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Emergence, adherence and proliferation of

industry level standards: A case study of Aligarh
padlock industry, India

Shekhar Jain

To cite this article: Shekhar Jain (2021) Emergence, adherence and proliferation
of industry level standards: A case study of Aligarh padlock industry, India, African
Journal of Science, Technology, Innovation and Development, 13:7, 853-864, DOI:
10.1080/20421338.2020.1771670

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African Journal of Science, Technology, Innovation and Development, 2021
Vol. 13, No. 7, 853–864, https://doi.org/10.1080/20421338.2020.1771670
© 2020 African Journal of Science, Technology, Innovation and Development

Emergence, adherence and proliferation of industry level standards: A case study of Aligarh
padlock industry, India
Shekhar Jain*

Center for Studies in Science Policy, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India
*Corresponding author. email: jainshekhar.research@gmail.com

Industry in developing nations has not attracted much attention from standard theorists. One of the reasons is that
developing countries are considered ‘standard takers.’ As a result, the limited scholarship on standards in the context of
developing countries largely remains occupied with global value chains and standards. Besides, industries in these
countries are often marked with various degrees of informality. Due to this, the innate structure and governance of these
industries depend a lot on socio-economic relations, over and above the formal legal and regulatory structures. This
makes operationalization of standards much more complex than simple adoption of standards in codified and
documented form, dominantly considered in mainstream discourse on standards. This paper attempts to answer a few of
the limitations highlighted and adds to the scholarship on standards in the context of developing countries by
considering the case of Aligarh padlock industry. The paper explores the socio-economic dynamics which govern the
emergence, adherence and proliferation of these standards. To this end, the paper considers standards as a form of
knowledge that brings order to an industry. Further, adapting upon the literature on global value chain and its role in
standard proliferation and informality, the paper explores the role of local value chain in the proliferation of industry-
level standards.

Keywords: BIS, formal standards, legitimacy, local value chain, local standards

Introduction adhered to by industry formally/tacitly/informally or

Standards are the backbone of every organized industry
and have emerged as hegemonic in the modern world
(Feng 2003), although, each era of human civilization is
marked by some form of standards (Krechmer and
Baskin 2006). The earlier forms of standards were mani-
fested in the form of social customs, religious symbols,
and ceremonies (Adams 1919; Edwards 1940; Harriman
1928), while the codified, documented and institutiona-
lized form of standards became more accepted in postmo-
dernity (Ewald 1990). However, in an abstract sense, both
forms represent knowledge; the former is about shared
knowledge and the latter is a codified form of tacit knowl-
edge (Antonelli 1994) and expert knowledge (Jacobsson
2002). Also, the former is considered to be a precursor
and infused within the latter (Ewald 1990; Sandholtz
2012).
However, despite being a hegemonic force, the institu-
tionalized form of standards remains a matter of concern in
developing countries, such as India, which have a large,
unorganized industrial sector with varying degree of
informality (Ghani and Kanbur 2013). In such cases,
industry comprises a mix of legally recognized and unrec-
ognized firms that lack legal recognition and association
with any formal institution (Muchi et al. 2017). Also,
the degree of informality often varies and even the
legally recognized firms do not follow the institutionalized
rules and procedures set by the due course of law, and
much of their activity remains below the radar (Williams,
Shahid, and Martínez 2016). The informality also restricts
the application of institutionalized standards, emerging as
a ‘soft law’ to organize any industry (Sandholtz 2012).
However, this state of industry does not rule out the pres-
ence of standards bringing order to an industry. In such
cases, standards could be the institutionalized standards
they could take the form of informal standards originated
at the local industry level. One cannot rule out the possi-
bility of having these standards in their ‘primitive’ form
as norms, values, and beliefs since these forms constitute
informal institutions (Williams, Shahid, and Martínez
2016). Besides, having a varying degree of informality
within any informal industry, a mixed state with the pres-
ence of all the variants cannot be ignored, too.
This proposition presents standards in a broad spec-
trum. However, barring a few theoretical discussions, the
empirical investigations of standards are focused around
their codified and institutional form. The discourse on
standards in the context of developing countries has not
been able to go much beyond the global value chain
(GVC) and global proliferation of standards (e.g.
Henson and Humphrey 2010; Perez-Aleman 2011). In
addition, the scholarship on standards in developing
countries is largely percolated with prejudice that develop-
ing countries are ‘standard takers’ (Stephenson 1997). On
the one hand, this prejudice ignores the standards promul-
gated by institutionalized standard-making bodies present
in many countries such as India. On other, the argument
also ignores the existence of local industry level stan-
dards1 evolved due to the unique socio-economic structure
of industries in developing countries.
This paper analyzes industry level standards in an
unorganized industry marked by a varying degree of
informality, considering the case of the Aligarh padlock
industry. The paper further analyzes factors governing
the emergence, adherence and proliferation of these stan-
dards. The paper acknowledges the existence of IS-
15275:2003, the padlock standard promulgated by the
Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) and the fact that any
firm has not officially licensed it. For this reason,

African Journal of Science, Technology, Innovation and Development is co-published by NISC Pty (Ltd) and Informa Limited (trading as Taylor & Francis Group)
854 Jain
alongside analyzing the relation of IS-15275:2003 with
industry-level standards, the paper analyzes the standard-
making process of BIS and IS-15275:2003 to gauge its rel-
evance in the context of the Aligarh padlock industry.
The paper considers standards as a form of knowledge
bringing order within industry. The tacitness of knowledge
is emphasized, considering the positive role tacit knowl-
edge plays in governance of unorganized industries (Gui-
brunet 2019; Sheikh 2014). Further, adapting the positive
role of value chains in standard proliferation at the global
level, the paper explores the role of local value chains in
knowledge and standard proliferation.
Moreover, the standard-making process of BIS and IS-
15275:2003 is analyzed through a legitimacy framework.
Understanding standards in such industries is important
for the development of inclusive and appropriate standards
for such industries. This will help in reducing the inform-
ality of these industries and increase their organization.
Understanding the emergence, adherence and proliferation
of such standards will also better help agencies in ensuring
adherence and proliferation of institutional standards.
For this research, interviews were conducted with sta-
keholders identified during the pilot survey. The question-
naires for interviews were prepared based on a review of
active padlock standards, literature and data collected
during the pilot survey. The paper is structured as
follows. The analytical framework of the paper is built
in the next section. The section thereafter provides a
brief introduction of informal industry along with the
details of the Aligarh padlock industry, followed by a dis-
cussion on the padlock and its standards. The method-
ology and research findings are discussed in the next
two sections. The last section presents the conclusion.
An analytical framework
Understanding standards
Standards are understood in such multiple ways that
Cargill once wrote, ‘there are nearly as many definitions
of the term “standards” as there are standards available’
(as quoted in Weitzel 2012, 7). The multiple understanding
of ‘standards’ is heightened by the disciplinary fragmenta-
tion within the literature on standards, contrasting econ-
omic and sociological perspectives, technological and
non-technological approaches, or formal and de-facto
standards (Botzem and Dobusch 2012). Among these
strands of literature, most of the empirical work on stan-
dards is guided by the codified or document form of stan-
dards. The ‘primitive’ form of standards is touched upon
by scholarship studying standards through a sociological
lens. However, most of the work in this direction
remains theoretical in nature, barring the literature where
social shaping/construction of standards is discussed.
Noteworthy work in this direction includes but not
limited to Lampland and Star (2009), Timmermans and
Epstein (2010), Brunsson and Jocobsson (2000).
However, the majority of scholarship on standards
through sociological perspective does not explicitly con-
sider social norms, values, customs, etc. as standards,
and remains limited to juxtaposing norms, directives and
standards, and exploring their coupling relations (e.g.
Sandholtz 2012). Cargill (1989, 13) is a notable exception
who calls standards the acceptable behaviour and mores of
society and culture. However, this consideration remains
on the margins and does not find space among the
central tenants of his thesis.
Overall, in an abstract sense, standards can be under-
stood as documents containing general and expert knowl-
edge in the form of rules and technical solutions
(Jacobsson 2002) or as codified tacit knowledge (Anto-
nelli 1994). This view reflects the formal, codified and
knowledge aspect of standards. Cargill’s (1989, 13) view
makes a strong argument for the presence of standards
in a tacit form since behaviour and mores are predomi-
nantly tacit (Braganza and Llenkramer 2002). However,
explicit mention of tacitness of standards is first found in
David and Greenstein (1990) when they postulated that
standards could be adhered to tacitly by a producer.
Also, ‘knowledge’ as an abstraction of standards enables
us to bring tacitness within the discourse on standards.
This is also possible because tacitness has been found to
be integral in knowledge proliferation and adherence, par-
ticularly in informal industries (Sheikh 2014). Besides, the
cyclic nature of knowledge to get back to its tacit form
once codified (Nonaka 1994) indicates the tacit avail-
ability of institutional standards. In addition, mimetic
forces play a positive role in ensuring standard adherence
and proliferation (Brunsson, Rasche, and Seidl 2012).
These forces predominantly govern the exchange of tacit
knowledge (Collins 2010, 159), asserting the role of tacit-
ness in standard adherence and proliferation. The role of
tacitness gets more emphasis when considering the result
that codified documents are always insufficient and some
form of tacit knowledge is always required to complete
any actions (Collins 1974).
However, most of standard developing organizations
treat standards in a more structured manner and follows
ISO2 which defines a standard as
document, established by consensus and approved by a
recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated
use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or
their results, aimed at the achievement of the optimum
degree of order in a given context. (Mackay 1989, 6;
ISO IEC 2003, 5)
On the other hand, in a widely acknowledged paper, David
and Greenstein (1990, 4) define standards as technical spe-
cification ‘adhered to by a producer, either tacitly or as a
result of a formal agreement’ (emphasis added) or ‘in con-
formity with explicit regulatory authority’ (David and
Steinmueller 1994, 218).
The two definitions together present a contrasting nar-
rative. David and Greenstein look at standards from the
producer’s point of view and restrict them to the technical
specification they are adhering to. ISO considers standards
as ‘documents’ generated through a ‘specific process’
within a given ‘context’. Further, David and Greenstein
emphasize the different ways/reasons producers adopt a
standard without deliberating on their sources. In contrast,
adherence does not seem to be an agenda for ISO, prob-
ably because the standards are considered voluntary
(Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000). Overall, ISO talks
about the development of standards while the latter con-
sider their implementation. Keeping the two definitions
 African Journal of Science, Technology, Innovation and Development 855
together, one can argue that there is a ‘source’ for stan-
dards and ‘producers’ are the ‘destination’ who follows
standards in the form of specifications. However, both
definitions fail to reflect upon the process of proliferation
from source to destination.
Value chain and knowledge governance
The process of standard proliferation finds an answer in
the value chain discourse. Broadly, value chain is a
network of different stakeholders involved in product
manufacturing. In a simple representation, the value
chain comprises a network of pre-production services,
arranging raw materials and components, production and
assembly, and distribution and retail (Brun et al. 2013,
7). Within the value chain, reciprocal transmission of
knowledge happens between the various economic entities
(Asheim and Gertler 2005, 293), enabling the possibilities
of emergence and proliferation of standards. Knowledge
transmissions can happen through multiple possible
means such as face-to-face interactions, knowledge spil-
lover, direct knowledge transfer, transfer through codified
documents or exchange through workers, imitations, and
training (Pietrobelli and Rabellotti 2008). The other way
of knowledge proliferation is through knowledge stored
within the objects (ostensive knowledge), practices
(Collins 2010, 93) or through machines and organization
(Jacobsson 2002).
Further, the knowledge proliferation in value chain is
governed by its architecture and the power relations gov-
erning the value chain. It is also found that the value
chain itself gives rise to the informalization (Phillips
2011), highlighting its relevance for the present study. In
earlier literature on the GVC, two type of value chain
architecture was identified as buyer-driven or the produ-
cer-driven, on the basis of who controls the specification
of the production systems (Gereffi 1994). In producer-
driven chains it is the large integrated industries, while
in buyer-driven chains, the large retailers, brand name
merchandizers, and trading companies provides the speci-
fications. Later on, this categorization was extended into a
five possible value chain architecture as market, modular,
relational, captive, and hierarchy, based on the high/low
value of the following three factors (Gereffi, Humphrey,
and Sturgeon 2005):
(1) the complexity of information and knowledge transfer
required, particularly with respect to product and
process specifications;
(2) the extent to which this information and knowledge
can be codified; and
(3) the capabilities of actual and potential suppliers.
Each of these value chain architectures has different
knowledge and power dynamics. For example, in the ‘rela-
tional type’ chains, the knowledge codification possibility
is low, information complexity required to complete the
transaction is high and supplier competence is high. In
such cases, a lot of tacit knowledge is shared among the
buyers and the suppliers and power dynamics are guided
by ethnic ties, and interpersonal and social relational
(Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005) elements which
are central to unorganized and informal industries
(Godfrey 2011). In the ‘captive type’ value chain,
however, knowledge codification possibility and infor-
mation complexity required to complete the transaction
is high and supplier competence is low. In the ‘captive
type’ value chain, large buyers tend to control the small
suppliers as well as the standards. Similarly, the scholar-
ship on value chains also identifies different ways and
kinds of power that operate in a value chain. Dallas,
Ponte, and Sturgeon (2019) define four different type of
power on the basis of transmission mechanisms (direct
or indirect) and the configuration of actors (one to one
or within groups) among which power is transmitted as:
bargaining, demonstrative, institutional and constitutive.3
Although in practical cases, the real value chain at industry
level is generally a mix of all these different value chain
architectures and power structure making the knowledge
and power dynamics controlling the standards much
more complex.
Legitimacy in the standard development process
The development process of an institutional standard is a
multi-stakeholder process (Mena and Palazzo 2012). In
this process, multiple stakeholders come together for the
development of a standard wherein innate limitations in
the process and stakeholders always provoke speculation
around the credibility and justifiability of institutionalized
standards. First of all, standards being the codification of
tacit knowledge and expert knowledge, the challenge of
bringing together stakeholders and knowledge distributed
across the value chain raises apprehension around the
codified standards, whereas the impossibility of codifying
all the tacit knowledge only adds to the concern. Along-
side, the political and self-interest of experts may also
lead to biased standards (Jacobsson 2002). Bias is
enhanced if there is any deliberate or non-deliberate ignor-
ance of existing norms and practices, which also impact
the standard adoption (Sandholtz 2012). These issues
have largely been raised in the discourse where topics
such as the social construction of standards (Bhaduri and
Sharma 2014; Monteiro and Hanseth 1996) and the poli-
tics of standards (Hodgson and Cicmil 2007; Mattli
2001) are discussed. However, recent scholarship
(Botzem and Dobusch 2012; Luca and Prather-Kinsey
2018; Mena and Palazzo 2012) has attempted to deliberate
on these issues by analyzing the input-legitimacy of the
standards. The input-legitimacy is part of the larger legiti-
macy framework.4 Input-legitimacy gauges the extent to
which standards are perceived as justified or credible
(Mena and Palazzo 2012). Table 1 describes the four cri-
teria to assess input-legitimacy identified by Mena and
Palazzo (2012). The four criteria are (a) Inclusion, (b) Pro-
cedural fairness, (c) Transparency and (d) Consensual
orientation.
The first three criteria described in Table 1 for input-
legitimacy are self-explanatory (see Johansson 2012;
Lindgren and Persson 2010; Bäckstrand 2006, etc. for an
implicit discussion on and further understanding of the
concepts). The meaning and ramifications of the fourth cri-
terion, Consensual orientation, are not as apparent. This
criterion analyzes how much the process adopted for
developing standards has accommodated differences
856 Jain

Table 1: Criteria for assessing input legitimacy.

Criteria for input legitimacy

Criteria Explanation
Inclusion Through inclusion the stakeholders participating is analyzed. It is analyzed that involved stakeholders are
relevant for the subject matter under consideration or not; and if there is sufficient representation from the relevant
stakeholders or not.
Procedural fairness Procedural fairness enquires if all the participants have equal say in the standard development process or some are
able to exercise larger influence; and if stakeholders are able to make a valid voice or not
Transparency The transparency aspect deals with the extent the decision making and standard-setting processes are transparent;
and to what extent the performance of the participating corporations and the evaluation of that performance
transparent.
Consensual This consensual orientation is understanding whether the differences during the deliberation are taken care of and
orientation how the difference impact the process.
Source: Adapted from Mena and Palazzo (2012).

among the stakeholders. This criterion also considers the
number of different views provided during the deliberation
and the stakeholders’ openness towards changing their
position to accommodate common ground (Mena and
Palazzo 2012). The consensual orientation is vital since
it attempts to accommodate the opposing view within
the final decision through deliberations instead of voting.
It enhances credibility and justifiability of the outcome
as the opposing views and their consideration in the
process leads to more appropriate or rational decisions
(Mayntz 2010).
Informality and Aligarh padlock industry
The informal industry is part of the larger discourse on the
informal economy. As per ILO estimates, the informal
economy employs two billion people, 93% of whom are
in emerging and developing countries. The idea of the
informal sector dates back to 1960 (Kumar and Bhaduri
2014) which was further conceptualized and taken
forward in the works of scholars like Hart (1971) and
De Soto (1986). Overall, the scholarship on the informal
sector can be categorized into the ‘old view’, ignoring
and criticizing the relevance of the informal sector citing
its innate ‘illegalities’ and other sets of issues, and the
‘new view’ which acknowledges the contribution and resi-
lience of the informal sector (Kumar and Bhaduri 2014).
The ‘new view’ on the informal sector also moves
beyond the dichotomy of formal and informal and
acknowledges a grey area where firms are treated as
having a degree of informality instead of being absolutely
informal (Kumar and Bhaduri 2014; Williams, Shahid,
and Martínez 2016). Perhaps, for this reason, the new
scholarship on the informal sector attempts to analyze
the informal sector in terms of sociological parameters
such as knowledge (Basole 2014; Sheikh 2014) and inter-
personal ties (Odera 2013), beyond simple determinants
such as wages, legality, and firm size which were used
in earlier definitions (Godfrey 2011). For the purpose of
this research, we align ourselves with the ‘new view’ on
the informal industry.
Aligarh padlock industry: Structure and constituents
Aligarh lock industry is one of the many informal and
unorganized industries in India. Aligarh lock industry
accounts for around 75% of total lock production in
India (Jaiswal 2016) and also has considerable brass and
hardware manufacturing (MSMEDI n.d.). In the past, the
livelihood of 54% of all lock manufacturing units was
dependent upon the padlock industry (Sharma, Sharma,
and Naqvi 2005). The Aligarh lock industry is dominated
by unregistered, tiny and cottage units (Sharma, Sharma,
and Naqvi 2005) with a mushrooming of small firms
(Nasir 2011). It is also estimated that every third house
in Aligarh is linked with lock making (Sharma 2013).
MSME ministry estimates that there are around 2500
lock and hardware units (MSMEDI n.d.) employing
more than 200,000 people (Bhat, Murtaza, and Rawal
2016). It is however difficult to keep an exact count
because many tiny and cottage setups open and close reg-
ularly (Nasir 2011).
The industry in Aligarh is seen as informal due to firm
size and the contractual status of the workers (Khan 2016,
139). However, the degree of formality varies within the
industry which is reflects in its structure. Structurally, the
Aligarh padlock industry is divided into three parts: the
brand owner, the contractors and the artisans. The brand
owner is further divided into three parts, based on his invol-
vement in manufacturing, which may be limited to provid-
ing only raw materials and working with a middleman, or
providing only raw materials and working without a mid-
dleman, or purchasing the basic parts and assembling the
locks (Sekar and Mohammad 2001). The lock making
units can also be divided into ‘small’ (more than 15
workers), ‘tiny’ (10–15 workers) and ‘household’ (up to
10 workers) and be made up of permanent, casual and
family workers (Sharma, Sharma, and Naqvi 2005). The
nature of employment adds further shades to the degree
of informality. In the Aligarh padlock industry, 70% of
the labour is casual with low job security and has the uncer-
tainty of irregular work (Sharma, Sharma, and Naqvi 2005).
This casualness has increased over time, and the average
number of permanent employees in firms has decreased
from two to one over the decade between 1995 and 2005
(Sharma, Sharma, and Naqvi 2005). The casualness was a
result of the cost-cutting methods adopted by firms and
the workers’ participation in agriculture activities
(Sharma, Sharma, and Naqvi 2005).
Padlock and padlock standard
A padlock is ‘a locking device made up of a case, shackle,
and the shackle-retaining assembly. Components perform-
ing the same purpose of a shackle but differing in design
 African Journal of Science, Technology, Innovation and Development 857

are sometimes used instead of a shackle’ (Tobias 2004,
chap 37). Multiple technologies are available to make a
padlock. However, in Indian markets, padlocks are
mainly available with three different locking technologies,
i.e. lever based mechanism, dimple key-based mechanism
and Chinese locks with pin cylinder. Besides technologies,
many active padlock standards are also available all over
the world. The list of active padlock standards used world-
wide is given in Table 2 and are briefly discussed below.
The institutionalized padlock standard of India, i.e. IS-
15275:2003, was enacted in 2003 by repealing and com-
bining the five existing standards of that time (Table 3).
An amendment in the standard was proposed in 2016 to
incorporate the concerns of handmade padlock
manufacturers.
In general, except the Indian standard, the main objec-
tive of all the standards listed in Table 2 is to define tests
using different parameters, and set grades for the locks
based on the test(s) results. For getting a grade, the
product has to clear the benchmark of all the test parameter
individually. The overall grade comes from the parameter
getting the minimum score. Along with tests, standards
also prescribe grading schema to be marked on products.
The most common test parameters are corrosion tests,
environmental tests, cycle tests, forcing tests, surreptitious
entry tests, and key differs. Apart from tests, standards also
suggest the preferable material for the Padlocks.
Like the other standards, the IS-15275:2003 also talk
about tests for ascertaining padlock quality, but it does
not use the same for grading purposes. The tests IS-
15275:2003 prescribes are non-interchangeability, load
test and soundness test. The non-interchangeability test
measures the unique combinations used in a particular
batch. In load test, a lock is held in clamps and is tested
for how much load it can bear. In the soundness test, a
lock is held in hand through shackle and lock strength is
tested through five sharp blows. Though IS-15275:2003
does recommend the use of corrosion-free material for
padlocks, it does not consider this as a grading parameter.
Table 3: Padlock standards existing in before IS 15275:2003 was
enacted.
S.
No Standard Type of Padlock
1 IS 275:1982 Padlocks lever type, hand made
2 IS 1018:1982’ Padlocks brass, lever type, machine
made;
3 IS 4230: 1967 Locks, lever tumbler type
4 IS 4231:1967 Locks, miller type
5 IS Padlocks, pin tumbler type
12197:1987
Source: Own compilation.
The Indian grading schema in IS-15275:2003 is inclined
more towards features and specifications for a padlock
than providing grades based on the test results and con-
ditions. The IS-15275:2003 only talks about printing the
BIS mark on the lock instead of showing the exact
grade, in principle defeating the purpose of grading.
Figure 1 shows the grading criteria for a padlock in BIS
IS-15275:2003.
Research method
Research for this paper was done in two phases. In the first
phase, 14 interviews in the Aligarh industry were con-
ducted as a pilot. Also, data were collected from india-
mart.com, global.ihs.com and infostore.saiglobal.com to
obtain information about the products and existing stan-
dards. The pilot phase identified the stakeholders and
value chain present in the Aligarh padlock industry. The
different stakeholders and value chain actors identified
were the manufacturer group, lock traders, raw material
suppliers, lock manufacturing association, Bureau of
Indian Standards, and NSIC (National Small Industries
Corporation).
In the second phase, data were collected through 30
interviews. Respondents were chosen through random
sampling and none of the interviews was planned,

Table 2: Different padlock standards obtained from standard databases.

S.
No Issuing organization Document title
1 American Society for Testing and Materials ASTM F883-13
Standard Performance Specification for Padlocks
2 American Society for Testing and Materials ASTM F2348-04#
Standard Performance Specification for Privacy padlocks
3 German Institute for Standardization (Deutsches Institut DIN EN 12320
für Normung) Building hardware. Padlocks and padlock fittings. Requirements
and test methods
4 Standard Australia AS 4145.4-2002
Locksets Padlocks
5 Bureau of Indian Standard BIS IS 15275:2003
Padlocks – Specification
6 Brazilian Standards NBR 15271:2005
Padlock – Requirements, Classification E Test Methods
7 South African Bureau of Standards SANS 1533 Ed. 1.05 (2014) Padlocks
8 Korean Standards Association KS B 6601:2009 Padlocks
9 German Institute for Standardization (Deutsches Institut DIN EN 16864 (2015-06)
für Normung) Building hardware – Mechatronic Padlocks – Requirements and
test methods
#
The ASTM F2348-04 is meant for only a subset of locks which are weak locks; ASTM F883-13 cover all the locks and is a superior standard.
Source: Own compilation.
858 Jain
Figure 1: Grades as per IS 15275: 2003.
except the interview with the lock manufacturing associ-
ation. The interviews were conducted using semi-struc-
tured questionnaires with traders, manufacturers and raw
material supplier groups with different questionnaires for
each of the groups. The questionnaires were based on
the information collected during the pilot phase, a
review of available standards and relevant literature. The
BIS, NSIC, lock association representative, and duplicate
key maker group were interviewed using the conversa-
tional interview method (Gray 2004, 217), also known
as ‘flexible’ interviewing or ‘conversationally flexible’
interviewing. This interview method is known to enable
greater accuracy since it allows the interviewer to clarify
responses and further clarify the respondent’s queries
(Lavrakas 2008, 151). Interview details are summarized
in Table 4.
Standards in Aligarh padlock industry: Nature and
dynamics
Canvas of existing industry level standards
This research identified that multiple standards, in differ-
ent contexts, are operating in the Aligarh padlock industry.
These standards emerge at the local industry level due to
the interplay of various stakeholders and bring order
within the industry. The institutionalized standard is
non-operative at the industry level, and is restricted to
Table 4: Number of groups and entities interviewed.
S. No Group
1 Traders
2 Raw Material Supplier
3 Manufacturers
4 Duplicate key makers group
Representative interviews
S.No Organization Representative interviewed
1 NSIC
2 BIS
3 Lock Association
Source: Field work.
indicative use for government procurement. Lever-based
technology is the standard technology in the Aligarh
padlock industry, which has multiple product niches
with different design standards. This finding follows
McGrath et al.’s (1991) arguments that user preference
can differ, so markets can typically accommodate multiple
designs of a particular product. The study identified the
tacit acceptance of brand/trademark/trade-name as a stan-
dard. The branded locks are used for design and specifica-
tions, and trade-name mimicking is done for capitalizing
on the market value associated with a trade-name. The
positive role of the local value chain and tacitness was
seen in the emergence, adherence and proliferation of
standards.
The research found that manufacturing firms in Aligarh
have such similar technological capabilities that one of the
respondents described the industry as being in a state of
‘perfect competition’. For this reason, the brand acts as a
source for the design rather than for technology. One of
the respondents proudly discussed his plans for imitating
a lock with new technology brought out by a well-known
brand operating outside Aligarh. Interestingly, his idea of
imitation was about imitating the outer look rather than
the new technology. The manufacturing firms agreed to fol-
lowing brand for product specifications. In response to a
question whether a manufacture follows the brand/
Entities interviewed Interview method
10 semi structured questionnaires
5 semi structured questionnaires
8 semi structured questionnaires
2 conversational interview
Interview method
1 conversational interview
2 conversational interview
2 conversational interview
 African Journal of Science, Technology, Innovation and Development 859
competitor for lock specifications, four out of eight eight
choose the brand and only two selected competitors.
Also, six out of eight people marked brand at rank one or
two in response to ‘what helps in selling the product of
the same quality’, over the options such as security features,
cost, material, weight, etc.
In addition, the majority of the manufacturers empha-
sized the brand value and claimed that they could make
better locks then the largest firm operating from Aligarh,
but market would not pay for it because of the lack of
brand value. The brand value reflects from another
finding that a very well-known lock company owing
brand ‘H’ does not manufacture locks and outsources all
of its manufacturing to smaller firms. We in fact noticed
that the same company even sold Chinese locks with
their own brand name. The role of brand is so strong
that one of the manufacturers with a well-known brand,
competing with Godrej5 in padlock market segment ‘X’,
told us about his plans of manufacturing padlocks for
other manufacturers for the padlock market segment ‘Y’,
as other manufactures’ brands have a good market position
in the market segment ‘Y’ and his does not.
It was also seen that one trade name ‘ATOOT’ (Hindi
word for unbreakable) is adopted by many and many locks
were stamped with phrase ‘ATOOT’ on their body. During
the trader interview it was noted that traders attempt to
promote a lock calling it ‘ATOOT’. Also, on searching
with the key word ‘ATOOT lock’ on trade website india-
mart.com, most the square locks fitted with rivets
appeared. This indicates that the trade-name ‘ATOOT’
has become a generic trade-name6 for a particular kind
of product. This further indicates the presence of trade
names as a standard. Similar to ‘ATOOT’, another trade-
name ‘Nau-tal’, was also often seen on locks, owing to
its similarity with the trade-name ‘Nav-Tal’ from Godrej.
Additionally, on asking about the best padlock in the
industry, half of the respondents said that ‘Link’ locks
are the best, with one of the respondents saying, ‘Link is
the king of locks.’ This example again indicates the
value that a brand-name/trade-name/trademark carries in
the Aligarh padlock industry.
Furthermore, most of the manufacturers were unaware
of the BIS standard. At the industry level, only handmade
padlock manufacturers who are supplying padlocks to the
government are using it. Moreover, it was reported that for
government supply, self-declaration of standard adherence
is sufficient. For this reason, BIS-15275:2003 in practice
has no use for the manufacturers. The only requirement
for procurement is to satisfy the prescribed tests, making
the use of the specification in the standard document
redundant. Compliance to the standard in this case was
restricted to the presentation. This manner of following
standards is one of the two ways the standards could be
followed (Brunsson and Jocobsson 2000). In fact, one
respondent added that some firms are making poor
quality locks and bringing a bad name to the industry
because even a poor-quality lock can fulfil the test require-
ments. So, as a cost-cutting measure, they make locks that
are not up to the quality standards required by the industry.
This again indicates the ineffectiveness of the IS-
15275:2003 for the industry.
Emergence, adherence, and proliferation through
tacitness and value chain
In the Aligarh padlock industry, tacitness and the value
chain play an important role in sustaining the standards.
Among all the stakeholders in Aligarh padlock industry,
mainly traders or bulk buyers influence the emergence of
product standards. No explicit role of raw material suppli-
ers and other allied services providers was identified in the
knowledge exchange process, particularly because pad-
locks are not their sole area of interest and they are part
of the other value chains as well. The value chain in the
Aligarh padlock industry is largely buyer driven which
could be further characterized as mix of relational and
captive type value chains. However, the nature of the
captive type value chain is due to manufacturers’ depen-
dence on buyers resulting from socio-economic reasons
and not because of knowledge complexity, codification
possibility, or lack of supplier competence, as suggested
in Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon (2005). The value
chain in the industry reflects various inter-dependencies
creating ample opportunities for knowledge transfer and
exchange. The traders are connected directly to multiple
manufacturers and vice versa. And some traders have
also internalized the independent manufacturing units,
especially those traders who have their own trade/brand
name. It was also found that sometimes small manufac-
turers accept help from other manufacturers who have
better opportunities in the market to clear their excess
stock. This makes it almost obligatory for firms that are
uncertain about their market to follow the standard of a
firm they can rely upon to clear their stocks. This indicate
strong mimetic forces within the Aligarh padlock industry.
Further, in addition to the nature of the value chain, the
casualness of the workers, which allows them to shift
from workplace to workplace, ensures mobility of knowl-
edge within the value chain (Pietrobelli and Rabellotti
2008).
At the industry level, traders facilitate the majority of
knowledge exchange. Traders reportedly give new pro-
ducts to manufactures to motivate them to mimic these
and, in this way, become a source of knowledge about
the new locks. The tacit knowledge in the product form
is considered ostensive knowledge (Collins 2010, 93).
The trader role is also important in sustaining lever-
based technology as the standard technology for the
padlock. Among the two alternative technologies,
dimple key-based technology is avoided for padlocks
because of its higher input cost in comparison to lever-
based technology. The traders avoid Chinese locks
despite the comparative prices, because the Chinese sup-
pliers never provide any warranty and they also do not
offer any credit facility. This again reflects that it is the
traders’ choice that is propelling the technology standard.
It is important to note that the technological capability
issue cannot be credited for such findings. As we observed
in the door lock segment of the Aligarh industry, the
dimple key-based technology dominates. And the positive
role of NSIC was identified in achieving this, while no role
of NSIC was found in sustaining lever-based technology.
This shows that the dominance of lever-based technology
in the padlock segment cannot be a capability issue, albeit
860 Jain
being due to the socio-economic issues as discussed. The
reported openness of the industry towards new technology
again reflects that there is no issue at the manufacturers
level.
The BIS standard is only used in government procure-
ment. This again reflects the role of bulk buyers in the
adherence to the standard. The role of tacitness is also
seen in compliance to BIS-15275:2003. It was found
that suppliers following the standard had poor knowledge
of its the content and the manufacturer interviewed could
not even properly explain all the tests mentioned in the
document. This indicates that manufacturers are relying
in tacit understanding to follow the BIS standard.
BIS standard-making process and input legitimacy of
IS-15275:2003
The Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS), a statutory organ-
ization formed under the Bureau of Indian Standards Act
1986 (BIS n.d.), is responsible for making standards in
India. In BIS, the standard-making activities begin at the
level of the Standard Advisory Committee (SAC). SAC
set the division council, headed by a member secretary,
with members from BIS and representatives from
various interest groups. Its major task is to form the sec-
tional committees and coordinate their activities. These
committees, while keeping national interest in mind,
‘seek to bring together all those with substantial interest
in particular project, wherever possible through organiz-
ations representing the views of an industry sector, trade
or other interest group such as organized consumers, regu-
latory bodies, consumer organizations, NGOs, etc.’. This
in principle achieves, economically, a wide measure of
consultation and support in standards work (BIS n.d.,
15). BIS tries to maintain ⅔ non-industry members in
the Sectional Committees. The Sectional Committees are
responsible for drafting a standard. This measure limits
the industry bias and maintain the larger public interest
in the standard-making process. Further, in principle, all
the nominated members should have expertise in the
subject and committee also attempt to ensure the partici-
pation of R & D institutions (BIS n.d., 15). Moreover,
the members are also free to suggest any other interested
organization who should be part of the standard-making
process (BIS n.d., 16). Also, BIS follow the consensual
process instead of voting to take the final decision (BIS
n.d., 15). This adds to the input legitimacy of the standard
developed (Mena and Palazzo 2012).
In principle, any individual or organization can
propose to develop a standard (BIS n.d., 32) whose rel-
evance is determined by the member secretary using a pre-
scribed Performa for the consideration of a sectional
committee. After acceptance, the standard development
procedure enters the preparatory stage where a preliminary
draft (P-draft) is prepared. It is advised to include trade
associations at this stage (BIS n.d., 24). The P-draft is cir-
culated to committee members and in the public domain
for comments. The comments are then scrutinized by the
member secretary and the sectional committee. After
this, the P-draft is converted into a working draft
through the consensus principle, numbered and sent for
the wide circulation in Hindi and English (BIS n.d., 38).
The draft is uploaded on the website and also sent to
various interest groups. Once the stipulated time for
receiving comments is over, the comments are brought
to the notice of the committee and the standard is sent
for the publication (BIS n.d., 40).
Importantly, the process does not explicitly mandate
that the draft standard must be sent to the applicable
trader’s association during wide circulation. Also, the
draft is only published in Hindi and English, limiting the
reach of the standard to people who understand either of
the two languages. For a country like India, where the
industry is dominated by rural firms spread all across the
country, this limitation creates apprehension around the
input legitimacy of the standard-making process. After
publication, the sectional committee should do a review
of the standard within five years. They are free to keep
the standard as it is, suggest changes or even revoke it
(BIS n.d., 48).
The whole procedure does indicate intent for having
inclusiveness and consensual orientation with a focus on
consumer interest. However, nothing much can be said
regarding industry interests. Transparency is largely
attempted through the public disclosure of drafts, but
this is limited by innate subjectivities. Overall, the input
legitimacy in the BIS standard-making process depends
on how carefully the section committee has been formed
and the interest of the members involved in the stan-
dard-making.
IS-15275:2003 and input legitimacy
From the limited public data on the standard development
and field interviews legitimacy issue with IS-15275:2003
were observed. The association participation from
Aligarh padlock industry could not be confirmed. The
same was expected since participation rate of MSME in
standard development process is a matter of concern
even in the developed part of the world like Europe (Euro-
pean Parliament 2010). Although, the BIS representative
emphasized on the importance of manufacturing associ-
ation from MSME sector in making an inclusive standard
but nothing could be confirmed for padlock standards. On
the other hand, participation of traders is very limited in
the BIS standard-making process but they are the riding
force in the governing value chain and industry level stan-
dards for the industry. Due to this the inclusivity aspect of
IS-15275:2003 remain uncertain. Moreover, the whole
standard development is guided by the consumer interest
of providing quality goods. The economic aspects do not
find any mention in the process, while it was found impor-
tant for the value chain governing industry level standards
in Aligarh padlock industry. In addition, user choice for a
padlock is determined by what is to be protected (www.
insight-security.com n.d.) instead of absolute quality.
The BIS emphasis on quality overlooks this aspect of
the consumer’s requirement, further reducing the legiti-
macy of the standard.
The IS-15275:2003 chooses a one size fits all policy
and in the soundness test defines same test condition for
all the padlocks. In this case, if the test is designed for
large padlocks, then there is very little chance that small
padlocks will pass this test. This again reflects legitimacy
 African Journal of Science, Technology, Innovation and Development 861
issues with IS-15275:2003. Further, it is highly unlikely that
a small or medium scale manufacturer can or would even
need to meet the requirement for grading purposes.
During the research no manufacturer manufacturing locks
beyond level 2 was found. This makes IS-15275:2003 in
principle useless for them. Also, the making of IS-
15275:2003 was so lax that the standard ignored the hand-
made padlocks which are still manufactured in Aligarh and
preferred by government agencies. There was thus no
rationale in excluding them from the newly developed stan-
dard. Further, government agencies had not used IS-
15275:2003 for more than a decade and kept using the
repealed handmade padlock standard IS-275-1982 as a
reference until 2015.7 This again points to legitimacy
issues with IS-15275:2003. The ignorance on the part of
BIS is so grim that despite the standard not being adopted
for over a decade, BIS failed to revise the standard, even
though BIS itself stipulates that standards should be
reviewed within five years. The revision attempts finally
came, as a result of the efforts of handmade padlock man-
ufacturers, when government agencies finally adopted IS-
15275:2003 for procurement. This, however, became an
issue for handmade padlock manufacturers since handmade
padlocks had no mention in IS-15275:2003.
Conclusion
The findings of this study add to the scholarship on stan-
dards in the context of developing countries. Industries
in developing countries are majorly unorganized and
marked by degree of informality. In such cases, industry
remains a mix of legally recognized and unrecognized
firms, while many industrial activities remain below the
radar. Consequently, these industries are inherently more
dependent upon social and relational dynamics for their
business than any regulatory or institutionalized frame-
work. As a result, the operationalization of institutiona-
lized standards and regulations within these industries
becomes difficult. On the other hand, for empirical inves-
tigations, the mainstream standard discourse largely
emphasizes the institutionalized form of standards, ignor-
ing the earlier manifestation of standards such as customs,
norms, values, and beliefs. This results in further margin-
alization of standards’ discourse in the context of such
industries which already suffer from the prejudiced view
that developing countries are ‘standard takers.’ For this
reason, this study diverges from the conventional
approach of restricting standards to codified and institutio-
nalized forms, and considers standards as a form of knowl-
edge that brings order to industry. This enables us to
reconsider earlier manifestations of standards such as
customs, norms, values, and beliefs within the modern
understanding of standards, along with institutionalized
standards, and place standards within the social and rela-
tional dynamics governing these industries.
In addition, the knowledge dimension allows us to
build upon the limited standards discourse available in
the context of developing countries, which is a part of a
larger GVC discourse, as the knowledge and power
dynamics are central tenets of GVC discourse. The GVC
discourse deliberate extensively upon how the knowledge
and power dynamics govern the value chain and hence the
standards. However, GVC discourse cannot be directly
used for our present analysis, and requires suitable adap-
tations, since this discourse majorly limits standards to
codified and institutionalized forms and treats developing
countries as ‘standard takers’. Hence, for this study, we
draw upon the insights from GVC discourse to understand
the role of a local value chain in the emergence, prolifer-
ation of and adherence to industry level standards, offering
a fresh point of view in standard discourse in the context of
developing countries. Such a view to understand the
process of emergence, proliferation of and adherence to
industry level standards is essential because, with the posi-
tioning of standards within social and relational dynamics
of unorganized industries, the process does not remain as
apparent as it is when standards follow an institutionalized
and organized framework. As the social and relational
dynamics of unorganized industries, along with their
below-the-radar functioning, makes the process of emer-
gence, proliferation of and adherence to industry level
standards complex and unorganized.
Following this theoretical positioning, we identified
that industry level standards in the Aligarh padlock indus-
try, guided by the intricate local value chain, go beyond
the codified, documented and institutionalized form of
standards. And tacit knowledge plays an important role
in the proliferation of and adherence to these standards.
Even the institutionalized form of standards promulgated
by BIS is adhered to in tacit form. However, the use of
the BIS standard was limited to a group of manufacturers
catering to the government and was only utilized for rep-
resentational purposes. At the level of technology used in
the locking mechanism, lever-based technology is a stan-
dard, while at product design level niche-based standards
are seen. Brand/trade-names act as a standard in the
Aligarh padlock industry.
The findings emphasize the need to redefine standards
more closely aligned with the inherent character of the
unorganized industries, in order to understand the nature
and operationalization of standards in these industries.
Moreover, the findings indicate that the GVC discourse
is insufficient, but could be adapted upon, to understand
standards in these unorganized industries. For this
reason, investigation of the GVC discourse should be
extended to build an understanding of the local value
chain governing these industries. Also, the present study
adds to the earlier evidence about the relevance of stake-
holder inclusion in the standard-making process. The
study suggests that local value chains could be a possible
route to identify the relevant stakeholders to make the
standard-making process more inclusive. As an important
finding, this study shows that intent and objectives of the
standard-making process should also be inclusive. The
process should consider the interests of all stakeholders,
in addition to stakeholder inclusion. For example, we
found that BIS in general only considers consumer inter-
ests in providing quality goods while making a standard.
The process does not make space for traders’ interests.
However, in the case of the Aligarh padlock industry,
traders govern the local value chain. This is perhaps one
of the reasons why IS-15275:2003 has not been accepted
as an industry standard.
862 Jain
Acknowledgment
I am thankful to the organizing committee of IndiaLICS 2017
where the initial draft of this paper was presented. I am also
thankful to the anonymous reviewers and the guest editor for
their comments and feedback. Insights provided by Dr. Sara-
dindu Bhaduri were a great help during the research phase and
writing of writing of this paper. I would also like to thank all
interviewees for sharing their knowledge and experiences, and
friends for their constant support and kindness.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. ‘India proposed notification of voluntary draft (or proposed)
standards, including those draft standards which were not
national standards, but whose wide adoption by local indus-
try gave them a status similar to national standards
(MTN.GNG/NG8/W/9,45); notification of voluntary stan-
dards that were made mandatory by legislation or by statu-
tory orders (MTN.GNG/NG8/W/9); and information to be
provided on, and ensuring compatibility among, standards
issued by recognized national bodies and other standardiz-
ation bodies within the territory of a party (MTN.GNG/
NG8/W/9). India explained that many parties to the Agree-
ment were not notifying voluntary draft standards even
though they were national standards, or were being widely
applied by the local industry which gave them a status
similar to that of national standards. Also, it was difficult
to obtain information on standards that had been made man-
datory by legislation or on standards being formulated by
different bodies in the country. India suggested that the stan-
dards prepared by local bodies be notified and that a national
body be made responsible for providing information on, and
ensuring compatibility of, standards issued by other recog-
nized bodies in the country’ (WTO 1995).
2. ISO, the International Organization for Standardization,
founded on 23 February 1947, is an independent, non-gov-
ernmental organization, the members of which are the stan-
dards organizations of the 164 member countries. It is the
world’s largest developer of voluntary international stan-
dards, and facilitates world trade by providing common
standards between nations.
3. Bargaining power most frequently refers to firm-to-firm
relations. There is some variability in the arena of actors:
unitary (internal to the firm) in the hierarchical form;
strongly dyadic in the captive form; less so in the relational
form; Demonstrative power operates through informal trans-
mission mechanisms along value chains between buyers and
suppliers, or aspiring value chain actors; Institutional power
is a form of direct power that is exercised by collectives with
some level of formal organization such as business associ-
ations, multi-stakeholder initiatives, technological plat-
forms, or administrative units of the state; Constitutive
power emerges when broad-based collective action involves
minimal formal institutionalization or an unclear or emer-
gent common identity or purpose.
4. Legitimacy framework is an evolving framework to assess
the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder initiative such as
standards. The legitimacy could be defined as a ‘status
or condition which exists, when an entity’s value system
is consistent with that of society, and legitimation is the
process which leads to an organization being viewed as
legitimate’ (Luca and Prather-Kinsey 2018). Please
provide a page reference for the quote from “Luca and
Prather-Kinsey 2018”] The legitimacy framework has
two aspects: input legitimacy and output legitimacy.
Input legitimacy is used to understand to what extent
regulations are perceived as justified or credible while
output legitimacy measures to what extent they
effectively solve the issues that they target (Mena and
Palazzo 2012).
5. The Godrej Group is an Indian conglomerate headquartered
in Mumbai, Maharashtra, India. They introduced the lever
lock to India in 1897 and still dominate the lock market in
India.
6. ‘A trademark becomes the generic term of a product or
service when, as a result of its owner’s actions or inaction,
the average consumer would more or less automatically
understand the name of the trademark to refer to the desig-
nated product or service.’ “Generic Trademark” retrieved
from http://en.cabinetbouchara.com/P-206-136-A1-generic-
trademark.html.
7. Tender for procurement, see tender number ‘06151913’ at
S. No: 8 at www.secr.indianrailways.gov.in/cris/secr/store/
1442389447990_E-17-2015.pdf, accessed on 30 August
2018.
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