Notes for Political Thinking Mid-Term

Alexander Peel

Condorcets Paradox: Even though each individual in the group has preferences that are complete and transitive, this need not be true of the groups preferences. Likelihood of Majority Rule Preference Cycle: This formula states the probability of intransitivity in the majority preferences of a group size n voting on m alternatives. Arrows Theorem: There exists no mechanism for translating the preferences of rational individuals into a coherent group preference that simultaneously satisfies conditions U, D, I and P. Rationality Assumption: Ri is complete & transitive, where Ri are the preferences of the individuals. Arrows Theorem Conditions U Universal Domain. Each iG may adopt any strong or weak complete and transitive preference ordering over the alternatives in A. D Non-Dictatorship. There is no individual i*G whose individual preferences dictate the group choice. I Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. If alternatives j and k stand in a particular relationship to one another in each group members preferences, and this relationship does not change, then neither may the group preference between j and k. This is true even if individual preferences over other alternatives change. P Unanimity/Pareto Optimality. If every member of G prefers j to k then the group preference must reflect a preference for j over k. Mays Theorem Conditions U Universal Domain. Each iG may adopt any strong or weak complete and transitive preference ordering over the alternatives in A. A Anonymity. The group preference depends only upon the collection of individual preferences, not who has which preference. N Neutrality. Interchanging the ranks of alternatives j and k in each group members preference ordering has the effect of interchanging the ranks of j and k in the group preference ordering.

M Monotonicity. If j RG k, and j rises in a group members preferences from below k to higher than k, then j RG k.

Mays Corollary: A method of preference aggregation over a pair of alternatives satisfies conditions U, A, N and M if and only if it is MMR. Method of Majority Rule: For any pair of alternatives, j PG k if and only if, the number of group members who prefer j to k exceeds the number of those who prefer k to j. Blacks Single-Peakedness Theorem: Consider a set A of alternatives from which a group G of individuals must make a choice. If, for every subset of three alternatives in A, one of these alternatives is never worst among the three for any group member, then this is sufficient consensus so that the method of majority rule yields group preferences PG that are transitive. Sens Value-Restriction Theorem: The method of majority rule yields coherent group preference if individual preferences are value restricted.

Notes for Political Thinking Mid-Term

Alexander Peel

Single-Peakedness Condition: The preference of group members are said to be single-peaked if the alternatives under consideration can be represented as points on a line and each of the utility functions representing preferences over these alternatives has a maximum at some point on the line and slopes away from this maximum on either side. Winset: The winset of y, written W (y), is the set of points that a majority prefers to y. (Note: the statement \the winset of x is empty" is equivalent to the statement x is a Condorcet winner." Can you see why? Condorcet winner: A policy that defeats or ties all others in pairwise majority contests. Black's Median Voter Theorem: If members of a group have single-peaked preferences, then the ideal point of the median voter has an empty winset (i.e., is a Condorcet winner). Median ideal point: The ideal point such that at least half the group members' ideal points are at or to its left, and at least half the group members' ideal points are at or to its right. Ideal/bliss point: An individual's most-preferred position (i.e., alternative, when represented as points on a line). Plotts Theorem: If voters possess distance-based spatial preferences, and if their ideal points are distributed in a radially symmetric fashion with x* the ideal point, and the number of voters is odd, then there is an empty Winset at x*. McKelveys Chaos Theorem: In multidimensional spatial settings, except in the case of a rare distribution of ideal points, there will be no majority rule empty-winset point. Instead there will be chaos no Condorcet winner, anything can happen, and whoever controls the order of voting can determine the final outcome. Closed-Rule Committee System: A previously appointed committee has gatekeeping agenda power. They may or may not make a proposal, and the legislature has to choose between the proposal or the status quo. Open-Rule Committee System: Identical to the closed-rule system, except the parent legislature opens to the floor to amendments. Plurality Rule: Everyone votes for their top preference, and whoever has the highest percentage of votes wins. Easy to vote, easy to count, but an option can win without a support by the majority, and there are wasted votes. Plurality Runoff: Everyone votes for their top preference, and the top two candidates with the most votes face off. An option will always have a majority in the second round, but requires multiple rounds of voting.

Notes for Political Thinking Mid-Term

Alexander Peel

Sequential Runoff: Everyone votes for their top alternative. Least-preferred option(s) eliminated. Easy to vote, easy to count, but everyone needs to vote multiple times. Borda Count: Voting is a point-system. There are K options, highest ranked alternative gets K-1 points, etc. Add up the points for each item across individuals, where the alternative with the most points wins. Approval Voting: Everyone writes down which alternative(s) would be acceptable to them, and the alternative that is acceptable to the most people wins. Plurality Systems: five bits of information can be used to characterize it and predict resulting tendencies. V number of votes per voter P if V>1, can voters partiall abstain? C if V>1, can voters cumulate votes? K district magnitude; are there multiple candidates being elected from one district? F electoral formula. First Past the Post: One representative is elected, one vote per voter, candidate with the most votes wins. Single Transferable Vote: S seats to fill, and V voters. The voters write down their rank-ordering for all options. Any candidate getting at least votes wins. Surplus votes are transferred to the remaining options, where checking continues until the quota of winners is met. See 9th October Power Point for example. Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV): Elect k >1 representatives at the same time, where each voters has one vote and the top k vote-getters are the winners. Tendency to disperse away from the centre, because nobody wins at the centre. Limited Vote (LV): Variant of SNTV, but voter gets multiple votes. The # of votes is less to fill than the number of seats, P is allowed, C is not. Central tendency, because candidates would want to cluster. Cumulative Vote (CV): Same as LV but C is permitted. Proportional Representation: Vote for party, not for individuals. Parliaments set the hurdle for a party to be allowed seats.