
relatively high powers, but at lower powers it was inadequate. Therefore they decided to
transfer to AR with four ex-core ion chamber detectors. The two regulators are equivalent, just
the other was used for low power. With the transition from LAR to AR, which turned out to be
defective, a power decrease to 30 MW occurred.
Here, two violations are attributed to the staff: the power rise after the failure: power was
raised to 200 MW.
In and of itself, a reduction in reactor power for one reason or another, is not an
infrequent occurrence, though perhaps not so much for the reactor operators it happens to.
What guidance should the operators rely on to determine whether or not they could raise power
after this? Instrument indications and Regulations.
According to Regulations, a manual or automatic reactor power reduction to any level
not lower than the minimum controlled one is considered a partial decrease in power. The
minimum controlled level is considered to be the power at which the low power regulator
becomes the controlling one, i.e. 8-100 MW. Without going into the technical details, I refer to
the entry in the reactor operator log, that he reduced the setpoint of the master power level,
balanced the regulator and set it to automatic. There is no reason not to trust this record,
because at the moment of entry, he could not have known how it would be necessary to lie.
And without this, there is no reason to suspect him of lying.
One more thing. In Regulations it is stated that on a decrease of ORM to less than 15
Manual Adjustment rods, the reactor should be tripped. What reactivity margin was at 30 MW,
couldn’t be measured, because the measuring device isn’t suitable. It was only possible to
make an approximate calculation based on information known at that time on poisoning and the
power coefficient of reactivity. According to this, reactivity margin at the time of the failure was
more than 15 rods. This means the staff did not allow violations. More on this later.
We are staying on the question of power level. First I must say that there is not one
operational, design, or directive document on the RBMK reactor, not even a hint of a restriction
to operate at some power level. Yes, this is not a typical reactor. In Regulations it
straightforwardly says that the duration of operation at minimal controlled power levels is not
limited. The same regulations give a recommendation on the separation of a unit from the
electrical system, to reduce reactor power to a level that will provide load for the machinery, and
needs of the station itself, and this is the same 200 MW for which we are blamed.
Therefore there was no violation on behalf of the staff when he began to reduce power.
Whoever gave the order and why. I agreed with Sasha Akimov’s suggestion to raise power to
200 MW after the failure for a very simple reason. Per Regulations, to raise power to 700 MW,
would need to be done over no less than a 30 minute period, and we already have a half hour
worth of work to do. Such a power level is neither required for the turbine vibration
measurement, nor for the experiment “TG Rundown Program” - for the latter, the reactor would
be completely tripped. When working on the submarines, it was necessary to constantly
consider the starting locations of the reactivity control mechanisms, and trying to do it following
an EPS actuation would take some time. It was necessary to account for xenon poisoning, and
other effects on reactivity. With the RBMK reactor, it is impossible to make this calculation with
such accuracy but to estimate is quite reasonable. In my opinion, up to the second reduction in
reactivity margin, there could not have been less than 15 rods. And now I am sure of it.
I certainly didn’t expect a dirty trick from the station’s Nuclear Safety Department. In
accordance with the requirements of the regulatory documents, the Department periodically
conducted measurements of reactor characteristics, including such parameters as the Void
Coefficient of Reactivity (αφ), and the Fast Power Coefficient of Reactivity (αω). Here is the
latest given data obtained by operating staff for work guidance:

αφ = +1.29β

αω= -1.7 x 10⁻⁴ β/MWth

After the accident, the steam void coefficient was measured at the other units of the
station and the values obtained were up to 5β. This is a large difference, and therefore so is the
difference in impact on reactivity margin with the start of the 7th and 8th MCPs, and the increase
in feed water flow in the direction of decreasing reactivity margin.
The Power Coefficient of Reactivity was measured by the Nuclear Safety Department at
a power level as close to nominal as possible, and this is what was given to us. After the
accident, it was found out that at low powers (from the start and still now, the Scientific Director
and Chief Designer haven’t specified their organizations), the reactor had a positive, rather than
negative power coefficient, and so far the magnitude is still unknown. And with a decrease in
power, what was received was not an increase in reactivity margin per rod, but a decrease of an
unknown magnitude. Therefore the prognosis for the change in margin came out wrong.
Whether or not the Scientific Director and Chief Designer of the RBMK reactor knew that
in a substantial range of power the reactor had a positive Power Coefficient of Reactivity, is not
for me to say. But it was definitely not accounted for in operation. The station’s Nuclear Safety
Department worked under their methodical guidance, and of course, had to measure
characteristics in the most unfavorable areas. Consequently, the Department did not receive
prompts from scientific organizations, and those which were received, to put it mildly, were of
poor quality. After all, by their method, the Void Coefficient of Reactivity was measured as 1.29
when in actuality it was 5.
To the designers of the reactor, there was clearly a large negative effect from the void
coefficient of reactivity on the dynamic properties of the reactor. Here is what RBMK Chief
Designer Academic N.A. Dollezhal writes to the inspector:
“At the start of construction of uranium-graphite reactor channels, based on the level of
knowledge at that time (mid 1960’s), the reactor core was designed using uranium with U-235
enriched at 1.8%. After some time of operation, it became apparent that this value should be
raised to 2%, which in particular made it possible to some extent to reduce the negative effect of
the steam void coefficient of reactivity. Further study of all parameters characterizing operation
of the reactor led to the conclusion that it would be advisable to increase enrichment of the
uranium to 2.4%. Such assemblies with active elements are manufactured and satisfactorily
pass representative tests on operating channel type NPP reactors.
With the creation of a reactor core at this level of uranium enrichment, the effect of the
steam void coefficient of reactivity is localized. Until this influence, i.e. uranium enrichment of
2%, is regulated by the placement of special absorbers (AA) into the channels, which is strictly
stipulated in operating instructions, deviation from this is unacceptable, as it makes the reactor
uncontrollable” (my emphasis - A.D.)
I suppose the word “uncontrollable” doesn’t require explanation. The Unit 4 RBMK-1000
reactor had a uranium enrichment of 2%, and did not have AA in the core. By determination of
the Chief Designer, this is uncontrollable. No indications of this appeared in the operating
instructions and the Chief Designer didn’t bother to report it in the design materials. In his report
to NIKIET (The Scientific Research and Design Institute for Power Technology), entitled
“Nuclear Safety of the Second Generation RBMK Reactors, Neutron Physics Calculations” the
steam void coefficient of reactivity doesn’t exceed 1β, and the power coefficient is negative.
Alright, these are calculations. Life makes corrections. The RBMK reactor cores were formed
using NIKIET calculations. They weren’t specified in the design materials. They knew that in
this form, it was uncontrollable, and still made them.
 It is namely the unacceptably positive magnitude of the steam void coefficient (effect) of
reactivity that made the power coefficient of reactivity positive. What is bad about this?
In a critical reactor, power stays at a constant level. If by some manner (a change in
coolant flowrate, feedwater flowrate, or primary system pressure) positive reactivity is added,
then power begins to increase. In a properly designed reactor, the rise in reactor power will
cause negative reactivity to be added (negative power coefficient), which compensates for the
previously introduced reactivity, and power stabilizes at a new higher level. In this lies the
principle of self regulation. The RBMK, at least at low power levels, had a positive power
coefficient. Now the addition of positive reactivity introduces additional positive reactivity.
Reactor power begins to increase at an increasing rate, which causes more positive reactivity,
and conditions are created for a runaway reactor. To say such a reactor won’t work at all would
be incorrect. An automatic regulator or the operator himself can keep the reactor from running
away. But that is all for the time being. When excess reactivity reaches the level of β (the
delayed neutron fraction), the reactor is already accelerating on prompt neutrons at a very high
rate, and nothing can save it from destruction. Exotic research reactors are not taken into
account.
Regulatory document GSP-82 requirement on the design of reactors:
ARTICLE 2.2.2 GSP “When designing the reactor it is desirable to ensure that the total
power coefficient of reactivity is not positive under any operating conditions. If the total power
coefficient of reactivity becomes positive under any operating conditions, the nuclear safety of
the reactor during steady state, transient and emergency operating conditions must be
guaranteed in the design and explicitly proved.”
Well, with an EPS speed of 18-20 sec. (slow-moving champion) even with a normal
control rod design, there is no reasonable assurance of safety with a positive power coefficient.
Another regulatory document, NSR-04-74, has a similar requirement.
We can say we have a certificate from the Chief Designer on the knowledge of how to
make a safe reactor. We have the requirement of regulatory documents. The opposite was
done.
At 00:43, shortly after the drop in power, Unit Shift Manager, A. Akimov blocked the
reactor protection on both TGs shutdown. It would be easy to say that according to
Regulations, this protection is no longer required at powers less than 100 MW electric, we had
40 MW, and therefore there was no violation. But it was. This is a violation already in the
international arena, and therefore it is necessary to clarify. This protection during unit
shutdowns, was most often taken out of service in advance since reactor operation was
required for some more time to perform some checks. If we take the Regulations, then it also
says that reactor power is reduced by the AR and then the EPS-5 button is used to activate
EPS to trip the reactor. This is common, and more importantly, normal. The purpose of this
protection is to prevent a sharp rise in primary system pressure since when the turbines are shut
down, they stop consuming steam. With a low turbine power, it is consuming very little steam,
so when it is stopped, there is nothing to protect the reactor from.
How much I had to write on this protection, I don’t even know. And let’s assume it had
been removed without violating the requirements of the operating documents. Here is the
question: With the explosion protection removed, would there not have been an explosion just
the same? But this did not matter.
After my arrest, when I was charged, I showed the investigator the paragraph of the
document that stated it was not a violation to block the protection. It seems like this question
would have been settled. It would not be there. I went to the indictment, the verdict and the
sentencing. The judge asked the question to a witness, the former M. Elshin. Who in his
opinion blocked the protection? To which he replied that according to operational discipline, I
believe that Akimov himself could not have done it. Further logic follows, Dyatlov gave the
order. The judge was very animated and even reminded the court secretary “Be sure to write it”.
However this is strange, seemingly everything should be recorded. It’s an interesting
phenomenon how a person starts to squirm in front of the investigator, the prosecutor and the
court. Especially the investigator, all kinds of people in the courtroom, and there - one on one.
Don’t believe the stories of those who are under investigation for the first time, how they
dishonorably answered the investigator. Even those who are not threatened, don’t always keep
their dignity. Wake up the very same M. Elshin in his house in the middle of the night and ask
the very same question. The answer will be different: The protection was blocked in
accordance with Regulations, and the Unit Shift Manager has the right not to ask anyone’s
permission. Don’t let it seem strange, but Elshin’s answer was similar to others, I was satisfied,
even though it sort of accused me - it meant the staff was trained correctly.
At that time A. Akimov did not ask me, and if he had, I would have allowed it. It needed
to be done. After the drop in reactor power at 00:28, primary system pressure started to
decrease. To prevent pressure from being dragged down too much, it might have been
necessary to close off steam to the turbine, but that would have actuated the reactor EPS.
The change in the protection set point on the shutdown of the turbines, was for the same
reason as the change in the set point on decreasing pressure in the drum separators (in the
primary system) from 55 atmospheres to 50. The staff chooses this set point at their own
discretion, special keys are kept on the operating panel. No one disabled protection. For
forensic experts and others this was transformed into blocking the reactor EPS on primary
system pressure. There is such protection, it causes a reactor shutdown on rising primary
system pressure. But this was in service the whole time.
As we see, the actions of the staff on the “criminal” block of EPS are actually in
accordance with working operational documents, are called for out of technical necessity, and
are not related to the accident in any way.
One more reactor EPS signal personnel are accused of blocking, is on decreasing
coolant level in the drum separators to less than negative 600 mm. This protection acts as
follows: at high reactor power levels, greater than 60% of nominal, on lowering level it
automatically reduces reactor power to 60%. At low power, it trips the reactor. This change in
function is activated by operations personnel with a key. After the power reduction we did not
do this. Why doesn’t the change in function happen automatically? The designer explains it
this way: On a decrease in power, for example on EPS-2 to 50%, level in the drum separators
will usually decrease to less than 600 mm and with an automatic swapover, the reactor would
be completely tripped. Therefore it is necessary to wait for parameters to stabilize and only then
make the swapover. At low powers, the feedwater regulators don’t work very well, and on April
26 after the decrease in reactor power, level in the separators decreased to -600mm. Whether
or not the reactor would have tripped with actuation of the protection is unknown because it’s
hard to say when the protection became inoperable. Even if it was known, and the EPS signal
on level had been swapped, nothing says the reactor would have been safely tripped on the
level deviation at 01:00. A reactor cannot be operated on “if”. After all, it wasn’t because of the
level deviation that the accident occurred, but for a completely different reason. And protection
on the coolant level drop in the drum separators to -1100mm remained in service.
Thus, emergency protection of the reactor was fully operational for this mode, except for
protection on level in the separators. It was -1100mm instead of -600mm.
On running eight MCPs. There were no restrictions on coolant maximum flowrate, only
on flow through individual fuel channels due to concerns of vibration of the fuel assembly. But
we were far away from that limit, there was not one signal that the maximum flow flowrate was
exceeded through a channel. The whole ideology in Regulations and other documents is based
on ensuring a minimum coolant flowrate to avoid a boiling crisis. Yes, usually six pumps are
running (three per side), and this is understandable. Why lose the reserve when three is
enough. No technical reasons that prevent running four pumps per side are found. And in the
reactor operating instructions, in agreement with scientific organizations, there are such
situations: when swapping from one pump to another, the fourth pump is started first, then the
scheduled one is stopped, also to check a repaired pump. There was no initiative, everything
was based on documents. The pumps were run in accordance with the “TG Rundown Program”
so that when the generator is coasting down, after the four pumps stop, another four remain in
operation, powered from the backup network.
It’s surprising in these five years, how many documents this high coolant flowrate
assertion has made its way into. The assertion being that with a high coolant flowrate, its
temperature at the inlet to the core approaches saturation, the temperature at which water boils.
And on this basis, it is concluded that there was thermal-hydraulic instability in the core.
Incorrect. This assertion is valid for the suction of the MCP, but not for the core inlet. If there
was instability, then this property is inherent in the core, and not caused by personnel.
After the drop in reactor power, the decrease in hydraulic resistance caused the flowrate
in two or three MCPs to increase and exceed the allowable flow for this amount of total feed
flow. Could these pumps disrupt i.e. stop the flow of coolant. Mid panel operator B. Stolyarchuk
was busy adjusting levels in the drum separators and couldn’t manage establishing the required
MCP flowrate. Even with a failure of three of the eight pumps, enough remained to remove heat
at such a power level. And the monitoring system objectively registered the proper operation of
all pumps without signs of failure or cavitation all the way to the explosion of the reactor.
Numerous judges of the operating staff assert that personnel breached Regulations and
operating instructions for the sake of completing the production task. Here I have told how
everything was in the control room on April 26 1986. As we see, there were practically no
violations. Emergency protections, contrary to many reports, were in accordance with
regulations for such a mode, parameters as well. And there was no reason not to complete the
task. Of course we sought to complete the job. This was a production task, not a decision from
some pioneer committee. On the other hand, no one was going to perform it at any cost either.
There is generally no need for personnel to receive an award upon task completion, and no
penalty if not completed. I also didn’t do things frivolously. Also on the shutdown for repairs of
this fourth unit, while performing the first item of the test program at close to nominal power, the
reactor EPS improperly actuated on high primary system pressure. We immediately responded
and everything was fixed. But in this situation, before triggering protection, reactivity margin
must be no less than 50 rods, then power can be increased again. There was no such margin
and I, without thinking, gave the order to dampen the reactor without quite finishing the stopping
program. Here everything was done except for one. Naturally our actions should not be
assessed from the bell tower of current knowledge about the reactor, but on the basis of the
documentation in effect at the time, with the level of knowledge about the reactor from all
sources available to the staff taken into account.
As noted above, before the start of the “TG Rundown Program” experiment, reactor
parameters were normal, there were no warnings or emergency signals on the unit.
And yet it was a bomb in full readiness at that time. If we had for some reason refused
to perform the last experiment as recommended by Regulations, and tripped the reactor by
pressing the EPS-5 button, we would have had an explosion just the same. Similarly, it would
have happened if EPS had been activated by some signal. A retrospective view shows that
RBMK reactors were in this state more than once earlier and were only separated from
explosion by a sharp edge. It turns out that the RBMK, like all reactors, is a nuclear hazard with
a large reactivity margin, but unlike all the others, it is even more hazardous with a small
reactivity margin. This is not mentioned in books on reactors. And the creators of the RBMK,
having given birth to a traitor, either to save face or out of pride kept silent about this property.
However, if they had reported it, they would have hardly been willing to operate it.
Chief Designer N.A. Dollezhal in the document mentioned above writes:
“The continual desire of the creators of a nuclear reactor to make it at its highest
efficiency is related particularly to the need to remove as many harmful and parasitic neutron
absorbing elements from the core as possible. Among others, one such element is water
remaining in the lower part of the channel occupied by the power control rod by design of the
reactor. In order to avoid this effect, a portion of the lower part of the control rod at a certain
strictly calculated size (my emphasis A.D.) is made of a non-absorbing material, thus displacing
the corresponding amount of water in the channel which was effectively an absorber.”
So, what did the designers do? A 4.5m displacer made of graphite was attached to the
bottom of the strong neutron absorbing boron carbide rods. With the absorber raised, the
displacer is symmetrically located along the height of the core, 1.25m of water is left in the top
and bottom of the channel. It would seem that the displacer should run the entire height of the
core (7m), for greater gain. But with a symmetric displacer it is necessary to either lengthen the
channel - which there is not enough space to do, or complicate the construction of the rods.
And since during reactor operation, the vast majority of the time, the neutron field above and
below is relatively small, the neutron gain is small. They arrived at 4.5m for the displacer.
Here it turns out that the assertion by the academic “strictly calculated size” is purely a
bluff, and doesn’t correspond to reality. Whether or not they considered it, I don’t know, but
there’s no need to talk about strictness.
When the rods move from the upward position the absorber introduces negative
reactivity into the upper part of the core, in the lower part of the channels, the graphite displacer
replaces water and adds positive reactivity. It turns out that the total reactivity addition with a
neutron field shifted downward is positive for the first three seconds of rod movement. This is
an unacceptable phenomenon. This was observed at Ignalina station, and Chernobyl during the
physical startup of the Unit 4 reactor, but wasn’t properly assessed by scientists. The tricks of
the 4.5m displacer don’t end there.
The RBMK reactor is geometrically and more importantly, physically large. Separate
regions can behave almost as independent reactors. With an EPS actuation, a large number of
rods are simultaneously inserted into the core. In lower portions of the core the rods create a
localized critical mass.
NSR Article 3.3.28: “The number, location, efficiency and insertion rate of the actuating
mechanisms of the EPS must be determined and analyzed in the reactor design documentation,
where it must be shown that, under any emergency operating conditions and even without the
operation of one of the most efficient actuating mechanisms, the actuating mechanisms of the
EPS are able to guarantee that:
- In an emergency, the rate of reactor power reduction is high enough to prevent the
possibility that damage to the fuel elements will exceed the permissible limits;
- The reactor can be brought to a subcritical state and maintained in this state, taking into
account possible reactivity increases, for long enough to enable other slower actuating
mechanisms of the RCPS to be introduced;
- No local critical masses are formed.’'

The reactor RCPS rods not only didn’t prevent, but they themselves created a critical
mass in the lower portion of the core.
NIKIET Deputy Director I.Ya. Yemelyanov, under whose leadership the RCPS design
was so coldly and academically created, gives testimony at a lecture at the Baumanov School:
“Reactivity control mechanisms must be designed in such a way that, with their movement in
one direction, the sign of the introduced reactivity does not change.” As if rods with opposite
properties were not created under his leadership.
When an RCPS rod is in the intermediate position, water in the lower part of the channel
is already displaced, and with inward rod movement, it immediately begins to introduce negative
reactivity. With a large reactivity margin, some number of the rods are in an intermediate
position, and EP is able to fulfill its purpose.
With a small margin, a large portion of the rods are removed from the core, and when EP
is activated by a signal or button, it can introduce positive reactivity according to post-accident
calculations, up to 1β. And only after five or six sec., which during emergency conditions is an
eternity, does protection begin to introduce negative reactivity.
NSR Article 3.3.5: “At least one of the planned systems for controlling reactivity must be
able to bring the reactor to a subcritical state and maintain it in this state under any normal or
accident conditions, even if one of the most efficient reactivity control mechanisms does not
work.’'
On April 26, 1986 after pressing the button, EPS unfortunately (I didn’t make a slip of the
tongue) actuated in full capacity and blew up the reactor. With a failure of part of emergency
protection, this could not have been. Paradox? Yes. But such is the protection.
 Operating Reactivity Margin

Typically ORM is necessary for the ability to maneuver power. It is not possible to
construct a reactor with a reactivity coefficient of zero, therefore when changing operating
modes, some sort of reactivity margin is necessary. For economic reasons and for safety
conditions it should be minimal. At first in the design documents for the RBMK reactor, no
minimum margin limitations were imposed. In 1975 at Leningrad NPP Unit 1 during a shutdown
from power following an EPS actuation, an accident occurred with the rupture of a fuel channel
due to overheating in a small part of the core. Reducing power in this part by inserting rods
here and withdrawing them from another location was not possible. Due to poisoning of the
reactor from xenon, there was no reactivity margin.
It was the first call, even the bell for a loud battle. The station was close to catastrophe.
One channel was depressurized and in those conditions it could have been several, and now it
is clear it was an accident similar to Chernobyl. After the accident, a commission of
collaborators from IAE and NIKIET examined the reactor and issued recommendations in 1976
for improvement of RBMK characteristics which laid out the basis for modernization measures…
in 1986, after the Chernobyl disaster. Well, ten years is some timeframe!
Hence the entry in Regulations prohibiting operation with less than 15 manual control
rods reactivity margin. Everyone at Chernobyl station, as well as others involved with the RBMK
reactors, understood its need for regulation of energy output across the core, in order to have
the ability to reduce neutron flux in the “hot” spots, and increase in the “cold”. The creators of
the reactor did not inform us of the fact that due to the fundamentally flawed design of the RCPS
rods, with a low reactivity margin, EPS becomes its inverse, an acceleration device. Did the
creators themselves know about this? With the aggregate of documents that have now been
uncovered, with an appropriate approach to the understanding of facts, they should have
known. Inside the IAE and NIKIET were groups that dealt with the RBMK subject matter.
Apparently the leadership posts of these groups long ago became gravy train positions, and
they considered any propositions (Leningrad NPP accident commissions of IAE collaborators
V.P. Volkov and V. L. Ivanov) to be an affront on their rest. The prevailing philosophy was: Well,
the reactors are indeed working, what is there to look for? It’s hard to come up with anything
different. It seems to me that the leadership did not have a clear understanding of the danger,
otherwise it is impossible to rationalize the absolute inaction and disdainful attitude toward
proposals of thinking workers.
It is evident from the clause in the Regulations rewritten from the standard regulations
drawn up by the creators, that they didn’t make a direct correlation between reactivity margin
and EPS operability.
P. 2.12.6 “If the reactor cannot be brought to criticality within 15 minutes, despite the fact
that all RCPS rods are removed from the core (except for the shortened absorber rods)
shutdown the reactor with the insertion of all rods to the bottom limit switches.”
 After the accident on April 26, staff of the IAEA and NIKIET immediately understood the
real causes of the catastrophe. I am absolutely convinced of this. In the explanatory note
immediately following the accident, having expressed four or five versions, I rejected them all
except for one which was the improper action of EPS due to the final effect of rods. In other
words, I came to the correct conclusion. If I could come to the correct conclusion, although that
is not all, then for them, having the operational data, even only that which became known to me,
coming to the correct conclusion was not difficult. Yet another lie continues to this day. The
reasons are clear, especially with the differences in these NIKIET employees. From their pen,
except for the note by N.A. Dollezhal (with reservations), I have not seen a single truthful
document on the accident. I don’t know whether the ability to lie is the minimum price of entry
for candidates, or if they master it after acceptance, but they have professionally mastered it.
The first one-sided version of the failure of the MCP didn’t pass because of a completely
obvious juggling of facts. Then others went into action. They made up personnel violations,
false calculations, and most importantly conclusions turned on their heads. The same NIKIET
employees again distinguished themselves with the most aggressive and overbearing ones.
They blamed us for EPS losing its functional ability because of the low reactivity margin. Not
because of the pathological design of the rods, but due to the low margin. Well we agree with
them briefly and turn to NSR 04-74 which came into effect in 1974. We read. “The rules are
mandatory for all enterprises, institutions and organizations in the design, construction and
operation of nuclear power plants…”.
And if the ORM parameter disables EPS (what could be worse for the reactor?!), then
why did design not comply with:
ARTICLE 3.1.8 NSR "The reactor alarm system must produce the following signals:
Emergency signals (optical and audible signals, including an emergency siren), when the
parameters reach the point at which the emergency protection system (EPS) is triggered and
when accident deviations in the operating conditions occur; warning signals (optical and
auditory signals), when the parameters approach the EPS trip point, when the radiation level
exceeds the established limits, and when normal operation of equipment is impaired.”
ARTICLE 3.3.21 NSR "The reactor control and protection system must include a fast
response emergency protection system (class I EPS) which ensures automatic shutdown of the
reactor in the event of an accident situation. The signals and trip points for the emergency
protection system must be analyzed in the design documentation.’'
There was nothing on this violation of the mandatory rules on reactivity margin. After the
accident we were told - This is the most important parameter of the reactor. Pardon me if I’m
skeptical. Every leak collection pit at the station has a high level alarm and often, automatic
pumping. But the most important parameter which explodes the reactor on a deviation has
nothing, not even a continuous control device. These are lyrics, but I set forth the requirement
of the Law a little higher. Operating staff were not provided means of automatic control in
accordance with the Law. We were limited to an indication in Regulations. One of the Soviet
specialists informing the IAEA international community in August 1986 told me at the sixth
hospital in Moscow, that foreign specialists made a statement about exorbitant operator burden
in connection with this. But our specialists were starting to talk about the difficulty of the
problem of separation of functions between man and machine. One needs a hefty amount of
cynicism to talk about division in these circumstances. Parameter deviations lead to a global
catastrophe, and the staff doesn’t even see or hear it.
What kind of measuring device was there? I will get to this soon. If the parameter
deviation leads to the shutdown of the unit without damage, I agree to respond with a
reprimand. But why should the staff pay with their lives, health and freedom for the sins of
others, instead of the sinners themselves?! I’m not bloodthirsty, I spent four years in the
slammer and didn’t particularly enjoy it. But I’m afraid that people who have been constructing a
device completely unsuitable for operation still to this day don’t recognize it, and after a slap on
the wrist, continue to do so. What else will they give to humanity?
Although we didn’t know that behind reactivity margin was its ability to turn EPS into an
acceleration device, and as I stated above, we could not have considered its importance with no
means of control, the following is simply for objection to the prosecutors.
We did not intend to violate ORM, nor did we actually violate it. Violation is when an
indication is consciously ignored, and on April 26, no one saw a margin of less than 15 rods.
Regulations must be adhered to. First of all, regulation of the reactor’s energy output is a
serious thing. Second, apparently we observed (incorrect, there was no reason to look) a
decrease in margin. Although this is not so indisputable for the moment of pressing the EPS
button. The plant computer lacks versatility; it calculated reactivity margin according to the
“PRIZMA” program for five minutes per instructions. It is possible to keep track of the parameter
if it changes by three or four rods in a few seconds, for example when feed water flowrate
changes. In stable conditions it is suitable, but not in transient conditions. For regulation of
energy output in combination with physical system control of reactor output with its 130 radial
and twelve seven meter high axial sensors, this method of measuring reserve was well suited.
But for its newly declared function as guarantor of the operability of EPS, it did not suit at all.
Yes, the staff was still unaware of it. The reactor operator would only have to track it. And for
operation of the reactor, he performs thousands of manipulations and for control has thousands
of parameters.
I admit that we looked, but everything for this project had been done, and even more.
As I already wrote, the Nuclear Safety Department supplied the operating personnel with
incorrect information which made it impossible to predict. And as it turns out, the parameter
cannot be measured to predict either. No one would think that the Scientific Director and Chief
Designer would clearly present danger to their own reactor. That would be a sad and
completely hopeless world.
But it is not so impossible. And the question is whether or not they knew, or whether
they clearly or vaguely presented it.
They had to know!
The constructor and designer have as much time as they need to deliberate and make
technical decisions, so as not to leave the operator, who has to do everything in a timely
manner, in extreme conditions. The operator shouldn’t be in situations that aren’t pre planned
for by the designer, and certainly shouldn’t be in situations that lead to destruction, not to
mention even global catastrophes. They should be prevented by construction or design
measures. With these huge amounts of energy stored in modern devices, machines and
pipelines, centuries old solutions won’t do. Approaches should be adequate for the technology
used.
The RBMK reactor has a nominal power of 3.2 million kW. During the accident,
according to various estimates, power reached from 20 to 100 times nominal. It would rise to
practically any value until it was destroyed. There is no protection from prompt neutrons, it can
only be prevented. There can be no question that such a situation could arise due to operator
error. This is not just my wishful thinking, this is directly stated by the regulatory documents on
reactor safety:
ARTICLE 2.7.1 GSP “Protective systems shall perform their provided safety functions in
the event of failures regardless of the initiating event in accordance with Section 1.2.4”
An erroneous action by personnel is also an initiating event.
There is no room for the designer to do things arbitrarily. I want to, I don’t want to. Shall.
This directly echoes the requirements of the NSR as laid out above. The reactor will be
equipped with alarms and automatic protection such that there could be no reactivity margin
decrease into the danger zone.
Another thing is that the minimum reactivity margin of 15 rods specified in Regulations,
did not guarantee safety at all. And it could not because it is established for entirely different
reasons. I don’t remember which organization showed it, but there is a calculation where one of
the numerous control rod alignments is taken with a margin of 15 rods and it is shown that there
is no positive reactivity once the negative reactivity is added with the actuation of protection.
But it is designed for complete simpletons. First, the margin can be realized with different rod
positions and the most unfavorable one must be chosen. Second, the absence of a positive
output does not demonstrate the operability of EPS. It is necessary to provide the needed
negative reactivity addition rate from the first moment following actuation.
Anyway, following the accident, for the remaining RBMK reactors, the minimum reactivity
margin was set at 30 rods, the design was modified, and 80 AA were installed, which
significantly reduced the steam void coefficient of reactivity.
In general, it is an unnatural occurrence for a reactor to be a nuclear danger with a small
excess reactivity.
After the closure of the stop valves at 01:23:04, the steam supply to the turbine was
stopped and the rpm started to decrease. The test was supposed to end at about 2,000 rpm. I
don’t know why, but the number 2,370 stayed in my head, whether that was when the explosion
happened, or when I turned back to the instruments following A. Akimov’s conversation with
reactor operator L. Toptunov. Everything was going calmly without deviation from expected
parameters. And in the first seconds after EPS was pressed, no one nearby showed
uneasiness. The central control systems, the DREG program in particular, until the moment the
button was pushed at 01:23:40, registered no changes in parameters that could have given the
operator reason to actuate EPS. The Gospromatomnadzor commission chaired by Brunsch
Valerie Ottovich collected and analyzed a large amount of material, and as written in the report,
was unable to establish a reliable reason for actuating EPS. There is nothing to find, there was
no reason. The reactor was shutdown at the end of the job.
How I saw it is already written. There is testimony given by G.P. Metlenko. He sat at the
desk of the Unit Shift Manager close to Akimov and Toptunov. His testimony is on magnetic
tape. But I have his letter in response to my request to send a copy of the Program and answer
some questions. On this matter he writes: “My impression of Akimov’s command is such: the
process was going calmly and he gave the command in a calm voice, half turned motioning with
his hand, and then I felt something that gave the impression of a reverberating hydraulic shock”.
There is also testimony from A. Kukhar, who popped into the control room just before
Akimov’s order to trip the reactor.
Yes, it seems now that no one has any doubt that EPS was actuated without any kind of
technical reason and protection itself initiated the acceleration of the reactor. Except for those
who, from the very beginning, were determined to prove the guilt of the staff.
For example the technical, completely transparent and natural phenomenon can be
beaten. The equilibrium within the deadband of the regulator as evidenced with DREG
registering the overcompensation upwards signal. With the coast down of the generator, energy
consumption is reduced, which leads to an increase in reactivity, and reactor power increases,
moving into the region of the positive imbalance, and the regulator begins downward movement.
The overcompensation upwards signal cleared at 01:23:30.
Forensic experts photographed a recording of power on tape with a 17 and 30 fold
increase and noticed that the increase in power was 20 seconds before the explosion. It went
into the indictment and further. This is a serious accusation. Just a seventeen times increase
and already a noticeable increase in power. We didn’t have microscopes or telescopes but an
increase in power visible to the naked eye isn’t special. The automatic regulator starts to
respond only when there is an imbalance, and moreover, it must be more than a certain value.
This is its principle of operation.
G. Medvedev paints the picture in his opus:
“The SIUR Leonid Toptunov first sounded the alarm. “The emergency safety needs to
be activated, Alexander Fedorovich, we have an excursion,” he told Akimov. Akimov quickly
glanced at the computer printout. The process was developing slowly. Yes, slowly… Akimov
hesitated”.
In general the computer doesn’t issue printouts on which one can see how the process
is developing. For the printout to hit the control room from the printer takes about two minutes if
done without delay. Any printout at 01:20:30 wouldn’t have shown up until after the accident.
And the “process” started after pressing the button. And it wasn’t Akimov who pressed the
button, but Toptunov (see above). G. Medvedev forgot to add that, before pressing the button,
Akimov listened to the faint rustle of neutrons splitting uranium nuclei, sniffed foot cloths and
only then decided. If you write a documentary story, everything must be noted, cut the whole
truth from the womb.
I didn’t hear what Toptunov said to Akimov, only G. Metlenko could hear, but he didn’t
say anything. He wasn’t interested in their discussion. B. Stolyarchuk was busy with his own
tasks, he didn’t hear either. Everyone else was too far away to hear the quiet calm
conversations. Judging by the behavior of Akimov and Tuptonov, and by the record of the
signals, it can be said with confidence, that when the AR rods reached the bottom of the core,
Toptunov asked what to do with the reactor, and Akimov, as was agreed at the briefing, ordered
him to trip it.
 Everything began from that moment. After a slight decrease in power at the very start of
rod motion into the core, which is completely understandable because the neutron field was
double-humped with a maximum at the top and a dip in the middle of the height. Such a field
always exists following a decrease in power, since during operation the maximum field was in
the middle, which means the poisoning was the greatest in the middle. Further, because of the
defect in the construction of the rods, the bottom became a localized supercritical reactor. Here
the neutron flux, and with it the energy output, increased, and in the top part, decreased. The
total reactivity introduced by the rods became positive, and power began to build up, mainly in
the bottom.
At 01:23:40 when the button was pressed, power could not significantly exceed 200 MW,
otherwise due to the large imbalance, the regulator would be kicked out from automatic. As
early as 01:23:40 the reactor period, and power excursion alarms were recorded.
These alarms should not occur on emergency protection downward rod motion with
correctly designed rods! As some now remember, there were earlier events, where the
triggering of EPS was brought on by different signals (level deviation in the drum separators,
and others). The reason for their occurrence couldn’t be explained by operation or the RCPS
developers. It’s not easy to say how many situations there were, and perhaps it is impossible to
identify all. The governing bodies are useless and don’t want to rummage through the operator
archives. Here is one more thing about it: The root cause for the EPS actuation is known, but
other alarms have gotten less attention. Although explanatory notes required personnel to write
down all alarms. At the time, these incidentally occurring alarms were considered spurious and
were written off as imperfections of the RCPS circuitry. As it is clear now, they were in fact
evidence of the improper operation of EPS.
There were actual power surges, but because of imperfections in the measuring and
recording instruments, they weren’t properly appreciated or understood. Even on April 26 with
power dozens of times the nominal, the power meter showed less than one due to
sluggishness. Those power surges were smaller and quicker, but were separated by a thin line
from catastrophe.
Reactor operator L. Toptunov shouted about an emergency increase in reactor power.
Akimov loudly shouted “Trip the reactor!” and jumped to the reactor control panel. This was the
second command to trip already heard by everyone. It was apparently after the first explosion
because I heard from Akimov in the hospital, that it was actually him who de-energized the
RCPS servo drive clutches, and DREG recorded this at 01:23:49. The second command could
change absolutely nothing, the button had already been pressed, and the EPS rods had
traveled as far into the core as they could.
Experts and investigators very much wanted to prove that the destruction of the reactor
began before pressing the EPS button. For what reasons? What kind of objectives are shown
by such conclusions? By the time the indictment was written, there were already graphs of unit
parameters and their existence makes it clearly visible that such conclusions have no basis.
But this version exists, and underneath it goes the pursuit of facts, and evidence.
I. Kirshenbaum, C. Gazin, and G. Lysyuk, all who were present in the control room,
indicated that they heard the command to trip the reactor immediately before the explosion, or
immediately after it. That’s right, they were far away and didn’t hear the first direction in the
calm quiet voice, only the second. A. Kukhar was forced to change his first testimony about
April 26, where he says that Akimov said to trip the reactor, and the emergency alarms and
explosion came a few seconds later. His second testimony is so: “I heard a voice, whose I don’t
remember, say that pressure in the MFCC is 79 atmospheres, although the nominal value is 70.
At that time I heard Akimov’s command - We are tripping the device. Literally immediately, a
strong crash sounded from the machine hall.” The first testimony of A. Kukhar contradicts their
version, it was thrown out. The second testimony, in principle, is also true, if we point out that it
is a few seconds off from the first one, and Akimov’s command is repeated. This is Kukhar,
confirmed in court. My question is “Why did he change his testimony?”
And here is the investigative quirk: These testimonies are objectively confirmed and
available in Toptunov’s explanatory note which says, in particular: “At the moment of impact (or
immediately after it) the RCPS rods stopped…”
Subjectively or objectively it doesn’t matter, but here the meaning is the exact opposite.
At the moment of impact, the rods stopped, by this time they had moved 2.5-3 meters, which
means they had been moving for seven seconds before impact. If you say anything, simply
anything to refute this, you are mistaken. This requires people who want to listen. Will you find
them in court? God help you!..
It seems the author of this version that the destruction of the reactor started before the
actuation of EPS is expert V. Dolgov from Obninsk. Also others did not object. Here is their
statement: “The development of the accident started before the pressing of the EPS-5 button,
as evidenced by the position of the RCPS rods after the accident and as determined by
specialists from NIKIET, the State Atomic Energy Agency of the USSR, and Chernobyl NPP.
This was the reason they noted that about 20 rods remained in the full out position, and 14-15
rods inserted no more than 1-2 meters into the core due to deformation of the channels.”
What kind of destruction could have possibly occurred in the core to deform the RCPS
channels such that there were no alarms in the reactor space or the RCPS circuit?
They didn’t even bother to see that most of the indicated channels were shortened
absorber rods, which per the algorithm, remain fixed in place when EPS is actuated.
Who can argue that the rod position indicators read correctly when the cables were torn,
lost voltage and everything was de-energized?
The printout of the RCPS rod positions was cleverly used by the accusers of the staff.
Remember, according to Medvedev, how Akimov quickly looked at the printout, and how the
process developed. This is ignorance. Others are more qualified to do it. The unit computer
periodically records parameters including rod position and the program calculation of ORM.
After 01:22:30, the margin calculation for this position was not completed by the computer
before the accident. It was performed at Smolensk NPP and turned out to be 6-8 rods. A
violation of regulations. At this time, margin was at its lowest, because coolant flow was at
maximum, and to maintain level in the drum separators, the operator raised feedwater flow,
which at this power led to the collapse of the steam void in the core. After a minute, margin was
around 12 rods, maybe more.
Considering peoples’ ignorance of the actual circumstances, prosecutors say the staff
knew of the violations and consciously ignored indications and continued to work. Let’s take a
look. We will suppose a printout of rod position was completed at 01:22:30. We would need to
cut it from the teletype, register it in the journal, the computer operator would bring it from the
computer 50 meters away, to the control room, and hand it to the operator. Of course no one
was running. A computer printout says nothing at all to the operator. By the start of the
experiment “TG Rundown Program” at 01:23:04, there could be no printout in the control room.
Let’s say it appeared in a minute, at 01:23:30. The reactor operator or the shift manager took a
look. It’s bad. According to regulations we either need to bring the parameter back to normal
(impossible), or actuate EPS. Protection was actuated at 01:23:40, the explosion occurred. But
this last paragraph was written only to show the clear dishonesty of technically literate people,
who solidly knew the unit and the circumstances. The staff didn’t take such a printout. They
can’t establish reactivity margin, the operator is not a computer. We took printouts with margin
calculated by a machine.
Emergency Protection, by its very name, is in fact intended for the shutdown of the
reactor without violation of its elements and systems in an emergency situation, in any
emergency and normal situations as required by regulatory documents, and stated in
Regulations for RBMK operation.
April 26 1986 we pressed the EPS button with normal parameters, in a stable mode, with
no emergency or warning alarms. We got an explosion.
ARTICLE 3.3.26 NSR “The reactor's emergency protection system must ensure that the
chain reaction is automatically, quickly and reliably terminated in the following cases:
- When the trip point of the emergency power protection system is reached;
- When the trip point of the emergency power (or reactivity) increase rate protection
system is reached;
- When the emergency protection buttons are pressed”

What happened? We know. What requirements did EPS meet?

At 01:23 it is unknown how long the reactor was in the state of an atomic bomb and not
one emergency or warning alarm! The staff saw no alarming positions on indications, and not
because they’re blind. What requirements does the control system meet?

Part 5: AFTER THE EXPLOSION

I listened, or more like watched Akimov’s conversation with Toptunov, and he turned to
the instruments. I knew the frequency at which the generator switches off, and converted it to
RPM using a digital display since it would be easier to follow. I didn’t have anything left to do,
the blast sounded. Debris fell from the false ceiling’s pressed tiles above. I looked up and at
that time, a second blast shook the whole building. The lights went out and shortly came back
on. A large number of alarm lights were flashing.
 The first thought was that something had happened to the deaerators. These are large
tanks partially filled with hot water and steam in a room above the control room. Although the
flooring was metal, such a blast could have caused cracks to show up and boiling water would
rush into the control room enclosure. I ordered everyone to go to the backup control panel.
Then once things calmed down we could see there were no water or steam leaks in the control
room. I cancelled the order.
I walked down the instrument panels to the reactor panel. Upon first look at the
instruments, before the reactor panel, I looked at nothing but primary system pressure and
coolant flow. Both read zero. By these instruments, I could already tell, this was a very unusual
accident. There was no coolant flow because the MCPs were off. It’s not a problem if the
system is still pressurized. From such a power, natural circulation removes heat without
question. But there is no pressure. The fuel rods are already damaged within the first minute.
But the operator mantra developed over many years: Maintain cooling to the core. It works.
Sasha Akimov ordered the ECCS pumps to be started from the automatic emergency diesel
generators, and Valery Perevozchenko to open the system valves. I understood then, that the
fuel elements could not be saved, however, not knowing the full extent of the damage, I believed
that: the fuel elements would start to melt from overheating, fuel would mix with the water, and
gradually melt the piping piece by piece as well, then find its way into other compartments. I
believed the reactor to be shutdown.
At the reactor console my eyes rolled back into my forehead. The RCPS rods,
somewhere in the intermediate position, did not go down with the servodrive actuator clutches
de-energized, the reactivity meter displayed positive reactivity. The operators were perplexed.
I’m sure I had the same look. I immediately sent A. Kudryavtsev and V. Proskuryakov together
with operators, to the central hall to lower the rods by hand. The lads ran. I immediately
realized the absurdity of my direction. If the rods won’t go into the core with de-energized
clutches, then they’re not going to go by rotating manually. And the reactivity meter indication,
not an indicator at all. I jumped into the corridor but the lads had already disappeared. Since
the accident, over and over again, practically every day to this day, I’ve analyzed my directions
and actions from April 26, 1986 and this was the only order I got wrong. I would like to see the
person who could keep a clear mind in this situation. It’s enough that this was my first and last
foolishness. Calmness came, not lethargy, just calmness, and clear thought. What could be
done.
The hall was filled with dust and smoke. I returned to the control room and ordered the
smoke removal fans to be turned on. Then I went through another exit to the machine hall.
There was a picture worthy of the great Dante’s pen! Part of the hall’s roof had
collapsed. How much? I don’t know three to four hundred square meters. The slabs damaged
and drained the oil and feedwater lines. Debris.
I looked down from the twelfth mark through the opening to the fifth mark where the feed
pumps were. Streams of hot water were shooting from the sides of various damaged pipes and
falling on electrical equipment. Steam was all around. Also the sounds of sharp pops and
clicks from short circuits were going off.
In the area of TG #7, an oil leak from damaged pipes caught fire, operators were running
to it with fire extinguishers and rolling out fire hoses.
 You could see through the opening in the roof, visible flashes of fire starting.
I returned to the control room and ordered Akimov to call out the fire brigade, as I said,
with all reinforcements. It turns out the station firefighters were already on the way since one of
them had been on the street at the time of the explosion.
We called for an ambulance.
Akimov informed Station Shift Manager B. Rogozhkin and according to instructions, he
notified Moscow and Kiev. Station workers are notified automatically by recording on magnetic
tape of the category of the accident. This incident was declared a General Emergency, the most
severe. Authorities were notified with a description and by morning they began to appear from
Kiev and Moscow. With the station notification, somewhere a tape recorder failed and the
phone operator additionally dialed up everyone on the list.
Except for Chief Engineer N.M. Fomin, the rest arrived at the station quickly after the
accident. I didn’t see any authorities in the Unit until just before they left. Valery Perevozchenko
returned to the control room after an unsuccessful attempt to get to the tank where there are
valves connecting the water supply to the primary system pumps. The entrance to the room
was covered in debris, impossible to get into.
Sasha Kudryavtsev and Vitya Proskuryakov returned. I addressed people senior to me
in age by their position, but most of the operators, I called by incomplete names. Name and
patronymic, using the last name was the exception. I called that only when strained
relationships arose. Such instances however, were rare and short lasting. Sasha and Victor
were also unsuccessful in getting into the central hall due to debris. Until at least five in the
morning on April 26, 1986, no one was in the hall.
If you want to do something, you need to know something. The instruments of the
control panel presented a picture of terror, but gave no information to act on.
I left the control room with the intention of taking a look at the situation in the reactor hall
where the top of the reactor is. I couldn’t get to it. I met gas system operators I. Simonenko
and V. Semikopov, and central hall operators O. Genrikh and A. Kurguz. Tolya Kurguz was
terribly burned. Skin on his face and hands was hanging down in shreds. I told them to quickly
get to medical where the ambulance should have arrived by then. Igor Simonenko said that the
reactor shop building was destroyed. I quickly went another few meters down the corridor to the
tenth mark, looked out the window and saw… more like did not see, it was gone, the walls of the
building. There wasn’t much else to see in the dark. Further down the corridor, down the stairs
and out the building. I slowly walk around reactor building 4, and then Unit 3. I look up. There
was something to see, but as they say, I would not have believed it had my own eyes not seen
such a sight. Despite the night and poor lighting, I could see enough. The roof and two walls of
the shop were gone. Through the openings of the missing walls, I could see in the spaces,
streams of water, electrical equipment short circuiting, and several fires. The gas tank room
was destroyed, tanks standing askew. V. Perevozchenko is right, there is no way to the valves.
On the roofs of Unit 3 and the ChemShop were several fires starting, still small. Apparently the
fires started from large chunks of fuel thrown out of the core by the explosion. Maybe also from
graphite, although at a power of 200 MW, graphite temperature would be no greater than 350 °C
, and flying through the air it would cool down. But dispersed fuel could penetrate into the
graphite and then heat it after flying out from the core. True, it’s doubtful. I didn’t see glowing
pieces of graphite on the ground. I didn’t see non-glowing pieces either, even though I walked
down the street along both units again later. Although I wasn’t looking down, my feet didn’t get
caught on large chunks of anything and I never stumbled.
Around the area of the Unit 3 backup control panel are fire trucks. The driver of one of
them asked who was in charge and someone pointed to a man walking around. It was
Lieutenant V. Pravik, I knew him by face. He told Pravik that he needed to drive up to the fire
pipeline accumulator going to the roof. There was a hydrant to connect to nearby. The fire
trucks began to turn around and I went up to the Unit 3 control room.
I asked Unit 3 Shift Manager Y. Bagdasarov if I was interfering with its operation. He
replied “Not yet, we have inspected all accessible spaces.” The faces of the operators were
very clearly asking - What?! But not a single question out loud. They gave me a prophylactic
iodine prep. I took it, and without telling them anything, I left.
And what could I say? I hadn’t even thought about the causes of the disaster yet. First I
was trying to figure out who had already been taken to the hospital. Earlier I didn’t think it was
necessary, but now that’s what I was busy with. With my walk outside around the units, a
picture started to form, I realized the reactor was wrecked. I imagined that a fuel channel had
broken off, resulting in a pressure rise in the reactor space which tore off the 2000 ton cover
plate, steam rushed into the hall and destroyed the building, after this the cover plate “landed” in
place. What threw it up and set it on the edge, I hadn’t thought about before, and it did not
change things.
From this point on, the Unit 4 reactor to me began to exist only as a source of danger to
the remaining units.
Upon arriving at the Unit 4 control room, I ordered A. Akimov to stop the pumps we
started after the explosion, since water from them could not reach the reactor because of the
damage to the reinforcement assembly, this adds no value half an hour after the explosion.
Everything that could have happened in the absence of cooling, already happened. We took no
further measures for this.
Petro Palamarchuk, a hefty man, brought in and placed Volodya Shashenok, from the
adjustment firm, in the engineer’s chair. He was observing from a space at the 24th mark for
abnormal indications, and was scalded with water and steam. Volodya was now sitting in a
chair barely moving only his eyes with neither a cry, nor a groan. Apparently the pain exceeded
all imaginable limits and turned off his consciousness. Before that I saw a stretcher in the
corridor. I told them where it was and suggested they take him to medical. P. Palamarchuk and
N. Gorbachenko carried him away. Vladimir Shashenok died in the morning and turned out to
be the second victim. P. Palamarchuk in his search for Shashenok received a large dose, and
while carrying him got his wet clothes on his back. The water was radioactive, and even five
years later, the burn wounds on his back haven’t completely closed.
The shift manager told V. Perevozchenko that the MCP operator Valery Khodemchuk
and two central hall operators were missing, and shortly ordered him to “Search!” A. Kabanov, a
Kharkov Turbine Plant approached with two of his comrades. I told them LEAVE the unit. A.
Kabanov started to tell me that the computer for measuring vibration was still in the machine
hall. It was a good computer made in Germany that simultaneously measured the vibration of
all bearings and gave good visual printouts. It was a pity for Kabanov to lose it. And here was
the only time on April 26, that I raised my voice, and cursed at him: “Dammit! To hell with that
machine. Get out of the unit now!”
I must say: April 26, 1986, everyone at the unit performed their tasks on the first word,
no excuses. Not once did I have to repeat an order. What they could do, they saw as a
necessity and did it themselves. There were cases of not knowing what to do. We weren’t
prepared for such an accident. And in my opinion, there’s no need to prepare. Such an
accident should not, cannot be allowed. Everyone was ready for anything, even
non-operational workers. True, we quickly sent them away from the unit. Only the Station Shift
Manager Rogozhkin, I believe, did not fulfill his official obligations. He had practically nothing to
do with the work on Unit 4, and according to his position, he is the one who should have been in
charge of the emergency situation. He is the only one who couldn’t go to the control room
because of “blockage.” Others went. Sure, there were no ikebana flower arrangements there.
Scary? It was. Seeing blockages, what should a shift manager do? Take people to break it
down. And down the corridor at the tenth mark, the blockage consisted of kilograms of
aluminum shield from a false ceiling. But he didn’t receive a large dose. To your health Boris
Vasilyevich.
With the dosimetrist, Samoylenko, they measured the atmosphere in the control room.
He had a 1000 μR/sec or 3.6 R/hr instrument. Around the left and middle portions of the control
room, the instrument read 500-800 μR/sec, on the right it was off-scale. Since I didn’t assume
there to be a close source of radiation there, I figured it to be no more than 5R/hr on the right
side. I had no other way to tell. They measured the dose rate at the backup panel. Well, the
path there and the area were off-scale.
A. Akimov told reactor operator L. Toptunov and turbine operator I. Kirshenbaum to go to
the Unit 3 control room. There was nothing useful they could do, and the situation here was
extremely unfavorable. Akimov and Stolyarchuk stayed in the control room.
Now we were busy with the main useful tasks, which were executed by operating
personnel of Unit 4 with risk to life and health. Due to extensive damage to piping and building
structure, short circuits in the electrical system were constantly occurring, the source of the
emerging fires. On my way back from Unit 3, I ran into Deputy Chief of the Electrical Shop A.G.
Lelechenko, and took him with me. Now he guided Akimov on ordering loads to be shutdown,
and electrical circuits to be shut off in order to de-energize the maximum number of cables and
electrical circuits.
He also ordered that the turbine oil be drained to the emergency tanks, and hydrogen
displaced from the electrical generators. All of these tasks were completed by personnel from
the electrical and turbine shops. Completed. Some died, and some received serious bodily
damage. The Deputy Chief heads of the Turbine Shop, R.I. Davletbaev, and the Electrical
Shop, A.G. Lelechenko helped the personnel well. Alexander Grigorovich was an amazing
man. You wouldn’t say he was healthy. I don’t understand where he got his strength from to go
work another two or three days after April 26 in the same radiation conditions. And when he
was taken to the hospital in Kiev, he didn’t live much longer.
Those fires that occurred as a result of the explosion, and at least partly eliminated by
the staff, were put out by two fire brigades: the station’s, and Pripyat’s. Who would put out the
new ones, and at what cost? I believe the staff acted correctly, exceptionally selflessly, and did
everything possible in that situation. Nothing more could have been done. I have told how it
was, and now you can judge for yourself.
I don’t want to condemn people, but to desecrate the graves of others is barbaric. No
one was forced to wear flowers, but you can’t just throw out the ones others brought. The
deceitful official version, dumped everything on the staff who were killed, and does not give
them their peace there. And they say lies have short legs. Apparently not, they are jumping,
and tenacious.
A. Akimov set forth to execution. I went back outside. The hotbed of fires on the roof
still hadn’t been extinguished, so I went to Unit 3 and ordered them to shutdown the reactor and
cool down at the emergency rate. B. Rogozhkin was in the Unit 3 control room and said I
should coordinate the situation with V.P. Bryukhanov, to which I replied: “Shutdown while the
situation is more or less normal.” Of course it was not normal, just nothing was technically
interfering with work on Unit 3 yet.
Recently, some strange conversations about the firefighters have been going on. About
how their actions were wrong, and how they didn’t volunteer for this situation. A correspondent
of the newspaper “Komsomolsk Banner” asked me about violations of the fire brigade’s
instructions. I don’t know, maybe they violated some sort of instruction, but it couldn’t have
changed anything. If they had put on protective dosimetry clothing, it wouldn’t have helped
them. Their regular clothing is made from coarse material, the boots provided protection from
β-radiation, but nothing could provide protection from γ-radiation. There is no such clothing.
Only automatic fire suppression not requiring the presence of people on the roof of the reactor
and chemical shops could have saved them. There was no such suppression. There was a
ring of piping around the perimeter with branches for connecting fire hoses, which were located
in nearby boxes. But without people, there was nothing to do.
And already in an interview with director V.P. Bryukhanov, it was stated that there was no
fire, and firefighters were sent to die in vain, pushing hot pieces of graphite. What, did I dream
up the fire? After all that was the very reason I gave the order to shutdown Unit 3. Yes, I admit
that then, it was not a raging fire, only localized hotbeds. So what was Lieutenant Pravik to do?
Wait until they combined to form one grand blaze? Then its spread to the other three units with
unpredictable consequences is inevitable. Maybe we needed to wait until it went out itself.
Usually fires go out only when everything that can burn has burned. And the correspondent’s
questions to me, he didn’t come up with on his own, and in the interview with Bryukhanov too
the correspondent questioned all these links in one chain, it is unclear. Are rewards really all
that enviable for deadly work? So to reiterate, the reality of our situation provided enough.
When I left the Unit 3 control room, I met V. Chugunov and A. Sitnikov, who were already
dressed for the dosimetric situation. I had the usual overalls and walking shoes. Shoe covers
would have significantly alleviated my condition, protecting my feet from terrible burns, which to
this day have not passed. But what good are they for walking? Then I didn’t pay it much
attention. I was carrying respirators in my pocket. I put one on, then somewhere got hit by
steam and couldn’t breathe, took it off and wasn’t wearing it anymore. They said that
Bryukhanov, who was in the civil defense shelter, directed them to inspect Unit 4. At that
moment I didn’t have time for conversations, I replied, there is nothing to look at, and left for Unit
4. Then Chief Deputy of the Safety Engineering Department, G. Krasnozhen, showed up. He
was short, and in a hurry, apparently he didn’t pick up clothes in his size, his head wrapped up
like a turban with a waffled towel, and only his eyes visible. He said nothing about the
dosimetric condition, but laughed about his appearance. I myself had a good laugh, although
not out loud, despite the tragic position and rotten state of our situation. I was periodically
pulled away due to uncontrollable vomiting, but I had nothing left to throw up. There is nothing
to describe what has been repeatedly described by those who didn’t experience this.
In the control room, V. Perevozchenko said that the two central hall operators had been
found, but not Khodemchuk. When Perevozchenko told me earlier about their absence, he
didn’t use their last names, I would have told him about Kurguz and Genrich. We went with S.
Yuvchenko and the dosimetrist. The device as before had a scale of 1,000 μR/sec. At the
entrance of the MCP hall, it was offscale high. We released the dosimetrist, useless with his
device. Sasha Yuvchenko and I stayed behind with the failed device, and V. Perevozchenko
started to climb the console toward where, although unlikely, Valery Khodemchuk could be. The
door to the room was leaning on a faucet. Climbing was dangerous, water was pouring from
above. A thought popped in my head, this was unnecessary. And then it was replaced by
another. “Can you live then, if he is here and has not received a lethal dose by now?” V.
Khodemchuk was not there, his body was never found. Buried beneath concrete and metal.
And there, apparently, Valery Perevozchenko received a lethal addition. He was soaked with
water, and died not from the large dose of radiation, but from radiation burns to the skin.
And here I began to fall into a slump, complete apathy. Caused by my physical
condition, and apparently the lack of a specific task at the moment. I saw nothing else useful.
We did everything we could and did it right. I had no confidence in the ventilation, and now still I
don’t know what would have been best. Then I ordered the ventilation for Unit 4 to be turned
off, and all ventilation in the machine hall of Unit 3 turned on to prevent spreading the
contaminated air from Unit 4. Yes, the air outside was contaminated. Let the smart people
figure it out. In court, an expert from either civil defense or public health, accused me of
incorrect ventilation operation. This bureaucrat accused me of violating the job description of
the Station Shift Manager. How could I violate it not being the shift manager? On the same
basis you can accuse me of violating instructions for Chiang Kai-shek.
I was called to the phone. It was V.P. Bryukhanov. I don’t remember what they were
talking about. It seemed that they weren’t talking, he said “Come to Civil Defense
Headquarters.” I took three diagram tapes with me: two of reactor power and one of primary
system pressure. I took a shower per the rules, first with cold water, then hot.
There were many people in the bunker, both from the station and strangers. I saw
Volodya Babichev, a unit shift manager. Around 0300 I told Akimov he should call a substitute
for himself. He called. I asked Babichev: “Why are you here?” He replied: “They’re not letting
us go.”
- Let’s go.
Babichev left to relieve Akimov. Unfortunately, Sasha stayed at the unit after his relief. I
went to the next room in the bunker. Director V. Bryukhanov, who wasn’t necessarily painfully
talkative anyway, was silent. He didn’t ask me about anything. I sat, and laid out the diagrams
that showed the trends of power and pressure. At the same time I said “Somehow there was an
improper RCPS response.” That was all, I said nothing else. Bryukhanov was depressed and
silent.
A colonel from one of the troop units came to the table and started to ask the director
about damage for the report to authorities, how many square meters of the roof and something
else. My words - write that Unit 4 is destroyed. The colonel arrogantly ignored me.
I started to vomit uncontrollably and ran out of the bunker up top, where I.N. Tsarenko
helped me get into an ambulance.
I was in the hospital for six long months.
One more task was performed at Unit 4 on April 26, impromptu so to speak. The rest
was done according to plan. Chief Engineer N.M. Fomin arrived at the station after the others,
around 0400 or 0500, and a few hours later than that would have been better. He decided to
organize a supply of water to the reactor. Why after so much time following the explosion? I
don’t know whether there were conversations between V.P. Bryukhanov and A. Akimov, but the
director demanded nothing of me. And what was there to demand? Clearly I know the reactor
better than him and when I am on the Unit, I will do everything I can. I did not see N.M. Fomin
on April 26, I didn’t talk to him on the phone, and the organization of a water supply to the
reactor was started after my exit, otherwise I would have said it was an unnecessary plan. A
useless operation, even harmful and at a high cost. The fact that Moscow was asking whether
or not the reactor was being cooled, naturally the most basic of basics for reactor workers
during an accident. You see, apparently Moscow did not have a factual view of the situation.
It seems to me that I explained quite clearly that this operation was useless, but to
explain to the specialists is not necessary.
It became apparent that the operation was harmful after a few hours of supplying water.
Because of damage to the piping connected to the reactor (the reactor which no longer was),
water didn’t reach the reactor and began to flow into various spaces in Unit 4 and the other
units, spreading radioactive contamination. Of course they discontinued it.
But this operation cost several people severe bodily damage, and for L. Toptunov, A.
Akimov, and A. Sitnikov, their lives. A. Sitnikov after inspection of the unit, where he received a
large dose, but by no means lethal, of course understood that the reactor was destroyed. He
reported back about this. He was not on the roof and did not look at the reactor from above.
They had attempted to go to the roof, but the metal door was locked. They were unable.
Otherwise, A. Kovalenko and V. Chugunov would have suffered the same bitter fate. I cannot
understand why Sitnikov, already knowing of the destruction of the reactor, took part in the plan
to supply water. There he received a completely unnecessary additional dose. Well, some
others participated still not knowing about the destruction of the reactor. Tolya was a disciplined
man, and for him the dictum “The order of the chief is law for subordinates” was undoubtable.
L. Toptunov was sent from the unit with Kirshenbaum, and had he not returned to the unit, would
have received a minimal dose without any kind of real consequences. When I arrived back in
the control room after my second trip around outside, I saw Toptunov there.
I sharply asked him: “Why are you here?” He didn’t say anything and showed the logs
under his arm. I thought he came to grab the logs. It turns out he stayed.
 A. Akimov of course received a more serious dose because he went out into spaces in
the unit, when V. Babichev arrived somewhere around 0500. But his dose would have been
under 200 rem.
Both of them stayed and participated in supplying water to the reactor. Lethal doses
were radiating there. There were no conversations about whose fault on the 26th, or in the first
days following. At least not around me. They only tried to understand why it happened, that’s
what all the conversations were about. D.P. Kovalenko, Chief of the Reactor Shop, says he
heard these words from Akimov in the hospital: “Our greatest mistake was we delayed pushing
the EPS button.” Sasha is mistaken. That was not the reason. And no personnel made fatal
mistakes. It is such a pity, that with a false sense of guilt, the lads died.
At the Pripyat hospital, the dosimetrist measured, got rid of everything of his, washed up,
and changed in the ward. Completely broken, I immediately went to the bed to sleep. It wasn’t
to be. A nurse came in with a drip bag. I begged: “Let me sleep, then do what you want.”
Persuasion was useless. And the strange thing was after the drip bag, what they poured in
there I don’t know. I didn’t sleep but cheerfulness appeared, and left the ward. Others had the
same experience. There were lively conversations in the smoking room, all about this, and that.
The reason, the reason, the reason?
I said this: “The most foolish versions are accepted for consideration, nothing is below
the threshold.” And the conversations continued to go on right up until our separation into
separate wards in Moscow hospital No. 6, a few days after our arrival there.
My wife came. She brought cigarettes, a razor, and toiletries. She asked if I needed
vodka. There was already a rumor that vodka was very helpful for large doses of radiation.
Unsuccessfully, I refused. Not because it’s so damn naturally useful to our people, but because
I had refused it for four and a half long years. It is of course, a small loss if done voluntarily. We
all drank April 26, I don’t remember anymore who it was brought for. On the evening of the 26th
they sent the first batch of us to Moscow. We left on a bus on the 27th at noon. I said: “Woman,
bury us early.” With all the symptoms, I was aware of the seriousness of our position. Frankly
speaking, I thought we would live. All of my optimism wasn’t justified.
Word of mouth works remarkably well. Just beyond Chernobyl is the Zalesskiy village,
along the street stood women with their hands on their cheeks, and pity in their eyes. In this
case, Victor Smagin got sick, and a doctor from another bus got on once we stopped. Quickly
by the bus was a crowd of women, crying, seeing us in our hospital clothes. Yes, our people are
sincere and understanding, for what is Chernobyl, and everything else leading to bitterness for
them?
We arrived at the airport without incident and went straight to the plane. In Moscow also,
the bus came right up to the plane, and to the hospital.
There, several departments were freed up from the sick who were discharged to home,
or sent to other hospitals. First I was sent to the gynecological department, but since I couldn’t
give birth to anyone, I was transferred to another. And only after half a year, on November 4,
was I discharged.
It is now acceptable to criticize our medical treatment. Not only our medical treatment, it
seems so much was criticized for so many reasons, but remaining himself, the doctor continued
this worthy occupation. Any other kind of talk would be forgotten. In an eight column
newspaper it’s hard to find a neutral paragraph. Intellectuals, the soul of our nation, and writers,
behave like spiders in a jar. Their life’s work, to write, they have forgotten.
Even a good deed, the selfless help of the American Dr. Gale, they managed to
discredit. After all, it is very clear that one doctor can’t do much, but another thing is clear,
regardless of how much he is unable to do, normal people should feel nothing but deep
gratitude.
No, I will not criticize the staff of the sixth hospital. They intercepted me and many
others from a bony old woman. My face was fragile. It was rather bad but I was thinking clearly.
I thought it was the end when they couldn’t stop the bleeding from my nose, they were just
changing out gauze tampons. Unfortunately I became accustomed to this. I can’t say how long
it continued. It seemed like I didn’t lose consciousness. But apparently it was some kind of
twilight, incomplete. One day suddenly I realized my legs and body, and from then on, began to
perceive myself in my entirety. The doctors pulled us out from this state. First of all, my
gratitude to Sergey Filippovich Severin, he was there in the most difficult time. Thank you to
Sergey Pavlovich Khalezov, Lyudmila Georgievna Seleznev, Alexandra Fedorovna Shamardina,
and the other doctors.
And what can I say about what the nurses experienced, who gently but persistently
persuaded us to eat at least a little? They maybe even irritated me a little with this. But you
can’t live without food. They spoon fed us. No, the girls didn’t perform the medical work, but
nursed the patient. Thank you to them.
Immediately after my release, I received a call from the sixth hospital where I stayed for
another three weeks. Six months later I went again. Both times they fixed me up. Especially
noticeable was my throat which Elena Mikhailovna Dorofeeva treated. I spent a year constantly
pestered by dry throat. Now apparently I will be in Kiev to be treated as necessary, trips are
difficult, although not far.

PART 6: WHO LED THE COMMISSIONS?

The immediate appointment of a commission to investigate the causes of the accident

was completely natural. Chronologically, the first commission consisted of workers from The
Ministry of Medium Machine Building, and The Ministry of Energy and Electrification represented
by Deputy Ministers (A.G Meshkov and G.A. Shasharin), organizations of these ministries, IAE,
NIKIET, creators of the RBMK reactor, The Hydroproject Institute, the general station designer,
the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operation (VNIIAES), and
the operating organization. I do not know who was appointed as chairman of the commission.
The order of its assembly was not known to me and I never saw it. No one wanted to be named
chairman of the commission or the groups in the report. For nearly all documents on the
Chernobyl catastrophe, there were no chairmen, at least not at first. For brevity I will call
Meshkov the chairman of the commission, as senior in position, because G.A. Shasharin, also a
deputy minister, did not sign this report.
In principle, the appointment of the aforementioned workers is completely appropriate
and cannot be protested. They are the most knowledgeable about the reactor, the station, and
the people. Who, if not them, would investigate the causes of the accident? The trouble is that
all of these people have the very same interest, albeit to different degrees.
Since the accident was so severe, guilt in its occurrence didn’t threaten the loss of a
promotion or a career, but freedom itself, then it’s not about adherence to principle. Honor and
conscience, if there was any, was on the side of those who needed them. The first line of
interest for creators of the reactor, was to hide the true causes of the catastrophe if they turned
out to be in the reactor itself. Others had the very same interest. It begs the question: What
was the collective VNIIAES staff involved in, and where were they looking? Why does it exist
and has it fulfilled its role? This is why it was impossible to expect an objective investigation
from the start.

The A.G. Meshkov Commission

Main Conclusion of the Commission: “The most likely cause of the explosion was the
formation of steam in the reactor core with a rapid loss of water in the fuel channels due to
cavitation of the operating MCPs”.
The explosion occurred 42.5 seconds after steam was isolated from the turbine, i.e. at
01:23:46.5. Everything else in the report tends to justify this version.
The people in the commission were competent, they knew the unit not by hearsay. More
than once they participated in accident investigations, and were familiar with calculations of the
reactor and systems. But something prevents them from seeing the glaring absurdity of this
conclusion.
The formation of steam and rapid loss of water? The authors do not explain when it
started, or what rapid means. If this is immediately before the explosion, then by that time the
RCPS rods had already inserted into the core by at least 2.5 m, and why did EPS not shut down
the reactor?
If at the moment of the EPS actuation, and it is necessary to assume protection was
actuated, then how did we see the need for such an action, because after only three seconds
there were excess power and rapid rate of rise alarms. There was no alarm for the MCPs
stopping.
Why did this even disrupt the pumps when they operated without trouble in less
favorable conditions?
What such mysterious cause could have disrupted the pumps powered by the
coasting-down generator? Completely normal operating conditions were provided for them.
Even with the failure of the other four pumps, they were completely sufficient for cooling the core
at a power of 200 MW.
 Why does the commission ignore the control system recording showing the output of all
eight MCPs? The outputs recorded by the control system were normal at the start of the TG
rundown at 01:23:04; furthermore, the four “running down” MCPs reduce their output, while the
four powered from backup power slightly increase, as they should. At 01:23:40, protection was
actuated, at 01:23:43 alarms for over-power and rapid rate of rise came in, and the pumps
continued to operate normally. Do the instruments lie? It’s hard to imagine that eight
independent instruments all began to lie in the same direction at once, each with the others they
followed as they should for technological reasons. And only when reactor power jumped up to
an unknown value, did the pumps, according to natural laws, reduce their output.
The central control system in the unit was called “Skala”, and as it turns out - why would
the commission look at the output of this soulless stone? It doesn’t show what is needed at all.
And NIKIET seems to have completely forgotten how to count. В акте утверждается,
что весовое содержание пара в теплоносителе при четырех работающих на сторону ГЦН
и мощности 200 МВт будет составлять 2 %, на самом деле -менее 1 %. И цифры вдруг
подзабыли. Для доказательства срыва ГЦН в акте указывают гидравлическое
сопротивление опускного тракта -8м водяного столба при расходе 21 тыс. м 3 , а в другой
справке по другому поводу дают 4 м при большем расходе.
Everything is possible when it’s needed!
Then why in the world did the commission put out that the cause of the accident was,
namely, failure of the pumps? I say put out, because not for one minute have I doubted that the
real causes of the accident have been clear to the commission, maybe some isolated
exceptions, from the beginning. The IAE and NIKIET workers knew, A.G. Meshkov knew… He
was previously the head of the main department dealing with RBMK reactors, and all the
documents from Leningrad and the other stations were known to him. Documents on accidents
and operational parameters. The commission was searching not for the causes of the accident,
but for the most acceptable display. And failure of the circulating pumps was considered the
most acceptable. The fact is that after the reduction of reactor power, pump flow increased, and
in 2-3 of the eight exceeded allowable limits for that operating region. Operator B. Stolyarchuk
took a look, and maybe saw this, but didn’t reduce it in time because he was busy with other
tasks. This is a violation of regulations by the personnel! The rest are technical matters. Could
such a violation disrupt these pumps? Possibly. Did it? Never mind. The operating personnel
are guilty!
To this I want to say the following. Even if the pumps had been disrupted, the explosion
of the reactor was in no way the fault of the personnel. Failure of the MCPs, not two or three,
but all at once is a completely possible scenario. Actuation of the main safety valves with a
subsequent failure to reseat, especially at low power, will cause a rapid reduction in primary
system pressure and failure of the MCPs. Improper operation of the feedwater regulator can
cause failure of one half of the pumps, which would be enough to cause an explosion of the
reactor as it was. Therefore the reactor needs to be such that it can withstand failure of the
main pumps. This is the task of science and designers. In the project, all such situations
should be analyzed and all necessary safety measures taken.
Did the A.G. Meshkov commission understand this? Of course. But the calculation is
simple: while they figure it out, time passes, and these, so to speak, deficiencies of the reactor
will be fixed. And will they figure it out? That which is classified as “Secret” and that which is
not secret is equally inaccessible. Those who have access and figure it out will keep their
mouths shut under threat of dismissal, or even worse - deprivation from access to secret work.
A serious specialist in the nuclear industry could do almost nothing without such access.
True, in further view of very clear developing facts, the MCP failure version was refused.
Only NIKIET still continues, although not very zealously, to stand by it, forgetting even under its
own report No. 05-075-933, where it states that the full effect of voiding in a hot core is always
negative. However, the report is incorrect.

The G.A. Shasharin Commission

Deputy Minister of Energy and Electrification G.A. Shasharin refused to sign the
investigative report. He and a group consisting of workers from the Hydroproject Institute,
VNIIAES, with help from The All-Union Heat Engineering Institute and the builders of the MCPs,
conducted an investigation into the causes of the Chernobyl accident and issued a document
under the title “Addendum To the Investigative Report”…
This document from May 1986 correctly reflected the essence of the events in the Unit.
In any case, it could have well become the basis for an objective investigation.
In it, are convincingly shown:
- the invalidity of the MCP failure version
- the implementation of the experiment “TG Rundown Program” is unrelated to the
occurrence of the accident.
- an automatic reactor shutdown at 01:23:04 with the start of the experiment would not
have changed the situation, and the explosion would have occurred 36 seconds earlier.
- there was no rupture of the primary system piping with a diameter of 300mm or greater.

I will cite this document with a few abbreviations. It is worthy of this not because it opens
up some kind of new aspects to the modern understanding of the causes of the accident, but
because in May 1986, the true causes of the accident had actually been established, the only
cost is to approach the question impartially. I quote the text while retaining the numbering of its
paragraphs.
1. As follows from the DREG program printouts, deciphering the oscillograms of the
running equipments’ changing parameters during the implementation of the test of the joint
rundown of the TG and with it, its internal loads (Appendix 2), diagrams of self recorders,
explanatory notes of the operating personnel, worker information from the organization - MCP
builder (Appendix 3), there was no disruption of circulation in the MFCC right up to the
uncontrolled acceleration of the reactor and the increase in system pressure.

2. The unit worked as per the normal technological design with one TG-8 running at a
power of 40 MW electric and a reactor thermal power of about 200 MW. Reactor power was
being maintained by the AR. Moreover, all parameters that characterize a running reactor plant
in the period of time prior to the accident right up to pressing the EPS button, were normal and
stable. There were no emergency alarms on the unit.

4. The change in operating mode of the unit after the isolation of TG-8 consisted of a
gradual 30-40 sec. reduction in flow through the reactor and the transition from eight operating
MCPs to four with a constant reactor power of 6-7% of nominal. In the process of implementing
this mode, the flow rate through the reactor was reduced by 20% of its initial value. Water flow
through each of the four MCPs remaining on normal power increased. This reduced the margin
to steaming of these MCPs. (Appendix 4). However, there was no disruption in pump head,
decrease in performance, sharp reduction in coolant flow through the reactor, change in
reactivity of the core, rise in power, or other noticeable changes in parameters due to this.
The difference from the normal mode of operation was that:
- For the implementation of the program, to check the operation of the necessary internal
loads being powered from the remaining energy of the TG after its disconnection from
the grid in the event of a loss of offsite power (blackout mode), eight MCPs were placed
in operation, which is not prohibited by the regulations and instructions.
- The operating reactivity margin before the accident, as established by additional
analysis, was about eight manual control rods with a minimum of 15 manual control rods
allowed by the regulations.

5. Operating personnel allowed the following violations:

5.1 The flowrate per individual MCP exceeded the value of 7000 m³/hr which was
established as the maximum with a feedwater flowrate of less than 500 t/hr.
5.2 When power collapsed during the transition process lasting 12 min, thermal power
decreased to 40-60 MW, ORM decreased to less than allowable and was at a value of eight
rods one minute before the accident. In addition to this, reactor power was deviated 200 MW
from program.
6. The group of experts analyzed the stated violations and notes the following:
To make an ORM determination, it is necessary to perform the calculation using the
program “Prizma” at the request of the operator and analyze the printout of the calculation
results. This process takes 7-10 min, where during this transition period, the conditions change
significantly. Another method of evaluation is to count the display positions of the 211 rods
which doesn’t take long.
In the design materials of the reactor construction, their bases, and regulations, there is
no basis for minimum reactivity margin in terms of reactor safety.
In the technical design of the reactor construction and in the regulations, there is no
explanation of possible consequences of reactor operation with a low reactivity margin.
There is no given optimal rod distribution during transient poisoning. On the other side,
nothing is indicated in any material that there is a particular risk in low power modes of
operation.
Emphasized in all materials is the particular risk of exceeding allowable limits at high
power levels. Thus, the staff was neither prepared technically, nor psychologically in that a low
power level could present not less, but greater risk under certain circumstances, than operation
at full power.
11. Causes of the accident.
As follows from the calculations of VNIIAES, the main cause of the uncontrolled
acceleration of the reactor is the actuation of EPS during specific conditions: reactivity margin
value of eight rods in the core and with the coolant at the reactor inlet heated to just below the
boiling point.
Such acceleration is possible due to the simultaneous occurrence of the following
factors:
11.1 The fundamentally faulty design of the control and protection rods, with their initial
lowering to completely stop the fission chain reaction leading to the introduction of positive
reactivity in the lower portion of the core. With some configurations of the neutron field and a
large number of rods removed from the core, this can lead to both local, and overall acceleration
of the reactor instead of stopping it.
11.2 The presence of a positive void coefficient of reactivity.
11.3 The presence as shown regarding the accident, of a positive fast power coefficient
of reactivity, contrary to what was asserted.
11.4 Operation of the MCPs at a low reactor power with a flowrate of up to 56,000 m³/hr
with low feedwater flow. (This is not prohibited by regulations).
11.5 The unintentional violation by personnel of regulation requirements regarding
maintaining a minimum reactivity margin, and regarding maintaining reactor power level for the
test program.
11.6 The inadequate reactor design, installation of technical means for protection, and
information to the personnel, as well as instructions in design materials and regulations on the
danger of the above violations.
The listed facts show that the most important requirements of paragraphs 2.2.2 and
2.3.7 of GSP were not met in the design of the reactor construction.
This is the only commission that noted non-compliance of the reactor with regulatory
documents. True, something hindered it, possibly a lack of time to firmly establish the
non-compliance of the reactor with the fundamental requirements of GSP, which became clear
after the accident. But if this document had been allowed for consideration, then all the
requirements of the regulatory documents on reactor safety that were not met by the reactor,
would have shown themselves.

V.P. Volkov

An IAE collaborator long before the accident, Volkov noted inadequate characteristics of
the RBMK reactor core and its RCPS. On his own and together with others, he made specific
proposals for modernization. In particular he proposed a high speed option for EPS. I don’t
know the specific points of his proposals, so I can’t voice an opinion on them, but the
phenomena which those proposals aimed to eliminate, should have been retired by V.P.
Volkov’s proposals or by some other method, because it was exactly those phenomena that
caused the accident. For several years his direct chiefs V.I Osipuk and V.V. Kichko took no
measures toward realization of the proposals. Then V.P. Volkov wrote a memorandum to the
director of the institute, scientific leader of RBMK subject matter, academic A.P. Aleksandrov.
Not a simple academic. His resolution in the memorandum; “Comrade Kichko, urgently
conference with me”. But either the loop in his signature isn’t wrapped there, or they say don’t
pay it any attention, or some other reason, but the meeting didn’t take place before the accident.
Volkov had nowhere else to write, you see, A.P. Aleksandrov at the same time was also
President of The Academy of Sciences.
He waited for the accident. V.P. Volkov passed the documents to the prosecutor’s office,
as he was convinced, and quite correctly, that the explosion of the reactor occurred due to its
inadequate quality, and not at all through the fault of the personnel. And then the reaction of
A.P. Aleksandrov was instantaneous - Volkov was no longer allowed at the institute.
This is not a production that can wait years, let alone eleven. Here, undermining your
own reputation, there is no delay in response.
Colonel Skalozub said: “I am Prince Grigory, and I will give you a sergeant major,
Voltaire.”
Our President does not need sergeants as assistants.
But V.P. Volkov, here you see he was pushy, wrote to M.S. Gorbachev himself. By letter
a group is formed under the leadership of the Deputy Chairman of Gosatomenergonadzor (The
USSR State Committee on Supervision of Safe Conduct of Work in Atomic Energy), V.A.
Sidorenko. It practically confirmed the unsuitability of the reactor for operation. An interesting
note was made by the group in a cover letter saying that Volkov miscalculates the directions in
the regulations. This is, of course, regarding the direction in regulations on the minimum
reactivity margin of 15 rods. This means: the oversight group, regarding protection, takes the
determination of the designers, to re-interpret the direction in the regulations, requiring by law,
an alarm for deviation of a parameter, automatic shutdown of the reactor when beyond the
normal, and even the absence of a satisfactory metering system.
And this is the oversight body! This is who is called to watch that reactors are operated
in accordance with the requirements of regulatory documents. However, there is no reason to
be surprised. V.A. Sidorenko just answered for the nuclear safety of reactors at
Gosatomenergonadzor. It’s all one and the same. After the conviction, I wrote an appeal to the
Central Committee; there were people there knowledgeable enough to be able to sort out my
arguments on the baselessness of the conviction. For example, V.I. Grechniy previously worked
as deputy chief engineer of the station in science, he was engaged in such issues on nuclear
safety. And what? My letter made it to the Central Committee to Deputy General Prosecutor
O.V. Soroka who approved my arrest. Guess what the answer was? That’s right, it was so.
This is how V.P. Volkov puts it in one of his reports on the causes of the catastrophe:

“With analysis of the Chernobyl accident, the following turned out: a large displacer
effect, a large void coefficient of reactivity, and the formation of an excessively large amount of
non-uniform energy release in the core during the accident. The last circumstance is one of the
most important and is due to the large dimensions of the core (7mx12m), the slow speed of the
heterogeneous (containing absorbers, displacers, and water columns) rods of 0.4 m/s, and the
large void coefficient of reactivity of 5 βeff. All of this predetermined the size of the disaster.
Thus, the scale of the Chernobyl accident is caused not by the actions of operational
personnel, but by a misunderstanding, primarily on the part of the scientific management, of the
influence of steam content on the reactivity of the RBMK core, which led to an incorrect analysis
of the reliability of operation; ignoring the repeated manifestations of a large value of the steam
void coefficient of reactivity during operation; to false confidence in the sufficient effectiveness of
the RCPS, which in fact could not cope with the accident as well as with many others, in
particular, with design basis accidents, and, of course, to draw up incorrect Operating
Regulations.
Such scientific and technical guidance is due to, among other things, the extremely low
level of scientific and technological developments to substantiate neutron-physical processes
occurring in the core of nuclear power plants with RBMK; ignoring the discrepancy between the
results obtained by various methods; the lack of experimental studies in conditions most close
to full-scale; the lack of analysis of special literature and, ultimately, the transfer to the chief
designer of incorrect methods for calculating neutron-physical processes and their functions —
substantiation of the processes occurring in the core, and justification of the safety of nuclear
power plants with RBMKs.
An important circumstance is that the Ministry of Energy has been passively operating NPPs
with RBMKs with neutron-physical instability in the core for a long time, and did not attach
proper importance to the repeated actuations of EPS and NPP alarms during EPS operation,
and did not require a careful analysis of emergency situations ... It must be noted that an
accident like Chernobyl was inevitable.”

So: if scientists, who have at their disposal calculating and experimental devices, do not
know, then how will the operators know? If science cannot interpret test data from the stations,
then how can people on shift do it? To be fair I must say, and V.P. Volkov was an example of
this, that not everyone was satisfied. They saw shortcomings and made proposals for their
elimination. But they fell on deaf ears.
Two Interdepartmental Science and Technology Council meetings, chaired by A.P.
Aleksandrov, were held on June 2, and 17, 1986. Calculations made by the All-Union Scientific
Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operation (VNIIAES) and conclusions of the G.A.
Shasharin group were not taken into account, along with the naturally disregarded arguments of
V.P. Volkov. The President and thrice Hero crushed everyone with the authority of power. As a
result, all the causes of the accident were reduced exclusively to errors and incorrect actions by
the personnel. The decisions taken by the Interdepartmental Science and Technology Council
paved the way for disinformation of specialists and the general public. Going forward, everyone
used these determinations with some variations.
Naturally, the Government Commission chaired by the Deputy Chairman of the Council
of Ministers, B.E. Shcherbina, was quite illogical in its conclusion.
The commission found that the RBMK reactor had a positive fast power coefficient of
reactivity; and in the same breath states that such a coefficient should not exist. One has to
think they looked at some regulatory documents, but there is no reference. If this property of
the reactor is unacceptable, then what the commission establishes further is completely
paradoxical, incomprehensible to the normal human mind. The property of EPS that in the first
few seconds after actuation, introduces positive reactivity.
And what is the conclusion of the high commission?
The operating staff is guilty!
Logic!…
Really? Did the staff design the reactor core according to their calculations such that it
had a positive power coefficient? No!
Really? Did the staff come up with this monstrous design for the rods? No! So why in
the world is the staff killed and crippled with this mastadon of guilt? What is the shift supervisor,
Alexander Fedorovich Akimov, who ordered the reactor EPS actuation in the absence of any
kind of emergency or even warning signal, and Leonid Fedorovich Toptunov, who executed the
order, guilty of? Nothing of course. How can one blame the operator for needing or not needing
to press the EPS button? In any case, with the recognition of the fact of the reactor EPS
explosion, per normal, non-governmental human logic, any charges against the operator should
be dropped.
Equipment is produced in the country without observing standards, and they no longer
write about this. Now the Government Commission with its own conclusion legalizes it.
Decisions are made as needed, according to the thoughts of the authors, for the benefit of, well
of course, the people. There is no time to think about justice.
The decision of the Interdepartmental Science and Technology Council regarding the
causes of the catastrophe, dictated by the creators of the reactor is understandable - they
defended their own interests. It is less clear why such a decision found such an approving
response in the Government Commission and above. But here it’s not hard to figure out. It is
enough to imagine what the establishment and publication on the fact of the reactor’s
inadequacy leads to:
- Both our own, and the international community would require an immediate shutdown
of the remaining RBMK reactors. And this is 13 million kilowatts of electric power, not counting
Ignalia Station. An industry without restrictions is indispensable;
- The two leading institutes of the nuclear industry in the country are found to be invalid;
- Gosatomenergonadzor, designed to prevent the operation of unfit reactors, to put it
mildly, would be slammed. And this already calls into question not only the RBMK reactor, but
the others as well, i.e. all nuclear energy;
- What a blow to the prestige of the Soviet Countries… All of this is true, it is so in
reality, but cannot be recognized.
It’s easier to blame the staff. Just a few unknown people.
This Government Commission conclusion and resulting stance taken by the Politburo
opened the path for those wishing to blame the staff, and at the same time shut down the
possibility of an objective investigation. Now commissions, writers of magazine and newspaper
articles, writers of artistic and “documentary” works, knew what and how to write about the
Chernobyl disaster.
According to new government policy, the USSR had taken steps toward the path of
glasnost and openness. Therefore specialists, under the leadership of academician V.A.
Legasov, were sent to the IAEA to give information to the “international community”. As put by
one of the informants - Dr. A.S. Shulenkov.

Soviet Informants to the IAEA

This commission had already abandoned the version of the failed MCPs, keeping focus
on the accusation of the staff. I don’t intend to comment on the materials from the IAEA report,
all of the material is quite specific. The report, although in a limited number of copies, can be
obtained and read. I will dwell only on the necessary moments.
Any kind of calculations or references to them are absent from the report. Qualitative
explanations are given that are quite arbitrary. This is how they explain the start of the
acceleration of the reactor in the report:
“At 01:23 the reactor parameters were closer to stable than at any other time in the
interval we are considering, and the experiment began. Because of the isolation of steam to the
turbine, steam pressure in the drum separators began to rise slowly (on average at a rate of 6
kPa/s). The total flow of water through the reactor began to fall off owing to the fact that four of
the eight main circulation pumps were working off the "running down" turbogenerator. A minute
before this the operator had reduced the feedwater flow. The increase in steam pressure and
the reduced flow of water through the reactor on one hand, together with the reduced input of
feedwater to the drum separators on the other hand, are competing factors in determining the
volumetric steam quality and hence the power of the reactor, since there is a positive feedback
in the reactor between power and steam generation. Under the conditions of the experiment
before the start of the TG rundown, there was a low vapor content in the core, and its increase
was many times greater than at normal power.
The rise in power was the circumstance which triggered the pressing of the EPS-5
button. Since, in violation of regulations, personnel removed more than the allowable number of
manual control absorbing rods from the core, the effectiveness of the emergency protection
system was seriously reduced, and the total positive reactivity continued to rise.”
Thus, the acceleration (rise in power) of the reactor, in the view of the commission,
began from the combined effects of decreasing coolant and feedwater flows, and could not have
been from the actuation of EPS. I’ll try to lay it out clearly in layman’s terms.
- The addition of reactivity in a critical reactor leads to an increase in its power.
- The RBMK reactor had a positive void coefficient of reactivity - an increase in steam
content in the core adds reactivity.
- Decreasing coolant and feedwater flows, leads to an increase in steam content.
- A rise in primary system pressure leads to a decrease in steam content.

What will be the result of their combined effects? First of all, this is not some kind of
extraordinary phenomenon, but a completely possible scenario under realistic operating
conditions, merely a decrease in coolant flowrate not due to the pumps running down, but due
to being stopped. This is why the reactor and its RCPS are required to be able to handle it.
 In the given situation the change in feedwater flow led to a faster and larger change in
the reactivity value, and up until 01:23, there were several such instances - the reactor power
AR handled it completely satisfactorily, the self-recorder registered no power surges.
A change in feedwater flow is a normal occurrence to regulate level in the drum
separators. It was one minute until the start of the rundown. Elementary calculation shows that
the perturbation from this was already worked out by the regulator by 01:23. And if it hadn’t
been worked out, for example due to a malfunction, then alarms would have come in. There
were none.
Reactivity changes due to changes in coolant flowrate, which are well compensated for
by a regulator, are smoother - a chart of reactor power showed an increase of five megawatts
over a period of 4 min. For the RBMK reactor - this is nothing.
The phrase: “since there is a positive feedback in the reactor between power and steam
generation” - some kind of revelation from the Commission. And what should this connection be
for a boiling reactor? Clearly, the greater the power, the more steam. As it should be.
If the commission wanted to say that the connection between power and reactivity was
positive, then that’s another thing. This connection can be either: negative in a correctly
designed reactor, or positive as it was in the RBMK, which is unacceptable.
The phrase regarding the growth of vapor content in core being many times greater than
at normal power is also obscure. You need to read it this way: at low power (always, not just
under experimental conditions), the growth of the volumetric vapor content in the coolant per
unit increase in power is many times greater than for the same increase at normal power. That
is namely the reason why at low powers, the RBMK reactor had positive feedback between
power and reactivity. It was this critically important safety fact that the scientists did not account
for when they recommended that the stations measure the power coefficient at powers close to
nominal. With competent recommendations, a positive power coefficient would have been
discovered long ago by the stations’ Departments of Nuclear Safety.
And what does “at normal power” really mean? Up until the accident, 200MW was a
normal regulated power.
Furthermore: “in violation of regulations, personnel removed more than the allowable
number of manual control absorbing rods from the core, the effectiveness of the emergency
protection system was seriously reduced”…
There is not one paragraph in regulations indicating how many rods can be removed
from the core. There is only an indication in the “RBMK Operating Instructions” and in the
“RBMK RCPS Operating Instructions”, where it is written that with a low reactivity margin and
neutron flux peaked in the bottom, the number of rods extracted completely from the core must
be limited to 150, with the remaining rods inserted by no less than 0.5m. On April 26, we had
neutron flux peaked in the top. Therefore we violated no instructions. These addendums to the
instructions, agreed upon by the Scientific Director and Chief Designer, then signed into effect
by the Deputy Director of NIKIET Y.M. Cherkashov, are where in particular it says:
“We emphasize once again, that the positive reactivity addition effect will be observed
only with rod motion from the extreme upper position, and only with neutron flux skewed to the
bottom.”
 With neutron flux peaked in the bottom, a rod starting from the upper limit switch always
introduces positive reactivity at first, which contradicts all design precepts. Yes, with a high
reactivity margin, when RCPS is actuated, a part of the rod starting from an intermediate
position along the height of the core, immediately starts to introduce negative reactivity. But in
any case, another part of the rod starts to introduce positive reactivity first, and what the sum
turns out to be - the one God knows. Can a conscientious person defend such a position?
In an effort to discredit the staff in front of the international community, Soviet informants
stooped to the lowest lies. Well, it turns out that something has to be sacrificed, since you can’t
“maintain innocence and acquire a capitalist”
We already know about the number of rods withdrawn from the core.
Foreign specialists said themselves that an exorbitant task was laid out before the
operator: to maintain a minimum reactivity margin without actual means of information and
control in transition mode. Then the informants say that the minimum margin of 30 is stipulated
in regulations. Really it was stipulated only after the accident.
Hiding the positive power coefficient at low reactor powers would not be possible, as it is
well known from the theory of automatic regulation that operation in this region is extremely
dangerous, and sooner or later, this coefficient will manifest itself. For our informants nothing is
simpler - they say: operation at powers below 700 MW is prohibited by regulations. Yes,
prohibited by regulations, after the accident.
By August 1986, when the informants traveled to Vienna, there were already calculations
showing that EPS could introduce a positive reactivity value of βeff. They stayed silent about
this. Such a painfully odious phenomenon. Well, EPS didn’t work, wherever it went, and EPS,
blowing up the reactor itself - nonsense. How could they admit this?
In the report is a table of violations committed by personnel on April 26 1986. It consists
of three columns: violations, motivations, and consequences. The second column does not
interest us. I will present it in order without this column.
Violation Commentary (A.D.) Consequences Commentary (A.D.)

1. Reducing the This is apparently correct. At Emergency Yes, but with a small margin, not
operational reactivity the time of pressing the protection system because of a small margin
margin substantially EPS-5 button, margin was on of reactor was
below the permissible the order of 12-13 rods versus ineffective
value the required 15

2. Power dip well This is not a violation of Reactor proved to The automatic controller
below the level regulations and instructions be in a condition maintained reactor power
provided for by the test difficult to control completely fine. The film of the
programme self recorder registered neither
power oscillations, nor bursts.
Yes, as is now clear, all of the
negative qualities of a reactor at
such a power have presented
themselves most sharply, but what
does this have to do with the
personnel!?

3. Connecting of all the There is no violation in Coolant To enter into the core, as the
main circulation pumps connecting all of the MCPs. temperature in informants have in mind, the
to the reactor, with There are such modes in the the multiple statement is simply incorrect
individual pump instructions forced circulation
discharges exceeding circuit
the levels specified in approached
the regulations saturation
temperature

4. Blocking of reactor This is not a violation. It was Loss of possibility This made no difference. The
protection system performed in accordance with of automatic accident would have occured 36
relying on shutdown regulations shutdown of the sec. earlier
signal from two reactor
turbogenerators

5. Blocking of Protection on water level was
protection systems from another group of
relying on water level instruments. Protection on
and steam pressure in pressure was in service.
the drum-separator Turbine protection on
decreasing pressure was in
service, the setpoint was
changed, this is the right of
the operator. This is not a
violation.
Reactor Reactor protection on physical and
protection system thermal parameters was in
based on heat accordance with regulations. The
parameters was report of the N.A. Shteynberg
completely cut off Commission in 1991 (finally! -
A.D.) on this specific occurrence
states “... the statement made in
the report that “reactor protection
system based on heat parameters
was completely cut off” does not
correspond to reality.”

6. Switching off of the It was disabled according to
protection system for the program approved by the
the design-basis Chief Engineer. According to
accident (switching off documents active at that time,
of the emergency core the Chief Engineer could
cooling system) allow temporary
disconnection.
Loss of the The commission knew well in
possibility of August the system and the
reducing the character of the destruction and
scale of the clearly presented that the
accident possibility of reduction was not
reduced, but in principle absent.
 This is how the case stands with violations attributed to the personnel. I don’t know how
the international community believed the Soviet informants - in word or in requested documents
to be shown. They could take their word because any community could hardly understand why
they would need to slander their own personnel and why it would be possible.
The findings of the commission were a natural continuation of the investigation.
“The developers of the reactor installation did not envisage the creation of protective
safety systems capable of preventing an accident in the presence of the set of premeditated
diversions of technical protection facilities and violations of operating regulations which
occurred, since they considered such a set of events impossible.”
You see, they scolded, but felt sorry for the poor developers: well, how could they
foresee violations and trickery of malicious personnel, seeking to, no matter what, annoy the
developers and blow up a perfectly fine reactor. And these very developers, knowing the
insidiousness of the personnel, realized the complete hopelessness to foresee some sort of
measures against their tricks and spat on the fulfillment of lawful written requirements of
regulatory documents. But silence on this. Read the report from the informants to the IAEA
attentively and you will not find one word of discrepancy between the RBMK reactor and the
GSP and NSR.
“Thus, the prime cause of the Accident was an extremely improbable combination of
violations of instructions and operating rules committed by the staff of the unit.”
I really liked the expression “reactor condition so contrary to regulations”. Many then
used that as their weapon. But how so? Why did the monitoring system not respond with one
alarm? Either a regulatory condition or a blind monitoring system. And in any case, how can
there be complaints against the personnel? What should they determine with their five senses?
And the power coefficient at high primary system flow rates is lower, because for the
same change in power, the change in steam content, and therefore reactivity, will be less. The
informants alarmed everyone with their findings of the first general of the Jesuit Order, Ignatius of
Loyola. He would have never thought of such a thing.
I was still in the hospital, my wife said that our niece had read a scathing article on the
personnel in the German magazine “Spiegel”. It seemed that the wool didn’t come off and the
tail didn’t fall off, and the reactor was under control. I swore, not out loud, at the “damned”. It
turned out my fellow compatriots had made friends. With success, my dear compatriots, in the
international arena, in the era of glasnost.
The informants smeared us, but they couldn’t hide the reactor. People will be able to
figure it out. They would deal with this later. But first, they arrived on horseback. The
prosecutor’s office calls them leading scientific physicists. Leading indeed. But where to?

IAEA Experts

They also became victims of the (mis)informants. Shortly after the Soviet specialists’
report, in close collaboration with them, the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group
(INSAG) with the IAEA presented a report on the Chernobyl accident. Its causes are stated in
two sections: the first - for ordinary readers, the second - almost repeats the first, but with
technical details for specialists.
We will look at the first section.
“After delays initiated by the system dispatcher, the further conditioning of the plant for
the test recommenced late on the night of 25 April, involving a reduction of power towards the
test target level of 700-1000 MW(th). This proved difficult because of the mishandling of the
control system by the operator. As a result reactor output fell to too low a level.”
I have described how the drop in power level happened. The decrease occurred as a
result of a regulator malfunction. The ordinary reader will think that “too low a level” is a criminal
occurrence, unacceptable for reactors. In fact for normal reactors, made according to accepted
regulatory documents, this occurrence presents no danger. Power was simply low, and to
continue the tests, it had to be raised to 200 MW level, high enough to carry out the remaining
work.
“Power was increased again. The level of 200 MW(th) was achieved with some difficulty
and it required many of the control rods to be withdrawn. Note that continuous operation below
700 MW(th) is forbidden by normal safety procedures owing to problems of thermal-hydraulic
instability. Two additional main circulation pumps were switched on with the motive of ensuring
that the reactor could continue to operate after the test with the necessary number of pumps
available. The high flow created by these extra pumps was a violation of normal station
procedures since it exceeded approved levels both for the reactor core and for certain individual
pumps: more importantly, it made control of the main coolant systems difficult.”
Everything is wrong in this long paragraph. Why follow people pursuing a very specific
goal? Yes, informants in the report say that, apparently they were unable to raise power higher.
But it should be clear to the reactor, that if the reactor is placed in a critical condition, and power
is raised to 200 MW, that with a positive fast power coefficient of reactivity, which is exactly what
it was, there are no obstacles to raising power.
Let’s suppose the informants were fooled about the power level below 700 MW, the
switching on of pumps, and flowrate through the core. But why did the experts so easily agree
with the assertion of the difficulty of control at high coolant flow rates? With a high coolant
flowrate, the amount of steam within the core and steam-water piping is lower than with a low
flowrate at the same power level. Therefore, for example, with an increase in feedwater
flowrate to maintain level in the drum separators, a steam quench (collapse) can occur. And
since there is less at high flow rates, the effect of the quench on reactivity in the core and on
level in the drum separators will be smaller. And with a high flowrate, overheating at the
entrance of the core would at least be less. The question is purely technical and does not
require specific knowledge of Chernobyl station instructions.
“One important consequence was that the operators disabled the reactor trip on
separation drum level and steam pressure to ensure that the fluctuations did not cause such a
reactor trip and stop the test, again a serious violation of normal station procedure.”
We did not block it. I have already written about this.
“Just before this the computer system for centralized monitoring provided the operator
with information about the condition of the reactor, including the position of all the control rods at
the time. This gave a clear warning, for it showed that the reserve of control rod capacity
required to guard against emergency was no longer available. The reactor should have been
shut down instantly. However, the operator began the electrotechnical test although the
condition of the plant was extremely unstable, as is self-evident, and as will be touched on
later.”
We already know that the staff didn’t have printouts at all. Even if one was printed, it
couldn’t have been done by the beginning of the test. We will leave this on the conscience of
the informants.
Here I want to say something else. The IAEA experts are not ordinary readers. From
the printout of the rod positions (I recall, completed after the accident), it can be seen that a
large number of them are removed from the core, i.e. located in a position where their
compensating ability, or the ability to suppress reactivity is at a maximum. This is a general rule
for reactivity control mechanisms. And experts talk about the lack of margin and compensating
ability of the control rods. In the event of an alarm, they have the quality of protection rods,
rather than controllers. This phrasing by the experts should be taken as agreement with such a
design of the rods, where they introduce positive reactivity at first. This is how it turns out. But,
it is completely unacceptable, and this vicious design of the rods is now universally recognized
(subsequently the design has been changed). To me it is completely incomprehensible how
experts let themselves be persuaded in such a manner.
“On starting the test, the turbine generator began to run down. Note here the crucial
violation of procedure. The reactor trip on loss of both turbine generators had been disabled
previously so that the reactor could remain at power to repeat the test if necessary. It is worth
making clear that the test could have, and should have, been conducted in such a way that the
reactor tripped when the test began.”
In blocking the trip on loss of both TGs, there is no violation of either procedure or
instructions. No one was going to repeat the test, these are inventions of the informants. The
informants’ assertion, readily repeated by the IAEA experts, that the test could and should have
been performed with the automatic trip of the reactor, has no basis. No documents or technical
considerations confirm this. With protection we could have, of course, had the accident 36 sec.
earlier. Later the report goes on to describe how the reactor was accelerated. It is no different
from the version presented in the report of the Soviet informants and shown here earlier. It
doesn’t correspond with reality.
Practically all the actions of the personnel on April 26 were laid out by the experts. And
all the violations, violations, violations. Did the IAEA experts really not find this to be
suspicious? We, who studied instructions, regulatory documents and passed exams to learn
them, then do the opposite? And they don’t ask the question to the informants: Why would you
keep such personnel? After all, it can’t be that the staff clearly followed the instructions, and
suddenly on April 26, 1986, went mad and started to do everything wrong. Which means they
did it before, but for some reason were allowed to stay. Okay, maybe not all, just Dyatlov went
from being a competent (practically recognized by all), thinking engineer, to some kind of
hussar, commanding left and right: “Block!” “Disable!” It would not be so easy for us to force an
operator to violate regulations or instructions. Either he refuses to do so, or says: “Document it
in the log, then I will carry it out”. These are the kind of questions that arise when reading the
report of the IAEA experts.
On the experts’ questions, the Soviet informants introduced fallacies, referring to provisions
that either did not exist or were introduced into instructions after the accident. But experts readily
followed the informants on technical responses where they needed to simply think.
I am far from following the thinking of V. Yavorivski, that the IAEA is a mafia, feeding off
the propaganda of nuclear energy. I am sure that these are people, convinced that nuclear
power plants are necessary and acceptable, people convinced of their safety now and see the
possibility of expanding it in the future.
And yet their complacency on the Chernobyl disaster is incomprehensible to me.
Therefore I consider them to be voluntary victims.
I read the International Advisory Group’s report for the first time in October 1990. I was
surprised to think how experienced sparrows were fooled by the chaff. Without doing a full analysis
on the report, I wrote comments on the second section and sent a letter to the director of the
IAEA, Mr. H. Blix. In the letter I posed questions to which the obvious answers showed the
inconsistency of the version of the accident as laid out in the report, as well as the fact that the
judgment of the operators based on their shaggy appearance can be seen quite clearly in the
report.
Anyway, it would have been better and more useful for the people of your agency to be
able to critically evaluate their positions and to take into account new information that became
known to them. Unfortunately, I don’t see such a desire or ability in the response of the
Chairman of the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, H.J.C. Kouts.
In a letter I indicated that we violated nothing regarding rod position. Mr. Kouts responds
as such:
“Regardless of whether the rod configuration played an important role in the accident,
and was permissible according to the rules at the time, the actions leading to this situation were
calculated incorrectly.”
Really! Comrades and gentlemen, scientists in offices with computers managed to
figure it out, and the operator had to figure it out on the fly. It turns out that not only by Soviet
standards, but also by criteria of the West (or just Mr. Kouts?), that whether you acted according
to the rules or not - you are still guilty. On this, Professor B.G. Dubovsky said:
“They, i.e the operators, could have avoided the accident if they had known more about
the reactor than the Scientific Director.”
That is clear.
And Mr. Kouts continues:
“In our opinion, the position of Mr. Dyatlov is that he attributes the accident entirely to the
introduction of positive reactivity with the EPS rods.”
Although the fact that EPS introduces positive reactivity is absolutely monstrous by itself,
and in other situations could lead to a catastrophe, on April 26 it acted in conjunction with the
positive power coefficient. In my letter this is stated explicitly.
The very same thing happens with other questions raised in my letter.
And the conclusion of Mr. Kouts’s answer comes in a familiar form to me - from
responses of the prosecutor’s office and the court:
 “We have no basis on which to change our point of view. The accident occurred as a
result of unsatisfactory operation, regardless of the underlying causes, in combination with
specific poor design characteristics of the reactor. The recent appearance of additional
important circumstances regarding these characteristics, does not radically change this point of
view.”
The informants framed the personnel, and Mr. Kouts’s group echoed them to the entire
world. It seems to me, in my simplicity, that if the personnel were slandered alone, this does not
at all give others the right to do the same. I indicated what the authors of the report baselessly
accuse us of. I’m not asking you to take my word for it. Verify it. Do you answer for your words
or not? I am not an academician, or an international expert, I am a former prisoner, therefore, I
only use words that I can verify with documents or indisputable technical information. I answer
for my words.
It is clear to the specialists that the added measures to be put in place on the remaining
RBMK reactors, immediately following the accident, were not in place on those operating
reactors. After that, other documents appeared. And Mr. Kouts is talking about all the
unsatisfactory operation, regardless of the underlying causes. As a scientist, you have the right
to dispassionately state the actions and qualify them: these are right, these are wrong. Just
don’t attribute violations to the staff that they didn’t make. In this case, you may really not be
interested in “the underlying causes”.
I would also like to hear from the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group on what I
believe to be within the scope of their task, not a statement on “poor characteristics of the
reactor”, but a clear opinion on the admissibility or inadmissibility of the creation and promotion
of a reactor with such characteristics:
1. A positive power coefficient of reactivity with a complete runaway of reactivity on account
of this effect of several βeff.
2. Reactivity control mechanisms that change the sign of introduced reactivity with
movement in one direction. And as a result, when actuated in various situations, EPS
can introduce positive reactivity.
3. Reactivity control mechanisms that do not prevent, but they themselves create a local
critical mass.
The Group’s report, released in 1986, actually repeats the account of the Soviet
specialists to the IAEA. The comprehensive work does not serve the truth. The revelations of
academician V. Legasov and Doctor A. Shulenkov were liked so much by the IAEA experts, that
they decided not to think for themselves. What was written in the report:
“On the basis of this information we have a plausible explanation for the sequence of
events at Chernobyl Unit 4, and no attempt has been made to find alternative explanations.”

The Forensic Technical Expert Commission

A frenzied organization. In some ways incompetent, basically biased and in any case,
unobjective. Frankly, I do not want to write about this commission. I saw it at critical moments
in my life, which would be best forgotten, but that is not happening. The NIKIET representative,
O. Shorok, looked especially “handsome”. Insolent, unscrupulous. Little difference between
him and V.A. Trifonov of Gosatomenergonadzor.
I didn’t see other commissions then, and therefore they are represented in my
consciousness quite abstractly, and not by specific people. Although I know most of them by
face, for example the grinning facial expression of the NIKIET employee V.N. Vasilevsky when
the forensic technical commission put into evidence the reliability of the RBMK reactor, given
that the cumulative service life of RBMK reactors was approaching a total of 100 reactor-years
by the time of the accident.
We’ll start with this. In fact by April 26, 14 RBMK reactors had operated for a sum of 87
reactor-years. We agree with the experts, that this is a reliability criterion. So, with the
remaining 13 RBMK reactors, if we divide 87 by 13, we will have a Chernobyl every 6 to 7 years.
I think that such a prospect will not inspire anyone. And that’s not all. After construction of the
reactor, not all of the fuel channels are loaded with fresh fuel, since there are not enough RCPS
rods to suppress the excess reactivity. Around 240 channels contain additional absorbers (AA),
and several hundred more absorbers are placed in special assemblies. This eliminates the
large vapor effect. They are removed as the fuel burns out over the course of two years, at
which time the reactor goes into the so-called steady state refueling regime. This means that 28
of the 87 years must be taken away.
The RBMK reactor is especially dangerous during low power levels with low reactivity
margin. It operated in such modes during shutdowns. In all, 10-20 hours per year for each
reactor. Thus, all reactors in this mode amounted to a total of two - three months. But with the
development of more nuclear stations, reactor units would need to be unloaded at night, and
therefore would be operating in the dangerous mode more. By 1985, the power system was
already forced to reduce power at night, but then it was not significant. Only operation in the
normal mode at constant full power allowed these reactors to stretch to those 87 reactor-years.
In an attempt to prove that personnel violated Regulations by blocking EPS on the
shutdown of two TGs, the commission arbitrarily interprets the clause in Regulations. As is
possible from: “switching on and off protection and automatic interlocks in accordance with
operating instructions and procedures” conclude that, “blocking is allowable only when the
reactor is shutdown and cooled, not simply with stable operation with electrical power less than
100 MW.” By the way, stable operation with turbine load at 100 MW is prohibited, and it was not
on April 26.
The experts either don’t know, or don’t want to know that every pump has EPS on a loss
of flow and will shut off when the valve is closed.
They also don’t want to see that on April 26, right up to the explosion of the reactor, the
control system recorded flows of no less than 5000 m³/hr. With such a flow rate, there can be
no discussion of valve closure.
- In their conclusion on ECCS, they cite section 5.4 of NSR, which refers to the
Emergency Reactor Cooldown System, but ECCS is the Emergency Core Cooling System. Two
different systems.
There was no documentation of the installation of the contingency DBA (Design Basis
Accident) button. Firstly, the terminal numbers for connecting the button are documented in the
program. And nowhere is it said that documentation should be only in graphical form.
Secondly, what is this talk about the button when ECCS itself is disconnected?
- This is a violation of <RBMK Operating Instructions>, which provides instructions for
swapping MCPs (i.e. placing one in service and removing another), stating that it must be
implemented in the presence of a representative of the station’s Nuclear Safety Department.
There was no MCP swap. The experts didn’t read the section to the end, where it says:
“henceforth until written direction is provided”. Written direction was provided. Apparently the
experts were in a hurry.
- “It is not indicated in the program where to put excess steam”. In the unit are automatic
and remotely operated steam release devices, this is stated in Regulations and other
instructions. This was not rewritten in the program. Such are the violations.
According to the opinion of the commission, the RBMK reactor in the form it was in in
1986, was quite suitable for operation. Such a conclusion is quite suitable for the court, but not
for life. Therefore, shortly after the accident, modernization began on the remaining RBMK
reactors.
The masterpiece of the forensic technical commission is the following statement: “water
displacement in the lower parts of the RCPS canals could introduce additional positive reactivity,
provided for in the design”. Here they present, not the blunder of the designers, but their
foresight! This is directly from a Crocodile column - “You couldn’t make this up if you tried”. But
it’s not funny to me. All of this went on a one-to-one scale for the indictment, and then the
verdict. Prove it. Done!
Pay attention: 30 rods and 15. Now it’s 30: with the steam effect reduced by several
times, and therefore, the speed and magnitude of the introduction of reactivity are reduced; a
modified design of the RCPS rods; the shortened absorber rods on the EP signal inserting from
below the core, i.e. in more favorable conditions. How could one not remember the
non-commissioned officer’s widow here? And not in the Gogolian sense, but literally.
In the Soviet Union, the NSRs are the main regulatory documents defining the safety of
nuclear reactors. There the requirements are laid out on what a reactor should be, so that
accidents aren’t turned into disasters. Accident situations can result due to technical
malfunctions, as well as due to personnel errors.
General Safety Provisions, Article 2.7.1 expressly obligates the designers to consider
possible personnel errors that could have serious consequences, and to neutralize or prevent
them. So, the authors of this article in vain pose as benefactors to the operating personnel. All
of this is their direct responsibility. And not after an accident, but before it.
Moreover, besides the automatic protection on a reduction of reactivity margin to less
than 30 rods, the rest in general has nothing to do with the personnel, and should be
implemented based on general technical rules.
Let’s look at the technical measures implemented at the RBMK reactors remaining in
operation following the accident in the light of their agreement with the requirements of the NSR
and GSP.
- The installation of AA in the core for reduction of the steam void effect of reactivity. -
Complies with article 2.2.2 of GSP.
 - Modified design of the RCPS rods, the introduction of shortened absorber rods into the
core on an EP signal, an increased ORM, increased EP speed. - Complies with articles
3.3.5, 3.3.26, and 3.3.28 of NSR.
- A reactivity margin deviation alarm. - Complies with article 3.1.8 of NSR.
- An automatic reactor trip on reduction of reactivity margin to 30 manual control rods. -
Complies with articles 3.3.21 of NSR and 2.7.1 of GSP.
As we see, the measures implemented on the reactors bring them into compliance with
the requirements of mandatory regulatory documents. No more than that. Therefore, the
reactor did not meet the requirements beforehand, and was operated illegally. To say that these
measures are intended to improve the reliability of reactors, is not possible. This is the
elimination of hopelessness.
This is what the authors of the following article say about it in the same journal (pg. 27):
“The analysis performed shows that the priority measures already guarantee the safety
of the RBMK.”
Therefore, it was already safe… Well now that is clear to everyone. However, this
acknowledgement of the authors of the article is valuable in that they, the creators of the reactor,
after the accident, shouted at every intersection: what a great RBMK. And they continue their
unseemly business in this article. Просто в тон фразе уши вылезли, куда их такие
упрячешь. According to their calculation, the reactor doesn’t explode if the MCP is not stopped.
And does explode if the MCP is stopped. What can be said about this reasoning?
- Aside from the control system recording the proper operation of the pumps (all eight
pumps, not just one, which may be being erroneously challenged), this is recognized by
all of the remaining investigators - the IAE, VNIIAES, the MCP designers, etc.;
- At the trial of “The Chernobyl Criminals”, witness Orlenke, shift supervisor of the
electrical shop, testified that he interrupted the field excitation of the generator, i.e.
switched it off, after the explosion of the reactor. With the explosion, he was blown into
the shield under the power console column, and then, overcoming fear, got up and
switched off the generator, as was agreed upon in the briefing in the event of any
problems;
- Well, what a trifle - the reactor actually did explode.
The authors of the article likened themselves to visitors at a zoo, who upon seeing a
giraffe say, such a long neck cannot be.
If the authors have a non-evil calculation, then this time would be the perfect opportunity
(we are still far from such an opportunity) to clarify coefficients and calculation programs, not to
persist in ambitions.
NIKIET provided several such calculations in the court proceedings.
Here we have technical sciences candidate, Gavrilov. According to his calculations, with
the already decreased speed of the MCPs powered from the running out generator, up to 0.9
times of the pumps’ nominal range according to the pump head characteristic curve shift to the
left of the “humpback” characteristic curve, in other words, stop! pumping water.
And what is the candidate concerned with:
- registered normal operation of the pumps at speeds of at least 0.75 times nominal
 - that in general, the characteristic of the pump curve for control valve throttling is not
“hunchback”, but falling;
- that if flowrate fell, the pump would be switched off by individual protection, but this was
not noted.
This is a group of authors. I don’t know if there are doctors, but there are candidates for
doctors. Yet again testifying to the MCP failure. Now with a primary system pressure decrease.
And they do not see in their own compiled graphics, that the pressure drop is a consequence of
the increased feedwater flow, and at the same time, the operating conditions of the MCP are
completely acceptable.
Here we have technical sciences candidate, K.K. Polushkin. As a character witness (this
is his department that constructed exotic RCPS rods) in court he testifies that personnel had a
printout of the RCPS rod positions, indicating the low reactivity margin, and continued the work
anyway. This printout, received after the accident, is the last position calculation remaining in
the computer’s memory. Let’s suppose that K.K. Polushkin doesn’t know that the printout
appeared after the accident. But he knows perfectly well the location of the control room and
the computer room. Now let’s compare the time. The printout was from 01:22:30. After
receiving the printout, you have to cut it from the teletype, record it in the log, and bring it to the
control room - this is 40 meters. Clearly no one was running. The rundown test starts at
01:23:04. Could it be presented to the control room in 34 sec? Of course not.
And what is the reactivity margin calculation curve due to poisoning presented by
NIKIET! Oooh! According to the printout of the RCPS rod positions mentioned above, at the
Smolensk NPP they calculated a reactivity margin of 6-8 rods at 01:22:30. NIKIET presented a
curve from 23 hrs 10min , when power was 50% and margin was 26 rods. Well, NIKIET ignores
the margin of 24 rods logged at midnight - the graphic turns “ugly”, and subsequently passes
through 19 rods. And in marvelous form arrives to the point of a 7 rod margin. As the
expression goes, fits to a T. But at 23 min 30 sec the margin was 3-4 rods less due to the high
feedwater flow. How is this accounted for in the computer? Don’t tell me, intelligent programs
and machines at NIKIET? Or? Or what.
Dear Reader, I would hope that to some extent I have explained the reasons for the
closure of materials on the accident. The people that need it were, are, and will continue to be
influential. And it turns out, there are quite a few of them.
A.I. Solzhenitsyn in “Archipelago” says that for decades, they have decided - who lives,
and who dies.
And it seems that success in human selection is undeniable. The NKVD is apparently
our only selectionist who achieved the result. We want to have Dutch cows, English pigs. And
there was no shortage of people for panels. Panels ready to formulate and sign what you want
as needed. Yes, these people with a clear conscience, in view of its complete absence.
And since the closure of materials can only be done with the agreement and approval of
senior officials, it is therefore done in the interest of the state. And what kind of a people do we
have that the state needs to hide everything from it? No, definitely not a good people. Some
radical, plebeian, or one of the many now divorced - may have some seditious little thought pop
up: aren’t some of the powerful confusing their individual or group interests with the state’s?
 The magazine “Young Guard” in 1990 issue No. 8 published a letter from the Donetsk
Oblast mine rescuers to the Chairman of Soviet Ministers, The All-Union Central Council of
Trade Unions, and the Prosecutor General of the USSR, which says:
“We have injuries with a severe or fatal outcome on an order higher than any other
developed country. Information about occupational illnesses of miners is kept in great secret.
With deep conviction, we believe great damage is caused not so much by the specifics
of working underground, as by the irresponsibility of the organizers of production. A system
formulated with collective irresponsibility and double standards. Security days are conducted,
staff sessions for battling violators are held, there is in addition to an army of supervisors, an
army of public inspectors. But in parallel with these cruel unwritten rules of “the game”
according to which person is in charge of the mine, is an obligation to give a plan, to fulfill a shift
order, whatever the cost. Those in disagreement with these rules are mercilessly forced out,
and replaced by others. Victims in this “game” will not find support anywhere.
The system is set up and distinctly operating such that the main “organizers” and
“masterminds” of these atrocities evade responsibility.
The monopolist investigates the accident himself, schedules and accepts measures
himself, controls and implements them himself. The Trade Union and bodies of Gospromnadzor
for a series of reasons and “telephone” law, are dependent on the monopolist. Most often, when
investigating accidents they do not “notice” that it was previously laid out in the outline and work
management program.”
Well said mine rescuers, they said it correctly. Everything, or almost everything,
happened just the same at Chernobyl. We saw the investigation of the accident, into whose
hands it was placed. And from the beginning it was impossible to expect objective conclusions.
About the same can be said of the supervisory bodies. In 1983, with the actual startup of
ChNPP Unit Four reactor, an unacceptable phenomenon was discovered - with the start of
motion, the RCPS rods introduce positive reactivity into the core. The Gosatomnadzor
Inspector notices this phenomenon, and allows the reactor to go into operation.
Gosatomnadzor was part of the internal structure of The Ministry of Medium Machine Building.
The organizations that created the reactor were also a part of this ministry. The dependence of
the supervisory body would be clear. The rightful successor to Gosatomnadzor -
Gosatomenergonadzor, has already become a formally independent committee, but it did
nothing. And still after all of this, it is necessary to say that the supervisory body now, namely
Gospromatomenergonadzor, is the first of the organizations to begin an objective investigation
after five years. At least they rejected the false accusation of the personnel.
We read about the tragedy in Bhopal - an explosion at a chemical plant. The firm that
supplied the low quality equipment is guilty. An example close to us. The accident at the
American NPP, Three Mile Island. Academician Aleksandrov in the newspaper “Pravda” says:
“The accident at TMI could only occur in the capitalist world, where safety is replaced by profit.”
According to our newspapers, it turns out: their accidents occur only due to poor equipment,
ours only due to poor staff. Neither one nor the other is wrong. I have long suspected that
equipment is non-partisan, and it is only with its creation, as A.P. Aleksandrov did with the
creation of the RBMK, neglecting the natural laws, that it refuses to work.
 The powerful ideological treatment of public opinion by the media always brought down
anger on the operators, whether completely guilty, or completely innocent, and not to the extent
attributable to them. By operators I mean service personnel regardless of job title.
Bocharov, a correspondent with “The Literature Gazette”, describing the case of an
airplane flight that went un-piloted for a long time due to loss of consciousness, says that in our
“fast paced time” almost all accidents occur due to operator error. Where does such confidence
come from? For obvious reasons, in recent years I took a strong interest in accidents and came
to a different opinion. Accidents occur in most cases due to an approach of builders and
designers based on centuries-old traditions. Because of high level managers forcing unfinished
facilities to be launched into commission, even if the project was perfect. With the concentration
in modern equipment, which man has reasonably or unreasonably come to a conclusion on,
technical solutions must be modern.
The RBMK reactor can develop a generally unknown power, unimaginable in magnitude.
But this is not the main thing, when the accumulated radioactive dirt is worse. To restrain such
an uncontrollable reactor is hardly a feasible task. You can only prevent an acceleration. This
is a direct task and duty of the designers, unfulfilled by them, even though they are written in
normative documents.
Here we have an explosion in Sverdlovsk. And questions:
- What of the station track arrangement that allows for a train to exit one line into another
with a passing train?
- Why are dozens of tons of explosives transported through a crowded city in an ordinary
car by an ordinary train?
- Why transport it in an explosive state at all, when it can be converted to explosion proof
by humidification?
- The point is not whether the dispatcher has the right to make a mistake or not, they
made a mistake and will make mistakes. This is not some 19th century station, when he
went and aligned the switch, thought about it, and checked one more time. And there is
time for everything. How many commands do dispatchers give per shift? Per month, a
year? How many dispatchers are there? Therefore errors, leading to serious
consequences, must be blocked by designers.
The tragedy of the ship “Admiral Nakhimov”. No one removes guilt from the captains in
a collision. But the death toll is not on their conscience. Yes, in a collision, there would have
been dead, but not five hundred. Close to the coast, warm calm sea, ambulances, with such
favorable factors, and such a tragedy. Vessels of this type are prohibited from operation. Why
was the ship pushed out to sea? The prosecutor’s office says the Register authorized it. And
that’s the end of it. Why was it authorized and who did it benefit?
And the explosion near Ufa, I don’t know how to say - trains or pipelines. The whole
river is a dangerous product - and the traditions of nine hundred rough years. What good are
valves after 5 km without automation? The chairman for the investigation of the Ufa explosion
was Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, G. Vedernikov, and B.E. Shcherbina. In
Pravda on June 9, 1989, correspondent N. Krivomazov quotes G. Vedernikov as saying:
“At different times, I was compelled to lead more than one such commission, and saw
that with all the differences in our troubles and accidents, they have one indistinguishable
similarity. Recall that in Chernobyl, there were four entire systems of “protection against the
fool” and all four managed to be turned off…”
Well of course, it was all just like that: We turned off one system, and a second. We
thought - we’re not going to explode. Let’s turn them all off. Only here, the Chernobyl reactor
did not have even one “protection against the fool”, although it should have.
Twice I wrote to “Pravda” and as they say, no answer, no hello. I wrote where you can
check my words. But what we have is such: you can walk around pouring mud on people, and
then put on an innocent face. Here he talks of “protection against the fool”, but doctor of
physical and mathematical sciences, O. Kazachkovsky, yet again in “Pravda” (Oct. 15 1989),
says that:
“The Chernobyl reactor at the time of the accident was insufficiently “professor-stable”,
and the professors presumptuously undertaking such a risky experiment found themselves
there.”
It is somehow doubtful that in 1989, O. Kazachkovsky did not know that the experiment
and the accident had no connection. In the same article he states:
“Existing reactors to one degree or another, have internal stability, which is provided on
the basis of negative reactivity feedback. This feedback can be refined by improving reactor
physics.”
Golden words, however, of course there is no novelty in them. And yet again it is
doubtful that in 1989 O. Kazachkovsky did not know that the RBMK reactor had a positive fast
(and full) power coefficient of reactivity. And for some reason doesn’t mention it in the article.
Well. It means he doesn’t want to. There were plenty of speeches in other newspapers as well.
And all would pour more mud on the ChNPP operating personnel. Here is “Izvestia” from Feb.
11, 1990, also a doctor of physical and mathematical sciences, Deputy Chairman of
Gospromatonenergonadzor, V.A. Sidorenko writes:
“However, many IAEA experts believe that it would be hard to find a reactor in the world
that could withstand such illiterate work as was carried out at Chernobyl Unit Four.”
If O. Kazachkovsky maybe didn’t know the exact circumstances of the accident, then
V.A. Sidorenko knows the RBMK reactor well, the circumstances and causes of the accident,
and how the outside specialists were informed. Up until the accident, he himself had written to
the manufacturers of the reactor about how good it (the reactor) was, principles and courage
alone would not be enough to stop operation, although there were reasons and rights. But
reports and studies had already come out that cast obvious doubts in the correctness of the
official version or completely negate it, which V.A. Sidorenko knew. There was already
information in newspapers on a revision of the causes of the Chernobyl catastrophe.
Shameless accusations of personnel would no longer pass. This is why the authority of outside
scientists was needed. There were so many commissions and individual prosecutors, all
pointing in the same direction. The title, starting with an academician and the Deputy Chairman
of the Council of Ministers. Well, how could one not believe it? And they convinced them.
Even the operating personnel of the station believed it for some time. It’s no wonder - material
on the accident was closed to everyone. Only gradually did the operators, recognizing the
measures implemented on the remaining reactor units, begin to understand what a powder keg
they were sitting on, or rather, they were kept on for a long time. When in court as a witness,
shift supervisor I. Kazachkov said the units one and two reactors had been modernized, but the
third hadn’t been yet.
The judge said to him: “Well, then it isn’t completed.”
To which Kazachkov replied: “The unit is not yet running, and if it isn’t ready in time for
the startup, then it will be without me.”
I am 100% sure that, if there was an announcement today that the reactors would be
returned to their previous conditions, no operator will go to work tomorrow.
When a cooked goose pecks you on the ass, you start to perceive reality in a different
way. Before, I perceived the appointment of a government commission to investigate the
causes of the accident with satisfaction, until I looked at it myself. Then I realized that, in our
conditions, at least at that time, the appointment of a government commission was a direct path
to concealing the truth.
This rule of introducing politics into everything, even when it wasn’t lying nearby, turns
everything on its head. For example, the high leader of the commission, The Deputy Chairman
of the Council of Ministers, practically answered to neither the people, nor the law. Whether he
does it right or wrong, it’s all the same, no punishment will follow. And since there is no threat of
punishment for the chairman of the commission, there is also none for its members, hiding
behind a broad back, they will sign what you want without fear. And since the head of the
commission is involved in the implication in one way or another, if the accident occurred due to
equipment, it will not figure in, in any case it will not be made public. How would B.E.
Shcherbina be interested in hiding the true causes of the accident? Simple: he oversaw this
field of industry. Would he want to hear complaints at his own address, or maybe be dismissed
from his position, even if another one wouldn’t be so bad? So, both the causes and
consequences of the accident are classified as secret. In general, I think that investigative
commissions should not be one dominant person with the influence of a specialist, much less
with the influence of the authorities. In the first commission there were two deputy ministers and
two documents appeared: an investigation report signed by A.G. Meshkov, and addendums to
the report, but in fact an independent report signed by G.A. Shasharin. From the very
beginning, everything could have taken a normal path, but one force after another interfered,
and introduced their considerations.
I can’t classify myself as an “idealistic carp”, I haven’t believed in the overall triumph of
free ideas for a long time. Years of molding and the formation of views, from fourteen to twenty
two years old, I lived in in the polar city of Norilsk. Anyone who lived there at that time knows
that people were very different there. With high moral qualities, and the lowest scum. Naturally,
in such an environment, it is difficult to maintain illusions. For example, my acquaintance with
political prisoners helped to dispel my faith in the sanctity of Comrade Stalin by the age of
twenty. It is safe to say that those northern acquaintances were very long lasting. While I was
in the hospital after the accident, many of them visited me. Even those who I had practically lost
touch with after leaving the city of Norilsk in 1953. M.I. Medvedkov and N. Korneichuki.
Having lost my illusion, I became neither nihilistic nor cynical. I learned to firmly defend
my opinions and human dignity. I perceived people as they were - with their dignities and
shortcomings. I can’t stand lies - I consider it to be man’s greatest flaw. That was namely what
I ran into an abundance of after the accident. That was the biggest shock, especially when
older people engage in lies. After all, it’s just like cancer patients at the edge of their lives, they
should only speak the truth and nothing but the truth.
Not our old people. What do they think they have two lives to live? Academician
Petrosyants for fifteen minutes, spread on all-union television how worthless the personnel at
ChNPP who took out ECCS were. It’s bad when a correspondent spreads a lie from someone
else’s words, well, the person was deceived and didn’t verify it. Academician Petrosyants has a
book on the RBMK, which he wrote himself, whether or not it was written for him, he probably
read it. In other words, he knew ECCS could not have helped. True, one could understand the
academician: he defended his position. Chairman of the State Committee for the use of atomic
energy - a ministerial post, the corresponding salary and ration. No responsibilities, and one
distinction. A sinecure. With relations abroad. Like Vysotsky:
“Maybe they will say: Drink, eat. Or maybe: not a damn thing.”
Here it’s “Constantly drink, eat, and they won’t say a damn thing.”
Yes, for such a position you would slander your motherland. It is true however, that it
was not possible to defend after all…
Here is an example of another plan. Academician L.A. Buldakov in the magazine
“Smena” issue No. 24 of 1989 writes:
“First of all, there was no delay, and there was an early evacuation from the city of
Pripyat.”
I’m paying attention: this is said at the end of 1989. Evacuation of the population from
the city of Pripyat began at 14:00 on April 27. By 10:00 on April 26, it was already clear that
extended residency in the city was not possible based on dosimetric measurements. Even if
you exclude the increasing dose rates in the following days, and there was no reason for this -
emissions continued, the need for an evacuation was clear. And it should have started a day
earlier. Or dozens of rem to each resident for this day benefited them? Not being a specialist in
radiation medicine, I don’t intend to discuss the entire article. But the academician’s statement:

“Analysis of world experience on the effects of radiation on the body shows that the
minimum significant dose to have lasting effects is 100-250 rem”

seems pretty arbitrary. Radiation safety standards say that only 25 rem is the dose at
which methods of modern medicine do not detect changes in the body. But it says nothing
about its harmlessness. In this case, I have no firm conviction, but on the evacuation, it was
clearly a day late. To me it seems everyone agrees on this. I do not think the academician of
the Academy of Medical Sciences had doubts. He knows better than others about the concept
of radiation protection of the population and the overall possibility of reducing individual and
collective doses.
And after all, L.A. Buldakov himself is by no measure involved with the occurrence of the
radiation release, and is not liable to even a small extent. Why on earth would he compromise
his conscience? To whose service and to what does he give his authority as a scientist? And
he is not alone. Science has been violated, turned into a maid. What can be said here about
the people personally responsible for the occurrence of the catastrophe?
 Dear Reader, I propose to offer you the analysis of another Report, with an attempt to
separate it from the others, since it was compiled considerably later than the others, and there
are more organizations taking part in it than the preceding ones. We will not consider measures
directed at improving the reliability of RBMK reactors, they are described correctly (this is not
surprising, the drafters are knowledgeable people), justified, and indeed have greatly improved
the physical characteristics of the core and EP of the reactor.
There is no need for surprise, that these same knowledgeable specialists after five years
continue to assert that the RBMK-1000 reactor in 1986 was fine, and that RCPS met its
requirements. They assert this contrary to facts, and contrary to their own statements, including
in this Report. Yes, apparently, without these assertions, the authorities would not have signed
this Report.

PART 7: ENVIABLE TENACITY

In 1991, a report “Causes of the accident at Chernobyl NPP Unit 4 and its
consequences. Safety Measures for NPPs with RBMK reactors” was released and signed by
IAE Director E.P. Velikhov, General Director of NPO “Energia” (VNIIAES), Director of NIKIET
E.O. Adamov, Director of the Institute for the Safe Development of Nuclear Energy in the USSR
L.A. Bolshov, Chief Specialist of GKNT E.I. Chukardin, and Director of the Science and
Technical Center of Gospromatomnadzor V.A. Petrov. The report was compiled by employees
of these organizations, and since this is practically all of the organizations involved with RBMK
reactors, then apparently this report should be considered the conclusive document. Nothing
else can be expected from them.
Naturally, the drafters of the report weren’t looking to condemn. It would be useless to
search for violations of project requirements in their draft. There are no violations. There are no
documents, they don’t know. In their opinion, RBMK reactor facilities only have features:
- “Insufficient automatic engineered protection of the reactor to prevent its being put into
an unauthorized regime.”
In other words, the reactor is in an explosive condition, yet the control system and
automation provide no indication of it. There is no warning signal or automatic EPS actuation to
prevent the reactor from entering a hazardous state. Including “one important physical
characteristic from the point of view of reactor control and safety called operational reactivity
margin”. This is some characteristic. I ask that you pay attention to the cynicism of the wording:
“prevent its being put into an unauthorized regime…”. The operating personnel are sleeping
and see how to put the reactor in an explosive state, there are no other thoughts. Here in the
report, it’s not clear for what purpose, the drafters provide information from Regulations: the
ORM at rated power and in steady state mode should be 26-30 rods; If the ORM decreases to
15 rods, the reactor should be shut down immediately. Thus, in all… 15 rods separate the
reactor from normal conditions and an atomic bomb, while at the same time, reactivity effects
due to regime change can amount to tens of rods. And therefore, the reactor puts itself into an
explosive state, no need to put it there.
Only a precise measurement system, signaling and automation could prevent this
transition, as required by NSR. But all of the drafters are silent - the reactor should not become
a nuclear hazard on a reduction of reactivity margin. There are no such reactors, only the
bungling of physicists and the RCPS rod designers led to this.
- “the void coefficient of reactivity αφ varies, and there is a coolant vaporization effect
owing to decreased coolant density in the core”
Well of course, the drafters are all scientists and should not simply express their
thoughts, but even accounting for that, this phrase is already very “special”. However, its
meaning is the same: a reactor with that core composition had an unacceptably positive value
for the void coefficient of reactivity. We have already talked about this.
- “the emergency protection system response is too slow, and a positive reactivity
insertion can occur when there is an unacceptable decrease in the reactivity margin”
What a feature! - EPS when activated, introduces positive reactivity, i.e. accelerates the
reactor.
With such “features” it stands to reason that a feature of the RBMK is that it sometimes
explodes.
The drafters of the report do not see violations of requirements in documents accepted
by the state, but they do see:
- “The reactor control and protection system (RCPS) consists of 211 movable solid
absorber rods in special channels cooled by an independent water circuit. In normal operating
modes, and in design basis accidents (DBAs)…”
and then comes an enumeration of the usual requirements for the system, including
tripping the reactor and so on.
- “Thanks to the aforementioned reactor characteristics, and the safety systems
(including the protection, localization and executive safety systems), reliable and effective
operation of RBMKs in all authorized regimes and safety for the whole range of DBAs have
been maintained, in accordance with the approved design documentation”
What follows these two excerpts? Control and protection systems and others, normal
and operating modes, and all regimes of reactor operation, including emergencies were
provided for in the best possible way. The RBMK reactor did not explode - “Churchill made it all
up in the eighteenth year”, that there was an explosion.
That the reactor exploded when the MCP failed, follows the act of the Meshkov
Commission which was dominated by NIKIET and IAE - the creators of the reactor. This version
was later refuted, but not because an explosion was impossible, but because there was no
failure of the pumps; and that the reactor could explode with an AR failure, according to the IAE.
Drafters of the report are silent about this. And there are many more situations which would be
sufficient. Maybe these accidents are not attributed to design basis? It would seem they
shouldn’t. Failure of the pumps is entirely conceivable in various cases. Failure of AR - all the
more so, in all textbooks on the reactor’s automatic regulator, is necessarily considered. In a
conclusion made by the GKNT, with such a void effect of reactivity, the reactor explodes during
a DBA. Even if you wanted, the latter can not be attributed to non-design basis.
However, the drafters of the report do not think like they write. This is a continuation of
all the same politics - defending the honor of a uniform, contempt for the people. After an
analysis and enumeration of the measures taken at the remaining reactors, they write:
“By implementing the above measures to improve the neutron physics characteristics of
the reactor and significantly improving the performance of the emergency protection system, we
have been able to preclude the possibility of an uncontrolled power rise during a loss of coolant
accident (LOCA) and limit the consequences of all DBAs to the permissible levels for radiation
exposure of personnel, the general public and the environment.”
Whether this statement is undoubtable, and whether the safety of the RBMK reactor is
really provided for, is not completely obvious, but with this phrase, the authors cross out the
previous two I cited. There is no doubt that the technical measures implemented on the
reactors following the accident, increased their reliability, or rather made it possible to raise the
question of the reliability of the reactors. What was before 1986, in view of the numerous
deviations of regulatory documents’ requirements, cannot be called a reactor, nor could anyone
speak to its reliability. If out of habit it is called the RBMK-86 reactor, then the RBMK-1000
reactor is completely different. Yes, accidents for the reason it happened in 1986, and a host of
other reasons, will not occur on this reactor. However, the inventors and designers of the
reactor neglected reactor fundamentals and the concept of safety so much that it’s hardly
possible to the level already achieved in other designs with any amount of modernization. I
don’t want to say it, but in all likelihood it’s so: the grave will fix the hunchback.
For example, we can take the case of a break in a fuel channel. Almost all reactors
(excluding the third and fourth units of Smolensk NPP) are designed to simultaneously break
two channels, no more. The rupture of more than two channels leads to, if not Chernobyl, then
to a completely comparable accident. According to a NIKIET calculation, the simultaneous
rupture of two channels is possible with a probability of 10⁻⁸ events per reactor-year. This is a
low probability, and the break of three or more channels is even less likely, it can be considered
hypothetically. Only, there is one but… A calculation should not be evil. I don’t doubt the
conscientiousness of the one making the calculation, I would think it was conducted with the
availability of all knowledge and the entire mathematical apparatus, in accordance with the task.
And here is the task and matter. The fact of the matter is that, in addition to channel breaks due
to manufacturing technology conditioning, control and operating conditions (environmental,
temperature, pressure, cyclicality), there are other, more difficult events to account for (for
example, localized core overheating, circulation violations). Is all of this accounted for?
From the three excerpts from the report, I want to emphasize the words “design basis
accident” not because they have great significance there. The reason is different. It’s not
entirely clear why the authors push it so incessantly. It was intentional. Do they want to say that
the accident on April 26 was beyond design basis? And with us they say bribes are smooth?
Yes, the accident is beyond design basis. In my opinion, such an accident, even in design, isn’t
necessary to envisage, only under some hypothetical conditions. It should be excluded in the
construction of the reactor and design of the reactor installation, and our regulatory documents
meet this condition. The reactor construction did not meet the conditions, which is why the
accident occurred. And do the creators of the reactor and the supervising organizations have
anything to do with it? Was the accident beyond design basis? Yes and no, it was namely due
to the construction.
The advance of the creators of the reactor is fraught with serious future consequences if
allowed to grow stronger.
The drafters of the report are going backwards by pushing through the narrative that
operation of the reactor at low power was prohibited. They write:
- The RBMK 1000 units are intended for base load operation (at constant power).
- The fast power coefficient of reactivity at the working point gives a negative value.
Everyone is trying to create the impression that the reactor was fine. You might not pay
attention because there are normal correct thoughts in the report, yes, but after all, everything
should be like this: the drafters (23 of them) are all completely competent people, and the
signatories are all leaders in their field. But something interferes with them and still interferes
after five years. And you can’t dismiss this, because the future of atomic energy depends on
these, if not people, then organizations.
The conclusion of the report turned out to be quite logical in connection with the
juxtaposition of the authors:

1. “The accident was caused by interaction of the following main factors: the physical
characteristics of the reactor; specific design features of the control elements; and the
unauthorized state into which the reactor was brought.”

Well, we have already had our fill of features. An unauthorized state too - again pointing
the finger at the operating personnel. But after all, the deviation of any parameter from normal
is an unauthorized state; On April 26 it was reactivity margin. And what, if a parameter
deviates, the reactor should explode? Then all reactors should explode, there are no reactors
that don’t deviate from normal parameters. But their construction and protection are such that
the chain reaction is stopped without unacceptable violations.

2. “Thanks to the availability of new, up to date computer programs, the use of powerful
computers, and experimental studies which have been carried out on the coolant
vaporization effect in RBMKs, we have been able to define more accurately the main
physical parameters of the reactor and thus develop new sets of requirements for
systems which improve reactor safety.”

This statement is five percent true. Only in the sense that studies and improvement
should naturally continue while the reactor is in operation. It has nothing to do with the accident,
and they all knew for a long time: and about the void effect *(<This is not true. The void effect
was not known>), and about the EPS, and about the construction of the rods. And there are no
new requirements in the measures of the accepted modernization plan. What should be done
so the void effect is no longer a problem? In 1976 a decision and a plan to achieve it were
made, and those exact paths were taken after the accident. The high-speed protection with
plenum cooling was developed no later than 1973. That it is impossible to construct reactivity
control mechanisms that change the sign of the reactivity introduced when moving them in one
direction, this is elementary. The fact of the matter is that not one factor in the accident was
unknown to them; there is not one new requirement after the accident, everything is simply
aimed at fulfilling the requirements of GSP and NSR, adopted and put in place more than ten
years before the accident.
So here came the final report of the organizations related to the RBMK reactor and the
supervisory authority along with them. The position of the supervisory authority representative,
V. Petrov, is very interesting: in this report, he signed on to assertions that the RBMK reactor
with with all its systems including RCPS “ensured” safe operation; practically at the very same
time he signed a document which stated quite correctly that this reactor did not meet the fifteen
articles of GSP and NSR directly influencing the occurrence of the accident on April 26, 1986. It
turns out, according to Mr. State Inspector, a reactor having several inconsistencies with
regulatory documents is still fine and quite suitable for operation. Maybe State Inspector, Mr.
Petrov, with such a large number of RBMK-86 project deviations from the requirements of
regulatory design standards, no longer considers it a reactor (and this would be correct) and is
guided by other documents (which ones?) and intuition. But in the report, the RBMK-86 is
called a reactor, so it must meet the requirements of GSP and NSR.
But there has been a shift in the last five years. They squeezed it out of themselves that
the accident occurred due to physical characteristics of the reactor, design features of the
control elements, and the reactor was brought to an unauthorized state. Previously these
people only recognized the cause to be an extremely improbable combination of violations of
instructions, and an unauthorized state. And since it’s clear that on April 26, 1986, the accident
would not have happened even with:
- a steam void effect of reactivity of 6β;
- a positive fast power reactivity coefficient in a wide range of reactor powers;
- an EPS that maybe did not meet its requirements, but at least did not introduce positive
reactivity,
then how many years do these people need to unconditionally recognize the cause of the
accident solely as the properties of the reactor?
I am writing this only because these people live nuclear energy, they rule, and as you
can see, you can’t count on their openness.
Note: V. Petrov later withdrew his signature.
PART 8: PEOPLE

Academician A.P. Aleksandrov

Of course, he deserves a special discussion. In 1986, he was President of The USSR

Academy of Sciences, Director of the IAE, Head of Science for the RBMK theme, and inventor
of the RBMK*(<The inventor of the RBMK was not A.P. Aleksandrov, but S.M. Feinberg>). What
other posts and positions he held then, I do not know. In those listed, he had a direct tie to the
catastrophe on April 26, 1986.
It may be that I am biased against him, for I am convinced that it was namely the trade of
A.P. Aleksandrov, that lost me my health and made me a prisoner. As the inventor of the
reactor, and Head of Science, he did not provide the necessary quality. As President, as
Director of the Institute, and as chair of the Interdepartmental Science and Technology Council,
he directed the investigation down the wrong path. Still, I will not allow any fabrication, I will
only present facts known to me and my understanding of them.
Twenty years ago, while still working in Komsomolsk on Amur, I went on a business trip
to the IAE. E. Alikin and other employees at the institute said that the director had a rule: The
paper should lay low, and if it becomes a scandal, then it needs to go. At the time I didn’t think
this mannerism of A.P. Aleksandrov would take such a heavy toll on the fates of so many
people, including my own.
Apparently, following his own rule, A.P. Aleksandrov did not take action on the proposals
of the commission, V.P. Volkov, and V.L. Ivanov following the accident at Leningrad NPP Unit 1.
These proposals and solutions from The Technical-Sciences Council of Minsredmash to reduce
the steam void effect of reactivity to 1β as early as the seventies, were made in vain, and laid
collecting dust. Waiting for a scandal? They waited!..
Tell me, who could prevent the academician from bringing all of this to life. Who would
want to? There are no such people. He didn’t have to do anything himself. Only allow it and
give the command. And since people didn’t know about Chernobyl until 1986, they wouldn’t
have known about it to this day.
I present an excerpt from A.A. Yadrikhinsky’s report:
 “Since 1965, staff members I.F. Zhezherun, V.P. Volkov, and V.L. Ivanov have pointed
out the nuclear danger of the proposed and subsequently implemented RBMK design at these
very NPPs. Their actions were successfully blocked by academician A.P. Aleksandrov and laid
“collecting dust”.
The launch and operation of the first unit of the Leningrad NPP in 1975 had in practice
already confirmed the nuclear danger of RBMK reactors. If violations of Regulations in the
RBMK project prior to the launch of the first unit at LNPP can be considered errors, then the
continued operation and subsequent replication following the experimental confirmation and
operating experience of the first Unit of LNPP, can only be called a crime.”
With further operation, other unsatisfactory, dangerous qualities of the RBMK reactor
presented themselves, which A.P. Aleksandrov knew about.
There is no doubt that knowing all of this up to the accident on April 26, when it
occurred, the academician clearly realized that the accident was a clear result of scientific and
design miscalculations. And then to save his own reputation (who would judge him - three times
a Hero and eight orders of Lenin?), pulled all levers to dump the blame solely on the personnel.
This was not difficult for him to do since the investigation was dominated by The Ministry of
Medium Machine Building, IAE, and NIKIET. And such a conclusion poured balm on all of the
hearts to the very top.
And look how strongly the academician defends his position! Five years and no change.
He would have had no use for dissenters. An interview with the academician was printed in
“Ogonyok” Issue No 35 of 1990. Very characteristic. A.P. Aleksandrov says to the
correspondent that he was not a part of the commission investigating the causes of the
accident. Formally yes, an academician doesn’t go into such business where you earn nothing
but bruises. In actuality, he constantly followed and directed it where he needed to.
Continuing his words:
“Understand, the reactor has flaws. It was created long ago by Dollezhal, an
academician, with the knowledge of that time. Now these flaws are minimized and
compensated for. It isn’t about the design. You drive a car and turn the wheel in the wrong
direction - an accident! Is the motor to blame? Or the builder of the car? Everyone answers:
“The unqualified driver is at fault.”
A very characteristic statement. It is amazing what lies a couple dozen words can
contain. Let’s figure out what is here.
Firstly, the reactor has “flaws”. No! The reactor has unacceptable defects which
disqualify it from operation, clear violations of regulatory documents accepted by the state. The
academician doesn’t talk about them. He, like the commission, doesn’t see these point blank
documents. In writing I indicated how EPS “conforms” to Regulations requirements. And as
professor B.G. Dubovsky, who headed the USSR Nuclear Security Service until 1973, says in
an abstract:
“It is unfathomable to the mind how heads of the RCPS project, and
Gosatomenergonadzor of the USSR could… make such major, often lacking elementary logic,
miscalculations.
In fact, RBMK-86 reactors (*meaning RBMK-1000 reactors as they were in 1986, A.D.)
did not have basic protection. They had no EP. Neither from below the core nor from above.”
 This is all B.G. Dubovsky says after his analysis of protection. A few years before the
accident, he gave recommendations for its improvement. The result of these suggestions is the
same - to the waste basket.
Chief designer, N.A. Dollezhal himself admitted that a reactor with such a highly positive
reactivity effect is uncontrollable. He found it impossible to lie in his later years.
Maybe the creator of the reactor doesn’t know that it should meet standards? Does that
fit with common sense?
Secondly, A.P. Aleksandrov deftly and quite masterfully points the finger at N.A.
Dollezhal. Of course, the Chief designer bears responsibility, but that shouldn’t absolve A.P.
Aleksandrov. Dollezhal made no money for its invention, unlike A.P. Aleksandrov. Patent
applications were denied twice by the Union Bureau (“Literary Gazette” Issue No. 20 of 1989),
then pushed through the department in secret. And in my opinion, the Union Bureau rejected it
without reason. There are obvious features to this invention:
- any reactor can be a nuclear hazard with a small ORM. The RBMK is a nuclear hazard
whether it’s large or small:
- a multipurpose EPS - both shuts down the reactor, and accelerates it.

Furthermore, A.P. Aleksandrov held an official position - Scientific Director of the RBMK
Theme. Therefore, how the reactor was with its creation, and how it was all the way up to the
accident, was a direct contribution from the academician.
Thirdly, A.P. Aleksandrov says that now these flaws are minimized and compensated for.
He speaks correctly. And is silent on all these “flaws” which he knew about long before the
accident at Chernobyl. We’ll visit the selectivity of the academician’s memory a little later.
Fourthly, the academician is misrepresenting when he talks about the car, the designer
and the driver.
According to the objective evidence of the control system, we pressed the EPS button in
the absence of any emergency signals. Were we right to expect a normal shutdown of the
reactor? Of course. Protection is obligated to fulfill this even in the presence of emergency
signals. That’s what EPS is. The actuation of reactor protection by the operator can in no way
qualify as a violation of nuclear safety. Accordingly, we didn’t “turn the wheel in the wrong
direction.” A more relevant and correct comparison with a car would be: “You’re driving a car
and press the brake. Instead of slowing down, the car accelerates - an accident! Is the driver to
blame? Or maybe some designer, citizen academician?”
You see, academician A.P. Aleksandrov, like a true academician, says:
“Think about it, why did an accident occur in Chernobyl, and not in Leningrad?”
That still wasn’t enough!
In 1975, Leningrad NPP only coincidentally avoided a catastrophe for different reasons,
but similar in scope to Chernobyl. Due to local overheating in the core, a technological channel
ruptured. But in that situation, it was completely possible for three-four channels to rupture
simultaneously, because about 20 parts were replaced during repairs. As is clear now, a
simultaneous rupture of 3-4 channels is precisely what led to Chernobyl.
 The academician has an especially selective memory. He recalls the turbine, the valves,
but the reactor, which is clearly the topic of conversation, A.P. Aleksandrov does not remember.
He also refuses his memory when he talks about the navy, and submarines.
“We had no troubles at the naval installations, and back then in 1957, the industry was
less developed, but nothing happened, we managed.”
In Chernobyl too, the industry managed, yes…
In the water cooled reactors on the boats, until 1973 I also don’t recall any accidents due
to defects in equipment manufacturing. But there were, due to scientific provision, or rather
non-provision, to which the academician had a direct relationship.
If memory serves, in 1962 on a nuclear boat, a 10 mm in diameter impulse line in the
primary system piping broke off. Yes, it is a small line, and the primary system volume is small.
The crew tried to take measures to prevent the core from losing cooling. Those guys
understood that they were being irradiated, and did it. Why? Because they were afraid:
- after melting, highly enriched fuel will form a compact mass and a nuclear explosion will
occur
- if an explosion doesn’t occur, the bottom of the reactor vessel and hull of the boat may
melt.

After the accident, the Institute performed a calculation which showed that there would
have been no explosion, or penetration of the hull. They calculated this after the accident, but
not before. But the dead can’t return. If the crew had this information, they would have
battened down the hatches of the compartment and went to the base, the reactor was lost
anyway. There would have been no casualties.
I knew the crews of many submarines. I can’t speak to the current ones. Back then, the
overwhelming majority of the officers serving at the nuclear installations were competent
specialists, commanders of battle section five, i.e. mechanics, all without exception. But the
crew is not a part of the Institute. They have different capabilities and tasks. The crew fulfilled
its duty to exhaustion, and the head of science, A.P. Aleksandrov, was late.
Another case. At one of the shipyards, they placed a temporary plug on the nozzle of
the reactor head, and during hydraulic tests, it blew out. A rod of a lattice, which suppresses
reactivity, passed through the nozzle. When the water gushed out in a stream, it lifted the
lattice, and an explosion occurred. With the pressure, the reactor head was lifted (the mounting
studs were pulled out), water flowed into the workshop, and the reaction stopped. I don’t
remember, but it seems that no one was killed.
The plant’s head of the physics laboratory was arrested. Just like that. Two institutes -
scientists and designers - they didn’t lose in emergency situations, and the plant worker had to
guess that if the plug failed, the lattice could be lifted.
How similar it is to Chernobyl. And the main character is the same. An accident
occurred, and they immediately calculated that EPS can introduce positive reactivity up to 1β in
the first few seconds? Not before the accident, but after!
There is no need to speak about the conclusion on ECCS and the test program again
and again to refute conjecture. But this tirade by the academician that necessarily portrays his
horror and indignation, is what I want to comment on most of all.
 “So this you won’t believe! At the very beginning of the Regulations of that experiment, it
is written: “Disconnect the emergency core cooling system - the ECCS system.” But it is namely
this that automatically starts the emergency protection system. Moreover, all of the valves were
closed so it was impossible to turn on the protection system. Twelve times (!) The Regulations
of the experiment violate the operating instructions for NPPs. In a nightmare you wouldn’t
dream of this. The NPP operated for eleven hours with ECCS disconnected! As if the devil was
managing and preparing this explosion.”
What expressions, and pathos! But after all, this is all a show for the public. The
academician knows perfectly well that ECCS being disconnected had no effect on the
occurrence of the accident. Everyone, including his student V.A. Legasov, and even an
extremely biased forensic-technical commission, recognizes this. We removed ECCS because
according to those documents, the chief engineer was allowed to do this, although one can
agree with an unconditional ban on the removal of the system, no matter how small the
likelihood of a DBA (April 26 was not one) at the same time.
With my non-academic mind, I cannot understand the phrase “But it is namely this that
automatically starts the emergency protection system.” According to GSP, ECCS itself is a
protection system and doesn’t start anything.
We already know how violations are woven. ECCS was disconnected for eleven hours
on Unit 4. A nightmare. Dear Anatoly Petrovich, I beg your pardon for the naive question. Do
you have nightmares about the two units at Leningrad, Kursk, and Chernobyl NPPs already
operating for several years without ECCS? After all, what is there very closely meets the
requirements.
And the Christian-like humility of academician A.P. Aleksandrov: “I am no one’s judge” -
a hypocritical pose, a wolf in sheep’s clothing. But what is he doing in this interview?
Repenting? Doesn’t look like it. He continues to unjustly blame the personnel. As they say,
where there’s a will, there’s a way. For A.P. Aleksandrov, where there’s an article, there’s a lie.

From the Newspaper “Izvestia” 10/14/89: “A little earlier, the groundwork for nuclear energy was
laid - the first NPP in the world was built (Chernobyl is the result of a “period of stagnation” i.e. a
period of general irresponsibility).”

And in this period of stagnation, the system is dumped. What does a period of
stagnation have to do with this? Who could have intervened, who could have done this,
eliminated the reactor’s unacceptable defects? He himself manifested irresponsibility first of all.
And if he is irresponsible, then there are no means at all. Recommendations, moreover
necessary ones, came long before the accident. Regarding the RBMK reactor, no one was
above A.P. Aleksandrov, everything directed by him would be done* (<Dyatlov is mistaken that
Aleksandrov could do everything. What I.Ya. Yemelyanov did not want done, Aleksandrov could
not do>). Another matter, is it possible to really lead while holding a mountain of positions and
posts?
The newspaper Pravda threw a bone to the academician by publishing his speech to the
Central Committee of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) with the mass
resignation of elderly members of the Central Committee. There he said:
 “To manage such an institute as the IAE, the largest institute with the most complex
work, and at the same time take on the work of the academy myself - I must say, it was
extremely difficult. And finally, it ended sadly. And when the Chernobyl accident happened, I
believe that was the beginning of the end of my life, and my creative life.”
Before that, he told me that he was forcibly roped into being President of the Academy.
Maybe. It would have been impossible to refuse. Could he leave his position as Director of the
Institute? Could he have refused other posts? What can one do in the field of ten to fifteen
posts and positions? He couldn’t reap what he didn’t sow.

Academician V.A. Legasov

I agree with the rule about the dead. Speak well or not at all. But overall I don’t see a
big sin, since the academician himself did not adhere to it. The operators, which he accused by
signing the conclusion of the government commission, had already died at that time. What he
did was on the same plane as the Soviet specialists and IAEA informants.
I do not want to talk about V.A. Legasov’s work on the liquidation in the aftermath of the
accident. Recently statements have come out regarding the fallacy of several technical
decisions made at that time. Well there has never been a lack of good hindsight, and not now.
Sitting in a comfortable office for years, eventually you can think of something useful. You’re in
extreme conditions for a short time, make decisions and then see if they’re optimal. And
besides that, why should incorrect decisions be attributed to Legasov. Was he alone? Velikhov
was. Or is it dangerous to criticize Velikhov? Alive and in power.
V.A. Legasov’s specialty was not in reactors, he didn’t specifically know power plants,
and I believe he couldn’t have specifically figured it out anyway. By virtue of character, he
trusted others. But this in no way justifies or explains his signature under the conclusion of the
government commission and actions at the IAEA.
A man of wide erudition, he was engaged in general industrial safety issues. With all of
the specifics of chemical, oil, or nuclear enterprises, safety issues have a lot in common.
No, academician V.A. Legasov could not understand that accusing the staff of such an
explosion is illegitimate. He couldn’t understand that if a reactor explosion occurred in such
normal conditions, without any kind of natural disasters, that it consequently had no right to
exist.
They should not and cannot be allowed to explode releasing huge quantities of
radioactive substances into the surrounding area. With the consciousness of this, he couldn’t
understand it in any way, he naturally had to arrive at the question - why did the explosion occur
after all? Even without figuring out, or coming to an understanding of the personnel errors.
After such a question, the direct path to follow is: did the reactor meet the accepted
nuclear safety standards? If so, do these standards sufficiently meet the level of safety criteria?
These questions were unable to come up. Any accident investigation is carried out using
operating and design documentation, and equipment certificates. There is nothing new here.
And the very first push in this direction would have shown clear discrepancies between the
reactor and GSP/NSR. Yes, you didn’t need to go anywhere for this, they are in the
Government Commission’s conclusion, only there is no reference to “Regulations”, but they are
called shortcomings.
Therefore I am certain: there is no conscious mention of the regulatory documents in the
conclusion. And the main person responsible for this is academician Legasov along with the
chairman of the commission, B.E. Shcherbina. Not the Minister of Internal Affairs, he answered
for his part in the commission, not for the technology.
V.A. Legasov does not bear any personal responsibility for the RBMK reactor and
generally had no relation to its existence before the accident. With his signatures, he covered
up the sins of others, consciously covered them up. And not so unexpectedly in a letter from
the senior scientist of the institute: “ Legasov is a clear representative of the scientific mafia,
whose politicking instead of leadership in science led to the Chernobyl accident…”, which V.
Gubarev writes about in “Pravda.” Apparently not so unexpected is his non-selection to the
Scientific Technical Council of the Institute: 100 for, 129 against.
What did he put his authority on, and who put pressure on him? We will not learn this.
No, V.A. Legasov’s report at the IAEA conference in Vienna did not bring him worldwide fame.
And he apparently understood this.
I would like to think that the academician was mistaken, and didn’t understand the
causes of the catastrophe, because it is painfully sad to think otherwise.
What did we live to?! I can’t, it’s not working. Elementary logic doesn’t stand. And V.A.
Legasov’s exit from life on the very anniversary of Chernobyl, says the same thing.
But I don’t attribute it to the mafia. This man had a conscience. Under the
circumstances, he made a cruel compromise with his conscience and couldn’t take it. Selection
continues. Having human qualities, they are knocked out, one way or another.

Dr. A.A. Abagyan

Director of VNIIAES - his other positions don’t interest us.

He was also part of the first commission on the investigation into the causes of the
Chernobyl accident. He, with Deputy Minister Shasharin, refused to sign the report as part of a
group of workers from Minenergo, and participated in writing a more realistic addendum to the
investigation report. Included in a group of Soviet specialists who informed the international
community at the IAEA, he sharply changed his position. Why he did this, I don’t know. Either
because Shasharin was removed from his position by then and was therefore no longer the
boss, or he “wisened up” and joined the majority. I don’t know what I don’t know.
I’m simply stating that Dr. A.A. Abagyan’s opinion, without the appearance of any new
research materials, changed to the opposite within two months. At this time, the Government
Commission’s report, which provided A.A. Abagyan no new technical information, and the
Politburo’s decision, which naturally contained no technical information, had just been released.
I won’t compare the entirety of the two documents, I will only give one specific example.
- From the addendum to the investigation report:
 Item 8: “The blocking of EPS on shutdown of both TGs, does not contradict Technical
Regulations and Instructions, and the actuation of this protection could not have prevented the
accident,… it would have occurred 35 sec. Earlier.”
- From the report to the IAEA (table of violations committed by operating personnel):
- Violation: Blocking of reactor protection system relying on shutdown signal from
two turbogenerators
- Consequences: Loss of possibility of automatic shutdown of the reactor

Both documents are signed by A.A. Abagyan: one in May, and the other in July of 1986.
Let’s suppose his opinion on the named issue changed, it changes the conclusions.
This could be understood. But Dr. Abagyan, how do you tell people to understand your two
opinions on blocking protection? In Regulations, it clearly states when it is taken out, and there
is no room for misunderstanding.
In the magazine “Our Contemporary”, it seems the doctor reports that they answered
questions from specialists and correspondents for five hours a day. Little by little it becomes
clear how they answered, how they tried to present the personnel to the international
community, (A.A. Abagyan’s expression) “beautifully, objectively” presented, Thank you!
That was protection. But regarding reactor power:
- In the addendum to the report, it is shown in detail that not one pre-accident document
shows any restriction on reactor operation at any power level, including at 200 MWth.
- The international community was informed that operation at power levels less than 700
MWth was prohibited by Regulations.

Quick and clear. A lie. So what?

These are the “principal” people that were involved, and continued to be involved in the
investigation. Well, he is the master of his own word: I gave it, and I took it back.

PART 9: WORKS OF ART

For a long time I didn’t read anything about the accident in general: No magazines, no
newspapers. Volodya Pchelin provided classics, and Pyotr Vyrodov provided detective books.
It seems like I read nothing else there. I didn’t really watch tv even though I was in the ward.
One time in the hospital, V.S. Konviz suggested “Sarcophagus” by V. Gubarav, but I declined.
The fact is that the investigator interrogated me several times in the hospital as a material
witness, but I already realized the general direction of the investigation, and to which side it was
going. Therefore I didn’t expect to see a real assessment of the events in publications from
newspapers and magazines.
I was discharged from the hospital on November 4, 1986, and I arrived in Kiev with my
wife the next day. I lived in freedom for a month, and with the help of two walks a day, began to
restore my coordination, and little by little began getting back to being myself. All of this was
difficult. During the illness I lost fifteen kilograms which I never recovered. I never had fat so I
lost muscle, which you can’t restore by eating.
And on December 4, I was locked up. The possibility of following the news is limited in a
pre-trial detention center. And after the trial, I was in shock for a long time. I couldn’t read
periodicals or normal books. Yes, frankly speaking, I still have no desire to read about the
catastrophe now, although I do. Now there is no more indiscriminate groaning about the staff
being thrown around, which even the well-wishers will distort. For example the staff considered
the reactor to be as simple and reliable as a cabinet, they weren’t warned, which is why they
violated the instructions. Gentlemen, no such defense or accusation is needed. We would have
talked with operators at other RBMK reactors beforehand. No, they don’t expect a
Chernobyl-like explosion - such is the pathology. No, they don’t expect EPS to introduce
positive reactivity - this isn’t even possible to qualify. As the Ukrainian would say - bezgluzdya
nisenitnitsya (nonsense). In other words, the operators don’t expect tricks or traps from the
designers. But even a compliant reactor made according to the norm, if the operating rules are
not complied with, has the threat of disaster, although not on the scale of Chernobyl. In every
article you can run into a slap in the face. It would seem that there were so many that it’s time
to get used to it. No, everything hurts.
We will not touch on purely artistic works, this is a job for literary critics. We will consider
only two documentary narratives, with a focus on how documentary they are.

G. Medvedev

Chernobyl Notebook

It would not make sense to dwell on this work if the author had called it artistic.
However, the author called this work a documentary, and kept the real names of the participants
in the events. So far as I understand this genre, according to its rules, the presentation of
events and actions of the people, are only subject to the will and fantasy of the author to a small
extent. Accuracy should in no way be sacrificed for colorful descriptions. If you want to write
beautifully, artistically, unbounded by moral norms in front of the living and the dead, write like a
free artist, not naming real names.
G. Medvedev in his work, took the tone of a mentor, or rather, a prosecutor. The
composition by its content and peremptory opinions, can be considered “an indictment” and
passed on as a judgment with the goal of handing us (the operating personnel and myself) a
more severe sentence, since the work of G. Medvedev cites new crimes not denoted by the
investigation.
Well, what then? He probably would have the moral right to judge if he conscientiously
understood the circumstances of the accident, and in areas where he doesn’t rely on the opinion
of knowledgeable people, based it on his own extensive experience in operations, which he
repeatedly mentions in the story. His recollection is incorrect. In fact, as it turns out, G.
Medvedev did not work one day at an operating nuclear station. He worked in Melekess from
1964-1972 at a VK-50, but this is an experimental reactor, not a nuclear station. He was at
Chernobyl NPP from 1972-1974, when it was far from operation. The first unit at Chernobyl
NPP was launched on September 16, 1977. Since 1974 he has lived in Moscow. As far as I
know, there have never been any nuclear power plants there. Even in the office, he had no
connection with NPP operation, he was involved with the supply of equipment at the station.
This was the actual case when he “worked at operating nuclear stations.”
In the same part:
“I arrived at the nuclear power plant’s construction site in the settlement of Pripyat
directly from a Moscow clinic, where I had been undergoing treatment for radiation sickness. I
was still not feeling well, but I could walk and decided that I would get back to normal more
quickly if I was working.”
I don’t know how he walked - badly or well, but according to information from Hospital
No. 6 (A.K. Guskov and A.F. Shamardina), G. Medvedev did not have radiation sickness and his
dose was minimal.
In light of the above circumstances, G. Medvedev’s knowledge on the technical aspects
of ChNPP and its technological systems (in 1974 when he left the station there weren’t even
schematics yet) is strictly approximate. Therefore, he himself could not have understood the
causes of the accident. He did not enlist the help of knowledgeable people, and judging by the
text in his work, his desktop reference was the Soviet specialists’ report to the IAEA, the
incorrect provisions of which were reinforced by Medvedev’s own comprehension. Well, as for
the question of reactor physics, and the RBMK physics in particular, Medvedev the great
authority himself does not enlist the help of anyone and repeatedly blunders.
It is especially surprising how one could achieve a practically one hundred percent
non-coincidence of presentation of the technical aspects with reality. It is pointless to criticize
this part of the work. Every paragraph would need to be rewritten and explained. Therefore, to
demonstrate the “documentation” of the work, I will make a few comments. At the end of the
given quotes, I indicate the page of the publication in the magazine “Novy Mir” No. 6, 1989, and
you will see that the text is taken in sequence, and also that the sequence is inaccurate.
G. Medvedev writes:
“While the unit was shut down, in accordance with a program approved by Chief
Engineer N.M. Fomin, tests were to be run to completely deprive the power plant’s equipment of
power while the reactor’s safety systems were turned off. The energy of the coasting of the
turbogenerator (rotation by inertia) was to be used to generate electric power.” (pg. 16)
I have the program right in front of me. It is also here in an appendix. There is not a
single word in the “TG Rundown Program” about shutting down the reactor’s safety systems.
Either the author of the work didn’t see the program with his own eyes, or didn’t understand
anything in it.
Complete de-energization of the unit equipment was not expected. On the contrary, per
the program, all the loads of the unit were transferred to backup power, and only the loads
necessary for the experiment were powered from the running down TG. This was done in order
to ensure a normal cool down of the unit after the lowering frequency of the running out TG and
disconnection of loads from it. In particular, four of the eight MCPs were powered from backup
power along with the remaining auxiliary loads and all essential power loads.
“What was the nature of the experiment, and why was it necessary? The reason was
that if the nuclear plant should suddenly be without power, all the machinery would, of course,
stop, including the pumps pumping coolant water through the reactor core. As a consequence,
there would be a meltdown of the core, which is equivalent to the worst case scenario
envisaged by the design (DBA). Use of any possible sources of electric power in such cases
was in fact envisaged by the experiment with the coasting of the turbogenerator rotor. After all,
so long as the generator rotor is turning, electric power is being generated. It can and must be
used in critical cases. The coasting regime is one of the subsystems in the DBA.” (pg. 16)
When the power plant auxiliary loads are de-energized (without a DBA), core cooling is
maintained by the MCPs due to the kinetic energy of the inertial flywheel provided on each
pump, then due to natural circulation of the coolant. The remaining loads are powered by
emergency diesel generators and batteries. ECCS is not involved with this.
A DBA is in no way tantamount to melting the reactor core. With core melt, the RBMK
reactor and the unit are considered to be severely damaged. It would be impossible to prevent
contamination of the building, and likely the territory of the station. With a DBA, none of this
should happen, although it is a major accident.
Indeed, the generator rundown regime is used for one of the ECCS subsystems during a
DBA. But as far as the rest of the loads, in this case it is only intended to ensure operation of
the feed pumps. A calculation for the MCPs during a DBA was not performed, since, depending
on the nature of the accident, they could be lost in the very first seconds. Of the long quotation,
only the last sentence is partially correct.
“Such tests had been conducted even earlier at the Chernobyl plant and other nuclear
power plants, but with the reactor’s safety systems in operation. And everything had gone well.
I myself have had occasion to take part in them.” (pg. 16)
EPS was fully in service for the given mode at the time.
Such tests which G. Medvedev writes about in his own story were not conducted at other
stations.
I participated in all of these tests and did not see G. Medvedev. And in what capacity
would he participate in by supplying equipment?
A true documentarian!
Only the words are real. Not the content expressed by them.
“When the reactor is loaded with fresh fuel, its reactivity margin (put simply - capacity for
growth of neutron power) exceeds the ability of the control rods to stifle the reaction. In this
case, a portion of the fuel (fuel assemblies) is withdrawn, and stationary absorbing rods
(referred to as additional absorbers - AAs) are inserted in their place so as to help the rods that
move. As the uranium is consumed, these supplemental absorbers are withdrawn and nuclear
fuel is installed in their place.
But there is an unalterable rule: As the fuel is consumed, the number of control rods
inserted in the core must not be less than 28-30 (since the Chernobyl accident, this number has
been increased to 72), since a situation can occur at any moment in which the fuel’s ability to
increase the power proves to be greater than the absorbing ability of the control rods.
These 28-30 rods which are in the zone of high effectiveness, represent in fact the
operational reactivity margin. In other words, in all stages of the reactor’s operation its capacity
for excursion must not exceed the ability of the control rods to shut down the reactor.” (pg. 17)
For those of you who understand reactor physics, do not despair and do not call yourself
dumb if you understand nothing from this long excerpt. There is nothing to understand here.
This is called “talking out your ass”. The point is this. After the startup of Leningrad NPP Unit 1,
as the fuel burned out, they started removing AA and replacing them with fuel assemblies. They
started to notice that the reactor was behaving more and more “capriciously” - to control it, it
was necessary to adjust the rods up to 40 times a minute. This was due to the increasing
steam effect of reactivity. They performed some calculations and came up with two
recommendations to reduce it: increase the uranium-235 fuel enrichment (it was 1.8% at LNPP),
or don’t remove part of the AA.
Then it was decided to leave at least 30 AA in the core. This of course is not enough
with a 1.8% enrichment, or even 2.0%.
Then the fuel enrichment was increased to 2%, the study baselessly considered it to be
sufficient, and then all AA were extracted because of their adverse economical effect. So at
Chernobyl Unit 4, by April 26, one AA remained in the core. I don’t remember why the remaining
one was there.
AAs have nothing to do with ORM. It is compensated (suppressed, absorbed) by the
RCPS rods - The manual, AR, and shortened absorber rods can all be quickly (efficiently)
released by the reactor operator. And it takes several hours to extract one AA using a loading
and unloading machine, and what kind of efficiency is that?
“In January 1986, V.P. Bryukanov, manager of the plant, sent the program of the tests for
clearance to the general designer at Hydroproject and to Gosatomenergonadzor. No answer
came. This disturbed neither the management of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant nor the
operating association Soyuzatomenergo. Nor did this disturb Hydroproject and
Gosatomenergonadzor.” (pg. 17)
Then for the next two pages, G. Medvedev goes on to describe how irresponsible these
people were and how nothing good should be expected from them.
To add credibility, he even specifically says “in January 1986”. Remember what
Saltykov-Shchedrin says about the next mayor: found in bed, eaten alive by bedbugs in 1856.
No. The program was signed by the chief engineer on April 24, 1986.
I’m not saying that Gosatomenergonadzor and Hydroproject performed their duties
flawlessly, but there is no need to lie to prove it.
“Another detail has to be added here, one which has not been mentioned in any of the
technical reports on what happened. Here is that detail: The regime with the spinning rotor of
the generator and with emergency safety systems practically inoperative had been planned in
advance and was not only reflected in the test program, the technical preparations had even
been made. Two weeks before the experiment the DBA (Design Basis Accident) button had
been inserted into the panel of the large control board of generating Unit 4; it was wired only to
the secondary power circuits, but not the monitoring and measuring instruments and the pumps.
That is, the signal produced by that button was just a simulation.” (pg. 19)
This is grasping for straws. He dug up the button, but he was not the first. It was
brought up by the forensic experts and in the indictment. The button was not installed two
weeks earlier, but on April 25, as the witness electrician Molay testified. Operators won’t allow
the installation of anything without a program.
The commissions do not mention this button in their reports because nothing can be
sucked out of it to accuse the personnel. Only the forensic experts and G. Medvedev bring it
up. Experts say that there were no documents for it, but G. Medvedev somehow came up with
it. This is what he says about it.
“Let us explain once again for the general reader: When the emergency safety system
(EP) is activated, all 211 control rods fall downward, cooling water shoots in, emergency pumps
are turned on, and the diesel generators providing reliable electric power are started up.
Emergency pumps supplying water from the clean condensate tanks and pumps supplying
water from the bubbler pond to the reactor are also activated. That is the safety systems are
more than adequate if they are activated at the right time.
So all of these safety systems should thus have been wired to the DBA button. But
unfortunately they had been disabled - since the operators were afraid of a heat shock to the
reactor, that is, the inflow of cold water into the hot reactor. This poor excuse for an idea had
apparently hypnotized both the management of the nuclear power plant (Bryukhanov, Fomin,
and Dyatlov) and the superior organizations in Moscow.” (pg. 19)
G. Medvedev has mixed everything up into a pile. The actuating mechanisms are
different for various signals and algorithms. Let’s assume he is talking about EPS with a DBA.
But during the experiment, the system was not intended to inject at all, why then connect ECCS
tanks and pumps supplying water from bubbler ponds to it? There is simply nowhere to send
the water - the drum separators will fill it.
The emergency core cooling system is designed for use in a DBA. It wasn’t in use on
April 26, 1986, there was no DBA. I don’t know how to qualify it, it is called the maximum
projected accident. Let it be so!
I will not bring any other considerations forward, I think that feeble minded people should
listen to the clever thoughts of the experienced NPP operator. And if it really could have
prevented the accident? Well, as they say, trust but verify. Let’s take G. Medvedev’s idea of
placing ECCS in service at the start of running down the TG. How could this affect the process
of the reactor? The coolant flowrate was already high without it, so just additional cold water to
the reactor, namely the core. Cold water would reduce steam, and therefore reactivity. It is
necessary to consider only the “instantaneous” part of ECCS, nothing else matters. Let’s agree
that the EPS signal will also be actuated with the DBA button.
We will of course use the time registered by the centralized control system “Skala”,
rather than the time presented in the story, taken from nowhere: 01:23:40 - the EPS-5 button is
pressed, 01:23:46 - 47 - the explosion of the reactor.
 This means we have 6 sec. at our disposal, since here the pressure in the system has
already increased, and the water supply from even the feed pump would have stopped, not to
mention the tanks.
The task before us is simple. Will cold water be able to reach the core in 6 seconds?
The calculation which I do not provide here, shows that even with the partial opening of the
valves, water from the collector at the +30m mark will take longer than 10 sec. to reach it.
And after 10 seconds, this water has nothing to do. There is no core.
Another option is actuating ECCS when steam is isolated from the turbine, and the EPS
button is pressed after 36 seconds, as it was on the unit. It also provides nothing. In 36
seconds, cold water will pass through the entire core, and the introduced negative reactivity will
be compensated for by the power regulator.
So this is the situation with G. Medvedev’s advice to connect ECCS.
I believe you should know the subject you are talking about. I have dwelled on the
details of this issue for the following reason: while I was still in prison, a pretty French television
reporter was pressing me on why they didn’t have water. I couldn’t understand at all what kind
of water she was talking about. When the interview was over, she said that she had read G.
Medvedev’s book. Only then did I understand what kind of water she was talking about. And
the story walks around the world, sowing lies.
The already biased forensic expert commission was forced to admit that ECCS being out
of service affected neither the occurrence nor development of the accident.
And all further reasoning on this issue in the story is completely baseless, and purely
speculative since it invariably affects the imagination of those who do not know the unit and the
reactor. And they are the overwhelming majority, even among specialists. General knowledge
will not help here, specifics are necessary.
Here is a phrase from the same part that simultaneously shows the author’s knowledge
of physics. Very revealing.
“After all, those 350 m³ of emergency water from the ECCS tanks, when the
prompt-neutron excursion began (*my emphasis - A.D.), when the main circulating pumps
failed, and the reactor was left without cooling, could possibly have saved the situation and
extinguished the steam effect of reactivity which was the most important one of all.” (pg. 22)
No, if an acceleration on prompt neutrons has begun, there is no saving it. Only
destruction of the reactor will stop it, there are no other means for energy reactors. On pg. 10 of
the story, G. Medvedev gives a list of accidents at reactors in the USSR: “7 May 1966.
Uncontrolled prompt-neutron reaction at the nuclear power plant with boiling-water reactor in the
city of Melekess. Dosimeter operator and shift chief of the nuclear plant irradiated. Reactor
shut down by dumping two bags of boric acid into it.” Indescribably lucky people - the prompt
neutrons got lazy. They managed to run for bags of acid and the reaction was extinguished.
With an acceleration on normal prompt neutrons, people have no time to think. Such ignorance!
“The simultaneous insertion of such a number of rods into the core produces in the first
instance a positive flash of reactivity, since the graphite tips are the first to enter the core (length
5 meters) and the empty sections 1 meter in length. A flash of reactivity is terrible in a stable
and controllable reactor, but when adverse factors coincide, this addition can prove fatal, since
an uncontrollable runaway ensues. Were the operators aware of this, or were they in a state of
blessed ignorance? I think that they knew it, in any case they had a duty to know it, SIUR
Leonid Toptunov in particular. But he was a young specialist, the knowledge still had not
become his flesh and blood….” (pg. 27)
G. Medvedev presents a distorted version of the RCPS rod design and their mechanism
of reactivity introduction. But that is not important.
What is important is that G. Medvedev finds a flash of reactivity on the actuation of EPS
to be not terrible! To make such a statement, all concepts must be turned on their head.
Anyway, this is outside the boundary of normal engineering thinking. Emergency protection is
designed to shut down the reactor not only in normal, but mainly emergency situations. For
example, a signal has been actuated to reduce the reactor’s doubling period, when the reactor
has already exceeded the emergency reactivity which continues to be introduced for
technological reasons, and EPS adds reactivity.
So it was on April 26, 1986. True, at the moment the EPS-5 button was pressed, and
EPS was actuated, the reactor was slightly supercritical, and 3 sec. later was in an emergency
condition. Is it not terrible?! Yes, it is monstrous!!!
And the bewilderment of the shift supervisor of the unit, Sasha Akimov, is completely
justifiable:
“I did everything correctly. I do not understand why it happened that way.” (pg. 27)
How to understand this? In a normal situation, with no emergency signals, the button to
trip the reactor is pressed, and we get an explosion.
Only with a complete perversion of the moral and ethical roots of the country, and with a
complete disregard for the law, can the operating personnel be blamed, as it happened and
continues to happen.
Neither Toptunov, nor Akimov, and in general none of the operators at nuclear stations
with RBMK reactors, knew about this. And if we had known, would we have agreed to work
there? And our ignorance was not at all blessed. This is directly attributable to the Scientific
Supervisor A.P. Alexandrov and Chief Designer N.A. Dollezhal. Their employees were required
to know, and A.P. Alexandrov personally knew. There are documents of the unacceptable
properties of the reactor, and measures to take to eliminate them.
If nothing else, at least inform the operating personnel of the reactor’s properties in the
design documents. They put the information there, but it was wrong. It states in the NIKIET
report that the power coefficient of reactivity is always negative - in actuality it was positive.
Now we have all these geniuses, G. Medvedev among them, looking down their noses, who
pompously say: “I did not know the operating personnel.” They make it all seem elementary. It
isn’t so simple. G. Medvedev still doesn’t understand it himself.
After the accident, the IAE and NIKIET had quite sufficient experimental data on the
station for a complete and deep understanding of the RBMK processes. They either couldn’t
decipher it, or just didn’t do it. Neither did Gosatomenergonadzor, which also had the data. All
things considered, I think they were thoughtless, for I cannot imagine that if they knew, they
would stay silent and do nothing.
Another quote from the story:
“Here we need yet another brief explanation. A nuclear reactor can be controlled only
thanks to the delayed neutron fraction, which is denoted by the Greek letter β (beta). According
to nuclear safety rules, the rate of increase of reactor power must not exceed 0.0065 β over a
60-second interval. If the delayed neutron fraction is 0.5 β, a prompt-neutron excursion begins.
Violations of the rules and overriding the reactor’s safety systems, which we have talked about
above, threatened a release of reactivity equal to at least 5 β, which meant a fatal explosive
excursion.
Did Bryukhanov, Fomin, Dyatlov, Akimov, and Toptunov understand this entire chain?”
(pg. 27)
Did you, the reader, understand this? No? No wonder. This is impossible to
understand.
I also do not understand why G. Medvedev measures the rate of increase of reactor
power in units of reactivity. Why not try to measure it with a spoon or a glass - it is still wrong,
but the objects are more familiar and convenient.
“If the delayed neutron fraction is 0.5 β”. How can this value be equal to half itself when
β is the delayed neutron fraction?
All books on reactors say that an acceleration on prompt neutrons occurs with a positive
reactivity of 1 β, not 0.5 β… He made this discovery. Has it been patented?
The Medvedev chain can only be imagined in a fevered brain.
I suppose this is sufficient enough to assess the competence of the “Chernobyl
Notebook” author on matters of the unit’s design, the circumstances of the accident, and reactor
physics.
Understandably it is difficult to explain the causes of the accident, and the actions of the
operators from such a position. It is incredibly difficult. And G. Medvedev is not afraid of
difficulties. It is necessary. So he proceeds… for a fee. He poured mud on the already
slandered, already dead, operators. He needs to live and reckon with this.
It seems to G. Medvedev that it’s not enough, the slanderous statements of various
commissions are unconvincing, and he digs up the DBA button. On page 26, he cites “the most
flagrant violations, both those contained in the program and also those committed in the process
of preparing and conducting the experiment.” I am not going to repeat them, they are taken
from the information given to the IAEA by the Soviet specialists. Look at No. 5, it says as a
consequence, reactor protection system based on heat parameters was completely cut off. It is
incorrect there, and Medvedev strengthens it by saying: “they overrode the protection of the
reactor with respect to many parameters (the shutdown signal when two turbines were
disconnected, the level of water and steam pressure in the drum separators, and the heat
parameters)”. I couldn’t rewrite it without mistakes.
Weak? He comes up with more.
“Finally, they overrode both emergency diesel generators as well as the operating and
startup-standby transformers, disconnecting the unit from sources of emergency supply of
power and from the power system. In trying to conduct a ‘pure experiment,’ they actually
completed the chain of preconditions required for the maximum nuclear disaster.” (pg. 26)
And what lies? Some are little, others are big. G. Medvedev added quite a lot.
But what a picture now!
Protection? - All blocked, no need to waste time.
Power supply? - All disabled and blocked.
 Personnel? - Well clearly, - neanderthals who fell out of the tree just yesterday.
Here you see, dear reader, we are surrounded on all sides and it continues with the help
of the Medvedevs of the world.
The description of the events leading up to the accident and his comprehension of them
in the story are incorrect, and they cannot be correct, judging by the author’s knowledge. Of
course it’s possible to write truthfully without background knowledge, if you listen to the opinions
of competent people. But his aplomb and self advertising as an experienced operator would not
allow G. Medvedev to consult with anyone. I will dwell on this for a few more moments.
“At 0107 hours, another pump was added to the six main circulating pumps that were
operating on the calculation that after the experiment was completed four main circulating
pumps would remain in the loop for reliable cooling of the core.” (pg. 30)
Correct.
But on pg. 34: “Total flow through the reactor began to drop because all eight main
circulating pumps were operating off the spinning turbogenerator.”
As we see, the author has already forgotten what he said four pages earlier, or does not
understand. How are all eight MCPs powered from the running down generator, and four at the
end of the rundown, will remain for reliable core cooling? Well, it’s all simple. Four MCPs, like
the overwhelming majority of the unit’s components, are powered from a backup power supply,
and all of the author’s reasoning about a backup power supply to avoid an accident was a bluff.
It was.
Take a look at the program. Look how the G.A. Shasharin Commission describes it
based on studying the system parameters recorded by the central control system, rather than
speculative conclusions. And here is a direct accusation of bungling aimed at the first in line,
me.
“The question that arises is this: Is it possible to avoid a disaster in that situation? Yes,
it is. All that is necessary is to categorically give up conducting the experiment, connect the
emergency cooling system to the reactor, and keep electric power supply in reserve in case of a
complete loss of power. Manually, by degrees, to undertake to reduce the reactor’s power until
it is finally shut down, but in no case pressing the EPS - emergency safety - since that would be
equivalent to the explosion…
But that opportunity was not taken.” (pg. 30)
Well, he has given his advice. Everything is simple. It was necessary to take six manual
control rods and lower them into the core, continue with six until the trip, and then reset EPS. It
was possible with four rods. We could have started with regulators. But this is clear now that
EPS’s unnatural capability is known. Operations with ECCS and a power supply are
unnecessary.
Тогда я до этого, прошу извинить за вульгарность, не допер, недошурупил, не
дорубил, как там еще надо... А если бы череп мой сварганил это, то я сразу бы выступил
за Кашпировского, Чумака и Тарасова. И орденов бы потребовал побольше, чем у
Леонида Ильича Брежнева.
“And suddenly Perevozchenko shuddered. Strong and frequent shock waves began,
and the 350-kilo blocks - they had another name in the design, ‘assembly 11’ - began to jump up
and down on the heads of the channels as though 1,700 men had begun to toss up their hats.
The entire surface of the snout had come to life, and it was rocking in a wild dance. The boxes
for biological shielding around the reactor were shuddering and caving in. This meant that
bursts of the explosive mixture had already occurred beneath them…” (pg. 33)
Well, the blocks (assembly 11) are only 50 kg, but that doesn’t matter.
G. Medvedev sets it up beautifully. I made the men jump up and throw their hats. Rich
fantasy. Only technically it is unthinkable. He is talking out his ass again. G. Medvedev
narrates that this is about hydrogen.
This won’t withstand the test of time.
At 01:23:40, power at 200 MW, stable parameters. There is no fantasy here - just what
the control system registered. Nothing can happen.
At 01:23:43 there were alarms for excess power and decreasing reactor period. Still
nothing can happen, since total power is only 520 MW. But here there are already ambiguities
and we will address them for the beginning of this dance.
At 01:23:47 there was already an explosion. So you cannot make it from the balcony on
the 50th mark through the central hall in four seconds in any extreme situation. There is no
spiral staircase, the author confused the first line with the second.
Still in prison, when I read the story, I wrote several letters to the witnesses for
clarification. Sasha Yuvchenko, a senior mechanical engineer (SME) for the reactor shop, on
this topic wrote:
“From the beginning of the shift to practically the very time of the explosion, V.I.
Perevozchenko and I were together. At first in the Unit 3 Control Room, then the Unit 3 MCP
Room, then in my SME office. From there we were going to go to Khodemchuk in Unit 4 (to
room 435). He was suddenly called to the Unit 4 Control Room for an urgent matter and left,
telling me to wait there and not to go alone. After he left (1 to 2 minutes later) the first shock
sounded, and then the explosion. So he could not have been able to make it to the hall and
observe what G. Medvedev describes. He never mentioned anything about it.”
I also confirm: Perevozchenko arrived in the Unit 4 Control Room just before the start of
the rundown.
No one heard such a story from Perevozchenko. Maybe G. Medvedev on intuition from
above gives this “documentary picture”?
“Thus, if we are to believe the computer, in the upper third of the zone there was formed
a zone of high energy emission that was like a flattened ball with a diameter of about 7 meters
and a height of about 3 meters. It is in this part of the core (its weight is about 50 tons) that the
prompt-neutron excursion mainly occurred; that is, it is here that the heat emission became
critical, rupture occurred, melting and then also evaporation of the nuclear fuel. It is this part of
the core that was ejected to a great height in the atmosphere…”
The computer almost always, unlike people, must be trusted; it is not subject to
influential considerations. But the destruction nevertheless started in the lower portion of the
core, this is a generally recognized fact. After the rods started movement into the core,
absorbers enter the upper part and reduce the neutron field; in the lower portion of the core,
water columns in the RCPS channels are replaced by displacers, which are less effective than
water at absorbing neutrons; positive reactivity is introduced and it was namely in the lower
portion that a roaring increase in power began, and where the core first collapsed.
 It is surprisingly bold for people to make such irresponsible statements on issues they
don’t have the first clue about.
Until a reliable picture of the explosion has been composed, speaking about the amount
of fuel strewn about is only possible by measuring the contamination of the territory, and by
measurements inside the premises of the unit. And of course, with the freedom of science from
the ideological press.
In any case, references to G. Medvedev’s novel regarding the amount of discharged
material, which have already appeared in print, are inappropriate. The author clearly has a
distorted representation of the picture of the explosion, and you understand that no true
conclusions can be drawn from incorrect premises.
Now about Dyatlov’s, i.e my actions on not only April 26. The fact that I seemed
cross-eyed and backwards to Medvedev does not matter. Maybe I really am. We seem
handsome to ourselves. And if we could view ourselves from the point of view of others, then…
Well, that’s beside the point.
Who am I and how did I get the position of Deputy Chief Engineer of Operations?
After technical school, I worked at a factory for three years. Although I graduated with
honors and could enter the institute without having to work it off, I decided to consolidate
knowledge with practice. Then after graduation from Moscow Engineering and Physics Institute
in 1959, I was sent to the Far East. Soon I was appointed Chief of the Physics Laboratory. It
seemed to be little work for little money. Family, two children. I had energy, knowledge,
conscientiousness, and a desire to work. I asked to be sent to the training center, where I
trained as an operator of nuclear submarine power plants. While remaining Chief of the
Laboratory, I also worked on the commissioning team for sea trials. Then all operators were
transferred to be under my supervision. The pay suited me, as did the work. It may seem that
all hunks of iron are the same. But in fact, each boat, even individual projects, have their own
characteristics. Things ran normally, relationships with subordinates and superiors were normal.
My superiors did not love me because of my obstinance, but I was respected as an employee. I
did not seek love from my subordinates or my superiors. I consider it sufficient for normal
working relationships to be competent and fair. In any case, during this working period, none of
my subordinates left due to an inability to work with me. Maybe it was hard, but no worse. Yes,
I was demanding.
It’s hard for me to judge what kind of boss I was, or whether I possessed the “art of
communication”. Anyway, I don’t think I was the worst. When I left the plant for Chernobyl
Station, several people who worked under me also came to the station to work under me. And I
didn’t call any of them. Of course when they arrived, knowing their qualities as workers, I
recommended to the director that they be accepted. It goes without saying that I am nowhere
near under the impression that they came out of desire to work for me. No, they wanted to
leave the city of Komsomolsk and were not afraid that I would be their boss again.
And there is no need to speak of them with arrogant disdain “friends-comrades”. All of
them: A.A. Sitnikov, V.A. Chugunov, V.A. Orlov, V.V. Grishchenko, A.V. Kryat proved themselves
to be good workers at the station. And why bury Slava Orlov early, citizen Medvedev? I saw
him yesterday. He came to Poltava to pick me up after being released from prison. The time
will come when we will die.
 Slava Orlov, Tolya Kryat, and Valera Lomakin came to Poltava to visit me in jail on three
occasions. I appreciate them greatly. I cannot even express. You had to be there to
understand the significance.
How did I treat people in general? I treated them as they deserved. And regarding
production, only the qualities of the worker mattered to me. I realized that it was not possible to
hire more than 200 people who were pleasant in every regard. I did not play favorites with
anyone, there were those who I treated meticulously.
When trouble happened, the investigation stubbornly created a guilty opinion of the
personnel, especially Dyatlov. Yet I couldn’t find any evidence of anyone speaking negatively
about me except for two authors, who the court did not call to the hearings later. And from
Komsomolsk where the investigator inquired, all eight testimonies are favorable. Thank you,
dear colleagues.
Not only Dyatlov, but other managerial personnel also did not set out to create
unbearable working relationships at the station. Somehow there was no such goal. Twice
during my time at the station, organizations (I don’t remember which ones) conducted
socio-psychological examinations. No deviations from the other NPPs as a whole were found,
neither in terms of psychological qualities of the operators, nor in social relations. That was in
no way a cause of the accident on April 26.
So I would have continued working in Komsomolsk, but there are factors I haven’t
outlined. Additionally there were long business trips, unfavorable working conditions at sea with
a naval crew, delivery team and an acceptance committee onboard, that pushed me to change
locations.
During my time off, I drove to Pripyat and made an agreement with Director V.P.
Bryukhanov for the position of Deputy Chief of the Reactor Shop. There was no talk about the
position of Chief of the Shop since that position was already filled. During my conversation with
Bryukhanov, no one was there, and Medvedev had no bearing on it. And in general, he clearly
exaggerates his role in staffing the station with people, he left the station in 1974 and then there
was still no money allocated for selecting personnel. By the way, this is the most reliable factor
by which one can gauge whether or not the Ministry has faith in the scheduled startup date of
the unit. No money allocated for selecting personnel, no startup.
It is possible Medvedev spoke with V.P. Bryukhanov about people, but this would be a
principle plan, and there could not have been any talk about specific individuals at that time.
I arrived at the station after receiving a call in September, 1973 after 14 years of working
at the plant. Of course, boat reactors are different by design, and much smaller. Still, not toys,
but real power reactors.
At the Chernobyl station, I worked as Deputy, then Chief of the Reactor Shop. And I had
experience since February 1983 working on reactors.
The accusations against Dyatlov by Medvedev are baseless.
“So, then was Dyatlov capable of making the only correct assessment of the situation at
the moment of its becoming an accident and of doing so instantaneously? I do not think so.
What is more, the necessary cautiousness and sense of danger so necessary to a supervisor of
nuclear operators were evidently not developed in him to a sufficient degree. On the other
hand, more than enough disrespect for the operators and the operating rules….
 It is precisely these qualities that were displayed in Dyatlov to their full extent when the
local automatic control turned off, SIUR Leonid Toptunov was unable to hold the reactor at a
power of 1.500 MW and let it slip to 30 MW thermal.” (pg. 24-25)
Apparently Medvedev denies Dyatlov the capability to assess the situation. On what
grounds? None. He never saw me doing operational work. And on April 26, no dramatic
decisions had to be made. We acted in accordance with the operational documents in effect at
the time. The tragedy is that the catastrophe happened in such an everyday environment. Our
actions must be judged based on what was in place on April 26, not from the bell tower of the
present. Not being able to actuate EPS, such an absurdity that would never have crossed my
mind, I have already spoken on this. And there was no printout of rod positions at 01:22:30,
which Medvedev mentions on pg. 31, and I have talked about this earlier as well.
Those who worked with me say something else - cautious. A lack of respect for
technological regulations?… plenty. Where did Medvedev get this? It was also in the
indictment. But I didn’t perform any operations myself. I did everything through the unit shift
supervisors or station management. Therefore I couldn’t hide anything. In the trial I specifically
asked these witnesses questions - all answered negatively. In the end, the judge said I was
asking strange questions. There were no violations while I was at the station. There were none
in the preliminary testimony. There were none on April 26. So, the prosecutor, and the
home-grown prosecutor, G. Medvedev, are wrong.
More than enough disrespect for the operators! What grounds are there for such a
statement?
I will explain specifically to G. Medvedev. There is no violation by L. Toptunov in raising
reactor power after it dropped. According to Section 6.7 of the Operating Procedures, a failure
to such a power level is regarded as a partial unit power reduction, and for the subsequent
power raise, the minimum reactivity margin of 30 rods is not required, the same as the
requirements for a short term shutdown. Having a 15 rod margin is sufficient. And there was.
Since power was 760 MW for the last 24 hours, and in half an hour (power drop at 00:28), it
could not have decreased due to poisoning. And we had a negative power effect. And the
reproachful exclamation: “Alas, Dyatlov, Dyatlov… You did not learn how fast the poisoning
proceeds.” - means nothing. Dyatlov has long and firmly mastered this. And although when I
arrived in the control room, the operators were already raising power, they would have been
allowed or ordered to do so had I been present at the time of the drop. Everything was in
accordance with Regulations.
And I did not express any displeasure to anyone. There was no reason. I don’t know
any operators who haven’t reduced power for one reason or another. L. Toptunov was a young
operator, so I wouldn’t have reproached him even if he had made a mistake. Then during
post-job analysis, of course I would point out mistakes, but only then. After working with reactor
operators for a long time (yes this applies to all board operators), I firmly learned the rule: no
reprimands, no reproaches for the operator at the controls. He was already going through what
was happening, but for those who were indifferent to it, I didn’t hold back. Not one remote
operator at the station can say I scolded him while at the controls. This could be more costly
because he may make even more mistakes in this state. I can’t recall any time over the past
three years, and I have a good memory, scolding someone while at the controls or after.
Immediately after the shift, there is a short meeting where participants give their explanatory
notes, and share their observations. Often no conclusions can be drawn from this. Only after
analysis of the instrument readings and the control system can you arrive at a final conclusion.
The heat of the moment has subsided by then. If mistakes were made, of course discipline
would follow in the form of reduction in premium by 20-30, and rarely 50%. But if a person is at
least somewhat capable of being self critical, what offense is there?
During my entire time at the station, not once did I remove an operator during the shift.
Why would I suddenly want to remove one on April 26? The dispatcher had permission to stop
it, practically all of the work was done. If the experiment wasn’t performed, it could be
performed after the repairs, it didn’t cost us any time since the system was put in place after the
rundown unit modification of the generator excitation system was tested at idle. And if the need
arose, for example, if I saw that the operator was demoralized by the drop in power, I would
have dismissed him unconditionally and without threat. Moreover, who would I replace him
with?
Did Dyatlov run around the room wasting valuable minutes? Dyatlov ran… in the forest,
but this has nothing to do with it. No one has ever seen me running in the control room. Why
would I suddenly run around on April 26?
Such idiotic behavior of a senior technical person in the control room, as described by
Medvedev, can lead to an accident itself. But there was nothing of the sort. On April 26, 1986, I
spoke loudly only twice: the first was a command “Everyone to the backup control panel” and
the second, when A.F. Kabanov started to say that the vibration computer was still in the shop
and I ordered him to leave the unit immediately. This was all after the accident.
G. Medvedev in his story, talks about the operators from the previous shift who stayed to
observe, Y. Tregub and S. Razin. Here is what they wrote in response to my questions:
Y Tregub: Up until the accident, there were no conversations in a raised voice with
individuals of the operating staff, and no dissatisfaction expressed with the power drop. There
were also no attempts to remove L. Toptunov from operation, and he carried out his official
duties for the duration of the shift. After the drop in power, the automatic regulator was switched
on, and per the command of the unit shift supervisor A. Akimov, who I believe was in agreement
with you and the station shift supervisor, the increase to 200 MW was commenced. I did not
notice anything that could be interpreted as disagreement over the increase in power. (06/07/90)
S. Razin: Before the accident, I didn’t hear words spoken in a raised tone of voice, only
instructions regarding the experiment per the Program. During the power drop, I approached
the SIUR panel and saw that as far as I could tell, Toptunov was working hard to raise and
stabilize power. I saw nothing resembling attempts to remove or replace L. Toptunov, or
pressure from you on A. Akimov and L. Toptunov allegedly refusing to raise power after the
drop, or discontent as a result of the drop. I believe such a situational conflict in the control
room would not be unnoticed. (06/07/90)
There were some talks of removing L. Toptunov. They came up after I told Akimov to
send him and Kirshenbaum to Unit 3 since it was useless and dangerous to stay in the Unit 4
control room due to the radiological conditions. This was about an hour after the accident.
One more point requires clarification since it is associated with the unnecessary
exposure of several people - this is Medvedev’s assertion on the version of the reactor’s
integrity and going for a walk after the explosion at Dyatlov’s direction. How does he know
everything? I didn’t tell anyone about this, including him. Perevozchenko didn’t tell anyone
about the wild dancing, but Medvedev knows. No one knows about the removal of L. Toptunov,
but Medvedev knows. No one knows that L. Toptunov and A. Akimov resisted increasing power,
but Medvedev knows. It turns out Medvedev knows what was, and what was not. True, he
mainly writes what was not. Such a ‘documentarian’.
I have described how it was. V.P. Bryukhanov did not question me over the phone or in
the bunker when I arrived. I didn’t speak with N.M. Fomin at all on April 26.
If I had thought the reactor was intact, then of course I would try to assemble a water
supply. I assure you, I knew the unit well, and no one at the station knew the reactor shop
better than I. If there were not enough people, I would make a request to Bryukhanov, but we
did nothing for this, which clearly says what I thought about the reactor.
G. Medvedev’s assertion that L. Toptunov and A. Akimov behaved courageously, but
uselessly, is immoral. Yes, Leonid Toptunov really couldn’t do anything in his position. But his
behavior when he returned to the unit, was a model of loyalty to the matter. And all the work
switching off loads, de-energizing, draining turbine oil, purging hydrogen from the generators,
i.e. to prevent starting new fires, was conducted under the direct supervision of Alexander
Akimov. It was impossible to do anything else useful in that situation. That which was done,
was a lot, and necessary. Alexander Akimov was a good, exceptional, and conscientious
worker. He died a worthy man.
We looked at the technical part of G. Medvedev’s story. Pay attention to the citations,
the page numbers of the magazine are presented at the end of my quotes. You will see that
everything is wrong. The rest of the words in between the citations tie them together. The rest I
didn’t continue on with, but believe it or verify it, everything further is wrong. Line after line!
To touch on the other part of the story, I cannot say how much of a documentary it is,
despite the names listed by the author. One of them who spoke with Medvedev, I also spoke
with in 1990. Viktor Smagin says that Medvedev misrepresented his words. According to V.
Smagin, A. Akimov said the same thing. It’s hard to imagine that the author would suddenly
jump from his favorite hobby. A naturalistic picture of pigs devouring a dog is, in principle,
possible, but it’s hard to imagine an author’s observation of this if he just spent five minutes in
the city. You’d have to assume the pigs postponed the meal and waited specifically for G.
Medvedev’s arrival. By my own existence I refute G. Medvedev’s report of the dose rates in the
area of Unit 4 of 15-20 thousand Rem. I walked around the territory near the unit twice going to
various places, and probably stayed around 20-30 minutes. I received a dose of 550 Rem. Any
more and I would not have lived.
In general, the author’s love for accusation and hyperbole is noticeable. Tolya Sitnikov
received a dose of 2,000 Rem, as if death from 500-600 Rem isn’t a tragedy.
Now, let’s take a look at “Chernobyl Notebook” as a whole. What did the author say in
it? Everything is the same as what is in the commissions - the guilt for the explosion lies on the
operating personnel and their leader, Dyatlov.
Disagree? Well yes, he also talks about the shortcomings of the reactor. But this is to
divert the eyes. Now, is it really possible to defend the RBMK reactor and its designers without
recognition of something in the reactor? However, the author of the story has twisted it so that
no matter what, the operating personnel are guilty. Dyatlov is even guilty of not guessing the
danger of actuating EPS. Not one commission, or even prosecutor is accused of this, and
understanding this absurdity, G. Medvedev reckons it in his own way. It turns out you can think
so. Well, we’ve talked about Dyatlov enough.
Reactor operator L. Toptunov is young, you see “the knowledge had not yet become his
flesh and blood…” and therefore…
Therefore what? What violations did L. Toptunov commit? In fact none according to
Medvedev. The drop in power? It occurred due to a faulty regulator which he transferred to.
We have let power be low for qualifications or even due to mistakes. Did they stir up charges
against the operator for a power reduction? Here they did. He raised power after the drop in
accordance with Regulations, not contrary to. Had he looked at reactivity margin? Probably.
Was he provided the necessary means to monitor the parameter as required by law? No. Not
to mention the absence of EPS required by law. The device for measuring this parameter is
completely unusable during transient conditions, like it was on April 26, like it is in many other
normal routine processes.
There you go. This is by the law.
I’m not even talking about human concepts - they are alien to Medvedev. I will remind
others. An operator performs more than a thousand manipulations per hour while controlling
the reactor and has more than 4,000 parameters to control. And he’s to blame for monitoring a
parameter that has no measuring device or alarm?
Alexander Akimov had not been a reactor operator. He worked, although not for long, in
preparation for the position. And yet he was already a unit shift supervisor not long before the
accident. There was an opportunity and I gave him a month to work on it.
And what did he violate?
He blocked one protection and changed the setpoint for another - in accordance with the
operating documents. “Character was not enough. He reluctantly obeyed” No one forced him,
and he violated nothing.
Take a look at how Medvedev writes:
“The total flow of water through the reactor increased to 60,000 m3 an hour while the
normal rate is 45,000 which is a flagrant violation of the operating rules.”
All numbers are clear regarding the Regulations. And this is all a bluff:
- It wasn’t 60 thousand, but 56, no more;
- Not 45 thousand, but 48;
- And at the time of pressing the button, it was 48,000;
- Not only in Regulations, but also in no other document is there even a hint of limiting the
maximum coolant flowrate.

Why, and on whose order did Grigory Istinovich Medvedev add his own to all the lies
about the operating personnel?
And the quintessence of the story is in the following phrase: “And still, to be fair, it has to
be said that the death warrant was to some degree predetermined by the very design of the
RBMK. All that was needed was to bring about a certain set of circumstances in which an
explosion was possible. And that was done....” (My emphasis - A.D.)
 I have already said that it is impossible to defend the reactor and its designers without
recognizing its “shortcomings”.
- “And still, to be fair” is camouflage. There is no fairness in this statement.
- Let’s take a look at “to some degree” closely. Everyone but academician A.P.
Alexandrov recognizes this to some degree. Well, this is alright for a thrice hero.
First: The RBMK-86 reactor did not meet the requirements of thirty-two points in the
regulatory documents, fifteen of which were directly related to the accident on April 26, as
indicated in the report by the N.A. Shteynberg Commission. There are no superfluous
requirements in the regulatory documents, since each of them can be costly. But the fulfillment
of each requirement is obligatory. Here, fifteen have not been fulfilled.
Second: Due to the positive power coefficient, the reactor was dynamically unstable, and
due to the defective control rod design, EPS introduced positive reactivity. Nothing else is
needed for an explosion. That is why it exploded on April 26.
And if this is “to some degree”, what would it take to be entirely and completely?
And to blame the personnel for the reactor explosion, even “to some extent”, is unfair.
Our actions were in accordance with the operating documents, the only possible violation in
monitoring reactivity margin is a consequence of the violation of NSR regarding equipping the
reactor with automation, alarms, and instruments. No coincidence of circumstances was
required for that reactor to explode. It would have exploded in a number of other situations.
It is no longer fashionable to not criticize those in power. But with G. Medvedev, it
somehow turns out that all of his criticism is elementary.
It happened with the criticism of the departments for agreeing to the rundown program -
they will say with complete honesty that they have not seen this program.
It happened with the amount of fission products ejected from the reactor - the evidence
report with now already tens of thousands of measurements, will of course, outweigh
speculative conclusions.
It happened with the statement from B.E. Shcherbina and Y. A. Israel at the press
conference on May 6, 1986, where they announced that the radioactivity in the area of Unit 4 is
only 25 mR/hr. They said something else.
There is reason to criticize Shcherbina, Israel, and the department, but G. Medvedev
was not going to do that at all. Yes, that is clear from his position in life. Throughout the story,
his involvement with powerful people of the world is evident. Take a look, always with generals,
ministers, instructing everything. And couriers, couriers, couriers! In fact, the desire to be host
to the powerful, is too strong.
Thinking outside the box is fraught with uncertainty at a minimum. Inside, everything is
alright. So he profusely supported the government version. A loyal man.
It’s not clear what B. Kurkin meant by saying that publishing “Chernobyl Notebook”
showed courage. What courage is needed here. He added slander to those killed and
imprisoned. A brave man!
Who then should be called a boor? A slanderer? Regarding Andrei Dmitrievich
Sakharov’s preface to “Chernobyl Notebook”, I can only bitterly say: apparently, a decent person
will never learn to recognize two-faced tricks.
 Y. N. Shcherbak

Chernobyl

Here everything is more simple. The story “Chernobyl” clearly does not fit into the
“outstanding” work category like “Chernobyl Notebook”. For some reason, Yuri Nikolayevich
Shcherbak tied himself to a promise: “I cannot allow myself a single inaccurate word (although
this doesn’t suit novelists), I have no right to speculation and guesswork.” With such a setting,
nothing good will come of it. He takes the numbers and references to Regulations, which he
has never seen before, from G. Medvedev, and it comes across as convincing and
documentary.
And yet, Y. N. Shcherbak’s story is not at all accurate. Not because he invents or
distorts respondents’ statements, these statements themselves are incorrect, and do not reflect
the truth of the matter and are illogical. I will only make a few comments on the technical side of
the catastrophe.
First of all, on the assertion that the accident could have occurred during I. Kazachkov’s
shift (April 25, 08:00-16:00) or Y. Tregub’s shift (April 25, 16:00-24:00), had the experiment not
been postponed to the night shift. Thus, the author ties the accident to the TG rundown
experiment.
There is no such connection. The accident occurred during the experiment, but it could
have happened just the same during any other operation, especially on a unit shutdown with the
reactor in the steady state refueling regime.
A. Uskov is correct, of course, that if this experiment had been conducted during the
startup of the unit, then there would have been no accident. Only, Uskov forgets that in the first
months following the unit startup, such an accident could not have happened at all.
The reactor is completely different at that point!
When there are more than two hundred AAs in the reactor, its steam void effect of
reactivity is negative, and these AAs largely compensate for the control rod tip effect. The
presence of a large number of absorbers in the lower part of the core evened out the effect of
replacing water columns with displacers in the RCPS channels. It was namely due to these
reactivity effects that the reactor exploded, and it doesn’t matter what kind of work was being
conducted.
This statement by I. Kazachkov is completely incomprehensible: “To the Unit Shift
Supervisor - i.e. myself - I would sentence eight years. And if it happened on my shift, I would
have accepted it as fair.”
Well, his “i.e. myself” is just talk. It was in fact A. Akimov. In court I. Kazachkov said
quite understandably, that if Unit 3 is not modernized, he will refuse to work on it. His own
words: “The startup will be without me.” That is to say, this person understands that it is not
possible to work on the reactor as it was before the accident. Now that he has learned what
kind of monster it was, he admits that it could have happened on his shift. That is to say,
regardless of the operator: Akimov, Kazachkov, Tregub… That is to say, that the catastrophe
occurred because of the reactor and its properties, not the properties of the operator. And yet
he would have sentenced Akimov to eight years, and considered it fair.
I refuse to accept it!
On raising power after it dropped. After the testimony of G.P. Metlenko in court, I am
thoroughly convinced that I was not in the Control Room at the time of the failure, I arrived
shortly after. I had begun to doubt whether I remembered exactly once I read testimonies of the
guys, and where they say I was. I have no reason to deny my presence. I am still responsible
for the actions of the personnel, whether I was there or not. Either I or Sasha Akimov gave the
order to increase power, there are no violations. When I asked Akimov what power had
dropped to, he said 30 MW and authorized the subsequent increase. I had no reason not to
trust Akimov, he was a competent specialist, and an honest man.
The same power, 30-40 MW, was stated after the investigation by the Meshkov
Commission, and there were enough “well-wishers” that would have taken the chance to catch it
before it fell to zero. This was also in the Shasharin Commission, and finally the government
reports. Only the Forensic Technical Commission, which had no workers at the reactor,
absolutely baselessly talks about a failure to zero. After analyzing the power diagrams, I am
convinced that it was at least 30 MW. This is a “partial power reduction” according to
Regulations. And there is no violation in raising power. Reactivity margin at that time was
required to be no less than 15 rods. At 24:00, it was 24 rods, there is a log entry. Take the most
limiting option - power failed from 50% to 0%. In half an hour, poisoning will not amount to 9
rods - take a look at the poisoning curve. The power coefficient, of course, was considered
negative, as it was presented to us.
Why then should Akimov or Dyatlov be “severely punished”? We acted in accordance
with the operating documents. I. Kazachkov had to have thought before saying: “But they
wanted to bring the tests to an end.” It was on his shift in 1985 that EPS failed during a planned
shutdown due to improper instrument operation. From the very first section of the program, the
work was scheduled for the shutdown. There was no reactivity margin of 55 rods, and Dyatlov
gave the order to cool down the unit without doing anything. Almost everything was done here,
but for some reason, Dyatlov violates it.
Some stereotypes are true. When questions are posed in an unusual setting, or on an
extraordinary occasion, the person is led like a calf on a rope, instead of saying: “Excuse me,
the question is incorrect.”
And Arkady Uskov is tormented with whether or not he would give in to the pressure of
his boss. He decided to give in.
Yes, there was no pressure, just like there were no violations.
Gentlemen, when will we start thinking?
A. Uskov was displeased when I told him all of this at a meeting. Why be offended?
This is the most vile type of accusation, when one would seem to sympathize with the
personnel, and sincerely try to understand why they committed violations, and how they could
be justified. People get the impression that if someone friendly to the personnel admits that
there were violations, then there were.
 In this case, I can’t go any further. God, deliver me from such friends, and I will deliver
myself from enemies.
I will not comment on statements by V.A. Zhiltsov. To a large extent, it has already been
said. Only one:
“Moreover, that rare situation arose, where EPS served as a starting mechanism for the
acceleration of the reactor. If EPS were normal, the reactor would never accelerate, no matter
what mistakes SIUR L. Toptunov made. The brake pedal should brake, not accelerate the car.”
Regarding this statement from a man who “devoted his whole life to nuclear power”,
questions arise:
Is it not clear to V.A. Zhiltsov that EPS should never act as an acceleration device, rather
than rarely or on the rarest of occasions?
V.A. Zhiltsov admits protection is abnormal, but blames the personnel?
V.A. Zhiltsov is driving a car, and sees a person walking into the road, and brakes.
Instead of stopping, the car accelerates and crushes the person. Will V.A. Zhiltsov consider
himself guilty?
Of course, he will not consider himself guilty, but the personnel - yes.
It is amazing how cooly, gentlemen scientists admit that the emergency protection blew
up the reactor (!!!) and in spite of everything, continue to seek out the sins of the personnel.
Wild. Absurd.

Part 10: OPERATOR FREEDOM

In my opinion, the very idea of operator freedom itself, as expressed by I. Kazachkov

and A. Uskov in Y. Shcherbak’s “Chernobyl”, is illegitimate when applied to the Chernobyl
collective in general, and certainly had nothing to do with the accident on April 26. The freedom
to make decisions regardless of any developing circumstances, other than technical
considerations, is necessary for not only the operator, but for everyone. But there is no
complete freedom, nor can there be in any job with an industrial setting. I am only talking about
hired workers, which includes everyone in Soviet state enterprises. In my opinion this freedom
was quite sufficient for the overwhelming majority of workers in our country, because, in the
event of a conflict where it became impossible to work any longer in a given place, it was always
possible to find another job with a comparable salary, losing little and perhaps only at first. That
is of course, if you are a skilled worker.
In any job, you can’t expect to object to your boss and have him pat you on the head and
say: “Good boy barking at me.” But if you follow two basic rules:
- не <лезть в пузырь> по мелочам;
- все-таки быть правым, возражая, то начальник покипятится и отойдет.
 Ему, начальнику-то, на должностях, от которых зависит производство, в первую
очередь нужны знающие, а уж потом покладистые. У нас, правда, много должностей
никчемных, вот туда можно в первую очередь покладистых.
To me, the so-called psychological climate at the station seemed quite acceptable. In
my opinion, this is mainly thanks to director V.P. Bryukhanov. It didn’t come naturally to him to
be harsh. He was restrained, and did not make hasty conclusions. Of course during the
construction and launch of the units, it was an especially nervous, extremely tense situation with
a lot of major questions. All sorts of things happened. But this was limited to the deputies and
heads of the shops.
In order to have external freedom, you have to possess internal freedom, a feeling of self
worth. I could object to anyone at the station, and in fact I did.
Chief Engineer V.P. Akinfiev is not an evil person overall, but he had an amazing ability
to offend people out of nowhere.
In Unit One, piping components were being installed for the ECCS system. The elbows
were manufactured by Minenenergo’s Bagliski factory. They were made according to required
standards, but the factory only had permission to manufacture components for pressures up to
22 atm.
At that time I was the Deputy Chief of the Reactor Shop. I went to the factory that had
permission to manufacture the components, since I had already been there to secure the
contract for the piping supplies. I arrived at the factory and they said they wouldn't do it
because the installers had already arrived. To establish “rapport”, at the restaurant I had to
spend money that I had set aside to buy a suit. I agreed to a new order and to use the previous
order on another unit.
Three days later, Akinfiev comes in and asks: Are they ready yet?
No, I said.
So what did you chat about, will they do it quickly?
Chief, are you crazy? It is impossible to do in such a short time. Although the
documentation is simple, it has to pass through the design, technological, and production
departments.
To his rude reproach, I also responded rudely.
Other conversations we had went well.
In another example, Unit 3 needed some 600 mm diameter diaphragms, and in the
entire country, stainless steel strips were rolled no wider than 400 mm. They needed to be
welded. Fitters wouldn’t take it because they were too thin. I established contact with the
Institute of Welding in Kiev. I told Akinfiev that I needed a day to travel to Kiev.
- Go, but no idle chit-chat. (!?)
I was exasperated. I had to shrug it off, it wasn’t my responsibility. We had nowhere
else to go and still had a demand from the chief of the shop. I went and inspected the welded
samples, and made a purchase agreement for 150 diaphragms at three rubles apiece.
I wasn’t involved with Unit 4. Someone made an agreement with VNIIAES, and they
started up with new equipment that cost the station 46,000 rubles. On the other hand, we
received a bonus for the “new equipment”. So it paid for my gas expenses. I drove my car to
Kiev.
 There were quite a few similar occurrences that I never thought I would have to put up
with. And Chief Deputy Engineer Y.A. Kamenev swore me off three times. I don’t know how
Y.A. Kamenev could be such a quick tempered, yet easy-going man. And V.P. Akinfiev, I’m
sure, went to V.P. Bryukhanov with a similar representation of me. But nothing came of it.
Although I sometimes felt sidelong glances, it didn’t bother me much.
I always thought: serve the cause, not the person.
My cause would not deceive. The truth is that I doubted this once. In November 1986,
after being discharged from the hospital, we arrived in Kiev. The books were laid in a pile in the
new apartment. I started going through them. Such anger took me that I threw out all of the
technical literature. A twentieth century Luddite… the same way they destroyed those
machines. But I eventually dove into the books. It was sensible. Yes, if you do everything right,
it’s very boring.
Of course I didn’t haphazardly object to my boss. There were avenues. Firstly, I thought
(justifiably so) that with my knowledge and attitude toward work, I would always find it.
Secondly, I always gave my salary to my wife, and she spent it at her own discretion. But back
in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, I said there should always be 3,000 ready. That would be enough to
move if needed. It was on these two conditions that I maintained my freedom. You have to be
prepared for any reaction from your boss, up to and including dismissal. You can’t even speak
about freedom if you’re always weighing the consequences of your objections on
pharmaceutical scales. They will give you seven less rubles in your bonus, they will force you
down the path to the sanatorium.
But this was in general, at the Chernobyl station in particular, I don’t know of a single
case of dismissing an operator, except for in absolutely indisputable derelictions of duty. These
can be counted on one hand. By operators, I mean everyone, starting with the station shift
supervisor.
Specifically on April 26, 1986. It is completely in vain that I. Kazachkov and A. Uskov
are tormented on whether or not they could have violated instructions.
There were no violations!
On April 26, we saw no decrease in reactivity margin “thanks” to the designers, so no
one should have been tormented. Not Akimov, Toptunov, nor Dyatlov. I just didn’t expect it until
01:30. And it wouldn’t have been with a negative power coefficient, as determined by the
design documents and measurements of the station’s Nuclear Safety Department. How could
we have known that they were all lies?
All the same - who cares when it doesn’t directly affect them? Uskov isn’t an operator,
but his position requires him to know the instructions. And Kazachkov’s answer to the story
author Y.N. Shcherbak, is completely incomprehensible:
- Was raising power the most fatal decision?
- Yes, it was a fatal decision…
And further he says that if it were him, he would understand and accept the legality of
the punishment. So Kazachkov would have done it without a moment’s hesitation, and wouldn’t
have violated anything - neither Regulations, nor Instructions. What is this accusation based
on? On post-accident knowledge? So it is clear from them that the drop in reactor power and
its subsequent rise, performed in accordance with the requirements of GSP and NSR, would not
have any negative consequences. We were hired to work on a normal reactor. Here it is,
closed-mindedness. What does operator freedom have to do with it - economically or
otherwise? Who is pressuring you here?
Freedom cannot be perceived as freedom from responsibility, from conscience. When
speaking about specific people, your statements should be based on in-depth knowledge of the
circumstances. Otherwise, what you say to be so, is only an assumption. Of course, it is a
hindrance for a writer to remain within the confines of actual events, so now we have this
fantasy already played out and dumped into “documentary” story “details” that never happened.
And G. Medvedev forgot that when speaking about real live people, one should at least observe
basic decency. Enter conflict: how is it a conflict-free tragedy? But the liveliness of the story’s
presentation comes out and gives the critics food for thought. You learn about yourself and
others from these productions, what was and was not. Perhaps the critical analysis of
“Chernobyl Notebook” (October No. 10 1990) by I. Borisova is good, but it is only tied to reality
in the same way as the story itself.
Let’s take a look at what I. Borisova writes, and compare it with reality:
“But while he (*Dyatlov - A.D.) was under the pressure of the order, he acted within his
framework, and pressured others in the same way that he had been pressured, by transmitting
and transporting this pressure. Before the explosion, Dyatlov demanded that the TG rundown
experiment continue, regardless of the reality of the emergency. After the explosion, he
fabricated a lie, that the reactor was supposedly intact, because this lie was expected of him.
In the Chronicle, Dyatlov is under pressure, and Dyatlov applies pressure. The pressure
of the system spreads. Dyatlov pressures Fomin pressures Bryukhanov pressures
Shcherbina… The Chronicle fixates on the “physiology” of pressure, its processes and
reactions, available to observe and record. Those who pressure, and those who are pressured,
are ultimately in the same camp.”
No, Dear Borisova, not all were in the same camp ultimately. Bryukhanov, Fomin and
Dyatlov were there. Akimov, Toptunov and Perevozchenko would have also been there, but the
actual culprits of the tragedy, who are hiding behind these types of productions, including
“Chernobyl Notebook”, are at large, grinning. Of course you are talking about another kind of
camp, but these words of mine should not be taken as a joke.
About pressure, winningly painted by G. Medvedev and picked up by the critic. No one
pressured me either visibly or invisibly. I’m not one to give into pressure. And I didn’t pressure
anyone. Not on April 26, and not earlier.
The words: “Do what I told you” and the like, are not in my lexicon. Persuasion with
reference to instructions and technical information - yes, but not a blatant order. Possibly there
was involuntary pressure placed on the personnel on my part because of my broader general
(As Y. Tregub and I. Kazachkov put it; a cut above that of others) knowledge. Well, so as not to
pretend to be a fool. On April 26, I did not convince anyone, since not a single person had any
protest. And there were none to have.
If G. Medvedev reinforces his own lies with those of the official commissions, then the
critic naturally builds on the third floor of lies.
“Before the explosion, Dyatlov demanded that the TG rundown experiment continue,
regardless of the reality of the emergency.”
 Back in May 1986, the G.A. Shasharin Commission found that there were no warnings or
alarms at the moment of pressing the EPS button. In January 1991, the same was confirmed
by the N.A. Shteynberg Commission. Other commissions do not focus on this for obvious
reasons, but they do not and cannot name any signals about “the reality of the emergency.” So
on what basis would someone have to protest? Why would Dyatlov need to apply pressure?
The third floor includes “After the explosion, he fabricated a lie, that the reactor was
supposedly intact, because this lie was expected of him.”
We’ll leave it on the conscience of the author of the story and the critic that someone
was expecting this lie.
They say that a goose during molting season, when it cannot fly, buries its head when
faced with danger. It can’t see, which means that it can’t be seen. So, you don’t respect the
people you write about, but why should you liken them to geese? It’s probably my fault that I
didn’t explain it to anyone in the whirlwind - the reactor was destroyed, it didn’t need cooling. I
didn’t even explain anything to Sasha Akimov. After my first tour around the unit, I realized it
was useless and simply told Akimov to stop the pumps that I had ordered to be started
immediately following the explosion. I considered Sasha to be a competent engineer, and my
order for the pump stoppage was understood by him. Yes, I believe he understood, and his
later participation in supplying water to the reactor is explained by his desire to do at least
something. As I have already written, V.P. Bryukhanov and I did not have a conversation on this
topic. I didn’t see N.M. Fomin at all on April 26, nor did I speak to him by phone. By the way,
Fomin did not forbid Y. Bagdasarov from shutting down Unit 3, and no one else forbade him
after I had talked to him.
Writers think according to a scheme - in every play, heroes and villains are needed.
There were no villains among the characters of the Chernobyl tragedy. They remained behind
the scenes.
Part 11: THE TRIAL

A trial is a trial. Plain, Soviet. It was all a forgone conclusion. After two sessions in
June 1986, The Interdepartmental Science and Technology Council, chaired by Academician
A.P. Aleksandrov, which was dominated by workers from the Ministry of Medium Machine
Building and the creators of the reactor design, the unequivocal version of the guilt of the
operating personnel was declared. Other considerations were thrown out as unnecessary. The
Politburo’s subsequent determination actually duplicated the findings of The Interdepartmental
Science and Technology Council, although it also noted the reactor’s shortcomings..
After such a determination from the Politburo, a person would have to be completely
naive to hope for a favorable outcome. For our people’s Court in 1987, a determination from the
Politburo was all that would be needed to convict Jesus Christ himself of atheism. Every
ordinary person will have had transgressions. Whether or not it's against the law, doesn’t
matter. Where there’s a person, there’s an Article. This cynical expression lurked around the
country at the behest of the NKVD and our, so to speak, law enforcement agencies. And this
expression is by no means just colorful language, but a clear picture of the actual essence of
the matter.
On that point, I’ll mention the Article here. I was convicted under Article 220 of The
Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR for improper operation of explosive enterprises. Nuclear
power plants are not included in the list of explosive enterprises in the USSR. The Forensic
Technical Expert Commission retroactively classified nuclear power plants as a potentially
explosive enterprise. That was sufficient for the court to apply the Article. This is not the place
to make the determination on whether nuclear power plants are explosive, establish it
retroactively to apply to a Criminal Code Article, and determine it to be clearly illegal. Who will
argue this to the Supreme Court? There was a person, and he acted on their orders. Anything
can be explosive if you don’t follow the design specifications.
And then, what does potentially explosive mean? Soviet televisions explode regularly,
several dozen people are killed every year. Where are they classified? Who is to blame? A
lawsuit for the deaths of tv watchers would have been a stumbling block for the Soviet court.
Indeed, as much as they may want to, they can’t blame the viewers for sitting in front of the tv
without helmets and body armor. Blame the enterprise? The state? Does that mean the state
is guilty? Something Soviet? The court will not allow such a distortion of principles. Man is
guilty before the state. And if not, then no one. For seven decades, our courts turned the screw
in only one direction. For how many recent years has there been talk about separation,
independence of the courts, serving the law and only the law. I’m still waiting for a precedent in
court where it isn’t the person that’s guilty, but the state. But this is unlikely to happen in the
near future. Not until the mastodons, cut from the cloth of Vyshinsky and the like die out, will
there be any change.
While I was in the camp, my wife went to all the officials and organizations. Wherever
she was! With much trouble, she got to the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR,
Smolentsev. Here is how a conversation they had went:
- What on earth do you want - others were convicted, and I’m supposed to release your
husband? To be kind?
- Well no. I’m not counting on any kindness. I’m counting only on justice. After all, it is
now known that the reactor was unsuitable. And my husband is innocent of this.
- So what, do you want me to put Aleksandrov in prison… so old?

A natural continuation would be: Dyatlov is younger, let him do the time.
This is how the Chief Justice talks with the wife of the convicted, substantiating the
justice of the sentence, as if over a cup of tea in a circle of acquaintances who are extremely
indifferent to who is locked up.

***

I stayed in Moscow’s hospital No. 6 for half a year and was discharged on November 4,
1986. I was afraid to leave the hospital, not just because there were open wounds on my legs
that wouldn’t heal, but mainly because on my legs and skin in various places, pus had started to
unexplainably ooze. I didn’t know how to stop it, but neither did the doctors. Anyway, the
process of trying different treatments was stopped. Typically, Chernobyl victims were sent to a
sanatorium for two or three weeks after being discharged. I also requested to be able to return
to the hospital if anything came up. I was refused. I learned the reason a little later. It turns out
that the investigation had been repeatedly seeking my arrest.
My wife and I arrived in Kiev on the fifth of November. But something had apparently
changed with the investigation, and we were allowed to live at home for an entire month. That
was good. In that month I learned to walk a little. I reduced my travel time around the block by
ten minutes.
But then they stopped me. On December 4, I was relocated to government housing for
almost four years. There is nothing to describe here. It has all been described many times.
These are the immediate, most memorable impressions:
- The one under investigation, is the one whose rights are infringed upon the most.
Everything depends on the investigator alone, or at the end of the investigation, the
judge. There are no rules. This is made more difficult to bear because you haven’t even
been convicted yet, no one has formally deprived you of your civil rights. But in fact, you
are deprived of all rights, you can only request. After the trial is easier both emotionally
and physically. The range of your duties and rights, however minimal, is determined by
the internal rules of the colony. And you are not confined by four walls, you can at least
 walk around (locally). Each barrack is additionally fenced in a zone. This is what I mean
by (locally). Of course I had noticed earlier that the leaves on the trees were green, and
it made me happy, especially in the spring. The trial took place in Chernobyl and started
in July. I hadn’t seen greenery in about a year. Apparently I didn’t remember it. It had
rained and washed the trees. What emeralds the leaves on the trees were, not a hint of
yellow. I could have gone and touched it, but there was a guard here. A step to the left
or to the right is considered an escape. We don’t value what we have until we have lost
it, and then we cry.
- Transfers. These were a nightmare for me. While I didn’t have to travel with thirty
people to a compartment, fifteen is still too much, and everyone smokes. The transfers
were generally not long: Kiev to Poltava, Poltava to Kiev. You wouldn’t think that Kiev to
Poltava would be so bad. We’d sit down in Kiev and arrive in Poltava. But for some
reason we arrived in the city of Sumy, even though the train was headed to Kharkiv.
Then we arrived in Kharkiv. There are good transfer cells there, at least they weren’t a
square meter per person. All three of my transfers resulted in extended illness.
- Lastly, I was very depressed knowing that I was imprisoned. Simply that fact.
Apparently I’m old-fashioned. During the Soviet era, people learned to be ashamed of a
criminal record. They grabbed them and threw them in jail for everything and nothing.
Don’t get me started on seeds and Article 58. Here’s a recent example for you: A
veteran of war and labor (his hut had collapsed) received housing in an apartment
building built by a collective farm. As always, builders cleaned up the rubbish from the
collapsed hut. The veteran cleaned up the plot, picked some clover seeds on the
collective farm, and sowed the plot. Theft. Trial. During the trial, the veteran launched a
handful of medals and awards at the judges. Who is he in the minds of his own people?
A criminal, or a victim of despotism? Here are some excerpts from the ruling:
“…committed theft without intent to sell…”, “… sold 9 bottles of vodka at 15 rubles
apiece to unidentified persons, for which he received illegal income in the amount of 135
rubles…”

The court doesn’t know to who, but he sold it for 15 rubles. And the income is 135
rubles, as if the store would have given him vodka for free. On top of three years imprisonment,
they added confiscation of “Muscovite” as a means of transporting vodka from the store. The
state created this vodka idiocy itself and released an army of guards on the people. Well, this is
off topic.
According to my medical note, I wasn’t to be interrogated for any more than two hours
per day. In reality, interrogation and familiarization with the case took six to eight hours per day.
But this wasn’t due to pressure coming from the side of the investigation, I myself wanted it
done quickly to get clarity. I strived to go to court, but it kept getting delayed further and further.
I spent December, January, and February in interrogations, getting acquainted with the materials
and comprehending them, so I wasn’t burdened by being isolated in jail. What followed was
unclear to me. I didn’t present any public danger. The investigation was over, and I couldn’t
influence the witnesses’ testimony. They had already changed their testimony at the trial, since
by July 1987, it became clear to many that the charges against the personnel were illegitimate.
The witnesses knew which measures were being taken for modernization of the remaining
reactors, they took the time to comprehend it and draw their own conclusions. The
modernization being undertaken was inadequate for the declared version of the causes of the
accident. I am still convinced that there was no reason to keep me in custody until the trial. Of
course, if free, I could understand the causes of the accident more clearly. But is that at the cost
of the truth? Once the trial was in progress, I realized that the judge did not strive for the truth.
He had no use for it. Judge R.K. Brize announced that all questions for the expert commission
must be submitted in writing. With a dim light bulb hidden behind a thick grating, I wrote 24
questions. Most of them were directed at clarifying compliance of the reactor with the nuclear
safety documents: NSR and GSP. The next day the judge, apparently after consulting with
experts, dismissed all my questions without justification. Why? It’s very simple. Although it was
an open trial taking place in a closed area, there were operators in the hall, who it was clear to,
that the requirements of the NSR and GSP were not met by the reactor. I’m sure it would have
had no effect on the court’s decision, but it could have caused some inconvenience, maybe a
lot. It’s easier to go with the viewpoint, as all the commissions did, that these documents didn’t
exist, and we won’t know whether the reactor should answer to them or not.
When answering questions about whether or not the reactor could be operated, the
forensic technical expert commission would respond with a list of what the reactor had, what
kind of protection. This turns out to be a lot, and at first glance, can be convincing. The
RBMK-1000 reactor is a complex device, RCPS is a multi-element branched control system.
Name everything and it will make a formidable list. But another question: What did the reactor
not have as directed by the NSR? For example, regarding the ORM parameter, the reactor did
not have automatic EPS, or even an alarm. And on a deviation of this parameter, the reactor
exploded when EPS was actuated automatically, or by the button. So it was on April 26, 1986.
And the RBMK-1000 reactor had something that no reactor should have - a positive fast
power coefficient of reactivity, which made it dynamically unstable. The expert commission was
silent on this, and the court, by rejecting my questions, contributed.
From the very first interrogation, I pointed out the baselessness of accusing the
personnel of violating Regulations by blocking EPS. Do you think it made a difference? None
at all. During the trial, the judge asked everyone, who ordered that protection be removed.
When Elshin and other witnesses replied that, in their opinion, according to operational
discipline, Akimov could not remove the protection himself, the judge concludes that Dyatlov
ordered it, and is guilty. First of all, since when did “in my opinion” become evidence?
Secondly, the judge knew from the case materials that whether Dyatlov ordered it, or whether
Akimov removed the protection on his own, there was no violation. Thirdly, this is enough to
accuse Dyatlov, but to conclude that the staff was accustomed to strict discipline, it was not
enough.
Any witness testimony in favor of the accused, found no understanding in the court.
Pressure was applied to the witnesses by the prosecutor, judge, or both. Some withstood this
pressure (G.A. Dick, I. Kazachkov), and some did not (Y. Tregub). The judge is a member of the
USSR Supreme Court, the prosecutor is the head of the oversight department for the
Prosecutor’s Office of the USSR. Who could be zealous enough to challenge them? One
would think that G.A. Dick’s opinion on Dyatlov would have had some meaning. But the
prosecutor directly threatened to find out who Dick works with when he expressed a positive
opinion about Dyatlov. It would be clear to anyone that a threat from a prosecutor with the rank
and position of a general, is not a harmless joke. Well, the prosecutor is the accuser, his zeal is
understandable. But what about the behavior of a judge? True, A.F. Koni wrote that a
prosecutor should use both negative and positive materials regarding the accused. But he was
a tsarist lawyer, and didn’t live long enough in Soviet times to develop properly. Now the Soviet
lawyer, Y.N. Shadrin chooses one out of dozens of witness statements. V.I. Fazly questions my
industrial competence. Shadrin emphatically exclaims that Dyatlov’s appointment was a
strategic (no more, no less) mistake. Although, from the very same testimony, Shadrin could
have concluded the exact opposite. In his testimony are the words - the personnel were
competent and disciplined. This is the highest compliment for me. My main task was to select
and train personnel. I didn’t perform operational activities, although I could have.
I must pay tribute to the head of the investigative group, Y.A. Potemkin. Of course, he
carried out and fulfilled the task of charging the personnel. If he hadn’t done it, someone else
would have. There were materials in the court case that weren’t suitable for the prosecution at
all, and could have been excluded from the case. These documents helped me understand the
causes of the catastrophe. In fact, my viewpoint has not changed at all since January 1987,
and I have learned practically nothing new from the reports that followed. At the time, I was
interested only in the causes that brought about the explosion. The first phase of an
uncontrolled acceleration. The second explosion that followed and its causes do not interest me
very much now. This is important to the scientists, for the operator, preventing the first phase is
important. From the materials in the court case and knowledge of the actual circumstances of
the accident, I developed a picture of the explosion, which now, most objective researchers
have come around to. However, I am 100% sure that this picture was clearly visible in the
minds of the creators of the reactor immediately after the explosion. The IAE and NIKIET
workers, if they had been the least bit conscientious, would not have been in a fog for five years.
Had they not sung the praises of nuclear energy: A.P. Aleksandrov on the scientific side, and
A.G. Meshkov on the administrative side, maybe others wouldn’t have dared to lie so blatantly.
The findings of A.A. Yadrikhinsky and B.G. Dubovsky, and especially the detailed report
of the Gospromatomenergonadzor commission, add nothing to my understanding, but they are
important for another reason. I am not speaking as a former prisoner, but as someone whose
only interest is to find the truth. What can you expect from me? I have to justify myself. My
words are perceived with an immediate prejudice toward skepticism, they don’t even think about
the meaning of what I say. And I practically couldn’t say anything. No one read my complaints
(a prisoner writes complaints, not letters) from the prison. No one published my letters to
newspapers or magazines. After my conviction, I wrote my first complaint to General Secretary
M.S. Gorbachev. Of course I didn’t expect the letter to find him, but I also didn’t expect that it
would be sent from the Central Committee to the Deputy General Prosecutor, O.V. Soroka, who
confirmed my indictment. You couldn’t pre-plan it better. I suppose the response requires no
comment.
Generally, you can write as many complaints and petitions under imprisonment as you
want with no results. I didn’t accept the guilt of myself and the personnel for the explosion. My
wife and I wrote, my wife also did the legwork. Unlike me, she could walk. I just couldn’t make
peace with the idea of spending the rest of my life locked up for the sins of others. Examples I
had seen in the press brought both discouragement and hope. Like the case with the director of
a state farm from the Krasnodar Territory. For three years, he and his wife wrote 375
complaints! Then finally, it was found by a man (who must have been a black sheep in the
orderly ranks of the prosecutor’s office), who read the case and protested. This is how many
people were involved with “verifying” complaints. Answers to everything came carefully. Then
you think about whether or not you should write. It depends on many things.
Imprisonment changes the human psyche. All life says: “Abandon hope, all ye who
enter here.” With fear, I would sometimes reflect that I had gone several days considering this
life to be normal. Not to say that I thought it was actually normal, just that I didn’t think of it as
abnormal. You can fall deeper into the quagmire, where the desire to do anything for liberation
is paralyzed. An innocent person can serve ten sentences, and no one from law enforcement
will remember.
This was in spite of the fact that I didn’t consider myself to be guilty for one minute. It
wasn’t until I understood the causes of the explosion, as a habit so as not to blame anyone
without having an understanding myself, that I believed it even more so.
Since I consistently received letters from my wife, relatives, acquaintances, and peers
from the institute, my consciousness was constantly disturbed. Everything is bad for the
prisoner: Letters, visits. Visits are even worse. After one visit with my wife, I came to my
senses for several days. Without that, I don’t know how I would feel. Fortunately I wasn’t
deprived of my visits.
Generally I couldn’t fall asleep or forget that the natural state of a person is to be free.
But all the same, I understood that my complaints, wherever they were written, yielded no result.
Only a man unshackled by his troubles can move them. My wife was such a trooper. She went
to the most inconceivable authorities and turned to various people. Finally, it worked, and I was
freed. Many asked for me, I will name just one, in the blessed memory of A.D. Sakharov. My
deepest gratitude to them.
I must state that I would have been imprisoned under any presidency in 1987. I was
released only under M.S. Gorbachev. Under another president? Doubtful. Still, I won’t thank
him. Not because it is now acceptable to criticize the president, but because I can’t figure how it
could be done. Thank you for only imprisoning me for four years instead of dozens? Clear
ambiguity.
But the prosecutor’s office and court aren’t severe to everyone. Take this decree of the
prosecutor’s office and therefore the court:
“Regarding the officials of Chernobyl NPP and the city of Pripyat responsible for the
organization of civil defense services, job safety and technical security, as well as officials in
design and construction organizations who did not take appropriate action in modernization of
the RCPS at facilities with RBMK-1000 reactors, separate criminal hearings will be held,
December 11, 1986.”
Notice how gently worded it is - didn’t take action in modernization of the reactor. With
wording like this, there will certainly be no bonus this month. What kind of court are we talking
about? Have they not been modernized? Sure, it was impossible to use another wording about
the designers. Let’s call it what it is. They threw together a worthless reactor, and a protection
system that does the opposite of protect. So why are we judged? They put out this decree to
divert the eyes.
It was never a trial, it wasn’t meant to be from the start. The designers can’t be judged
for not modernizing the reactor and its protection. They can’t be judged for “shortcomings'' or
“features”. They can only be judged for non-compliance with requirements of the regulatory
documents. And just how could all of the commissions, including the forensic-technical expert
commission, the prosecutor’s office, and the court diligently ignore this? Not out of naivety, the
judge rejected my questions at the trial, along with questions from the other defendants, while at
the same time favorably accepting all the rather innocuously formulated questions from the
lawyers. And the commission gave their answers in writing. No, you can clearly track the
judge’s understanding of the essence of the case. And just the same, the clear opposition to
clarifying it.
When I was chief of the shop, Tolya Sitnikov was my deputy. He frequented meetings
for the party committee, station committee, and human resources. Frankly, I avoided such
gatherings. He came in swearing about how they were being forced to make some kind of list. I
asked: “Did you swear about it at the meeting?”
“What for? It’s all the same, and necessary.”
“So what? You might as well just sell your soul then. And next time they’ll think they can
just push off unimportant things on anyone.”
With this character trait, despite the fact the judge rejected my questions, I would have
forced him to shut me up by taking me off the stand. Otherwise I would have forced the
commission to answer: “How does the reactor comply with the requirements of NSR?” For
example:
- On a deviation of the ORM parameter, the reactor exploded. According to article 3.1.8,
there must be an emergency and warning alarm. There was none.
- According to article 3.3.21, if this same parameter has a deviation, the reactor should
automatically shutdown. There was no such signal.
- According to article 3.3.26, EPS should quickly and reliably extinguish the chain reaction
upon pressing the button. Pressing the button was precisely how the accident began.

That would have been relevant following my question, the shamelessly insolent expert
from NIKIET, V.I. Meehan, would reply that the RBMK complied with NSR.
But at that time, my physical condition was in a completely unfit state. I could hardly
speak, the right side of my head was torn to pieces. Repeated requests to bring in a dentist
were ignored. After the court hearings, I don’t know how but I would run to the isolation ward to
get some pills.
Knowledgeable people will grin - well, yes, run. Just try it. Well for me, running is not
fast. Secondly, I had already been living in this isolation ward, with this officer for eight months.
It was only at the end of the trial, when we were taken to the Lukyanovskaya prison in
Kiev, that a supervisor was called. After a conversation he asked what requests we had. I
asked to be taken to a dentist. He immediately called, and an hour later I could talk, and my
head was back to normal. And I only had to lose one tooth.
 On the evening of Thursday, September 27, 1990, I was sitting in the library. I had just
finished reading an article in the magazine “Ogonyok” (never published in the free press) about
an interview with A.P. Aleksandrov. Vitya Chistyakov, the Zonovsky radioman, and a
cameraman arrived. He said my release had been announced on the radio. Afterwards, others
spoke. Then on Friday, the head of the colony said the same thing. Then I believed it.
Naturally, the boss can’t release someone based on messages and phone calls. Each prisoner
is numbered, inventoried, and strung together. You can only be released with documents. The
boss shortened my time in the zone as much as possible and called my wife.
To keep from jinxing the news, I showed no external signs, I didn’t gather my belongings,
I didn’t even let any thoughts of it in. As they say: “We are not superstitious, but why risk it?”
The only thing I did was have a farewell party. You think about what you want yourself, but still
observe the ritual. Well I had plenty of tea, some food, and cigarettes. It was fine. A pity there
was no drinking. Some general advice for future convicts: when serving your term in prison,
accept the rules of conduct. And not just externally, but internally. The game will not work.
Aside from the higher security and strict prisons, where people are more serious, generally
prisoners think rather primitively, but in a refined way. It doesn’t matter if you’re innocent times
three. In prison, you’re a prisoner. No one cares about your troubles. Everyone has their own
great sentence. Don’t show your intellectual superiority, even if it isn’t just imagined. This will
avoid unnecessary conflict with both the prisoners and the administration.
On Monday, as usual, I went to the post office in the village for newspapers and
magazines. I met with the dentist, Anatoly Danilovich, who pointed to a folder and said, “I
brought your release.” Here, my heart skipped a beat. I brought the newspapers back but
didn’t organize them. I threw my documents in my backpack along with several books. Then
they came. “To the exit with your things!” But this is not the exclamation, either in content or
intonation, that pushes you onto the stage, although the words are the same. Vitya Chistyakov
brought my backpack to the checkpoint, where once I left the zone, my wife and Slava Orlov
were standing. This is freedom!
I got changed. As a keepsake I took my shirt with the prisoner tag, and the hat
affectionately called a piderka. Three years and ten months of life down the drain. I lost my
health, and to them it seemed like nothing.

PART 12: INVESTIGATION LAUNCHED

The commissions and groups of authors of articles in technical magazines, while

somewhat different from each other, have similarities in two positions:
- unanimous recognition of the personnels’ guilt in the accident, undoubted and sole guilt
 - diligently ignoring the main regulatory documents on nuclear reactor safety - NSR and
GSP

Since the reactor exploded, some sins are naturally admitted to, which various
commissions refer to as shortcomings and features. Everyone understands that nothing is
perfect, and that with any reactor there are certain shortcomings. This is no surprise.
Everything gradually improves. So they say spots have been discovered on the sun, we don’t
pull it out of the sky for it - it still shines and warms. This logic is shortsighted. Who is even
bothered by sunspots? Anyway, public opinion was lulled and even most specialists were
convinced. Various commissions all with one voice. The composition of the commissions is
overweight - academicians, doctors and doctoral candidates, ministers, deputy ministers,
directors of institutes, and no small number of other officials. This all creates the appearance of
objectivity of the investigation. To be fair, I must say not all teams blamed the personnel.
A group of scientists led by Ponomarev-Stepny made a conclusion about the explosion
of the reactor, owing it to the large positive steam void effect of reactivity. The commission
which was formed at the direction of The State Committee for Science and Technology,
speaking further to the large steam void effect, adds that with such a steam void effect, the
reactor would have exploded even with a DBA, which should not happen. It also established
that the introduction of positive reactivity with EPS actuation is unacceptable, stating that such
protection does not fulfill its function of shutting down the reactor. Perhaps the commission
believes (which would be fair) that what they have noted is sufficient to declare the reactor unfit
for operation. There is no such conclusion in the report. In any case, the undoubtedly
competent commission did not answer the question of the reactor’s compliance with NSR and
GSP. Inconceivably, the commission does not see the reactor’s contradictions with the
requirements of design standards for reactors in its own noted properties of the reactor. Timidly
noting the failure of EPS to comply with the requirements of NSR Article 3.3.5 regarding shutting
down the reactor in any normal or emergency condition, the commission now places doubt on
whether this is a requirement at all.
But these groups do not express their opinion on the personnel. Nor do they form an
opinion on the acceptability or unacceptability of using such a reactor. Impassive researchers,
so to speak. This is useful if the investigation is objective, which cannot be said about the report
of The State Committee for Science and Technology Commission.
For years the experts have ignored the regulatory documents on reactors. They are not
there and that’s it. Well, not really. A large group of authors of an article in “Atomic Energy”
magazine writes that following the accident, NSR and GSP were thoroughly reviewed and found
that the safety criteria was fundamentally met. Foreign scientists like Professor A. Birkhofer of
Germany also wrote about this. But this is not regarding the RBMK reactor as it was in 1986.
They don’t know at all whether the RBMK should have complied with these, or some other
Regulations.
Why do respectable scientists and non-scientists not want to answer a completely
natural question? They can’t say with certainty that the reactor didn’t comply with Regulations.
Clearly they don’t want to say something false either. That is all.
 Fundamentally, according to factual data, the investigation materials are correct. There
is little direct manipulation. Only the IAEA informants went for explicit forgery, but they probably
hoped this would remain hidden from the Soviet people. The facts presented are not so, and
the conclusions drawn from the presented facts are wrong. They can always say if they were
wrong, it was wrong when they got it.
Recognition of the reactor’s shortcomings and “features'' doesn't obligate anyone to
anything. They existed and will exist. We will eliminate them. But recognition of the reactor
design’s nonfulfillment of the regulatory documents’ direct requirements is a legal matter.
Therefore it’s better to be silent. Others will be imprisoned? That’s their problem. Here we
have ethics.
You might think - what’s the difference whether or not they say it? The technical
measures implemented at the remaining reactors didn’t change from this anyway. There is a big
difference. RBMKs aren’t the only reactors, and to allow such mistakes would be completely
foolish and unforgivable. Designers are also working on new reactors. They are needed.
Approaches to security problems are similar in other sectors of the national (or whatever it is
now) economy. This is also necessary. Even so, we have not yet matured to justice, and are
not sure whether or not we need it. Like the words of S. Yesenin: “Calm down traveler, and do
not demand the truth you do not need.”
Some don’t need the truth, they protect their own skin. Others might have wanted to
speak up but were afraid of the Politburo’s decision. After all, these decisions are always
correct. If they are in actuality not correct, but recognized as correct anyway, then it was still
impossible to speak out. This was common knowledge.
True, everything has been confused in our land lately. Suddenly, from the tribune of the
XXVIII Congress, it seems that it turned out that the Politburo too could be wrong. They say
they haven’t figured it out, but that is not true. Solo researchers, not the most well-informed,
who didn’t have access to all the materials (more on that below), were able to figure out and
understand the causes of the catastrophe, while the omnipotent body, with all the country’s
scientific forces at its disposal, could not. I also cannot agree with the assertions, often found in
the press lately, that they were all fools. I am sure there were no fools there, they didn’t make
their way to the Politburo by inheritance. They were anything but fools. Unlimited power and
complete lack of control allowed the Politburo to never think about justice and the righteousness
of their decisions. What they decided was righteous, what they decided was correct. Therefore,
the decision, which was considered necessary, was made regardless of actual circumstances.
They didn’t figure it out because they didn’t try, and didn’t want to. They simply didn’t need to.
The congressional tribunal’s statement was forced, made under pressure from the public, due to
the severity of the consequences of the accident. If not for this, if only for the causes of the
accident, there would have been no statement, everything would have remained as it had
always been. This is actually the basis of the investigators’ calculations. Top and bottom will be
connected by a common wrong version of the cause of the catastrophe, and no one will get to
the truth. Anyone can wish whatever they like, and the oxygen will be cut off from this alliance.
Perestroika wasn’t all bad, it had its benefits. There were people before who weren’t
afraid to go against the flow. They were promptly rolled away. And now when this phenomenon
is observed, we read about it in the press. There are no longer endless encounters with
despotism. And they haven’t gotten rid of all the lone enthusiasts yet.
First of all, here I must mention IAE employee, V.P. Volkov, who I have already written
about. From the very beginning, he was convinced that the only reason for the reactor’s
explosion was its completely inadequate qualities. Of course he was far from the only one who
thought so. But others thought, and remained silent, while Volkov reached the head of state.
Well then, there’s no one else to go to but God.
There were two more interesting reports, also by individuals. Their main difference from
the other scientific reports is that they differentiate between what was the fault of the personnel
and the designers of the reactor, while other reports only state the reasons for the explosion: a
large steam void effect of reactivity and an unsuitable EPS, without mentioning the physicists
and designers. They seem to have appeared in the reactor themselves. Better yet, ascribe
them to the operating personnel, as if they were the ones who created such a core and
designed the control rods. That’s it, under the prevailing operating conditions (a nod to the
operators) the extremely negative properties of the reactor are especially pronounced. As if it’s
not clear to them that under no operational or emergency conditions, should the properties of
the reactor lead to an explosion.
The first to come out was Professor B.G. Dubovsky’s work: “On the Factors of Instability
of Nuclear Reactors, the RBMK Reactor as an Example”. B.G. Dubovsky was head of the
nuclear safety service in the USSR from 1958-1973, and knows the RBMK reactor by more than
hearsay. He made proposals to improve the protection of these very reactors in the 70’s.
The work considers and explains in detail the defects of the reactor’s RCPS. Here they
are: The core is seven meters high, therefore nearly independent reactors can form in the top
and bottom of the zone. At the same time, all of the RCPS rods associated with EPS are
located at the top, so when a localized reactor forms in the bottom, the neutron absorbers are
introduced with a large delay. Contained in the RBMK RCPS, are also the so-called shortened
absorber rods. They are always located in the lower part of the core or withdrawn below it.
Therefore they can reach the bottom of the zone quickly. However, “due to a gross error, and a
completely illogical miscalculation in the protection design, the shortened absorber rods were
not connected to the general emergency protection EPS-5 signal, which excluded their rapid
introduction into the space of the developing uncontrolled regional reactor in the lower part of
the core - the most dangerous area regarding reactor acceleration.”
The localized reactor at the bottom of the core was not formed due to technological
reasons, it was formed by the RCPS itself. Due to the heterogeneity of the rods (absorbers,
displacers, water columns), when the rod is located at the top, a 1.25 m water column is formed
in the lower part of the channel. Replacing these columns with a graphite displacer, which
absorbs neutrons more weakly, creates a localized reactor.
“The presence of water columns under the graphite displacers led to the second gross
miscalculation in the RCPS design.” B.G. Dubovsky’s comments on the phenomenon:
“Unfortunately, a dangerous pre-emergency situation, proceeded into the first stage of the
emergency process after pressing the EPS-5 button at the command of the shift supervisor to
trip the reactor, due to the acceleration of the zonal uncontrolled reactor formed in the lower
portion of the core (just think: pressing the emergency protection EPS-5 button, the rescue
button, causes a reactor explosion).”
Thus the third fundamental miscalculation presents itself in the design of the EPS rods,
and all the absorber rods in general - their low speed of introduction into the core with an
inconceivably long total immersion time of 18-20 seconds.
At the very same time, a highly supercritical reactor was formed in the lower portion and
neutron power there began to increase sharply with the neutron absorbers still far away. During
their movement, the neutron power has time to be realized into thermal power (for specialists,
the thermal time constant of fuel elements is 10 seconds). And here the steam void effect of
reactivity has already manifested itself - water in the technological channels turns into steam,
which again leads to an increase in reactivity, and an increase in power. A surge in neutron
power could cause boiling of water in the RCPS channels and also an increase in reactivity.
These are the characteristics the designers chose for the reactor.
“The choice of such unfortunate, and in fact dangerous physical characteristics,
especially during operations at low reactor power levels, was apparently made to achieve more
favorable economic indicators.”
Having convincingly shown the failure of EPS and the entire RCPS system, the
professor is convinced that it was namely this along with the large positive steam void effect of
reactivity that blew up the Unit 4 reactor on April 26, 1986.
It isn’t just a matter of conviction, there are others. It is also a matter of the active civic
position of B.G. Dubovsky. Here is an excerpt from his letter to M.S. Gorbachev following the
organization of a Supreme Council commission to determine the causes and consequences of
the Chernobyl accident:
“The continued unjust imposition of blame on the personnel of Chernobyl excludes
further development of the energy industry - it is impossible to exclude personnel errors in the
future. Assuming violations by the personnel, minimal compliance of reactor protection with its
intended purpose would have only caused a week of downtime. The admin team’s
pseudoscience misled the people, the Academy of Sciences, Academician Sakharov, and the
Supreme Council.
I request to be provided an opportunity to explain to the scientists of the Supreme
Council the true causes of the Chernobyl reactor accident, and the necessary measures to
ensure safety.” 11/27/89.
By mentioning the week of downtime due personnel violations, the professor is most
likely paying tribute to the charges brought against the personnel. In fact, with normal
protection, at worst an unsanctioned shutdown could occur without any damage. After its
modernization, the RBMK reactor really is a new reactor, vastly different from the previous one
regarding safety. The measures implemented are inadequate for the declared version faulting
the personnel, it is clearly exaggerated. We need a correct assessment of the miscalculations
and errors on behalf of the personnel and the builders of the reactor, which will only serve to
benefit establishing a normal psychological climate in the NPP staff, their families, and the
populations of the regions adjacent to the NPP.
 B.G. Dubovsky led the country’s nuclear safety service for fourteen years and repeatedly
participated in the investigation of spontaneous chain reaction accidents, as there was in
Chernobyl. He knows what he’s talking about:
“A subsequent investigation is warranted not only for a more clear understanding of the
scientific and technical mistakes made, but also due to the fact that immediately after the
accident, several participants who made mistakes are intentionally distorting the circumstances
that led to the accident; in some cases, group collusion is possible.”
“Does it correspond to the principles of humanity to mention leaders involved in the
occurrence of the accident who have passed away (Feinberg, Kunegin) or who have become
honored meritorious pensioners (Aleksandrov, Dollezhal)? Given the tragic consequences of
the accident at ChNPP Unit 4, it would seem that it is precisely the principles of humanity that
require the rejection of anonymity, in the name of justice for the victims and in their memory, and
more importantly, to prevent the occurrence of further large-scale accidents.”
These words are fair, and grounded in knowledge of the subject of the conversation.
Nothing said in the work of B.G. Dubovsky can be refuted, one can only claim that he told it like
it was. There is only one clarification of practical circumstance related to B.G. Dubovsky’s lack
of knowledge. The professor says that experiments involving a change in reactivity of greater
than 0.5 βeff (the equivalent of 5 manual control rods), should only be carried out when
equilibrium xenon is reached with a sufficient and relatively stable reactivity margin at powers
greater than 30%.
Although this statement is not indisputable, one can agree for the RBMK reactor.
Based on these considerations, a conclusion is drawn:
“The major principal mistake made by the NPP personnel was the extremely unfortunate
choice of time, due to their illiteracy, to conduct a clearly dangerous experiment during a strong
decrease in the value of reactivity margin due to the rapid accumulation of radioactive xenon,
the strongest neutron absorber.”
Without pretending to be particularly literate, I can say that the usual calculations for
operation were available to me. Changes in reactivity related to the experiment were observed
only during the startup and shutdown of the MCP due to a change in steam content of the
coolant. According to a reference provided to us by the Department of Nuclear Safety, the
steam void effect of reactivity was +1.29 βeff. Отсюда, при остановке четырех насосов из
восьми, изменения реактивности больше двух стержней не насчитать. Б.Г. Дубовский,
видимо, имел ввиду величину парового эффекта в 5- 6 ? эфф , намеренную после аварии.
​Pump trips are possible during normal operation of the reactor, and it can happen even
more quickly than in the experiment if the electrical bus is de-energized. Does this mean the
plant shouldn’t operate at all? Anyway, that’s how it was, but the experiment had nothing to do
with it.
A report by A.A. Yadrikhinsky, Gosatomenergonadzor inspector for Kursk NPP, raised
questions about the RBMK reactor’s compliance with the main regulatory documents, GSP and
NSR, for the first time. It’s clear from this work that this was not the first document, but the
others are unknown to me.
The regulatory documents contain the necessary minimum requirements for the design
and operation of the reactor and the unit. Each requirement of the Regulations must be met,
otherwise, safety must be demonstrated, confirmed by calculation, and approved by the
authorities. No deviations were announced for the RBMK reactor, and no approvals were made.
It turns out that, according to the authors, the RBMK fully met the requirements of these
documents.
Doubts about this came up before, but only a comprehension of the accident and
subsequent calculations revealed the true essence of the RBMK for the operators. At Kursk
NPP, A.A. Yadrikhinsky compiled a list for the RBMK of exactly 32 deviations from the
requirements of GSP, NSR, and Regulations for the Design and Safe Operation of NPPs. It is
clear that not all of these deviations had an effect on the occurrence of the accident on April 26,
1986, but there were enough (more than a dozen) that “participated” on April 26, and this is
convincingly shown in his work.
Establishing the specific points in the documents which carry the force of the law, and
have not been fulfilled by the designers, is important. This excludes subjective interpretation,
and puts it on a lawful, legal basis - the reactor could be safely operated, or it could not. If the
reactor could not meet its legal requirements, then the responsibility falls on the designers, and
pushing the reactor through into operation is criminal. This is stated in NSR, as well as in other
regulations:
“Individuals guilty of violating ‘Regulations’ will be brought up on administrative or judicial
charges according to active Legislation.”
Doubts about the objectivity of the investigation into the causes of the accident, where
the main participants were the authors of the reactor project i.e. the potential culprits of the
accident, forced an independent investigation to be carried out. From this investigation, A.A.
Yadrikhinsky draws the conclusion that “the authors of the project should be defendants, not
plaintiffs, as is currently the case.” He also names specific individuals:
“Currently, there are a handful of actual perpetrators of the Chernobyl accident. They
are Academicians - A.P. Aleksandrov and I.A. Dollezhal who supervised all work on RBMK
reactors; press correspondent and head of the RCPS - I. Ya. Yemelyanov; and Chief State
Inspector of Nuclear Safety in the USSR, N.I. Kozlov, who signed off on the RBMK reactor’s
nuclear safety knowing it was inadequate.”
They should be found guilty according to NSR which they themselves developed. Being
neither a prosecutor nor a judge, I do not determine the degree of responsibility of these
individuals, but their guilt is beyond doubt.
This is not about legal responsibility. More than five years have passed since the
accident. And our laws are cruel to some, but ultra-humane to others. Remember Yakhyaev,
the Uzbekistani Minister of Internal Affairs. He received his rank by committing crimes. Then
those honors became indulgences for crimes.
It is necessary to find out the truth, and remove baseless accusations against the
personnel.
This will be very difficult to do. The bold faced lie continues. The Minister of Atomic
Energy issued a list of violations and agreed with the Chief Designer and Scientific Supervisor
that there were no major violations of NSR. I won’t quote articles 3.2.2, 3.3.21.3.3.26 and
3.3.28 here. It is unclear how one could overlook or deny their violations. As long as the same
people are involved, there will be no change. At a meeting of the Supreme Soviet Commission,
where I was invited to describe the circumstances under which the accident occurred, the
Deputy Director of NIKIET, Yu. M. Cherkashov sought to find out whether or not I was in the
Control Room at the time that reactor power dropped. As if my presence could change the
physical phenomenon. Dolgov from the Forensic Technical Commission:
“Why, in violation of the experiment program, was protection on a trip of two TGs
removed?”
Even though there is not a word about protection in the program, and he knows it.
These participants do everything they can to drown the investigation in completely unnecessary
details, and never touch the heart of the matter. True, the chairman of the commission figured it
out quickly. But I was only there twice, they were all constant participants. I cannot and will not
try to anticipate the decision of the Supreme Soviet Commission. There is no certainty that the
oppressive accusation of the personnel will be overcome. I do however believe that the
so-called flaws of the reactor will finally be called what they are. If unacceptable defects of the
reactor are flaws, then the pregnancy of a Vestal Virgin is also a flaw. And we know from history
that Vestals with such a “flaw” were immured alive.
No matter how good, true and decisive A.A. Yadrikhinsky’s and B.G. Dubovsky’s reports
are, these are amateur reports, no official organization instructed them to make them. And for
that reason, all official institutions can pretend that they don’t exist. No organizations in the
Soviet Union are interested in establishing the RBMK reactor’s inconsistency with the regulatory
documents.
Rest assured that if the reactor had met design standards, IAE and NIKIET would have
generated a report with detailed evidence within a week of the accident. This wasn’t necessary
for the Ministry of Energy and its successor, the Ministry of Atomic Energy.
The right and the duty to establish the reactor’s adherence to the standards lies directly
with the supervisory authority - Gosatomenergonadzor. However, having not fulfilled its
supervisory function leading up to the accident, this body, or rather the people working within it,
resisted it for several years following the accident. The State was named as the supervisory
authority, even though in actuality it wasn’t. And until 1984, a piece of the supervisory
organization was a division of Minsredmash. Formally allotted great authority, in actuality they
didn’t dare use it. Even after the accident, repeated requests by Gosatomenergonadzor for a
safety basis of the RBMK from its creators, the Scientific Supervisor, and the Chief Designer,
were simply ignored.
In 1986, when deciding on the startup of Chernobyl NPP Unit 1, which was shutdown
following the accident, the issue of a provision of safety basis material was brought up again, to
which Scientific Supervisor, A.P. Aleksandrov replied: “What other justification do you need if I
am here? I say the reactor is safe. Start it up.”
And per the decision of the Governmental Commission, they started it up. The aplomb
and habitual power-wielding of A.P. Aleksandrov were understandable. The actions of the
supervisory body and the entire commission were less understandable: there was no shortage
of statements from A.P. Aleksandrov about the reliability of the reactor, even before the
accident. And there you go, it worked. At least this time.
Only after a change in leadership, did the supervisory body finally decide to look at the
relationship between the RBMK and the legal design requirements.
 In 1990, the scientific-technical sector held a meeting which invited representatives of
various organizations. A.A. Yadrikhinsky’s report was considered. I do not address questions
on the explosion process or the amount of radioactive material released. One person cannot
answer this problem. I dare say, there will never be an accurate depiction of the explosion. This
does not interest us. We need to know the source, and what led to this ill-fated source.
At this sector meeting, for the first time, a large number (more than twenty) of violations
of NSR and GSP articles was recognized by the commission of various organizations. Only
representatives of the Chief Designer disagreed with this decision. This by itself is scary, such
people should be removed from the design of reactors. Regardless of what guides their
motives: either they are unaware of these violations, or they are aware but deny it. Both are
intolerable.
The N.A. Shteynberg Commission was appointed by the order of the Chairman of
Gosatomenergonadzor No.11 on February 27, 1990, and in January 1991, the report was
released.
The commission studied several dozen documents on reactor design, post-accident
calculations and studies, and accident documentation. From what I can tell (I do not know
everything), this is the most objective and complete report covering various aspects of the
reactor and causes leading to the catastrophe. In its account of the events of April 26, the
commission does not resort to baseless assumptions, and conclusions are drawn practically
only on the basis of documents.
My representation, the representation of an eyewitness to the events, coincides with
their depiction in the report of the final minutes prior to the explosion. I consider it necessary to
cite all preserved digital data. For nuclear energy specialists, it is of undoubted interest, others
may not read it.
“Before the tests, the core parameters were therefore such as to increase the reactor's
runaway susceptibility in the lower part of the core. The Commission believes that this situation
was created not only as a result of a higher than normal flow rate of coolant through the reactor
(because eight instead of the usual six MCPs were in operation, and an increased flow rate
prevents steam generation), but primarily as a result of the low reactor power level. Similar
thermal-hydraulic parameters could occur during any power reduction of the reactor. (*My
emphasis - A.D.)
The unit's initial condition immediately before the tests at 01:23 was characterized by the
following parameters: power of 200 MW(th), ORM (value obtained using the PRIZMA-ANALOG
code for the state at 01:22:30) equal to 8 manual control rods, double peaked axial neutron field
with a maximum above, coolant flow rate of 56,000 m³ /h, feedwater flow rate of 200 t/h and
thermophysical parameters close to stable values.
The unit shift supervisors considered that preparations for the tests had been completed
and, having switched on the oscilloscope, gave the order to close the emergency stop valves.
These were closed at 01:23:04.
At this time, and for the following approximately 30 s of rundown of the four MCPs, the
parameters of the unit were controlled, remained within the limits expected for the operating
conditions concerned, and did not require any intervention on the part of the personnel.
 However, it would appear that, under the conditions of reduced ORM, as of 00:30 on 26
April 1986 it would have been impossible to use the emergency protection system of the reactor
of this particular design, either in response to emergency signals or manually after completion of
the tests, without damaging the core. This will have to be confirmed by further studies.

1-4.6.2. Implementation of the test programme

The tests, which started at 01:23:04, caused the following processes in the reactor.
The rotational speed and delivery of the MCPs powered from turbogenerator No. 8,
which was being run down (MCPs Nos 13, 14, 23 and 24), were reduced. Delivery of the other
MCPs (MCPs Nos 11, 12, 21 and 22) was slightly increased. The total coolant flow rate began
to fall. Thirty-five seconds after the start of the transient it had fallen by 10-15% of the initial
value.
The reduction in coolant flow rate led to a corresponding increase in steam quality in the
core, which was to some (small) extent offset by the increase in pressure following the closure
of the emergency stop valves of turbogenerator No. 8.
This stage of the process has been mathematically modelled by experts in the USSR
and in the USA. The theoretical predictions of the integral parameters agree well with the values
actually recorded. Both calculations showed that the released void reactivity was negligible and
could have been compensated for by insertion for a short distance (up to 1.4 m) of the EPS rods
into the core.
During the rundown of turbogenerator No. 8 there was no increase in reactor power. This
is confirmed by the DREG program, which from 01:19:39 until 01:19:44 and from 01:19:57 until
01:23:30 (i.e. prior to and for a substantial period during the tests) recorded the ‘One
overcompensation upwards' signal, at which time the automatic control rods could not move into
the core. Their positions, recorded for the last time at 01:22:37, were 1.4, 1.6 and 0.2 m for
automatic regulators Nos 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
Thus, neither the reactor power nor the other parameters (pressure and water level in
the steam separator drums, coolant and feedwater flow rates, etc.) required any intervention by
the personnel or by the engineered safety features from the beginning of the tests until the
EPS-5 button was pressed.
The Commission did not detect any events or dynamic processes, such as hidden
reactor runaway, which could have been the event which initiated the accident. The Commission
identified a rather extended initial reactor state, during which, if positive reactivity had occurred
for any reason, there could have been a power excursion under conditions in which the reactor's
EPS would be unable to perform its functions.

1-4.6.3. Development of the accident

At 01:23:40 the senior reactor control engineer pressed the manual emergency stop
button (EPS-5). The Commission was unable to establish why the button was pressed.”
PART 13: COINCIDENCE OR INEVITABILITY?
The first written opinion I know of on the causes of the Chernobyl catastrophe comes
from IAE employee V.P. Volkov in a letter to the IAE Director, A.P. Aleksandrov on May 1, 1986.
Following a peculiar, but natural reaction to the letter, which included Volkov being banned from
the institute, Volkov subsequently expressed the following version in a letter to M.S. Gorbachev:
“The accident can be attributed not to the actions of the operating personnel, but to the
design of the reactor core and a lack of proper understanding of the neutron physics processes
going on in it.”
The immediate causes were: the introduction of positive reactivity when EPS was
actuated due to a design defect in the control rods and large positive steam void effect of
reactivity. This is the first and absolutely correct opinion, which receives public recognition only
after five years. Of course, this was not expressed on intuition, but on the basis of concrete
knowledge of the characteristics of the RBMK, and its unsatisfactory properties of which he had
long but unsuccessfully warned leadership, including A.P. Aleksandrov. The letter was sent
from the Central Committee to Gosatomenergonadzor, where a commission chaired by V.A.
Sidorenko actually recognized the accuracy of the causes of the origin of the accident.
Such a version could not receive recognition at that time. It would be very bad for a lot
of people. This was followed with a report by an interdepartmental commission chaired by the
Deputy Minister of Medium Machine Building, A.G. Meshkov. True, it was formed only as a
result of this version, but afterwards, it practically became a Minsredmash, i.e. creators of the
reactor, Commission. Subsequently, insufficient attention was paid to this version, due to the
clear bias of Deputy Minister of Energy G.A. Shasharin, Director of VNIIAES A.A. Abagyan, and
Chief Engineer of Glavatomenergo B. Ya. Prushinsky.
According to the commission’s report, the reactor explosion occurred due to voiding in
the core caused by MCP disruption. Disruption of the pumps, i.e. they stopped supplying
coolant to cool the core and the explosion occurred due to a mismatch between feed flow and
coolant flow supplied by each pump.
I have encountered the enterprises and organizations of Minsredmash for many years in
my work. The people there are qualified, orderly, and disciplined better than in other places.
But there is more pride and aplomb. It was rare but sometimes there were flaws in their work.
It’s true however, that they would eliminate them in the shortest technical time possible. Really
it was so no traces would remain in the form of reports or protocols. Of course this was all
settled and closed in strict secrecy. I am not contradicting facts. It turns out that the institution
knew of practically all of the RBMK defects, and it was only the incomprehensible inactivity in
the minds of management that allowed them to not be eliminated in a timely manner. The same
thing when V.P. Volkov reached out to Aleksandrov. Where else could he go? Let’s see, on his
appeal to M.S. Gorbachev, only in light of the actual accident was he allowed to go on and not
get chewed up. If he had appealed prior to the accident, so much dirt would have been poured -
it would have never washed off.
The A.G. Meshkov Commission worked according to established stereotypes, and did
not take into account the scale and nature of the catastrophe. We’ll write a report for the crowd
that’s convenient to us, and we’ll take the necessary measures ourselves. This is clear from the
technical measures developed by the IAE and NIKIET immediately following the accident for the
remaining RBMK reactors. A review of these measures shows that the creators of the reactor
immediately and clearly understood why the explosion occurred, but they muddied the waters
and continue to do so for understandable reasons, far from science and ethics.
G.A. Shasharin, refusing to sign the report, created a Commission in the Ministry of
Energy, which with the involvement of other employees, particularly from The Mechanical
Engineering Experimental Design Office (designers of the MCPs), and The All Union Heat
Engineering Institute, wrote an addendum to the report.
This document is fundamentally true to the essence of the matter. Compiled according
to VNIIAES calculations, it takes into account objective evidence from the control system and
eyewitness testimony. The main conclusion of the A.G. Meshkov Commission about pump
disruption has been shown to be baseless. In my view, the lack of documentation brings about
the consideration of all factors that influenced the occurrence of the accident - significant and
insignificant, which obscures the matter. This document could be the basis for the correct
conclusion. It was not taken into account.
Then on the 2nd and 17th of June 1986, the Interdepartmental Science and Technology
Council, chaired by A.P. Aleksandrov, recognized the reactor as good, and the personnel as
bad. He is guilty too. And then came the report from the Government Commission and
decision from the Politburo. For the thrice Hero and President of the Academy of Sciences etc.
etc. it was not difficult to select the necessary and discard the unnecessary documents. An
excellent switchman, he clearly transfers the arrow in the right direction: Who is guilty? The
personnel; Did Aleksandrov participate in the accident investigation? No; Who created the
RBMK reactor? N.A. Dollezhal while Aleksandrov, the inventor and scientific director had
nothing to do with it; Who was sent to Chernobyl after the accident? Legasov, even though he
had nothing to do with it. This wasn’t for a medal, he was the last in line here.
​It should be noted here, at the moment the EPS button was pressed, the control system
didn’t register a single signal, no emergency or warning about the deviation of the reactor’s and
its system’s parameters. The reactor is blown up by emergency protection!!! Nonsense. More
than thirty articles from normative documents on reactor design were violated by the reactor
design.
By establishing any of these three points, and it is impossible to challenge them, in a
normal human society you could drop all charges against the personnel. But that’s in a normal
society. What do we have?
Nowhere further on does the disruption of the MCPs appear as a cause of the accident -
it is very odious.
 Soviet informants to the IAEA generally explain the runaway reactor phase vaguely. But
now there is new wording:
“Thus, the secondary cause of the Accident was an extremely improbable combination of
violations of instructions and operating rules committed by the staff of the unit.”
The informants have put into use the term “reactor condition so contrary to regulations.”
I have already explained in detail “staff violations” and “contrary to regulations.” I will only cite
the testimony of other specialists who do not wish to lie.

G.A. Shasharin, Novy Mir, No. 9, 1991:

“The press has already indicated that the operators disconnected EPS altogether. This
is not true.”
“In some publications, emphasis is placed on a number of other, allegedly erroneous,
actions of the personnel. None of them plays a role in the occurrence and more so in the
development of the accident. Reducing power to 60 MW is also not prohibited by Regulations,
although this circumstance, as mentioned above, turned out to be extremely negative.”
I’ll add on my own - only in such a reactor in such an emergency situation.
But these formulations are tenacious, especially those that caress the ear. Here is an
excerpt from a letter dated March 26, 1990, signed by IAE Deputy Director N.N.
Ponomarev-Stepnoy, NIKIET Director E.O. Adamov, and VNIIAES Director A.A. Abagyan:
“The accident occurred as a result of bringing the reactor into an unregulated condition
due to a number of reasons, the main of which are: a decrease in ORM below the regulatory
value, and the coolant’s low subcooling value at the reactor inlet. Under these conditions, a
positive steam vapor effect of reactivity, design flaws in the RCPS rods, as well as an unstable
shape of the neutron field, which arose as a result of the complex transient mode, manifested
themselves. The accident ended with an acceleration of the reactor on prompt neutrons.”
Let’s take a closer look at this short excerpt. It deserves it, first of all because these
people are at the helm of nuclear power - Notice their positions. Also take a closer look at the
time this was written - not in 1986, when they still might not have fully figured it out. So:

- Unregulated condition: Small operating margin. Yes, it probably was. I say “probably”
because so far the creators of the reactor have not given a margin calculation at the time
of pressing the EPS button. And that’s the one that matters. It would be useless to ask
the authors of the letter why it arose. It arose as a result of the absence of automatic
EPS and alarms on a violation of the requirements of NSR by the reactor designers.
- Unregulated condition: Low value of subcooling at the reactor inlet. Why? It is always
low at low powers, and in 1986 all power levels were within regulations. If the authors of
the letter want to say that the subcooling was low due to the high flowrate of the coolant,
then this is not true. And besides, when the button was pressed, after which everything
started, the coolant flowrate was normal. And in general, a boiling water reactor can
have any amount of subcooling.
- Take a look at Regulations. Under these conditions a positive steam void effect
appeared? First of all, it wasn’t just a positive void effect, but an unacceptably positive
 void effect. This was discussed back in 1976 at the Scientific-Technical Council of
Minsredmash where it was decided that it should be no more than 1β. They forgot about
this absolutely correct decision which they returned to only after the accident. And what,
it wouldn’t appear in other conditions? When the coolant piping breaks, when steam
piping breaks, when the main safety valves stick open, when the MCPs fail?
- Design flaws of the RCPS rods? How long will completely unacceptable defects be
shamefully called flaws? These “flaws” have manifested themselves before as
evidenced by the appearance of excess power and high rate of power increase alarms
when EPS was actuated on other signals. God spared us from an accident due to a
significant rapid introduction of positive reactivity until April 26, with such RCPS rods, an
explosion was inevitable. It’s as if the authors do not know that such a construction is
unacceptable.
- What does the shape of the field have to do with it? It is always this way after a
decrease in power from a steady state poisoned reactor. This is quite natural for these
physical considerations. Is the shape of the field unsuitable for shutting down a reactor?
Will we adjust it to uniform or make the protection normal?
- Suppose this unregulated condition of the reactor is not marked by any alarms. There
were none.
- Suppose the positive steam effect during core voiding is 5-6β which is unacceptable for
a number of reasons.
- Suppose EPS introduces positive reactivity when actuated, and the conditions in which
this is realized are not prevented by any technical measures.
- If the shape of the neutron field, which occurs naturally on each reactor shutdown, is
unacceptable, can such a reactor be operated? Of course not, and this is actually
recognized through re-creation at the remaining reactors.

Such a position of leaders in the most important institutions working in nuclear energy is
alarming. If even after four years they don’t want to honestly admit, they are trying to disguise
the causes of the catastrophe, then can we hope for truthful information about current affairs?
For what purpose are absolutely clear miscalculations by physicists and reactor designers not
recognized? The wording of the leaders of the driving organizations is not reservation, not
inaccuracy, but a position.
It was disregard of the obvious facts that led to the Chernobyl catastrophe. Two
examples. After the accident at Leningrad NPP Unit 1 in 1975 with the rupture of a
technological channel, IAE members issued recommendations for improvement of RBMK
reactors’ nuclear safety.

1. Reducing the void effect of RBMK reactors by:

○ increasing fuel enrichment and density
○ reducing the amount of graphite in the core
○ abandonment of the D11 reactor core
○ increasing reactivity margin
 2. Change the design of the RCPS rods with an increased length of the absorbing portion
and independent regulation of energy release in height and radius, i.e. when adjusting
the radial field, the axial field must not change.
3. Creation of a high speed EPS

Later at Ignalina NPP and during the physical startup of Chernobyl NPP Unit 4, the
introduction of positive reactivity by the RCPS rods at the beginning of their movement into the
core was discovered. The reactors were allowed to operate. The sluggish correspondence on
the elimination of this unacceptable phenomenon between the Scientific Supervisor and the
Chief Designer didn’t lead to anything real before the accident in 1986. Only after the accident
did these measures begin to be implemented at the reactors. We waited.

***

Without an understanding of what happened, there is no hope that it won’t be repeated.

What kind of understanding can we speak to if at the IAE on the day of information following the
release of the official version, it was forbidden to even ask questions. It is no coincidence that
the reactor’s creators - IAE and NIKIET didn’t have a single document analyzing the
RBMK-1000’s compliance with the main regulatory documents, requirements which are
mandatory for designers. And more than that.
Following the release of A.A. Yadrikhinsky’s report in 1989 “Nuclear Accident at
Chernobyl NPP Unit 4 and Nuclear Safety of RBMK Reactors” which independently performed a
lot of analytical work, a meeting was held at Gosatomenergonadzor where NIKIET
representatives recognized no violations of the RBMK project regarding NSR and GSP
requirements. So everyone recognizes it, but them. The requirements are clear and they were
clearly not fulfilled by the reactor. This situation gives no optimism for the future, they continue
to “create.” A.A. Yadrikhinsky refers to a document released at Kursk NPP, which lists 32 items
in NSR, GSP, and Rules for the Safe Design and Operation of NPPs that were violated by the
RBMK creators. In January 1991 the Gospromatonenergonadzor Commission, chaired by N.A.
Shtyenberg, released a report naming 15 articles of NSR and GSP that were violated by the
reactor designers and were directly related to the accident in 1986. Any half of these would be
enough to declare the reactor unfit for operation.
Any product must be designed and manufactured according to standards and
regulations. Naturally this is true also for a reactor, only here the standards are more stringent.
NSR and GSP state that any deviation must be justified, with nuclear safety ensured, and
agreed upon by the appropriate authorities. None of this happened with the RBMK-1000
reactor. An unbiased commission, composed of workers from supervisory organizations,
identified fifteen violations with the RBMK-1000 project just in relation to the accident on April
26,1986. Therefore, there can be no talk of coincidence. The catastrophe was inevitable!
The reactor had a positive fast power coefficient of reactivity, which made it dynamically
unstable. The positive reactivity effect with voiding in the coolant system was 5-6β. Post
accident calculations show that the reactor would have exploded in a number of situations.
 Emergency protection when triggered automatically or by the button, as it was on April
26, 1986, introduced positive reactivity of up to βeff for five seconds! Such a phenomenon
simply does not fit in the human mind. It is clear to specialists that the catastrophe was
inevitable for such a reactor.
In the process of operation, beginning with the startup of Leningrad NPP Unit 1 in 1973,
there have been repeated displays of the reactor’s unacceptable nuclear-hazardous
characteristics. Inadequate properties of the RCPS have also been revealed. These
dangerous properties were understood by the scientists, but all of the proposals for many years,
right up until the accident, were not implemented. In light of the fact that the exposed
dangerous properties of the reactor, which made it unacceptable for operation, were ignored by
the Scientific Supervisor and Chief Designer, the catastrophe was inevitable.
This chapter is a short reminder of the versions of the causes of the Chernobyl
catastrophe put forward by the creators of the reactor and includes an excerpt from a letter from
the NIKIET and IAE leaders, showing that even after so much time, they are unable to admit to
their mistakes, and have all along been trying to mislead the world’s scientific community. They
misinform society. Using their monopoly on materials from the accident, they managed to do
this for a long time. Such a position not only does not guard against recurrence of an accident
in the future, but instills a direct fear of it. We need people capable of creative thinking.

PART 14: THE USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

Still, one cannot go without expressing an opinion on the acceptability or unacceptability
of operating nuclear power plants. When asked about my attitude toward future NPPs in
connection with the Chernobyl catastrophe and my personal tragedy, I answer that sixty years
doesn’t change God. Maybe. Well, gods are not perfect. How much evil in the world has been
perpetrated in the name of Jesus and Allah? Of course this was all done by people, but if God
is almighty, then why does he allow unseemly things to happen?
After my illness when bit by bit I was getting back to being myself, I hit a complete
mental discord. It seemed that my whole life had been devoted to a worthless cause, and if I
was indifferent or didn’t care for my work, it would be no great loss. But my work has always
come first. Like the vast majority of people (I am convinced of this), I just wanted to live, work,
and make enough means for a bearable existence. And I think I had it all: a family, various
interests with no particular passions, decent earnings by our standards. I never had any false
notions about the high vocation of each person, and I never experienced an inferiority complex
because of this. And yet, when it seemed that I had lived my whole life in vain, I became very,
very sad. Is it all hopeless now?
Could we do without nuclear energy at the present state? Yes, possibly. Would it be
better? I am far from sure of this. Supporters of NPPs say we can’t do without them. Well why
not? In 1990 nuclear stations generated 211 billion kWh of electricity in the Soviet Union. This
would require 50 to 60 million tons of coal for thermal stations. With a total coal production of
700 million tons in the country, such a quantity doesn’t look impossible. And the additional
burden on the environment is small, considering all types of fuel used. And burning fuel in
power plants does less harm than burning in primitive boilers and homes. So it is doable.
It would seem that these thermal stations would not add much to the entire polluting
complex (stations, cars, diesel locomotives, metallurgy, chemistry, etc.), but there is a lot about
the necessity to reduce, rather than add.
The generation of electricity at nuclear power plants can be one of the ways to reduce
the burden on the environment. A good nuclear power plant is environmentally cleaner than
any thermal power plant, including ones that run on natural gas. The absence of visible smoke
from the exhaust pipe should not deceive. They constantly emit gases in huge quantities. Even
at stations with RBMK reactors, fish could always be caught in the cooling ponds. There was a
ban on fishing at Chernobyl station, but not due to radioactive contamination of the fish, but for
safety concerns of the fishermen. They drowned, and one threw a fishing line on a power line.
The RBMK reactors in the 80s generally looked like a completely archaic structure. Its design to
a large extent coincides with that of industrial reactors made for the production of plutonium.
Such reactors are not used in the peaceful energy industry. In literature, sometimes you can
find statements that they were chasing cheapness. No. Capital costs per kilowatt produced at
plants with RBMK reactors are one and a half times higher than those of plants with reactor
vessels; operating costs are comparable. Their use at stations can be explained by
non-technical considerations.
After the country’s authorities came to the decision of developing nuclear nuclear energy,
a backbreaking pace was set for the industry. In the Soviet Union, maybe not the same as in
China, but the authorities were inclined to jumps. So the decision to use the RBMK turned out
to be a broad jump. They understood then that vessel type reactors at least had the prospect of
increased reliability, but to meet the accepted timeline, the industry couldn’t ensure the
production of basic equipment in sufficient quantities. So it was decided to build some of the
power plants with RBMK reactors. Academician A.P. Aleksandrov played a role in the authority
and nuclear affairs of Minsredmash.
Here’s an anecdote. In 1991 a meeting was held in Kiev to discuss A.D. Sakharov’s
idea to place reactors deep underground. Who was appointed as the Scientific Supervisor of
this topic? Who else but Aleksandrov. This started gaining momentum in the flywheel, then
inertia! But where to without a “great luminary” (as we used to say as students)? It isn’t
hypnosis, it’s psychosis.
 The RBMK reactor isn’t hopelessly bad. Although in some aspects it doesn’t align with
fundamental security aspects. For example, it was impossible to enclose it in an airtight shell at
an acceptable cost. It was hopeless in 1986 due to the physicists’ and designers’
miscalculations, not at all due to the construction of the reactor. G. Medvedev writes in his story
that the positive void effect of reactivity is most significant in uranium-graphite reactors. Not so,
for uranium-graphite reactors, as well as for others, it can be of any value and sign, i.e. positive
or negative. It all depends on the composition of the core components. Proper calculations,
correct according to experimental data made it possible to make the RBMK quite safe without
any special expenses. But the RCPS rods are a pure miscalculation. For the manufacture of
acceptable, we’ll say - proper, rods, no additional funds were required at all. Even with the initial
operation of the reactor at Leningrad NPP Unit 1, their negative and dangerous properties were
revealed. IAE specialists comprehended them and issued correct recommendations for their
elimination. I have no information on what reasons academician Aleksandrov had for not giving
them a try. And God was merciful - He allowed ten whole years to implement the corrective
actions. Yes, knowing now the properties of the reactor as they were before 1986, one should
be surprised not that there was an explosion, but that it didn’t happen earlier. There is no need
to scold the people that didn’t insist on implementing the necessary modernization, they had
nowhere to turn: To the authorities? Useless. They listened to Aleksandrov. To the newspaper?
Not one would have printed it. At best they would be expelled from the institute. Even after the
actual catastrophe, V.P. Volkov was reduced to invalidity for his actions. Frankly speaking, it
brings fear that the “hosts” of the institutes are the same ones who conceived not a reactor, but
a bastard. It’s hard to believe these people when in 1991, in the report which I cited, they say in
droves that RCPS met all such requirements.
The future of RBMK reactors? They have no future, that’s for sure. The question can
only be posed as: Should they be operated until the motor resources are exhausted, or be
closed immediately? I cannot answer this question. There are enough irresponsible statements
and I don’t want to add my own here. I don’t think anyone can answer this question alone. Yes,
the post-modernization reactor in many regards has acceptable properties that meet the
necessary safety criteria. But unfortunately, its original accident prone capabilities have not yet
been eliminated. Severe accidents, perhaps not the same as in Chernobyl, are not excluded
from these reactors, and their emergence is by no means hypothetical. The likelihood of their
occurrence should be assessed by competent organizations. Whether it is only ours, or with
involvement from international organizations, the solution to this issue cannot be left to the
authors of the reactor. The decision must be based on the results of the assessment.
The Chernobyl disaster is the worst that can happen at a station. Less severe accidents
are still unacceptable. In my opinion, the reactor design should be such that these accidents
could not be envisaged under normal conditions, accounting for natural disasters inherent to an
area.
There is no eco-friendly power generation now or in the foreseeable future. Neither wind
nor solar stations will produce a significant amount of energy. Of course hydro-stations in
mountainous regions can be considered ideal, but their resources for power are insufficient.
And what do hydro-stations on lowland rivers produce? Look at Kievskaya. A large amount of
good floodplain lands have been flooded, and I think that in the not so distant future, these lands
will need to be reclaimed. And the station’s power is only enough to open the floodgates. Well,
not literally, but the energy generated by the station is not worth the occupied land. The
ecological impact of hydro-stations is not limited to flooded land. The impact is negative. It was
only our illiterate ancestors that could exploit the earth for their own benefit with little to no harm
to the land. We are different. In the Soviet Union, perhaps, you will not find a single
“transformation” that won’t turn out sideways for nature and people.
Of course, within the territory of the former Soviet Union is a large reserve for the energy
economy, not just electricity. Structural perestroika takes as much from the industry as it can
give.
We produce the largest number of metal pipes, and we still buy some. With the lowered
production of ferrous metals, the gross national product was decreased, and our economists,
including in the magazine “World Economy and International Relations”, continued to bring up
the foreign metallurgy crisis. Academician B. Paton, a respected person, spoke about this at
the Party’s 26th Congress. No one refuted him, but nothing has changed. If you take a look at
the empty trucks scurrying back and forth, you’ll see that you could save a lot, but after some
time you will have to increase the production of electricity, because it is unlikely that man will
moderate his ambitions. Reasonable limitations of demand are not expected.
I am sure that any thermal power plant is ecologically dirtier than a good nuclear one.
RBMK reactors have no future, and that’s no surprise since their design is from the forties.
Their use in the energy sector was made possible by people in power who couldn’t think of
anything else. But after all, the world does not revolve around these reactors. There are much
more reliable reactors now, and if we renounce the persecution of nuclear scientists and give
them the opportunity to work normally, there will be reactors with a high degree of reliability
satisfying man’s highest criteria.
In any case we should not hide from the population that there are still problems that
don’t have a satisfactory solution. First of all is what to do concerning spent fuel. The second
problem is station decommissioning, and here the RBMK reactor brings more difficult questions
than others.
It seems that after Chernobyl, they were convinced by where the lie led. They fully
achieved complete and absolute distrust not only of their own, but also foreign science. Any
idiot has more chance of being heard than a conscientious scientist. And if he says he worked
at the station (with who doesn’t matter) and pleases the crowd, then complete trust.
Here is how G. Medvedev writes:
“The officers and the soldiers were not wearing their breathing masks, which were
hanging around their necks. The training had been bad, and they were not radiation-literate....
After all, it was from these young lads that the next generation would come. Even 1 roentgen
per year yields a 50-percent likelihood of mutation….”
This is of course terrible if true. The entire world works at a limit of five Rem per year for
radiation workers. But there are several thousand of them. Not everyone receives the
maximum allowable dose. But for reactor shop maintenance personnel, for example, receive
almost all of this dose throughout the year. At five rem per year, mutations should be more
frequent than at one. And what, no one notices these anomalies, neither the people
themselves, nor the doctors? No surprise, this statement of Medvedev’s is drawn from the
finger, not from reality.
Here is what Academician N.P. Dubinin, a geneticist by profession who, judging by his
biography, is not inclined to conformism, writes:
“The UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, taking into account the
world’s leading experts in radiation genetics, has accepted that a doubling of mutation rates with
acute radiation exposure occurs at the level of 30 rem. If a person is chronically exposed to low
doses of radiation during the reproductive period (30 years), then the total dose of radiation
capable of doubling the mutation rate is 100 rem.
Any increase in radiation draws some level of damage to human heredity, corresponding
to the radiation dose.”
Ignore the names of the units of dose: roentgen, rem, rad. With γ and β radiation, they
are equal; the average person does not encounter other types of radiation.
So, according to the UN committee’s conclusion, a one-time dose of 30 rem, or a chronic
dose of 100 rem can double the frequency of mutations compared to the natural rate. With
natural background radiation, about 70 of 1,000 newborns have birth defects that cause various
illnesses. Thus even doubling the dose does not result in a 50% likelihood of mutation.
Who to believe… Medvedev or Dubinin, or rather, the international committee. There is
no question. But some bits of information are regularly and well distributed to wide circles of the
population, while others remain known only to a narrow circle.
A lot of different information can be drawn from newspapers, and it all puts pressure on
the psyche of already worried people.
And then we have a “specialist” in atomic matters broadcasting a statement that the
territory contamination measured in Curies was calculated by γ-radiation rather than by the
necessary β which would make it ten times greater. If you are a specialist, then you must know
that a Curie means a certain number of disintegrations per second of a material and nothing
more. The decay scheme accounts for the harmfulness by the disintegration rate, which is
different for each isotope. One rate for plutonium, another for cesium.
I also came across statements about the greater harm of small doses than large ones.
That would be simple, just additionally radiate those who received a small dose, there are plenty
of sources. This comes from the misunderstanding of the following situation: The effect of
small doses is more significant than it should be if extrapolated from large doses. Just for
illustrative purposes, let’s say that when the dose is reduced by ten times, the effect is not
reduced by ten, but only by five times. Once again this is just an illustration, not real numbers.
How much has been written about the deceased liquidators of the Chernobyl accident.
Just that they got sick and died, that’s it. Before, they weren’t sick, not dying, and there were no
congenital defects. There was no analysis by age group, no comparison with a control group.
Crossing the Dnieper River on a bus, the driver lost consciousness and the bus slid into the
river. Why would the driver lose consciousness? The opinion of the State Automobile Inspector
is simple - from radiation.
Today, April 26 is a day of sorrow. This day is taken to commemorate the dead, and
express sympathy to the victims. And just as usual, everything is poisoned by lies. On the
Ostankino channel show “Vesti”, the anchorman (as they’re called now) confidentially reports
that the accident occurred on April 26, and the state communication about it wasn’t until the
28th after several hundred had already died. Where does such information come from? In fact,
by April 28, two people had died: Valery Khodemchuk directly from the explosion, and Vladimir
Shashenok died in the morning in a Pripyat hospital. They lied under a totalitarian regime, the
democrats, or at least that’s what they call themselves, lie. I listened and I will say, the
democrat’s lie is no less shameful than the totalitarian’s. This year, Easter fell on April 26. At
least they were careful not to lie on this Holy Day. It would be nice to know if these people
charged with being guardians of the population know what great harm they are causing. It
imposes a heavy burden on top of the already inflicted harm, and multiplies the suffering. There
is a term for injury caused by a doctor; iatrogenic. And it is punishable.
I couldn’t find anything on the concept of radiophobia in dictionaries. I wouldn’t include
fear of any radiation exposure under this concept, but only the inadequate perception of it by a
person informed of the possible consequences depending on the dose. The rest can hardly be
attributed to radiophobia, this is a person’s natural concern for their health and the health of
those close to them. The general population doesn’t know serious information about the
consequences of radiation and is forced to believe information from the media.
But to great misfortune, due to the initial incorrect policies and practices by the
authorities, the scientific workers brought with them numerous incompetent people and
opportunists to the crest of a muddy wave instead of a clear and honest communication to the
population about:
- actual levels of contamination of the territory
- the harmful effects of radiation at various doses and the degree of risk associated with
them
- the resettlement of young people and families with children from the contaminated
territories if resettlement for everyone wasn’t possible. This is not a disregard for the
aged and elderly. In lightly contaminated areas with low doses, these people would die
of natural causes before the dose would take effect. Then the young people could go
live and give birth.

I understand very well that I give reason to accuse me of fanaticism. Well, sanctimony
and hypocrisy are quite characteristic for the times. Is it better to keep children in unfavorable
conditions for three to five years before resettling them? Demagogic shouting about the
immorality of considering money when it comes to peoples’ health is not difficult. It costs
nothing personally, and on the contrary, creates popularity. But this is equivalent to “profoundly”
stating: “It is better to be rich and healthy, than poor and sick.”
Well I’ll throw them a bone and go further. During the liquidation of the accident, it
became clear that the unit could not be restored, and there was nothing that could be
immediately done to stop the burning. First of all, set up all activity away from the direction of
the plume drift and prepare there. Then, make it a point not to use young soldiers from the
reserves, but to call on the older generation. These people could do the job more skillfully, with
less dose, and less genetic consequences. This is unforgivable for both the doctors and upper
management, a shameless calculation. So, what to do?
 If catastrophes like Chernobyl cannot be excluded, then there is no need to develop
nuclear energy. Can they be excluded? I think so. Chernobyl is a pathological case and should
be excluded from consideration.
An explosion like Chernobyl is practically excluded from possibility in a reactor used
according to design standards. Designers know how to do it without any excessive costs. The
procedure should be such that each project meets the standards, and passes inspections,
including international ones. I believe now that no adherent to sovereignty will consider
international inspection to be a violation of sovereign rights. It would be more expensive for
yourself. Accidents cannot be completely excluded from possibility, but localization methods are
known.
To agitate the population into accepting NPPs, they exclude whatever they need to omit,
and pressure them. “You will have to sit in the winter cold” they say, so they agree. Every
station by rule has a sanitary zone where it is prohibited to build housing, and a monitored zone.
The population should be informed of the dosimetric situation in the monitored zone. Whether
there was an accident, what kind of activity release came with it, and is there a threat to the
population. Or again, as Gadzhiev said: do we not yet know about the effects of small doses on
humans? This is in a country where thousands and thousands of people have been working
with ionizing radiation for decades. And the Chelyabinsk and Semipalatinsk years? Doses
ranging from zero to lethal. Talking about enterprise, there are medical records for all
employees for all years, and those working in the clean zone aren’t control groups?
Conversations about the high level of training and responsibility for the stations’ operating
personnel should be abandoned. These requirements are obviously unconditional, but they
can’t convince anyone of the stations’ reliability. By the way, the Chernobyl personnel were
recognized as well prepared after the accident, including by international experts. And if I’m
being objective, one must admit that the personnel of Chernobyl station after 1986 were less
prepared due to the large and constant replacement. Not that those who came later were
worse, mastery just takes time. Even by the strictest order, you cannot improve the
qualifications of a worker, you need experience and skill. Mistakes by personnel have been and
will be. But what will be the result of the mistake: a reactor explosion, as it was at Chernobyl
when personnel scan for deviation of a parameter that doesn’t even have a measuring device,
or a trip leading to nothing. It depends on the equipment and the quality of the design.
We need ecological education of the population so that people have neither a doomed
indifference toward, nor an excessively heightened perception of, the danger of radiation
emissions, as well as all other impacts of the technogenic environment. We have had a lot piled
onto man: poisoned food, poisoned air, inability to increase productivity, earth defiled, the
release of products for which man has no use. You listen to the latest news on the radio and
television, and it seems the news is there to annoy you rather than convey the news. So, we
need a measured approach to the structure of life, without hysteria. If we close the stations,
then do it by normal government resolution, not by disorganized picketing. If we put them into
operation, then again, do it in a normal planned manner, not under pressure of forced
circumstances. There were reports about possibly resuming operation of the Armenian NPP. It
is clear what caused this, but it will not be easy to start it up, and of course, this is worse than if
it had run continuously.
 I have no confidence in the ability of people to rationally organize the social and state
structure. Recent referendums and voting have quite clearly shown this. Moreover, I have no
faith in the ability to correctly solve a special technical problem. And yet, in our condition, the
decision on the fate of nuclear energy should be given to the people, but not on the basis of
rallies of passion where whoever shouts louder is right, but on the basis of science. To do this,
the former Soviet Science (what’s it called now?) must earn the people’s trust again.

PART 15: CONCLUSION

In my presentation of the events around the Chernobyl tragedy, I have been objective, I
hid nothing, and added nothing. I spoke only to that which I know for sure. As a result of my, so
to speak, special circumstances, I was forced to resort not to references to documents, but to
their literal presentation. Thus, I invite you, the reader, to think for yourself, draw your own
conclusions, and not to believe one word. On one hand, a former prisoner is not to be trusted,
at least for many.
Here’s a little added touch for you. After the accident, my daughter worked at the station
for some time in the First Department. The Deputy Director of Personnel told her: “I can’t keep
you in First Department, I can only offer you a place in the cafeteria.” Well it’s clear, they’re
sending the father to jail and the daughter works in the secret department. Although, what are
the secrets? These people haven’t gone anywhere.
On the other hand, so many lies have been piled up around Chernobyl that it would be
extremely difficult for a person to figure it out. Here I give the factual events and NSR article,
and propose that we figure out for ourselves how, for example, EPS fulfills the requirements of
this article. I am practically certain that I have not allowed inaccuracies in my presentation of
the events. My view and assessment of the events is another thing. You understand that here,
I cannot be impartial in all my efforts. Up to now, whether someone comes to talk late into the
night about the accident, or something needs to be written, a sleepless night is guaranteed.
However, this situation seems so clear to me, that even to a biased person with an
interest but not an inclination to lie, it would be unmistakable. Or maybe I don’t understand
anything at all, in technology or in life.
Judge for yourself.
 - At 01:23:40, the operator pressed the EPS button to shutdown the reactor, while the
centralized control system recorded not a single deviation in the parameters of the
reactor and its systems.

This is an indisputable fact.

The Emergency Protection System was kept in good material condition. Its electronics
and reactivity control mechanisms (RCPS rods) worked at its full capacity and in accordance
with the algorithm.
We got a reactor explosion!..
What complaints can be lodged against the operating personnel? In a normal human
society - none. Emergency Protection, by name and purpose, is designed to shut down the
reactor in emergency situations without any kind of damage. I’m not talking about an explosion.
On April 26, protection did not shutdown the reactor from a steady state.
Even if we violated some provisions of Regulations or instructions earlier, this gives no
ground for blaming personnel for the explosion. After all, nothing happened then.
Suppose we violated (in fact we didn’t) Regulations when we began increasing power
after its “drop” and risked an accident similar to the one that occurred at Leningrad NPP Unit 1
in 1975. Nothing happened.
Suppose we violated Regulations by disabling ECCS, what does this have to do with the
explosion? The emergency core cooling system could not protect the reactor from explosion in
any way, and after the explosion it is useless due to the reactor’s destruction.
Only the “great operator” G. Medvedev says he could have taken some mystical form
and staved off the explosion, and the “naive” academician A.P. Aleksandrov was horrified by his
conclusion. Even the official commissions, and they wouldn’t have missed it, don’t talk about
the possibility of preventing the accident with the help of ECCS; even if a ghostly opportunity
had peeped through, they would not have missed it.

- The reactor was blown up by emergency protection!

The IAE Report lists thirteen possible causes of the reactor explosion, and based on
instrument readings and calculations, all but one were rejected - the EPS rods introduced
positive reactivity which was the spark for the accident.
Presently, it is namely this version that has stayed consistent and is recognized by
everyone as the cause of the accident. This has been clear for a long time, since 1986.
I refuse to qualify the fact that the actuation of EPS introduces positive reactivity.
Impossible. As Vitya Tarasenko put it, it is an oxymoron.
Such colossal stupidity born in the heads of the RCPS rod designers, could only be
brought about if the owners of these heads took “seven hundred to the snout”
Upon establishing the facts around the EPS reactor explosion, can anyone speak to the
fault of the operating personnel?
It turns out they can. With morality turned inside out, anything is possible.
Nevertheless, dear citizens and gentlemen, when talking about the Chernobyl tragedy
and you want to throw stones, remember - the reactor was blown up by EPS. This
phenomenon is not subject to engineering comprehension. An eternal monument to the
bungling of physicists and designers.
- The RBMK-1000 reactor in 1986, did not meet the fundamental requirements of
regulatory and technical documents on nuclear safety.

Based on the very fact of the explosion, based on post-accident analysis and
experiments, the Gospromatomnadzor Commission established fifteen NSR article violations in
the reactor design, which directly affected the occurrence and scale of the accident. And in
total, taking into account the “Regulations for the Design and Safe Operation of NPPs”, there
are 32 articles violated with the reactor design.
A natural question arises: can that structure be called a reactor with so many deviations
from requirements? It’s something different. Can such a structure work reliably? Well, there is
no such question here. What is there to ask?
In the IAE report mentioned above, in the section “The most plausible versions and their
analyses” are listed:

1. Hydrogen explosion in a steam separator drum;

2. Hydrogen explosion in lower tank of the RCPS cooling circuit;
3. Sabotage (explosion of an explosive device resulting in destruction of MFCC piping);
4. Rupture of MCP pressure header or of the distribution group header;
5. Ruptures of steam separator drum or steam-water lines;
6. Effect of RCPS rod displacers;
7. Failure of automatic controller;
8. Serious operator error in controlling the manual control rods;
9. MCP cavitation leading to a steam-water mixture supply to fuel channel;
10. Cavitation of the throttle regulating valves;
11. Steam capture from steam separator drum to downcomers;
12. Steam-zirconium reaction and hydrogen explosion in the core;
13. Penetration of compressed gas from the cylinders of the ECCS.

These are not all the possible reasons that led to the explosion of that device, but they
are quite enough for a substantive conversation. For the version that doesn’t contradict
anything, we’ll take #6. Version #10 is perhaps impossible to implement. And now for the most
important thing. The remaining eleven versions, when implemented, blow up the reactor. They
were rejected not for being impossible, but for contradicting the readings of the instruments and
the logic of events on April 26, 1986. This list is interesting because it was compiled by the
creators of the reactor. The creators themselves admit that a series of situations can lead this
reactor to catastrophe.
What is, for example, #7 (Failure of Automatic Controller)! Here is what the authors of
the report write:
“A failure associated with the immobility of all ARs can lead to a reactor acceleration due
to the large steam void coefficient of reactivity.”
 With such a coefficient as the RBMK reactor had in 1986, an acceleration is really
possible. AR failure is not some improbable case. It is actually very probable. Moreover, the
authors took an easy case of AR failure - immobility of rods. The theory of automatic reactor
control requires an accident-proof reactor in the more severe case of automatic failure, namely,
the movement of rods in the direction of increasing reactivity. Then all the more an explosion.
While the authors of the report are in the framework of a technical study, their
competence and sense of reality do not change. As soon as they reach the conclusions, a
strange transformation with their logic took place:
"The primary cause of the accident was an extremely improbable combination of
violations by the unit personnel (*That’s incredible!) of operating instructions and procedures, in
the course of which deficiencies in the design of the reactor and the control rods of the control
and protection system emerged”
No surprise here if you remember that the authors of the report are IAE employees and
the creators of the reactor. Thanks to them for at least recognizing what they called the
“explosive nature” of their offspring. Although not all cases were named, these are enough to
understand that - such a reactor doesn’t require any special circumstances for an explosion.
But the RBMK reactor was unlikely, and extremely unlikely.
Firstly, a commission of rarely unanimous staff slanderers. An organization including
scientists and non-scientists (cannot write both together and separately - anyway, the meaning
will be about the same). A commission of administrators comprised of elders in decline and
those still young, from their tower. With such an organization, you can start any campaign
without risk of losing. And so far, they are clearly winning the wrong thing.
Secondly, it is difficult to imagine how the creators managed to assemble in one reactor,
seemingly all conceivable defects for channel type reactors. If not all, they managed to collect
the worst. Here’s something incredible!
Three organizations are responsible for the quality of the RBMK-1000 project.
The Institute of Atomic Energy (IAE), named after I.V. Kurchatov, provides scientific
substantiation of all issues related to the reactor, including nuclear safety. Its role is not limited
to the issuance of scientific data and recommendations to the designers, as they were
presented to A.P. Aleksandrov (according to him: “Dollezhal created the reactor…”). And then
during operation, they were involved with the reactor, for which positions were appropriated:
Scientific Supervisor (Aleksandrov), two deputies (Kalugin and Kramerov) and a group of
workers, one of whom I have named here - V.P. Volkov.
The Scientific Research and Design Institute for Power Technology (NIKIET)
implemented the structural design of the reactor, carried out field supervision during operation,
and calculated core composition using periodic data from power plants. Both of these
organizations provided methodical guidance for the work of the stations’ Nuclear Safety
Departments.
The State Supervisory Committee - Gosatomenergonadzor, whose first responsibility is
to install a barrier prior to operation of reactors that do not meet the requirements of regulatory
and technical documents. The Committee is not subordinate to any ministry. It grants
permission to put the reactor into operation, and by its decision, operation can be terminated at
any time. The Committee has the right to demand any calculations along with any
supplementary information. At least that’s how it’s written.
You could develop another working organization, but it’s not clear why this system
should not work. But for the RBMK-1000 reactor, the system failed on all levels. Remember
how it was for the RCPS rods:
- During the physical startup of the Unit 4 reactor in 1983, an introduction of positive
reactivity was detected with rod movement into the zone.
- The state inspector states the inadmissibility of such a phenomenon and…allows
commissioning of the reactor.
- In December 1983, the Scientific Manager wrote a letter to NIKIET about the need to
eliminate the rods’ defects.
- There they accepted and developed the technical changes for the new rods in
December 1984. And that was it. No working drawings, no new rods, until the accident
itself.

Here is an improbable combination, I don’t know how, but these were by no means
positive qualities of the Heroes and Committee Chairman.
As we can see, the Scientific Manager, Chief Designer, and Supervision understood the
defect in the RCPS rod design long before the accident. Replacement of the old rods with the
newly designed rods, without making the RBMK reactor safe, would have ruled out the accident
on April 26 and a few other situations.
The same is true for the steam void coefficient of reactivity. If it were also reduced to an
acceptable value, the reliability of the reactor would have been increased by an order of
magnitude.
I cannot say why all those responsible for the reactor project stood idly by, knowing its
raw, completely unacceptable defects. On the void reactivity coefficient and RCPS, I cited the
words of N.A. Dollezhal and I. Ya. Yemelyanov. Everyone knew and yet did nothing. Their
positions were such that no one could interfere with them. There is no system that would work
on its own. In any case, people work. I don’t mean the political system, I won’t go there - I don’t
speak that language. An example from the past: In the city of Torzhok, a bathhouse was
opened thanks to the party and Comrade Stalin personally, so everyone began to bring down
the system to stagnation. The same was for A.P. Aleksandrov, who was not dominated by the
system in any way, at least regarding RBMK matters. A very convenient loophole to hide your
own idleness.
Sometime in the fifties, the scientific organization of labor began to come into fashion
with us. The engineer recommends to the plant director rearranging the table, bookcase, and
telephone. Aunt Masha who washed the floor said that before the revolution she worked in a
brothel, and when income fell, they replaced the prostitutes, not the furniture.
Apparently people in leadership positions on the RBMK theme should have been
replaced a long time ago. Aleksandrov, Dollezhal, and Yemelyanov all made it quite apparent in
their statements following the accident. I think the leadership at Gosatomenergonadzor was
selected incorrectly. The head, E. Kulov, has always been in A.G. Meshkov’s shadow. He
worked under him for a long time and it was difficult to show independence in a new position.
And his deputy, Sidorenko, came out from under Aleksandrov’s wing. It must be said that both
Kulov and Sidorenko knew well that the RBMK existed. The latter even wrote a letter indicating
the negative properties of the reactor. But he mixed something up, in his position, they don’t
write letters, but prohibit the operation of unqualified equipment. There are already writers for
the epistolary genre.
Everyone was waiting to see which official organization in the Soviet Union would dare to
declare that that reactor was in no way fit for operation and that first of all, the crime was
committed against the collectives of the stations with these reactors. They were tricked into
working on atomic bombs because they weren’t told the true properties of the reactors. Don’t
hold your breath. And there is no Union, only disagreements remain. Even in the
Gospromatomenergonadzor Commission, which God himself ordered to determine whether or
not that reactor could be operated, having established a dozen and a half violations of articles,
deemed it not possible to say directly.
But the question is beyond doubt. The General Safety Provisions and Nuclear Safety
Regulations apply to NPP reactors. The reactor design was made in violation of these
documents and therefore was not fit for operation.
Our actions on April 26 on the reactor, implemented in accordance with NSR and GSP,
did not lead to any accident, let alone an explosion. This is perfectly clear. So it would seem
that the charges against the personnel should be dropped. That’s not what happened.
There are people who hint that if it had been them in our situation, there would have
been no accident.
According to these people, any junk can be thrown to the staff, and in the event of an
accident, they are still guilty.
We had snares and pitfalls set, and we fell into them. Einstein says “The Lord God is
subtle, but malicious he is not.” The designers were both subtle and malicious.
Now I know how it would have been possible to avoid the explosion on April 26.
Honestly, the provided condition would have to be one where automatic EPS doesn’t actuate
automatically on any signal, otherwise - the coffin. We lived to this point, and we’re discussing
how to save ourselves… from emergency protection. But this was April 26, when there was no
emergency at the reactor. In reality, one RBMK-1000 reactor was doomed to explode.
Regarding the law, I don’t know who to pose the question to, so I turn to people to find
an answer, if only in terms of morality. The reactor did not meet design standards accepted in
the country, and exploded namely due to these discrepancies. Does the guilt lay at the feet of
the personnel, or the designers?
I write these words, and everything in me screams: You are writing nonsense! But no.
At least the lawyer responded that he didn’t know of any article in the Labor Code of the USSR
or in any other document having the force of the law, where guilt would be assigned to an
employee due to equipment discrepancies from the standard. Nonsense or not - I write with
reality.
But of course, our laws have always been one sided in the relationship between the
individual and the state. The state could not be guilty. We were hired to work on equipment
made according to standards accepted by the country. The state did not fulfill the conditions of
the agreement. It’s inhumane, but according to the law, you can’t blame the state. But in this
case we can’t be blamed by either human standards or even by the law.
There has never been an organization or society in the Soviet Union, capable or even
willing to defend the individual. We won’t talk about the state or the party, they are no longer.
Law enforcement agencies have long been unequivocally aimed in one direction. The labor
union, brought to the point of absurdity when, naturally, no one in any union could defend
anyone. And so it goes.
It seems we go to society with some kind of face. I would like for a person not to scream
in horror at the sight of this face.
In conclusion, I would like to say the following: The Chernobyl disaster in its purest form,
occurred as a result of gross miscalculations by physicists and reactor designers.
It is long overdue to say: The properties of the reactor were not the main, not the
decisive, but the sole cause of the Chernobyl disaster.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

Time Event

April 25, 1986 (time in operating log)

01:06 Start of power reduction; ORM equals 31 manual control rods

03:45 Start of replacement of the nitrogen—helium gas mixture with nitrogen in the
gas cooling system for the reactor graphite stack

03:47 Reactor thermal power is 1600 MW

From 04:13 Sequential measurement of the control system parameters and vibration
Until 12:36 characteristics of turbogenerator No. 7 and turbogenerator No. 8 at constant
thermal power of 1500 MW

07:10 ORM equals 13.2 manual control rods

13:05 Disconnection of turbogenerator No. 7 from the system

14:00 Disconnection of the ECCS from the multipass forced circulation circuit (MFCC)

14:00 Postponement of testing programme requested by Kiev power grid controller

15:20 ORM equals 16.8 manual control rods

18:50 Power supply to auxiliary equipment not involved in the tests switched to
working transformer No. T6

23:10 Power reduction continued, ORM equals 26 manual control rods

April 26, 1986 (time on printout of DREG)

00:05 (in Reactor thermal power was 720 MW

operating
log)

00:28 (in At reactor thermal power of about 500 MW transfer made from the local to
operating global main range automatic power control (automatic power controllers Nos 1
log) and 2). During the transfer there was a reduction in thermal power to 30 MW
(neutron power to zero), which was not envisaged in the testing programme.
Measures to increase the power were taken

00:34:03 Emergency fluctuations of water level in steam separator drums

00:43:37
00:52:27
01:00:04
01:09:45
01:18:52

00:36:24 The EPS trip point in response to a pressure drop in the steam separator
drums was changed from 55 to 50 kg/cm²

From DREG did not work

00:39:32
Until Personnel blocked the EPS signal which would have shut down the two
00:43:35 turbogenerators

From 00:41 Disconnection of turbogenerator No. 8 from the system to determine the
until 01:16 vibration characteristics during rundown
(in operating
log)

From DREG did not work

00:52:35
Until
00:59:54

01:03 (in Reactor thermal power increased to 200 MW and stabilized

operating
log)

01:03 (in Seventh main circulating pump was put into operation (MCP No. 12)
operating
log)
01:07 (in Eighth MCP was put into operation (MCP No. 22)
operating
log)

From DREG did not work

01:12:10
Until
01:18:49

01:19:39 'One overcompensation upwards' signal on

From ‘One Overcompensation upwards’ signal on

01:19:44
Until
01:19:57

01:22:30 The parameters were recorded on magnetic tape (calculations were performed
at the Smolensk plant after the accident using the PRIZMA program; ORM
proved to be equal to 8 manual control rods)

01:23:04 'Oscilloscope is on' signal was given, emergency stop valves of turbogenerator
No. 8 were closed. The rundown was started of four MCPs: MCPs Nos 13 and
23 (section 8RA) and MCPs Nos 14 and 24 (section 8RB)

01:23:10 Design Basis Accident Button pressed

01:23:30 'One overcompensation upwards' signal went off (it lasted 3 min 33 s)

01:23:40 EPS-S button was pressed; the EPS rods and manual control rods started to
(01:23:39 on move down into the core
teletape)

01:23:43 Power excursion rate emergency protection system signals on; excursion
period: less than 20 s; emergency power protection system signals actuated;
power exceeded 530 MW(th)

01:23:46 Disconnection of the first pair of MCPs being 'run down'

01:23:46.5 Disconnection of the second pair of MCPs being 'run down'

01:23:47 Sharp reduction in the flow rates (by 40%) of MCPs not involved in the
rundown test (MCPs Nos 11, 12, 21 and 22) and unreliable flow rate readings
of the MCPs taking part in the rundown (MCPs Nos 13, 14, 23 and 24); sharp
increase of pressure in the steam separator drums; sharp increase in the
water level in the steam separator drums; signals 'failures of measuring
systems' from both main range automatic controllers (automatic power
controllers Nos 1 and 2)

01:23:48 Restoration of flow rates of MCPs not involved in the rundown test to values
close to the initial ones; restoration of flow rates to 15% below the initial rate
for the MCPs on the left side which were being 'run down'; restoration of flow
rates to 10% below the initial rate for MCP No. 24; unreliable readings for MCP
No. 23; further increase of pressure in the steam separator drums (left side
75.2 kg/cm² right side 88.2 kg/cm² ) and of water level in the steam separator
drums; triggering of fast acting systems for dumping of steam to condensers
Nos 1 and 2

01:23:49 Emergency protection signal 'Pressure increase in reactor space (rupture of a

fuel channel)'; 'No voltage — 48 V signal (no power supply to the servodrive
mechanisms of the EPS); 'Failure of the actuators of automatic power
controllers Nos 1 and 2' signals
From a note in the chief reactor control engineer's operating log: "01:24:
Severe shocks; the RCPS rods stopped moving before they reached the lower
limit stop switches; power switch of clutch mechanisms is off