Women, Men, and Society - Renzetti, Claire M Curran, Daniel J - 1995 - Boston - Allyn and Bacon - 9780205156191 - Anna's Archive

Susan Basow, Ph.D.
Women, Men,
and Society
Third Edition
Claire M. Renzetti
St Joseph’s University
Daniel J. Curran
St Joseph’s University
Allyn and Bacon

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Renzetti, Claire M.
Women, men, and society / Claire M. Renzetti and Daniel J. Curran.
— 3rd ed.
p. cm. — (LSMS working paper) '
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
ISBN 0-205-15619-3
1. Sex role—United States. 2. Sexism—United States. 3. Women—
United States—Socialization. 4. Women—United States—Social
conditions. 1. Curran, Daniel J. 11. Title. III. Series.
HQ1075.5.U6R46 1995
305.3—dc20 94-31685
CIP
Printed in the United States of America
10 98765432 99 98 97 96 95
In memory of Daniel J. Curran, Sr.,
and with thanks to our parents, Nancy Curran and
Clara and Joseph Renzetti
Preface XI
Chapter 1 Studying Gender: An Overview 1

Sociological Perspectives on Gender 3
Structural Functionalism 4
A Paradigm Revolution 7
A Feminist Sociology of Gender 8
The Perspective of This Text 15
Key Terms 16
Suggested Readings 16
PART I MEN AND WOMEN: WHATS THE DIFFERENCE?
Chapter 2 Sex Differences: The Interaction of Nature

and Environment 1S
The Sex Chromosomes and Sexual Differentiation 19
Prenatal Mishaps: What Can They Teach Us
about Gender? 21
Sex Differences: Much Ado about Nothing? 31
Independence vs. Dependence 32
Aggression vs. Passivity 33
Verbal Ability and Visual-Spatial Ability 38
The Case for His and Hers Brains 42

Box 2.1 Sexual Orientation and the Brain 43
“My Hormones Made Me Do It”: Premenstrual Syndrome 46

Box 2.2 Postpartum Depression Syndrome 48
The Interaction of Biology and Culture 53
Key Terms 55
Chapter 3 Ancestors and Neighbors: Social Constructions of

Gender at Other Times, in Other Places 56
Bones and Stones: The Archeological Record 57
Our Relatives, the Chimps 62

VI Contents
\ . r
Women and Men Elsewhere; Are Western Constructions or
Gender Universal? 64
Gender Relations in Contemporary Foraging Societies 65
Multiple Genders 71
Gender, Evolution, and Culture 73
Key Terms 74
PART II TEACHING U6 TO KNOW OUR RE6PECTIVE PLACES
Chapter 4 Early Childhood Gender Socialization 70

Box 4.1 Sex Selection 78
Learning Gender 80
Identification Theory 80
Social Learning Theory 83
Cognitive-Developmental Theory 85
Bern’s Enculturated Lens Theory of Gender Formation 87
Growing Up Feminine or Masculine' 90

The Gender-Specific Nature of Children’s Environ¬
ments 92
Early Peer Group Socialization 99
The Intervening Variables of Race and Social Class 100
By the Time a Child Is Five 102
Key Terms 103

Chapter 5 Schools and Gender 105

An Historical Overview of Women and Men in Education 106
' Women and Men in Education during the
Twentieth Century 109
Educating Girls and Boys: The Elementary Schools 112

Box 5.1 Special Education 114
Educating Teenage Girls and Boys: The Secondary Schools 119

Box 5.2 The High School Experience for Lesbian
and Gay Youth 121
Box 5.3 Sex Differences in Mathematics and Science 125
Educating Women and Men: Golleges and Graduate Schools 127

Women Faculty and Administrators; Still Too Few 131
Contents vii
Sexual Harassment 135

Structuring More Positive Learning Environments 139
Gender, Education, and Power 143
Key Terms 144

Chapter 6 The Great Communicators: Language and

the Media 146
Sexism and Language: What’s in a Word? 147
Box 6.1 Sexism and Language 148
Do Women and Men Speak Different Languages? 152
Gender and the Media 154

The Written Word: Gender Messages in Newspapers
and Magazines 155
Television: The Ubiquitous Media Socializer 163
Gender Messages in Advertisements: Does Sexism Sell? 172
Images of Gender in the Media: What Are Their Effects? 176

Box 6.2 Violence and the Media 177
Language and Media as Shapers of Gender 179
Key Terms 180

PART ill KEEPING US IN OUR RESPECTIVE PLACES:

INSTITUTIONS OF SOCIAL CONTROL
Chapter 7 Gender and Intimate Relationships 152

Sociology Constructs T/jg Eamily 183
Sexuality and Reproductive Ereedom 188

Box 7.1 Children Having Children: The Problems of
Unwanted Teen Pregnancy and Parenthood 190
Reproductive Ereedom 192
Gender, Intimacy, and Power 202

Heterosexual Marriages 203
Single-Parent Eamilies 216
Singles and Domestic Partnerships 223
The Dark Side of Intimacy: Domestic Violence 237

Partner Abuse in Heterosexual Relationships 237
Partner Abuse in Lesbian and Gay Relationships 243
viii Contents
Child Abuse 247

Elder Abuse 249
Intimate Relationships: The Ideal and the Real Revisited 250
Key Terms 251

Chapter & Gender, Employment, and the Economy 253

U.S. Working Women and Men in Historical Perspective 254
Sex Segregation in the Workplace 259

Consequences of Workplace Sex Segregation 267
The Male/Female Earnings Gap 271

The Earnings Gap, Poverty, and Welfare Policy 273
Box 8.1 Gender and Homelessness 278
Explaining the Wage Gap 280
Box 8.2 The Child Care Dilemma 283
The Work World: Ideology and the Role of Law 289

Gender Stereotypes at Work 289
Legislation for Equality in the Workplace 293
Gender and Work in Post-Socialist Societies 300
The Intersection of Home and the Work World 303
Key Terms 304

Chapter 9 Gender, Crime, and Justice 306

Women and Men as Offenders 307
Box 9.1 Drugs, Crime, and Gender 312
With Justice for All? 316

The Administration of Justice 316
Do the Punishments Fit the Crimes? 322
Gender and Corrections 329
Criminal Victimization: Gender, Power, and Violence 333

Box 9.2 Hate Crimes 336
Rape 338
Pornography 345
Institutionalized Violence against Women 350
Box 9.3 Violence against Women as Human Rights
Violations 351
Power, Crime, and Justice 356

Contents
Key Terms 357

Chapter 10 Gender, Politics, Government, and

the Military 358>
The Gender Gap: Political Attitudes and Activities 360
Gender and Public Office 368

Women and Men in State and Local Government 373
Women and Men in the Federal Government 375
Women and Men in the Military 381

Box 10.1 Homosexuals in the U.S. Military 388
The Politics of Gender 391
Key Terms 392

Chapter 11 Gender and Spirituality 393

Gender and Religiosity 395
Of Goddesses and Witches 398
Traditional Religious Teachings on Gender 402

Judaism 403
Christianity 408
Islam 416
Religion, Politics, and Social Change 420

The Politics of Gender in the Evangelical New Right 420
Minority Churches: Resistance and Liberation 422
Challenges to Patriarchal Religions: Feminist Spirituality 423

Box 11.1 Ecofeminism 425
Key Terms 427

Chapter 12 Gender and Health 429

Gender and Mortality 431
Box 12.1 Sex and Life Expectancy in the Third World 434
Heart Disease and Stroke 435
Cancer 438
Occupational Hazards to Male and Female Workers 439
Other Causes of Death 441
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) 443
X Contents
Box 12.2 AIDS Prevention 445

Women, Men, and Morbidity 447
Sexism in Health Care 448

The Patriarchal Hierarchy of Health Care Work 454
Feminist Health Care 457
Gender, Sport, and Fitness 458
The Politics of Mental Health and Mental Illness 462

The Double Standard of Mental Health 464
Sexism and Mental Health Services 479
Box 12.3 Beauty Norms 480
Feminist Therapy 483
Gender, Health, and Illness: A Summary 484
Key Terms 485

PART IV TAKING CHARGE—6EX, GENDER, AND

SOCIAL CHANGE
Chapter 13 Restructuring Sex/Gender Systems 4S7

Social Change and Social Movements 488
The Women’s Movement in Historical Perspective 489

Box 13.1 Early Feminists 490
Box 13.2 What Happened to the Equal Rights
Amendment? 497
The Second Wave of Eeminism 499
Eeminism’s Third Wave 503
The Women’s Movement Internationally 506
Men and Liberation 512 '
Gay and Lesbian Rights 515
Carrying On 518
Key Terms 519

Glossary 520
Bibliography 525
Name Index 586
Subject Index 597
Preface
The primary purpose of any textbook is to summarize and explain the

rich body of knowledge that constitutes a specific discipline or subdisci¬
pline. It is impossible, however, to do this with complete objectivity,
especially given the constraints of space and time. Authors bring to their
writing projects personal and paradigmatic biases with respect to what
should as well as what must be covered in a text. In addition, they infuse
the presentation with, at the very least, a particular theoretical perspec¬
tive. Since we certainly cannot claim to be exceptions to this, we would
like to define the goals, methods, and perspectives of this text.
Our first objective remains to assist students in connecting a central
element of their personal lives—their gendered experiences—^with the
social and political world in which they live. To do so, we present them
with a broad sampling of the wealth of recent scholarship on gender and
gender-related issues. Most of this research is sociological, but we have
also drawn on the work of biologists, psychologists, anthropologists,
economists, historians, and others. This material will often affirm stu¬
dents’ observations that women and men are different in many ways—al¬
though perhaps less so than students might suppose. Clearly, women and
men are treated differently in most societies, and much of the research
we examine addresses this differential treatment and its significance in
the everyday lives of women and men within the context of particular
structural or institutional arrangements. The material in the third edition
has not only been updated, it has also been expanded to more thoroughly
address these issues.
Our second objective is closely intertwined with the first. Specifically,
we wish to persuade students to look beyond the boundaries of their own
lives so as to understand the complexity and diversity of gendered expe¬
riences in terms of race, social class, sexual orientation, age, cultural
differences, and physical ability/disability. The book is written from a
feminist perspective, and although our primary focus is a critical assess¬
ment of gender inequality, we also emphasize the interdependence of
multiple inequalities. We want students to understand how the constraints
imposed on women and men by specific social constructions of gender
may be tightened when one also has a devalued racial status, sexual
orientation, age, or economic status.
Although we cannot claim to provide a fully balanced picture of the
experiences of all groups, we have tried to incorporate into every chapter
XI
xii Preface
research that examines how gender inequality intersects with inequalities

based on race, social class, age, ability/disahility and/or sexual orienta¬
tion to produce multiple oppressions that differentially impinge on the lives
of specific groups of women and men. We also include cross-cultural
research on the social constructions of gender and on gender-related
issues in other societies, often non-Western ones. In these ways, we hope
to encourage students to question their own beliefs about what is true or
correct with regard to sex and gender, and to expose them to experiences
and conditions with which they may not be personally familiar. Most of
the new material in this edition speaks to these issues. We have made a
special effort to expand our coverage of age-related gender issues as well
as those related to ability/disability. In acknowledgment of religious di¬
versity, we have used the designations B.C.E. (Before Common Era) and
C.E. (Common Era) instead of the traditional designations B.C. (Before
Christ) and A.D. {anno Domini—in the year of our Lord).
Finally, we hope to accomplish the first two objectives by presenting
the material in a way that students find stimulating, clear, and highly
readable. Together, we have brought to this project more than 30 years
of experience teaching the sociology of gender, women’s studies, mar¬
riage and family, and similar courses. During these years in the classroom,
we have observed that our students typically come from diverse academic
backgrounds. Although most are juniors and seniors, many have had only
one or two introductory-level social science courses. With this in mind,
we have incorporated into the text a number of useful pedagogical tools.
For instance, key terms or concepts are emphasized in boldface within
each chapter, allowing students to study each in the context in which it is
introduced. These key terms are also grouped at the end of each chapter,
where they appear with a brief definition. At the end of the book, all of
the concepts are alphabetized and defined in a glossary. Each chapter
also concludes with a brief list of suggested readings. An Instructor’s
Manual that contains a test bank, film and video suggestions, classroom
exercises, and other resources is also available in both printed form and
on disk. The Instructor’s Manual has been expanded considerably since
the second edition.
As we have moved through three editions of this text, we have
witnessed an explosion of scholarship, especially feminist scholarship, in
the field of gender studies. In fact, research in the field is so prolific that
it can be difficult to keep abreast of all the very latest findings. We are
also lucky, therefore, to have had the support and assistance of many
colleagues who reviewed all or part of the manuscript, made insightful
comments and criticisms, suggested additional references, shared jour¬
nals and other publications, or passed along relevant information that
crossed their desks. In particular, we wish to thank Raquel Kennedy
Bergen, St. Joseph’s University; Betty Dobratz, Iowa State University; Con-
Preface xiii
Stance Hardesty, University of Oklahoma; and Jane Hood, University of

New Mexico. Thanks also to librarian Barbara Lang.
Many others contributed in various ways to this third edition. Our
special thanks to Karen Hanson, executive editor at Allyn and Bacon, for
her expert advice, patience, and cherished friendship. Thanks also to
Kathy Smith, who somehow always makes the production process a pleas¬
ure. We’re grateful for her editorial skills as well as her good humor.
And finally, a message to our sons, Sean and Aldan: Thanks, yet
again, for your unfailing patience.
Chapter
Studying Gender: An Overview

2 Chapter 1
We describe ourselves in âny different ways. One of the most fundamen¬

tal ways is to say “I am a man” or “I am a woman”—that is, to describe
oneself in terms of biological sex. However, the information conveyed by
these simple phrases goes beyond the mere description of one’s anatomy.
It also conjures up a configuration of personality traits and behavior
patterns. Without ever having seen you, others are likely to draw conclu¬
sions about you—about the clothes you wear, the way you express your¬
self, and the various activities you pursue.
If you are a woman, for example, people may picture you wearing
slacks, but they would not be surprised to see you in a dress. Most expect
you to be rather passive and dependent, also emotional and given to
crying easily. They will think of you as nurturing and happiest when
you are caring for children, preoccupied with your appearance, disin¬
terested in business affairs and world events, and inept with things me¬
chanical.
If you are a man, though, people will picture you wearing slacks, and
they would be shocked, maybe even frightened, to see you in a dress. Most
expect you to be assertive and independent, always in control of your
emotions. They will think of you as ambitious and happiest when pursu¬
ing your career, preoccupied with your studies or your Job, well informed
about business and world affairs, and mechanically inclined.
In other words, a biological given, sex (i.e., maleness or femaleness)
is used as the basis for constructing a social category that we call gender
(i.e., masculinity or femininity). It may be that few of the socially defined
characteristics of your respective gender describe you accurately, but this
is perhaps less important than the fact that people believe these assump¬
tions to be true or appropriate and that they act on their beliefs, treating
women and men differently, even as opposites.
Significantly, this differentiation occurs not only on an interper¬
sonal level between individuals, but also on a structural level within a
given society. Every society prescribes traits, behaviors, and patterns of
social interaction for its members or; the basis of sex. These prescriptions
are embedded in the institutions of the society—in its economy, political
system, educational system, religions, family forms, and so on. This insti¬
tutionalized pattern of gender differentiation is referred to as a society’s
sex/gender system, and an examination of sex/gender systems, as well as
their consequences for women and men, forms the major focus of this
book.
As we will learn, sex/gender systems vary historically and cross-
culturally, but each system includes at least three interrelated compo¬
nents:
1. the social construction of gender categories on the basis of biological

sex.
Studying Gender: An Oyerviexu 3
2. a sexual division of labor in which specific tasks are allocated on the

basis of sex, and
3. the social regulation of sexuality in which particular forms of sexual
expression are positively or'negatively sanctioned (Thorne 1982; Ru¬
bin 1975).
Of special concern to us will be the ways in which a sex/gender system

functions as a system of social stratification; that is, the extent to which
women and men, and the traits and behaviors respectively associated with
them, are valued unequally in a society.
Given that social institutions are imbued with the power to reward
and punish—to bestow privileges as well as to impose obligations and
restrictions—a sex/gender system has a profound impact on the lives and
life chances of women and men. Consider, for example, that although
“women represent 60 percent of the world population, they perform
nearly two thirds of all working hours, receive only one tenth of the world
income and own less than one percent of world property” (United Na¬
tions Commission on the Status of Women 1980). These startling statistics
reflect the fact that most women and men worldwide live in societies with
patriarchal sex/gender systems. A patriarchy is a sex/gender system in
which men dominate women, and that which is considered masculine is
more highly valued than that which is considered feminine. Yet, as we will
learn in this text, patriarchy is by no means universal. Thus, one of our
tasks here will be to examine alternative, more egalitarian sex/gender
systems. We will also find that patriarchy does not benefit all groups of
men equally, just as it disadvantages some groups of women more than
others.
Before we undertake our analysis of gender and sex/gender systems,
however, we should realize that not all sociologists agree on how to study
gender or on what aspects of sex/gender systems are most important to
study. Why the disagreement? To understand it better, let’s look at some
of the research on gender and the various theoretical perspectives that
have informed it.
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON GENDER
Broadly defined, sociology is the scientific study of human societies and

cultures, and of social behavior. Not all sociologists undertake this work
in the same way, however. Rather, a single social phenomenon gender,
for instance—may be researched and explained differently by various
sociologists. This may be a bit puzzling, since it is commonly assumed that
all sociologists by virtue of being sociologists share the same perspective.
Certainly, the traditional image of science itself is one of a cumulative
1
4 Chapter 1
enterprise. That is, eacVi scientist, whatever his or her specific field,
supposedly works to solve the problems that the members of the disci¬
pline have agreed are most important. Each scientist’s work progressively
builds on that of others until the answer or truth is attained. The fact of
the matter is, though, that scientists, including sociologists, conduct their
research within the framework of a particular paradigm.
What is a paradigm? Ritzer (1980:7) defines it as “a fundamental
image of the subject matter within a science. It serves to define what
should be studied, what questions should be asked, and what rules should
be followed in interpreting the answer obtained.” In other words, a
paradigm is a school of thought that guides the scientist in choosing the
problems to be studied, in selecting the methods for studying them, and
in explaining what is found. This implies that research carried out within
a specific framework is, to some degree, predetermined. The paradigm,
in focusing the researchers’ attention on certain issues, simultaneously
blinds them to the significance of other issues and also colors their view
of the social world. Still, this is not to say that there is no objective social
reality or that sociology is simply what our favorite paradigm tells us it is.
Instead, it indicates that sociological research, like all scientific research,
is subjective as well as objective. This is an important point to which we
will return shortly.
Sociology is a multiple-paradigm science; that is, it comprises a
number of competing paradigms (Ritzer 1980). Thus, we solve our earlier
puzzle of how a single social phenomenon can be researched and ex¬
plained differently by different sociologists. At any given time, however,
one paradigm tends to dominate the discipline. This does not mean that
other paradigms are ignored or not utilized, but rather that one para¬
digm seems to better explain current social conditions. Consequently, the
majority of sociologists at that time will carry out their work within the
framework of the dominant paradigm.
For much of sociology’s recent past—especially from the 1940s to
the 1960s—the dominant paradigrp was structural functionalism. The
structural functionalist perspective has been particularly influential in the
study of gender, so it behooves us to examine it carefully.
Structural Functionalism
The structural functionalist paradigm depicts society as a stable, orderly
system in which the majority ot members share a common set of values,
beliefs, and behavioral expectations that may be referred to collectively
as societal consensus. The social system itself is composed of interrelated
parts that operate together to keep the society balanced or, as a function¬
alist would say, in equilibrium. Each element of the society functions in
some way to maintain social order. Change, then, must come about slowly.
Studying Gender: An Overview 5
in an evolutionary way; rapid social change in any element would likely

be disruptive and, therefore, dysfunctional for the system as a whole.
In their analysis of gender, structural functionalists begin with the
observation that women and men are physically different. Of special
significance are the facts that men tend to be bigger and stronger than
women and that women bear and nurse children. According to function¬
alists, these biological differences have led to the emergence of different
gender roles. More specifically, a social role, not unlike a theatrical role,
includes a set of behavioral requirements or expectations that the person
who occupies the role is supposed to play. The concept of gender roles
refers to the behaviors that are prescribed for a society’s members de¬
pending on their sex.
Functionalists maintain that for much of human history, women’s
reproductive role has dictated that their gender role be a domestic one.
Given that women bear and nurse children, it makes sense for them to
remain at home to rear them. It then follows that if women are at home
caring for children, they will assume other domestic duties as well. In
contrast, men’s biology better suits them for the roles of economic
provider and protector of the family. As one prominent functionalist
theorist put it:
In our opinion the fundamental explanation for the allocation of the

roles between the biological sexes lies in the fact that the bearing and
early nursing of children establishes a strong and presumptive primacy of
the relation of mother to the small child and this in turn establishes a
presumption that the man who is exempted from these biological
functions should specialize in the alternative [occupational] direction
(Parsons 1955:23).
Adherents to this perspective point out that the work women do in

the home is functional. In many ways, women reproduce society: by giving
birth to new members, by teaching or socializing them to accept the
culture’s agreed-upon values and norms, and by providing men and
children with affection and physical sustenance. However, functionalists
simultaneously devalue traditional women’s work, referring to it as a
“duty” or “pseudo-occupation” and designating men as the instrumental
leaders of their families.
Setting aside for the moment the inherent sex bias in this approach,
let’s consider two of functionalism’s central themes. First is functionalists’
emphasis on gender differences as natural phenomena deriving from
human biology. Portraying masculinity and femininity as natural, how¬
ever, confuses gender with sex and suggests immutability. The implicit
message is that efforts to reconstruct our definitions of masculinity and
femininity are futile at best in terms of their effects on behavior. More¬
over, in this perspective, men and women are opposites, what men are.
6 Chapter 1
women are not, and effdrts to alter this natural dichotomy will likely do
more harm than good. Yet, the fact is that gender is quite amenable to
change; what constitutes masculinity and femininity varies tremendously
throughout history and across cultures. That is because gender as we
defined it at the outset is a social creation, not a biological given. Even if
biological factors play some part in producing gender differences, avail¬
able evidence shows that biologically determined traits can be modified
or completely overridden by environmental influences. We will discuss
this point further throughout the text, especially in chapters 2 and 3.
Another serious consequence of depicting gender differences as
natural is that such a position traditionally has been used to justify in¬
equality and discrimination on the basis of sex. History is replete with
examples. In the fifth century B.C.E., for instance, the Chinese philoso¬
pher Confucius declared that while women are human beings, they are
of a lower state than men (Peck 1985). In 1873, Myra Bradwell was denied
admission to the Illinois bar and the right to practice law on the ground
that “the natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belong to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life”
(quoted in Goldstein 1979:50). More recently, a social scientist has ar¬
gued that men inevitably surpass women in the competition for the most
prestigious positions in society because men secrete more testosterone
(the hormone associated with aggressive behavior) and this gives them
“an insuperable headstart” over women (Goldberg 1974).
It may well be the case that biological factors are responsible for
many of the personality and behavior differences that we may observe
between women and men. However, that does not mean that one sex or
gender is better than the other or that members of one sex deserve a
disproportionate share of society’s resources and rewards because of their
sex. In chapter 2, we will more thoroughly evaluate claims regarding
biologically based differences between the sexes; however, the problems
of gender inequality and discrimination will occupy us throughout the
text.
This brings us to a second major theme in the structural functional¬
ist perspective: the conception of gender in terms of roles. Although this
position recognizes the importance of social learning in the development
of gender, it also presents several difficulties. Stacey and Thorne
(1985:307) succinctly summarize these:
The notion of “role” focuses attention more on individuals than on social

structure, and implies that “the female role” and “the male role” are
complementary (i.e., separate or different, but equal). The terms are
depoliticizing; they strip experience from its historical and political
context and neglect questions of power and conflict. It is significant that
sociologists do not speak of “class roles” or “race roles.”
A key concept in this critique is power. Power is one’s ability to impose

one’s will on others. The most powerful members of a society are usually
those who control the largest share of societal resources, such as money,
property, and the means of physical force. In hierarchically structured
societies such as our own, these resources may be distributed unequally
on the basis of characteristics over which individuals have no control,
such as race, age, and sex. In overlooking the issue of power relations,
then, the structural functionalist perspective neglects significant dimen¬
sions of gender: the structural causes of gender-based inequality and the
consequences this inequality has for women and men in society.
This point of view also has serious implications with regard to social
change. If we put too much emphasis on the process of individual learn¬
ing, we may be tempted to assume that the solution to gender inequality
lies simply in teaching people new social roles. Although much has been
accomplished by individuals learning to reject the social constructions of
gender that they find oppressive, we will see in the chapters that follow
that far-reaching and effective social change requires a fundamental re¬
structuring of society’s basic institutions. A fatal inadequacy of the struc¬
tural functionalist analysis of gender is its defense of the status quo.
A Paradigm Revolution
We noted earlier that structural functionalism was the dominant para¬
digm in sociology from the 1940s to the 1960s. Like most dominant
paradigms, however, structural functionalism began to wear out; that is,
it could no longer adequately explain social conditions or problems
without being revised in some fundamental way (Harding 1979). When
this occurs, a paradigm revolution is likely. This means that the members of
a scientific discipline reject the dominant paradigm in favor of a compet¬
ing paradigm that is better able to explain prevailing conditions (Kuhn
1970). Specifically what prompted a paradigm revolution in sociology
during the 1960s?
The popularity of structural functionalism during the years follow¬
ing World War II is understandable, given the conservative climate of the
time. During the 1960s, however, structural functionalism began to lose
its status as the dominant sociological paradigm. The turbulent sixties, as
the decade is often called, was a period of social protest and activism.
Athough opposition to the Vietnam War is usually viewed as the focal
point of this unrest, other social problems mobilized many people for
collective action. At the heart of their concern was the widespread in¬
equality that characterized American society. Poverty and malnutrition in
the United States, for instance, demonstrated that American affluence
was not as widely shared as was commonly believed (Harrington 1962).
8 Chapter 1
The black civil rights movement and the women’s liberation movement
raised public awareness of the fact that many Americans were systemati¬
cally denied both full participation in their society and equal access to its
resources and rewards simply on the basis of their race and/or sex.
Sociologists began to question the accuracy of depicting society as
an orderly, harmonious social system. Many also rejected the notion of
societal consensus and instead undertook an examination of the develop¬
ment of dominant ideologies as products of the struggles between the
haves and have-nots in a society. At the center of their analysis was the
issue of power relations.
A number of different paradigms have emerged out of the turmoil.
Particularly important to the sociological study of gender has been the
development of the feminist paradigm. Although it has been argued that
feminism has had less revolutionary effects on sociology than on other
disciplines, its impact nonetheless has been far-reaching (Abbott 1991;
Chafetz 1988; Kramarae and Spender 1992; Stacey and Thorne 1985;
Stanley 1992; Baca Zinn 1992). Let’s take a closer look, then, at the
feminist paradigm.
A Feminist Sociology of Gender

We must begin this discussion with a caveat: it is inaccurate to speak of
feminism as a single unified perspective. It is more appropriate, as Del-
mar (1986:9) argues, to think in terms of a “plurality of feminisms.” The
diversity within feminism is a benchmark of the extent to which it has
developed and matured—a point that we will consider more carefully in
a moment. Nevertheless, there are several points that virtually all feminist-
identified perspectives share, and these will be our initial focus.
The feminist paradigm acknowledges the importance of both nature
and learning in the acquisition of gender. However, feminist sociologists
stress that it is virtually impossible to separate out the precise influences
of biology because, as we will see in qhapter 4, the learning process begins
immediately after birth. The complex interrelation between biological
and cultural factors is also emphasized. Our genes, they tell us, “do not
make specific bits and pieces of a body; they code for a range of forms
under an array of environmental conditions. Moreover, even when a trait
has been built and set, environmental intervention may still modify [it] ”
(Gould 1981:156).
The feminist perspective, therefore, begins with the assumption that
gender is essentially socially created, rather than innately determined.
\ Feminists view gender, in part, as a set of social expectations that is
reproduced and transmitted through a process of social learning. In this
way, the expectations become fundamental components of our personali¬
ties. But feminists also recognize that a complete understanding of gen-
der requires more than an analysis of this learning process. They point
out, in fact, that what we learn is itself a social product that is generated
within the context of a particular political and economic structure. Con¬
sequently, feminist sociologists'seek to answer research questions that set
them apart from structural functionalists and other nonfeminist sociolo¬
gists.
Feminists take issue with the inherent sex bias or sexism in tradi¬
tional sociological research that we noted earlier. Sexism involves differ¬
entially valuing one sex, in this case, men, over the other, ffistorically,
sexism in sociology has been in large part the result of the relatively low
numbers of women faculty and students at academic and research institu¬
tions. However, it also reflects a broader societal prejudice against
women, which is embodied in the assumption that what women do, think,
or say is unimportant or uninteresting (Lorber 1993).
The influence of these factors on sociological research has been
threefold:
1. Most sociological studies were conducted by men, using male subjects,

although findings were generalized to all people.
2. Gender was considered an important category of analysis only in a
limited number of sociological subfields, such as marriage and family,
whereas in all others (e.g., sociology of work, complex organizations,
or sociology' of law), it was ignored.
3. When women were studied, their behavior and attitudes were analyzed
in terms of a male standard of normalcy or rightness.
A few examples should make these points clearer.

Consider, for instance, the classic research in the subfield of urban
sociology. In her review of this literature, Lyn Lofland (1975:145) found
that “[women] are part of the locale or neighborhood or area—described
like other important aspects of the setting such as income, ecology, or
demography—but are largely irrelevant to the analytic action.'' Thus,
although urban sociologists claimed to be studying community, their
focus was limited to empirical settings in which men were likely to be
present (e.g., urban street corners or neighborhood taverns). They com¬
pletely overlooked the areas of urban life where women were likely to be
found (e.g., in playgrounds with their children or at grocery stores),
though few of us would deny that these locales are also central compo¬
nents of human communities.^
^Sociologist Liz Stanley (1992) points out that urban sociology remains one of the
subfields of the discipline that is most resistant to feminist critiques and suggestions for
more inclusive sociological work. Abbott (1991) argues that the areas of greatest resis¬
tance are sociological theory, the study of social class, and political sociology. These
three disciplinary subfields, she maintains, are high-status and male-dominated.
10 Chapter 1
Sociologist Dale Spender (1981) offers another example. Studies on

sex and language have shown differences in women’s and men’s speech.
Spender found in her examination of the extant research that many
studies were designed to discover deficiencies in women’s speech. The
underlying assumption of such research is that there is something wrong
with women’s speech because it is different from that of men. That is,
men’s speech is taken as normative; therefore, speech that is different
must be deficient.
In short, “most of what we have formerly known as the study of
society is only the male study of male society” (Millman and Kanter
1975:viii). Feminists, in contrast, include gender as a fundamental cate¬
gory of analysis in their research because they view the understanding of
gender relations as central to understanding other social relations. This,
in turn, has important implications for the research process and its
outcomes. For one thing, it means that although feminist researchers
strive to uncover similarities and differences in women’s and men’s be¬
haviors, attitudes, and experiences, they do so not for the sake of estimat¬
ing the value of one relative to the other. Rather, their goal is to develop
a holistic view of how women and men, because of their different loca¬
tions in the social structure, encounter differential opportunities and
constraints, and how they resist or respond-to their relative circumstances
(Offen 1988; Hess and Ferree 1987).
We are speaking here of the differential consequences of particular
social arrangements on the lives of women and men, and of women and
men as agents of social change. We will return to each of these issues
momentarily. Notice first, however, that feminists do not exclude male
experiences and perspectives from their research, but they do insist on
the inclusion of female experiences and perspectives. Feminists deliber¬
ately seek to make women’s voices heard in sociological research where
previously they have been silenced or ignored. To do this, feminists reject
the traditional model of science “as establishing mastery over subjects, as
demanding the absence of feeling, ^nd as enforcing separateness of the
knower from the known, all under the guise of ‘objectivity’ ” (Hess and
Ferree 1987:13; Reinharz 1992). Feminist researchers instead take an
empathic stance toward their research subjects. They frequently utilize
more inclusive research methods that allow subjects to express their
feelings and to speak for themselves, rather than imposing the re¬
searchers’ own ideas or categories of response on their respondents.
The experiential emphasis in feminist research has frequently drawn
charges of bias from traditional sociologists. However, feminists do not
^ deny the partiality of their work; on the contrary, they acknowledge that
it is intended. Feminists recognize that sociological research is dualistic: it
has both subjective and objective dimensions. On the one hand, no
research, including that conducted within the structural functionalist
paradigm as we have seen, is completely unbiased or value free. No matter

how objective sociologists may like to think they are, they cannot help but
be influenced by values, personal preferences, life experiences, and as¬
pects of the cultural setting in'which they live. On the other hand, this
does not mean that research is completely subjective either. While a
researcher may be influenced by values (i.e., judgments or appraisals), her
or his goal is the collection of facts (i.e., phenomena that can be observed
or empirically verified). Two social theorists expressed it this way: “It’s one
thing to find out what the state of affairs is in the world, another thing to
decide whether we think it is good or bad, just or unjust, beautiful or ugly”
(Collins and Makowsky, 1989:7). The former involves the pursuit of facts,
the latter a statement of values. Feminists call for open acknowledgment
by researchers of their assumptions, beliefs, sympathies, and biases. They
question not only the possibility, but also the desirability, of a value-free
sociology'. But while rejecting the notion of value-free science, feminists
do not reject “scientific standards” in their research (Reinharz 1992).
The dualistic nature of sociological research makes it especially
challenging, particularly for those of us interested in the study of gender.
This is because of our intimate tie to what we are studying—after all, each
of us has gender. But this duality also makes gender research very prom¬
ising. Just as our values affect what we choose to study and how we choose
to study it, they can also guide us in deciding how the facts we gather can
be put to practical use. As we will argue shortly, the scientific knowledge
we acquire through the research process can empower us to act to change
behaviors and conditions that are harmful or oppressive.
Let’s return now to the issue of consequences. Feminist sociologists
are fundamentally concerned with the question of how specific social
constructions of gender impinge upon the lives of women and men. The
feminist research we will review in this text documents the serious and
far-reaching effects of sexism in our society and in others. In chapter 8,
for example, we will learn that sexist beliefs that devalue women’s labor
have served as justifications for paying women less than men, and often
as excuses for not paying them at all. This, in turn, is one of the major
reasons women outnumber men among the ranks of the world’s poor.
Similarly, in chapter 12, we will see that the notion that men should be
stoic and unemotional has had profound consequences for their physical
and mental health.
This latter example highlights an important point, raised earlier, but
worth repeating here. Specifically, although many people tend to think of
feminism as applicable only to so-called women’s issues, feminists them¬
selves see their paradigm as relevant to the experiences of both sexes.
Certainly, feminists’ primary concern has been to study the position of
women in society, largely because, as we have already noted, women and
women’s experiences have long been devalued or ignored in scientific
12 Chapter 1
research. Nevertheless, they have not left the social construction of mas¬
culinity unanalyzed. In studying men’s lives, in fact, feminist researchers
have found that, although virtually all men benefit from institutionalized
patriarchal privilege, not all men actually have power in our society. As
Bern (1993:3) points out, “the term male poxuer should thus be construed
narrowly as the power historically held by rich, white, heterosexual men,
for it is they who originally set up and now primarily sustain the cultural
discourses and social institutions of this nation. It is thus not women
alone who are disadvantaged by the organization of U.S. society but poor
people, people of color, and sexual minorities as well.”
Feminists, therefore, also recognize that the consequences of sexism
are not identical for all groups of women and men. Instead, the effects of
gender inequality are made worse by other types of discrimination. Con¬
sider, for example, the likely dissimilarities in the lives of a white, middle-
class, middle-aged, gay man and a poor, black, pregnant teenager. Both
may think of themselves as oppressed, but their objective circumstances
are very different. Feminist research, therefore, attempts to account for
the gendei'-based experiences of many diverse groups of women and men
in our society. It analyzes the inextricable links among multiple oppres¬
sions: sexism, racism, classism, ageism, and heterosexism (King 1988). An
examination of these complex interrelationships is a central theme of this
text.
Finally, just as other sociological models, such as structural function¬
alism, have implications for social change, so does the feminist paradigm.
Feminist sociologists, in fact, are advocates of social change. They seek to
develop effective means to eradicate gender inequality and to change
those aspects of our social constructions of gender that are harmful or
destructive.
An important first step in this process is for people to develop a
group consciousness; that is, they must begin to see that their problems are
not personal ones, but rather are shared by others like them. Until a
group consciousness develops, change is likely to be limited to the indi¬
vidual level. As one observer explained, “People tend to think that per¬
sonal problems can be solved simply by working harder. Personal
problems become political demands only when the inability to survive, or
to attain a decent life, is seen as a consequence of social institutions and
social inequality rather than personal failure, and the system is blamed”
(Klein 1984:3). Once a group consciousness emerges and institutional
arrangements are identified as the source of the problem, collective
action can be taken to bring about structural change.
N Feminist research serves to raise our consciousness about gender
inequality, and it has spurred many people to work together for social
cliange. This collective effort is usually fittingly referred to as the feminist
movement. Throughout this text we will examine the extent to which
Studying Gender: An Overvieiv 13
feminists have been successful in their efforts to reconstruct gender, and

in chapter 13 we will give special attention to feminist social movements
and other social movements that share similar goals. Importantly, we will
see that although feminists share similar views with regard to the themes
we have discussed so far, they also are quite diverse, comprising hetero¬
geneous factions with different interests and perspectives. In chapter 13,
we will focus on how this diversity gives rise to different tactics or strate¬
gies within feminism to achieve various objectives. Now, though, we will
briefly discuss the different forms of feminism.
A plurality of feminisms Although it appears at first that feminism is a

single, unified approach, we have noted that there are actually several
feminist perspectives. Jaggar and Rothenberg (1984) have identified at
least four feminist approaches to the analysis of gender inequality, but
others argue that there are even more (Tong 1989; Chafetz 1988; King
1988; Offen 1988).
One perspective, known as liberal feminism, views gender inequality
as simply a form of discrimination. Liberal feminists maintain that gender
inequality is produced by unequal access to civil rights and certain social
resources, such as education and employment, on the basis of sex. Missing
from the discussion is any clear-cut analysis of why such opportunities
became blocked in the first place; but this perspective nevertheless has
important policy implications. The concern of liberal feminists is to
provide all individuals with a chance to succeed, regardless of their sex
(or other social characteristics). This may be accomplished through
changes in legislation that ensure that the rights of individuals are pro¬
tected. If each person is given the same chance to achieve his or her goals,
then failure will be the product of personal inadequacies, not socially
imposed ones (Crowley and Himmelweit 1992; Jaggar and Rothenberg
1984). The liberal feminist perspective underlies many mainstream pro¬
grams and policies aimed at ending sex-based discrimination, including
laws prohibiting sex discrimination in the workplace. We will discuss
many of these programs and policies throughout this text.
There are other feminist perspectives, however, that are more far-
reaching. Marxist feminists, for example, see gender inequality as rooted
in social class inequality. It is the capitalist system of production that
generates social class inequality as well as women’s economic dependence
on men. From this perspective, gender inequality can only be eliminated
by replacing capitalism with socialism; then, social classes will be abol¬
ished and women along with men will be fully integrated into the econ¬
omy. Once women are equal economic contributors, equality in other
areas will follow, although some resocialization may be necessary to
change entrenched sexist attitudes (Jaggar and Rothenberg 1984). Marx¬
ist feminism, however, has been criticized for downplaying the impor-
Chapter 1
tance of sex and gender as well as race in its analysis of capitalism. “While
Marxism theorizes a genderless mode of production and genderless
classes, capitalism is very aware of workers’ sex and race and uses the
subordinate groups to its advantage in the labor market (Danner
1989:4).
In contrast, socialist feminists take issue with the notion of the primacy
of social class inequality and point out that some forms of gender oppres¬
sion cut across class boundaries. Socialist feminists maintain that capital¬
ism and patriarchy are interdependent systems; consequently, both must
be overthrown if gender inequality is to be eliminated (Hartmann 1984).
“The essence of socialist feminism is seen in two major points. First, the
mode and relations of production and reproduction are interconnected,
indeed, inseparable. And second, gender, class, and race intersect in ways
that result in important differences in life experiences in both the pro¬
ductive and reproductive realms for persons” (Danner 1989:4).
Finally, radical feminism sees women’s oppression as primary relative
to all other oppressions and maintains that gender inequality is rooted
in the nature of traditional heterosexual interpersonal relationships as
well as in the structure of social institutions. Sexism, then, must be
addressed not only in the public sphere, but also in the private sphere;
both are seen as arenas of political struggle (Crowley and Himmelweit
1992; Jaggar and Rothenberg 1984). Some radical feminists go so far as
to advocate separatism, recommending the establishment of female-only
communities free of male dominance. Radical feminism, though, has
been criticized for ignoring the significant differences in power and
privilege among various groups of women, such as those between white
women and women of color (Crowley and Himmelweit 1992; Danner
1989; King 1988).
Although this brief overview can hardly do justice to the complexity
of any of these perspectives, it does provide some sense of the diversity
that characterizes contemporary feminism. It also outlines the theoretical
positions that frame the contemporary feminist debates that we will dis¬
cuss throughout this text. Many of these debates center around the
question of the extent to which women and men are different or the
same. Some feminists, for example, argue that women and men differ in
their moral sensibilities, their speech, and their behavior, and that these
differences should be celebrated. Women’s ways of knowing and doing,
it is implicitly and sometimes explicitly stated, are better than men’s ways.
Corollary arguments have to do with the source of these differences and
the value placed on them. One may accept that women and men are
different—indeed, it is impossible to totally deny this—but are these
differences innate or learned, and should the traits and behaviors associ¬
ated with one sex be more highly valued than those associated with the
opposite sex?
Other feminists, however, deny difference, claiming that unless

women are viewed as similar to men, with the same abilities and sensibili¬
ties, they will never be treated equally. And still others have pointed out
the error of analyzing gender relations dichotomously, an analysis which
creates a false polarity. As Bacchi (1990:xv, 266) argues, “With this kind
of analysis, we can easily lose sight of the fact that what is at issue are
necessary social arrangements for humane living. . . . ensur[ing] that our
living and working conditions reflect the full range of humanity in all its
diversity—a humanity which comprises two sexes, not one.”
We offer no pretenses of resolving these debates in the pages of this
text. For the most part, we see them as beneficial to the development of
the paradigm as a whole. Our goal, instead, is to highlight and analyze
these debates in the context of available empirical research from a variety
of disciplines. In the chapters that follow, these diverse views will be
considered in more detail as we examine gender relations within specific
areas of social life.
THE PERSPECTIVE OE THIS TEXT
We have discussed feminism at length because it is the paradigm that

informs this book. Despite the diversity of approaches that are labeled
feminist, there are themes or principles shared by all feminists. We think
that these themes, coupled with the diverse interests and emphases within
feminism, demonstrate the richness of the feminist model. The fact that it
is interdisciplinary—that feminist sociologists share their research with, and
learn from the work of, feminist psychologists, biologists, historians, and
others—adds to this model’s ability to account for the many observed
variations and similarities of gender. We second Kramarae and Spender’s
(1992:6) point that “Whatever the approaches used most frequently these
days—postmodernism, French feminisms, deconstructionism, ecofemi-
nism . . . —we should not overlook the role that feminist scholarship has
played in shifting the criteria of knowledge making. Feminist scholarship
has helped formulate a model which values plurality and commonality,
which presupposes diversity as well as interconnectedness.” In short, the
feminist paradigm, taken as a whole, offers a comprehensive and insight¬
ful framework for the analysis of gender and gender inequality.
But the feminist paradigm has its problems. One common criticism
is of an aspect that has been called its structural determinism, that is, its
tendency to blame the “system” or society for social problems such as
gender inequality, and downplay the role of individuals in creating and
maintaining their circumstances. Structural determinism runs counter to
the feminist goal of mobilizing and empowering people to act for social
change. It depicts individuals as passive victims of oppression and gives
16 Chapter 1
the sense that society is Something over which we have no control. Femi¬
nists, however, recognize that societies are made up of people, and people
have the distinctively human ability to transform their environment to
better meet their needs. As we proceed with our study, therefore, we must
not lose sight of the fact that although we are born into a particular social
structure that in many ways constrains us, we in turn can act back on this
structure and change it.
KEY TERMS
feminist paradigm explains gender in terms of the political and socioeco¬

nomic structure in which it is constructed; emphasizes the importance of
taking collective action to eradicate sexism in sociology as well as in soci¬
ety, and to reconstruct gender so that it is neither a harmful nor oppres¬
sive social category
gender socially generated attitudes and behaviors, usually organized dichoto-
mously as masculinity and femininity
patriarchy a sex/gender system in which men dominate women, and that
which is considered masculine is more highly valued than that which is
considered feminine
sex the biologically determined physical distinctions between males and fe¬
males
sex/gender system the institutionalized traits, behaviors, and patterns of so¬
cial interaction that are prescribed for a society’s members based on sex;
the system incorporates three interrelated components: (1) the social
construction of two dichotomous genders on the basis of biological sex,
(2) a sexual division of labor, and (3) the social regulation of sexuality
sexism the differential valuing of one sex over the other
structural functionalist paradigm explains gender as being derived from the
biological differences between the sexes, especially differences in repro¬
ductive functions
SUGGESTED READINGS
Each chapter of this text will conclude with a list of books that we feel will
enhance your understanding of the issues just discussed. We begin with several
that provide a good introduction to the study of gender and to the theoretical
perspectives that inform it, both in the United States and abroad.
Bacchi, C. L. 1990. Same Difference: Feminism and Sexual Difference. Sydney: Allen
and Unwin.
Collins, P. H. 1990. Black Feminist Thought. New York: Unwin Hyman.
Crowley, H., and S. Himmelweit (Eds.) 1992. Knowing Women: Feminism and Knowl¬
edge. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hirsch, M., and E. F. Keller (Eds.) 1990. Conflicts in Feminism. New York: Rout-
ledge.
Kimmel, M. S., and M. A. Messner (Eds.) 1992. Men’s Lives. New York: Macmillan.
Kramarae, C., and D. Spender (Ed&.) 1992. The Knowledge Explosion: Generations of
Feminist Scholarship. New York: Teachers College Press.
Chapter
Sex Differences: The Interaction

of Nature and Environment
Sex Differences: The Interaction of Nature and Environment 19
We all probably have childhood memories of meeting some of our par¬

ents friends for the first time and of having to stand by with a tolerant
smile while they chattered on about how much we resembled Mom or
Dad or Aunt Tilly or Uncle Ned. Thinking about it for a moment, you can
probably recall innumerable instances of being told you have your
mother’s eyes or your father’s chin.
In recollecting these experiences, we are doing more than just remi¬
niscing about the little indignities of childhood. Rather, we are beginning
to get an inkling of the extent to which most people incorporate the idea
of inheritance into their understanding of the world around them. Not
only do we learn from others how much we physically resemble our kin,
but we also often hear about the behavioral traits we have inherited as
well. You may have been told, for instance, that you are stubborn like your
father, or outgoing like your mother. Of course, this kind of explanation
for our actions and appearance can come in handy at times. It allows us
to rationalize, for example, that the inability to find a pair of jeans that
fits properly is because of the large bone structure passed on from our
mother’s side, rather than recent overindulgence in pepperoni pizza.
Undoubtedly, the notion that genetics is responsible for who we are
socially, as well as physically, holds considerable appeal. Not surprisingly,
it has been very popular as a way of explaining many of the differences
we observe between men and women. In this chapter, we will examine
some of the available scientific evidence on the genetic causes of these
sex differences. We will review research on both animals and humans, and
will discuss the significance of studies of genetic abnormalities for our
understanding of sex differences. We will also examine the possible ef¬
fects of other biological factors on gender, particularly the role of hor¬
mones, and the influence of the size and structure of our brains. In short,
we will be discussing in greater detail the relationship between (biologi¬
cal) sex and (social) gender that we introduced in chapter 1. To make
sense of all this, however, we need some knowledge of how we become
male or female in the first place. Let’s begin, therefore, by discussing the
process of sexual differentiation—a process that begins not long after
conception.
THE SEX CHROMOSOMES AND

SEXUAL DIFFERENTIATION
Human development is extraordinarily complex. Consider the process of

sexual differentiation, for example. Typically—although not always, as
we’ll see shortly—a person is born with forty-six chromosomes arranged
in twenty-three pairs, one of each pair contributed by the individual’s
mother and one by his or her father. One pair of chromosomes is referred
20 Chapter 2
to as the sex chromosomes lêcause it plays the primary role in determining

whether a fertilized egg will develop into a male or a female fetus. The
sex chromosomes of a genetically normal male consist of one X and one
Y chromosome, while genetically normal females have two X’s. Thus,
since the mother of a child always contributes an X to the sex chromo¬
some pair, it is the father’s genetic contribution that determines the
child’s sex.
It is not until the sixth week of embryonic development that the
process of sexual differentiation begins. This means that from the mo¬
ment of conception until the sixth week of their development, all em¬
bryos, be they XX or XT, are sexually bipotential; they are anatomically
identical, each possessing the necessary peirts to eventually develop as a
male or a female. One scientist explains it this way:
During this early period each develops an embryonic gonad dubbed the
“indifferent gonad” because of its sameness in both XX and XT embryos.
In similar fashion the other internal structures of both the male and
female reproductive systems begin to form, so that by the first month and
a half of embryonic development all the embryos, regardless of which
sex chromosomes are inside their cells, have a set of female (mullerian)
ducts as well as a set of male (wolffian) ducts . . . (Fausto-Sterling
1985:78).
What happens during week six? Scientists are not entirely certain.
However, they have recently isolated a gene on the T chromosome that
appears to trigger a sequence of events, beginning in the sixth week of
embryonic growth, that leads to the development of a fully recognizable
fetus. The gene, which scientists have labeled SRY (sex-determining re¬
gion of the T), seems to stimulate the transformation of the indifferent
gonad into fetal testes. For many years, it was hypothesized that a protein
called H-Y antigen promoted this transformation, but after a group of
male mice were found with testes, but no H-Y antigen, it became clear that
some other factor had to be responsible for determining testis formation.
Although SRY may actually operate in conjunction with other genes
located on the T chromosome which have not yet been isolated, it never¬
theless seems to be a key component in the sexual differentiation of an
embryo into a male (McLaren 1990; Page et al. 1990; Sinclair et al. 1990).
Once developed, the fetal testes then begin to synthesize a whole
group of hormones called androgens. Two of the most important andro¬
gens are mullerian inhibiting substance (MIS) and testosterone. M/S causes
the degeneration of the female duct system, while testosterone promotes
the further growth of the male (loolffian) duct system. (It is testosterone that
will figure prominently in our discussion of behavioral and personality
differences between the sexes.) Meanwhile, the secretion of the hormone
dihydrotestosterone (DHT) during week eight prompts the formation of the
external genitals. The genital tubercule (another bipotential structure
like the indifferent gonad) develops into a penis and the surrounding
tissue becomes a scrotum. DHT also contributes to the “masculinization”
of the male brain—an issue to which we will return later in the chapter
(Hoyenga and Hoyenga 1993; Fausto-Sterling 1985).
What about the development of a female fetus? Unfortunately, sci¬
entists are less clear about this process. Traditionally, it was argued that
the absence of a F chromosome and the subsequent lack of testosterone
production prompt the indifferent gonad of an XX embryo to transform
into ovaries at about the twelfth week of gestation. In other words, female
development was conceptualized in terms of a lack of the male or F
chromosome. More recent research, however, suggests a more balanced
alternative hypothesis: that a genetic parallel to male gonadal develop¬
ment exists for females, and spurs the formation of ovaries (Eicher and
Washburn 1986). Some scientists have theorized that estrogen (often
referred to as one of the “female sex hormones”) synthesized by the fetal
ovaries may be responsible for the development of the female genitalia
much the same way that androgens are involved in male genital develop¬
ment (Fausto-Sterling 1985). This hypothesis, though, is refuted by evi¬
dence that shows that the ovaries actually develop after the female
external genitalia have begun to develop (Hoyenga and Hoyenga 1993).
Clearly, much more research is needed before the entire puzzle of sexual
differentiation is solved.
Figure 2.1 on page 22 summarizes the process of sexual differentia¬
tion in the human embryo. We know that males and females are identical
in their development until the sixth week of gestation. At that point it
appears that genetics, along with various hormones, come into play to
help produce those physical differences between the sexes of which we
are all very aware. However, several questions remain: Do chromosomes
or hormones contribute in any way to the behavioral and personality
differences we often observe between males and females? If so, to what
extent? And given that these are biologically based differences, are they
immutable? Given the recent surge in publications in this area, it is not
an overstatement to argue that many scientists appear almost obsessed
with answering these questions. There are a variety of ways they have
attempted to do this, and a discussion of these will occupy us for the
remainder of this chapter. We will begin by taking a brief look at studies
of individuals with genetic and hormonal abnormalities.
Prenatal Mishaps: What Can They Teach Us

about Gender?
What if a female fetus is somehow exposed to androgens? When she is
born, will she behave like a girl or a boy? Or, suppose that because of a
genetic malfunction, the cells of a male fetus are insensitive to the andro-
22 Chapter 2
Male and Female Identical
FIGURE 2.J External Genital Pifferentiation in the Human Fetus. Source: Money, John and Anke A.
Ehrhardt. Man and Woman, Boy and Girl. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore/Lon-
don, 1973, Fig. 3.2, p. 44. Reprinted by permission of John Money.
gens it secretes—^will that child grow up to be masculine or feminine?

Mishaps such as these actually do occur, although fortunately they are
rare. When they occur, however, they provide researchers with a unique
opportunity to gauge the effects of the sex chromosomes and hormones
on the development of gender. The classic research in this area has been
conducted by John Money, Anke Ehrhardt, and their associates at the
Johns Hopkins University Gender Identity Clinic.
The first situation we described here is referred to as adrenogenital
syndrome (AGS). It is caused by a malfunction in the mother’s or the
fetus’s adrenal glands or from exposure of the mother to a hormone that
acts upon the fetus like an androgen. Individuals with AGS “have abnor¬
mally high levels of androgens both prenatally and—unless recognized
and corrected by giving the person regular doses of cortisol—throughout
life” (Hoyenga and Hoyenga 1993:169). Both males and females may have
AGS, but it is genetic females who are more severely affected.' These are
individuals whose genetic sex is female and who have the internal repro¬
ductive organs of females, but whose external genitals are masculinized
(i.e., the clitoris is enlarged and resembles a small penis). Because their
internal reproductive organs (ovaries, fallopian tubes, and uterus) are
normal and they are often fertile, cosmetic surgery is now typically under¬
taken to redesign their external genitals so as to make them consistent
with their genetic sex (Hoyenga and Hoyenga 1993; Ehrhardt and Meyer-
Bahlburg 1981).
Although AGS females also usually receive hormonal replacement
therapy, which causes them to experience normal female pubertal devel¬
opment, researchers have been interested in whether their excessive
exposure to male hormones in utero affected their gender identities or
behavior. To investigate this possibility. Money and Ehrhardt interviewed
twenty-five fetally androgenized females who came to the Gender Identity
Clinic for treatment. The researchers questioned the girls (who ranged
in age from four to sixteen) about their clothing preferences, how they
liked to spend their leisure time, their goals for the future, and so on.
They then compared the girls’ responses with those of twenty-five other
girls, similar to the research subjects in age and other social charac¬
teristics, but without AGS. The findings did reveal some striking differ¬
ences between AGS patients and normal girls. For one thing, AGS girls
described themselves as tomboys more often than normal girls did, and
they preferred to dress the part, wearing slacks and shorts more often
than dresses. They also expressed a preference for toys considered more
appropriate for boys and showed a greater interest in pursuing a career
Tndeed, Hoyenga and Hoyenga (1993) note that were it not for illnesses that AGS
males contract, they would most likely go undetected.
24 Chapter 2
than did non-AGS girls. Nevertheless, AGS girls were not more physically
aggressive than normal girls, and each expressed a desire for romance,
marriage, and motherhood in the future (Baker 1980; Money and Ehr-
hardt 1972).
In a follow-up study with twelve AGS women who had been studied
as adolescents, Money and Matthews (1982) reported that four had mar¬
ried and that none showed any difficulty in establishing relationships
with men. Other researchers, however, have noted that AGS women be¬
gin dating and engaging in sexual relations later than non-AGS women
(Hurtig and Rosenthal 1987), and that some report dreams or fantasies
involving bisexual sexual relations (Ehrhardt and Meyer-Bahlburg 1981).
It may be that a delay in dating and sexual behavior is related to the
extensive hormonal replacement therapy these women undergo. More¬
over, there is no evidence that their experiences of bisexual dreams or
fantasies occur with greater frequency than those of non-AGS heterosex¬
ual women.
What about boys who prenatally were insensitive to androgens? They
have a condition known as androgen-insensitive syndrome. Individuals who
are androgen-insensitive are sometimes referred to as “XTfemales” owing
to the fact that, although they possess the sex chromosomes of normal
males (XY), their testes do not descend and'they are born with the external
genitalia of females. Because they look like girls at birth, they are typically
raised as girls by their parents. But do their XY chromosomes predispose
them to behave masculinely? According to Money, Ehrhardt, and others,
androgen-insensitive individuals are as feminine (and sometimes more
feminine) than normal XXfemales. In one study, for example, androgen-
insensitive subjects expressed as pronounced an interest in dolls, dresses,
housewifery, and motherhood as did normal girls who were identical to
them in terms of age, race, social class, and IQ (Baker 1980; Brooks-Gunn
and Matthews 1979; Erieze et al. 1978; Money and Ehrhardt 1972).
Another condition, one which involves partial rather than total
androgen insensitivity, is 5-alpha-reductase deficiency. In individuals with this
condition, an enzyme (5-alpha-reductase) responsible for converting tes¬
tosterone into dihydrotestosterone (DHT) is abnormally low or absent.
As we noted earlier in the chapter, DHT is the hormone that prompts the
formation of the external genitalia—the scrotum and the penis. Individu¬
als low in DHT or who lack it completely are born with normal unde¬
scended testes and internal male accessory organs. Externally, they have
female genitals that are partially masculinized (an enlarged clitoris that
resembles a small penis and sometimes an incomplete scrotum that looks
\ similar to the female labia). Because of the presence of normal testes,
however, at puberty, when the testes begin to produce large amounts of
testosterone, the external genitalia change: “The penis may reach func¬
tional size, allowing adequate sexual relationships. However, ejaculation
occurs from the urethra, which is still located in the peritoneal area
rather than at the tip of the penis. Spermatogenesis may also occur”
(Hoyenga and Hoyenga 1993:168).
Individuals with 5-alpha-reductase deficiency provide scientists with
an interesting research opportunity with respect to the question of the
effect of hormones on the development of gender identity. Males with the
condition are typically reared as females. Yet, some researchers who have
studied such cases have reported that those with the deficiency experi¬
ence little difficulty in changing their sex and gender identities at puberty
when their external genitalia become masculinized. Other scientists, how¬
ever, have called this finding into question.
For instance, in a small rural village in the Dominican Republic, the
deficiency seems to occur with relative frequency, perhaps due to inbreed¬
ing. Imperato-McGinley and her colleagues (1979) studied 38 males from
this village who had the 5-alpha-reductase condition and reported that
although they had been reared as girls, they easily switched their identi¬
ties when their genitalia masculinized: at puberty, they became men.
Imperato-McGinley’s controversial explanation for this ease of transition
is that their brains, having been exposed to prenatal testosterone, had
been masculinized in utero, thus allowing them to quickly ignore or reject
seven to twelve years of socialization as a female (see also Moir and Jessel
1989).
A number of scientists have challenged this conclusion as well as the
research itself. For one thing, they have questioned the extent to which
affected indhiduals were reared as normal females prior to puberty.
There is considerable evidence that they were recognized as “different”
or “special” at birth and treated accordingly (Herdt and Davidson 1988;
Rubin et al. 1981). In fact, in the Dominican Republic, boys who are
recognized as having the condition are called guevedoces (penis at twelve)
or machihembra (man-woman). Research with 5-alpha-reductase individu¬
als in other societies indicates that not only are they treated differently
than normal boys during childhood, their attempts to change their sex
and gender identities at puberty or in adulthood are not as smooth as
Imperato-McGinley and others maintain (Hoyenga and Hoyenga 1993;
Herdt and Davidson 1988). Indeed, the conclusion that begins to emerge
from this research is that sex of rearing is a more potent determinant of
gender identity than physical or chromosomal sex. This is a point to
which we will return shortly, but first let’s consider other abnormalities
that may give us clues to the relationship between sex and gender.
There are several chromosomal abnormalities that have sparked
scientists’ interest. These often have their origins in faulty sperm produc¬
tion. More specifically, during sperm production the chromosomes divide
and duplicate themselves in a two-stage process called meiosis. This usually
produces two kinds of sperm—those that carry a Y chromosome and
26 Chapter 2
those that carry an X chromosome. (Recall that a woman always contrib¬

utes an Xchromosome to her offspring.) Sometimes, however, the sperm
fail to divide properly, a problem called nondisjunction. If nondisjunction
occurs during the first meiotic division (stage one), two kinds of sperm
are produced: those with both an X and a Y and those with neither an X
nor a Y (see Figure 2.2). If one of these sperm fertilizes a normal egg, the
offspring will be either XXF or XO. If nondisjunction occurs during the
second meiotic division (stage two), three kinds of sperm are produced:
XX, YY, and those with no sex chromosomes (see Figure 2.2). Eggs
fertilized by these sperm would produce offspring that are XXX, XYY, and
XO respectively.
Individuals who are XO have Turner’s syndrome. Because they do not
have a Y chromosome, they do not develop as males. However, without a
second X chromosome they have no gonadal tissue and produce no sex
hormones. They are reared as females because their external genitals
appear to be female. Despite the absence of sex hormones, however,
research with Turner’s syndrome females reveals an exaggerated feminin¬
ity in their behavior and personalities. Turner’s syndrome females
showed “a lower frequency of being labeled a ‘tomboy,’ preferring or
content to be a girl, a higher interest in ‘frilly dresses,’ extensive prefer¬
ence for girls rather than boys as playmates, play only with dolls versus
boys’ toys, and a strong, actively expressed interest in infant care” (Baker
1980:87; Money and Ehrhardt 1972).
Women and men with an extra X chromosome (that is, those who
are XXXand XXY, respectively) differ considerably. XXXwomen show few
visible signs of abnormality, although they tend to be taller than XX
women and have a higher incidence of learning disorders (Hoyenga and
Hoyenga 1993). In contrast, the XXF chromosome combination (a condi¬
tion known as Klinefelter’s syndrome) produces a number of physical
anomalies. Individuals with Klinefelter’s syndrome physically look more
male than female, although they usually have small penises and testes. At
puberty, although they tend to grow taller than average, their hips tend
to feminize, they may have some breast development, their testes do not
enlarge, they do not produce sperm, their voices do not deepen, and they
develop little or no pubic and facial hair. It has been reported that these
men tend to be timid and socially isolated, at an increased risk for
developing emotional and interpersonal problems, and uninterested in
women, dating, or sex. Of course, such difficulties could be related to
their condition in an indirect rather than a direct way. Instead of Kline¬
felter’s syndrome causing these problems, the problems may result from
\ trying to cope with their abnormality in a society that is not especially
kind to deviants, especially sexual deviants. At the same time, however,
Hoyenga and Hoyenga (1993:115) report that “many XXF males are
indistinguishable from XFmales in emotional/social characteristics.”
NORMAL MALE MEIOSIS

(Formation of the sperm)
Primary Spermatocyte
NONDISJUNCTION OF SEX CHROMOSOMES IN MALE MEIOSIS

Primary Spermatocyte Primary Spermatocyte
xy,
NONDISJUNCTION AT FIRST MEIOTIC DIVISION
FIRST MEIOTIC DIVISION
^y)
SECOND MEIOTIC DIVISION
SECOND MEIOTIC DIVISION
sp™ fojixxj (o)(yy)
XYY
Syndrome
(aiuosomes omitted)
FIGURE 2.2 Normal Male Meiosis and Nondlsjunctlon of Sex Chromosomes In Male
Meiosis. Source: M. F. A. Montague. “Chromosomes and Crime.” Psychology Today
October, 1968, p. 47.
28 Chapter 2
\
Scientists grew increasingly interested in the condition known as
XYY syndrome during the 1960s when researchers found a disproportion¬
ately high incidence of the abnormality among institutionalized and
incarcerated men: some reported a frequency ten to twenty times greater
than that in the general population. Add to this the fact that offenders in
at least two well-publicized murder cases—Daniel Hugon in France and
Richard Speck in the United States—reportedly had XYY syndrome, and
it is not difficult to understand how this chromosome abnormality at¬
tracted the attention of both the scientific community and the general
public.^ By 1970, more than 200 scientific articles and books had been
written on XFYsyndrome (Ellis 1982).
As we have already noted, the presence of a F chromosome is
associated with the secretion of the sex hormone testosterone and, as we
will learn shortly, testosterone has been linked with aggression. Conse¬
quently, it was hypothesized that an extra Y chromosome would lead to
elevated testosterone levels which, in turn, would increase the likelihood
of aggressive, even violent behavior. Subsequent research, however,
showed that XYY offenders committed primarily petty property crimes
and that rather than being especially aggressive, they were somewhat less
aggressive than chromosomally normal men (Sarbin and Miller 1970).
Their overrepresentation among the institutionalized and incarcerated
has been explained by several social and psychological factors. For exam¬
ple, because XYY men tend to be unusually tall, they may look “danger¬
ous,” thus predisposing criminal justice officials toward arresting,
convicting, and institutionalizing them (Sarbin and Miller 1970). Social
class bias may also be at work. If the rate of chromosome abnormalities is
higher among the poor due, perhaps, to the unavailability or unaf¬
fordability of prenatal care, adequate nutrition, and so on, then the
disproportionate number of institutionalized XYY males is simply a reflec¬
tion of the class bias of the criminal justice system: the lower social classes
are significantly more likely than the higher classes to be arrested and
convicted of crimes (Kessler and Moos 1969). The high institutionaliza¬
tion of XYY men has also been associated with their low level of intellec¬
tual functioning (Witkin et al. 1976). What we see in each of these
hypotheses, however, is an emphasis on the interaction between the
biological and the social, rather than a reliance on simple biological
determinism. This is an important point to which we will return through¬
out the chapter.
The rare condition known as pseudohermaphroditism is also worth
considering here. Pseudohermaphrodites are people in whom sexual
differentiation is ambiguous or incomplete. They may have both a testicle
Ît was later discovered that Richard Speck, who one night brutally murdered nine
student nurses in their dormitory rooms, was not, in fact, XYY.
and an ovary, for example, but may not be able to produce functional
sperm or eggs (Hoyenga and Hoyenga 1993). In one case studied by
Money and Ehrhardt a chromosomally normal (XT) male was born with
a penis just one centimeter long (resembling an enlarged clitoris) and a
urinary opening similar to that of a female. The parents opted to surgi¬
cally “reassign” the child’s sex and rear it as a girl. Following up on the
case three years later. Money and Ehrhardt reported on the child’s overt
femininity. She preferred “girlish toys” (such as Cinderella’s glass slip¬
pers) and especially enjoyed dancing with her father when he arrived
home from work (Money and Ehrhardt 1972).
One final case originally studied by Money and Ehrhardt deserves
mention here. This case involved a set of identical twins who were chro¬
mosomally and physically normal males at birth. During circumcision,
however, the penis of one of the boys was almost completely destroyed. In
consultation with physicians, the parents decided in favor of sex reassign¬
ment; at seventeen months of age, the boy was surgically reconstructed as
a girl and lifelong hormone replacement therapy was planned. Money
and Ehrhardt’s follow-up research with the family indicated that the
reassigned twin had been “successfully” socialized as a girl. She preferred
to wear dresses rather than slacks, had feminine toy and play preferences,
and, in contrast to her brother, was neat, clean, and enjoyed helping with
housework.
Although initially this case appeared to provide strong support for
the social basis of gender identity, a later study of the reassigned twin
indicated that at about the age of thirteen she began to experience
serious emotional problems apparently stemming from the fact that she
had developed a rather masculine appearance and was teased by her
peers because of it (Diamond 1982). Unger and Crawford (1992) report
that as an adult, the reassigned twin opted to have surgery for the con¬
struction of a penis and chose to live as a male instead of a female.
In considering this case, some observers have argued that it provides
strong evidence of the biological roots of gender identity. However, it is
also important to emphasize that this individual’s identity problems may
have arisen in response to an interaction between the biological and the
social. At puberty, when the twin’s appearance grew more masculinized,
she was treated as deviant by her peers and experienced the psychological
stress that follows from such interaction. She could not experience pu¬
berty as her female peers did because she could not menstruate. It should
also be noted that at the age of thirteen, the twin had not yet been told
about the circumcision accident. In light of these facts, it appears unwise
to draw inferences about the social versus the biological factors involved
in the development of gender identity from this one highly unusual case.
What then, if anything, do studies of prenatal mishaps teach us
about gender? Apart from the issues raised by the cases just discussed.
30 Chapter 2
\
most scientists urge caution in generalizing the findings of such studies
because of the serious weaknesses inherent in the research (Rogers and
Walsh 1982). For example, researchers often have to rely on information
from very small, atypical groups of individuals. What is more, although
they frequently match the research subjects with a control group similar
in various social characteristics, other important factors are sometimes
ignored. The research on AGS females, in particular, has been strongly
criticized for this reason. The AGS subjects, for instance, were familiar
with the researchers and were already comfortable with the clinical set¬
ting in which the research took place. “Thus, it is possible that the results
reflect a greater willingness of the androgenized girls to mention cross¬
sex-typed attitudes and behaviors more than this being a true behavioral
difference between the patient group and the control group” (Frieze et
al. 1978:88). In addition, the researchers themselves were aware of which
subjects were AGS females and which were normal girls. “Such knowledge
could lead to nonconscious but nevertheless inaccurate assessments of
the behavior of AGS patients” (Fausto-Sterling 1985:137; Logino and
Doell 1983).
Despite these and many other problems, however, this research does
offer us an important lesson with regard to the relationship of chromo¬
somes and hormones to gender. It suggests that the development of a
masculine or feminine gender identity is quite independent of either the
presence of a pair of XY or XX sex chromosomes, or the production of
particular hormones. More importantly, however, this research highlights
the fact that neither sex nor gender is a dichotomy. When we speak of
sex, we may be referring to chromosomal sex, hormonal sex, gonadal sex,
or genital sex. Although for most individuals these are consistent with the
category male or the category female, the research we have discussed so
far shows vividly how they may sometimes be inconsistent, so that, difficult
as it may be for us to do, we should stop thinking of sex as a unidimen¬
sional characteristic with dichotomous attributes (see also chapter 3). At
the same time, gender—what we generally call masculinity and feminin¬
ity—far from being an either/or phenomenon, includes a broad spec¬
trum of attitudes, behaviors, and social expectations that we acquire
during our lifetimes, through interactions with one another, and through
experiences in various environments. Though biology clearly plays a role
in who we are as women and men, the components that constitute an
individual’s sex (chromosomes, hormones, gonads, genitals) do not nec¬
essarily coincide with one’s gender. As the research discussed here indi¬
cates, in most cases what appears to be more important in the acquisition
of gender is the sex our parents and others assign to us and use as a guide
in rearing and interacting with us. We will return to this topic again, in
chapter 4 when we discuss gender socialization, and throughout much of
this text.
Sex Differences: The Interaction of Nature arid Environment 31
Of course, there’s more to the debate over the effects of chromo¬

somes and hormones on gender than what we have discussed so far. To
understand the controversy a bit better, we will next examine some of
the research on sex differences between genetically normal males and
females.
SEX DIFFERENCES: MUCH ADO

ABOUT NOTHING?
Scientists of all types have long been preoccupied with documenting

differences between women and men (see, for example, Myers 1986). As
we noted in chapter 1, however, in these comparisons, attitudes and
behaviors that are associated with men are typically viewed as the norm
or the standard against which women’s attitudes and behaviors are
judged. But not only do traditional arguments pinpoint differences be¬
tween the sexes, they also imbue them with differential value. One is
inevitably, even if only implicitly, considered superior to the other—the
“other” almost always being the female. Moreover, observed attitudinal
and beha\ioral differences between women and men are often explained
solely in biological terms, without acknowledgment of the interaction
between the biological and the social dimensions of life. As we will see
shortly, the social may influence the biological as much as the biological
influences the social. Psychologist Carol Tavris (1992:24) has offered an
explanation for this state of affairs:
Views of woman’s “natural” differences from man Justify a status quo that
divides work, psychological qualities, and family responsibilities into “his”
and “hers.” Those who are dominant have an interest in maintaining
their difference from others, attributing those differences to “the harsh
dictates of nature,” and obscuring the unequal arrangements that benefit
them.
Tavris (1992:21) maintains that “there is nothing essential—th?it is,

universal and unvarying—in the natures of women and men” (see also
Lorber 1993). But let’s assume for the moment that she is wrong: that
there are distinct differences in the aptitudes and behaviors of women
and men and that these are grounded in human biology. MTiat would be
the implications of such findings for social life and social organization?
In this section, we will answer this question by reviewing research
that has examined aptitudes and behaviors (apart from reproductive
capacities) that supposedly distinguish men from women. Most of the
differences scientists have tested for are those suggested by gender stereo¬
types. A stereotype is an oversimplified summary description of a group of
people. There are positive and negative stereotypes, and virtually every
32 Chapter 2
group in our society has been stereotyped at one time or another; the
sexes are not exceptions. Gender stereotypes, then, are simplistic descrip¬
tions of the supposedly “masculine male” or “feminine female.” Most
people conceive of these in bipolar terms, that is, a normal male suppos¬
edly lacks any feminine traits, and a normal female lacks masculine traits
(Deaux and Kite 1987). Thus, gender stereotypes are all-inclusive; every
member of one sex is thought to share the characteristics that constitute
their respective gender stereotype. The reality, as we will learn in this
chapter, is that many members of each sex do not conform to their
stereotyped images. Sometimes this may be looked upon favorably by
others, but often a nonconformist is labeled deviant, abnormal, or bad
and is treated as such.
Some commonly held gender stereotypes include the beliefs that
males are independent, females dependent; males are aggressive, females
passive; and males are better at spatial tasks, females at those requiring
verbal skills. We will consider the evidence for each hypothesized sex
difference in turn, but we must keep in mind that different does not
necessarily mean unequal. Prevalent stereotypes may predispose us—and
the scientists who have conducted the research—to rank any observed
differences, but the differences themselves have no inherent hierarchical
order.
Independence vs. Dependence

A considerable amount of the research on sex differences utilizes infants
as subjects, under the assumption that the younger the subject, the lesser
the impact of environmental influences on his or her behavior. Sex
differences that emerge at or near birth are easier to attribute to biologi¬
cal causes than those that emerge later in life. Some scientists, though,
have called this assumption into question. There are those who point out
that a number of sex differences do not emerge until after puberty
because they require an adult level of sex hormones in order to appear
(Hoyenga and Hoyenga 1993). Others question the validity of this as¬
sumption because they maintain that gender socialization begins at
birth—some even argue that it begins in utero—so that studying sex
differences in infancy or early childhood does not necessarily rule out the
effects of social and environmental influences (see chapter 4).
In any event, in research with infants and young children, depen¬
dence is one of the two most frequently studied behaviors that is pre¬
sumed to be associated with sex (Maccoby and Jacklin 1974). (The other,
aggression, will be discussed shortly.) Scientists usually measure depend¬
ency in terms of what is called separation anxiety: the level of distress
exhibited by a child if its parent leaves the room, and the extent to which
the child clings to its parent or seeks the parent’s help when placed in
novel situations.
In one famous study of dependency, researchers Goldberg and
Lewis (1969) reported findings that affirmed the female/dependent,
male/independent gender stereotype. Goldberg and Lewis’s observa¬
tions revealed that eleven-month-old girls tended to play quietly, close by
their mothers in the laboratory setting, whereas same-age boys were more
active and tended to venture away from their mothers to explore their
new environment. In addition, when the children were separated from
their mothers by a barrier, the little girls usually just stood and cried,
while the little boys tried to figure a way to remove the barrier.
Fascinating as the Goldberg and Lewis study may be, research by
numerous other scientists contradicts their findings. For example, Mac-
coby and Jacklin (1974) reviewed twenty studies of dependency behaviors
in children under two years of age. Twelve of the studies showed no sex
differences. The results of the remaining eight were inconsistent—boys
were more dependent in some cases; girls were more dependent in
others. Similarly, another study reported by Brooks-Gunn and Matthews
(1979) found that although girls do tend to play close to their mothers,
boys are not as adventurous as the Goldberg and Lewis research made
them out to be. The boy infants in this study played just a few feet from
their mothers, and they also got more upset than the girls at the prospect
of their mothers leaving them.
Given the inconsistent nature of the research findings, there does
not seem to be much evidence to support the notion that girl infants are
any more dependent than boy infants. Instead, we agree with the conclu¬
sions drawn by Maccoby and Jacklin two decades ago:
[T]he picture as a whole is quite clearly one of sex similarity rather than
sex difference. . . . Clinging to parents or other caretakers, or remaining
near them under conditions of uncertainty or anxiety, is a characteristic
of human children . . . (1974:201, emphasis added).
Aggression vs. Passivity

Research on aggression has yielded some of the most consistent findings
of sex differences in behavior, at least among school-age children. The
results of these studies repeatedly show males to be more aggressive than
females. The research findings of infant studies are less clear, however,
and a large part of the ambiguity rests with the problem of measuring
aggressiveness in infants. Many of us would probably define aggression as
actions intended to hurt other people, either physically or psychologi¬
cally. It is difficult, though, to imagine an infant harboring such motives.
34 Chapter 2
Consequently, scientists have had to rely on other (often question¬

able) indicators of aggression in infants. One commonly used measure is
the infant’s activity level. Researchers have counted the number of hours
a baby sleeps, how much the baby moves when awake, the vigor of the
movements, and so on, under the assumption that the highly active baby
may grow into the aggressive youngster or adult. You may already have
detected some of the weaknesses in this kind of research, but before we
discuss them, let’s review the findings.
Early research indicated that male infants, on average, sleep ap¬
proximately one hour less than female infants do, although the findings
of subsequent studies are inconsistent (Frieze et al. 1978; Maccoby and
Jacklin 1974). What is more certain is that when children are awake, there
are no significant sex differences in their activity levels. This appears to
be the case for both infants and toddlers. Female infants kick and wave
their arms as often and as vigorously as male infants do, and male and
female toddlers tend to engage in equal amounts of running, tricycle
riding, and fidgeting during quiet times (Maccoby and Jacklin 1974;
Pedersen and Bell 1970). As two astute observers concluded, it’s hard to
imagine a healthy eight-month-old who just sits quietly in a living room
without reaching for stereo knobs, lamp cords, magazines, or knickknacks
(Brooks-Gunn and Matthews 1979). By the time the children are pre¬
school age, greater difference has emerged—boys tend to move more
quickly from one activity to another, whereas girls have a longer attention
span (McGuinness 1985)—but by this age, environmental influences have
surely come into play.
Of course, one obvious, but nonetheless serious problem with this
sort of research concerns whether or not activity level is a valid measure
of aggression. There is considerable evidence that suggests that it is not.
Various studies have found infant activity level to be a poor predictor of
later childhood behavior (Maccoby and Jacklin 1974). One study, for
instance, discovered that the most active newborn baby boys grew up to
be rather passive preschoolers who preferred to quietly watch other
children play rather than join in group activities (Bell et al. 1971).
A second serious methodological weakness in this research concerns
the extensive use of observers to record activity level as well as other
indicators of aggression. Although some researchers use mechanical de¬
vices such as actometers in their studies, most rely on their own perceptions
or on the judgments of observers to determine whether a specific behav¬
ior is exhibited by a subject. Observers are trained as to what to look for,
but because they usually know the sex of the child they are watching, it is
\ possible that nonconscious stereotyping comes into play, influencing
what they see. Consider the case of “Baby X,’’ for instance. In this experi¬
ment, one group of observers was told that the three-month-old baby they
were watching was a boy, while another group was told that it was a girl.
In fact, the baby was a boy, but the observers’ descriptions of the behavior
they saw depended on what sex they thought the child was. Those who
believed they were observing a girl described the child as friendly, satis¬
fied, and accepting, and “saw” the baby smile more than they thought a
boy baby would (Sidorowicz and Lunney 1980).
In a similar study, male and female college students were shown a
videotape of a baby reacting to a jack-in-the-box. At first, the baby is
startled, and then it becomes agitated and starts to cry. Interestingly,
observers who were told the baby was a boy described the reactions as
anger, but those who thought it was a girl described the baby as fright¬
ened. The authors of this study conclude—and we find it difficult to
disagree—that observed sex differences are frequently “in the eye of the
beholder” (Condry and Condry 1976).
This point raises another important issue with regard to research on
aggression. More objective indicators of aggression, such as hitting or
name-calling, can easily be observed among older children. By that time,
however, boys and girls have had considerable exposure to a variety of
emironmental influences, including television programs, the examples of
their older brothers and sisters, and the rewards and punishments meted
out by their parents. Thus, it is virtually impossible to sort out the extent
to which these later sex differences are biologically determined or
learned. Moreover, sex differences in aggression among adults are ex¬
tremely small: “less than one-third of a standard deviation in the direction
of greater aggression by men than women” (Eagly and Steffan 1986:323).
This perhaps would not be worth emphasizing were it not for the fact that
many scientists have tried to build their strongest case for innate sex
differences using aggression research. Because their work generally is
given a lot of media attention, it deserves a closer look from us.
The most common argument in favor of a biological basis for sex
differences in aggression centers around the fact that men secrete higher
levels of the hormone testosterone. (It is important to note here that both
males and females produce the same sex hormones, but in different
amounts; males secrete more testosterone and other androgens, while
females produce more estrogen and progesterone.) The evidence linking
testosterone to aggression comes largely from animal studies. Typically, in
these experiments, laboratory animals (rats, mice, or monkeys) are in¬
jected with testosterone. The usual outcome is that, regardless of their
sex, the animals show a significant increase in rough-and-tumble play and
fighting behavior. A variation on this theme involves castrating newborn
rats with the result that as they mature, they display little aggressive
behavior.
Some people accept such findings as strong indicators that males are
biologically programmed to be aggressive. However, there are many good
reasons to be cautious about interpreting these results. First, further
36 Chapter 2
research has cliscovereci a number of aggressive animal behaviors (e.g.,

offensive sideways movements) that appear to be unrelated to testoster¬
one levels. Second, it has been shown that abnormally high levels of
various hormones, not just testosterone, also increase fighting behavior
in animals (Frieze et al. 1978).
A third reason for caution is that while the research with rats pro¬
vides the strongest evidence of a link between testosterone and aggres¬
sion, we must keep in mind that there is tremendous variation in behavior
among different animal species. Female gerbils and hamsters, for in¬
stance, are just as aggressive as the males of their species, without being
injected with hormones (Fausto-Sterling 1985). Clearly, this variation
points to the difficulty in generalizing about behavior from one species
of rodents to another, let alone from rodents to human beings (Frieze et
al. 1978; see also Angier 1992a).
Moreover, the kind of experimental research that is possible with
animals cannot be undertaken with humans for obvious ethical reasons.
Reinisch’s (1983) research, which studied twenty-five boys and girls
who had been exposed to unusually high levels of androgens in utero,
did show these subjects to be more aggressive than a group of control
subjects. However, Reinisch used a paper-and-pencil test to measure ag¬
gression, which raises some serious methodological questions. Other re¬
searchers have measured testosterone levels in subjects’ blood and then
correlated this with various psychological tests of hostility or aggression.
Rubin (1987:245) reports, though, that “there is no consistent correlation
between various measures of hostility, aggression, and similar behavior, as
determined both by rating scales and observed behavior, and circulating
testosterone levels” (see alsojacklin 1989).
It is also important to understand that the relationship between a
single hormone and specific behaviors, such as aggression, is neither as
simplistic nor as direct as many of the animal studies would lead us to
believe. Anne Fausto-Sterling (1985:130-131) provides an example worth
quoting at length: ^
Mired in the morass of arguments about testosterone and aggressive

behavior, it is easy to forget that our bodies have a number of different
hormonal systems, all of which interact with one another. . . . For
example, people sometimes say in referring to a situation that made
them angry, “that really got the adrenalin flowing.” What they meant, of
course, was that their brains translated their psychological state of anger
into a chemical message which traveled through the bloodstream to their
adrenal glands. The glands responded by producing adrenalin, which in
turn enabled people, quite literally (because of the dilated blood vessels),
to get “hot under the collar,” to become agitated, excited, to scream
loudly—that is, to act angrily-Under stress, during a fight, when
angry, when engaging in behavior some might label aggressive, many

different hormone levels change in the body.
It is erroneous, then, to conclude that it is the fluctuation in the level of

one hormone that causes behavioral changes, when in fact, several hor¬
mone levels may be fluctuating simultaneously (see also Kemper 1990).
At the same time, studies abound which demonstrate that human
social behavior is highly governed by the situation or context in which it
occurs, and that this, in turn, may easily override the potential effects of
hormones. In one experiment, for example, human subjects were in¬
jected with a hormone that was supposed to induce aggression, but they
were subsequently placed in a peaceful environment. The result was that
their observed behavior was also peaceful and sociable (Richardson
1981). Other studies show that females can be just as aggressive as males
in certain situations—for instance, when they are rewarded for behaving
aggressively or when they think no one is watching them (Hyde 1984;
Frieze et al. 1978). This research suggests that females may simply inhibit
aggression because of social pressures to conform to a feminine or lady¬
like ideal; in the absence of such pressures, they may be as likely as males
to express aggression. Additional research also indicates that females are
more likely than males to perceive aggressive behavior on their parts as
posing a danger to themselves and, therefore, may inhibit aggression
when the likelihood of retaliation is high (Eagly 1987; Eagly and Steffan
1986).
Einally, it is important to point out that a correlation between testos¬
terone and aggression does not prove that the former causes the latter;
increases in both may be caused by some other intervening factor. Kem¬
per (1990) cites studies that show that the relationship may, in fact, be
opposite of what has traditionally been hypothesized. In one study, for
example, researchers found that, following tennis matches, testosterone
levels rose in young men who had won decisively and dropped in those
who had lost (Mazur and Lamb 1980). Kemper maintains that it is not the
relationship between testosterone and aggression, but rather the relation¬
ship between dominance/eminence and testosterone that is significant.
Dominance “refers to an elevated social rank that is achieved by overcom¬
ing others in a competitive confrontation, and eminence is where the
elevated social rank is earned through socially valued and approved ac¬
complishment” (Kemper 1990:27-28). Thus, Booth et al. (1989) discov¬
ered a rise in testosterone in male medical school graduates the day
before graduation—that is, the day before they achieved an eminent
status. As Kemper convincingly argues, research such as this not only
reframes our understanding of the relationship between testosterone and
aggression, it also illustrates how biology itself is affected by social factors.
38 Chapter 2
Within broad limits,^concrete social arrangements can thus dictate a

biology that underwrites specific social consequences. Changing the
original social arrangements will change the biological parameters and
their social effects as well (Kemper 1990:2).
We will return to this issue later in the chapter. For now, however,
we will turn our attention to two other areas in which sex differences have
been extensively investigated: verbal ability and visual-spatial ability.
Verbal Ability and Visual-Spatial Ability

In chapter 5, we make note of the fact that few female college graduates
are awarded degrees in fields such as architecture and engineering.
Rather, they are concentrated in majors such as literature, education, and
library science. Some observers of this trend maintain that it is because
of men’s superior visual-spatial skills and women’s greater verbal prowess.
Certainly it is the case among adults that men outperform women in
solving visual-spatial problems, whereas women are the higher scorers on
tests of verbal ability. But are these differences biologically caused? We’ll
begin to answer that question by considering the research on verbal/audi¬
tory differences between males and females. Then we will consider the
research on sex differences in visual-spatial ability, an area that has re¬
ceived considerable attention in the academic as well as popular presses
recently.
Everyone is probably familiar with the stereotype of women as natu¬
rally talkative; therefore, on some level, the idea that females are more
responsive to sound and vocalize earlier and more often than males seems
to make sense. In looking at available scientific evidence, however, we find
more similarity than difference in the visual-spatial abilities of the sexes.
Consider, for instance, research with infants and toddlers. Studies exam¬
ining responsiveness to sound (audition) have produced findings that are
either inconsistent or reveal no sex differences. In most studies, male and
female infants respond similarly tc^sound, but in a few studies the results
depended on what the sounds were and how responsiveness was mea¬
sured. In some cases, boys appeared more responsive; in others, girls were
more responsive (Maccoby andjacklin 1974).
There is some evidence that girls vocalize earlier and more often
than boys, but the large number of studies reporting no differences
makes this finding less impressive (Sherman 1978; Maccoby andjacklin
1974). There is also evidence that females vocalize more in response to
human faces, whereas males verbalize to inanimate objects and blinking
lights (McGuinness 1985), thus lending support to the notion that fe¬
males are naturally more social than males. However, it appears that
environmental influences may be at the root of any differences that are
observed. For instance, cross-cultural research indicates that female ver-
bal superiority is not universal (Safir 1986; Harmatz and Novak 1983).
Studies in the United States have also found that male infants tend to
hahhle as much as female infants, hut that female infants vocalize more
in response to their mothers. However, they also report that mothers talk
more to infant daughters than to infant sons. “This raises the age-old
question—^which came first: girls’ interest in and responsivity to speech
or mothers’ more loquacious style with their daughters?” (Brooks-Gunn
and Matthews 1979:70).
It is the case that hoys have higher rates of speech problems and
language-processing disorders, such as stuttering and dyslexia. Boys also
tend to have more difficulties with reading (Hyde and Linn 1988). How¬
ever, in terms of various other verbal skills, such as language-acquisition
rate, vocabulary, expressiveness, spelling, and verbal problem-solving
skills, research indicates little difference in girls’ and boys’ abilities until
late childhood (Maccoby and Jacklin 1974). According to Maccoby and
Jacklin (1974), it is at about eleven years of age when girls begin to excel
in verbal skills. More recent research, though, qualifies this finding. For
instance, on large standardized tests, such as the Scholastic Aptitude Test
(SAT), girls’ and boys’ verbal scores are similar and have grown more so
in recent years (see chapter 5). In fact, Hyde (in Gorman 1992) argues
that sex differences in verbal abilities have declined dramatically since
1974 when Maccoby and Jacklin published their findings. Moreover, in a
review of studies examining sex differences in verbal abilities, Hyde and
Linn (1988) found that there appears to be no overall difference between
males and females. However, small differences did emerge with respect to
specific verbal skills, especially quality of speech production.
Researchers have offered a variety of explanations for these ob¬
served differences, small though they may be. It has been hypothesized
that women may develop verbal prowess and talk more as a means to
compensate for their lower social status, although studies indicate that
women’s verbal fluency depends a great deal on situational context (see
chapter 6). However, the explanation that has received the greatest media
attention recently is one that focuses on differences in the structure and
organization of women’s and men’s brains. Before we examine this argu¬
ment and the research that tests it, let’s consider one final area of sex
difference, visual-spatial ability.
Studies of infants’ visual abilities use a variety of different measures.
Often, the infant’s eye movements are recorded as he or she is shown
some Usual stimulus. In addition, the infant’s interest in the visual stimu¬
lus is frequently measured in terms of the length of time he or she looks
at it. Such studies, however, yield few findings of sex differences. Maccoby
and Jacklin (1974), for instance, reviewed nine studies of newborns and
thirty-three of infants from one month to twelve months old. They report
no difference for the newborns, but inconsistent findings with regard to
40 Chapter 2
the infants: “For most samples and most stimuli, sex differences are not
found. When a difference is found, it favors one sex nearly as often as the
other, with a slight balance in favor of boys” (Maccoby and Jacklin
1974:28). There is some evidence that males are more sensitive than
females to bright light and are better able to detect subtle differences in
lighting, but it is unclear how this may influence their visual-spatial skills
(McGuinness 1985).
Significantly, other tests using older children (from age two) and
including a spatial component (e.g., asking subjects to find certain ob¬
jects camouflaged in a larger picture) show almost no sex differences
until adolescence, although some emerge in elementary school (Fausto-
Sterling 1985; Maccoby and Jacklin 1974). However, while sex differences
in visual-spatial skills have been found in the United States, this pattern
is not found in all societies. For example, studies of Canadian Eskimos
show no sex differences in males’ and females’ visual-spatial skills, indi¬
cating that the pattern observed in our own society may be more cultur¬
ally than biologically induced (Harmatz and Novak 1983). Even among
men and women in the United States, the amount of difference discov¬
ered varies significantly depending on the type of spatial test used in the
research (Deaux and Kite 1987).
Generally, scientists have focused on three different types of spatial
tasks. In tasks involving spatial perception—that is, tasks which require the
location of a vertical or horizontal line in a visual field that includes
information or cues designed to distract the viewer—boys as young as
elementary school-age do better than their female peers (Linn and Pe¬
tersen 1985). Much has been made of this difference, with males tradi¬
tionally being labeled field independent and females being labeled field
dependent. In other words, males are supposed to be able to ignore dis¬
tracting or irrelevant information in a perceptual situation, whereas fe¬
males must place everything in context. Though neither approach is
necessarily better than the other, discussions of field independence versus
dependence are often highly valqe-laden, with the former trait either
implicitly^ or explicitly considered superior to the latter. More recent
research, however, indicates that it might be more appropriate to label
the field dependent approach “superior” since it is actually m.ore complex
than the field independent approach and requires greater memory ca¬
pacity. In one study, for instance, it was discovered that in learning a
maze, men relied on their sense of motion using remembered vectors,
while women relied on environmental clues. Although men learned the
maze more quickly than women, women were more likely to find their
way through the maze even if external conditions were changed; such
changes confused the men (Blakeslee 1992a; Gorman 1992). We mention
this research not to assert female superiority in visual perception, but
rather to emphasize, as one of the researchers did, that “Groups may
differ in the way they tend to solve a problem but have functionally equal
abilities” (quoted in Blakeslee 1992a:C8).
Other types of visual-spatial tasks that have been examined for sex
differences are mental rotation tasks and spatial visualization tasks. Tests of
mental rotation require the viewer to imagine how a two- or, more often,
a three-dimensional figure would look if rotated in space. In spatial
visualization tests, the viewer is asked to discern relationships between
various spatial figures, such as sets of attached blocks. In their review of
research on sex differences in visual-spatial perception, Linn and Pe¬
tersen (1985, 1986) report that again, males generally outperform fe¬
males on tests of mental rotation. The gap is greater between adult men
and women than between boys and girls. At the same time, however, the
mental rotation findings are not consistent across measures; on some
tests, women do better than men. With respect to spatial visualization
tasks, Linn and Petersen report that the studies show no sex differences.
Importantly, as with sex differences in verbal ability, the sex differ¬
ences in vdsual-spatial ability that have been discovered are relatively
small: less than 5 percent variation between male and female test takers
(Deaux and Kite 1987). Nevertheless, scientists have offered divergent
explanations to account for even these differences. As we will discuss in
chapters 4 and 5, a number of researchers point to the differential
socialization experiences of males and females to explain these differ¬
ences. The toys that boys and girls are given to play with, their interactions
with parents and teachers, the curriculum to which they are exposed—all
tend to foster and reinforce gender stereotypes of males’ and females
relative abilities. Thus, if sex differences develop, they are due to a
self-fulfilling prophecy rather than to natural or biological dictates. A self-
fulfilling prophecy occurs when predictions about how people will behave
come true primarily because others’ expectations have led the individuals
to behave that way.
Although the evidence in support of this social explanation is rather
convincing (see especially chapters 4 and 5), other scientists have argued
that sex differences in visual-spatial abilities are largely biologically based.
One such explanation focuses on hormonal differences between the
sexes. Psychologist Doreen Kimura recently reported, for instance, that
men do better on mental rotation tests in the spring when their testoster¬
one levels are lowest (Blakeslee 1992b). Other researchers, however, have
argued that increased testosterone levels contribute to success with visuaf
spatial tasks. Kemper (1990), in fact, has hypothesized that the recent
narrowing of the gap in men’s and women’s scores on tests of visual-spa¬
tial ability is due to the fact that women’s opportunities for dominance
and eminence have increased in recent years, thus raising their testoster¬
one level. (Recall our earlier discussion of Kemper’s research which
indicates that experiences of dominance and eminence increase men s
42 Chapter 2
testosterone secretions, êe also Hampson and Kimura 1988; and Kimura
and Hampson 1988.)
Such arguments are controversial, however, and their empirical sup¬
port is minimal and inconsistent. But as we noted previously, one biologi¬
cal explanation for sex differences in both verbal ability and visual-spatial
skills that has received considerable attention recently—and which has
been the focus of extensive scientific investigation—focuses on differ¬
ences in the structure and organization of women’s and men’s brains.
Let’s examine some of that research now.
THE CASE FOR HIS AND HERS BRAINS
Men are different from women. They are equal only in their common
membership of the same species, humankind. To maintain that they are
the same in aptitude, skill or behavior is to build a society based on a
biological and scientific lie.
The sexes are different because their brains are different. The brain, the
chief administrative and emotional organ of life, is differently
constructed in men and in women; it processes information in a
different way, which results in different perceptions, priorities and
behavior (Moir and Jessel 1989:5).
The notion that men and women have different brains is an old one.
Nineteenth-century scientists maintained, for instance, that women were
less intelligent than men because their brains are smaller. When it was
pointed out that elephants, then, should be more intelligent than men
given the relative size of their brains, the argument was quickly modified.
It was subsequently argued that the best estimate of intelligence could be
obtained by dividing brain size by body weight. However, this hypothesis,
too, was abandoned when it was discovered that according to this mea¬
sure, women were more intelligent than men (Harrington 1987; Fausto-
Sterling 1985; Gould 1980). As we can see from the quote above, the
debate has not disappeared, but has simply changed form. Today, the
controversy centers not on the size or weight of men’s and women’s
brains, but rather on how our brains are organized (Gornick 1982).
Indeed, it has been hypothesized that the differential organization of the
brain is not only the source of behavioral differences between women and
men, but may also be responsible for the development of sexual orienta¬
tion (see Box 2.1).
During the 1970s and into the 1980s, much of the discussion of sex
differences in brain structure and function focused on the phenomenon
of brain lateralization. In the late 1960s, Dr. Roger Sperry and his col¬
leagues, working with a group of patients suffering from severe epileptic
Sexual Orientation and the Brain 30X2.1
In the August 30, 1991 issue of the prestigious journal Science, neuroscientist Si¬
mon LeVay reported the results of a study he conducted in which he examined
the post-mortem tissue of the brains of six women and sixteen men that he pre¬
sumed had been heterosexual, and those of nineteen men who had been ho¬
mosexual. LeVay found that one node of the anterior hypothalamus (an area
of the brain that may play a part in sexual behavior) was three times larger in
the heterosexual men than in the homosexual men, whose nodes were closer
in size to the ones found in the heterosexual women’s brains. The day LeVay’s
findings appeared in Science, major national newspapers and news magazines
ran prominently placed stories with titles such as “Brain May Determine Sexual¬
ity; Node Seen as Key to Gay Orientation” {The Washington Post 30 August
1991) ; “Zone of Brain Linked to Men’s Sexual Orientation” {The Neiu York
Times 30 August 1991); and “Born or Bred?” {Newsweek 24 February 1992). One
year later, another study reported that the anterior fissure (a cord of nerves
that is thought to facilitate communication between the two hemispheres of
the brain) is larger in homosexual men than in either heterosexual men or
women (Allen and Gorski 1992). These findings, like LeVay’s, not only trig¬
gered a storm of media attention, but also added fuel to a heated debate over
whether sexual orientation is innate or learned.
On the one hand there are those—including many members of the gay
community'—who welcome such findings, arguing that they will reduce preju¬
dice and discrimination against gays. If gay people cannot help what they do—
that is, if their sexual behavior is biologically programmed and not freely
chosen—then they are not responsible for their orientation and should there¬
fore be granted the same basic rights as other minority groups (e.g., racial mi¬
norities) whose minority status is based on some biological trait (Herek 1991).
On the other hand, there are those—also including many members of the gay
community—^who maintain that negative attitudes toward homosexuals are
not likely to be changed by research findings indicating that homosexuality is
biologically based. Rather, they maintain that such findings have the potential
for doing more harm than good to gay people. They warn, for instance, that
such findings could be used to support a eugenics movement to eliminate ho¬
mosexuality through surgery or some other interventionist strategy (Zicklin
1992) .
Members of the scientific community are also polarized in their re¬
sponses to these studies. Some claim that the studies provide strong support
for the hypothesis that sexual orientation is biologically determined, while oth¬
ers are skeptical. Much of their skepticism stems from the serious methodologi¬
cal weaknesses of the research. One point that the studies overlook is that
homosexuals are not just men; women also may be homosexual. But lesbians
have not (at least to the researchers’ knowledge) been included in these stud¬
ies. This exclusion is primarily because the brains that have been studied have
come mostly from individuals who died from AIDS or who had some history of
sexually transmitted diseases so that their sexual orientation was noted in their
44 Chapter 2
30X 2.1 continued ^
medical records. Since lesbians rarely die from such causes, their sexual orien¬
tation usually is not recorded with their medical history. It would be a mistake,
however, to use the findings from research that excludes lesbians to generalize
about a//homosexuals.
In addition to this criticism, there are several more which also question
the methods and conclusions of these studies. First, many scientists have ques¬
tioned the validity of generalizing findings from studies using the brains of
AIDS patients to the general population, both heterosexual and homosexual.
As one commentator noted, “We know that HIV has an affinity for brain cells,
and I don’t think we can rule out that this is having an effect” (quoted in
Angier 1992b). Second, research indicates that human behavior itself may af¬
fect the structure and organization of the brain. We will return to this point
later in the chapter, but suffice it to say here that along with the hypothesis
that the structure of the brain causes particular forms of sexual behavior, there
is an equally tenable hypothesis that particular types of sexual behavior may
lead to alterations in the structure or organization of the brain. As Gelman
(1992:50) reports, there is “a body of evidence showing that the brain’s neural
networks reconfigure themselves in response to certain experiences.”
A third methodological problem in these studies is that they are based on
very small samples: LeVay examined a total of 41 brains; Allen and Gorski stud¬
ied a total of 193 brains, only 34 of which carrte from known homosexual men.
Moreover, none of these studies has been replicated (Marshall 1992; Zicklin
1992). And finally, many scientists caution that little is known about the gen¬
eral significance of the areas of the brain studied by LeVay and by Allen and
Gorski, let alone their possible role in such complex human behavior as sexual
behavior (Angier 1992b).
Unfortunately, despite the serious shortcomings of this research, many
people have come to accept the findings as scientific “facts.” Science—even
rather shaky science—carries considerable weight in our society because it is
considered “objective” and this ascribed objectivity often makes it a powerful
political tool (see, for example, Hubbard and Wald 1993; Gould 1981). As the
public debates show, the findings of the studies discussed here became politi¬
cized almost instantly. Wliat remains t® be seen are their political conse¬
quences for homosexual people (see also chapters 7 and 13).
seizures, discovered that the right and left halves or hemispheres of the
brain appear to “specialize” in certain functions or tasks (Sperry 1982).
This specialization is referred to as hemispheric asymmetry or brain laterali¬
zation. It appeared that the left hemisphere (which controls the right side
of the body) was responsible for speech, among other things, whereas the
right hemisphere (which controls the left side of the body) was thought
to be re.sponsible for such functions as visual perception. Not surprisingly.
soon after Sperry’s work was first published, some scientists began to
speculate that sex differences in verbal and visual-spatial abilities may be
caused by the differential lateralization of males’ and females’ brains
(Lambert 1978).
Though intriguing, the research on the hypothesized relationship
between brain lateralization and sex differences in behavior and skills is
characterized by numerous unresolved contradictions (Fausto-Sterling
1985; Gornick 1982; Lambert 1978). For one, scientists have relatively
little knowledge of how the human brain works. It was only in 1992, for
instance, that scientists discovered that genes may not determine the
functions of specific brain cells. They discovered that the neurons of the
brain seem to be highly malleable and may adjust their performance in
response to input which indicates changes in other parts of the body
(Walsh and Cepko 1992). Furthermore, scientific studies of sex and brain
lateralization have yielded few consistent findings. As neurophysiologist
Ruth Bleier (1984:93) observed, some researchers have found that
women are less lateralized than men (i.e., that neither hemisphere is
dominant), while others have found that they are more lateralized, with
the left hemisphere being dominant. “A third group finds no convincing
sex differences in cognitive abilities or lateralization, and yet a fourth . . .
questions the basic assumption that there is any lateralization of cognitive
functions at all, quite apart from the issue of sex differences.”
More recent research has focused on the hypothalamus (the part of
the brain that controls the release of hormones at sexual maturity). Most
of these are animal studies. Research on rats, for example, shows that the
presence or absence of testosterone secretion during fetal development
affects the cell structure of the hypothalamus and produces a male or
female pattern of brain functioning. The implications of this for human
behavior, however, remain unclear and, although much speculation has
been offered, there is still little evidence that sexual differentiation of the
hypothalamus predisposes human males and females to behave in gen¬
der-specific ways (Kemper 1990; Treadwell 1987; Harmatz and Novak
1983).
More promising research with human subjects has shown that the
corpus callosum (the mass of tissue and nerve fibers that connect the two
hemispheres of the brain) is as much as 23 percent larger in women than
in men (Allen and Gorski 1991). It has been hypothesized that this may
allow greater communication between the brain’s two hemispheres. This
would help to explain why women recover from strokes more quickly than
men do, and why they are less likely to suffer certain types of brain
damage (Witelson 1989). Some researchers also maintain that it may
explain differences in women’s and men’s verbal and visual-spatial abili¬
ties. In one study, for instance, it was found that women use both hemi¬
spheres of the brain when spelling words, thereby using a wider range of
46 Chapter 2
information to accomplish the task, while men use only the left hemi¬
sphere. However, while the greater communication between the left and
right hemispheres of women’s brains may facilitate their verbal skills, it
may also inhibit their visual-spatial skills. It has been found, for example,
that cross-talk between the two hemispheres appears to impede success
on the mental rotation test (Gorman 1992).
Re.search on the structure and organization of men’s and women’s
brains is fascinating, but its significance with respect to sex differences in
behavior remains speculative. One reason for this is that, until very re¬
cently, available technology has allowed scientists to get only a gross
picture, with little fine detail, of the brain’s organization. The develop¬
ment of new magnetic resonance imaging machines (called fast MRI)
now permits scientists to observe the brain as it works to solve specific
problems, highlighting those areas in use during a particular task. Scien¬
tists are using this technology to study not only how male and female
brains compare, but also if culture affects the way brains are organized
(Blakeslee 1993). These two issues are related, and the influence of
culture is significant. As mentioned previously, differences in brain struc¬
ture and organization may be the products of experience. As one writer
recently concluded, “[CJertainly an event or act of learning can directly
affect the brain’s biochemistry and physiplogy. And so, in the final analy¬
sis, it may be impossible to say where nature ends and nurture begins
because the two are so intimately linked” (Gorman 1992:51).
“MY HORMONES MADE ME DO IT”:

PREMENSTRUAL SYNDROME
Before concluding this chapter, we wish to consider one final biosocial

event that also has commanded considerable attention in the popular
media in recent years: premenstrual syndrome (PMS). We refer to pre¬
menstrual syndrome as biosocial because, as we will see shortly, although
menstruation is clearly a biological phenomenon, one’s experience of
menstruation is influenced by cultural and subcultural norms as well as
by social interaction. To understand this better, let’s discuss premenstrual
syndrome in greater detail.
Premenstrual syndrome was first discussed in the medical literature
more than sixty years ago, but it captured the attention of the general
public during the 1980s, largely as a result of media coverage of two
British homicide trials in which PMS was used as a defense. The first case
\ began in December 1980, in a town fifty-two miles northeast of London,
where thirty-seven-year-old Christine English drove her car at full speed
directly at her boyfriend, pinning him to a telephone pole and killing
him. She was subsequently convicted of manslaughter instead of murder,

and she was released on probation because of a mitigating factor in her
case: at the time of the crime, her defense attorney argued, English was
suffering from premenstrual syndrome, a condition which may cause
those afflicted to behave violently. That same year, twenty-nine-year-old
Sandie Smith was convicted of killing a co-worker at the London pub
where she tended bar, but she too was sentenced to probation on the basis
of the premenstrual syndrome defense. As a condition of probation, both
English and Smith were required to receive monthly hormone injections
to control their PMS symptoms (Glass 1982; Parlee 1982).
Lhiderstandably, these cases generated considerable controversy,
not only in Great Britain, but also in the United States. Legal scholars
worried that the courts would be flooded with cases in which female
defendants would try to escape punishment for serious crimes by claim¬
ing that their behaUor was a product of the stress caused by the onset of
their monthly periods. Others used the cases to bolster their argument
that women are naturally unfit for positions of responsibility and leader¬
ship. Dr. Edgar Berman, once the personal physician of Senator Hubert
Humphrey, was often quoted on this matter. Said Berman:
If you had an investment in a bank, you wouldn’t want the president of

your bank making a loan under those raging hormonal influences at that
particular period. . . . There just are physical and psychological
inhibitants that limit a female’s potential (quoted in Parlee 1982:126).
This, of course, generated alarm among feminists. As one physician

pointed out:
I don’t think anything is going to set back women’s causes more than
[PMS]. ... To let women think they become criminal once a month as a
result of their physiology is to really debase the status of women. This is
to say women are criminal by nature (quoted in Glass 1982:8C).
More than a decade has passed since the English and Smith trials,
and much of the sensation surrounding PMS has died down. Neverthe¬
less, the treatment of PMS has become a thriving business: more than
seventy-five PMS clinics are operating in the United States and numerous
over-the-counter medications are available to treat PMS symptoms (Chis-
ler and Levy 1990). At the same time, other hormonally related syn¬
dromes have been receiving increasing attention (see Box 2.2). A number
of important questions, however, remain unanswered: What is PMS? What
causes it? What are its real effects on women’s personalities and behavior?
Premenstrual syndrome has been called “the disease of the eighties,”
but it is not that new (Eagan 1983). In 1931, Dr. Robert T. Frank defined
it as a “ ‘feeling of indescribable tension’ occurring from 7 to 10 days
before a period and causing ‘unrest, irritability . . . and a desire to find
48 Chapter 2
30X2.2 Postpartum depression Syndrome
In early January 1989, Tanya Dacri, a twenty-year-old Philadelphia woman, told

police her seven-week-old son had been kidnapped by two men at a shopping
center. Within twenty-four hours, Ms. Dacri had been charged with the murder
of the infant whom she had drowned in the bathtub, dismembered, and whose
body parts she then disposed of in area rivers. Ms. Dacri’s attorney asked that
she be found not guilty by reason of insanity; she was suffering, it was argued,
from postpartum depression syndrome.
By the time Ms. Dacri went to trial, there were about twenty-five similar
cases in the United States, less than half of which had successfully used this de¬
fense. In England and Canada, however, a woman charged with killing her in¬
fant within one year of its birth cannot be found guilty of murder if it is
determined she was suffering from postpartum depression syndrome. Instead,
she may only be found guilty of a special category of infanticide similar to man¬
slaughter which carries a less severe sentence than murder (Conrad 1989).
Depression after the birth of a baby, also called the “maternity blues” or
the “baby blues,” is not uncommon. Studies indicate that in the United States
and Great Britain, 60 to 80 percent of women report feelings of sadness, ten¬
sion, and irritability during the first two weeks postpartum. However, for these
women, the symptoms also disappear quickly, usually in one to three days.
About 10 to 30 percent of women who have given birth report more severe
symptoms, including feelings of inadequacy, guilt, anxiety, fatigue, and an in¬
ability to care for the baby. These symptoms—usually referred to as postpartum
depression—may appear from two weeks to three months postpartum and may
last from several weeks to several months. For a very small number of women—
about one in 1,000 of those giving birth—the symptoms may be so severe as to
constitute postpartum psychosis, involving hallucinations, mental confusion,
panic attacks, suicide attempts, and attempts to kill their babies. Although it ap¬
pears that the incidence of maternity blues and postpartum depression has in¬
creased in the United States and Great Britain during this century, the rate of
postpartum psychosis has remained fairly stable (Giovannini 1992).
The most widely cited theory of the causes of these postpartum disorders
focuses on hormonal changes following childbirth, especially the sudden
drop in progesterone (Gitlin and Passnau 1990). However, the scientific
data directly supporting this position is limited. Moreover, as Giovannini
(1992) points out, the exceptionally low incidence of postpartum depression
and psychosis reported in cross-cultural studies indicates that sociocultural
or environmental factors may play a central role in the etiology of these
disorders.
Indeed, Giovannini’s (1992) own research has shown that the incidence
and severity of postpartum emotional disorders are directly related to the
amount of social support available to new mothers as well as the amount and
type of socioenvironmental stressors (e.g., financial or housing difficulties,
marital problems, the number and ages of other children in the household) to
which they are exposed. Women who are isolated in their homes, who lack
BOX 2.2 continued
family and social support networks, and who are exposed to serious and pro¬
longed stress are more likely to expei'ience a postpartum emotional disorder
(see also Belsky 1981; Heitler 1976; Robson and Kumar 1980). In addition,
women who experience a traumatic labor, who are unprepared for the level of
pain and discomfort they experience, and who undergo unexpected surgery
may also be at high risk for postpartum emotional disorders. Oakley
(1980:128) has argued, in fact, that the increased medicalization of childbirth
in the United States and Great Britain (see also chapter 12), coupled with the
lack of preparation for mothering and the low level of support offered to most
mothers (see chapter 7), have contributed to the rise in the incidence of post¬
partum emotional disorders in these countries. As she puts it, “Any man sub¬
jected to major surgery and then told to start a new job immediately for which
he has had no training and in similarly rigorous conditions would probably
also react negatively.”
relief by foolish and ill-considered actions’ ” (Vrazo 1983:1K). PMS was

further popularized in the 1950s through the work of Dr. Katharina
Dalton. Dalton has claimed that her work demonstrates that women in
the premenstrual phase of their monthly cycles become unreliable, irre¬
sponsible, accident-prone, and even violent and suicidal. She and others
have estimated that anywhere from 20 to 100 percent of the female
population suffers from premenstrual syndrome, with approximately 20
to 40 percent being mentally or physically incapacitated by it (Fausto-Ster-
ling 1985; Frieze et al. 1978). Most researchers, though, place the figure
considerably lower, at around 10 percent (Golub 1992).
A precise definition of PMS has eluded scientists and physicians.
Many define it simply as a “menstrual disorder,” but one that encompasses
up to 150 disparate symptoms, including headaches, bloating, cravings
for salty or sweet foods, skin disorders, depression, and irritability (Golub
1992; Chrisler and Levy 1990). In 1987, the American Psychiatric Associa¬
tion (APA), amid great controversy, added PMS to the revised third
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (known as DSM-lll-R). The
DSM is the official classification manual of the psychiatric profession,
which is used not only by psychiatrists in making diagnoses, but also by
insurance providers in determining patients’ eligibility for reimburse¬
ment, and by the courts in deciding criminal responsibility (Figert 1992).
In the DSM, PMS has been renamed Late Luteal Phase Dysphoric Disorder
(or LLPDD). Although it appears in the manual’s appendix as a category
in need of “further systematic study and research,” its inclusion in the
manual at all legitimates it as a “scientific” entity. Moreover, in the DSM-
50 Chapter 2
III-R, its diagnostic cod'e number was changed from a gynecological code
(307.90) to a psychiatric code (300.90, “unspecified mental disorder ),
moving the diagnosis and treatment of PMS or LLPDD from the realm of
physical health to the realm of mental health (Figert 1992).
The APA delineates rather specific criteria for the diagnosis of PMS
or LLPDD. The key is apparently the timing of the symptoms. For LLPDD
to be diagnosed, at least five of the ten symptoms listed by the APA must
occur during the week before menstruation begins and subside within a
few days after the onset of menstruation. In addition, the symptoms must
be severe enough to interfere with work, social activities, and interper¬
sonal relationships.
As Figert (1992:4) points out, when examined in the DSM-III-R, “as
an established psychiatric disorder with set criteria and as ready-made
scientific fact, the diagnosis does not appear so controversial. ...” Yet,
there is little consensus regarding the cause of PMS. For example, one
theory, proposed by Dalton, explains PMS as a hormone imbalance or
deficiency. Several days before menstruation, production of the hormone
progesterone by the adrenal glands drops. Since the adrenal hormones
regulate such body functions as fluid retention, allergic reactions, and
blood-sugar level, a drop in progesterone may cause an imbalance relative
to other adrenal hormones, and may provoke the physical and psycho¬
logical symptoms (Golub 1992). However, there is little evidence in sup¬
port of this theory and the research findings are frequently contradictory
(Reid and Yen 1980). Other physical factors thought to be related to PMS
are nerve irritability, an imbalance in electrolyte metabolism, an excess
of prostaglandins, vitamin or mineral deficiency, and an abnormal release
of, or sensitivity to, certain hypothalamic hormones. Again, though, evi¬
dence on the role of each of these factors is limited (Golub 1992).
Much of the research on PMS is plagued by serious methodological
difficulties. Indeed, Blume (1983:2866) has argued that available data on
PMS are “seriously flawed.” For instance, the majority of studies have
relied on subjects’ self-reports in determining the onset of premenstrual
symptoms. However, this method is highly unreliable for several reasons.
First, there is evidence that retrospective studies dependent on subjects’
recall produce exaggerated results compared with prospective studies
which begin with a sample of women who subsequently chart their cycles
over several months (Sommer 1983; Koeske 1980). Second, Widom and
Ames (1988:319) cite several studies that show that “there is a tendency
for women with randomly occurring chronic mood changes to selectively
remember those changes occurring during the premenstrual phase of
the cycle.” Third, Culpepper (1992) notes that many women perceive
researchers as condescending toward them and, therefore, these women
are reluctant to report information about how they feel and behave
during their menstrual cycles. Fourth, several recent studies indicate that
social and psychological factors have an influence on the experience of

PMS symptoms. It has been argued, for example, that the attitudes toward
menstruation prevalent in a particular culture may affect women’s reac¬
tions to their monthly periods (Woods et al. 1982). In the United States,
menstruation has long been viewed as a negative event in a woman’s
life—at best it is an inconvenience, at worst, a “curse.” Women have also
been led to believe that they should restrict their behavior during their
periods; they should not swim, bathe, or have sexual relations during that
time. Although these negative attitudes have diminished somewhat in
recent years, research indicates that they still are not uncommon. In one
study, for instance, nearly a third of the male and female respondents felt
that women need to restrict their physical activities while menstruating;
more than half felt that women should not have sexual intercourse while
menstruating; and one quarter said that women look different when
menstruating (Golub 1992; see also Jurgens and Powers 1991).
Clarke and Ruble (1978) report that negative attitudes toward men¬
struation are learned by both girls and boys at an early age. These nega¬
tive expectations may influence women’s experience of PMS symptoms.
One researcher, for instance, asked a group of students to evaluate the
behaviors of several hypothetical female patients. Included with each case
was information about the patient’s menstrual cycle. When the students
thought that the patient was in the premenstrual phase of her cycle, they
attributed any hostile, aggressive, or negative behaviors to biological
causes; interestingly, they attributed positive behaviors during the same
period to nonbiological factors (Koeske 1980). In a second experiment,
psychologist Diane Ruble (1977) told a group of female subjects that
physical tests indicated that they were in the premenstrual phase of their
cycles. In reality, all the women were in another cycle phase, but they
began to report PMS symptoms. “Expectations became reality, apart from
actual bodily state” (Parlee 1982:127).
Given these findings, what actual behavioral or personality changes
have been found to be related to the menstrual cycle, especially the
premenstrual phase? The question is a difficult one to answer largely
because the results of most studies are inconsistent. Some of the research
on mood swings, for example, has found that women tend to feel less able
to cope with everyday problems during the premenstrual phase of their
cycles than during the ovulatory phase (Friedman et al. 1980). But others
report that negative changes in mood, as well as physical changes, may
have more to do with stressful external events (e.g., the triple burden of
child care, housework, and work outside the home) than with the phase
of the menstrual cycle (Golub 1992). At least two studies have found
cyclical changes in mood to be more highly correlated with the day of the
week than the day of the month; study participants were more likely to
feel happy and healthy on weekends than during the rest of the week
52 Chapter 2
(Ripper 1991; Rossi and^JRossi 1977). Interestingly, in one of these studies,

both men and women participated, with men reporting that they experi¬
enced physical discomfort more days per month than women did (Rossi
and Rossi 1977). Indeed, one researcher, noting that men are subject to
a daily hormonal cycle in which testosterone levels peak at about 4 A.M.
and are lowest at around 8 P.M., stated, “When people say women can’t be
trusted because they cycle every month, my response is that men cycle
every day, so they should only be allowed to negotiate peace treaties in
the evening” (quoted in Gorman 1992:51).
A few studies show improved task performance premenstrually, lead¬
ing one researcher to suggest that perhaps we should study “premenstrual
elation syndrome” (Parlee 1983). There is no evidence to support the
notion that women’s academic or work performance declines during the
premenstrual phase of their cycles. The majority of studies report no
relationship between task performance and menstrual cycle at all (Chris-
ler 1991; Sommer 1983; Friedman et al. 1980). Some researchers have
observed a relationship between menstrual cycle phase and such psycho-
physiological functions as visual, auditory, and olfactory sensitivity; gal¬
vanic skin response; and spontaneous body movement. “However, the
variations among findings are such that one could select studies to sup¬
port almost any hypothesis one chose ...” (Sommer 1983:82).
It does appear that most women experience some physical discom¬
fort around the time of menstruation, but the majority appear to accept
this as normal and do not see menstruation as debilitating (Golub 1992).
Ripper (1991) hypothesizes, in fact, that one of the reasons that re¬
searchers frequently find negative attitudes toward menstruation is that
the questionnaires most often used in such studies only ask about nega¬
tive effects. In her research using a questionnaire from which the bias
toward negativity had been eliminated, she found that “The menstrual
cycle did have an impact on most of the moods and perceptions of
performance [of the women studied]; however, it is more accurate to
describe this variation as positive, rather than negative” (Ripper 1991:25;
see also Culpepper 1992). '
Certainly, these studies neither prove nor disprove the existence of
PMS, but, taken together, they do allow us to roughly gauge the current
state of scientific knowledge about the problem. In a nutshell, there are
few definitive findings on PMS as a medical entity. Nevertheless, thou¬
sands of women seek treatment for PMS symptoms each year, and re¬
search in this area indicates that the side effects of many treatment
programs may be worse than the condition itself. The most common
treatment for PMS is the administration of the hormone progesterone,
usually throughout the premenstrual phase of the cycle. Women who take
progesterone, however, report a number of serious side effects, including
chest pains, vaginal and rectal swelling, a lessened sex drive, and bleeding
between periods. What concerns researchers even more are the long-term
effects of progesterone treatments since laboratory tests have linked pro¬
gesterone injections with increased rates of breast tumors and cervical
cancer. In addition, progesterone may have addictive effects (Golub
1992).
Among the other common PMS treatments is the administration of
megadoses of vitamin Bg, but this, too, is not without side effects. High
doses of vitamin Bg have been shown to cause nerve damage, leading to
a loss of feeling in the fingers and toes (Fausto-Sterling 1985). And, of
course, there is the issue of whether any of these treatments really work.
In a careful review of the research on treating PMS, Dr. Judith Abplanalp
(1983) discovered that placebos (inactive substances with no medicinal
content) are just as successful in relieving PMS symptoms as are vitamins,
hormones, and other drugs. What this means is that patients are as likely
to report feeling better after taking sugar pills as they are after a dosage
of vitamin Bg or progesterone (see also Golub 1992). Among the most
effective treatments for the relief of many of the symptoms typically
associated with PMS are regular exercise, changes in diet (elimination of
caffeine and sugar; reduced sodium intake; and consumption of frequent
small meals of high-protein, high-complex carbohydrate, low-fat foods),
and supportive psychotherapy (Golub 1992).
We must be careful not to interpret these findings to mean that what
women experience during their menstrual cycles is “all in their heads.”
Nor is it to say that biological factors are insignificant in women’s men¬
strual experiences; the menstrual cycle is clearly rooted in biology (Parlee
1982). Instead, the point we are trying to make is that, in light of our poor
understanding of PMS and its effects, and given the impact of social
factors on women’s menstrual experiences, some caution should be exer¬
cised in pursuing a PMS “cure.” Research on premenstrual syndrome has
been conducted for more than fifty years, and scientists are still unsure of
precisely what it is or what causes it. Meanwhile, thousands of women have
been encouraged to seek treatment for PMS, using substances that are
known to be detrimental to their health. Unfortunately, in our zeal to rid
ourselves of the “disease of the eighties,” we may end up producing more
serious health problems for the 1990s.
THE INTERACTION OF BIOLOGY

AND CULTURE
The issues we have discussed in this chapter highlight the interaction

between the social and the biological. However, it behooves us at this
54 Chapter 2
point to consider more precisely what we mean by interaction. Lynda Birke

(1992:74) has argued that feminist critiques of biological theories of
gender have tended to conceptualize biology as something that comes
first—“the biological base onto which experience and the effects of the
environment are added during our development as individuals” (author s
emphasis). Birke maintains that the difficulty with such a position is that
it portrays development as progressing along a simple linear path: a
person’s biological beginnings impose constraints on what she or he can
learn from the cultural environment, but the individual has no role or
active part in her or his own development. Birke emphasizes, in contrast,
that continuous and transformative change occurs throughout a person’s
lifetime and that the person’s own behavior can alter not only his or her
environment, but also his or her biology and physiology. Certainly, much
of the research we have reviewed in this chapter confirms this.
Birke urges feminist scientists to move beyond critiques that sim¬
ply replace biological determinism with social constructionism that
denies the body altogether. She urges instead the formulation of a
transformative account of gender development, and we echo her call.
Social constructionist critiques have been central in challenging the
oppressive aspects of many biological determinist theories, but they have
tended to reinforce the dichotomous view of biology versus environment,
rather than transcending it. To focus on o'nly the biological or the social
is to tell, at best, just half the story. As Birke (1992:76) points out, “our
bodies are social, too, and our experiences of, and engagement with, a
gendered world is as embodied persons. Surely those bodies, and their
(often messy) processes, must be part of any continuing construction of
gender?”
A transformative account of gender development—one that exam¬
ines how culture and individual behavior may impact biology and physi¬
ology as well as vice versa—underlines the pitfalls of using biological
principles to Justify gender inequality and also overcomes a longstanding
preoccupation with sex differences. As Janet Sayers (1987:68) has ob¬
served, “Preoccupation with sexual'difference and inequality has tended
to be particularly intense at those times when prevailing differences
between the sexes seem most likely to be eroded.” We may only speculate
on the motives that underlie some scientists’ tenacious attempts to estab¬
lish a biological basis for behavioral and personality differences between
women and men. To reiterate a point that we made at the outset of this
chapter: the existence of difference, even if biologically caused, does not
imply a hierarchical ordering, nor does it imply that one behavior or trait
is inherently superior to another. That women and men are different in
many ways is an observable fact; however, that either is discriminated
against on the basis of these differences is a social injustice.
KEY TERMS
gender stereotypes summary descriptions of masculinity and femininity that

are oversimplified and generalized
premenstrual syndrome (PMS) a menstrual disorder, the exact causes of
which are unknown; there are up to 150 disparate physical, psychologi¬
cal, and behavioral symptoms
separation anxiety the level of distress exhibited by a child if left alone by a
parent; the extent to which the child clings to its parent or seeks the par¬
ent’s help when placed in new situations; used as a measure of depen¬
dency in infants
transformative accoimt of gender development a theory of gender develop¬
ment that recognizes the truly interactive nature of biology and environ¬
ment as well as individual agency in the creation of gender by examining
how culture and individual behavior may impact biology and physiology
and vice versa
SUGGESTED READINGS
Bern, S. L. 1993. The Lenses of Gender: Transforming the Debate on Sexual Inequality.
New Haven: Yale University Press.
Fausto-Sterling, A. 1985. Myths of Gender. New York: Basic Books.
Golub, S. 1992. Periods: From Menarche to Menopause. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Hare-Mustin, R., andj. Marecek 1990. Making a Difference. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
Rhode, D. L. 1990. Theoretical Perspectives on Sexual Difference. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
Tavris, C. 1992. The Mismeasure of Woman. New York: Simon and Schuster.
\
Chapter
Anceetore and Neighbors: Social

Constructions of Gender at
Other Times, in Other Fiaces
Ancestors and Neighbors: Social Constructions of Gender at Other Times, in Other Places 57
None of us was alive 5 million years ago when humans as a species

diverged from the apes, but all of us probably think we have a pretty good
idea of what life was like for our prehistoric ancestors. For most of us, the
quintessential symbol of prehistory is the caveman: a hairy, club-wielding
cross between a man and an ape, who fiercely protected the homefront
and hunted wild animals to provide food for his dependents. Where do
women fit into this scenario? “If women appear at all, they are at the edge
of the picture, placid-looking, holding babies, squatting by the fire, stir¬
ring the contents of a pot” (Bleier 1984:116; see also Conkey and Gero
1991).
“The theory that humanity originated in the club-wielding man-ape,
aggressive and masterful, is so widely accepted as scientific fact and vividly
secure in our popular culture as to seem self-evident” (Bleier 1984:115).
Yet, this theory has been challenged recently by scientists uncovering new
data and reexamining existing data. In this chapter, we will discuss the
Man the Hunter theory of human evolution more fully, and we will review
some of the major scientific criticisms that have been leveled against it.
Our discussion will be based on evidence from three sources:
1. the archeological record, which includes fossil remains;

2. primatology, especially studies of living nonhuman primates, such as
chimpanzees; and
3. anthropological studies of preindustrial societies which scientists be¬
lieve may be replicas of the earliest human communities.
To begin, then, let’s turn to the archeological evidence.
BONES AND STONES:

THE ARCHEOLOGICAL RECORD
Scientists confront a number of problems when attempting to reconstruct

evolutionary history. For one thing, archeological finds are relatively
sparse and fragmentary and, as Ruth Hubbard (1990:67) points out,
“behavior leaves no fossils.” Scientists must rely on a few, very general
clues—a jaw or skull (but often just pieces of them), some teeth, or
chipped stones—as they try to solve the puzzle of how our early ancestors
lived hundreds of thousands of years ago. The farther back in time we go,
the less evidence we have and the more geographically spread out the
puzzle is. For some periods, there is a “fossil gap”; for instance, no fossil
remains have been discovered for the period between 8 or 9 million years
ago and 4 or 5 million years ago—a gap of about 4 million years (Bleier
1984; Hubbard 1979). Adding to the difficulty is the fact that only certain
types of material such as bone and stone can be preserved. Organic
materials, such as reeds and other plants as well as wood and bark, decay
58 Chapter 3
(Bleier 1984; Tanner aryi Zihlman 1976). Consequently, “the fossil record
available for study in no way represents an adequate sample of human
populations once inhabiting the planet,” nor of the foods they ate nor of
the tools they used. “Even armed with the maximum amount of informa¬
tion currently available for study . . . the amount of knowledge we do not
possess is so vast that no one can claim a definitive theory of human
origin and evolution, either morphological or cultural” (Bleier 1984:122-
123, author’s emphasis). Theories about the history and process of hu¬
man evolution remain, as John Dupre (1990:57) notes, at the level of
“origin myths.”
Despite these difficulties, however, archeologists and anthropolo¬
gists have provided us with what by now has become a familiar account of
prehistory focusing on Man the Hunter. According to this traditional
reconstruction, some time between 12 and 28 million years ago, our ape
ancestors were forced down out of the trees as the climate became dryer,
causing their subtropical forest habitat to recede. One of their most
important adaptations to life on the ground was bipedalism: the ability to
walk upright on two feet. This freed their hands for reaching, grasping,
and tearing objects; for carrying; and eventually, for using tools. However,
bipedalism had other significant consequences as well. “Walking upright
produced a narrower pelvis to hold the guts in position. Yet as language
developed, brains and hence heads grew much bigger relative to body
size” (Gough 1975:61). To compensate for these anatomical changes,
offspring were born at an earlier stage of development than had pre¬
viously been the case, making them more dependent on their mothers’
care for survival. Obviously, females burdened with helpless infants could
not roam very far in search of food, so the role of breadwinner was taken
up by the males.
In assuming the responsibility of breadwinner, males faced a special
challenge: the spread of indigestible grasses in their new savanna habitat
made foraging for vegetation an unreliable food source. Gradually, hunt¬
ing replaced foraging as the primary subsistence strategy, and meat be¬
came a central part of the early human diet. The most successful hunts
were cooperative, so men banded together on hunting expeditions. This,
in turn, led to the further evolution of their communication skills (in
particular, language) and to the invention of the first tools (weapons for
hunting and for defense). After a successful hunt, the men would share
the kill and carry it back to their home bases where the women would
prepare it for eating (Gough 1975).
This sexual division of labor—^women as caretakers of home and
children, and men as breadwinners and protectors—was adaptive; those
who conformed to it enjoyed a distinct advantage in the struggle for
survival. In addition, these mutually exclusive female and male roles gave
rise to particular personality traits; women grew to be empathic, nurtur-
ing, and dependent, whereas men were daring, unemotional, and aggres¬
sive. Over time, these adaptive characteristics were also naturally selected
for in the evolutionary process (Lovejoy 1981; Tiger and Fox 1971; Ardrey
1966).
It is hardly a coincidence that this depiction of prehistoric social life
bears an uncanny resemblance to the traditional, middle-class nuclear
family of Western societies. Anthropology, like most scientific disciplines,
has been dominated by white, middle- and upper-middle-class men from
Western industrialized countries, primarily the United States, Great Brit¬
ain, and France. As we argued in chapter 1, the values and beliefs of our
society, as well as those of the specific groups to which we belong in that
society, can strongly influence or bias our understanding of the world
around us. Indeed, feminist anthropologists have identified two types of
bias in the traditional Man the Hunter theory of human evolution: eth-
nocentrism and androcentrism.
To be ethnocentric means that one views one’s own cultural beliefs
and practices as superior to all others. Looking again at the Man the
Hunter argument, we can see that it is ethnocentric in two ways. First, it
inaccurately depicts contemporary Western gender relations as universal,
both historically and cross-culturally. In other words, it makes it seem as
if the behaUors and traits that are typically viewed as masculine or femi¬
nine in modern industrial societies like the United States are the same for
men and women everywhere and that they have remained basically un¬
changed throughout human history. Second, and perhaps more impor¬
tantly, this argument implies that the contemporary Western model of
gender relations is the only correct or appropriate model because it is
natural and adaptive (Wylie 1991). We will return to these criticisms
shortly, but for now let’s examine the second type of bias inherent in the
Man the Hunter perspective.
Androcentric means male-centered. The Man the Hunter theory
clearly emphasizes male behavior, “with females having little or no part in
the evolutionary saga except to bear the next generation of hunters”
(Tanner and Zihlman 1976:585). Cooperation and sharing, competition
and aggression, communication and the development of material tech¬
nology are all seen as deriving from the exclusively male role of hunter.
“Because both sexes are not included, because the interaction of their
roles is not examined except in the most rudimentary sense, traditional
reconstructions have been incomplete and misleading (Tanner and
Zihlman 1976:585; Gero 1991).
Initially, feminist anthropologists attempted to correct the ethno-
centrism and male bias characteristic of traditional anthropology by “find¬
ing women” in the archeological record (di Leonardo 1992, Wylie 1991).
Largely by reexamining existing evidence, they developed alternative
reconstructions of our prehistoric past which highlight the female role in
60 Chapter 3
human evolution. For example, Tanner and Zihlman (1976) argued that
the traditional notion of apes being forced into the open savanna as
forests receded was no longer tenable. Instead, they maintained that our
ape ancestors moved away from the forests as their numbers grew, so as
to avoid competition with the various species of monkeys and other
animals living there. On the forest fringe, they found not just indigestible
grasses, but a plentiful variety of foods, including nuts and seeds, fruits
and berries, roots and tubers, eggs and insects, and several species of
small animals, some of which burrowed underground. Successful exploi¬
tation of these resources, as well as the need for protection and defense
in the open savanna habitat, required new survival strategies and adapta¬
tions. Bipedalism was one such adaptation, as it freed the hands for other
tasks.
As this feminist reconstruction goes, bipedalism did result in other
physiological changes, including the birth of offspring at an earlier stage
of development, but rather than forcing mothers and children to become
dependent on males, these changes spurred females to be more innova¬
tive in their quest for food and in the defense of their young against
predators. The mothers’ food-gathering task was made more difficult by
additional physiological changes, especially the loss of body fur. This
meant that infants had to be carried, since they could no longer cling to
their mothers’ fur the way ape offspring do. Consequently, women had to
invent something to carry their babies in, so they could keep their hands
free for collecting food. Moreover, they may have extended this innova¬
tion to food gathering itself, making carriers that permitted them to
collect more food than could be eaten on the spot (Bleier 1984; Tanner
and Zihlman 1976; Slocum 1975).
The value of the initial feminist reconstructions, such as this one, is
not that they are necessarily more accurate than those of traditional
anthropology, but rather that they force us to consider alternative visions
of prehistory. They suggest that perhaps the first material technology was
not weapons for hunting, but rather slings or carriers for babies and food.
They also suggest that females, fan from being passive, dependent child-
bearers, may have been active technological innovators who provided
food for themselves and their young and defended against predators.
Instead of living in nticlear families, our prehistoric ancestors may have
lived in mother-centered kin groups with flexible structures.
By reconceptualizing prehistory, this initial feminist research—
which Wylie (1991) has referred to as “remedial”—encouraged feminist
anthropologists to reexamine gender attributions in the archeological
record. Gender attribution is the process of linking archeological data
(e.g., tools and other artifacts) with males and females. “These gender
links usually, and problematically, depend upon assumptions about what
males/females do (or, on what they did in prehistory) ” (Conkey and Gero
1991:11). Thus, feminist reexaminations of the archeological record pro¬

vided support for feminist reconstructions of prehistory. For instance, the
earliest archeological evidence for the hunting of animals with weapons
is only 100,000 years old. (Bows and arrows appeared just about 15,000
years ago.) Older tools—small hand-sized stones dating as far back as
about 2.5 million years ago—might have been used for cutting and scrap¬
ing meat, but would not have made good weapons for killing animals
(Gero 1991; Bleier 1984; Longino and Doell 1983; Zihlman 1978). More¬
over, archeological finds of early hominid teeth indicate that they were
used primarily for grinding, most likely “to process gritty food from the
ground, characteristic of much vegetable food” (Tanner and Zihlman
1976:598). This and other research (e.g., Gailey 1987; Slocum 1975)
indicated that meat probably made up a fairly small portion of the early
human diet. Gatherers, not hunters, therefore, likely made the major
contribution to early humans’ nutritional needs.
Nevertheless, feminist anthropologists themselves recognized some
of the difficulties inherent in this “Woman the Gatherer” response to Man
the Hunter theory. In its gynecentrism (that is, its “woman-centered-
ness”), the Woman the Gatherer reconstruction “simply reproduced or
inverted the androcentric assumptions underlying the patently sexist re¬
search it was meant to challenge” (Wylie 1991:39—40). Feminist anthro¬
pologists began to consider what it means to “engender the past.” Conkey
and Gero’s (1991:12,14) response to this question is worth quoting at
length:
Engendering the past becomes much more than “finding” men and
women. It is trying to understand how gender “works” in all of its
dimensions: as gender ideology, gender roles, gender relations, as well as
a significant source of cultural meanings related to the construction of
social lives. . . . Larger questions . . . should lie at the heart of
evolutionary studies . . . : has there always been a sexual division of labor?
has there always been gender? what alternative forms of labor division
might exist? how might such divisions of tasks, in fact, “create” gender?
Even if some version of a sexual division of labor is one of the entry
points through which we engender our narratives of the past, this
division of labor—as an object of knowledge—should not go
unquestioned or unchallenged (authors emphasis).
Feminist anthropologists who have undertaken research with these ques¬

tions in mind have focused largely on interpersonal relations and house¬
hold activities, rather than the traditional areas of trade, politics, and
government. However, they emphasize that household production and
social life cannot be separated from the “external” public domain because
these activities are critical to the ability of a population to grow and
sustain itself and they also make possible the work that a state requires
(Conkey and Gero 1991; see also chapter 7). These studies have found
62 Chapter 3
that in many early human societies, male and female experiences were
apparently often overlapping, and there is ample evidence that women
participated in activities, such as flintknapping and the creation of art,
from which they were previously thought to have been excluded (Gero
1991; Handsman 1991). Moreover, feminist anthropologists have devel¬
oped new ways of writing about the past that, unlike the traditional, sterile
accounts, convey more vivid images of our prehistoric ancestors, not only
as gendered, but also as purposeful human actors (Spector 1991).
This engendering of the past has not only occurred in archeology,
but also in other branches of anthropology, including primatology and
ethnographic studies of contemporary nonindustrial societies. Let’s ex¬
amine some of this research now.
OUR RELATIVES, THE CHIMPS
Because of the many gaps in the archeological record, scientists have

sought additional sources of data to help them piece together our evo¬
lutionary past. Research on Imng, nonhuman primates has been espe¬
cially useful in this regard. Recent studies have identified close biological
similarities between humans and various species of monkeys and apes,
particularly chimpanzees. Recent DNA analyses, in fact, show that chim¬
panzees are the primate most closely related to humans and that they
differentiated about 5 million years ago, a relatively short time in evolu¬
tionary history (Zihlman 1993). Therefore, “observing what living pri¬
mates do as they adapt to the various environments in which they live
should, in theory, throw some light on the social behavior of our ances¬
tors,” and perhaps on contemporary human behavior as well (Leibowitz
1975:23).
Of course, this approach has its problems too. For one, “The women
and men who have contributed to primate studies have carried with them
the marks of their own histories and cultures. These marks are written
into the texts of the lives of the monkeys and apes, but often in subtle and
unexpected ways” (Haraway 1989:2). Second, primate species vary widely
in the extent to which there are both anatomical and behavioral differ¬
ences between the sexes. There are about 200 species of primates and,
according to Wright (1993), in about 40 percent of these, females are
dominant or equal to males. We will return to this point shortly, but for
now suffice it to say that the tremendous variability among primate spe¬
cies makes it possible for one to cite examples of virtually any behavior
one is looking for simply by choosing a particular animal (Dupre 1990;
\ Hubbard 1990). Finally, “most scientists find it convenient to forget that
present-day apes and monkeys have had as long an evolutionary past as
we have had, since the time we went our separate ways millions of years
ago” (Hubbard 1979:30). Nevertheless, keeping the limitations of these

data in mind, many scientists, feminists included, maintain that much can
be learned about human evolutionary history by studying present-day
primates, especially our closest primate relatives, the chimps.
Early primate studies were much in the tradition of the Man the
Hunter theory (Haraway 1989). They characterized the primates ances¬
tral to humans as killer apes, with the males of the species competing
aggressively with one another for food and sexual access to females.
Primate herds were said to be organized into dominance hierarchies sNith the
largest male assuming the role of leader and being accorded special
sexual privileges as well as top priority in the food distribution order
(Lovejoy 1981; Ardrey 1966).
Wright (1993) maintains that the gender stereotypes that emerged
from this early research were due to the fact that the studies were based
on only cursory observations of certain types of primates (baboons,
vervets, and macaques). Among these primates, there is indeed a strict
dominance hierarchy betw'een males and females, and males are almost
always dominant. However, more recent and more thorough field studies
of a diversity of primate species have shown tremendous variation in their
social organization and in male/female behavior. For example, as we
noted earlier, of the approximately 200 known primate species, females
are dominant or equal to males in 40 percent. “At the family level, six out
of ten families have females equal in rank or dominant over males and
one of these families (Cebidae) has genera with females either equal,
subordinate or dominant” (Wright 1993:127).
We now know that chimpanzees, for instance, are very sociable
creatures and that they live in flexibly organized communities. Rather
than being a rigid hierarchical structure, it appears that leadership shifts
frequently along with the composition of the group as a whole. As with
many other primate species, size does not necessarily determine domi¬
nance, especially if dominance is measured in terms of who has feeding
priority. The largest male in the group has no prerogatives over others.
Females, in fact, are often the initiators of sexual activity and may choose
to mate with several males who each wait their turn (Wright 1993;
Zihlman 1993; Tanner and Zihlman 1976; Leibowitz 1975).
Both male and female chimps participate in food acquisition activi¬
ties, and both prepare and use tools for these tasks. Contrary to earlier
reports, chimpanzees are neither strict carnivores nor pure vegetarians.
Like humans, they are omnivores—that is, they eat both vegetable foods
and meat—although approximately 95 percent of their diet is made up
of plants and fruits (Bleier 1984; Teleki 1975). Some of the meat that is
eaten is obtained by “hunting”; groups of two to five adult chimps may
cooperatively pursue, capture, and kill small prey (Teleki 1975). In any
event, chimpanzees share food with one another, and it is age, genealogi-
64 Chapter 3
cal relationship, and friendship that govern the distribution of food, not
physical size (Wright 19^3; Tanner and Zihlman 1976).
What does all this tell us about the evolution of human gender
relations? Although we must remember the dangers of making generali¬
zations about human behavior based on observations of even our closest
primate relatives, studies of primate behavior and social organization may
provide us with clues—albeit limited ones—about our ancestral roots. At
the very least, such research calls into question gender stereotypes de¬
rived from early cursory studies of a small percentage of primate species
and highlights the important roles females play in structuring primate
societies (Wright 1993). Certainly, such research forces us to consider the
possibility that our prehuman ancestors, quite unlike so-called killer apes,
lived in groups characterized by sociability and cooperation among males
and females. Such gender relations are not unknown among contempo¬
rary human societies, as we will see next.
WOMEN AND MEN ELSEWHERE: ARE WESTERN

CONSTRUCTIONS OF GENDER UNIVERSAL?
Earlier we discussed the ethnocentric bias of Man the Hunter theory. This
perspective portrays male dominance and female subordination as his¬
torical and cultural universals. It assumes that men everywhere and at all
times have been women’s superiors and that the work men do is more
important or more highly valued than women’s work. Not surprisingly,
this theory was developed largely by Western male anthropologists who
were viewing other societies through the tinted lenses of their own cul¬
ture. Assuming male dominance, they often overlooked women’s roles in
the societies they were observing, or they relied on male informants for
data on women (Gailey 1987; Rogers 1978). The question, then, bears
re-asking: Are Western constructions of gender universal?
More than fifty years ago, the pioneering anthropologist Margaret
Mead answered that question in thq negative based on her field research
among three societies in New Guinea. Mead observed cultures in which
men were expected to be timid and nurturant, but women could be
described as aggressive and competitive (Mead 1935). Since Mead’s work
was published, more research has been done on cross-cultural variations
in gender. Rather than lending support to the notion of the universality
of Western constructions of gender or gender inequality, these studies
reveal a rich assortment of patterns of gender relations throughout the
world.
Every known society has a division of labor by sex (and also by age).
However, what is considered men’s work versus what is considered
women’s work varies dramatically from society to society. In some cul-
Ancestors and Neighbors: Social Constructions of Gender at Other 'rimes, in Other Places 65
tures, for instance, women build the houses; in others, this is men’s work-
in most societies, women usually do the cooking, but there are societies
in which this is typically men’s responsibility. In fact, looking at Table 3.1
on pages 66-67, we see that there are very few tasks from which either sex
is completely excluded. According to the table, there are no tasks from
which men are totally excluded and the only tasks from which women are
totally excluded appear to be the hunting of large sea animals (e.g.,
whaling) and the smelting of ores. There are very few societies in which
women participate in metalworking, lumbering, and hunting large land
animals, although there are exceptions. For example, among the Agta of
the Philippines, women hunt deer and wild pigs with knives and bows and
arrows (Estioko-Griffm 1986). In most cases, though, women’s hunting
activities do not involve the use of spears, bows and arrows, or heavy clubs
(Harris 1993). It has also been argued by some researchers that in virtu¬
ally all societies men hold a monopoly on the use of physical violence
(e.g., Harris 1993; Konner 1982), but others have reported on female
warriors and soldiers (e.g.. Sacks 1979; see also chapter 10). There is also
considerable evidence that women may behave as aggressively as men,
especially when competitiveness and verbal abusiveness are included as
measures of aggression (e.g., Bjokqvist 1994; Lepowsky 1994).
Of particular interest to us, however, are gender relations in contem¬
porary foraging societies. Anthropologists maintain that these societies
are probably most like the communities of our earliest human ancestors
(O’Kelly and Carney 1986). This is not to say that the present-day forag¬
ing society is an exact replica of prehistoric social organization; these
societies, like all others, have experienced numerous environmental and
social changes throughout their histories, not the least of which came
through contact with European and American colonizers during the past
600 years (Leacock 1993; Bleier 1984; Etienne and Leacock 1980). But as
the smallest (25 to 200 members) and least technologically developed of
all human societies, contemporary foraging peoples may offer us further
clues as to how our early ancestors lived, while teaching us valuable
lessons about the diversity of social consti uctions of gender today.
Gender Relations in Contemporary Foraging Societies

The foraging society is also referred to as the hunting-gathering society
because its members meet their survival needs by hunting game (and
often by fishing) and by gathering vegetation and other types of food m
their surrounding environment. Just who performs each task, however,
varies somewhat from society to society. The pattern most frequently
observed is one in which men hunt large animals and go deep-sea fishing
if possible, while women take primary responsibility for gathering and for
hunting small animals as well as for food preparation, home building, and
66 Chapter 3
TA3LE 3.1 The DMelon of Labor by Sex for 5(^ Tasks in 105 Societies
Number of Societies in Which Task Is Done by:
Men Both Women

Men Predom¬ Sexes Predom¬ Women %
TASK Only inantly Equally inantly Only Male
1. Hunting large sea animals 48 0 0 0 0 100.0

2. Smelting of ores 37 0 0 0 0 100.0
3. Metalworking 85 1 0 0 0 99.8
4. Lumbering 135 4 0 0 0 99.4
5. Hunting large land animals 139 5 0 0 0 99.3
6. Woodworking 159 3 1 1 0 98.8
7. Fowling 132 4 3 0 0 98.3
8. Making musical instruments 83 3 1 0 1 97.6
9. Trapping small land animals 136 12 1 1 0 97.5
10. Boatbuilding 84 3 3 0 1 96.6
11. Stoneworking 67 0 6 0 0 95.9
12. Work with bone, horn, 71 7 2 0 2 94.6
or shell
13. Mining/quarrying 31 1 2 0 1 93.7
14. Bonesetting/surgery 34 6 4 0 0 92.7
15. Butchering 122 9 4 4 4 92.3
16. Collecting wild honey 39 5 2 ' 0 2 91.7
17. Clearing land 95 34 6 3 1 90.5
18. Fishing 83 45 8 5 2 86.7
19. Tending large animals 54 24 14 3 3 82.4
20. Housebuilding 105 30 14 9 20 77.4
21. Preparing soil 66 27 14 17 10 73.1
22. Netmaking 42 2 5 1 15 71.2
23. Ropemaking 62 7 18 5 19 69.9
24. Generating fire 40 6 16 4 20 62.3
25. Bodily mutilation 36 4 48 6 12 60.8
26. Preparing skins 39 4 2 5 31 54.6
27. Gathering small land animals 27 3 9 13 15 54.5
28. Planting crops 27 35 ,, 33 26 20 54.4
29. Making leather goods 35 3 2 5 29 53.2
30. Harvesting 10 37 34 34 26 45.0
31. Tending crops 22 23 24 30 32 44.6
32. Milking 15 2 8 2 21 43.8
33. Basketmaking 37 9 15 18 51 42.5
34. Burden carrying 18 12 46 34 36 39.3
35. Matmaking 30 4 9 5 55 37.6
36. Tending small animals 19 8 14 12 44 35.9
37. Food preservation 24 2 3 3 40 32.9
38.\ Loom weaving 18 0 6 8 50 32.5
39. Gathering small sea animals 11 4 1 12 27 31.1
40. Gathering fuel 25 12 12 23 94 27.2
TA3LE 3.1 continued
Number of Societies in Which Task Is Done by:
Men Both Women

Men Predom¬ Sexes Predom¬ Women %
TASK Only inantly Equally inantly Only Male
41. Making clothes 16 4 11 13 78 22.4

42. Preparing drinks 15 3 4 4 65 22.2
43. Pottery making 14 5 6 6 74 21.1
44. Gathering wild vegetables 6 4 18 42 65 19.7
45. Dairy production 4 0 0 0 24 14.3
46. Spinning 7 3 4 5 72 13.6
47. Laundering 5 0 4 8 49 13.0
48. Fetching water 4 4 8 13 131 8.6
49. Cooking 0 2 2 63 117 8.3
50. Preparing vegetables 3 1 4 21 145 5.7
Source: Adapted from G. P. Murdock and C. Provost, “Factors in the Division of Labor by Sex; A Cross-Cultural Analysis,” Elhnolog)
12:207; and D. S. Eitzen, In Conflict and Order, Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc.
child care (O’Kelly and Carney 1986). In most societies, though, in spite
of a clear dmsion of labor by sex in principle, in practice there is actually
considerable overlap in what men and women do and there are “cross¬
overs in role,” as Gilmore (1990) refers to them, without shame or anxiety
for women or men.
O’Kelly and Carney (1986:12-21) have identified six different pat¬
terns of the gendered division of labor among hunting and gathering
societies:
1. men hunt, women process the catch;

2. men hunt, women gather;
3. men hunt, men and women gather;
4. men hunt and fish, women hunt and gather;
5. men and women independently hunt, fish, and gather;
6. men and women communally hunt and gather.
In the first type, which is common among Eskimo groups, meat and fish
are the dietary staples, and men are the chief food providers. This puts
women at a disadvantage relative to men; they are dependent on men for
food as well as for goods obtained through trade with non-Eskimos.
Consequently, men in these societies have more power and prestige than
women, but this does not mean that women are powerless or that
women’s work is considered unimportant. Women may secure power and
68 Chapter 3
prestige as shamans, and elderly women may act as political and military
advisors. Wliat is more, women are responsible for making the clothing
and much of the equipment men need to hunt and fish (O’Kelly and
Carney 1986). As a result, “the skills of women are as indispensable to
survival as are those of men, and they are so perceived by men. . . . The
question, ‘Which is better (or more important), a good hunter or a good
seamstress?’ is meaningless in Eskimo; both are indispensable” (quoted
in Sacks 1979:89-90).
Despite the complementarity of gendered behaviors in hunting¬
gathering societies of this first type, they are the least egalitarian of all
hunter-gatherers. Women who live in societies characterized by one of the
five other previously listed patterns take a more direct and active role in
food acquisition, which in turn affords them more equal access to their
societies’ resources and rewards. Among the IKung bush-living people of
the Kalahari Desert, for example, women provide from 60 to 80 percent
of the society’s food through their gathering activities. The IKung division
of labor conforms to the second type on our list, but the game hunted by
men is a much less dependable food source than the plant and small
animal food obtained by women. IKung women are respected for their
specialized knowledge of the bush; “successful gathering over the years
requires the ability to discriminate among hundreds of edible and ined¬
ible species of plants at various stages in their life cycle” (Draper 1975:83).
In addition, women return from their gathering expeditions armed not
only with food for the community, but also with valuable information for
hunters:
Women are skilled in reading the signs of the bush, and they take careful
note of animal tracks, their age, and the direction of movement. ... In
general, the men take advantage of women’s reconnaissance and query
them routinely on the evidence of game movements, the location of
water, and the like (Draper 1975:82).
\
The IKung have a clear division of labor by sex, but it is not rigidly
adhered to, and men and women sometimes do one another’s chores.
This is especially true of men, who frequently do “women’s work” without
any shame or embarrassment. Childcare is viewed as the responsibility of
both parents, and “as children grow up there are few experiences which
set one sex apart from the other” (Draper 1975:89). In fact, IKung
childrearing practices are very relaxed and nonauthoritarian, reflecting
IKung social relations in general. Among the IKung, aggressive behavior
on the part of men or women is discouraged and the IKung rarely engage
in organized armed conflict (Harris 1993; Shostak 1981; Draper 1975).
As Harris (1993) notes, although IKung boys are taught from early child¬
hood how to kill large animals, they are not taught to kill other people.
Egalitarian gender relations like those of the !Kung are also charac¬
teristic of the other types of hunting-gathering societies remaining on our
list. In these societies, one sex is not intrinsically valued over the other.
Rather, an individual wins respect and influence within the community
based on his or her contribution to the general well-being of the group
(Bleier 1984). The Mbuti Pygmies of Zaire (type 6 in the preceding list)
provide another example. In Mbuti society, work is a collective enterprise,
and few tasks are assigned exclusively to one sex. Men and women share
childcare, forage together, and even hunt cooperatively. The Agta of the
Philippines also have this type of division of labor. As noted previously,
Agta women and men hunt, using knives or bows and arrows. They fish
with spears while swimming underwater, an activity that requires consid¬
erable skill and physical stamina. Although hunting and fishing supply
most of the Agta’s food, members of both sexes gather vegetation as well
(Estioko-Griffm 1986). As O’Kelly and Carney (1986:13) observe, “This
cooperative interdependence is associated with highly egalitarian gender
roles.”
It should be noted that egalitarian gender relations are not limited
to hunting and gathering societies, although they are more common in
these types of societies than in others. Lepowsky (1990) reports on a
horticultural society, the people of Vanatinai (a small island southeast of
mainland Papua New Guinea), where the division of labor and other
social relations are highly egalitarian. Both Vanatinai women and men
plant, tend, and harvest garden crops. Although hunting with spears is a
male monopoly, women also hunt game by trapping. Women have pri¬
mary responsibility for caring for children, but men share this task quite
willingly. Members of both sexes learn and practice magic; participate in
warfare, peacemaking, and community decision making; and undertake
sailing expeditions in search of ceremonial valuables. In short, Vanatinai
society “offers every adult, regardless of sex or kin group, the opportunity
of excelling at prestigious activities such as participation in traditional
exchange or ritual functions essential to health and prosperity” (Le¬
powsky 1990:178; see also Sutlive 1993).
Several important points can be drawn from these cross-cultural
data. First, it should be clear to us by now that contemporary Western
constructions of gender are not universal. The research indicates that
there is a wide range of gender relations cross-culturally and that in some
societies, gender relations are highly egalitarian. Furthermore, if contem¬
porary foraging societies do resemble the communities in which our
earliest ancestors lived, they do not lend support to the reconstruction
offered by Man the Hunter theory. Instead, they reinforce archeological
and primatological data that indicate that at least some of our early
ancestors may have lived in groups characterized by cooperation and
70 Chapter 3
\
reciprocity and in which adults of both sexes actively contributed to
group survival.
A second significant point that can be gleaned from these anthro¬
pological studies is that a gendered division of labor does not necessarily
produce gender inequality. The key intervening variable appears to be
the value that the members of a society attach to a particular role or task.
In our own society, the work women do is typically viewed as less impor¬
tant than the work men do. But in the societies discussed here, women
are seen as “essential partners” in the economy and in decision making,
even though women and men may be responsible for different tasks or
have different spheres of influence (Miller 1993; Galley 1987; O’Kelly and
Carney 1986). As Sacks (1979:92-93) observes, “Many nonclass societies
have no problem in seeing differentiation without having to translate it
into differential worth.”
A third and final point concerns women’s capacity to bear children.
’We noted earlier in the chapter that some scholars maintain that women’s
reproductive role prevents them from fully participating in other activi¬
ties, such as food acquisition. However, the anthropological studies re¬
viewed in this section suggest that women are not automatically excluded
from certain activities because they bear children. Nor are men auto¬
matically excluded from childrearing simply because they cannot bear
children.
It is important to see that, unlike breathing, for example, the biological

capacity to reproduce does not necessarily mean that one has to
reproduce or even be heterosexually active, nor does it dictate the social
arrangements for child nurturance and rearing or determine how child
rearing affects one’s participation in other cultural activities. Wliether or
not we bear, nurse or mother children is just as much a function of
cultural, social, political, economical, and, no more importantly,
biological factors as whether we are poets or soccer players (Bleier
1984:146, author’s emphasis). >
In preindustrial societies, like those we have discussed so far, childbearing

and childrearing do not isolate mothers as they frequently do in societies
like our own. “The tasks are absorbed by a broader range of people, and
children are more incorporated into public activities. . . . Moreover,
motherhood (either through childbirth, adoption, or fosterage) often
conveys an increase in status, giving women a greater say in matters than
when they were not fully adult” (Gailey 1987:45-46, author’s emphasis).
It appears, then, that nonbiological factors—among them environ¬
mental resources, size of the group, the economy, and, of course, ideol-
ogy—play a more significant part in determining what the members of a
society define as appropriate “men’s work” and “women’s work” than do
biological factors; Contrary to Sigmund Freud’s assertion, anatomy is not

destiny. This point is made even clearer when we consider examples of
multiple genders.
Multiple Genders
Throughout this chapter so far, we have discussed gender as a dichoto¬

mous category. However, as we learned in chapter 2, such a conceptuali¬
zation of gender is at best misleading. Anthropological research also
provides fascinating data that call into question the notion of gender as
a dichotomy. Indeed, in some societies there are three genders, and in
others, four. The berdache of some Asian, South Pacific, and North Ameri¬
can Indian societies is an excellent example. Berdaches are individuals who
adopt the gender behavior ascribed to members of the opposite sex.
While women may become berdaches, most of the research that has been
conducted has focused on men who chose to be berdaches.
Berdaches lived, worked, and dressed as members of the opposite sex,
although they were often specialists in tasks associated with both sexes
(Roscoe 1991; Gailey 1987; Williams 1986; Whitehead 1981; Martin and
Voorhies 1975). The Mohave, for instance, allowed men and women to
cross genders. Boys who showed a preference for feminine toys and
clothing would undergo an initiation ceremony at puberty during which
they became alyha. As alyha, they adopted feminine names, painted their
faces as women did, performed female tasks, and married men. When
they married, alyha pretended to menstruate by cutting their upper
thighs. They also simulated pregnancy. “Labor pains, induced by drinking
a severely constipating drug, culminate in the birth of a fictitious stillborn
child. Stillborn Mohave infants are customarily buried by the mother, so
that an alyhols failure to return to ‘her’ home with a living infant is
explained in a culturally acceptable manner” (Martin and Voorhies
1975:97).
A Mohave female who wished to pursue a masculine lifestyle under¬
went an initiation ceremony to become a hwame. Hwame dressed and lived
much like men; they engaged in hunting, farming, and shamanism, al¬
though they were not permitted to assume leadership positions or partici¬
pate in warfare. They did, though, assume paternal responsibility for
children; some women, in fact, became hwame after they had children.
Importantly, neither hwame nor alyha were considered abnormal or devi¬
ant within their cultures (Martin and Voorhies 1975).
Anthropologist Will Roscoe (1991) has conducted extensive re¬
search on Zuni berdaches, called lhamana by this American Indian nation.
Roscoe points out that although berdaches cross-dressed, it is inaccurate to
label them transvestites or transsexuals as some researchers have done.
This is because their cross-dressing was routine, public, and without erotic
72 Chapter 3
motives. Nor were berdaches necessarily homosexual as we think of this

sexual orientation today. There were Zunis who were sexually oriented to
the opposite sex, some who were sexually oriented to the same sex, and
still others who were sexually oriented to berdaches. “Such an organization
of gender geometrically increased options for individual identities and
behaviors” (Roscoe 1991:146). Moreover, Roscoe emphasizes that there
was no stigma attached to the berdache status; berdaches were not viewed
negatively as deviants. Roscoe attributes this openness to the Zuni con¬
ception of gender acquisition, which maintained that gender is not some¬
thing one is born with, but rather something that develops over the
course of one’s life. In fact, until about age six, gender was not seen as an
important attribute of a child and children of both sexes, rather than
being called “boy” or “girl,” were simply referred to as “child.”
According to Roscoe (1991:146):
In Zuni philosophy, one’s status as a man, woman, or berdache was a

product of culture, the result of [socialization], while gender balance,
the possibility of combining or temporarily adopting roles and
experiences of more than one gender, was a desirable end for all Zunis.
Berdaches were not branded as threats to a rigid gender ideology; rather,
they were considered an affirmation of humanity’s original, pre-gendered
unity—representatives of a form of solidarity and wholeness that
transcended the division of humans into men and women.
Unfortunately, this positive evaluation of berdaches and broad conception

of gender were virtually extinguished through contact with white society.
Although berdaches certainly did not disappear, by the end of World War
II, the common attitudes toward them in Native American communities
were shame and often hostility. Native Americans with traits and interests
that previously could have been expressed by becoming berdaches were
forced to either deny their feelings or to hide them. However, Roscoe has
found a rediscovery of berdachism among some North American Indian
societies, largely through the combined efforts of the Native American
rights mQvement and the gay rights movement (see also Williams 1986).
Other examples of such gender crossing can also be found in Tahi¬
tian culture (Gilmore 1990); among the Omani Muslims (Wikan 1984);
and with the Hijras of India (Nanda 1990). Meigs (1990) and Gailey
(1987), however, report on a society in which gender is regarded as a
process rather than as a stable social category. Among the Hua of Papua
New Guinea, gender is perceived as changing throughout an individual’s
life. The Hua bestow high status on masculine people, but view them as
\ physically weak and vulnerable. Feminine people are regarded as invul¬
nerable, but polluted. When children are born, they are all at least partially
feminine because the Hua believe that women transfer some of their own
femininity to their offspring. Thus, the more children a woman has, the
more femininity she loses. After three births, she is no longer considered
polluted. She may participate in the discussions and rituals of men and
share their higher status and authority, but she must also observe their
diet and sanitation customs since she has now become vulnerable.
Hua men, meanwhile, gradually lose their masculinity by imparting
it to young boys during growth rituals. As this happens, they become
regarded as physically invulnerable, but polluted. Consequently, old men
work in the fields with young women and have little social authority.
“Among the Hua, then, gender is only tangentially related to sex differ¬
ences; it is mutable and flows from person to person. The process of
engendering is lifelong, and through it males and females shed the
gender they were born with and acquire the opposite characteristics”
(Gailey 1987:36).
Each of these examples illustrates the fluidity of gender as well as
the creativity that humans bring to the process of social organization.
While “our society typecasts women and men from birth through death
. . . other societies exist where gender differences are not extended be¬
yond adult reproductive roles” (Gailey 1987:35).
GENDER, EVOLUTION, AND CULTURE
In this chapter, we examined evolutionary perspectives of gender. The

traditional view—Man the Hunter theory—rests on the assumption that
the gender inequality and asymmetry attached to masculinity and femi¬
ninity in modern Western industrial societies are historical and cultural
universals. This position maintains that contemporary Western construc¬
tions of gender evolved from a prehistoric past in which women were
necessarily dependent on men for food and protection as a result of the
burdens of pregnancy and motherhood. Women, then, were relegated to
the “home,” whereas men assumed the public roles of defender and food
provider. They fulfilled the latter primarily by hunting together in groups,
and it was through these hunting activities that the hallmarks of the
human species—in particular, language and the invention of material
technology—supposedly developed.
In contrast to Man the Hunter theory, we also discussed feminist
perspectives of the evolution of gender. Feminist social scientists have
sought new evidence and reexamined existing evidence from three main
sources—the archeological record, primatology, and ethnographic stud¬
ies of contemporary foraging societies. Standing alone, each of these data
sources has serious drawbacks, but taken together they allow us to develop
alternative reconstructions of our prehistoric past. Although initial femi¬
nist efforts to correct the androcentric bias in Man the Hunter theories
resulted in reconstructions that were also sexist because of their gynecen-
74 Chapter 3
trism, more recent research has revealed that at least some early human
communities were probably cooperative and quite flexible in their social
organization. Moreover, women, rather than being passive and depen¬
dent, were instead likely to have been active food providers as well as
inventors and crafters of new material technology. Not unlike our closest
primate relatives and probably very similar to members of contemporary
foraging societies, our early human ancestors of both sexes were hunters
and gatherers, although gathering may have been a more successful
subsistence strategy.
In any event, the research reviewed in this chapter suggests that if
we are to develop a more balanced account of the evolution of gender,
we need to explore further the very strong possibility that both females
and males were full and active participants in the struggle for survival. A
presumption of gender inequality appears to be unfounded and mislead¬
ing. Moreover, the existence of multiple genders in some societies under¬
lines the point that sex and gender are distinct and sometimes
independent categories. Gender is not an either/or category, but rather
a fluid one that can best be conceptualized as multifaceted rather than
dichotomous.
One question that remains unanswered is how did we get here from
there? That is, if gender relations in sorhe societies were (and still are)
highly egalitarian, what factors gave rise to the pervasive gender inequal¬
ity characteristic of societies like our own? Any answer remains specula¬
tive, but scientists who have addressed this question have identified a
number of related factors, including population growth, increased envi¬
ronmental danger owing to ecological changes or warfare, the estab¬
lishment of trade or exchange relations between societies, a change from
a nomadic to a sedentary lifestyle, and technological advances allowing
for the accumulation of a surplus of food and other goods (Harris 1993;
Nelson 1993; Sutlive 1991; Lepowsky 1990; Galley 1987; O’Kelly and
Carney 1986; Bleier 1984; Gough 1975). Certainly, much more research
is needed to clarify the relationship between each of these conditions and
the emergence of gender inequality. However, what the available evi¬
dence does indicate is that specific gender relations appear to arise
largely in response to external circumstances—economic, political, and
social—not biological imperatives. In succeeding chapters, we will focus
on how particular gender relations are reinforced and perpetuated.
KEY TERMS
androcentrism male-centered; the view that men are superior to other ani¬
mals and to women
bipedalism walking upright on two feet
ethnocentrism the view that one set of cultural beliefs and practices is supe¬
rior to all others
foraging societies (hunting and gathering societies) small, technologically un¬
developed societies whose mertibers meet their survival needs by hunting
and trapping animals, by fishing (if possible), and by gathering vegeta¬
tion and other types of food in their surrounding environment; charac¬
terized by highly egalitarian gender relations
gender attribution the process of linking archeological data with males and fe¬
males
gynecentrism female-centered; the view that females are superior to other ani¬
mals and to men
SUGGESTED READINGS
di Leonardo, M. (Ed.) 1991. Gender at the Crossroads of Knowledge. Berkeley: Uni¬

versity of California Press.
Gero, J. M., and M. W. Conkey (Eds.) 1991. Engendering Archeology. Cambridge,
MA: Basil Blackwell.
Haraway, D. 1989. Piirnate Visions. New York: Routledge.
Miller, B. D. (Ed.) 1993. Sex and Gender Plierarchies. New York: Cambridge Uni¬
versity Press.
Nanda, S. 1990. Neither Man nor Woman: The Hijras of India. Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth.
Roscoe, W. 1991. The Zuni Man-Woman. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press.
Sanday, P. R., and R. G. Goodenotigh (Eds.) 1990. Beyond the Second Sex: New
Directions in the Anthropology of Gender. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylva¬
nia Press.
Chapter
Early Childhood
Gender Socialization
Early Childhood Gender Socialization 77
Imagine that it is ten years from now. You are married and would like to
start a family, but you and your spouse have just been told that you can
have only one child. WTiich would you prefer that child to be: a boy or a
girl?
If you are like most college students in the United States, you would
prefer your only child to be a boy. Indeed, since the 1930s, researchers
ha\e documented that Americans in general have a "boy preference”
(Coombs 1977; Williamson 1976a). Not only do we prefer boys as only
children, but also in larger families, we prefer sons to outnumber daugh¬
ters, and we have a strong preference for sons as firstborns. There is some
evidence to suggest that this may be weakening a bit in the United States;
for instance, several recent studies have reported an increasing tendency
for people to express no preference rather than an explicit son or daugh¬
ter preference (Steinbacher and Gilroy 1985; Gilroy and Steinbacher
1983; Rent and Rent 1977; Williamson 1977). There also appears to be a
strong desire among most American couples to have at least one child of
each sex (Teachman and Schollaert 1989). Outside the United States,
however, boy preference remains so strong that, as Box 4.1 on pages
78—79 shows, in some countries, such as India and China, parents are
using technology to choose the sex of their offspring, resulting in a
disproportionate ratio of boys to girls.
It appears, then, that children are born into a world that largely
prefers boys over girls. Some of the more common reasons that adults
give for this preference are that boys carry on the family name (assuming
that a daughter will take her husband’s name at marriage) and that boys
are both easier and cheaper to raise. The small minority that prefers girls
seems to value them for their traditionally feminine traits: they are sup¬
posedly neater, cuddlier, cuter, and more obedient than boys (Williamson
1976b). Although it is uncertain whether children perceive their parents’
sex preferences (Williamson 1976a), it is clear that these attitudes are
closely associated with parental expectations of children’s behavior and
tend to reflect gender stereotypes.
In this chapter, we will discuss how parents transmit these expecta¬
tions to their children through socialization. Socialization is the process
by which society’s values and norms, including those pertaining to gen¬
der, are taught and learned. This is a lifelong process, but in this chapter,
we will concentrate on the socialization that occurs mostly in the early
childhood years. We will see that gender socialization is often a conscious
effort in that expectations are reinforced with explicit rewards and pun¬
ishments. Boys in particular receive explicit negative sanctions for engag¬
ing in what adults consider gender-inappropriate behavior. Gender
socialization may also be more subtle, however, with gender messages
relayed implicitly through children’s clothing, the way their rooms are
decorated, and the toys they are given for play. In addition, children may
78 Chapter 4
30X4 A 6ex Selection

Although research indicates that in the United States and Europe, both
women and men have a slight preference for sons, there remains in these coun¬
tries strong disapproval of the use of medical technology, such as ultrasound
and amniocentesis, for sex selection (Kolker and Burke 1992). However, in
some countries, such as China and India, where son preference is exception¬
ally strong, recent studies show that such technology is increasingly being used
not for diagnostic purposes, but solely to identify the sex of a fetus. In India,
for example, there are physicians who specialize only in doing ultrasound tests
on pregnant women (Gargan 1991). In India, as well as China and several
other countries, if the fetus is the “wrong” sex—that is, if the fetus is female
the parents frequently opt for an abortion. Kristof (1991:C12) quotes from an
article in a Chinese publication in which a man from a rural peasant commu¬
nity states, “Ultrasound is really worthwhile, even though my wife had to go
through four abortions to get a son.”
As Table 4.1 shows, in China, India, and a number of other countries,
the sex ratio is skewed in favor of males. This has been the case historically. In
these countries and others, female infants were often killed by being left ex¬
posed to the elements, or else they died in early childhood from neglect or
from lack of food. It is still not uncommon ip niany countries for boys to be
breastfed longer than girls.
Philosopher Mary Anne Warren (1985) refers to this phenomenon as gen-
dcrade—that is, the deliberate killing of females simply because of their sex.
She notes that the suggestion that such a practice occurs on a widespread basis
strikes many people as simply false or paranoid. Available statistics, however, in¬
dicate that in some areas, the practice may actually be increasing. Since the
1970s, for example, the sex imbalance in China and India has widened, and
many analysts attribute the growing gap to the wider availability of amniocente¬
sis and ultrasound (Kristof 1991; Jeffery et al. 1988).
One of the reasons that sex selection with amniocentesis or ultrasound
may still be unpopular in the United States and Europe is that in these coun¬
tries, due to potential hazards the tests pose for the developing fetus, use of
the technology has been limited to diagnosis of fetal abnormalities in high-risk
pregnancies. The majority of these are wanted pregnancies. In addition, ultra¬
sound, in particular, has a high error rate with regard to sex determination,
and both tests are done fairly late in a pregnancy (usually after sixteen weeks),
making the decision to abort more difficult, while also increasing the health
risks.
At the same time, however, some analysts have argued that as new tech¬
nology, such as chorionic villus sampling (CVS), becomes available, gendercide
may become more common in the United States and Europe. CVS, like ultra¬
sound and amniocentesis, is a fetal diagnostic tool that also reveals the sex of
\
the fetus. A catheter is inserted through a pregnant woman’s cervix (or, in
some cases, through her abdomen) so that pre-placental tissue can be
30X 4.1 continued
TA3LE 4.1 Estimated Deficits in Female Populations Caused by Excess

Female Mortality: Selected Areas, Latest Available Data
Ratio of Males to
Females
Number of
Number of % Missing
Country Actual Expected Females Females Females
or Region Ratio Ratid^ (millions) Missing ( millions)
China, 1990 1.066 1.010 548.7 5.3 29.1
India, 1991 1.077 1.020 406.3 5.6 22.8
Pakistan, 1981 1.105 1.025 40.0 7.8 3.1
Bangladesh, 1981 1.064 1.025 42.2 3.8 1.6
Nepal, 1981 1.050 1.025 7.3 2.4 .2
West Asia, 1985 1.060 1.030 55.0 3.0 1.7
Egypt, 1986 1.047 1.020 23.5 2.6 .6
*Based on a model stable population incorporating levels of fertility and mortality prevailing some ten years earlier and assuming
1.059 as the sex ratio at birth.
'^Females missing as a percent of the reported female population shown in column 3.
Source: Reprinted with the permission of the Population Council from AnsleyJ. Coale, “Excess Female Mortality and the Balance of
the Sexes in the Population: .\n Estimate of the Number of ‘Missing Females,’ ’’ Pofmlation and Development Review 17, no. 3
(September 1991): 522
suctioned out for analysis. A major advantage of CVS relative to ultrasound and
amniocentesis is that CVS may be done as early as the ninth week of preg¬
nancy, thus possibly making the decision to abort a fetus of the “wrong” sex an
easier one to make. Moreover, recent surveys of physicians and genetic counsel¬
ors indicate a growing willingness on the part of the medical community to use
fetal diagnostic tools for the sole purpose of identifying the fetus’s sex. Accord¬
ing to Kolker and Burke (1992), for instance, in 1972, only 1 percent of U.S.
physicians indicated they were willing to use fetal diagnostic technology solely
to determine fetal sex; by 1975, 25 percent stated they would do so. Similarly,
in an international survey of geneticists conducted in 1988, 24 percent of
those in Britain, 47 percent in Canada, and 60 percent in Hungary expressed
the belief that sex selection is morally acceptable (Kolker and Burke 1992). In
light of such findings, as well as rapid advances in medical technology and the
continued preference for male children in most cultures, ethicists’ concerns
about a potential rise in gendercide seem far less paranoid than they may have
seemed Just twenty years ago.
80 Chapter 4
socialize one another through their interactions in peer groups. To begin

our discussion, we will examine some of the theories that have been put
forward to explain how young children acquire their gender identities.
LEARNING GENDER
Research indicates that children as young as two years old are aware of
their gender and already adhere to gender stereotypes (Cowan and Hoff¬
man 1986; Kuhn et al. 1978). Obviously, children are presented with
gender messages very early in their lives, but how do they come to adopt
this information as part of their images of themselves and their under¬
standing of the world around them? In other words, how do little girls
learn that they are girls, and how do little boys learn that they are boys?
Perhaps more importantly, how do both learn that only boys do certain
(masculine) things, and only girls do other (feminine) things? A number
of theories have been offered in response to such questions. We will
discuss the four major ones: identification theory, social learning theory,
cognitive-developmental theory, and Bern’s enculturated lens theory of
gender formation.
%
Identification Theory
Identification theory is rooted in the work of the famous psychoanalyst
Sigmund Freud (1856-1939). According to Freud, children pass through
a series of stages in their personality development. During the first two
stages, referred to respectively as the oral and anal stages, boys and girls
are fairly similar in their behavior and experiences. For both boys and
girls, their mother is the chief object of their emotions since she is their
primary caretaker and gratifies most of their needs. It is around age four,
however, that an important divergence occurs in the personality develop¬
ment of girls and boys. It is at this age that children become aware both
of their own genitals and of the fact that the genitals of boys and girls are
different. This realization signals the start of the third stage of develop¬
ment, the phallic stage. It is during the phallic stage that identification
takes place; that is, children begin to unconsciously model their behavior
after that of their same-sex parent, thus learning how to behave in gen¬
der-appropriate ways. Significantly, identification does not occur for girls
the same way it occurs for boys.
For boys, identification is motivated by what Freud called castration
\ anxiety. At this age, a boy’s love for his mother becomes more sexual and
he tends to view his father as his rival (the Oedipus complex). What quickly
cures him of this jealousy is a glimpse of the female genitalia. Seeing the
clitoris, the little boy assumes that all girls have been castrated for some
reason, and he fears that a similar fate may befall him if he continues to
compete with his father. Boys perceive the formidable size and power of
their fathers and conclude that their fathers have the ability to castrate
competitors. Consequently, instead of competing with his father, the little
boy tries to be more like him and ends up, in a sense, with the best of both
worlds:
[I]n choosing to be like his father, the boy can keep his penis. The boy,
however, may still [vicariously] enjoy his mother sexually, through his
father. As a result of this . . . identification, the boy begins to take on his
father’s characteristics, including his [gender] role behaviors (Frieze et
al. 1978:98).
In contrast, a girl’s identification with her mother is motivated by

what Freud called penis envy. Penis envy develops in girls upon first sight
of the male genitals. Seeing the male’s “far superior equipment” as Freud
put it (1983/1933:88), the little girl also thinks she has been castrated.
She becomes overwhelmed by her sense of incompleteness, her jealousy
of boys, and her disdain for her mother and all women since they share
her “deformity.” Instead, she shifts her love to her father, who does
possess the coveted penis, and begins to identify with her mother as a
means to win him. Eventually, the girl realizes that she can have a penis
in two ways: briefly through intercourse and symbolically by having a baby,
especially a baby boy. “The original penis-wish is transformed into a wish
for a baby which leads to love and desire for the man as bearer of the
penis and provider of the baby” (Frieze et al. 1978:31). However, a female
never fully overcomes the feelings of inferiority and envy which leave
indelible marks on her personality:
Thus, we attribute a larger amount of narcissism to femininity, which also

affects women’s choice of object, so that to be loved is a stronger need
for them than to love. The effect of penis envy has a share, further, in the
physical vanity of women, since they are bound to value their charms
more highly as a late compensation for their original sexual inferiority.
Shame, which is considered to be a feminine characteristic par excellence
but is far more a matter of convention than might be supposed, has as its
purpose, we believe, concealment of genital deficiency. . . . The fact that
women must be regarded as having little sense of justice is no doubt
related to the predominance of envy in their mental life (Freud
1983/1933:90,92).
Now before you start looking askance at every four-year-old you

meet, let us point out that identification theory has received considerable
criticism. For one thing, the theory maintains that identification is an
unconscious process. As such, we have no objective means to verify it.
Instead, we must rely on either the psychoanalyst’s interpretation of an
individual’s behavior or the individual’s memories of childhood. Even if
82 Chapter 4
we are willing to trust\he memories of individuals, we aie still left with

the problem of observer bias. Because the methods of psychoanalysts are
extremely subjective, we may question whether their interpretations of
individuals’ experiences are accurate or whether they simply reflect what
the psychoanalyst expects to find in light of identification theory. Other
than clinical reports of psychoanalysts themselves, there is little evidence
of the existence of castration anxiety in boys or penis envy in girls (Frieze
et al. 1978; Sherman 1971). Moreover, research indicates that children do
not understand the relationship between gender and genitalia until at
least th^ ages of seven to nine, or perhaps even later (McConaghy 1979).
Identification theory also portrays the gendered behaviors acquired
in early childhood as fixed and stable over time. In other words, the
theory leaves little room for personal or social change. However, while it
is certainly the case that gender is resilient, it is also true that social
learning continues throughout our lives and that we may modify our
behavior and attitudes as we are exposed to new situations and models.
Finally, it is impossible to overlook the antifemale bias in Freudian
identification theory. Females are defined as inadequate; they are jealous,
passive, and masochistic. Freud defined women as “an inferior departure
from the male standard” (Bern 1993:59). Femininity itself was seen as a
pathology (Brennan 1992). In short, identification theory asserts that
women are clearly men’s inferiors. At its best, the theory legitimates
gender inequality; at its worst, it is misogynistic and harmful to women.
In light of these serious weaknesses, it is not surprising that some of
Freud’s early supporters, as well as more contemporary theorists working
within a psychoanalytic framework, have offered substantial revisions or
reinterpretations of Freud’s original argument. Karen Homey (1967)
and Erik Erikson (1968), for instance, felt that Freud’s theory was too
“phallocentric,” although each of these theorists continued to focus on
how biological differences between the sexes influenced their respective
psychological development. Homey rejected the idea that penis envy
played a central role in females’ psychosexual development and offered
the provocative suggestion that males harbor jealousy toward females for
their unique ability to bear children, a phenomenon she referred to as
womb envy. Erikson also claimed that women’s reproductive capacity—the
fact, as he put it, that women have an inner space in which to carry and
nurture new life—causes them to develop a psychological commitment to
caring for others. In contrast, men’s reproductive organs are external and
active, which in turn is reflected in the male psyche with its external focus
and action orientation (Bern 1993).
Others utilizing a psychoanalytic perspective, including Clara Thomp¬
son (1964), Jacques Lacan (1977), and Juliet Mitchell (1974), have placed
the notion of penis envy in a social context. That is, women are jealous of
the male organ only in that it is a symbol of male power and privilege in
a patriarchal society. From this point of view, then, women are actually
envious of men’s higher status and freedom.
Feminist theorist Nancy Chodorow (1990; 1978) also offers a revi¬
sion of identification theory that places gender acquisition squarely in a
social context. Her goal is to explain why females grow up to be the
primary caretakers of children and why they develop stronger affective
ties with children than males do. She suggests that identification is more
difficult for boys since they must psychologically separate from their
mothers and model themselves after a parent who is largely absent from
home, their fathers. Consequently, boys become more emotionally de¬
tached and repressed than girls. Girls, in contrast, do not experience this
psychological separation. Instead, mothers and daughters maintain an
intense, ongoing relationship with one another. From this, daughters
acquire the psychological capabilities for mothering, and “feminine per¬
sonality comes to define itself in relation and connection to other people
more than masculine personality does” (Chodorow 1978:44).
There are other feminist psychoanalytic theories as well (see Bern
1993; Chodorow 1990). Each raises some interesting possibilities for our
understanding of gender acquisition, but all remain largely speculative
because of their untestability and lack of supporting evidence (Lorber et
al. 1981). In addition, they have been critiqued as ethnocentric. As we saw
in chapter 3, the sexual division of labor in which only women care for
infants is not present in all societies, yet children in all societies acquire
gender, whatever its specific content. Thus, the developmental sequence
described by Chodorow and others applies only to Western families, and
not all Western families at that (Lorber et al. 1981). Chodorow’s model,
for example, may describe best the process of gender acquisition in white,
middle-class families, but as Joseph (1981) argues, it does not accurately
reflect the experiences of most African-American mothers and daughters.
Similarly, Segura and Pierce (1993) maintain that certain features of
Mexican-American families, such as the presence of multiple mothering
figures (grandmothers, godmothers, aunts), require that extensions or
modifications of Chodorow’s model are necessary to account for racial,
ethnic, and social class differences in gender acquisition.
Identification theory is not the only explanation of gender acquisi¬
tion that has been developed. We will turn now to three other theories.
Social Learning Theory

Social learning theory is more straightforward than identification theory
in that it focuses on observable events and their consequences rather
than on unconscious motives and drives (Bandura 1986). The basic prin¬
ciples of social learning theory derive from a particular school of thought
in psychology known as behaviorism. You are probably somewhat familiar
84 Chapter 4
with at least one important idea of behaviorism, the notion of reinforce¬

ment: a behavior consistently followed by a reward will likely occur again,
whereas a behavior followed by a punishment will rarely reoccur. So, for
example, your dog will probably learn to play frisbee with you if you give
it a biscuit every time it runs to you with the plastic disk in its mouth.
Conversely, the dog will stop urinating on your houseplants if you put it
outside each time it squats or lifts a leg near the indoor foliage. According
to behaviorists, this same principle of reinforcement applies to the way
people learn, including the way they learn gender.
More specifically, social learning theory posits that children acquire
their respective gender by being rewarded for gender-appropriate behav¬
ior and punished for gender-inappropriate behavior. Often the rewards
and punishments are direct and take the form of praise or admonish¬
ment. For instance, on a recent shopping excursion, one of the authors
overheard a little girl asking her father to buy her a plastic truck. Looking
at her with obvious displeasure, he said, “That’s for boys. You’re not a boy,
are you?” Without answering, the little girl put the toy back on the shelf.
[Interestingly, research indicates that boys actually receive harsher disap¬
proval for cross-gender behavior than do girls (see, for example, Martin
1990; Fagot 1985; Feinman 1981), a point to which we will return later.]
Children learn through indirect reinforcement as well; for example, they
may learn about the consequences of certain behaviors just by observing
the actions of others (Bronstein 1988).
This latter point raises a second important principle of social learn¬
ing theory: children learn not only through reinforcement, but also by
imitating or modeling those around them. Of course, the two processes—
reinforcement and modeling—go hand-in-hand. Children will be re¬
warded for imitating some behaviors and punished for imitating others.
At the same time, children will most likely imitate those who positively
reinforce their behavior. In fact, social learning theorists maintain that
children most often model themselves after adults whom they perceive to
be warm, friendly, and powerful (iê., in control of resources or privileges
that the child values). More importantly, these theorists predict that
children'will imitate individuals most like themselves (Bussey and Ban¬
dura 1984; Margolin and Patterson 1975; Mischel 1966). Obviously, this
includes same-sex parents and older same-sex siblings, but as we will see
in chapters 5 and 6, teachers and media personalities also serve as effec¬
tive models for children.
Social learning theory is appealing. Chances are that we have seen
reinforcement in practice, and we know that children can be great imita¬
tors (sometimes to the embarrassment of tbeir parents). However, social
learning theory is not without difficulties. First, studies of same-sex mod¬
eling indicate that children do not consistently imitate their same-sex
parent more than their opposite-sex parent (Raskin and Isreal 1981).
Rather, sex may be less important in eliciting modeling than other vari¬
ables, especially the perceived power of the model (Jacklin 1989). For
instance, “both boys and girls imitate a cross-sex model when that model
controls rewards . . . [and] children imitate the dominant parent, regard¬
less of sex” (Frieze et al. 1978:111). In addition, children tend to imitate
a same-sex model only if that model is engaged in gender-appropriate
behavior (Jacklin 1989; Perry and Bussey 1979). This finding suggests that
children have some knowledge of gender apart from what they acquire
through modeling. Finally, social learning theory depicts children as
passive recipients of socialization messages; “socialization is seen as a
unilateral process with children shaped and molded by adults” (Corsaro
and Eder 1990:198). There is evidence, though, that children actively
seek out and evaluate information available in their social environment
(Bern 1983).
One theory that attempts to address each of these criticisms is called
cognitive-developmental theory. Cognitive-developmental theory is the
third explanation of gender learning that we will examine in this chapter.
Cognitive-Developmental Theory
Based on the work of psychologists Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg,
cognitive-developmental theory holds that children learn gender (and
gender stereot\pes) through their mental efforts to organize their social
world, rather than through psychosexual processes or rewards and pun¬
ishments. For the young child who is literally new to the world, life must
seem chaotic. Thus, one of the child’s first developmental tasks is to try
to make sense of all the information he or she receives through observa¬
tions and interactions in the environment. According to cognitive-devel¬
opmental theorists, young children accomplish this by looking for
patterns in the physical and social world. Children, they maintain, have a
natural predilection for pattern seeking; “once they discover those cate¬
gories or regularities, they spontaneously construct a self and a set of
social rules consistent with them” (Bern 1993:112).
Sex is a very useful organizing category, or schema, for young chil¬
dren. Why sex? The answer lies in a second major proposition of cogni¬
tive-developmental theory: children’s interpretations of their world are
limited by their level of mental maturity. Early on in their lives (from
about eighteen months to seven years of age, according to Piaget), chil¬
dren’s thinking tends to be concrete; that is, they rely on simple and
obvious cues. Sex, in the view of cognitive-developmental theorists, is “a
stable and easily discriminable natural category” (quoted in Bern
1993:112), with a variety of obvious physical cues attached to it. Children
first use the category to label themselves and to organize their own
identities. They then apply the schema to others in an effort to organize
86 Chapter 4
traits and behaviors in\o two classes, masculine or feminine, and they
attach values to what they observe—either gender appropriate ( good )
or gender inappropriate (“bad”).
Cognitive-developmental theory helps to explain young children s
strong preferences for sex-typed toys and activities and for same-sex
friends, as well as why they express rigidly stereotyped ideas about gender
(Cann and Palmer 1986; Cowan and Hoffman 1986; O’Brien and Huston
1985). Children at this stage of development—what Piaget calls the preop-
erational stage—tend to see every regularity in their world as a kind of
immutable moral law (Bern 1993). At the same time, children in the
preoperational stage are not yet capable of conserving vananc^tha.t is,
they cannot understand that even if superficial aspects of an object
change (e.g., the length of a man’s hair), the basic identity of the object
remains unchanged (e.g., the person is still a man even if his hair falls
below his shoulders). Studies indicate, too, that as children get older and
as their cognitive systems mature they appear to become more flexible
with regard to the activities that males and females pursue, at least until
they reach adolescence (Stoddart and Turiel 1985; Aicher 1984, for a
contrasting view see Carter and McClosky 1983).
Still, cognitive-developmental theory has not escaped criticism. One
difficulty centers around the question of the age at which children de¬
velop their own gender identities. Cognitive-developmental theorists
place this development between the ages of three and five, but their
critics point to research that shows that it may appear sooner and that
children as young as two years old subscribe to gender stereotypes
(Cowan and Hoffman 1986; Kuhn et al. 1978). In addition, recent re¬
search indicates that not everyone uses sex and gender as fundamental
organizing categories or schemas; there are some individuals who may be
considered gender “aschematic,” although they themselves have devel¬
oped gender identities (Skitka and Maslach 1990). Thus, the process by
which a child learns to use sex and gender as organizing schemes needs
to be better understood. ^
This latter criticism is related to another, more serious charge. Spe¬
cifically,'critics maintain that by portraying gender learning as something
children basically do themselves, and by presenting the male-female di¬
chotomy as having perceptual and emotional primacy for young children
because it is natural, cognitive-developmental theory downplays the criti¬
cal role of culture in gender socialization (Bern 1993; Corsaro and Eder
1990). ’We may agree that children actively seek to organize their social
world, but that they use the concept of sex as a primary means for doing
so probably has more to do with the gender-polarizing culture of the
society in which they live than with their level of mental maturity. More¬
over, the male-female dichotomy may have perceptual and emotional
primacy for young children not because it is a natural division, but be-
cause members of the children’s social world consistently interact with

them on the underlying assumption that they are in some unitary and
bipolar way male or female and, therefore, teach them to organize their
own identities and the world around them according to this same gender-
polarizing schema (Davies 1989). There are other organizing categories
available with obvious physical cues, but children use sex instead—not
because it is natural, but because in the culture of their society, sexual
distinctions are emphasized. As Bern (1983:608-609) explains:
Nearly all societies teach the developing child two crucial things about
gender: first. . . they teach the substantive network of sex-related
associations that can come to serve as cognitive schema; second, they
teach that the dichotomy between male and female has intensive and
extensive relevance to virtually every domain of human experience. The
typical American child cannot help observing, for example, that what
parents, teachers, and peers consider to be appropriate behavior varies as
a function of sex; that toys, clothing, occupations, hobbies, the domestic
division of labor—even pronouns—all vary as a function of sex.
It is not surprising then that research shows that about 80 percent of

two-year-olds in the United States can easily distinguish males from fe¬
males using cultural cues such as hair style and clothing, but that only
about 50 percent of three-, four-, and five-year-olds can make such distinc¬
tions if presented only with biological (natural) cues such as genitalia
(Bern 1989; Carey 1985; Goldman and Goldman 1982).
These criticisms are especially significant if one values social change
for they imply that “children would be far less likely to become gender
schematic and hence sex-typed if the society were to limit the associative
network linked to sex and to temper its insistence on the functional
importance of the gender dichotomy” (Bern 1983:609). Bern has taken
these issues into account in developing a fourth explanation of gender
acquisition, which will be the final theory we will consider in this chapter.
Bern’s Enculturated Lens Theory of

Gender Formation
In developing her theory of gender acquisition, psychologist Sandra Bern
(1993) begins with the observation that the culture of any society is
composed of a set of hidden assumptions about how the members of that
society should look, think, feel, and act. These assumptions are embed¬
ded in cultural discourses, social institutions, and individual psyches, so
that in generation after generation specific patterns of thought, behavior,
and so on are invisibly, but systematically reproduced. Bern calls these
assumptions lenses. Every culture contains a wide assortment of lenses
for example, one of the lenses of U.S. culture that Bern identifies is
88 Chapter 4
radical individualism—feut she concentrates her analysis on the lenses of

gender. There are three gender lenses in the United States and most
Western cultures: gender polarization, androcentrism, and biological es-
sentialism. Gender polarization refers to the fact that not only are males
and females in the society considered fundamentally different from one
another, but also that these differences constitute a central organizing
principle for the social life of the society. Androcentrism is a term with
which we are already familiar (see chapter 3); Bern uses the term not only
to refer to the notion that males are superior to females, but also to the
persiste^t idea that males and the male experience are the normative
standard against which women are judged. And finally, biological essen-
tialism is the lens that serves to rationalize and legitimize the first two by
portraying them as the natural and inevitable products of the inherent
biological differences between the sexes. Bern’s chief concern is how
these lenses operate to mold men and women into the sex-typed like¬
nesses enshrined in our culture.
The process of gender acquisition, Bern tells us, is simply a special
case of the process of enculturation or socialization in general. She dis¬
cusses two processes that she considers critical to “successful” encultura¬
tion. First, the institutionalized social practices of a society preprogram
individuals’ daily experiences to fit the “default options” of that society’s
culture for that particular time and place. At the same time, individuals
are constantly bombarded with implicit lessons—^what Bern calls metames¬
sages—about what is important, what is valued, and what differences
between people are significant in that culture. It is through these two
processes that the lenses of the culture are transmitted to the conscious¬
ness of the individual, and the processes are so thorough and complete
that, within a fairly short period of time, the individual who has become
a “cultural native” cannot distinguish between reality and the way his or
her culture construes reality.
One gets some sense of this melding of realities when visiting a
society where the culture is different from one’s own; “their” way of doing
things seems wrong, even unreal. However, Bern (1993:140) argues that
a true native consciousness is acquired through enculturation during
childhood because children “learn about their culture’s way of constru¬
ing reality without yet being aware that alternative construals are possible.
In contrast to the adult visiting from another culture, the child growing
up within a culture is thus like the proverbial fish who is unaware that its
environment is wet. After all, what else could it be?”
The lens of gender polarization, Bern observes, begins to organize
children’s daily lives from the moment they are born: pink or blue name
tags are attached to their bassinets in the hospital (and, in our older son’s
case, a little white cap with a blue stripe was put on his head). As we will
discuss later in the chapter, this gender polarization continues through-
ovit childhood through clothing, hair styles, bedroom decor, and toys. Is
it any wonder that by the age of two, children are aware that there are
“boy things” and “girl things”?
We may recognize in Bern’s theory aspects of the social learning
perspective. Gender socialization may be explicit, but Bern focuses more
on the metamessages about gender, how gender polarization is taught
implicitly through the way we organize our everyday lives and the lives of
our children. (A metamessage about gender is sent, for instance, every
time children observe that although their mother can drive a car, their
father is the one who drives when their parents or the family go out
together.) However, Bern does not see children (or adults) as passive
receptors of culture. “[A] gendered personality is both a product and a
process” (Bern 1993:152). Like the cognitive-developmental theorists, she
argues that the child is ripe to receive the cultural transmission because
she or he is an active, pattern-seeking human being. By the time people
become adults, it is not just the culture that imposes boundaries on their
definitions of gender appropriateness, it is their own willingness to con¬
form to these boundaries and evaluate themselves and others in terms of
them. Moreover, what they have internalized as children is a social/cul-
tural definition of sex, not a biological one, so that the cues children use
for distinguishing between the sexes—a significant task in a gender-polar¬
ized society such as ours—are also social/cultural (e.g., hair style, cloth¬
ing) rather than biological (genitals).
Bern also goes beyond cognitive-developmental theory by emphasiz¬
ing that the lens of androcentrism is superimposed onto the lens of
gender polarization. Children learn not only that males and females are
different, but that males are better than females and that what males do
is the standard, while what females do is some deviation from that
standard. The inclusion of the lens of androcentrism “dramatically alters
the consequences of internalizing the gender lenses. Whereas before,
the individual has been nothing more than a carrier of the culture’s
gender polarization, now the individual is a deeply implicated—if unwit¬
ting—collaborator in the social reproduction of male power” (Bern
1993:139).
The implications of Bern’s theory for social change are fairly obvi¬
ous. All societies must enculturate new members, but at least with respect
to gender, we must alter the cultural lenses that are transmitted. This will
involve nothing less than eradicating both androcentrism and gender
polarization. Bern notes that some may argue that the former is currently
under way because antidiscrimination laws have been enacted in recent
years. However, she points out—and we will cite ample evidence of this
throughout the text—that our society is so thoroughly organized from a
male perspective that even policies and practices that appear to be gender
neutral are, upon closer examination, strongly androcentric. “[AJndro-
90 Chapter 4
centrism so saturates the whole society that even institutions that do not
discriminate against women explicitly . . . must be treated as inherently
suspect” (Bern 1993:190).
At first glance it may seem that eradicating gender polarization
might be easier than eradicating androcentrism. However, Bern cautions
that dismantling gender polarization involves more than simply allowing
males and females greater freedom to be more masculine, feminine,
androgynous, heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual, or whatever they
would choose to be. Rather, it involves a total transformation of cultural
consciousness so that such concepts are absent from both the culture and
individual psyches. A modest beginning to this project is for parents to
retard their young child’s knowledge of our culture’s traditional messages
about gender, while simultaneously teaching her or him that the only
definitive differences between males and females are anatomical and
reproductive. In addition, parents must provide their children with alter¬
native lenses for organizing and comprehending information. Perhaps
parents could substitute an “individual differences” lens that emphasizes
the “remarkable variability of individuals within groups” (1983:613). Nev¬
ertheless, given that parents are not the only ones responsible for gender
socialization (see chapters 5 and 6, for example), anything short of a
collective, society-wide effort to transform the culture is likely to produce
only limited change.
Bern’s perspective is still too new to have been put to rigorous
empirical testing. Throughout her discussion, Bern (1993) presents a
number of research studies that support parts of the theory, particularly
the various effects of gender polarization (see, for instance, Bern 1975;
Bern and Lenney 1976; Bern 1981; Frable and Bern 1985). Certainly the
theory is provocative enough to generate extensive research into the next
century. Meanwhile, however, we will continue to explore the issue of
gender polarization by examining more carefully the various ways that
children’s worlds are structured in terms of sex and gender.
GROWING UP FEMININE OR MASCULINE
If you ask parents whether they treat their children differently simply on
the basis of sex, most would probably say “no.” However, there is consid¬
erable evidence that what parents say they do and what they actually do
are often not the same.
It has been argued by some that gender socialization actually may
begin in utero by those parents who know the sex of their child before it
is born. As Kolker and Burke (1992:12-13) explain, “The knowledge of
sex implies more than chromosomal or anatomical differences. It implies
gender, and with it images of personality and social role expectations.”
Such a hypothesis is difficult, if not impossible to test, but what currently

is known is that gender socialization gets under way almost immediately
after a child is born. Research shows, for instance, that the vast majority
of comments parents make about their babies immediately following
birth concern the babies’ sex (Woollett et al. 1982). Moreover, although
there are few physiological or behavioral differences between males and
females at birth, parents tend to respond differently to newborns on the
basis of sex. For example, when asked to describe their babies within
twenty-four hours of birth, new parents frequently use gender stereotypes.
Infant girls are described as tiny, soft, and delicate, but parents of infant
boys use adjectives such as strong, alert, and coordinated to describe their
babies. Interestingly, fathers provide more stereotyped descriptions than
mothers (Powers 1981; Lake 1975; Rubin et al. 1975).
It is not unreasonable for us to suspect that parents’ initial stereo¬
typed perceptions of their children may lay the foundation for the differ¬
ential treatment of sons and daughters. Maccoby and Jacklin (1974), for
example, found that parents tend to elicit more gross motor activity from
their sons than from their daughters, but there appears to be little if any
difference in the amount of affectionate contact between mothers and
their sons and daughters (see, however, Lewis 1972). Additional research
indicates that parents tend to engage in rougher, more physical play with
infant sons than with infant daughters (MacDonald and Parke 1986). This
is especially the case with respect to father-infant interactions. Studies
show that fathers play more interactive games with infant and toddler
sons and also encourage more visual, fine-motor, and locomotor explora¬
tion with them, whereas they promote vocal interaction with their daugh¬
ters. At the same time, fathers of toddler daughters appear to encourage
closer parent-child physical proximity than fathers of toddler sons (Bron-
stein 1988). Parents are also more likely to believe—and to act on the
belief—that daughters need more help than sons (Burns et al. 1989; Snow
et al. 1983). In these ways parents may be providing early training for
their sons to be independent and aggressive, while training their daugh¬
ters to be dependent and helpless.
This pattern continues through the preschool years. For example.
Fagot et al. (1985) discovered that adults respond differently to boys’ and
girls’ communicative styles. Although thirteen- and fourteen-month-old
children showed no sex differences in their attempts to communicate,
adults tended to respond to boys when they “forced attention” by being
aggressive, or by crying, whining, and screaming. Similar attempts by girls
were usually ignored, but adults were responsive to girls when they used
gestures or gentle touching, or when they simply talked. Significantly,
when Fagot and her colleagues observed these same children just eleven
months later, they saw clear sex differences in their styles of communica¬
tion; boys were more assertive, whereas girls were more talkative.
92 Chapter 4
In studies with a related theme, researchers have found that parents

communicate differently with sons and daughters. Gleason reports that
parents speak more to their daughters about feelings and emotions than
they do to their sons (cited in Shapiro 1990). However, the one emotion
that parents discuss extensively with sons, but not with daughters is anger,
thus perhaps sending children the message that anger is an appropriate
emotion for boys to express, but not girls (Fivush 1989). Additional
research supports this observation. For instance, when parents tell stories
to their children, they tend to use more emotion words with daughters
than sons, except that they speak more about anger in stories told to boys
(Goleman 1988). One outcome is that by the age of two, girls typically use
more emotion words than boys.
Finally, Weitzman and her colleagues (1985) found that mothers
tend to speak to their sons more explicitly, teach and question them
more, and use more numbers and action verbs in speaking to them.
Others have reported similar findings with respect to father-son commu¬
nication (Bronstein 1988). This indicates that parents provide more of
the kind of verbal stimulation thought to foster cognitive development to
their sons than to their daughters. What is also interesting with respect to
Weitzman et al.’s study, however, is that the researchers included mothers
who professed not to adhere to traditional gender stereotypes. Although
the differential treatment of sons and daughters was less pronounced
among these mothers, it was by no means absent.
It is significant to note that the studies discussed so far have been
based almost exclusively on samples of white, middle-class, two-parent
families, making generalizations with regard to other types of families’
socialization practices unreliable at best. Despite the limitations of such
studies, they do help to explain why sex differences that are absent in
infancy (see chapter 2) begin to emerge during early childhood. However,
as we have already mentioned, gender socialization is accomplished not
only through parent-child interaction, but also through the ways parents
structure their children’s environment. Let’s turn, then, to a discussion
of this latter aspect of the socialization process, keeping in mind that this
research,' too, tends to be race- and class-specific. We will examine more
carefully the variables of race and social class later in the chapter.
The Gender-Specific Nature of

Children’s Environments
What is the easiest and most accurate way for a stranger to determine the
sex of an infant? According to Madeline Shakin and her associates
(1985), a baby’s clothing provides the best clues. Ninety percent of the
infants they observed in suburban shopping malls were dressed in sex-
typed clothes. The color of the clothing alone supplied a reliable clue for
sex labeling: the vast majority of the girls wore pink or yellow, while most
boys were dressed in blue or red. The style of children’s clothing also
varies by sex. On special occasions, girls wear dresses trimmed with ruffles
and lace; at bedtime, they wear nighties with more of the same; and for
leisure activities, their slacks sets may be more practical, but chances are
they are pastel in color and decorated with hearts or flowers. In contrast,
boys wear three-piece suits on special occasions; at bedtime, they wear
astronaut, athlete, or super-hero pajamas; and for leisure activities, their
overalls or slacks sets are in primary colors with sports or military decora¬
tions. Disposable diapers are even different for girls and boys, not only in
the way they are constructed, which arguably might have a rational basis
to it, but also in the way they are decorated: girls’ diapers often have pink
flowers on them; boys’ diapers are embellished with sailboats or cars and
trucks.
All of this may seem insignificant, even picky, to you. However, what
we must emphasize here is that clothing plays a significant part in gender
socialization in two ways. First, by informing others about the sex of the
child, clothing sends implicit messages about how the child should be
treated. “We know . . . that when someone interacts with a child and a sex
label is available, the label functions to direct behavior along the lines of
traditional [gender] roles” (Shakin etal. 1985:956). Second, certain types
of clothing encourage or discourage particular behaviors or activities.
Girls in frilly dresses, for example, are discouraged from rough-and-tum¬
ble play, whereas boys’ physical movement is rarely impeded by their
clothing. Boys are expected to be more active than girls, and the styles of
the clothing designed for them reflect this gender stereotype. Clothing,
then, serves as one of the most basic means by which parents organize
their children’s world along gender-specific lines.
Parents also more directly construct specific environments for their
children with the nurseries, bedrooms, and playrooms that they furnish
and decorate. The classic study in this area was conducted by Rheingold
and Cook (1975), who actually went into middle-class homes and exam¬
ined the contents of children’s rooms. Their comparison of boys’ and
girls’ rooms is a study of contrasts. Girls’ rooms reflected traditional
conceptions of femininity, especially in terms of domesticity and mother¬
hood. Their rooms were usually decorated with floral designs and ruffled
bedspreads, pillows, and curtains. They contained an abundance of baby
dolls and related items (e.g., doll houses) as well as miniature appliances
(e.g., toy stoves). Few of these items were found in boys’ rooms, where,
instead, the decor and contents reflected traditional notions about mas¬
culinity. Boys’ rooms had more animal motifs and were filled with military
toys and athletic equipment. They also had building and vehicular toys
(e.g., blocks, trucks, and wagons). Importantly, boys had more toys overall
as well as more types of toys, including those considered educational. The
94 Chapter 4
only items girls were aS likely to have as boys were musical instruments
and books (although, as we will see shortly, the content of children’s
books is rarely gender-neutral). Given that similar findings were obtained
more than ten years later (Stoneman et al. 1986), it appears that Rhein-
gold and Cook’s conclusion remains applicable, at least with regard to the
socialization of middle-class.children:
The rooms of children constitute a not inconsiderable part of their

environment. Here they go to bed and wake up; here they spend some
part of every day. Their rooms determine the things they see and find for
amvisement and instruction. That their rooms have an effect on their
present and subsequent behavior can be assumed; a standard is set that
may in part account for some differences in the behavior of girls and
boys (1975:463).
The Rheingold and Cook study also highlights the importance of

toys in a young child’s environment. Toys, too, play a major part in gender
socialization. Toys not only entertain children, but they also teach them
particular skills and encourage them to explore through play a variety of
roles they may one day occupy as adults. Thus, if we provide boys and girls
with very different types of toys, we are essentially training them for
separate (and unequal) roles as adults. What is more, we are subtly telling
them that what they may do, as well as What they can do, is largely de¬
termined (and limited) by their sex.
Are there clear differences in the toys girls and boys are expected to
play with and, if so, just what are these differences? Rheingold and Cook’s
research already answered these questions to some extent, but a quick
perusal of most contemporary toy catalogs further addresses the issue.
The toys for sale are frequently pictured with models; pay careful atten¬
tion to which toys are pictured with female models and which are shown
with males. In the catalogs we picked up (Best Products 1992-93; Child-
craft 1993; F. A. O. Schwartz 1993), most of the toys were obviously gen¬
der-linked. We found, for instance, that little girls were most frequently
shown with dolls or household appliances. The only “dolls” boys were
pictured ^with were a vinyl six-foot inflatable Godzilla; “Big Frank,” a
talking Frankenstein construction toy that has a gear box that says “Fix
me” if he needs fixing; and the “Totally Awesome Duelin’ Dudes,” which
requires two players, aged three years or older, to use “the multi-action
control to knock [their] opponent’s head off!” and makes “Exciting
sound effects.” Costumes for dressing up also were featured in gender-
specific ways. An “authentic western outfit” for boys included red chaps
decorated with rodeo cowboys, a matching vest, and matching hat. For
\ girls, the costume was a pale pink miniskirt with fringed hem, a pale pink
vest decorated with silver ornaments, and a white hat. On other pages,
little girls were shown driving a hot pink “beach buggy,” while boys drove
a yellow and black “sand blaster.” Girls were shown dressing up in child-
size Barbie “glamour” costumes, making bows for their hair, and applying
makeup at a beauty salon (for which you can also buy the “working beauty
kit for the world’s most unforgettable girls”). Boys drove a crane and
trailer, built a house with a plastic construction kit, and played basketball.
Only boys were shown with computers, an important point to which we
will return in chapter 5.
Toy catalogs are directed primarily to parents. In the United States,
parents make over 70 percent of all toy purchases (Kutner and Levinson
1978) and typically encourage their children to play with gender-stereo¬
typed toys, while discouraging them from playing with toys associated with
the opposite sex (Caldera et al. 1989). However, children themselves
spend considerable time looking at toy catalogs and often ask their par¬
ents to buy specific toys they see advertised. If the catalogs we examined
are typical of toy catalogs in general—and we have no reason to doubt
that they are—then children are receiving very clear gender messages
about the kinds of toys they are supposed to want.^ These messages are
reinforced by their parents, by television commercials, by the pictures on
toy packaging, by the way toy stores often arrange their stock in separate
sections for boys and girls (Shapiro 1990; Schwartz and Markham 1985),
and by sales personnel who frequently recommend gender-stereotyped
toys to potential customers (Ungar 1982; Kutner and Levinson 1978). It
is no wonder that by two years of age, children show a preference for
gender-stereotyped toys (Robinson and Morris 1986; Roopnarine 1986;
however, see also Cameron et al. 1985).
The toys themselves foster different traits and abilities in children,
depending on their sex. Toys for boys tend to encourage exploration,
manipulation, invention, construction, competition, and aggression. In
contrast, girls’ toys typically rate high on manipulability, but also creativ¬
ity, nurturance, and attractiveness (Miller 1987; Bradbard 1985; Peretti
and Sydney 1985). As one researcher concluded, “These data support the
hypothesis that playing with girls’ vs. boys’ toys may be related to the
development of differential cognitive and/or social skills in girls and
boys” (Miller 1987:485). Certainly the toy manufacturers think so; the
director of public relations for Mattel, Inc. (which makes the Barbie doll)
stated in a recent interview that, “Girls’ play involves dressing and groom-
'We did find that, compared with our examination of toy catalogs in 1989, there were
some minor improvements in the 1993 catalogs in terms of the gender images
depicted. For example, in 1993, it was common to see a little girl playing with a
doctor’s kit and a little boy playing in a toy kitchen. The biggest improvement,
however, has been that minority children are shown more frequently than in the past.
Unfortunately, children with physical disabilities are still missing from toy catalogs,
although they are sometimes shown in children’s clothing catalogs.
96 Chapter 4
ing and acdng out thek future—going on a date, getting married—and

boys’ play involves competition and conflict, good guys versus bad guys”
(quoted in Lawson 1989:C1).
Interestingly, at the 1993 American International Toy Fair, repre¬
sentatives of the $15 billion a year toy industry claimed that manufactur¬
ers were making efforts to produce toys that appeal to both sexes and that
overcome gender stereotyping. One example, offered by Mattel, was
“Earring Magic Ken,” an updated version of Barbie’s longtime boyfriend.
The new Ken has blond streaks in his brown hair and wears an earring in
his left ear (Lawson 1993). Barbie herself has been given a number of
nontraditional roles, including astronaut and business executive (the
latter carries a portable lap-top computer). However, the best-selling doll
is still Totally Hair Barbie, which in 1992 was the fifth-best-selling toy in
the United States (Adelson 1992), and every Barbie continues to have a
figure that translates into proportions of 36-20-32 (that is, the bust of an
adult woman, the hips of a teenager, and the waist of a child)
As for the new toys that are supposed to cross gender lines, closer
examination reveals that they are hardly gender neutral. In most cases, in
fact, the toys are simply produced in male and female versions (Lawson
1993). Troll dolls are a good example. As the Hasbro television commer¬
cial claims, girls like smiling trolls with jqweled belly buttons and cotton-
soft hair in bright colors, but boys like Battle Trolls, nasty-looking
characters who wear paramilitary clothing, are heavily armed, and have
nasty-sounding names. The Battle Trolls burst onto the television screen
by breaking down a door that smashes one of the “girls’ trolls” when it
falls.
Apart from toys, what other items stand out as a central feature of a
child’s environment? You may recall from the Rheingold and Cook study
that books are one of only two items that boys and girls are equally likely
to have. Unfortunately, children’s literature traditionally ignored females
or portrayed males and females in a blatantly stereotyped fashion. For
example, Lenore Weitzman and her colleagues (1972) found in their
now-classic analysis of award-winning picture books for preschoolers that
males were usually depicted as active adventurers and leaders, while
females were shown as passive followers and helpers. Boys were typically
rewarded for their accomplishments and for being smart; girls were re-
În late 1991, a small woman-owned company, High Self-Esteem Toys Corporation,
began marketing a new doll called “Happy to Be Me.” The doll was created by Cathy
Meredig out of concern for women’s and girls’ commonly expressed dissatisfaction
\ with their bodies and their chronic (and often harmful) dieting (see chapter 12).
Consequently, the Happy to Be Me doll is proportioned more like an average woman
(36-27-38) and has larger feet which, unlike Barbie’s, are not molded into a shape to
wear only high heels {Neiu York Times 15 August 1991:C11).
warded for their good looks. Books that included adult characters showed
men doing a wide range of jobs, but women were restricted largely to
domestic roles. In about one third of the books they studied, however,
there were no female characters at all.
In a replication of the Weitzman research, Williams et al. (1987)
noted significant improvements in the visibility of females. Only 12.5
percent of the books published in the early 1980s that they examined had
no females, while a third had females as central characters. Nevertheless,
although males and females were about equal in their appearance in
children’s literature, the ways they were depicted remained largely un¬
changed. According to 'Williams et al. (1987:155), “With respect to role
portrayal and characterization, females do not appear to be so much
stereotyped as simply colorless. No behavior was shared by a majority of
females; while nearly all males were portrayed as independent, persistent,
and active. Furthermore, differences in the way males and females are
presented is entirely consistent with traditional culture.”
To mark the twentieth anniversary of the publication of the
Weitzman et al. study, Clark and his colleagues (1993) also reconfirmed,
using more specific evaluation criteria, Weitzman et al.’s findings. In
addition, however, Clark et al. analyzed children’s picture books that
received awards during the years 1987 through 1991 and compared those
illustrated by white illustrators with those illustrated by African-American
illustrators. Among their findings were that while all the recent children’s
picture books contained more female central characters who are depicted
as more independent, creative, and assertive than those in the past, the
books illustrated by African-American artists (and written by African-
American authors) gave female characters the greatest visibility and were
signiflcantly more likely to depict these females as competitive, persistent,
nurturant, aggressive, emotional, and active. Clark et al. (1993) argue
that the recent books illustrated by white artists reflect the liberal feminist
emphasis on more egalitarian depictions of female and male characters,
whereas those illustrated by African-American artists reflect the aims of
Black feminist theorists who emphasize women’s greater involvement in
an ethic of care and an ethic of personal accountability.
These researchers’ general findings with respect to recent children’s
literature may also be a byproduct of the considerable attention that has
been given to the problem of sexism in children s literature and the
resulting efforts to change it. Publishers, for instance, have developed
guidelines to help authors avoid sexism in their works, and a number of
authors’ and writers’ collectives have set to work producing egalitarian
books for youngsters. Some researchers, though, now claim that the
so-called nonsexist picture books frequently advantage female characters
at the expense of male characters, thus simply reversing traditional depic¬
tions of gender rather than portraying gender equality (St. Peter 1979).
98 Chapter 4
However, others (e.g., Davis 1984) praise the nonsexist books for their
depictions of females as highly independent and males as nurturant and
nonaggressive. Still, regardless of what adults think of these books, the
nontraditional gender messages may be lost on children. In an interesting
study, Bronwyn Davies (1989) read storybooks with feminist themes to
groups of preschool boys and girls from various racial and ethnic and
social class backgrounds. She found that the majority of children ex¬
pressed a dislike for and an inability to identify with storybook characters
who were acting in nontraditional roles or engaged in cross-gender activi¬
ties. By the time the children heard these stories (at the ages of four or
five), “[t]he power of the pre-existing structure of the traditional narra¬
tive [prevented] a new form of narrative from being heard.” There
were no differences across racial, ethnic, or social class lines. What did
emerge as significant was parents’ early efforts to socialize their children
in nonsexist, non-gender-polarizing ways. Thus, the two children in the
study whose parents did not support polarized gender socialization did
not see anything wrong with characters engaged in cross-gendered behav¬
iors and had less difficulty identifying with these characters—a finding
that offers support for Bern’s theory of gender acquisition that we dis¬
cussed earlier.
One way that writers and publishers have tried to overcome sexism
in children’s literature is to depict characters as genderless or gender
neutral. However, recent research casts doubt on the potential success of
this approach since it has been found that mothers who read these books
to their children almost always label the characters in gender-specific
ways. In 95 percent of these cases the labeling is masculine (DeLoache et
al. 1987). In this study, the only pictures that prompted feminine labels
were those showing an adult helping a child, an interpretation consistent
with the gender stereotypes that females need more help than males and
that females are more attentive to children. Based on this research, then,
it appears that “picturing characters in a gender-neutral way is actually
counterproductive, since the adult ‘reading’ the picture book with the
child is likely to produce an even more gender-biased presentation than
the average children’s book does” (DeLoache et al. 1987:176).
To summarize our discussion so far, we have seen that virtually every
significant dimension of a child’s environment—his or her clothing,
bedroom, toys, and, to a lesser extent, books—is structured according to
cultural expectations of appropriate gendered behavior. If, as Bern and
other theorists maintain, young children actively try to organize all the
information they receive daily, their parents and other adults are clearly
providing them with the means. Despite their claims, even parents who
see themselves as egalitarian tend to provide their children with different
experiences and opportunities and to respond to them differently on the
basis of sex (Weisner et al. 1994). Consequently, the children cannot help
but conclude that sex is an important social category. By the time they are
ready for school, they have already learned to view the world in terms of
a dichotomy: his and hers. Parents are not the only socializers of young
children, however; recent research has demonstrated the importance of
peers in early childhood socialization. Let’s consider, then, the ways in
which young children help to socialize one another.
Early Peer Group Socialization

As we noted previously, socialization is not a one-way process from adults
to children. Rather, childhood socialization is a collective process in
which “children creatively appropriate information from the adult world
to produce their own unique peer cultures” (Corsaro and Eder
1990:200). Indeed, according to Beverly Fagot (1985), children’s same-
sex peers are the most powerful agents of socialization.
Children socialize one another through their everyday interactions
in the home and at play. Research indicates, for example, that one of
young children’s first attempts at social differentiation is through increas¬
ing sex segregation. Observations of young children at play indicate that
they voluntarily segregate themselves into same-sex groups. This prefer¬
ence for play with same-sex peers emerges between the ages of two and
three and grows stronger as children move from early to middle child¬
hood (Feiring and Lewis 1987; Maccoby and Jacklin 1987). Moreover,
when compared with girls, boys tend to interact in larger groups, be more
aggressive and competitive, and engage in more organized sports (Cor¬
saro and Eder 1990; Maccoby 1988; Thorne 1986).
Thorne (1993) is critical of much of this research for focusing solely
on sex differences and ignoring sex similarities and cross-sex interaction.
She gives a number of examples in which young children work coopera¬
tively and amiably in sex-integrated groups (see also Goodenough 1990).
She also points out that children frequently engage in “borderwork”; that
is, they attempt to cross over into the world of the other sex and partici¬
pate in cross-gender activities. There is considerable evidence, however,
that children reward gender-appropriate behavior (Goodenough 1990;
Carter and McClosky 1983; Langolis and Downs 1980). Boys especially are
criticized more by their peers for cross-gender plsy; but both boys and
girls who choose gender-appropriate toys are more likely to have other
children play with them (Roopnarine 1984).
Unfortunately, the research on peer cultures in early childhood is
limited; much more is needed before we can fully appreciate the ways that
young children actively participate in the socialization process. We will
return to this topic in chapter 5, when we discuss children s interactions
with one another in school. Here, however, we may say that available data
do indicate that at the very least, young children should be considered
100 Chapter 4
partners with parents and other caregivers in socialization, including

gender socialization.
The Intervening Variables of Race and Social Class

We must emphasize again that much of the research on early-childhood
gender socialization has recruited subjects from white, middle- and up-
per-middle-class, two-parent families. There are indications that the find¬
ings of such studies may not be representative of the socialization
practices of families of other races and social classes (Mirande 1990). The
work of Janice Hale-Benson (1986) is instructive on this point.
Hale-Benson has studied the socialization goals and practices of
black families. She emphasizes the dual nature of the socialization that
takes place in black households. “One of the challenges Black families
must face in socializing their children is to understand and assist their
children to function within their peer group. In addition. Black parents
must also provide them with the skills and abilities they will need to
succeed in the outside society” (1986:64). For both male and female
children, black parents stress heavily the importance of hard work, ambi¬
tion, and achievement. Thus, black children of both sexes tend to be
more independent and self-reliant than their white peers. They are also
imbued at an early age with a sense of financial responsibility to earn
income for themselves and to contribute to the support of their families.
Finally, black children of both sexes are taught racial pride and strategies
for responding to and overcoming racism (Poussaint and Comer 1993).
Still, the socialization experiences of young black males and females
are not identical. Hale-Benson points out, for example, that among the
traits and skills taught to black boys (largely in the context of their peer
group) are the ways to move their bodies distinctively, athletic prowess,
sexual competence, and street savvy, including how to fight. In contrast,
black girls are socialized into “a very strong motherhood orientation,”
although this does not preclude the general expectation that they will
also work outside the home. The development of personal uniqueness or
distinctiveness is also emphasized, with special attention given to sexual¬
ity, clothing, and body movement.
Black children are often exposed to women and men sharing tasks
and assuming collective responsibility. A number of studies indicate that
in two-parent black families, women are typically employed outside the
home and men participate in child care (Hossain and Roopnarine 1993;
Colletta 1981; Johnson 1981), although there is also evidence that dis¬
putes the finding of role-sharing in black households (Wilson et al.
1990). Almost 62 percent of black children live with Just one parent,
usually their mother, compared with 21 percent of white children and 33
percent of Hispanic children (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993; see
also chapter 7). In black single-parent households, the parent may be

aided in the care and socialization of the children by an extended kin and
friendship network (Staples andjohnson 1993; Reid 1982). Segura and
Pierce (1993) also emphasize the significance of multiple mothering
figures in the socialization of Mexican-American children. In addition,
Hale-Benson (1986:53) notes that the black church offers “a kind of
extended family fellowship that provides other significant adults to relate
to the children, and it also provides material and human resources to the
family.”
In light of these data, it is not surprising that Hale-Benson and
others (e.g., McAdoo 1988; Lewis 1975) have found that black children
are not taught to perceive gender in completely bipolar terms. Instead,
both males and females are expected to be nurturant and expressive
emotionally as well as independent, confident, and assertive. Reid (1982)
reports that black girls more than black boys are encouraged to be high
achievers, and Carr and Mednick (1988) have found that this nontradi-
tional gender socialization leads to high achievement motivation in black
female preschoolers. Bardwell et al. (1986) have also found that black
children are less gender stereotyped than white children. Importantly,
Isaaks (1980) obtained similar results in a comparison of Hispanic and
white children. However, there is some research that reports contradic¬
tory findings. For instance, Gonzalez (1982) and Price-Bonham and
Skeen (1982) found at least as much, if not more, gender stereotyping
among blacks and Hispanics as among whites. Similarly, in her study of
Mexican fathers’ interactions with their seven- to Uvelve-year-old children,
Bronstein (1988) reports that, similar to white fathers, these men inter¬
acted more socially with daughters than with sons, but encouraged their
sons’ cognitive achievement more than their daughters’.
The picture becomes blurred or more complex when social class is
taken into account. For example, there is modest support for the hy¬
pothesis that gender stereotyping decreases as one moves up the social
class hierarchy (Burns and Homel 1989; Lackey 1989; Brooks-Gunn 1986;
Seegmiller et al. 1980). However, if parental educational level may be
used as an indicator of a family’s social class, it appears that, at least
among whites, gender stereotyping may be greater the higher a family’s
social class position (Bardwell et al. 1986). Most studies of black and
Hispanic or Chicano socialization practices, though, still utilize middle-
class samples (e.g., Bronstein 1988; McAdoo 1988), and there is little
research that examines the interaction of social class with race and eth¬
nicity. One study that did address this interaction indicates that the latter
is the more important variable; that is, race and ethnicity have a stronger
influence on child-rearing practices than does social class, although this
research did not examine gender socialization specifically (Hale-Benson
1986). We can only conclude that much more research is needed to
102 Chapter 4
elucidate the rich diversity of gender socialization practices and their

outcomes among various races and social classes.
BY THE TIME A CHILD IS FIVE
At the outset of this chapter, we argued that children are born into a
world that largely favors males. Throughout much of the remainder of
our discussion, we examined research that indicates that this male pref¬
erence carries over into parents’ and other adults’ interactions with
children. We have seen here that during early childhood, boys and girls—
at least those from white, middle-class families—are socialized into sepa¬
rate and unequal genders. Little boys are taught independence,
problem-solving abilities, assertiveness, and curiosity about their environ¬
ment—skills that are highly valued in our society. In contrast, little girls
are taught dependence, passivity, and domesticity—traits that our society
devalues. Children themselves reinforce and respond to adults’ socializa¬
tion practices by socializing one another in peer groups.
We also discussed four theories or explanations of how the process
of gender socialization takes place. The first, Freudian identification
theory, argues that all children pass through a series of psychosexual
stages, with the phallic stage being the most critical for the development
of gender identity. It is during this phase that boys and girls attempt to
resolve their respective gender-identity complexes by identifying with
their same-sex parents. However, identification theory’s emphasis on the
unconscious nature of this process makes it virtually impossible to verify
objectively.
Social learning theory maintains that children learn gender the
same way they learn other behaviors and attitudes—through reinforce¬
ment (i.e., rewards and punishments for specific behaviors) and by imi¬
tating adult models. Cognitive-developmental theory contends that
children acquire gender as they try to make sense of their everyday
observations and experiences. Sex, according to this perspective, is a
natural category for them to use in their organization efforts. Both of
these theories have received some empirical support, but both have also
been extensively criticized. The former depicts gender socialization as a
simple case of “monkey see, monkey do,” whereas research indicates that
it is far more complex. The latter, by portraying gender polarization as
natural, overlooks the role of culture and social structural factors in the
process of gender socialization.
The fourth theory, Bern’s enculturated lens theory of gender
formation, plays on the strengths of the social learning and cognitive-
developmental theories, while avoiding their pitfalls. Bern sees gender
socialization as a special case of enculturation through which the gender
lenses of a culture are transmitted to new members. It is a process in

which those being socialized actively take part, but Bern places consider¬
able emphasis on how culture and social institutions transmit the lenses
of gender polarization, androcentrism, and biological essentialism by
structuring males’ and females’ everyday experiences in particular ways
and by bombarding society’s members with metamessages about gender.
The remainder of our discussion in this chapter reviewed research
that lends support to Bern’s theory. We have seen here that gender-typed
clothing, room furnishings, toys, and books serve both to organize chil¬
dren’s everyday experiences in terms of a gender dichotomy and to
reinforce children for stereotypic gender-appropriate behavior. Not
surprisingly, children as young as two years old already adhere to
gender stereotypes and exhibit preferences for gender-typed toys and
activities.
May we conclude, then, that nonsexist socialization is impossible?
Certainly not. Considerable research is under way to evaluate a variety of
nonsexist socialization techniques (Lorber 1986). Davies’s (1989) study
indicates that attempts at nonsexist socialization by parents do have a
positive impact on children’s attitudes and behavior. We also considered
Bern’s suggested strategies for nonsexist socialization, which we think
have merit and deserve further exploration. However, we must keep in
mind that parents are not the only ones responsible for gender socializa¬
tion. Indeed, as we will see in chapters 5 and 6, schools and the media
take up where parents leave off, and peers remain active socializers
throughout our lives.
KEY TERMS
androcentrism male-centered; the notion that males are superior to females

and that males and the male experience are the normative standard
against which women should be judged
biological essentialism a cultural lens that rationalizes and legitimates both an¬
drocentrism and gender polarization by portraying them as the natural
and inevitable products of the inherent biological differences between
the sexes
gender polarization the assumption that males and females are fundamentally
different from one another, and the practice of using these differences as
a central organizing principle for the social life of the society
identification a central concept of the Freudian-based theory of gender sociali¬
zation; the process by which boys and girls begin to unconsciously model
their behavior after that of their same-sex parent in their efforts to re¬
solve their respective gender-identity complexes
modeling the process by which children imitate the behavior of their same-sex
parent, especially if the parent rewards their imitations or is perceived by
104 Chapter 4
them to be warm, friendly, or powerful; a central concept of the social

learning theory of gender socialization
reinforcement a central principle of the social learning theory of gender so¬
cialization which states that a behavior consistently followed by a reward
will likely occur again, whereas a behavior followed by a punishment will
rarely reoccur
socialization the process by which a society’s values and norms, including
those pertaining to gender, are taught and learned
SUGGESTED READINGS
Bern, S. L. 1993. The Lenses of Gender: Transforming the Debate on Sexual Inequality.
Davies, B. 1989. Frogs and Snails and Feminist Tails. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
In addition, we .suggest several practical guides to the issues we have raised in this
chapter. Two useful sources for nonsexist children’s literature are Books for Today’s
Children compiled by Jeanne Bracken and Sharon Wigutoff (published by the
Feminist Press at the City University of New York) and the Appendix (pp. 142-
143) in Davies’s book. The Feminist Book Mart of New York provides a catalog of
nonsexist children’s books, and author Jack Zipes has compiled an anthology of
sixteen feminist retellings of classic fairy tales entitled. Don’t Bet on the Prince:
Contemporary Feminist Fairy Tales in North America and England (New York:
Methuen, 1986). See also Tatterhood and Other Tales edited by Ethel Johnston
Phelps, and My Mother the Mail Carrier by Inez Maury (with a Spanish translation
by Norah Alemany) from the Feminist Press at the City University of New York.
Finally, for toy catalogs that picture models engaged in cross-gender behav¬
ior, consult “Constructive Playthings” available from the company of the same
name, 1227 East 119th Street, Grandview, Missouri 64030; “Hand in Hand”
available from First Step, Ltd., 9180 LeSaint Drive, Fairfield, Ohio 45014; and
“Toys to Grow On,” available from Toys to Grow On, 2695 E. Dominguez Street,
P.O. Box 17, Long Beach, CA 90801.
Chapter
Schools and Gender

106 Chapter 5
In a speech before a group of educators in 1980, Florence Howe, herself

an educator, began by quoting from the writings of Frederick Douglass,
the famous abolitionist. In the passage she selected, Douglass recalls his
childhood as a slave on a Southern plantation and relays a conversation
he overheard between the slave owner and the slave owner’s wife. Said the
slave owner to his wife, “If you teach that. . . nigger how to read, there
would be no keeping him. It would forever unfit him to be a slave. He
would at once become unmanageable, and of no value to his master. As
to himself, it could do him no good, but a great deal of harm. It would
make him discontented and unhappy” (quoted in Howe 1984:247). Howe
selected this passage because it aptly illustrates what she calls the power
of education. Both Douglass and his master recognized that education
may enable us to understand our social position and thus empower us to
act to change it.
To this observation we must add another: education is powerful in the
sense that it may also serve to keep us in our respective places. More
specifically, schools are officially charged with the responsibility of equipping
students with the knowledge and skills they need to fill various roles in their
society. This is accomplished primarily by requiring students to study subjects
(e.g., reading, writing, mathematics, and history) known collectively as
the formal curriculum. But schools also teach students particular social,
political, and economic values. This instruction, too, may be done explicitly
(by punishing students for being late, for instance), but just as often these
value messages are implicit in the curriculum materials used to teach tradi¬
tional academic subjects. They constitute, in other words, a kind of hid¬
den curriculum that operates alongside the more formal one. However,
the subtle nature of the hidden curriculum in no way lessens its signifi¬
cance. Through it, students learn to view the world in particular ways. More
importantly, they learn what they can expect for themselves in that world
and, for certain groups of students, this may result in very low aspirations.
In this chapter, we will examine the kinds of messages both the
formal and informal curricula send about gender, and we will assess their
impact on the aspirations and achievements of male and female students.
In addition, we will explore some of the recent efforts to transform the
educational experience into a richer, more equal one for students of both
sexes. Before we examine the current relationship between schools and
gender, however, let’s begin with a brief discussion of how this relation¬
ship has developed and changed over time.
AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF WOMEN

AND MEN IN EDUCATION
The word school derives from an ancient Greek word that means “leisure.”
This makes sense when one considers that until relatively recent times.
Schools and Gender 107
only the very wealthy had enough free time on their hands to pursue what
may be considered a formal education. Literacy was not a necessity for the
average person; most people acp[uired the knowledge they needed to be
productive citizens either on their own, or from parents, other relatives,
coworkers, or tradespeople. However, even the education of the privi¬
leged few was somew'hat haphazard. The educated man—for formal edu¬
cation was restricted to males until 1786—was schooled in the classics,
moral philosophy, mathematics, and rhetoric, although he acquired this
knowledge through private study, tutoring, and travel as well as in a
classroom (Graham 1978). Those who went to college were trained in
self-discipline and moral piety as much as in academic subjects, for upon
graduation they were to take their places among the white “ruling class”
as ministers, lawyers, and other professionals (Howe 1984).
Upper-class white w'omen, w4ien educated, were taught at home, but
what they learned was far more restricted than the knowledge imparted
to men. Women learned music and were given “a taste” of literature and
a foreign language. Their education was to prepare them not to assume
public leadership positions, but rather to better fulfill their “natural” role
in life as demure, witty, well-groomed partners for their elite husbands.
Even when schools for girls began to open in America—the first, the
Young Ladies Academy, established in Philadelphia in 1786—the ratio¬
nale behind them centered on women’s domestic roles. In the post-Revo-
lutionary War period, it was argued that American women would play a
vital role in the future of the republic, not as political leaders, but as the
first educators of sons who would grow up to be citizens. If women were
to be good teachers of civic virtue, they needed to be better educated
themselves (Schwager 1987). Still, these early educational opportunities
for females were offered largely by private schools and thus remained
available only to the well-to-do.
With increasing industrialization in the United States during the
nineteenth century, basic literacy and numeracy skills came to be viewed
not only as desirable, but also as necessary for most jobs. During the first
half of the century, free public schools for girls and boys began to open,
especially in the northeastern cities. This produced two major conse¬
quences. The first was that white female literacy rates, at least in the
northeastern part of the country, began to match white male literacy rates
by mid-century. Nevertheless, black literacy rates remained substantially
lower (Schwager 1987).
Second, the proliferation of elementary schools provided women
with new career opportunities as teachers. In the early 1800s, men domi¬
nated teaching and looked upon it as a good sideline occupation that
provided extra income. The school year was relatively short and was
structured around the farm calendar, with classes held during the winter
months when farm chores were light. However, with urbanization and
growing demands for higher educational standards in an industrialized
108 Chapter 5
society, teaching became a full-time job, albeit one that earned a salary
too low to support a family. As a result, educational administrators em¬
ployed women as a cheap and efficient means to implement mass elemen¬
tary education (Strober and Lanford 1986). Women were paid 40 percent
less than their male counterparts on the (often false) assumption that
they had only themselves to support (Schwager 1987). Their maternal
instincts” made them naturally suited to work with young children, and if
a disciplinary problem arose, they could enlist the aid of the school
principal or superintendent who was invariably a man. Valued, too, were
their supposed docility and responsiveness to male authority since male-
dominated school boards were handing down strict guidelines for instruc¬
tion and a standardized curriculum (Strober and Lanford 1986; Strober
and Tyack 1980). Given such attitudes, as well as the fact that few other
occupational opportunities were open to women, it is not surprising that
female teachers outnumbered male teachers by 1860 (Schwager 1987).
Most of the women who became teachers were trained in normal
schools (precursors to teacher training colleges) or in female seminaries,
such as the Troy Female Seminary established in 1821. It was not until
1832 that women were permitted to attend college with men. Oberlin
College in Ohio was the first coeducational college in the United States;
it was, incidentally, also the first white college to admit black students.
Lawrence College in Wisconsin followed suit in 1847, and by 1872, there
were ninety-seven coeducational American colleges (Leach 1980). Still,
the more prestigious institutions, such as Harvard, Yale, and Princeton,
continued to deny women admission on a number of grounds. It was
widely believed, for example, that women were naturally less intelligent
than men, so that their admission would lower academic standards. A
second popular argument was that women were physically more delicate
than men and that the rigors of higher education might disturb their
uterine development to such an extent that they would become sterile or
bear unhealthy babies. Others argued that women would distract men
from their studies, or that college would make women more like men:
loud, coarse, and vulgar (Howe 1984). (Yale and Princeton did not admit
women as undergraduate students until 1969.)
Even at coeducational colleges, however, women and men had very
different educational experiences. At liberal Oberlin, for instance, female
students were expected to remain silent at public assemblies; in addition,
they were required to care not only for themselves, but also for the male
students by doing their laundry, cleaning their rooms, and serving them
their meals (Flexner 1971). Moreover, there, and at virtually every other
coeducational college, women and men were channeled into different
areas of study. Men specialized in fields such as engineering, the physical
and natural sciences, business, law, and medicine. Women, in contrast,
studied home economics, nursing, and, of course, elementary education
(Howe 1984). In, fact, a teaching degree or certificate remained one of

the few avenues of upward mobility for white, black, and immigrant
women well into the twentieth century (Giddings 1984).
Nevertheless, some women did earn degrees in nontraditional or
male-dominated fields, and many of them graduated from women’s col¬
leges. Wheaton College, established in 1834, was the first women’s col¬
lege, and in the late 1880s, the elite “Seven Sisters” colleges (Mount
Holyoke, Vassar, Wellesley, Smith, Radcliffe, Bryn Mawr, and Barnard)
were opened. MTiat is perhaps most significant about these institutions is
that they offered women the traditional men’s curriculum in a highly
supportive environment that fostered their ambitions and encouraged
achievement. Consequently, “these institutions produced an exceptional
generation of women during the 1890s who, nurtured by the collective
female life of the women’s college, emerged with aspirations to use their
educations outside the confines of women’s domestic sphere as it was
narrowly defined in marriage” (Schwager 1987:362). Many of these
women became leaders of the various social reform movements, includ¬
ing the suffrage movement, that grew during the early 1900s. A substan¬
tial percentage pursued further training or entered the professions. Even
midway through the twentieth century when, as we will soon see, the
overall percentage of female Ph.D.’s dropped considerably, the women’s
colleges continued to graduate exceptional female students who often
went on to graduate and professional schools (Tidball 1980).
Women and Men in Education during the

Twentieth Century
The emphasis on mass education did not diminish during the early
decades of the twentieth century, fueled in large part by widespread
concern over the influx of European immigrants into the United States.
Special efforts were made to teach immigrants English and basic literacy
skills, for according to many social reformers, education would help solve
the social problems associated with immigrant life (e.g., poverty, alcohol¬
ism, and juvenile delinquency). This, coupled with continuing industriali¬
zation, promoted a steady rise in elementary and secondary school
enrollments throughout the first half of the century.
Still, as Table 5.1 on page 110 indicates, an education gap between
males and females persisted, especially at the higher educational levels.
To some extent, this was because of the popular belief that education was
less important for females. Although Tyack and Hansot (1990) maintain
that gender was rarely a major factor in the development of educational
policy, there is evidence that in the often overcrowded public schools,
administrators appeared quite willing to let girls drop out, since their
departure would open more spaces for boys. In the 1930s, however, many
no Chapter 5
TAeLE 5.1 The Education Gap between the Sexee, 1570-1990
% of
Eemales as Females as
Population
Bachelor’s Master’s Females
Enrolled in
Eemales as Degree Degree as
Elementary &
Undergrads Recipients Recipients Doctorates
Secondary
School (M/E) (%) (%)* (%) (%)
Year
21 15 n.a. 0
1870 49.8/46.9
32 19 n.a. 6
1880 59.2/56.5
35 17 n.a. 1
1890 54.7/53.8
50.1/50.9 35 19 n.a. 6
1900
59.1/59.4 39 25 n.a. 11
1910
64.1/64.5 47 34 n.a. 15
1920
70.2/69.7 43 40 n.a. 18
1930
1940 74.9/69.7 40 41 n.a. 13
1950 79.1/78.4 31 24 29.3 10
1960 84.9/83.8 36 35 32 10
1970 88.5/87.2 41 41 39.7 13
1980 95.5/95.5 52.3 47.3 49.3 29.8
1990 96.3/95.9 54.5 53.2 52.5 36.2
Încludes first professional degrees from 1870 to 1970.

Smirces: Commission on Professionals in Science and Technology 1992; U.S. Department of Commerce 1991, 1985, and 1975;
Graham, 1978.
states enacted laws that made school attendance until age sixteen manda¬
tory. This, in turn, narrowed the gap at the secondary school level, but
other factors operated to preserve it in colleges and graduate programs.
Looking again at Table 5.1, we see that, until the 1980s, women have
consistently comprised less than half the undergraduate student body in
the United States, despite the fact that they make up slightly more than
50 percent of the country’s population. Interestingly, in 1920, they did
approach the 50 percent mark, but by 1930, their numbers had dwindled,
continuing to fall until 1960. A similar pattern can be seen with regard to
graduate school as measured by the percentage of doctoral degrees
awarded to women. The percentage of doctorates who were women
peaked in 1930, but then dropped considerably until 1970 when it began
to rise steadily once again.
How can we account for this kind of roller coaster pattern in
women’s representation in higher education? As we mentioned pre¬
viously, a number of factors appear to be involved. The early growth in
female college and graduate school enrollments was probably due, at
least in part, to the first feminist movement and the struggle for women’s
rights (see chapter 13). In addition, with males off fighting World War I,
colleges may have looked to (tuition-paying) females to take their places
(Graham 1978). The Great Depression of the 1930s dashed many young
people s hopes of attending college, but it is likely that women more often
sacrificed further schooling given the old belief that education (particu¬
larly a college education) was less important for them. World War II sent
men abroad once again to fight, while women were recruited for wartime
production jobs (see chapter 8). After the war ended, an unprecedented
number of men entered college thanks to the GI bill. For women, though,
the dominant postwar ideology idealized marriage and motherhood and
promoted a standard of femininity by which women were judged accord-
ing to how well they cared for their families, their homes, and their
appearance. As Graham (1978:772) reports:
The women of the forties and fifties absorbed the new values and
withdrew from the professional arena. They married at very high rates at
more youthful ages and had lots of babies. The birth rate reached its
peak in 1957, at which time the average age for first marriage for women
was just over 20.
Those women who did attend college were often accused of pursuing a
Mrs. instead of a B.S., for the college campus came to be seen as the
perfect setting for meeting a promising (i.e., upwardly mobile) mate. Not
infrequently, women dropped out of school to take jobs to help support
their student-husbands.
This pattern appears applicable only with regard to the educational
history of white women, however. When race is taken into account, a
different historical overview emerges. According to Giddings (1984:245),
for example, during the time that white women began to drop out of or
not attend college, the number of black women in college, especially in
black colleges, increased:
By 1940, more black women received B.A. degrees from Black colleges
than Black men (3,244 and 2,463 respectively). By 1952-53, the surge of
Black women had increased significantly. They received 62.4 percent of
all degrees from Black colleges when, in all colleges, the percentage of
women graduates was 33.4 percent. The percentage of Black women
graduates was in fact just a little below that of mafe graduates in all
schools (66.6 percent) and substantially higher than that of Black men
(35.6 percent). An important dimension of this was that a large
proportion of these women were the first in their families to receive
college degrees.
Also significant is the fact that many of the.se women went on to graduate
school. By the early 1950s, the number of black women with master’s
112 Chapter 5
decrees exceeded the number of black men with this level of education.
However, black male Ph.D.’s and M.D.’s still outnumbered their female
counterparts by a considerable margin (Giddings 1984). Interesting y,
Smith (1982) reports that black females’ educational aspirations are
higher than those of black males until college, when they begin to de¬
cline. This is a point to which we will return shortly.
Since the 1970s, the percentage of women and minority under¬
graduates and graduate students has risen substantially, and considerable
attention has been given to the problems of sexism and racism at every
level of schooling. Undoubtedly, the civil rights movement and the resur¬
gence of the feminist movement during the sixties and seventies played a
major part in bringing about these changes. With respect to sex discrimi¬
nation, in particular, feminist lobbying efforts were instrumental in the
passage of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, which contains the
important provisions known as Title IX. Simply stated, Title IX forbids sex
discrimination in any educational program or activity that receives fed¬
eral funding. This law has resulted in a number of beneficial reforms in
education, especially in school athletic programs for women and girls
(see chapter 12). Nevertheless, the educational experiences of males and
females remain quite different and, more significantly, unequal. In the
remainder of this chapter, we will examine the various structural factors
that serve to perpetuate this inequality, from elementary school through
graduate school.
EDUCATING GIRLS AND BOYS:

THE ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS
When elementary school teachers are asked about the way they treat their
students, they respond in the same way that parents do, and state that they
treat all their students fairly, regardless of their sex. Research indicates,
however, that in practice, teachers typically interact differently (and often
inequitably) with their male and female students. The interactions differ
in at least two ways: the frequency of teacher-student interactions and the
content of those interactions.
With respect to frequency of teachers’ interactions with their stu¬
dents, studies show that regardless of the sex of the teacher, male students
interact more with their teachers than female students do (American
Association of University Women [AAUW] 1992). Boys receive more
teacher attention and more instructional time than girls do. Of course,
this may be due to the fact that boys are more demanding than girls. Boys,
for instance, are eight times more likely than girls to call out answers in
class, thus directing teachers’ attention to them more often (Sadker and
Sadker 1985a). However, research also shows that even when boys do not
voluntarily participate in class, teachers are more likely to solicit informa¬
tion from them than from girls (Sadker and Sadker 1994).
Apart from the frequency of teacher-student interactions, education
specialists Myra and David Sadker (1994) report that the content of
teacher-student interactions also differs, depending on the sex of the
student. By observing teacher-student interaction in the classroom over
many years, the Sadkers found that teachers provided boys with more
remediation; for instance, they more often helped boys than girls find
and correct errors (see also Box 5.1 on pages 114-115). In addition, they
posed more academic challenges to boys, encouraging them to think
through their answers to arrive at the best possible academic response.
Other studies support these findings. For example, teachers’ com¬
ments to boys are more precise than their comments to girls (AAUW
1992). Boys also get more praise for the intellectual quality of their work,
whereas girls are praised more often for the neatness of their work
(Dweck et al. 1978). At the same time, however, while boys generally
engage in more positive interactions with teachers, they are also more
likely than girls to incur their teachers’ wrath. Boys are subject to more
disciplinary action in elementary school classrooms, and their punish¬
ments are harsher and more public than those handed out to girls.
Perhaps boys misbehave more than girls; after all, as we learned in chap¬
ter 4, preschool boys are encouraged to be active and aggressive, while
preschool girls are rewarded for quiet play and passivity. It may be that
the early childhood socialization of girls better prepares them for the
behavioral requirements of elementary school. Nevertheless, classroom
observations show that when boys and girls are being equally disruptive,
it is the boys that teachers most frequently single out for punishment
(Serbin et al. 1973).
The American Association of University Women (1992) argues that
the sex inequities embedded in teacher-student interactions lower female
students’ academic self-esteem and confidence. This relationship is com¬
plicated, however, by the factors of race and social class. Black boys
interact with their teachers less than other students. Black girls interact
with their teachers less than white girls, but try to initiate more teacher-
student interaction than do white girls and black and white boys; unfor¬
tunately, teachers often rebuff these students (AAUW 1992). The
interaction that black students have with their teachers is also less positive
'Interestingly, the Sadkers’ research also shows that when hoys call out comments in
class without raising their hands, teachers usually accept their answers. When girls call
out, however, teachers typically reprimand them for this “inappropriate” behavior by
responding with comments such as, “In this class we don’t shout out answers, we raise
our hands” (Sadker and Sadker 1994).
114 Chapter 5
30X 5.1 Special Education

Boys outnumber girls in special-education programs by startling percentages.
However, research on special education has rarely focused on gender issues
Figure 5.1 shows that more than two-thirds of all students in special-edu¬
cation programs are male. In fact, the more “subjective” the diagnosis, the
higher the representation of boys. , ru •
One traditional explanation for the disproportionate number ot boys in
special-education programs is that males are born more often with disabling
conditions. However, a careful examination of the existing data does not fully
support this explanation.
Several recent research studies raise new questions about the identifica¬
tion of students with special needs. Medical reports on learning disabilities and
attention-deficit disorders indicate that they occur almost equally in boys and
girls. However, schools regularly identify many more boys than girls m these ar¬
eas. Furthermore, a recent review of research data indicates that girls who are
identified as learning-disabled by school personnel have lower IQs than do
boys who are referred to special education classes.' Rather than identifying
learning problems, school personnel may be mislabeling behavioral problems.
80 ^
70 -
60 -
50 -
40 -
30 -
20 -
10 -
0-^
Trainably Educably Speech Emotionally Learning TOTAL
mentally mentally impaired disturbed disabled ALL
retarded retarded PROGRAMS
FIGURE 5.1 Enrollment In Special Education Grades K-12 by Sex Source: Data
from the 1988 Elementary and Secondary School Civil Rights Survey: U.S.
Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights.
30X 5.1 Continued
Girls who sit quietly are ignored; boys who act out are placed in special pro¬
grams that may not meet their needs.
Boys who are enrolled inappropriately in special-education classes face
limited educational opportunities and carry a lifelong label. Girls with special
needs who are not placed in special-education classes are deprived of the spe¬
cialized services they need to develop fully.
Once students are placed in special-education programs, they often are
exposed to curricular offerings that are heavily stereotyped in terms of gender
roles.^ The irony is that students whose options are already limited by physical
and developmental disabilities need more, not fewer, degrees of freedom in
terms of occupational and personal choices. This is particularly true for girls
with disabilities who must contend not only with their disabling condition, but
with the limitations that our society places on women.
Given the composition of the population, enrollment data in special edu¬
cation also reveal a disproportionately high number of minority students in
classes for the mentally retarded. However, the data are not available broken
down by race and sex.
The interaction among race, ethnicity, and sex must be examined. Re¬
search must be undertaken to examine the ways in which students are identi¬
fied as in need of special services and the content of the special services they
eventually receive. Special-education legislation requires the development of
an individual education plan; equity in terms of gender, race, and culture must
be part of this plan.
'S. A. Vogel, “Gender Differences in Intelligence, Language, Visual-Motor Abilities, and

Academic Achievement in Students with Learning Disabilities: A Review of the Literature, Jour¬
nal of Learning Disahilities 23 (January 1990):44-52.
^S. Shaywitz et al., “Prevalence of Reading Disability in Boys and Girls: Results of the
Connecticut Longitudinal Study,” Journal of the American Medical Association \o\ 264 (August
22/29 1990):998-1002; D. McGuinnes, “Behavioral Tempo in Pre-school Boys arid Girls,”
Learning and Individual Differences 2 (1990):315-25; P. Phipps, “The LD Learner Is Often a
Boy—Why?” Academic Therapy 17 (March 1982):425-30; C. Berry, S. Shaywitz, and B. Shaywitz,
“Girls with Attention Deficit Disorder: A Silent Minority? A Report on Behavioral and Cog¬
nitive Characteristics,” Pediatrics 76 (November 1985):801-9; A. Karlen, R. Hagin, and
R. Beecher, “Are Boys Really More Vulnerable to Learning Disability than Girls?” Academic
Psychology Bulletin 1 (Winter 1985):317-25.
^1988 Elementary and Secondary School Civil Rights Survey. U.S. Department of Educa¬
tion, Office of Civil Rights. The survey is based on a representative sample of 4,556 public
school districts and 40,020 individual schools. The Office of Civil Rights cautions that the data
are for the “sample frame populations only, based on data submitted by the school districts in
the sample.”
Sowrce; American Association of University Women (AAUW) Educational Foundation.
“Special Education,” pp. 19-20 in Hoiv Schools Shortchange Girls, AAUW, 1992.
116 Chapter 5
than that experienced by white students. Black boys, for example, receive
significantly more qualified praise (e.g.. That s good, but. . . ) than o
other students. Black students, regardless of their sex, are more likely to
be reinforced for their social behavior, whereas white students are more
likely to receive teacher reinforcement for their academic achievements
(AAUW 1992). In one study, in which the reinforcement practices of sixty
female black and white teachers were observed, it was found that teachers
tended to reinforce children of their same race less than opposite-race
children and to reinforce boys more often than girls. However, the study
showed that black girls received the least reinforcement of any group of
children (Reid 1982). A study by Jensen and Rosenfeld (1974) indicated
that children’s social class mediated this pattern to some extent in that
middle-class children, regardless of race, receive more favorable evalu¬
ations from teachers than lower-class children. “Interestingly, however,
academic ability has the reverse effect upon teachers reinforcement of
black children. Black girls with high academic ability were ignored even
more than those with less ability. The same effect was true to some extent
for black boys. It seems as though teachers prefer black children to
conform to expectations of low academic ability” (Reid 1982:144). In¬
deed, the AAUW (1992) report states that when black girls perform as
well as white boys in school, teachers tend" to attribute their success to the
black girls’ effort, but at the same time assume that the white boys must not
be working up to their full potential. Clearly, race and social class preju¬
dices interact with sexism to have an especially pernicious effect on some
students’ educational experiences. We will return to this point shortly.
It is hardly surprising that teachers respond to their students in
these ways given that few teacher preparation programs do anything to
prevent it. In one study of teacher-education textbooks, for instance,
researchers found that the problem of sexism in the schools is rarely
addressed. In fact, the authors of these texts are sometimes guilty of
sexism themselves (Sadker and Sadker 1980).
The gender messages that teachers send to students are reinforced
by the traditional curricular materials available in elementary schools. We
noted at the outset of this chapter that students learn not only the
academic subjects of their school’s formal curriculum, but also a set of
values and expectations of a hidden curriculum. We can see the hidden
curriculum at work in the selective content of textbooks and other edu¬
cational materials. Studies conducted during the 1970s (see, for example,
Weitzman and Rizzo 1976) showed that, although the United States is a
country with citizens of both sexes who share a rich and varied racial and
ethnic heritage, racial minorities and women were conspicuously absent
from elementary school textbooks and readers. During the 1980s, re¬
search revealed some improvements, but according to the AAUW
(1992:62), “the problems persist... in terms of what is considered impor-
tant enough to study.” Regardless of the subject—English, history, read¬

ing, science—women and minorities continue to be underrepresented in
textbooks. In history texts, for example. Native Americans and Chicanos
are rarely mentioned apart from such events as Custer’s last stand or the
Alamo, and in both cases, it is made extremely clear who the “bad guys”
were. African Americans and women are more likely to be included, but
the presentation is usually limited to a few “famous women” or “famous
blacks”; or they are mentioned only in traditional historical contexts
(slavery, the Civil War, and the civil rights movement for blacks; the
suffrage movement for women) or in terms of traditional roles (e.g.,
women who were married to famous men). That there is a heterosexist
bias in the texts goes without saying.
Most publishers today issue guidelines to textbook authors to assist
them in avoiding nonsexist language, but the extent to which the guide¬
lines are actually followed is uneven, and such guidelines do little to
increase the representation of women and minorities in the texts nor to
expand the content of the texts to include the perspectives of women and
minorities on their own terms (Sadker and Sadker 1994; AAUW 1992).
For example, there is evidence that children’s readers have improved
significantly with respect to the use of gender neutral language and the
inclusion of females. However, there continue to be imbalances in favor
of males with the regard to rate of portrayal and types of roles assigned
to males and females in the stories (e.g., girls need to be rescued more than
boys; boys are more adventurous than girls (Purcell and Stewart 1990).
The AAUW (1992) notes that the major curriculum reform projects
that have been undertaken in the United States since the early 1980s have
not explicitly addressed the issue of gender equity. However, since 1990,
several state boards or commissions on education, such as those in New
York and Pennsylvania, have begun to reevaluate the formal curriculum
of their schools and to consider revisions that would make the curriculum
more gender-fair, multicultural, and inclusive of lesbians and gay men.
Needless to say, such efforts have generated considerable controversy, and
most changes in schools’ curricula regarding sex, race, sexual orienta¬
tion, and social justice have occurred at the local level in only a handful
of school districts (see, for example. Cells 1993). The importance of using
nonbiased, multicultural curriculum materials, however, is exemplified by
evidence that indicates that children learn their lessons quite well. Con¬
sider, for instance, the results of a recent survey of almost 7,500 school
children in grades one through twelve living in the Minneapolis-St. Paul
area. The majority of the youngsters expressed the belief that only men
can be president of the United States; some stated that women cannot
even try to become president (Snow 1992; see also Best 1983).
The organization of school activities also gives children messages
about gender. For example, many teachers continue to use various forms
118 Chapter 5
of sex separation in their classrooms. They may seat girls on one side of the
room and boys on the other; they may ask girls and boys to form separate
lines; or they may organize teams for a spelling or math competition
according to students’ sex. Teachers also sometimes assign girls and boys
different classroom chores; for instance, girls may be asked to dust or
water the plants, whereas boys are asked to carry books, rearrange desks,
or run equipment. Sociologist Barrie Thorne (1993), who has made
extensive observations of elementary school classrooms, points out that
teachers engage in contradictory practices: sometimes they reinforce sex
separation, but other times they challenge or disrupt it. She notes that
teachers more often mix boys and girls than separate them, but that
separating girls and boys in lines or seating arrangements, as well as
pitting them against one another in classroom contests, is not uncom¬
mon. Moreover, this physical separation is reinforced by a verbal separa¬
tion, in that teachers routinely use gender labels as terms of address to
the students and invariably put “boys” first in speaking to the children, as
in “boys and girls.” Thorne observed that girls and boys typically separate
themselves in school lunchrooms and on school playgrounds—probably
much more than they do in their home neighborhoods—and teachers
and aides often ratify this division by seeing certain areas as “girls’ terri¬
tory” and other areas as “boys’ territory.” '
Trivial though they may appear to be, these kinds of sex separations
have at least three interrelated consequences. First, sex separation in and
of itself prevents boys and girls from working together cooperatively, thus
denying children of both sexes valuable opportunities to learn about and
sample one another’s interests and activities. Second, it makes working in
same-sex groups more comfortable than working in mixed-sex groups—a
feeling that children may carry with them into adulthood and which may
become problematic when they enter the labor force (see chapter 8).
Third, sex separation reinforces gender stereotypes, especially if it involves
differential work assignments (Sadker and Sadker 1994; Lockheed 1986).
Thorne (1993) found that in a classroom activity with a central
focus, such as the collective making of a map or taking turns reading
aloud from a book, girls and boys participated together. Similar observa¬
tions have prompted some educators to advocate that classroom activities
be reorganized to facilitate cooperative learning. Cooperative learning in¬
volves students working together in small, mixed-sex, mixed-race groups
on a group project or toward a group goal (e.g., solving a problem,
writing a report). The cooperative learning approach is designed to
lessen classroom competition, maximize cooperation, foster group soli¬
darity and interdependence, and promote understanding among mem¬
bers of diverse groups of children. Research indicates that cooperative
learning does have a number of benefits: it appears to increase interracial
friendships, it raises the self-esteem of students of all races, and it is
especially helpful in mainstreaming students with disabilities (AAUW

1992; Aronson and Gonzalez 1988). Unfortunately, it appears to be less
successful in fostering positive relationships between boys and girls in
school. According to the AAUW^ (1992:73):
Some research indicates that the infrequent use of small, unstructured

work groups is not effective in reducing gender stereotypes, and, in fact,
increases stereotyping. Groups often provide boys with leadership
opportunities that increase their self-esteem. Females are often seen as
followers and are less likely to want to work in mixed-sex groups in the
future. Another study indicates a decrease in female achievement when
females are placed in mixed-sex groups.
As the AAUW concludes, more fundamental changes than simply provid¬

ing mixed-group learning activities are necessary to bring gender equity
to elementary school classrooms.
Finally, children receive messages about gender simply by the way
adult jobs are distributed in their schools. Although approximately 85
percent of elementary school teachers and 83 percent of teachers’ aides
are women, women are underrepresented in upper management of
school administrations (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993). Chief state
school officers, for example, are the leaders of a state’s public school
system; in 1991, only nine of the fifty chief state school officers were
women. Just 4.8 percent of school superintendents and 27.7 percent of
principals are women (AAUW 1992). As research indicates, the sex of a
school administrator can have a measurable effect on children’s gender-
role perceptions. According to one study of first graders, for instance,
children who attended a school headed by a female principal held fewer
gender stereotypes than those who went to a school with a male principal
(Paradise and Wall 1986).
In light of our discussion so far, it may be somewhat surprising to
learn that girls earn higher grades than boys throughout their school
years (AAUW 1992). However, girls’ achievement test scores, as well as
their self-confidence, decline as they progress through elementary school
and high school (Sadker and Sadker 1994; AAUW 1992; Gilligan et al.
1990). Let’s consider now girls’ and boys’ educational experiences in
high school in order to better understand these findings.
EDUCATING TEENAGE GIRLS AND BOYS:

THE SECONDARY SCHOOLS
Both parents and teenagers will attest that adolescence is one of the more
stressful periods of the life cycle. As one’s body changes and matures, so
do one’s interests, and the opinions of friends take on greater signifi-
120 Chapter 5
cance in the formation of one’s self-concept. Young men and women

both feel the need to be popular with their peers, but the means and
measures of their success at this are somewhat different.
For teenage boys, the single most important source of prestige and
popularity is athletic achievement. The teenage boy tends to measure
“himself by what he can do physically compared to others his age, and
how he stacks up determines to a great extent his social acceptance by
others and his own self-esteem” (Richardson 1981:69). The non-jock is
at an obvious disadvantage, socially and psychologically. It is the athlete
who is looked to as a leader, not only by his peers, but also by teachers
and parents. Moreover, on the court or on the playing field, boys are
taught a variety of stereotypically masculine skills and values: aggression,
endurance, competitiveness, self-confidence, and teamwork (Messner
1989).
It is also in high school that young men are expected to formulate
their career goals. For those not planning to attend college, there are
vocational training programs that provide the educational background
needed for Jobs in the skilled trades or in preparation for technical
school. Most boys, though, study an academic or college prep curriculum,
which may seem a bit surprising given their greater likelihood for aca¬
demic difficulties in the lower grades. However, as we will discuss shortly,
boys’ academic performance usually improves during high school.
What about girls? How does their high school experience differ
from that of boys? For one thing, physical prowess and athletic ability are
not their chief sources of prestige and popularity. Indeed, most teenage
girls learn that to be athletic is to be unfeminine and, as we will discuss
in chapter 12, schools reinforce this message with inadequate funding for
girls’ sports programs. Instead, what contributes most to a teenage girl’s
prestige and popularity is having a boyfriend. “A girl may be bright,
friendly, competent, and attractive, but without a boyfriend she lacks
social validation of these positive attributes. It is as though being selected
by a boy tells others that a girl is worthwhile” (Lott 1987:71; Bush 1987).
Obviously, teenagers, both female and male, who are not heterosexual
face tremendous difficulties in high school and, as Box 5.2 shows, fre¬
quently experience isolation and ostracism from their peers as well as
from adults.
During high school, young women also begin to plan for their
futures. Until the late 1960s, studies showed that high school boys had
higher career aspirations than high school girls. However, more recent
research has found no sex differences in either the educational or occu¬
pational aspirations of young women and men, and some studies show
girls as having higher aspirations than boys (Dennehy and Mortimer
1992). Despite their raised aspirations, though, teenage girls still tend to
underestimate their academic abilities and to express greater pessimism
The High School Experience for Lesbian and Gay Youth BOX 5.2
Adolescence is a period of tremendous physical and emotional change. It is a
time when most young women and men begin to actively explore their sexual¬
ity and sexual identities. Indeed, research indicates that more than a quarter of
the adolescent population is sexually active by the age of fourteen (AAUW
1992). Historically, our schools have been woefully remiss in educating young
people about sex, but they have been most neglectful with respect to lesbian
and gay youth. Although recent surveys indicate a willingness on the part of
teachers and school administrators to treat homosexual students in a nonjudg-
mental way and to attend school-sponsored workshops related to homosexual
students, there remains an unwillingness to proactively address the special
needs of homosexual students or to openly affirm their sexual identities (Sears
1992). Most school personnel, in fact, continue to assume the heterosexuality
of their students and never raise the issue of sexual orientation. Except for re¬
sponding to especially blatant or heinous forms of harassment against homosex¬
ual students, the majority of school personnel do not seriously confront the
problem of homophobia—an unreasonable fear of or hostility toward homo¬
sexuals—in their classrooms or on school grounds (AAUW 1992; Sears 1992).
“The absence of visible support from educators conveys to all students the legiti¬
macy and desirability of the heterosexual standard” (Sears 1992:74).
VVTiat are the consequences of this neglect for lesbian and gay high
school students? Uribe and Harbeck (1992) report that lesbian and gay adoles¬
cents have a disproportionately high rate of substance abuse, sexual abuse, pa¬
rental rejection, homelessness, and conflict with the law. Although the
participants in their study were very intelligent, few were achieving their full
academic potential. Lesbian and gay adolescents, in fact, are at an especially
high risk of dropping out of school. The social rejection and violence that
these students often receive from their nonhomosexual peers and, not infre¬
quently, from their parents, lead to low self-esteem, alienation, feelings of isola¬
tion, and a sense of inadequacy. Those who hide their sexual orientation may
escape some of the physical and verbal harassment, but their secretiveness is
likely to increase their feelings of loneliness and alienation. “By developing
elaborate concealment strategies these young people are often able to ‘pass as
straight,’ but at some significant, unmeasurable cost to their developmental
process, self-esteem, and sense of connection” (Uribe and Harbeck 1992:11).
According to recent estimates, more than 30 percent of the 5,000 suicides com¬
mitted each year by young women and men between the ages of fifteen and
twenty-four are related to emotional trauma resulting from sexual orientation
issues and from societal prejudices about same-sex relationships (Harbeck
1992).
In response to these disturbing statistics, about 170 organizations nation¬
wide have been established to specifically meet the special needs of lesbian and
gay youth. The Harvey Milk High School in New York is a secondary school des¬
ignated specifically for lesbian and gay students and staffed primarily by lesbian
and gay teachers and administrators. Agencies, such as the Hetrick-Martin Insti¬
tute in New York, the Gay and Le.sbian Community Services Center in Los
122 Chapter 5
\
30X 5.2 Continued
Angeles, and the Sexual Minority Youth Assistance League in Washington,
D.C., offer a variety of services, including counseling, tutoring, meals and,
sometimes, shelter for homosexual youth who have been kicked out of their
homes after coming out to (or being found out by) their parents. A central
goal of all of these organizations is to affirm the identities of homosexual teen¬
agers and thereby raise their self-esteem. Some of the organizations also do pro¬
grams, such as peer trainings, at local schools to help foster acceptance of
homosexual youth and to help prevent harassment and violence. A number of
them also engage in political lobbying with school boards and state depart¬
ments of education to make the school activities and curriculum more inclu¬
sive of gay and lesbian youth (Green 1993; Uribe and Harbeck 1992).
There is evidence that such organizations are successful in raising the self¬
esteem and, consequently, the academic achievement of the youth they serve,
while also lowering rates of suicide attempts, substance abuse, and other de¬
structive behavior. But they have been less successful in getting school boards
and education departments to respond (for an exception, see Rimer 1993b).
As the AAUW (1992:80) concludes, until the mainstream education system ef¬
fectively addresses homophobia among its staff, students, and students’ par¬
ents, it is abdicating its “responsibility not only to adolescents who are
questioning their individual sexual orientation,but to all students.”
about their ability to achieve their goals (Dennehy and Mortimer 1992;
Eccles 1985). In their recent study of adolescents at a private girls school
in New York, for example, Carol Gilligan and her colleagues (1990)
found that by age fifteen or sixteen, girls who had earlier exuded confi¬
dence became less outspoken and more doubtful about their abilities.
This decline in females’ self-confidence and self-efficacy during ado¬
lescence is a phenomenon that researchers have observed for a number
of years. Why does it occur? One explanation that gained considerable
popularity during the 1970s was offered by psychologist Matina Horner
(1972), who argued that women fear success. In her research, Horner
asked female and male subjects to write stories based on information she
provided them; in some cases, the story theme was success. She found that
62 percent of the women, but only 9 percent of the men, wrote stories
containing negative imagery in response to success-related cues. She
subsequently discovered that these women tended to perform better on
word-game tasks when they worked alone rather than in mixed-sex
groups. This led her to conclude that women’s fear of success was related
to a discomfort they experienced when competing with men. Horner
argued that women may deliberately, though perhaps unconsciously,
underachieve because they fear the consequences that success in high
achievement situations might bring—specifically, that they will appear

unfeminine and, therefore, be rejected socially.
Empirical research on the “fear of success” theory, however, has
yielded inconsistent findings. There is evidence that girls tend to feel
uneasy and embarrassed about academic success (Sherman 1982), and
that they often avoid subjects defined as masculine because they think
boys will not like them (Tobias and Weissbrod 1980). There is also evi¬
dence that their concerns are not unfounded. Pfost and Fiore (1979)
report that females described as masculine and seeking traditionally mas¬
culine jobs were considered by research subjects as undesirable hetero¬
sexual partners and friends, although subjects’ responses to males
described in gender-incongruent ways were not consistently negative. It is
certainly the case, too, that girls do excel in many areas; the fact that our
male-centered culture devalues what it defines as feminine accomplish¬
ments should not detract from their successes. In addition, replications
of Horner’s research have produced no significant differences between
females and males in their use of negative imagery in response to success-
related cues. In other words, male subjects in subsequent experiments
were just as likely as female subjects to exhibit fear of success (Tresemer
1977).
By focusing on the psychology of the adolescent girl, the fear of
success argument also ignores the invisible ceiling that others frequently
impose on young women’s ambitions. This invisible ceiling takes a variety
of forms. First, there is the widespread belief that girls are not as intellec¬
tually gifted as boys and, therefore, cannot be expected to do as well in
school. Research reveals, for example, that both parents and teachers
tend to attribute boys’ academic achievements as “bad luck.” They do just
the opposite for girls; if they are successful, they were lucky or the task
itself was easy; if they do poorly, it is because they are not smart (Deaux
1976). Consequently, high school teachers, like their elementary school
counterparts, appear to offer male students more encouragement, to
publicly praise their scholastic abilities, and to be friendlier toward them
than they are toward female students. As Bush (1987:15) notes, “These
findings are analogous to those for teacher expectations linked to class
and/or race” in which teachers respond more positively to middle- and
upper-class students than to working class and poor students or to white
students relative to minority students. We can only speculate on the
impact that the intersection of teachers’ sexism, racism, and classism may
have on students, but there is evidence that students internalize these
beliefs which, if one is female, could reasonably lead to lowered self-con¬
fidence and self-efficacy—not for fear of success, but for fear of failure
(AAUW 1992; Bush 1987; Vollmer 1986; Smith 1982).
Curriculum materials may also send girls the message that they are
unlikely to realize their ambitions. Recent reviews of high school text-
124 Chapter 5
books, for instance, have found both subtle and blatant gender biases,
including language bias and gender stereotypes, omission of women and
a focus on “great men,” and neglect of scholarship by women (AAUW
1992; New York Times 4 March 1990:35; Reskin and Hartmann 1986). As
in elementary school, research indicates that the type of curriculum
materials used in the schools clearly has an impact on students attitudes
and behaviors. According to the authors of a recent review of more than
100 studies of gender-fair curriculum materials, “Pupils who are exposed
to sex-equitable materials are more likely than others to 1) have gender-
balanced knowledge of people in society, 2) develop more flexible atti¬
tudes and more accurate sex-role knowledge, and 3) imitate role behaviors
contained in the materiaT (Scott and Schau 1985:228; emphasis added).
The gender bias common in high school curriculum materials is com¬
pounded by the lack of attention to racial and ethnic diversity. As one
young African-American woman noted, “In twelve years of school, I never
studied anything about myself’ (quoted in AAUW 1992:61).
School personnel often contribute to making girls feel that they will
be unable to fulfill their own aspirations. There is evidence that gender
stereotyping is common among high school guidance counselors (Petro
and Putnam 1979). Counselors may channel male and female students
into different (i.e., gender stereotyped) fields and activities, especially in
vocational education programs. There is also evidence that counselors
sometimes steer female students away from certain college prep courses,
particularly in mathematics and the sciences (Marini and Brinton 1984).
For example, in one study of girls who went on to study engineering after
high school, the women who participated reported that although their
teachers tended to encourage them to pursue an engineering degree,
their counselors tended to discourage them from that pursuit (AAUW
1992; see also Box 5.3).
Finally, although elementary school girls can identify with their
teachers, who are almost always women, it becomes more difficult to do
so in high school, where about 46 percent of the teachers are men (U.S.
Department of Commerce 1993). In vocational courses, female teachers
are concentrated in subjects traditionally considered feminine: occupa¬
tional home economics (92 percent), health (90 percent), and office
occupations (69 percent). They are rarely found in industrial arts (4
percent), agriculture (6 percent), and trade and industry (9 percent).
High school students are especially likely to have a male teacher for their
math courses (57.7 percent) and science courses (65.4 percent). Teachers
of these subjects also are usually white: only 11 percent of math teachers,
10 percent of biology teachers, and 7 percent of chemistry teachers in
grades nine through twelve are minority group members (Commission
on Professionals in Science and Technology 1992).
6ex Differences in Mathematics and Science 30X 5.3
For many years, much has been made of die fact that boys score higher than
girls do on the Scholastic Assessment Test (S.A.T., formerly the Scholastic Apti¬
tude Test) and that the differences between boys’ and girls’ scores are espe¬
cially large on the math portion of the exam. Some observers have argued that
this gap is biologically or genetically caused—that males, for example, have a
genetic predisposition to excel at math or that the organization of their brains
favors math achievement (see chapter 2). Despite the widespread attention
such claims receive in the popular media, there is little, if any, scientific data to
support them (Tartre 1990). There is considerable evidence, however, of gen¬
der bias in the S.A.T. and other standardized exams that may give male test tak¬
ers an advantage over female test takers (see, for instance, AAUW 1992; Rosser
1989). If we consider, instead, achievement in math and science courses as well
as scientific investigations of math and science ability, we find that sex differ¬
ences are small and have been decreasing since the mid-1970s (AAUW 1992).
The differences that remain appear to be due to a number of social factors:
(1) the extent to which these subjects are oriented to males; (2) teacher-stu¬
dent interaction; and (3) parental encouragement.
With regard to the first factor, observers have noted an absence of
women from science curricula. For instance, Marie Curie is typically the
only female scientist individuals ever recall being mentioned in their
science classes (AAUW 1992). In addition, several observers have noted
that math word problems are often oriented toward traditionally masculine-
typed areas and interests (Rosser 1989; Frieze et al. 1978). Other research
has pointed to the masculine orientation of much computer software,
particularly computer games (Crawford 1990; Lockheed 1985). Fless and
Muira (1985) found that the educational software programs most likely
found in math and science classes center around male themes of violence
and adventure. Consequently, girls may come to see math, science, and
computer-related activities as masculine—a perception that may affect not
only their performance, but also their career aspirations. In addition, research
indicates that girls may pay a heavy social cost for computer proficiency. Wlien
interviewing adolescents, for example, Crawford (1990:25) heard many stories
from female achievers in computer studies “of the boys being ‘jealous’ of [the
girls’] knowledge of electronics and of ‘hassling’ the girls in class. The boys
confirmed their view.” Not surprisingly, then, as one young woman reported
about girls who pursue computer science, “It’s usually the brave that do it”
(quoted in Crawford 1990:25).
Fennema and Sherman (1977) discovered that the major difference be¬
tween males and females with regard to mathematics is not math ability per se,
but rather extent of exposure to mathematics. Girls and boys with identical
math backgrounds show little difference in performance on math tests. Yet
girls are less likely than boys to pursue math training beyond their schools’ re¬
quirements for graduation, and two critical factors influencing their decisions
126 Chapter 5
\
30X 5.3 Continued
appear to be their interactions with teachers and the encouragement of

their parents (Crawford 1990). Sherman (1982), for example, reports that
girls (33 percent) are much more likely than boys (10 percent) to cite a
teacher as the factor that most discouraged them from studying math.
Research on teacher-student interaction indicates that there are various
ways that teachers differentially reinforce math achievement in male and
female students: by perceiving and conveying the belief that math is more
important for boys than for girls, by encouraging girls to become proficient
at computational math and boys at problem solving, and by calling on boys
more than girls to solve problems in class (Leder and Fennema 1990; Koehler
1990; Leung 1990).
Girls who pursue math training tend to be closer to their parents and
more influenced by them (Sherman 1983). Although few parents openly
discourage their daughters from studying math or math-related fields, the
message may be communicated indirectly. For instance, recent research
indicates that parents are much less likely to enroll daughters than sons in
computer camps, especially when the cost of the camps is high (Hess and
Muira 1985). Importantly, although girls and boys both recognize that
computers will have a significant impact on their personal futures, boys are
more likely to report having access to computers at home (Crawford 1990;
Lockheed 1985).
In summary, the weight of the evidence points to a variety of social fac¬
tors as being responsible for observed differences in math achievement be¬
tween males and females. In one sense, this is encouraging since, as we have
argued previously, socially induced conditions are more easily changed than
those that are biologically caused. Indeed, the solution seems obvious: educa¬
tors and parents must consciously commit themselves to providing a more sup¬
portive and less sex-segregated learning environment for both boys and girls.
Until such steps are taken, math will probably remain a “critical filter” that
blocks females’ advancement into the lucrative and prestigious scientific profes¬
sions (Leder and Fennema 1990; Chesterman 1990; The McClintock Collective
1990; Sherman 1982).
Although there is no research that shows a clear cause and effect

relationship, it is not unlikely that the rather discouraging nature of girls’
high school experience, more than their fear of success, is what weakens
their self-confidence and self-efficacy. Nevertheless, a high number of
female high school graduates goes on to college. In fact, as Table 5.1
shows, they now constitute a slight majority of college students. Unfortu¬
nately, the education they receive continues to differ from that of their
male peers in many important respects.
EDUCATING MÔMEN AND MEN:

COLLEGES AND GRADUATE SCHOOLS
“What’s your major?” is certainly a question college students get asked a

lot. The next time you are in a group and that question comes up,
compare the responses of the male students with those of the female
students. Chances are you will discover an interesting sex-specific pattern,
for as Table 5.2 on page 128 shows, men and women continue to be con¬
centrated in very different fields of study. Male students tend to pursue
degrees in engineering, architecture, the physical and natural sciences,
computer science, and business. Women, in contrast, are heavily concen¬
trated in nursing, home economics, library science, education, the social
sciences, and humanities. Among the few exceptions in the latter two
areas are political science, criminology, philosophy, and theology, which
each have a higher percentage of male than female degree recipients.
This imbalance persists and, in fact, worsens at the graduate level.
Again, the graduate degrees of men and women tend to be concentrated
in different fields. For example, men earn 91 percent of the Ph.D.’s in
engineering, but less than 10 percent of the Ph.D.’s in nursing. Con¬
versely, women earn 71 percent of the doctorates in home economics, but
Just 10 percent of the doctorates in physics (Commission on Professionals
in Science and Technology 1992).
An even more disturbing trend emerges at the graduate level; the
number of female degree recipients declines dramatically. Consider that
although women represent more than half of all bachelor’s and master’s
degree recipients, they constitute slightly more than one-third of all
doctorate recipients. More importantly, male Ph.D.’s outnumber female
Ph.D.’s in several fields that have either a higher concentration of women
undergraduates or a relative balance between the sexes at the under¬
graduate level. International relations is a good example; men receive 32
percent of the bachelor’s degrees in international relations, but 79 per¬
cent of the doctorates. Similarly, in music, men are awarded 50 percent
of bachelor’s degrees and 64 percent of doctorates; and in mathematics,
53 percent of bachelor’s degrees and 81 percent of doctorates (Commis¬
sion on Professionals in Science and Technology 1992). If we consider
race as well as sex, we find that the overwhelming majority of Ph.D.’s are
awarded to whites of both sexes (more than 90 percent in 1991). The
numbers for men and women of other racial groups are significantly
lower; 4 percent to Asian Americans, 2.8 percent to African Americans,
2.3 percent to Hispanic Americans, and Just .35 percent of Native Ameri¬
cans. We will see shortly that this imbalance has a substantial impact on
the number of minorities, especially minority women, in university facul¬
ties who may then serve as role models for students.
128 Chapter 5
TA3iE 5.2 Percentage of Bachelor’s Degrees Conferred by U.S. Institutions to

Men and Women in Selected Fields of Study, 1909-1990
% Bachelor’s % Bachelor’s
Degrees Conferred Degrees Conferred
Major Field of Study to Men to Women
Accounting 47 53
Agriculture 61 39
Anthropology 36 64
Architecture 74 26
Astronomy 68 32
Banking Sc Finance 67 33
Biology 48 52
Business Management
& Administration 54 46
Chemistry 60 40
Computer &: Information
Sciences 70 30
Communications 39 61
Criminology 60 40
Economics 69 31
Education 22 . . 78
Engineering 85 15
English 32 68
Eoreign Languages 27 73
Geology 71 29
History 62 38
Home Economics 10 90
International
Relations 41 59
Library Science 19 81
Mathematics 53 47
Military Science 92 8
Music 50 50
Nursing ' 6 94
Philosophy & 64 36
Religion
Physics 84 16
Political Science &
Government 59 41
Psychology 28 72
Public Affairs 33 67
Sociology 32 68
Theology 76 24
Source: Commission on Professionals in Science and Technology 1992:79-81,

All important point that must be made with regard to sex is that
these figures actually represent a better balance between women and men
in higher education than in the recent past. For instance, in 1970, women
constituted only 13 percent of the doctoral recipients in the United
States, up from 10 percent in 1960 (U.S. Department of Commerce
1985). It is especially noteworthy that women have made their greatest
gains in some of the fields that have had the fewest female students, such
as the physical sciences and engineering. Although still small, the number
of doctorates earned by women in engineering increased rapidly in re¬
cent years, more than tripling between 1978 and 1991 (Commission on
Professionals in Science and Technology 1992; see also Clewell and An¬
derson 1991). Still, some nagging questions remain: Why does sex segre¬
gation in particular fields persist, and why is the education gap between
the sexes still so large?
In addressing the first question, we must consider not only why
women are largely absent from certain fields, but also why there are so
few men in fields such as nursing, home economics, and library science.
We can say with some certainty that the scarcity of men in the female-
dominated fields has less to do with discrimination against them than
with their unwillingness to pursue careers in areas that typically have
lower prestige and lower salaries than the male-dominated fields. We have
already noted that activities and topics deemed feminine are systemati¬
cally devalued in our society. Until fields such as nursing and home
economics are viewed as being equally important as accounting or public
administration—and are rewarded with comparable salaries—it will re¬
main difficult to attract men to major in them. However, in solving the
puzzle of women’s relative absence from the more prestigious and higher
paying male-dominated fields, the issue of discrimination is central.
It is widely thought that sex discrimination in education has virtually
disappeared, thanks to Title IX. You may recall that Title IX is the provi¬
sion of the 1972 Education Amendments Act that forbids discrimination
in any educational program or activity that receives federal funding.
However, Title IX has not eliminated sex discrimination in education for
a number of reasons. One important reason for the less than total success
of Title IX is that, while the law abolished most overtly discriminatory
policies and practices, it left more subtle forms of sex discrimination intact
(Sandler and Hall 1986).^ Sandler and Hall (1986:3) refer to these subtle,
everyday types of discrimination as micro-inequities. Micro-inequities sin¬
gle out, ignore, or in some way discount individuals and their work or
^Because of the failure of Title IX in producing gender equity in education a new law,
the Gender Equity in Education Act, was introduced in Congress in 1994. Easy
passage of the bill, however, is not expected.
130 Chapter 5
ideas simply on the basis of an ascribed trait, such as sex. Often the
behaviors themselves are small, and individually might even be termed
‘trivial’ or minor annoyances, but when they happen again and again,
they can have a major cumulative impact because they express underlying
limited expectations and a certain discomfort in dealing with women
(Sandler and Hall 1986:3).
Hall and Sandler (1985) have documented more than 35 different
kinds of micro-inequities experienced by female undergraduate and
graduate students, including the following:
Male students are called on more than female students and are inter¬
rupted less when they are speaking (see also Lewis and Simon 1986).
Professors may use sex stereotyped examples when discussing men’s and
women’s social or professional roles (e.g., always referring to physi¬
cians as “he” and nurses as “she”).
References are made to males as “men” but to females as “girls” or “gals,”
or the generic “he” or “man” is used to refer to both men and women
(see chapter 6).
Comments are made about a female student’s physical attributes or ap¬
pearance, especially while she is discussing an academic matter or an
idea (e.g., “Did anyone ever tell you how big your eyes get when you’re
excited about something?”).
Comments are made that disparage women in general (e.g., references
to single, middle-aged women as “old maids”), that disparage women’s
intellectual abilities (e.g., “You girls probably won’t understand this”),
or that disparage women’s academic commitment and seriousness
(e.g., “You’re so cute; why would you ever want to be an engineer?”).
It is difficult to imagine such comments being made to or about men

or male students, but they are not infrequently made to or about women.
Granted, “these behaviors do not happen in every class, nor do they
happen all the time. But they happen often enough that they contribute
to a pattern—a pattern of behaviQr that dampens women’s ambition,
lessens their class participation, and diminishes their self-confidence”
(Hall and Sandler 1985:506, authors’ emphasis). More importantly, it
appears that these inequities are more common in courses and fields of
study traditionally dominated by men, and that they intensify in graduate
school (Hall and Sandler 1985). Clearly, this helps to explain the relative
absence of women in the sciences and business and also at the doctoral
level.
There are at least two other major barriers to equality for women in
higher education: the lack of mentors and role models, and the incidence
of sexual harassment. But before we discuss each of these, it is important
to note that college peer culture may interact with structural variables, as
well as with students’ views of school formed earlier in their lives, to
diminish young women’s ambitions. Eisenhart and Holland (1992), for

example, note that when young people go to college, they are often
struck by the fact that they must study harder than they did in high school
to achieve comparable grades. However, competing with study time, espe¬
cially at residential colleges, is time for socializing with peers. Although a
peer culture might help stimulate the development of high-achievement
career-related identities among college students—as we suspect it often
does for male students—Eisenhart and Holland’s research indicates that
for women in college, the peer culture emphasizes involvement in roman¬
tic relationships and a concern with being physically attractive to men
(see also Holland and Eisenhart 1991). The majority of women in this
study spent most of their time with their peers discussing boyfriends or
potential boyfriends, their own and others’ physical appearances (with an
emphasis on weight), and social activities. In contrast, most seemed to
know little about their peers’ schoolwork or career interests. Only the
relatively few women who came to college with the view of higher educa¬
tion as a setting in which they could learn from “experts,” especially those
in their field of interest, did not succumb to the social pressures of the
campus peer culture. Thus, Eisenhart and Holland (1992:175) conclude
that “peer culture must be added to family socialization patterns, individ¬
ual personality development, and institutional structures as an important
influence on women’s career decisions.”
We may ask, however, what it is about the university environment
that allows such a peer culture to flourish for female students and what
makes it more attractive than the academic life of the institution? To
answer that question, we must return to the structural barriers that con¬
front women in higher education.
Women Faculty and Administrators: Still Too Few

Despite the gains that women have made in the percentage of advanced
degrees awarded to them, they still constitute a minority of university
administrators and faculty. The national average for women in senior
administrative positions on college and university campuses was only 1.1
in 1987 (Weis 1987). A significant increase in the number of women
presidents of colleges and universities has occurred during the last twenty
years. In 1992, there were 348 women heading U.S. colleges and univer¬
sities, more than doubling the percentage of women college and univer¬
sity CEOs since 1975. However, this means that women still constitute just
12 percent of the chief executives of the approximately 3,000 regionally
accredited institutions of higher education in the United States (Ameri¬
can Council on Education 1992). Less than 2 percent of college and
university presidencies are held by minority women (Commission on
Professionals in Science and Technology 1992).
132 Chapter 5
Women represent just 29.7 percent of full-time college and univer¬

sity faculty (American Association of University Professors [AAUP] 1993).
In general, the more prestigious the institution or department, the fewer
the women. For example, in the Ivy League—an elite group of eight
universities in the northeastern United States—women are from 7 to 13
percent of the faculty. In many departments within these universities
there are no female full professors (DePalma 1993). In fact, in general
the higher the academic rank, the fewer the women. For instance, women
are just 14.4 percent of full professors and 28.9 percent of associate
professors. In contrast, they are 42.3 percent of assistant professors and
58.1 percent of instructors (AAUP 1993). One might expect the percent¬
age of women in higher ranks to increase as more women enter academic
employment and, in fact, the greatest increases in the representation of
women in the professorial ranks has occurred at the associate professor
and full professor levels (AAUP 1993). Nevertheless, given that the tenure
rate for women is only 46 percent compared to 71 percent for men, one
wonders if these gains will be sustained over time. Regardless of rank or
tenure status, however, women faculty are paid less than men and, as
Table 5.3 shows, the gap is widest at the highest academic rank. Indeed,
even though the number of faculty who are women has increased substan¬
tially during the last ten years, there has been virtually no change in the
ratio of female faculty salaries to male faculty salaries (AAUP 1993). As
we see in Table 5.3, the gender gap in faculty salaries has remained fairly
stable in the last ten years.
Female faculty and administrators, like female students, confront
innumerable inequities—some subtle, some overt—on the campuses
where they work (Sandler and Hall 1986). They may find, for example,
that male colleagues or students feel free to address them as “honey” or
“dear,” or that their male colleagues are consistently called “Dr.” while
they are “Miss” or “Mrs.” At department or committee meetings, they may
TA3LE 5.3 Average Salaries for University Faculty by Rank and Sex, 1992-1993
Salary Women’s Salaries as a

Academic Rank Salary Difference Percentage of Men’s Salaries
Men Women M/F 1982-1983 1992-1993
Professor $60,620 $53,460 $7,160 88.2 89.0

Associate Professor 44,990 41,830 3,160 93.0 93.4
Assistant Professor 38,010 35,080 2,930 92.3 92.9
Instructor 28,570 26,960 1,610 94.4 92.9
SoMrce; AAUP 1993:13, 20.

be expected to record the minutes or, as the “token woman,” to provide

the “women’s point of view” as if one woman can speak for all. Their
personal lives may be scrutinized (e.g., “Who takes care of her kids?”),
and their appearance commented on (e.g., “With legs like those, why
don’t you wear skirts more often?”). But perhaps most frustrating and
damaging of all, their work may be devalued even when it is equal or
superior to that of a man. Sandler and Hall (1986:6) report some of the
research findings on this issue:
In one study, first done in 1968 and then replicated in 1983, college
students were asked to rate identical articles according to specific criteria.
The authors’ names attached to the articles were clearly male or female,
but were reversed for each group of raters: what one group thought had
been written by a male, the second group thought had been written by a
female, and \ice versa. Articles supposedly written by women were
consistently ranked lower than when the very same articles were thought
to have been written by a male. In a similar study, department chairs
were asked to make hypothetical hiring decisions and to assign faculty
rank on the basis of vitae. For vitae with male names, chairs
recommended the rank of associate professor; however, the identical
vitae with a female name merited only the rank of assistant professor.
Discrimination such as this effectively keeps women out of academia

and prevents those already there from moving up. Once again, the prob¬
lem is most acute in the academic disciplines traditionally dominated by
men, but it has its greatest impact on minority women regardless of
department. This is because they face a kind of double jeopardy—dis¬
crimination on the basis of both race and sex—that is often perpetrated
by white women as well as by men (Carty 1992; Sandler and Hall 1986).
This discrimination helps to account for the even greater absence of
minority women from academe. However, there are actually slightly fewer
minority men than minority women on higher education faculties, indi¬
cating that race may be a more salient factor than sex in university hiring
decisions. Table 5.4 on page 134 shows the race and sex distribution of
faculty at four-year colleges and universities. Contrary to popular belief,
minority faculty of either sex are not more likely to be found at two-year
than at four-year colleges; of the faculty at two-year colleges, 89.1 percent
of the female faculty and 92.6 percent of the male faculty are white
(Commission on Professionals in Science and Technology 1992). It
should also be noted that not only are minority faculty few in number,
but, regardless of sex, they also are concentrated in the lower ranks of the
academic hierarchy.
A net result of the imbalance of university faculty is a lack of mentors
for female and minority students. A mentor is a role model and more; as
an older, established member of a profession, a mentor shows young, new
134 Chapter 5
TA3LE 5.4 Percentage Distribution of Faculty at Four-Year Colleges

and Universities by Sex and Race, 1990
Sex
Race* Women Men
White 88.7 90.7

Black/African American 6.9 2.9
Native American 1.1 0.7
Asian American 2.3 3.8
Mexican American/Chicano 0.6 0.5
Puerto Rican American 0.7 0.4
Other 1.9 2.4
*Percentages do not add to 100 because some respondents selected more than one racial category with
which they identify themselves.
Source: Commission on Professionals in Science and Technology 1992:141.
members “the ropes” by giving advice and providing valuable contacts

with others in the field. However, since mentors tend to choose proteges
who are most like themselves, and since'there are so few women in the
upper echelons of the academic hierarchy, female students (and junior
faculty) may have fewer opportunities to establish mentoring relation¬
ships and thereby lose out on the benefits such relationships provide
(Nevels 1990). Like secondary school students, they may come to doubt
the realism of their own ambitions, as one student’s account illustrates:
I had a man advisor . . . there was only one woman who taught in the
graduate school. . . . [T]he whole time I never did work with any women
professors. . . . And I began to think, “Where do I fit in the system if
there are no women in it, or very few?” (quoted in Sandler and Hall
1986:16; see also Arundel 1989).
Although some have questioned the necessity of a mentor for indi¬

vidual success (Speizer 1981), we maintain that at the very least, the
presence of senior female faculty and administrators communicates to
students and other members of the campus community that women are
as capable, productive, and serious professionally as their male counter¬
parts. Recent research also indicates that the presence of female faculty
on campus may benefit male as well as female students in a number of
significant ways. For instance, one recent study (Statham et al. 1991) has
shown that the teaching emphases of male and female faculty differ;
female faculty focus more on the student as the locus of learning, whereas
male faculty focus more on themselves. Female faculty also tend to use a
more interactive style in the classroom, making greater efforts than male
faculty to get students to participate in class. In fact, this study showed that
female faculty report that their teaching satisfaction derives from “stu¬
dents relating to each other, developing their own ideas, and coming
prepared to participate in class discussions,” while male faculty tended to
see students’ class participation as either a requirement or as a waste of
class time (Statham et al. 1991:126). Female faculty also interact more
with students outside of class than do male faculty. They chat with stu¬
dents more and pro\'ide them with more counseling than do male faculty.
In contrast, male faculty report negotiating more with students about
their course grades (Statham et al. 1991). In short, what these data
indicate is that female university faculty may utilize a kind of instructional
and interactional style that is more conducive to learning and more
beneficial to both male and female students.
This is not to say that male faculty cannot be mentors or role models
for female students; in fact, they often are. However, there is abundant
evidence that male faculty typically interact differently with male and
female students; we have already discussed some of these findings. Male
faculty sometimes feel uncomfortable with female students, or they may
relate to them paternalistically rather than professionally. Worse still, they
may view their female students as potential sexual partners and use their
positions of power and authority to coerce sexual favors. As we will see
next, this is not an uncommon experience for college women.
Sexual Harassment
Sexual harassment involves any unwanted leers, comments, suggestions,
or physical contact of a sexual nature, as well as unwelcome requests for
sexual favors. Studies conducted on campuses throughout the country
indicate that between 20 and 49 percent of female faculty have experi¬
enced some form of sexual harassment along with 20 to 30 percent of
female students (Dzeich and Weiner 1990; Project on the Status and
Education of Women 1986a; Reilly et al. 1986; Sandler and Hall 1986).
Although only 2 to 3 percent of female undergraduates are victims of the
most serious forms of harassment (e.g., threats or bribes involving grades
or letters of recommendation in exchange for sex), a sizeable minority
experience unwanted touching and verbal harassment (Reilly et al. 1986;
Sandler and Hall 1986). Unfortunately, as DeFour (1991) has pointed
out, most researchers studying sexual harassment fail to ask respondents
their race or ethnicity. Consequently, we have no information on the level
of sexual harassment experienced by minority women on U.S. campuses.
Despite the widespread nature of sexual harassment, most incidents
go unreported to campus authorities. Instead, victims try to manage the
problem (usually by simply avoiding the harasser whenever possible), or
they tell only family members and friends about it (Stanko 1992; Benson
136 Chapter 5
and Thompson 1982). Neither of these tactics may be helpful, however.

For example, attempts to avoid the harasser often are not easy, sometimes
such efforts mean having to withdraw from a required course or other
academic activity that may have been necessary or beneficial to the stu¬
dent’s school achievement or career plans. In addition, family and friends
not infrequently blame the victim or tell her to just ignore the harassment
(Reilly et al. 1986).
Even when students choose to report incidents of sexual harassment
to school officials, administrators may downplay it and, despite the fears
of overly harsh sanctions that are frequently voiced by faculty, harassers
usually are dealt with informally, with the most common sanction being
a verbal warning from a superior (Robertson et al. 1988). Few universities
have dismissed perpetrators, especially tenured faculty members, in re¬
sponse to sexual harassment complaints (Carroll 1993).
Such administrative passivity may be changing, however, as a result
of recent court rulings. In 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
remarks, gestures, graffiti, and the display of nude pin-up posters in a
work setting constitute sexual harassment and that employers who fail to
address such behavior by their employees may be liable for maintaining
a “hostile environment.” In a 1992 case, the high court stated that sexual
harassment in school is a form of educational discrimination and that
schools that fail to address the problem may be held liable for damages
to victims. That same year, a Minnesota high school reached an out-of-
court settlement with a female student who had been harassed by her
male classmates, agreeing to pay her $15,000 in damages for the mental
anguish she had experienced (Gross 1992a) As Carroll (1993:23-24)
points out, these cases emphasize that “both the workplace and the
classroom should present a neutral environment, an affirmative climate
in which individuals can work, interact, or learn without impediment or
interference” (see also chapter 8).
One of the ways that some colleges and universities have begun to
proactively address sexual harassment is to enact policies that prohibit
“romantic” or sexual relationships between faculty (including graduate
teaching assistants) and the students whom they teach, supervise, evalu-
^The fact that much of the litigation on sexual harassment has involved high school
students highlights the fact that sexual harassment takes place at all levels of the
educational system. Indeed, 85 percent of the girls in grades eight through eleven
who responded to a 1993 Harris poll reported that they were harassed “often” or
“occasionally” at school (AAUW 1993). In these grades the harassers are usually male
students who typically make lewd remarks to the girls, pass sexual notes about them
in class, or grab their breasts or buttocks. Traditionally, school officials have ignored
such behaviors as “harmless,” adopting a “boys will be boys” attitude. However, as the
recent court rulings make clear, by not responding seriously to such incidents, school
officials are in effect condoning them (AAUW 1993).
ate, coach, or to whom they allocate money (Gross 1993). Individuals who
oppose such policies argue that they are unenforceable in practice, that
they attempt to “legislate morality” and regulate the behavior of “consent¬
ing adults,” and that they are a violation of privacy. Universities have
already found that their attempts to regulate sexist and racist verbal
harassment have not stood up well to court challenges. The courts have
struck down a number of institutions’ “speech codes,” ruling that such
regulations violate the First Amendment right of freedom of expres¬
sion (Bernstein 1993; New York Times 13 May 1993;A2; see also chapter
9). The legal fate of the “sexual behavior codes” remains to be seen, but
supporters argue that while they are in effect, such regulations offer some
protection from harassment to both students and faculty and also in¬
crease the likelihood that flagrant violators will be sanctioned (Gross
1993).
Inevitably, when the issue of sexual harassment is discussed, some¬
one will feel obliged to point out that male students can be victimized too,
or that female students sometimes approach faculty with offers of sex in
exchange for grades. It is also sometimes argued that female students may
make false complaints against faculty members whom they dislike or who
have spurned their sexual advances. Although such incidents certainly do
occur, there are several important factors that distinguish them from the
sexual harassment experienced by female students at the hands of male
faculty which, research indicates, constitutes the majority of sexual ha¬
rassment incidents on college and university campuses (Robertson et al.
1988). First, the sexual harassment of male students is relatively rare and
appears to take rather mild forms, such as suggestive looks and gestures,
or unwanted sexual teasing by female staff and graduate assistants, rather
than by faculty (Reilly et al. 1986). Second, “when a man is harassed, the
event is an isolated incident at odds with conventional norms about
appropriate forms of sexual expression for men and women and about
appropriate gender-related patterns of assertiveness and deference [on
campus].” The sexual harassment of women by men is more systematic
and, as we will see shortly, functions as a form of social control (Hoffman
1986:110). Third, male students who indicate on surveys that they have
been sexually harassed are less likely than female students to report that
the incidents frightened them or had a negative impact on their school-
work (AAUW 1993).
Despite widespread concerns among faculty regarding the possibil¬
ity of false accusations, evidence indicates that these are rare. In fact, in
their survey of 668 U.S. colleges and universities, Robertson and her
colleagues found among the 256 administrators who responded to a
question about how many false complaints of sexual harassment they had
ever received, only 64 complaints were identified as proven to have been
intentionally fabricated compared with 425 documented incidents of
138 Chapter 5
sexual harassment and 760 estimated complaints of sexual harassment

made at these institutions. “A rough extrapolation from the numbers
given would make the false complaints less than 1 percent of annual
complaints. This is a maximum estimate that does not take into ac¬
count that some complaints listed as false by administrators may actu¬
ally have been genuine according to our definition” (Robertson et al.
1988:800).
With regard to female students propositioning faculty, we must ques¬
tion whether such incidents actually constitute sexual harassment. As
McCormack (1985) points out, what is askew here is the direction of the
asymmetrical power relationship between male professor and female stu¬
dent. There is little with which a student can threaten a faculty member—
a poor teaching evaluation perhaps, but in many schools these do not
count for much, or a complaint brought to the department chairperson
maybe, but as we have already noted, the institution usually operates to
protect faculty more than students. Consider, on the other hand, that
feculty control students’ grades and recommendations and thus, to some
extent, their futures. Viewed in this light, we conclude with McCormack
(1985:30) that “to make assertions that students sexually harass faculty is
to attribute power to the powerless.”
However, Benson (1984:517) and others (e.g., Reilly et al. 1986)
have documented what they call contrapoiver sexual harassment which “oc¬
curs when the victim has formal power over the abuser.” Contrapower
harassment, then, would involve a male student propositioning or abus¬
ing a female faculty member. For instance, Reilly et al. (1986:354) report
that one of the male students in their study recounted an incident in
which he asked a female professor for a cigarette and when she did not
have one, he said, he “smacked the bitch.” Contrapower sexual harass¬
ment clearly illustrates how some men in our society, by virtue of their
sex, may feel free to exercise power and control over women even if their
other statuses indicate a relatively lower social standing (Reilly et al. 1986;
Benson 1984). s
What impact does sexual harassment have on women’s educational
experience? Research findings indicate that sexual harassment has seri¬
ous negative consequences for female students. Victims report declines
in their academic performance, discouragement about studying a par¬
ticular field, lowered self-esteem, and emotional disturbance, physical
illness, or both (AAUW 1993; Stanko 1992; Koss 1991; Dzeich and Weiner
1990; Reilly et al. 1986). In addition, sexual harassment fosters tension-
filled relationships rather than mentoring relationships between female
students and male faculty. Students consciously avoid certain professors,
and some professors, afraid that their interest may be misinterpreted,
distance themselves from female students. The outcome is “limitations on
students whose academic success often counts on developing a close
working relationship with their instructors” (McCormack 1985:30). In

short, sexual harassment creates an unpleasant and hostile learning
environment for female students which, in turn, affects their perfor¬
mance, their personal and professional growth, and ultimately, their
future careers.
Structuring More Positive Learning Environments

It seems clear that women are shortchanged in their educational experi¬
ences, but the question of how to redress the inequities continues to be
debated by educators. Interestingly, some observers advocate sex segre¬
gated schools as a solution. This is not to say that these educators favor
channeling women and men into “gender appropriate” fields. To the
contrary, their position is that single-sex institutions make it easier for
both women and men to pursue fields of study not traditionally domi¬
nated by members of their sex. This is especially true at all-female schools
where women can major in such traditionally male-dominated fields as
physics, engineering, and business without the discomfort of being in the
minority and without discouragement from male peers and faculty (see,
for example. Association of American Colleges and Universities 1994).^
As we noted earlier in this chapter, graduates of all-female schools histori¬
cally have excelled in many fields, including male-dominated ones, and
more recent research has continued to bear this out (Rice and Hemmings
1988; Lyall 1987; Tidball 1980).
Opponents of sex-segregated schooling are quick to point to its
various disadvantages, some of which we also have considered in this
chapter. However, regardless of one’s views on sex-segregated schooling,
the issue may soon be moot. The school-age, and in particular, the col¬
lege-age population has been declining during the past two decades,
forcing many single-sex institutions to become coed in the hopes of
attracting more new students. Between 1965 and 1992, the number of
all-female colleges in the United States dropped from 281 to 84. By 1991,
there were only two all-male private colleges in the United States, and a
similar rationale has led African-American leaders to open Afrocentric academies

or elementary schools in a number of large U.S. cities. Given that the traditional U.S.
educational system has historically failed to meet the needs of minority youth, these
schools offer not only the usual academic curriculum, but also education directly
relevant to the children’s African heritage. The schools are staffed by African Ameri¬
cans who work not only as teachers and administrators, but who also serve as role
models. Originally, the schools were planned only for African-American boys, but
lawsuits in Detroit and Milwaukee resulted in cotirts ruling that the schools must also
provide African-American girls with an equal education (Wilkerson 1991b). No re¬
search has been conducted yet to determine if the schools are successfully meeting
their educational and social goals.
140 Chapter 5
handful of small private colleges that admit only men, but that have
coordinate women’s colleges nearby (DePalma 1991, Bishop 1990).'
A second method for balancing the educational experiences of the
sexes is the integration of material about women into the curricula of
educational institutions. One way this has been accomplished at the
university level is through women’s studies programs. By 1990, there were
more than 600 such programs at U.S. institutions of higher learning.
One of the original goals of women’s studies was to add women to
the traditionally “womanless” curriculum (McIntosh 1984). This resulted
in numerous “special subject” courses or seminars such as Women in
History, Women in Literature, Women in Economics, and so on—not
only in the women’s studies program, but in other departments as well.
Although an important step in increasing knowledge by and about
women—thus making the invisible visible—these courses tend to focus on
only those women who succeed according to a male standard. Only
“deserving” women are discussed—those women who behave like men,
who have done what men do. As a number of researchers have pointed
out, such courses may actually have a negative impact on students, espe¬
cially female students, because they may reinforce gender stereotypes and
label women who cannot or will not behave like men “failures” (Good-
stein 1992; Koser Wilson 1992).
Most women’s studies courses have moved well beyond this ap¬
proach to one which considers how current knowledge bases, policies,
and practices would be transformed if they were structured and orga¬
nized from women’s perspectives. This newer approach, for example,
might ask questions such as. How would the inclusion of women’s unpaid
labor in the home modify traditional analyses of the economy?, and What
are women’s standpoints on various economic issues?
With respect to the latter question, there would be many different
answers, since there are many different women’s perspectives—perspec¬
tives, as we noted in chapter 1, that are not only gendered, but which also
reflect the position holder’s race, social class, sexual orientation, age, and
‘’There are also two state-run military colleges that exclude women—the Virginia
Military Institute (VMI) and The Citadel. In May 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that VMI could continue to exclude women only if it established at another college a
program for women equivalent to its program for men. In September 1993, VMI
administrators announced that it would underwrite a military program for women at
nearby Mary Baldwin College. The program would provide joint exercises with VMI
cadets, use of VMTs obstacle course, physical training, and wilderness and adventure
exercises. It remains to be seen if such a program will conform to court requirements,
but some critics are already charging that it constitutes not only separate, but un¬
equal, education for women {New York Times 27 September 1993:A13). In 1994, The
Citadel, under court order, admitted a woman to its day classes, but would not permit
her to join the college’s corps of cadets.
physical ability/disability. According to a number of recent analyses, how¬

ever, the challenge of diversity is one that remains unmet in the majority
of women’s studies courses. One recent examination of 100 women’s
studies course syllabi found that the incorporation of material from
women of color and lesbians was limited at best (Cramer and Russo
1992). Two-thirds of the syllabi had very little material on women of color;
20 percent had none at all; 50 percent used material only on African-
American women to cover all issues of race. According to the researchers,
the most underrepresented groups of women in women’s studies syllabi
are Jewish women and women with disabilities. As the authors conclude,
the syllabi indicated a need for more self-education about diverse groups
of women and a more consistent effort to decenter white, middle-class
heterosexual women so that women of color do not only appear under
discussions of racism, or lesbians only under discussions of sexuality, but
throughout” (Cramer and Russo 1992:103; see also Bannerji et al. 1992;
Watt and Cook 1991).
Feminist educators have also been working diligently to transform
the traditional curriculum so that women’s experiences and perspectives
are not the material of just women’s studies courses, but are taught as
knowledge in their own right—as half the human experience studied in
all courses. Unfortunately, both women’s studies and curriculum revision
or transformation projects are being threatened by policy makers, admin¬
istrators, and faculty who see them as academically weak, narrow in focus,
and politically biased. Alan Bloom (1987), E. D. Hirsch (1987), and
Roger Kimball (1990) have been perhaps the most vitriolic complainants
against feminist education, women’s studies, and similar programs on
these grounds. Their charges are frequently heard in institutional debates
over the distribution of limited resources and the programs that should
be cut as university enrollments shrink and budgets are trimmed. There
are those who claim that university funds should not be spent frivolously
on “marginal” (read “feminist”) programs, but rather that money should
be invested in the “essential” (read “traditional, Eurocentric, male-cen¬
tered”) curriculum.
Curriculum revision or transformation projects also are often de¬
railed by faculty who resist being told what to cover in their courses or
who simply refuse to undertake the work that revising their courses would
entail (Aiken et al. 1988). Others claim that they already include women
or “women’s issues” in their courses, so there is no need to change
anything. And still others continue to see the issue of gender (as well as
race, class, sexual orientation, age, and disability) as unimportant or
peripheral to what they teach (Garrison et al. 1992). This latter attitude
is typified in the answers one of the authors received when she surveyed
the faculty at her institution about whether they incorporate women’s
experiences and perspectives into their courses. The near-unanimous
142 Chapter 3
response was, “Only when they’re relevant.” When, we may ask, are the
ideas and experiences of half of humanity not relevant?
There is evidence that women’s studies courses and feminist educa¬
tion have a positive impact on students by diminishing stereotyped atti¬
tudes about women, increasing self-esteem, expanding students sense of
their options and goals in life, and helping students acquire a greater
ability to understand their personal experiences in a broader social con¬
text (Howe 1985). Nevertheless, the current threats to the future of
women’s studies and feminist education are quite real. A number of
observers have warned that some of the most dangerous threats are more
subtle than the ones we have discussed so far. Cramer and Russo (1992),
for instance, argue that the renaming of women s studies as gender
studies” may serve to neutralize or dilute the emphasis on gender and
sexual inequalities that constitutes the core of feminist analyses. Similarly,
the establishment of men’s studies programs by male friends of femi¬
nism and women’s studies jeopardizes the autonomy and strength of
women’s studies. Men’s studies actually grew out of women’s studies
during the late 1970s and 1980s (Robinson 1992). By the late 1980s,
men’s studies was offered on almost 200 college campuses in the United
States (Project on the Status and Education of Women 1986b). Leaders
in the area of men’s studies maintain that'it is complementary to women’s
studies and informed by feminist scholarship (see, for example, Brod
1987). “As women’s studies brought women into history, men’s studies
began to ask how men had experienced history as men, as carriers of
masculinity” (Stimpson 1987:xii). Although male attitudes and behavior
have been the almost exclusive focus of the academic canon historically—
resulting, we might add, in no charges of narrowness from those who see
women’s studies as too narrow—the role of gender in shaping these
attitudes and behaviors has not been examined. However, Cramer and
Russo (1992:106) warn that men’s studies can be positive only when “truly
feminist and committed to challenging male power, but too often it
focuses on how sex differences limit all of us equally, rather than on
sexual inequality and the social significance of men’s subordination of
women.” In addition, although advocates claim that one of the goals of
men’s studies is to revise the traditional view of men’s experience as
homogeneous and to elucidate the diversity of men’s lives, particularly in
terms of race, social class, and sexual orientation, recent reviews charge
that for the most part, men’s studies has simply paid lip service to diversity
(Robinson 1992).
Courses in gay and lesbian studies have also emerged, partly in
^ response to the failure of the traditional curriculum to examine the
intersection of gender inequality and heterosexual privilege, and also in
response to political and cultural events of the 1970s and 1980s (see
chapter 13) (Escoffier 1992). For the most part, gay and lesbian studies
courses have been housed in traditional academic departments or offered

through research centers, such as the Lesbian/Gay Studies Center at Yale
(established in 1986) and the City University of New Y^rk Center for
Lesbian and Gay Studies (estabhshed in 1990). The City College of San
Francisco was the first U.S. institution to establish a department of gay
and lesbian studies, and as of September 1993, it remained the only
institution of higher education in the United States to have such a depart¬
ment (Collins 1992). In Canada, a number of lesbian studies programs
have been initiated, though most appear to be sponsored by or housed in
women’s studies departments (Gammon 1992). In contrast to the United
States and Canada, however, lesbian and gay studies programs have been
flourishing in Europe, particularly in the Netherlands, since the late
1970s (Hekma and van der Meer 1992; Minton 1992).
Escoffier (1992:8) argues that one of the most significant conse¬
quences of the growth of lesbian and gay studies is that it sets the stage
for a major “historical shift in the intellectual life of lesbian and gay
communities—the entry of the university into the communities’ cultural
development.” Nevertheless, there is concern by some that as lesbian and
gay studies becomes institutionalized in academia, it may lose its ties to
the lesbian and gay political movements (Minton 1992). This has been a
concern for women’s studies advocates and feminist educators as well.
Indeed, Cramer and Russo (1992) argue that one of the most important
challenges for women’s studies and feminist scholarship in the next
decade is to strengthen connections with political and social movements.
These movements are sources of new ideas, diverse perspectives, and
dynamic energy—all of which are vital in the continuing struggle against
backlash and retrenchment.
GENDER, EDUCATION, AND POWER
In this chapter we have learned how the educational experiences of

female and male students—from elementary school through graduate
school—are different and, more importantly, unequal. Although females
now constitute a slight majority of students, they continue to confront a
number of structural barriers. We have seen, for example, that women are
underrepresented in textbooks and course material. They are inter¬
rupted and silenced in classroom discussions. They are channeled into
relatively low-paying, low-prestige fields that have been devalued simply
because they are female-dominated. They lack mentors and role models
and, not infrequently, they are sexually harassed by male faculty and
students. Indeed, given the rather dismal educational environment pro¬
vided to most female students, we may begin to marvel at the many who
do succeed in spite of the disadvantages.
144 Chapter 5
We also discussed some of the means to remedy these inequities,

such as increasing the number of feminist educators throughout the
educational system, offering women’s studies and lesbian and gay studies
programs, and initiating curriculum revision or transformation projects
on an institution-wide basis. Although there continues to be resistance to
and backlash against such efforts, their thrust has been to insure that the
educational process is a democratic one that is not “merely technical and
task-oriented [but also addresses] the facts of a multiracial and multicul¬
tural world that includes both women and men (Andersen 1987.233). It
is only when this vision becomes reality that we may speak of education
as an empowering agent of social change rather than as a preserver of the
status quo.
KEY TERMS
formal curriculum the set of subjects officially and explicitly taught to stu¬
dents in school
hidden curriculum the value preferences children are taught in school that
are not an explicit part of the formal curriculum, but rather are hidden
or implicit in it
homophobia an unreasonable fear of and hostility toward homosexuals
mentor an older, established member of a profession who serves as a kind of
sponsor for a younger, new member by providing advice and valuable con¬
tacts with others in the field
micro-inequities subtle, everyday forms of discrimination that single out, ig¬
nore, or in some way discount individuals and their work or ideas simply
on the basis of an ascribed trait, such as sex
sexual harassment involves any unwanted leers, comments, suggestions, or
physical contact of a sexual nature, as well as unwelcome requests for sex¬
ual favors
Title IX the provisions of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 that forbid
sex discrimination in any educa^tional programs or activities that receive
federal funding
SUGGESTED READINGS
American Association of University Women 1992. How Schools Shortchange Girls.

Washington, D.C.: AAUW Educational Foundation and the National Edu¬
cation Association.
Dzeich, B. W., and L. W. Weiner 1990. The Lecherous Professor: Sexual Harassment on
Campus. Boston: Beacon Press.
Fennema, E., and G. C. Leder (Eds.) 1990. Mathematics and Gender. New York:
Teachers College Press.
Harbeck, K. M. (Ed.) 1992. Coming Out of the Classroom Closet: Gay and Lesbian
Students, Teachers, and Curricula. New York: Haworth Press.
Holland, D. C., and M. A. Eisenhart 1991. Educated in Romance: Women, Achieve¬
ment, and College Culture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Sadker, M., and D. Sadker 1994. tailing at Fairness: How America’s Schools Cheat
Girls. New York: Scribners.
Thorne, B. 1993. Gender Play: Girls and Boys in School. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
University Press.
Eor a review of innovative educational equity programs being implemented in

Great Biitain, consult Burchell, H., andV. Millmen (Eds.) 1989. Changing Perspec¬
tives on Gender: Neiu Initiatives in Secondary Education. Milton Keynes, England:
Open University Press.
In addition, three journals have published special issues of relevance:
Sex Roles, Volume 13, No.3/4, 1985 is devoted to research on “Women, Girls, and
Computers.”
Signs, Volume 12, No.2, 1987 provides essays and research on “Restructuring the
Academy. ”
Refractory Girl, a feminist journal published in Australia, devoted its May 1990
issue to the theme of “Women and Technology,” with articles on girls and
computers and gender-inclusive science and technology education.
Chapter
The Great Communicators:

Language and the Media
The Great (Communicators: Lanâge and the Media 147
Each year, American consumers spend more than $100 billion on the
media. An estimated $36 billion is spent on books, newspapers, and
magazines, while much of the remainder goes to audiovisual media, such
as CDs, tapes, and movies. Wifhout a doubt, one of the most popular
forms of media is television. More than 98 percent of U.S. households
have at least one television set (4 percent more than have telephone
service). About 73 percent of households have videocassette recorders,
and more than 57 percent subscribe to cable television (U.S. Department
of Commerce 1993). Television viewing consumes from 26 percent to 33
percent of adult Americans’ leisure hours, and in the average U.S. home,
the television is on six hours a day (Gerbner 1993; Staples and Jones
1985).
Obviously, the mass media are an important part of our everyday
lives. Through them, we are both entertained and informed. In either
case, however, we are mistaken if we think that the media are simply
transmitting neutral or objective information and messages. Rather, as we
will learn in this chapter, much of what is conveyed to us through the mass
media is infused with particular values and norms, including many about
gender. In other words, the media serve as gender socializers, and our
focus in this chapter will be on what various media communicate about
gender and how they communicate it. We will examine the gender images
depicted in print media (newspapers and magazines) and an audiovisual
medium (television), as well as a communication form common to both
(advertisements). Although we will not discuss music, film, or theater,
much of our analysis is applicable to those media too.
Before we look at the content of specific media, however, it would
be instructive for us to examine the primary means by which media
messages are conveyed—that is, through language. While “a picture
paints a thousand words,” the English language itself expresses our cul¬
ture’s underlying values and expectations about gender. Let’s see how.
SEXISM AND LANGUAGE: WHAT’S IN A WORD?
“Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt me!”
How many times did you recite that chant as a child? In response to Jeers
or name-calling, we tried to tell our taunters that what they said had no
effect on us. Yet, as we have grown older, we have come to realize that
although words do not have the same sting as sticks and stones, they can
indeed inflict as much harm. That is because words are symbols with
meaning; they define, de.scribe, and evaluate us and the world in which we
live. The power of words lies in the fact that the members of a culture
share those meanings and valuations. It is their common language that
148 Chapter 6
allows the members of a society to communicate and understand one

another, and thus makes for order in society.
Language is a medium of socialization. Essentially, as a child learns
the language of his or her culture, he or she is also learning how to think
and behave as a member of that culture. What gender socialization mes¬
sages, then, are conveyed through our contemporary language? Let’s
consider some of them.
To begin, consider the first group of word pairs in Part A of Box 6.1.
In each case, a word associated with men appears on the left and a word
associated with women appears on the right. What does each word con¬
note to you? The words associated with men have very different connota¬
tions than those associated with women, and the latter are uniformly
negative or demeaning. The male words connote power, authority, or a
positively valued status, while most of the female words have sexual con¬
notations. Interestingly, many of these words originally had neutral con¬
notations; spinster, for example, meant simply “tender of a spinning
wheel.” Over time, though, these words were debased, a process known
as semantic derogation. “[LJexicographers have noted that once a word
or term becomes associated with women, it often acquires semantic char¬
acteristics that are congruent with social stereotypes and evaluations of
women as a group” (Smith 1985:48).
30X 6.1 Sexism and Language
A. Connotations B. Generic He/Man

governor—governess policeman
master—mistress spokesman
patron—matron manpower
sir—madam Social Man
bachelor—spinster mankind
workman’s compensation
“Man the oars!”
he, him, his
Word Pairs
brothers and sisters
husband and wife
boys and girls
hostess and host
queen and king
^ Eve and Adam
Source: Compiled from Smith 1985; Strauss-Noll 1984.

The Great Communicators: Language and the Media 149
Reflecting on the words we have been discussing, what do their

contemporary connotations tell us about the status of women in our
society? In general, we see that women are associated with things negative,
and men with things positive. Additional examples are abundant. Linguist
Alleen Pace Nilsen (1991:267), for instance, points out that the word
shrew, taken from the name of a small, but vicious, animal is defined in
most dictionaries as “an ill-tempered scolding woman.” The word shrewd,
however, has the same root, but is defined as “marked by clever, discern¬
ing awareness.” In the dictionary Nilsen analyzed, the meaning of shrewd
was illustrated with the phrase “a shrewd businessman.” Consider also
patron and matron, both Middle English words for father and mother.
Today, patron signifies a supporter, champion, or benefactor, such as a
“patron of the arts.” A matron, in contrast, is someone who supervises a
public institution, such as a prison, or is simply an old woman.^ And which
would you rather be: an old master (someone who has achieved consum¬
mate ability in your field), or an old mistress (an elderly paramour)
(Takeoff 1991)? It is important to note that many of the most unflattering
and derogatory words for women are reserved for old women (Nilsen
1991). As we will discuss later in this and subsequent chapters, ageism
combines with sexism to doubly disadvantage women in our society.
Another form of semantic derogation is illustrated by the second
group of word pairs in Part A of Box 6.1. When you read each word pair,
chances are that the word pairs in which the female term precedes the
male term sound awkward or incorrect. The tradition of placing the
female term after the male term further signifies women’s secondary
status and is hardly accidental. Eighteenth-century grammarians estab¬
lished the rule precisely to assert that, “the supreme Being ... is in all
languages Masculine, in as much as the masculine Sex is the superior and
more excellent” (quoted in Baron 1986:3). Thus, according to them, to
ht may be argued by some that a woman supporter of the arts could be called a
patroness (which literally means “female father”). There are numerous other words
like this as well: poetess, authoress, aviatrix, bachelorette. Miller and Swift (1991a)
refer to these as “Adam-ribbisms.” In each case, a neutral word is gendered in such a
way that the base becomes male and the female is a diminutive. A similar effect is
rendered when a gendered word is used to describe an otherwise neutral word. For
instance, one often hears “woman judge” or worse, “lady doctor,” but rarely, if ever,
“man judge” or “gentleman doctor.” In fact, it has been argued that unless the job
holder’s sex is identified as female with the adjective woman, most people simply
assume that the job holder is a man. Putting women in front of another noun creates
a kind of “subspecies nomenclature” (Miller and Swift 1991a). Using luoman as an
adjective is also sometimes meant to convey negative images of the competency or
abilities of a person; consider, for instance, the negative stereotypes attached to
“woman driver.” Fortunately, both diminutives and the use of woman as an adjective
have become less frequent in public writing and speech (e.g., newspaper articles),
although they remain a common feature of routine informal conversation.
150 Chapter 6
place women before men was to violate the natural order. Again, the
masculine word also serves as the base from which compounds are made
(e.g., from king-queen we get kingdom, but not queendom) (Nilsen 1991).
The exceptions to this usage rule are few (for instance, ladies and
gentlemen” and “bride and groom”), and most contemporary speakers of
English perpetuate it—and its traditional connotation—in their everyday
communications.
Semantic derogation is just one dimension of the larger problem of
linguistic sexism. Linguistic sexism refers to ways in which a language
devalues members of one sex, almost invariably women. In addition to
derogating women, linguistic sexism involves defining women’s “place” in
society unequally and also ignoring women altogether. With respect to
the former, for example, we may consider the commonly used titles of
respect for men and women in our society. Men are addressed as Mr.,
which reveals nothing about their relationship to women. But how are
women typically addressed? The titles Miss and Mrs. define women in
terms of their relationships to men. Even when a woman has earned a
higher status title, such as Dr, she is still likely to be addressed as Miss or
Mrs. (Henley et al. 1985). A couple we know, both Ph.D’s, often get mail
from friends and relatives addressed to Dr. and Mrs. To a large extent, a
woman’s identity is subsumed by that of hbr husband, particularly if she
adheres to the custom of adopting her husband’s family name when she
marries. She will find that she not only acquires a new surname, but also
a new given name, since etiquette calls for her to be addressed as, for
instance, Mrs. John Jones rather than Mrs. Mary Jones (Miller and Swift
1991b; Smith 1985).
The most blatant way that our language ignores or excludes women
is through the use of the supposedly generic he and man. Erom our first
grammar class on, we are told that these two terms should he used to refer
not only to males specifically, but also to human beings generally. Recent
research, however, raises serious doubts as to whether this he/man ap¬
proach is really neutral or generic (Martyna 1980).
To understand the issue better, read the words in Part B of Box 6.1.
What image comes to mind with each word? Do you visualize women,
women and men together, or men alone? If you are like a majority of
people, these words conjure up images only of men (Treichler and Prank
1989a; Wilson and Ng 1988; Silveira 1980; Schneider and Hacker 1973).
Of course, it could be argued that these words lack context; provided with
a context it would be easier to distinguish whether their referents are
specifically masculine or simply generic. Perhaps, but research indicates
that context is rarely unambiguously generic and, consequently, the use
of “he/man” language frequently results in “cognitive confusion” or mis¬
understanding. Miller and Swift (1991a:256), for instance, cite the case of
an eight-year-old member of a Brownie Scout troop who, after viewing a
museum exhibit on environmental pollution and overpopulation called

Can Man Survive?”, thoughtfully responded to the question by saying, “I
don t know about him, but we re working on it in Brownies.” Similarly,
Adams and Ware (1989:481) recount an incident that occurred at the
conclusion of a popular television series on human evolution: the host of
the program questioned the guest anthropologist about “what women
were doing during this early period in the ascent of man.”
There are those who feel that this emphasis on language is trivial or
misplaced. Some maintain, for example, that a focus on language ob¬
scures the more serious issues of the physical and economic oppression
of women. [Blaubergs (1980) provides an excellent summary of this and
other, less compelling arguments against changing sexist language.] But
others counter that “one of the really important functions of language is
to be constantly declaring to society the psychological place held by all of
its members” (quoted in Martyna 1980:493; Treichler and Frank 1989a).
Given that women are denigrated, unequally defined, and often ignored
by the English language, it serves not only to reflect their secondary status
relative to men in our society, but also to reinforce it. Changing sexist
language, then, is one of the most basic steps we can take toward increas¬
ing awareness of sexism and working to eliminate it.
How can sexist language be changed? A variety of simple, but effec¬
tive usage changes has been instituted by individuals and organizations.
Substituting the title Ms. for Miss and Mrs. is one example.^ Alternating
the order of feminine and masculine nouns and pronouns is another.
Perhaps most controversial has been the effort to eliminate the generic
he/man. Instead of he, one may use she/he, or he and she, or simply they
as a singular pronoun. Nouns with the supposedly generic man are also
easily neutralized—for example, police officer, rather than policeman;
spokesperson, rather than spokesman. Humanity and humankind are
both sex-neutral substitutes for man and mankind (Frank 1989; Treichler
and Frank 1989b; Baron 1986; Henley et al. 1985).
Those who have made an effort to overcome linguistic sexism in
their own communications report that the changes required are not
difficult to make (Blaubergs 1980). We share Baron’s (1986:219) opti¬
mism, therefore, “that if enough people become sensitized to sex-related
language questions, such forms as generic he and man will give way no
matter what arguments are advanced in their defense.” Nevertheless, how
words and ideas are conveyed may be as important as the words and ideas
^Lakeoff (1990) notes that Ms. as a replacement for Miss or Mrs. has not been as
widely accepted as its proponents had hoped, perhaps because it has been derogato-
rily labeled a “feminist word.” It is most often used in place of Miss, and it is typically
listed along with Miss and Mrs. as a form an individual may choose for her title of
address if she wishes.
152 Chapter 6
themselves. Consequently, it is important that we also consider the issue

of communication styles.
Do Women and Men Speak Different Languages?

According to linguist Deborah Tannen (1990), women and men have
different styles of communication and different communication goals.
Just as people from different cultures speak different dialects, women and
men speak different genderlects. Women, maintains Tannen, speak and
hear a language of intimacy and connection, whereas men speak and hear
a language of status and independence. In addition, women s and men s
differing communication styles reflect differences in their life experi¬
ences and the power imbalances between them (Takeoff 1990; Henley et
al. 1985; Nichols 1986).
In cross-sex conversations, men tend to dominate women in at least
three ways: “(1) they actually do more of the talking; (2) they interrupt
women, in the sense of seizing the floor, more often than women inter¬
rupt them; and (3) they more often succeed in focusing the conversation
on topics they introduce. ... In all these respects, the conversational
relation between women and men parallels that between children and
adults, employees and employers, and othfer power-differentiated groups”
(McConnell-Ginet 1989:41; Edelsky 1981). The nonverbal communica¬
tion of men in cross-sex interaction also tends to be characterized by
dominance; men control more space than women and they invade
women’s personal space more than women invade men’s by standing
closer to them, and by touching and staring at them more. Women, in
contrast, tend to avert their eyes when stared at by men, but they also
smile more than men whether they are happy or not, a gesture that can
be viewed as both social and submissive (Henley et al. 1985).
These findings fly in the face of the common stereotype that women
are more talkative than men. Research on same-sex conversation, how¬
ever, does show that in all-female groups women talk more than men do
in all-male groups. In addition, studies of same-sex talk indicate that
women’s conversations have a cooperative character, “enlarging on and
acknowledging one another’s contributions, responding to conversation¬
alists’ attempts to introduce topics, and signaling active listening by nods
and mmhmms during a partner’s turn” (McConnell-Ginet 1989:42). Men’s
conversations are more competitive, less social, and more individualistic.
In short, “the evidence shows that men generally aim at individual con¬
versational control, whereas women aim at social conversational collabo¬
ration” (McConnell-Ginet 1989:43; Tannen 1990; Stanback 1985).
What are some of the consequences of the clash between these
different communication styles? Tannen (1990) argues that women and
men frequently misinterpret one another’s words and gestures, which
causes interpersonal conflict in intimate relationships and misunder¬

standings in public and professional interactions. For instance, she points
out that in the workplace, a woman’s connective style of communication
(a positive attribute) may be misjudged by her male colleagues as a lack
of independence, which they associate with incompetence and insecurity
(negative traits). Lakeoff (1990) emphasizes, however, that women are in
a double bind communicatively. If they adopt the communication style of
men or even try to approximate it, they risk being stigmatized as un¬
feminine and uppity, both indicative of bad character.
This discussion raises two other important points:
First, men are more likely than women to have a chance to express their
perspective on situations, not only because they have more frequent
access to the floor but also because they are more actively attended to.
This distinction is especially important, since comprehension goes well
beyond simple recognition of the linguistic structures used. In other
words, where the sexes have somewhat different perspectives on a
situation, the man’s view is more likely to be familiar to the woman than
hers is to him. This observation leads directly to the second point: men
are much more likely than women to be unaware that their own view is
not universally shared. As a result, women and men may well be in
different positions regarding what they believe to be commonly accepted
(or accessible) in the speech community (McConnell-Ginet 1989:43).
Indeed, the negative consequences associated with sex differences in

communication styles have been borne almost exclusively by women,
since men have had greater power to define acceptable standards of
speech. In this way, women’s styles of communication have been Judged
not only as different from the male standard, but also typically as inferior.
As Lakeoff (1990:203) explains, men, as a dominant group in our society,
first notice how the nondominant (that is, women) differ from them¬
selves. But they do not view these differences as necessary responses to
external forces, such as cultural expectations; nor do they see their own
role, as part of the dominant group, in imposing such differences (e.g.,
women’s communicative style may be viewed as a survival strategy in a
misogynist world). Instead, they assume that these differences are rooted
in inherent physical and psychological differences between the sexes.
Since women are “the other”—and the other is always worse—there must
be something in women’s bodies and minds that causes them to commu¬
nicate worse than men do. Whatever men do will be defined and identi¬
fied as “correct” and “good”; “[sjince women are the other, anything they
do that is different will be assigned to the opposite pole.”
Despite the pessimistic tone of such an analysis, several writers
(Steinem 1991; Henley et al. 1985) have offered suggestions for break¬
ing sex-specific communication habits; for instance, they urge men to be
more cognizant of women’s personal space, to become better listeners.
154 Chapter 6
\
and to interrupt women less in conversations. They also encouiage men
to be more emotionally expressive and women to be more assertive.
However, they are quick to point out that changing personal communica¬
tion styles is not enough, for these habits are simply indicators of power
in our society. ‘Hhe power imbalance is still with us, writes Robin Takeoff
(1990:214), “and therefore linguistic inequity persists.” Consequently,
what must also change is the power structure, but this is further embed¬
ded in other institutions of social control, such as the mass media.
GENDER AND THE MEDIA
Raise the question of media portrayals of men and women, and someone
will invariably argue that the media only give the public what it expects,
wants, or demands. This popular view is known in technical terms as the
reflection hypothesis. Simply stated, the reflection hypothesis holds that
media content mirrors the behaviors and relationships, and values and
norms most prevalent or dominant in a society. There is certainly some
truth to this position. After all, sponsors (the media’s most important
paying customers) want to attract the largest audience possible, and
providing what everyone wants or expects seems like a logical way to do
this. However, media analysts also point out that, far from just passively
reflecting culture, the media actively shape and create culture. How?
Consider the network news. In a brief twenty-two minutes (account¬
ing for commercials), these programs purport to highlight for us the most
significant events that took place throughout the world on a given day.
Obviously, decisions must be made by the program staff as to what gets
reported, and that is precisely one of the subliminal ways the media shape
our ideas and expectations. “The media select items for attention and
provide rankings of what is and is not important—in other words they ‘set
an agenda’ for public opinion. . . . The way the media choose themes,
structure the dialogue and control,the debate—a process which involves
crucial omissions—is a major aspect of their influence” (Baehr 1980:30;
see also Jensen 1993).
In addition to their role as definers of the important, the media are
the chief sources of information for most people, as well as the focus of
their leisure activity. There is considerable evidence indicating that many
media consumers, particularly heavy television viewers, tend to uncriti¬
cally accept media content as fact. Although there are intervening vari¬
ables, such as the kinds of shows one watches and the behavior of the
N real-life role models in one’s immediate environment, the media do
appear to influence our worldview, including our personal aspirations
and expectations for achievement, as well as our perceptions of others
(Gross 1991). Not surprisingly, therefore, feminist researchers have been
especially concerned with media portrayals of gender. If these depictions

are negative and sexist, or if they distort the reality of contemporary
gender relations, they may nevertheless be accepted as accurate by a large
segment of the general public (Courtney and WTiipple 1983).
It has been argued that with respect to their treatment of women,
the media are guilty of symbolic annihilation (Tuchman et al. 1978). That
is, the media traditionally have ignored, trivialized, or condemned
women. In the sections that follow, we will investigate this charge more
carefully. In addition, however, we will discuss the ways in which men have
been exploited and denigrated by media portrayals. Although they typi¬
cally fare better than women, men’s media roles are also limited by
stereot\pes that are not always positive or flattering.
The Written Word: Gender Messages in

Newspapers and Magazines
Since 1986, researchers have been observing a gender gap in daily read¬
ership of newspapers in the United States. Between 1986 and 1992, daily
readership among men rose slightly from 65 percent to 65.3 percent.
During the same period, however, there has been a slight decline in
female daily readership—from 61.1 percent to 60.2 percent—making for
a total male/female readership gap of 5.1 percentage points {Media Report
to Women [MRTW] 1993a).
A number of explanations have been offered to account for this
difference. One researcher, for example, reports that the women who are
least likely to read a newspaper every day are those who are young
(between the ages of eighteen and thirty-four), unemployed, or who have
children under the age of six. In fact, among women with all three of
these characteristics, daily newspaper readership is only 40 percent. Read¬
ership is lower, then, among women who lack the time and financial
resources that permit daily readership (M/?7W 1993a).
A second reason for the gender gap in newspaper reading lies with
the fact that newspapers often do not speak to women, or if they do, they
do so in a denigrating or patronizing way. A quick perusal of just about
any news daily gives one the impression that it is surely a man’s world.
News of women-centered activities and events, or of particular women
(with the exception of female heads of state and women notable for their
association with famous men) is usually reported as soft news and rele¬
gated to a secondary, “non-news” section of the paper. For instance, a
1993 study of twenty U.S. newspapers (ten large market and ten small-to-
meditim market) found that just 15 percent of sources in front-page news
stories and only 34 percent of front-page photos included women. Men
wrote 66 percent of front-page articles and 74 percent of the opinion
pieces that appeared in these papers. This study did discover one notable
156 Chapter 6
exception with regard to the coverage of female leaders; they were more
likely to get front-page coverage if the news in which they were involved
was negative {MRTW 1993b). Women fare the same in news magazines
(e.g., Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News and World Report), wheie in 1993 they
were 14 percent of references and 34 percent of bylines and photos. With
respect to news magazines, however, these figures represent a marked
improvement over those of 1989, when women had just 28 percent of
bylines and were included in only 26 percent of photos 1993c).
Perhaps more telling, though, is the way news about women is
treated when it is reported as hard news. A study by Karen Foreit and her
colleagues (1980) is enlightening on this point. Foreit et al. found that in
female-centered news stories, reporters were likely to mention an individ¬
ual’s sex (e.g., “the female attorney”), physical appearance (e.g., “the
petite blonde”), and marital status or parenthood (e.g., “Dr. Smith is the
wife of’ or “the feisty grandmother”). Such details were rarely provided
in male-centered stories, however. Almost fifteen years after this study was
conducted, examples of this trivialization of women remain plentiful.
Consider, for example, that in December 1992, the Associated Press ran
brief profiles of eight appointees to the Clinton Cabinet. There was one
woman—Madeleine Albright, later confirmed as Ambassador to the
United Nations—who was described as “a mother of three,” but there was
no mention of parental status in the male appointees’ profiles {MRTW
1993d). Similarly, in 1992, the Washington. Post, in profiling two Pennsyl¬
vania candidates running for the U.S. Senate, described the Democratic
candidate, Lynn Yeakel, as a “feisty and feminine 50-year-old with the
unmistakable Dorothy Hamill wedge of gray hair and the dazzling silk suit
of lime, tangerine, and blue.” In addition, it was noted that she was a
congressman’s daughter, currently married to a stockbroker, and for¬
merly a full-time mother. In contrast, her opponent. Republican Senator
Arlen Specter, was described as a “crime-busting district attorney and
mayoral hopeful.” The profile of Specter did not mention his hair or his
wardrobe (M/?T1T 1992a). Six months later, the Washington Post ran a
story on a meeting between Hillary Rodham Clinton and women elected
to the House of Representatives. Rather than focusing on the substantive
content of the meeting, the article relayed “gossip” heard in the hallway
and gave a detailed description of what Hillary Clinton was wearing
(MA7W1993e).
Feminists both here and abroad have long complained about media
portrayals of themselves, as well as negative reporting of the women’s
movement. According to Faludi (1991), for example, the media depict
feminists as a small, but vocal radical fringe group that most members of
the general public dislike. Feminists are divisive, and the women’s move¬
ment is portrayed as the root cause for contemporary women’s problems.
Faludi presents numerous examples from newspapers and news maga-
zines in which, she argues, the message reflects a backlash against femi¬
nism—that is, women who pursue true equality with men in our society
will ultimately sacrifice true happiness (see also M/?TW 1992a).
In attempting to explain the symbolic annihilation of women by
newspapers, many analysts have emphasized the overwhelming male
dominance of newspaper staffs. Although women now constitute on aver¬
age 34 percent of the newsroom staff at daily circulation newspapers
(Marzolf 1993), they remain underrepresented in the upper echelons of
newspaper employment. A 1993 survey found that while the number of
women in senior newspaper positions had increased somewhat since
1989, women still held only 19.4 percent of directing editorships. Accord¬
ing to this study, the rate of increase of women in the top newspaper job
categories has been about 1 percent per year since 1989. Consequently, if
this trend continues, women will not reach parity with men in these jobs
until the year 2025 {MRTW l99Sf).
There appears to be some effort being made, at least at the largest
newspapers throughout the country, to increase the diversity of news¬
room staffs and newspaper management. For instance, in 1993, leading
papers such as the Los Angeles Times, the Miami Herald, the Washington Post,
and the New York Times sent representatives to a meeting of the National
Lesbian and Gay Journalists Association to recruit lesbians and gay men
for their staffs (Glaberson 1993a). Also in 1993, the American Society of
Newspaper Editors, whose membership is the editors of the 430 largest
U.S. newspapers, elected its first African-American president, William A.
Hilliard (Glaberson 1993b). Although it is impossible to determine how
many lesbians and gay men work for newspapers in this country—many
remain closeted because of the intense stigma still attached to homosexu¬
ality—it is clear that, despite recent gains, racial minorities, especially
minority women, continue to be underrepresented on newsrooms staffs,
particularly in high-level positions. For example, the Media Report to
Women noted in spring 1993 that the number of African-American women
who are publishers at U.S. daily newspapers had increased 300 percent
since 1992. That meant, however, that there were still only four African-
American women working as daily newspaper publishers in this country,
and each published a relatively small circulation paper {MRTW\999g).
Similarly, the National Association of Hispanic Journalists (NAHJ) re¬
ported in 1993 that every top U.S. newspaper employed at least one
Hispanic American on its newsroom staff. In 1992, there was a total of 634
Hispanic Americans working at the top U.S. newspapers, but of these only
about a third were Hispanic-American women. At the same time, only 14
percent of Hispanic Americans at these newspapers held managerial
positions (NAHJ 1993). Overall, racial minorities are just 9.4 percent of
the staffs at the fifty largest U.S. newspapers and only 6.3 percent of
newsroom supervisors (Guy 1992).
158 Chapter 6
The question remains as to whether having more women—or mem¬

bers of racial minority groups, or gay men and lesbians—on newspaper
staffs actually decreases sexism—or racism or homophobia—in the pa¬
pers. One recent study, for instance, found that although female journal¬
ists quote women as sources more frequently than male journalists do,
they tend to define expertise the same way male journalists do and,
consequently, seek out the same types of experts that male journalists seek
(Buresh et al. 1992). According to one sociologist of the media, this is
because women journalists’ judgments about general news resemble
those of men (Tuchman 1979). Others, however, dispute this claim,
arguing that the presence of women on newsroom staffs usually results in
an expanded definition of what is newsworthy and the introduction of
new topics not traditionally covered in the papers (Marzolf 1993). The
same has been said with respect to racial minorities as well as gay men
and lesbians (see, for example, Glaberson 1993a), but more research
is obviously needed in order to determine if members of these groups
give newspaper readers a view significantly different from that of white,
straight, male journalists.
Similar issues arise when magazines are analyzed. Magazines, of
course, are different from newspapers in many ways. Of particular interest
to us is the fact that while newspapers seek a broad, general readership,
magazines try to appeal to specific segments of the population. There are
women’s magazines (e.g., Redbook, Working Woman, Seventeen), and there
are men’s magazines (e.g., Esquire, Sports Illustrated, and Playboy)} Even
within these two large groups, there are various subgroups that specialty
magazines target as potential readers. Subscribers to Ms.: The World of
Women, for instance, are likely to have very different attitudes and inter¬
ests than subscribers to Cosmopolitan, although both groups are almost
exclusively female and both may see themselves as “liberated.”^ Generally
În 1991 alone, 541 new magazines were launched. According to industry analysts,
the largest number of new periodicals could be classified as sex magazines (66 of the
541), while the second highest number fell in the sports category (41 of the 541)
(Husni 1992).
Îndeed, Cosmopolitan has attempted to capitalize on its image of the “liberated”
woman by contrasting it with a stereotyped negative image of feminism (see also
chapter 13). In a recent ad for Cosmopolitan, for example, a photograph of a woman
lounging in a low-cut dress with much of her left breast visible is accompanied by copy
in which this woman states that upon returning to her office after getting a beauty
makeover, a female coworker told her that trying to “look good” is “anti-feminist.” To
which this woman replies, “Is there any reason a girl can’t be smart, serious and wear
eyeliner? My favorite magazine says work on yourself outside, inside . . . never feel
guilty. ... I guess you could say I’m that COSMOPOLITAN Girl” {New York Times 13
December 1993:D10, original emphasis).
speaking, then, how do magazines expressly designed for women differ

from those for men?
Women are the primary purchasers of magazines; they make 75
percent of single copy purchases and account for about two-thirds of
magazine subscriptions (Audits and Surveys 1991). According to Mar¬
jorie Ferguson (1983), magazines for women promote what she calls
a “cult of femininity.” Central to the notion of femininity as defined by
these magazines is a narcissistic absorption with oneself—with one’s
physical appearance (“the business of becoming more beautiful”), with
occupational success, and with success in affairs of the heart (“getting
and keeping your man”) (see also McCracken 1993). Interestingly, Fer¬
guson found few changes in women’s magazines over a thirty-one-year
period (1949 to 1980). In 1980, even though establishing one’s own
identity displaced getting and keeping a man as the number one theme
of these periodicals, the goals they set for their readers were little
changed from those of thirty years before. The goals included personal
happiness (e.g., by winning romance, losing weight, or getting a satis¬
fying Job); personal achievement (whether in the kitchen or at the
office); having a happy family (including one-parent families); and physi¬
cal attractiveness (the triumph of nurture over nature). Not surprisingly,
the magazines themselves promised to provide advice and sometimes
even step-by-step instructions to help their readers accomplish these
goals.
Ferguson’s study focuses chiefly on British magazines, but she main¬
tains that the analysis is applicable to most women’s magazines in other
countries. Similar research in the United States supports her claim
(McCracken 1993; Cantor 1987; Glazer 1980; Phillips 1978).
In the first and second editions of this text, we undertook our own
unscientific test of Ferguson’s argument about women’s magazines. We
examined the contents of two issues of three of the most popular U.S.
women’s magazines: Cosmopolitan and Glamour (which are targeted
primarily for a white female readership) and Essence (which is designed
for black women). On both occasions, we found that relationships with
men was clearly the dominant theme in all three magazines, with becom¬
ing beautiful the second most prevalent theme. We found that the ad¬
vertisements had the same emphases, with the themes of physical
attractiveness and “getting and keeping a man” intertwined and often
indistinguishable. In short, in both 1989 and 1992, we found, even more
than Ferguson (1983), an ideal of femininity projected in these maga¬
zines that was embodied in the woman who first and foremost attracted
men. Although each of the magazines had articles and features about
careers and occupational success, achievement in the work world was
often presented as being dependent on physical attractiveness (e.g..
160 Chapter 6
“dressing for success,” applying the right makeup, or fixing one s hair a
particular way).
In preparing this edition of the text, we decided to see, again unsci¬
entifically, if the predominant themes of these magazines had changed
over the past two years. This time we found some interesting differences
among the three magazines. In Cosmopolitan, the focus on relationships
with men seemed even stronger than in the past. Romance and sex were
emphasized throughout the magazine—in the books and fiction sections,
in the monthly columns, and in the feature articles (e.g., “Why Being a
Man Is Harder than Ever,” which stated that “Even ‘sensitive’ guys still
find strong, successful women threatening and confusing”; and “Anatomy
of the Sexually Aggressive Woman,” which gave tips on how to pursue
men without scaring them off, such as “Respond lavishly when he touches
you the way you wish to be touched,” “Be as graphic as you can without
barking orders,” and “Stay playful!”). There were articles on careers and
occupational success, including one on Attorney General Janet Reno, but
one of these articles (“What Can a Business Card Do?”) was about using
a business card as “a smooth way to hand him your number.” So extensive
was the emphasis on sexual relationships, there was even an article on
“When Animals Make Love,” accompanied by photos of various animals
copulating in the wild.
In contrast, both Glamour and Essence appeared to have increased
their focus on health issues, family (as opposed to sexual) relationships,
careers, and financial matters. In Glamour, for example, feature articles
on relationships with men were a minority; other feature articles included
“10 Big Ways to Cut Your Health Care Costs Now,” and “Adopting
Andrew,” which was the story of a single woman who adopted a child
from Paraguay. In Essence, the articles on sexuality and relationships
with men were more diverse and less exploitative than those in Gosmopoli-
tan. One (“Sex at a Certain Age”), for instance, rebutted the myth of the
“sexless senior years,” stating that sex can improve after one turns fifty.
Another discussed the decisions ofi some young African Americans to
remain celibate, but the primary emphases were on health, jobs, and
finances.
However, despite the diversity we found this time in the themes in
the magazines’ articles and columns, we found little change in the adver¬
tising. Making oneself beautiful in order to attract men remained the
dominant message in the ads in all three magazines. Advertisements for
cosmetics and perfumes remained the single most frequent category of
ads: 33 in Gosmopolitan, 27 in Glamour, and 20 in Essence (overall. Essence
contains far fewer ads than the other two magazines). Personal hygiene
items, especially hair care products, were second in terms of numbers of
advertisements: 25 in Gosmopolitan, 22 in Glamour, and 10 in Essence. These
advertisements promise that the buyer will not only become more beau¬
tiful after using the featured product, but also sexier and irresistible to
men.®
Men’s magazines provide some glaring contrasts to women’s peri¬
odicals. Historically, men’s magazines have been more specialized, al¬
though as our recent analysis of the women’s magazines revealed, target
audiences for specific women’s magazines may also be getting narrower
(see Kiafft 1991). Nevertheless, most men’s magazines can still be placed
in one of three categories: fmance/business/technology, sports/hobbies,
and sex. Sex, which we have seen is by no means absent from women’s
magazines, is still typically discussed in women’s periodicals in terms of
interpersonal relationships, whereas men’s sex-oriented magazines objec¬
tify and depersonalize sex (see chapter 9). That is, the emphasis is almost
exclusively on the physical aspects of sexuality and the articles are gener¬
ally devoid of emotions and interpersonal involvement.
Apart from these three types of magazines, however, what are the
dominant themes in more general periodicals designed for men? In our
1989 and 1992 analyses, and again for this third edition, we examined two
men’s magazines—Esquire and Gentleman’s Quarterly (“For the Modern
Man”)—^which we felt were especially comparable to Cosmopolitan and
Glamour.^ In addition, for this third edition, we examined two relatively
new men’s magazines. Details and Inside Edge, which target a male audi¬
ence somewhat younger than that of Esquire and GQ. Overall, the pre¬
dominant theme in Esquire and GQ remains, as it was in 1989 and 1992,
living a leisurely lifestyle which is made possible by one’s financial success.
Articles about music, art, and sophisticated men (often celebrities of
some sort) continue to be common (and GQ not surprisingly, continues
to devote about thirty pages to men’s clothing and accessories). Still
conspicuous by their absence are articles about male/female relation¬
ships. In our most recent perusal, we found that the only place that this
topic was raised in either magazine was in a monthly advice column in GQ
called “Dr. Sooth,” where readers’ letters are answered. Here, the good
^McCracken (1993) points out that in addition to overt advertisements, magazines

also contain covert advertisements, that is, advertisements camouflaged by the maga¬
zine’s cover or stories. For instance, an article on how to prevent wrinkles in one’s
skin typically suggests or mentions various products one can use for this purpose.
About 95 percent of the pages of women’s magazines are devoted to overt advertising,
but no estimate is available on how much space goes to covert advertising. Given the
prominence of the ads, however, we must agree with McCracken that women s
magazines should be considered “advertising magazines for women.”
'^We could not find a magazine similar to Essence that was targeted primarily to black
men. Such a magazine, entitled Image, was scheduled to debut in April 1994, but no
issues were available at the time we did our analysis.
162 Chapter 6
doctor responded to readers’ queries about how to give women multiple

orgasms, whether women like men who have shaved off all their pubic
hair, and how to find a good sex therapist. There were two other articles
about women: one about Tina Turner (in GQ with the cover caption
“Tina Turn-On”) and the other, “What Every Man Should Know about
Models” (in Esquire with the cover photograph showing a blonde model
posed in a slip atop a heap of naked mannequins).
Details, though a newer magazine, is hardly much different from
Esquire or GQ. It contained more articles and columns on music, but its
only discussion of male/female relationships was a one-and-a-half-page
article on couples therapy. Two other articles focused on women celebri¬
ties (of sorts): Hollywood Madam Heidi Fleiss, and singer Deborah Harry.
In contrast, Inside Edge, written “by guys for guys,” unabashedly proclaims
its emphases as “beer, the game, and your date tonight.” Although it
might be argued that of the four men’s magazines reviewed, Inside Edge
focuses considerably more attention on male/female relationships, a
closer look reveals that the common theme is how men can get women
to have sex with them without becoming “trapped” in a long-term rela¬
tionship.
The low priority that men’s magazines give to interpersonal relation¬
ships is reinforced by the advertisements most prevalent on their pages.
Judging only by the ads, one might easily conclude that men spend the
majority of their time playing sports with other men, or alone, working
out on exercise equipment, listening to music, looking at their watches,
and drinking alcohol, much to the neglect of their personal hygiene.
Apart from clothing advertisements in GQand Details, the most common
ads in all four magazines we looked at were for beer and alcohol, and
wristwatches. Equipment was second, especially athletic gear and exercise
machines as well as compact disc players and stereos. However, ads for
cosmetics and personal hygiene products were relatively few (zero in
Inside Edge, two in Esquire, seven in Details, and fifteen in GQ most of
which were for cologne).
Like women’s magazines, then, periodicals intended for men gener¬
ate their own gender images and ideals. Modifying Ferguson’s concept a
bit, we may say that in the cult of masculinity, getting and keeping a
woman is not a priority. Instead, the real man is free and adventurous. He
is a risk-taker who pursues his work and his hobbies—including in this
latter category relationships with women—^with vigor. He is concerned
about his personal appearance, but not in an all-consuming sense as
women seem to be. The magazines, of course, promise to help their
readers achieve these goals with articles and ads on muscle tone, hair
retention, and sexual aids, among others. In this respect, they are not at
all unlike the magazines for women.
Despite their continuing appeal, magazines like those we have been

discussing have shown declines in sales in recent years. Media analysts
report that consumers appear to be turning away somewhat from print
media and utilizing more electronic, audiovisual media. Television re¬
mains the most popular form of electronic media, especially since the
advent of the cable networks, which now claim more than 56 million
subscribers (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993). A critical question
that arises, therefore, is whether the gender messages of television pro¬
gramming are any less sexist or exploitative than those we have found in
the print media. Or do television programs simply reinforce the cults of
femininity and masculinity promoted by the popular women’s and men’s
magazines? These are questions that we will address next.
Television: The Ubiquitous Media Socializer

It has been argued that television is the most important media socializer.
We will discuss the effectiveness of television shortly, but for now we must
agree that the sheer pervasiveness of television sets, as well as television’s
unique characteristics do make this claim plausible. Research documents
the central place that television holds in the lives of most Americans.
Average household consumption of television is fifty-five hours per week.
It is estimated that women aged thirty-five to fifty-four spend about thirty-
four hours per week watching television, compared with twenty-nine
hours for their male contemporaries. Children aged two to eleven spend
almost twenty-eight hours a week and teenagers more than twenty-three
hours a week in front of the television. In fact, for children, watching
television occupies more time than any other out-of-school activity (Com¬
stock 1991).^
Television also has special characteristics that add to its potency as
an agent of socialization. For instance, it is free, it is available to just about
everyone, and it does not even require viewers to leave the privacy of their
homes, as movies and theater do. It requires no special skills, such as
literacy, to watch, and everyone, regardless of sex, race, age, social class,
sexual orientation, and often, geographic location, gets the same visual
and verbal messages. Research shows, however, that these factors (sex,
race, etc.) may influence how members of various groups interpret or
■^Comstock (1991) notes, however, that viewing time does vary by such factors as race
and education. For example, African-American children, regardless of their social
class, tend to watch more television than white children. In addition, the fewer the
number of years of education completed by the parents, the more television is
watched in the household.
164 Chapter 6
relate to program content (Berry 1992; Comstock 1991; Gross 1991; Press
1991; Richardson 1981).
A recent study conducted over a ten-year period by a research team
from the Annenberg School of Communication at the University of Penn¬
sylvania fotmd that on prime-time television, women continue to play only
about one out of every three roles—a figure, it should be added, that has
not changed since 1954 (Gerbner 1993; see also Metzger 1992). This
study, noteworthy for its magnitude as well as its findings, analyzed 19,645
speaking parts in 1,371 television programs on the three national net¬
works, Fox Television, and eleven major cable networks.^
Not only do women have fewer roles on television, but the charac¬
ters played by women tend to be younger and less mature than male
characters and, therefore, less authoritative (Fejes 1992). One study, for
example, found that although 35 percent of the female characters in the
analyzed shows were less than twenty-six years old, only 16 percent of the
male characters were in this age group. Fifty percent of the males were
older than thirty-five, but only 22 percent of the females were in this age
group (Silverstein et al. 1986). According to the Annenberg study, women
on television age faster than men, and the older they are, the more likely
they are to be portrayed as unsuccessful (Gerbner 1993). Despite the
tremendous popularity of The Golden Girls, older women typically are
portrayed negatively on prime-time television. As Condry (1989:73)
notes, “It is especially bad to be old on television, and it is terrible to be
an old woman.” Older women on television are often witches or they are
portrayed as being crazy (Gerbner 1993).
Young female characters are typically thin and physically attractive.
In the Silverstein et al. study (1986), for instance, 69 percent of the female
characters were rated as thin, compared with just 17.5 percent of male
characters; but only 5 percent of female characters were rated as hea\y,
compared with 25.5 percent of male characters. In general, male televi¬
sion characters are given more leeway in terms of their appearance.
Female television characters are four times more likely than male charac¬
ters to be shown scantily dressed (e.g., dressed in bed clothes, underwear,
or swimsuits). They are also likely to be blonde: there are twice as many
blonde women on television as there are in the actual population
(Metzger 1992).
This is not to say that the portrayal of women on television has not
changed over the history of the medium. Press (1991) documents three
periods of television programming—prefeminist, feminist, and post-
^This study also found that on children’s programs, women have even fewer roles—
one out of four—and that on no daytime serials, for which the audience is over¬
whelmingly female, do women make up a majority of the characters portrayed
(Gerbner 1993).
feminist—in which she identifies clear changes in the portrayal of

women. One might expect that the most negative images of women would
have occurred on prefeminist programs (encompassing the period from
the introduction of television until the mid-1960s). Press did find that
women during this period were shown as immature and dependent and
as family women whose lives revolved around the home. Rarely did these
women enter the public world of work (i.e., men’s world). Nevertheless,
Press notes that women on programs during this period were often shown
in solidarity with other women, in a kind of “battle of the sexes.” Although
they usually lost this battle, they were at least frequently depicted in strong
and supportive friendships with other women.
The feminist programming period, which Press (1991) notes was
brief (mid-1960s through the 1970s), was not feminist in the sense that
women were portrayed as men’s equals, but rather because women played
more nondomestic roles—that is, female characters were more likely to
hold positions outside the home in the male work world. Press also notes
that during this period, more central female characters were introduced
in action/adventure and dramatic prime-time series, whereas previously
women were found almost exclusively in situation comedies and variety
shows. But while female characters during this period became increas¬
ingly likely to work outside the home, they continued to be portrayed in
many traditionally feminine ways. Press cites Charlie’s Angels as an exam¬
ple; the three female detectives are intelligent and active independent
women with careers, but they are also glamorous sex objects who take
orders from the never-seen male boss, Charlie. Hill Street Blues is another
program from this period that is cited for its more positive portrayals of
women outside the home, although the one female character connected
primarily with the home—Faye Furillo, the captain’s ex-wife—is depicted
negatively as self-absorbed and preoccupied with trivial domestic prob¬
lems. A number of programs during this period also focused on the lives
of single women (e.g.. The Mary Tyler Moore Show and Alice). Although
Press notes many positive features of these shows’ depictions of women,
she is quick to point out that they also minimized or ignored many of the
problems real-life women in similar situations confront (e.g., loneliness,
financial difficulties).
We are currently in the postfeminist period of television program¬
ming, according to Press (1991). Programs during this period continue
to have female characters who work outside the home (about 30 percent,
according to Metzger 1992), but these women are rarely shown actually
on the job. Instead, the focus of their lives is once again on their families.
The focus of these programs may sometimes be the conflicts these women
have between pursuing their careers and caring for their families, but the
problems are usually resolved fairly easily, always to the benefit of the
family, and frequently with the help and understanding of the female
166 Chapter 6
characters’ male partners, who are now typically depicted as idealized

family men (see also Fejes 1992). These men are sensitive and supportive
of their wives, and are quite willing to do more than an equal share of
housework, although only 3 percent of men on prime-time television
programs are actually shown performing household chores (compared
with 20 percent of women on these shows) (Metzger 1992; Press 1991). A
strong, independent career woman whose primary focus is work is por¬
trayed as inept in the domestic sphere and unable to maintain an intimate
relationship with a man (Japp 1991). Consider, for instance, Murphy
Brown, one of the most highly rated programs on prime-time television.
Though strong and competent at work, Murphy relinquishes much of the
care of her infant son to her painter, Eldin; and a frequent theme in the
show are Jokes about Murphy’s unsuccessful relationships with men and
her virtually defunct sex life.
Despite a few strong, independent female characters now on prime¬
time television, men are still far more likely than women to solve prob¬
lems (Fejes 1992). In fact, women usually need help from others to solve
problems. Men are more powerful and less emotional; rarely do male
characters cry, unless the objective is to make them look silly or funny.
Female characters, in contrast, express emotions easily—even if they are
successful career women, such as the femhle characters on L.A. Law (Japp
1991) . Women are also more likely than men to use sex or romantic
charm to get what they want (Condry 1989). But there is one way that
men are depicted clearly less favorably than women: they are the “bad
guys.” Male characters are significantly more likely than female characters
to use force and violence, and they commit twice as many crimes (Fejes
1992) . Women, especially old women, are the usual victims. “Old women
are the most victimized category of individuals on television, being thirty
times more likely to be caught up in a violent act than older women
actually are in reality” (Condry 1989:73; see also chapter 9).
Findings such as these may be a bit surprising since, to many viewers,
women seem more prominent onxtelevision nowadays, and their charac¬
ters appear more “liberated.” This may be because one of the biggest
changes on prime-time programming has been the incorporation of
women’s rights and gender equality themes, and programs that raise such
issues typically take what could be described as a feminist stand {MRTW
1986). In addition, several prime-time specials and made-for-television
movies have sensitively addressed such topics as sexual assault, spouse
abuse, and incest. Nevertheless, strong or serious feminists are portrayed
negatively. “Strident feminists are usually seen as loners or disconnected
souls” (Press 1991:39; see also Japp 1991). They are often punished for
what is depicted as an unnecessary overcommitment to the feminist
“party line.”
The illusion of more women in prime time may also be due to a few
well-placed female characters—what the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
(1977) referred to as “window dressing on the set.” Keep in mind that, as
we noted earlier, the percentage of prime-time characters who are women
has not changed significantly since 1954. A small number of prominently
placed female characters may give the impression that there are more
women on television than there actually are. Importantly, however, the
women who do appear in lead roles are still most often white. Female or
male, racial minorities continue to be underrepresented on television
(Rhodes 1991; Condry 1989). According to the Annenberg study, in a
single week, the typical prime-time viewer sees an average of 355 charac¬
ters with speaking parts on network television. Of these, only 4 are African
Americans. Moreover, the typical viewer will see only one Hispanic Ameri¬
can every two weeks, one Asian American every three weeks, and one
Native American every ten weeks (Gerbner 1993; see also Williams and
Condry 1988).
MTien minorities do appear on prime-time television, it is usually in
supporting rather than starring roles, and the roles are often demeaning,
negatively stereotyped, and distorted (O’Connor 1991a; Rhodes 1991).
There are exceptions, of course—recall the enormously popular Cosby
Show and A Different World. Apart from these programs and a few others,
however, nonwhites usually are cast in less prestigious occupations than
whites (despite the fact that the occupational levels of most TV characters
are significantly higher than those of the actual population). Williams
and Condry (1988) report that nonwhites are likely to be cast as blue-
collar workers and as public safety personnel, and are less likely than
whites to be depicted as friends and neighbors. The most common roles
for African Americans are athletes, entertainers, criminals, crime victims,
and servants (O’Connor 1991a; Staples and Jones 1985). In Williams and
Condry’s (1988) research, none of the Hispanic characters was cast as a
friend or neighbor, and their criminality rate was the highest of all racial
groups. Minority women, in particular, are practically invisible on prime¬
time television, and when they do appear, with few exceptions, they are
portrayed in stereotyped roles (Rhodes 1991). One recent study found,
for instance, that childless, black female characters are typically depicted
as unskilled, unpolished, and lacking in decorum; rarely in control of a
situation; financially dependent on a parent or even a white family;
unknowledgeable, except about child care or housekeeping; and, if sin¬
gle, desperately preoccupied with finding a husband (M/?7W1990).
In addition to racial minorities, other groups have been rendered
invisible or negatively stereotyped in television programming. Individuals
with physical disabilities, for example, are just 1.5 percent of prime-time
characters (Gerbner 1993). Lesbian and gay characters are more likely
168 Chapter 6
to be found in made-for-television movies, particularly since the televi¬

sion industry has begun to address the problem of AIDS, but as Gross
(1991) points out, the focus typically is on the reaction of family and
friends to the disclosure that someone they know is gay. Gay and les¬
bian characters are extraordinarily rare on prime-time serials. One excep¬
tion was the CBS situation comedy. Doctor, Doctor, which portrayed a
warm relationship between the lead character, a heterosexual, and his
brother who was gay. Gay male roles are more frequent than lesbian roles,
but typically homosexuals are depicted as buffoons, villains, or victims
(most recently, as victims of AIDS) (Gross 1991). As Fejes (1992:12)
points out, gay and lesbian characters are totally defined by their
“problem.”
Homosexuals, especially gay men, have been portrayed more posi¬
tively on public television (PBS) and cable networks than the three major
prime-time networks. The Showtime cable network carried the situation
comedy. Brothers, for a number of seasons; and in June 1993, a monthly
program called In the Life had its debut on PBS stations throughout the
country. In the Life has been described as a “cross between 60 Minutes and
a gay version of The Ed Sullivan Shoiv” (quoted in O’Connor 1991b:32H).
The goal of In the Life is to rectify television’s negative portrayals of
homosexuals by showing gays and lesbians in nonstereotypical roles. It is
not known how many PBS stations air the program, but what is clear is
that the negative image of gays and lesbians on television cannot be
changed with a single monthly program “ghettoized” on a limited num¬
ber of public television stations. Gays and lesbians, like other minority
groups, must be integrated into all of the ordinary situations that prime¬
time programs attempt to depict. As Gross (1991) notes, they must be
shown as just “folks” rather than as deviants; after all, that is the reality of
their daily lives.
If we turn from prime-time entertainment programming to news
programming, we find that some groups have made progress in their
portrayals on television. Indeed, the greatest move toward equality of the
sexes on television has taken place on local news programs. All-male news
desks are rare on local televised news shows, where the trend has been
toward male-female anchor teams. By 1982, 92 percent of local TV sta¬
tions had a female anchor for at least one of their regular news programs
(Steenland 1987). Unfortunately, female co-anchors often confront a
double standard on the job. Higher standards of physical attractiveness
and dress are sometimes set for them compared to their male colleagues,
and they may be expected to look younger and act friendlier than male
\ anchors (M/?T1T 1993h; Craft 1988). Most, in fact, are younger. More
than a third of local television news anchors are women, but just 3 percent
of them are over age forty; 50 percent of male local television news
anchors are over forty and 16 percent are over fifty years old (Sanders and
Rock 1988). On national news programs, women are also younger than
their male peers. With the exception of Barbara Walters, viewers do not
see women on national news programs who are in their late fifties or
sixties. Consider, however, the ages of some of the most respected men
on national news programs: David Brinkley and Hugh Downs, for exam¬
ple, are in their seventies {MRTWl99Si).
Overall, women have made fewer inroads on national network news¬
casts than local ones. In 1993, Connie Chung (age forty-six) made news
herself by becoming the co-anchor of the CBS Evening News with Dan
Rather (age sixty-one). The weeknight news on both ABC and NBC
continue to be anchored by men, although women do anchor weekend
newscasts and co-anchor prime-time news programs.
At the same time, research indicates that the percentage of female
correspondents reporting news on the three major networks has risen
considerably since 1974, although in 1992 the percentage of news stories
filed by women on these networks was only 19 percent. Women are 25
percent of the on-air correspondents at CBS, 16 percent at ABC, and 11
percent at NBC. In 1992, ten of the fifty most prominent network corre¬
spondents were women, with four of these ranking in the top ten; in 1991,
only four of the fifty most prominent network correspondents were
women (Center for Media and Public Affairs 1993).
Still, minority men and women remain dramatically underrepre¬
sented on the network news, with only slight improvements in recent
years. In 1989, for example, there were no African-American correspon¬
dents, male or female, ranking among the fifty most prominent, although
there were two Hispanic-American men in the top fifty. In 1992, two
African American men and one African-American woman ranked among
the fifty most prominent network news correspondents, along with one
Hispanic American woman and one Asian-American man. Racial minori¬
ties constitute 16 percent of the on-air correspondents on CBS, but only
6 percent on both ABC and NBC. In 1992, 91 percent of all on-air
network news stories were read by whites, compared with 6 percent by
African Americans, 2 percent by Asian Americans, and 1 percent by
Hispanic Americans (Center for Media and Public Affairs 1993). Accord¬
ing to the Annenberg study, only 0.2 percent of men and women on
newscasts are people with disabilities (Gerbner 1993). No figures are
available regarding the number of lesbian and gay newscasters, a fact that
once again underlines their invisibility on television.
Off-camera, women, particularly women of color, also have fared
poorly. Nationwide, women are 33.7 percent of the televised news work
force. However, 79 percent of these women are white (Stone 1992). The
double discrimination confronted by women of color is clear in Table 6.1
on page 170 where we see the distribution of television news directors by
sex and race. In 1991, 16.8 percent of TV news directors were women
170 Chapter 6
(down from 18.5 percent in 1988), and 8.6 percent were racial minorities
(up from 7.9 percent in 1988), but only 2.9 percent were minority women
(1988 figure unavailable) {MRTW 1992h). According to Stone (1993),
the percentage of racial minorities in the TV news work force has
changed little since 1976.
In closing this section on television, we want to briefly discuss a
relatively new genre of television programming that has generated con¬
siderable controversy; the music video. Parents and others have expressed
concern about the violence and sexual content of many music videos
broadcast by the cable stations MTV and Black Entertainment Television.
However, little empirical research has been done on music videos, and
the limited findings that are available have mixed conclusions.
In one early study, the researchers concluded that music videos
tended to reflect “the chauvinism of rock culture” in general (Sherman
and Dominick 1986:89). This study showed that women appeared signifi¬
cantly less often than men did and, when they were shown, they were
typically white and frequently portrayed as “upper-class sex objects for
lower-class males with visions of sexual conquest.” More than half the
women were provocatively dressed, and sex was usually depicted in physi¬
cal terms with little emotional involvement. Violence was a common
theme, with men the likely aggressors and victims. Interestingly, however,
when females were involved in violence, they were more often aggressors
TABLE 6A Race and Sex of Commercial Television News Directors, 1991
Estimated Number Percent
Total Male 620 83.2

Total Female 125 16.8
Total White 681 91.4

Total Minority 64 8.6
White Men > 577 77.4

Wliite Women 104 14.0
African-American Men 13 1.8

African-American Women 2 .3
Hispanic-i\merican Men 25 3.3
Hispanic-American Women 7 1.0
Asian-American Men 1 .2
Asian-American Women 10 1.3
Native American Men 4 .5
Native American Women 2 .2
Source: AIR'CIV 1992b:5

than victims, leading these researchers to conclude that “the predatory

female is a popular music TV stereotype” (Sherman and Dominick
1986:90).
Several other studies report similar results. Brown and Campbell
(1986), for instance, report virtually identical findings with regard to the
loles of men and women as aggressors. In addition, when they compared
what they classified as “white” videos (from MTV) with black videos (from
Black Entertainment Television’s Video Soul), they found that regardless
of race, women were relatively rare on music videos. When they are
shown, black women are usually dancing, rather than singing or playing
an instrument. \\Tite women, on the other hand, frequently wander
aimlessly or try to get the attention of a man who is ignoring them.
Roland (1993) reports that music videos often depict women as easily
aroused sexually, and that viewers who describe themselves as being “suc¬
cessful” in their own sexual experiences tend to see this depiction as
realistic. Moreover, male viewers are more likely than female viewers to
see forced sex depicted in music videos as justified if mutual sexual
attraction between the male and female performers was implied.
Roland’s study indicates that men and women are likely to react to
music videos differently. Another recent study echoes this point and
argues that there is a male style of address that appears in most music
videos, but that there is also a female style of address that comes across in
many videos made by female musicians (Lewis 1990). According to Lewis
(1990), at its inception, MTV undoubtedly was designed to appeal to a
white male adolescent audience. But by 1983, female artists had made
significant inroads in the area of music videos and began producing
videos that spoke to adolescent women. (The target audience for MTV
largely remained white.)
Lemale artists’ video performances prior to 1983 were geared pri¬
marily to male spectators (Lewis 1990). The women were expected to be
sexy, they touched their hair and their bodies often, and the underlying
themes of the videos were feminine, not feminist. A turning point oc¬
curred with the release of Cyndi Lauper’s popular video, “Girls Just Want
to Have Lun.” In this and numerous subsequent videos by other female
artists, Lewis discovered that a female form of address began to take hold.
Lemale artists appropriated for themselves the privileged experiences of
males portrayed in most music videos, and often showed a dramatic
reversal of gender roles or a rejection of traditional gender stereotypes.
At the same time, the female musicians in the videos depicted female
modes of cultural expression and experience in a celebratory rather than
deprecating way. Wliile sex remained a central theme in many women’s
music videos, the message was often one of women in control of their
sexuality, acting in their own interests rather than in the intere/ts of men
(see also McClary 1991).
172 Chapter 6
Recent reviews, in fact, indicate that many female rock and pop
artists, such as k.d. lang, L7, and Hole, are openly challenging sexist as
well as heterosexist stereotypes. With songs focusing on feminist issues,
such as sexual harassment and reproductive freedom, along with love
songs written by women to women, the music videos of these performers
demonstrate that music videos do not have to be exploitative or degrad¬
ing to women (Powers 1993). Still, the impact of these and even more
traditional music videos on different viewing audiences is not well under¬
stood, and much more careful research on this topic is clearly needed.
We will return to the issue of the effects of television in general, but
for now we turn to an examination of gender portrayals in advertising.
Gender Messages in Advertisements: Does

Sexism Sell?
A woman changes her clothes from business suit to housedress to evening
gown while singing in a husky voice about how she can “bring home
the bacon, fry it up in a pan,” and still make her husband “feel like a
man” all because she uses a particular perfume.
A young man stands beside his car, discussing its merits, while beautiful
women pass by and ask for a ride. Visibly proud of his ability to attract
women, he soon realizes that it is not him they find attractive, but the
car.
These scenarios are quite familiar to us. They come, of course, from
the contrived world of advertising and, like most advertisements, they are
selling us more than a specific product. Indeed, they are peddling needs
and desires. In the first example, the implicit message is that every woman
can have a successful career, be a good homemaker, and find sexual
fulfillment by using the advertised product which, realistically, is designed
only to make her smell good. In the second, men are told that regardless
of what they look like or how socially inept they are, they too can attract
beautiful women if they buy the advertised car, the real purpose of which
is just to provide them transportation. Just about everyone wants to be
successful, physically attractive, even sexy. What advertisers often do is
play on these desires by implying that their products may serve not only
their intended purposes, but also offer bonuses as well. In this way,
“advertisements portray an image that represents the interpretation of
those cultural values which are profitable to propagate” (Courtney and
Whipple 1983:192).
N Advertisements also portray images of gender that the advertis¬
ing industry deems profitable. According to advertising analysts, for
male consumers the message is to buy a particular product and get the
“sweet young thing” associated with it, whereas for female consumers the
message is to buy the product in order to be the sweet young thing

(McCracken 1993; Strate 1992; Masse and Rosenblum 1988). This has
resulted in ads rife with sexist stereotypes because, as Courtney and
Whipple (1983) and others (e.g., Lazier-Smith 1989) point out, the domi¬
nant philosophy of the industry proclaims that “sexism sells.” Before we
evaluate the accuracy of this belief, let’s look at some of the common
gender stereotypes in print and television advertising.
Occupational stereotyping by sex pervades advertisements. Men
hold positions of authority—they are the so-called experts—while women
receive ad\ice, usually from men, or are shown in traditional female
occupations (Fejes 1992). For example, in a recent analysis of pictorial
representations of the sexes in popular computer magazine ads, the
researchers found that females were overrepresented as sales and clerical
workers, and were often depicted in a passive role—for example, as an
onlooker or as learner rather than teacher. Males, on the other hand,
were portrayed as active computer users and were overrepresented as
managers, experts, and technicians (Ware and Stuck 1985).
Occupational stereotyping is endemic in less specialized advertising
too. Suppose we told you that we were about to show you ten advertise¬
ments featuring male models, and we asked you to guess what jobs they
would most likely be doing. You would probably have little difficulty
coming up with answers because men in advertisements are shown in a
wide range of roles—from white-collar professionals such as scientists,
physicians, and business executives, to blue-collar workers such as plumb¬
ers, electricians, and exterminators. Less often, they are shown in family
roles as husbands and fathers. But what if we asked the same question
using ads with female models? Chances are you would have a tougher
time varying your answers; two of the most common roles for women
depicted in advertisements remain housewife and mother (Lazier-Smith
1989; Courtney and Whipple 1983). Although nontraditional roles for
women are appearing more often than in the past, women’s traditional
roles, especially that of homemaker, continue to far outnumber nontra¬
ditional portrayals {MRTW 1992c). Women also are twice as likely as men
to appear in television commercials as spouses or parents with no other
occupation (Metzger 1992).
In television commercials, women most often demonstrate house¬
hold cleaning products, personal care items, and food, although since
1978, men have become three times more likely to sell domestic products
(Metzger 1992). Yet the announcers and background voices (known as
voice-overs) in these ads are almost always male. Studies indicate that in
any given viewing period the percentage of male commercial voice-overs
ranges from 84 to 90 percent (Metzger 1992; MRTW 1992d). The ratio¬
nale of the advertising industry is that female voices are neither authori¬
tative nor believable. Consumers, they maintain, trust a male voice; “the
174 Chapter 6
male voice is the voice of authority” (quoted in Courtney and Whipple

1983:136). Marketing research refutes this argument, however. Studies,
for instance, show no differences in the persuasiveness of female and
male voice-overs (Courtney and Whipple 1983). Other studies have also
found that female spokespersons are more trusted by the public than
male spokespersons (Steenland 1987). These findings are further under¬
lined by annual rankings of the consumer appeal of celebrity spokesper¬
sons for specific products. In 1993, six of the top ten celebrity product
endorsers were women. Indeed, for the first time in the ten-year history
of the rankings, a woman—Candice Bergen—topped the list {Wall Street
Jaurnal 17 September 1993). Given these findings, we may expect female
voice-overs to become more common.
Another frequent role for women in advertising is as sex objects.
Usually this is purely a decorative role; in other words, the model has no
clear relationship to the product and is shown simply because of her
physical attractiveness and sex appeal. Typically, models are scantily
dressed (e.g., in bathing suits) and provocatively posed. While many
consumers have come to expect these portrayals in personal care or
cosmetics ads—indeed they dominate such advertisements—they are also
prevalent in nonappearance-related advertising (Downs and Harrison
1985). For instance, in magazine ads for computers, women are often
shown dressed in evening gowns and seductively draped across equip¬
ment (Ware and Stuck 1985). “In many industrial advertisements women
are employed to call attention to parts and equipment. In those advertise¬
ments it is not uncommon to see bikini-clad women lounging on new
machine tools or electronic equipment” (Courtney and Whipple
1983:103). In a comparison of magazine ads from 1973 and 1986, Lazier-
Smith (1989) found that there has been a 10 percent increase in ads
depicting women as sex objects or in decorative roles. Indeed, a recent
survey of marketing and advertising professionals found that overall,
while the portrayal of women in advertising had improved in recent years,
sexual portrayals remained unchanged or worsened, a situation that these
industry observers expected to continue for at least another decade
{MRTW\992c).
Research indicates that the percentage of advertisements depicting
men in decorative roles also has increased in recent years (Skelly and
Lundstrom 1981). It appears that the response of the advertising industry
to complaints of sexism in ads using decorative female models has not
been to eliminate such ads, but rather to demean men by increasing
portrayals of them as sex objects too. This approach reflects the industry’s
\ confusion of gender equality with sexual permissiveness and exploitation.
Consider, for instance, the now famous print advertisement for Charlie
perfume in which a “liberated” businesswoman publicly patted the be-
hind of her businessman companion. Other forms of confusion appear

in ads that show “liberated husbands” trying ineptly to help with house¬
work, or that depict “liberated women” as domineering types who like to
put down men (Courtney and Whipple 1983).
There are other, more subtle ways that sexism permeates advertise¬
ments. One, for example, is the way models are posed. In a study that
compared the ways women and men are depicted in magazine advertise¬
ments, Masse and Rosenblum (1988) found that female models are sig¬
nificantly more likely than male models to be depicted in subordinate
poses. Female models are more frequently solitary and also appear more
often as “partials,” that is, only a part of their bodies, such as their legs, is
shown. Models are sometimes diminished in advertisements, although
this is more common in men’s magazines. Masse and Rosenblum found
that almost a quarter of the female figures were not full-sized, in these
magazines, as compared with less than 7 percent of the male figures. (In
women’s magazines, 6.5 percent of female models and 7 percent of male
models were diminished.) Overall, 27 percent of the female models, but
just 3.8 percent of the male models, in the magazine ads were subordi¬
nated in some way.
Despite industry claims that sexism sells, research provides only
qualified support for this position. Advertisements that use women’s sexu¬
ality to sell products to men do appear to be appealing to and effective
with that constituency. Ads emphasizing sex also often appeal to teenag¬
ers of both sexes. However, such ads are ineffective with a large segment
of adult female consumers (Grigsby 1992; USA Today 24 February 1992).
Additional research indicates that while consumers in general do like to
see attractive models of both sexes in advertisements, the use of nudity,
semi-nudity, and sexual innuendo may inhibit consumers’ ability to recall
the products and the advertisements in which they appeared (Courtney
and Whipple 1983).
Sometimes, in fact, such sexism offends and angers consumers.
Such was the case in 1989 when a Miller beer advertising supplement
designed as a “humorous take-off on spring break,” was distributed in
college newspapers throughout the United States. The ad depicted
women as mindless objects and men as only interested in sex and drink¬
ing. At some schools, students were so offended by the ad that they called
for a boycott of Miller products and demanded an apology from the
company, which they got almost immediately {New York Times 13 March
1989). Nevertheless, many industry representatives continue to deny that
sexism is a problem in advertising, and they have openly resisted change.
As we have seen here, in fact, the changes that have been made frequently
perpetuate sexism by distorting liberation and increasingly demeaning
men.
176 Chapter 6
IMAGES OF GENDER IN THE MEDIA:

WHAT ARE THEIR EFFECTS?
Defenders of the media sometimes argue that while media portrayals are
often sexist, their effects are benign. “That only happens on television,”
they say. “People don’t really believe that stuff. There is evidence,
though, that appears to contradict this argument; many people, it seems,
do believe that stuff.
The majority of research on media effects has focused on television,
largely because of its popularity, particularly with children, and because
of its unique characteristics that we outlined earlier. A central issue has
been the effects of violent television programming, an issue that we
examine more closely in Box 6.2. With regard to violent behavior, televi¬
sion’s impact hardly seems benign. Is there a similar relationship between
television viewing and perception of appropriate roles for women and
men? Although current research provides no conclusive answers, the
available findings warrant our attention.
Recent reviews of the literature have found evidence that viewers
who watch television frequently are more sexist than those who watch it
only occasionally. “The amount of television viewing was positively associ¬
ated with stereotyping of both males and females, and stereotyping
tended to increase with age, but decreased among those who were light
viewers” (Comstock 1991:162; see also Courtney and Whipple 1983, but
for a partially opposing view see Perloff 1977).
Some have argued that an observed relationship between television
viewing and gender stereotyping does not necessarily mean that it is the
television viewing that causes the stereotyping. It may be that those who
tend to stereotype also tend to watch more television (Courtney and
Whipple 1983). Additional research indicates that children tend to
choose programs that conform to gender stereotypes that they have
already learned. In other words, the media reinforce gender stereotypes
that children are taught both by their parents and in school because
children will select those media presentations that conform to what they
have previously learned (Liebert et al. 1982; Morgan 1982). Similarly,
Johnson and Ettema (1982) used a specially produced television series to
try to alter children’s beliefs about gender, but found that changes would
not occur without additional external reinforcement of the programs’
content.
Research on television commercials has also generated interesting
findings. For instance, Geis and her colleagues (1984) showed groups of
students a series of commercials, some of which were gender stereotyped
and others that portrayed gender role reversals. They then asked the
students to write a short essay about how they pictured their lives ten years
Violence and the Media 30X 6.2

In the fall of 1993, the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications
Commission issued stringent rules regulating the broadcast of violent program-
ming. These rules include a ban on the depiction of gratuitous violence; a limi¬
tation of the times that adult programming (including ads and promotions)
containing violence can be broadcast, to between the hours of 9 P.M. and 6
A.M.; and a total ban on any violent depictions in children’s programs that mini¬
mize the effects of the violence, or that encourage or promote imitation of vio¬
lence (Affi7TT1993j).
In contrast, in the United States, although concern has been expressed
for many years over the social and psychological impact of escalating violence
on television and in films, little action has been taken to curb it. In July, 1993,
chief executives of the major national networks—ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox-
agreed to air parental advisories before programs that the networks consider
violent. Later that year, during testimony before a congressional committee. At¬
torney General Janet Reno warned the networks that unless they took further
steps to limit the violence likely to be viewed by children, the federal govern¬
ment would enact legislation to force them to do so.
Reno’s concern was heightened by several violent incidents that occurred
just a week before her congressional appearance and that were linked to a vio¬
lent television program or film. In one case, a five-year-old Ohio boy set a fire
in his family’s mobile home after watching the MTV cartoon Beavis and Butt-
head, in which the central characters depicted setting fires as fun. The little
boy’s two-year-old sister died in the fire. Two other deaths—one in Pennsylva¬
nia and one in New York—resulted from teenagers imitating a scene in the
movie. The Program, in which the hero, a college football player, lies down in
the middle of a busy highway in order to demonstrate his bravery and tough¬
ness. Following these incidents, MTV announced that it would change the
broadcast time of Beavis and Butt-head from 7:30 P.M. to later at night and that
references to setting fires would no longer be made. Similarly, The Walt Disney
Company announced that it would delete the highway scene from The Program.
These events have fueled an ongoing debate among representatives of
the entertainment industry, psychologists and sociologists, legislators and attor¬
neys, and concerned parents regarding whether viewing violence on television
and films prompts subsequent violent behavior in viewers, especially children
and teenagers. Despite literally thousands of studies on the subject, the pri¬
mary question—Does violent viewing mMve violent behavior in viewers?—re¬
mains unanswered; and many researchers are quick to point out that a
correlation between violent viewing and violent behavior does not necessarily
indicate that the former caused the latter.
There are at least three theories about the relationship between violent
viewing and violent behavior (Vivian 1993). One emphasizes the cathartic effect
of violent viewing. According to this perspective, viewing violence actually
reduces the violent drives of viewers because watching allows viewers to fanta¬
size about violence, thereby releasing the tensions that may lead to real-life
178 Chapter 6
30X €>.2 Contmueii
aggression. It has also been argued that this catharsis may lead viewers to take
positive rather than violent action to remedy a problem. For instance, Vivian
(1993) reports that following the broadcast of the television movie, The Burning
Bed, in which a severely abused woman ultimately kills her batterer-husband by
setting fire to his bed while he sleeps, domestic violence agency hotlines were
flooded with calls from battered women seeking help.
Vivian also notes, however, that The Burning Bed appears to have inspired
others to take violent action. One man set his estranged wife on fire and an¬
other severely beat his wife; both men later stated that they were motivated by
the television movie. Such acts of direct imitation are illustrative of a second
theory that emphasizes the modeling effect of violent viewing. Put quite simply,
this perspective maintains that media violence teaches viewers to behave vio¬
lently through imitation or modeling. Critics of this position point out that de¬
spite the sensationalism that surrounds individual acts of direct imitation, they
are actually rare. Moreover, studies of social learning, as we pointed out in
chapter 4, indicate that there are several intervening factors that play a role in
determining whether a specific act will be modeled by others. These include
the model’s and the learner’s relative age and sex, the model’s objective status
and her or his status in the eyes of the learner, and whether or not the model
is rewarded or punished for engaging in the behavior in question.
These, as well as other factors, are examined by researchers who propose
a third theory which emphasizes the catalytic effect of violent viewing. They main¬
tain that if certain conditions are present, viewing violent media depictions
may prompt real-life violence, but viewing violence is not a sufficient cause in
and of itself Among the contributing conditions that these researchers have
identified, in addition to those already listed, are: whether the violence is por¬
trayed as realistic or exciting, whether the violence succeeds in righting a
wrong, whether the program or film contains characters or situations that are
similar to those the viewer actually knows or has experienced, and whether the
viewer’s media exposure is heavy (Vivian 1993).
It remains to be seen whether the federal government will enact legisla¬
tion to curb violent programming. Any legislative proposal is likely to be
fiercely opposed by the entertainment industry, among others. Previous govern¬
ment attempts to regulate broadcast hours in an effort to prevent children
from viewing programs or films with adult themes have been struck down by
the courts as a violation of the First Amendment (see, for example, Lewis
1993). What is more certain is that while this debate rages on, the majority of
U.S. households will continue to fulfill the last condition of the catalytic effect:
frequency of viewing. Indeed, according to the American Psychological Associa¬
tion (1992), the average child, by the time he or she finishes elementary
school, will have watched 100,000 violent acts and 8,000 murders on television.
Violence is especially prevalent on Saturday morning cartoons, with a rate of
20 to 25 violent acts per hour (compared with 5 to 6 per hour during prime
time). These figures hardly inspire optimism with respect to the inhibition of
violence in our society.
into the future. Women who saw the stereotyped commercials tended to
stereotype their futures; they emphasized homemaking and expressed
few aspirations for achievement outside the home. In contrast, women
who saw the role-reversed commercials wrote essays similar to those of
male subjects; their essays were achievement oriented and had few home¬
making themes. The researchers concluded that gender depictions in
television commercials may be understood as gender prescriptions by fe¬
male viewers and may have a cumulative effect on their real-life aspira¬
tions, especially given that, as children, they watch an estimated 22,000 to
25,000 commercials a year (see also Baran and Blasko 1984).
Clearly, the Geis et al. (1984) study points to the detrimental effects
of gender-stereotyped commercials, but it is significant for a second rea¬
son: it also indicates that nonstereotyped commercials can have a positive
impact on women’s aspirations. Similar results have been obtained by
other researchers who have studied nonstereotyped programming (see,
for example, Rosenwasser et al. 1989; Wroblewski and Huston 1987;
Johnson and Ettema 1982). Television is a teaching tool; what is taught
depends on what viewers watch. The evidence indicates that television can
be effective in reducing gender stereotypes (Condry 1989; Wober and
Gunter 1988; Courtney and Whipple 1983). The same outcome may also
be produced by print media, but research has found that audiovisual
media, such as television, are even more beneficial in this regard (Flerx
etal. 1976).
LANGUAGE AND MEDIA AS

SHAPERS OF GENDER
In this chapter we have examined the gender images communicated by

the primary means by which we give and receive information: language
and the mass media. Far from simply reflecting the values and norms of
our culture, we have learned here how language and media shape and
re-create culture. In this way, language and the media socialize us, and
with respect to gender, much of this socialization takes place through
symbolic annihilation: symbolically ignoring, trivializing, or demeaning a
particular group, which in this case has traditionally been women. We
have found, for example, that language “tells a woman she is an after¬
thought, a linguistic variant, an ‘et cetera’ ” (Butler and Paisley 1980:50).
Newspapers convey a similar message. Rarely are women or women-
centered events and issues considered to be worthy of serious attention
as hard news; instead, they are ghettoized or distorted. Magazines, televi¬
sion, and the advertisements that dominate both, promote what may be
called cults of femininity and masculinity.
We have discussed evidence in this chapter indicating that such
depictions do have a negative impact on men’s and women’s behaviors
180 Chapter 6
and self-concepts. Bu\ we have also reviewed research that shows that the
media, particularly television, can be a powerful force in breaking down
sexist stereotypes by sensitively and realistically portraying women and
men in nontraditional roles. Some observers have argued that this latter
consequence is likely only if more women are hired for policy-making
posts at newspapers, television stations, and advertising agencies. We, too,
advocate a balanced representation of the sexes in these jobs; however,
evidence we have discussed in this chapter suggests that this is not
enough. In addition, a concerned public must take action. Successful
strategies have included letter-writing campaigns to newspapers and tele¬
vision stations, and boycotts of products promoted in sexist advertise¬
ments {New York Times 13 March 1989; Courtney and Whipple 1983). At
the very least, we must adopt the practice of using nonsexist language in
our own communication. If language and the media help to construct
what comes to be defined as reality, we must act to insure that the reality
constructed is a nonsexist one.
KEY TERMS
linguistic sexism ways in which language devalues members of one sex

reflection hypothesis the belief that media content mirrors the behaviors, rela¬
tionships, values, and norms most prevalent or dominant in a society
semantic derogation the process by which the meaning or connotations of
words are debased over time
symbolic annihilation symbolically ignoring, trivializing, or condemning indi¬
viduals or groups in the media
SUGGESTED READINGS
Beasly, M. H., and S. J. Gibbons 1993. Taking Their Place: A Documentary History of
Women and Journalism. Lanham> MD: University Publishing Associates.
Condry, J. 1989. The Psychology of Television. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates.
Craig, S. 1992. Meri, Masculinity and the Media. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Frank F. W., and P. A. Treichler (Fds.) 1989. Language, Gender, and Professional
Writing: 1 heoretical Approaches and Guidelines for Nonsexist Usage. New York:
The Modern Language Association of America.
McCracken, E. 1993. Decoding Women 's Magazines. Nevc York: St. Martin’s Press
Press, A. L. 1991. Women Watching Television: Gender, Glass, and Generation in the
Ameircan Television Experience. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press
Wolf, M. A., and A. P. Kielwasser 1991. Gay People, Sex and the Media. New York’
Harrington Park Press.
In addition, Comniunications Research Associates publishes a quarterly newslet¬

ter, Media Report to Women, on which we have drawn heavily in this chapter. The
newsletter provides summaries and often reprints excerpts from reports and
articles covering virtually every dirhension of the topic of gender and the media.
Subscriptions or single copies may be ordered from Communications Research
Associates, Inc., 10606 Mantz Road, Silver Spring, MD 20903-1228.
For a compilation of further suggested readings we also recommend Blacks
on Television: A Selectively Annotated Bibliography by G. H. Hill and S. Saverson Hill
(Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press). Despite the fact that this bibliography was
published in 1985, it remains one of the only bibliographies that focuses on race
and the television medium.
Chapter
Gender and
Intimate Refationehips
Gender and Intimate Relationships 183
During the 199,2 presidential campaign, conservative Republicans fre¬

quently made the claim that one of the root causes of major social
problems in the United States was a breakdown in “family values.” In
sifting through the political rhetoric, it quickly became clear that what the
conservatives were lamenting was the decline of a particular family
form—the isolated nuclear family or what Dorothy Smith (1993) calls the
standard North American family (SNAF)—and the hierarchical gender
and generational relations that characterized it. In this chapter, we will
examine the dynamics of gender (and generation) in the isolated nuclear
family and compare them with those of other family forms, forms that
today constitute the more common type of intimate relationships for the
majority of Americans. Are the conservatives’ claims valid? To answer that
question, we must raise two others:
1. How do the nonfamilial institutions and dominant normative ideology

of a particular society impinge on home life and relationships among
intimates?
2. At the same time, how do relations of production and reproduction in
the home serve to reinforce or undermine gender relations in the
larger society?
These are the questions that will occupy our attention in this chap¬
ter. They are obviously complex, and the task of answering them is made
more difficult by the fact that much of our thinking about families is
colored by our own familial experiences as well as by the culturally
prescribed ideals of our society. Not surprisingly, sociology, as both a
product and a reproducer of culture, has played a part in the social
construction of cultural images of families and family life. Therefore, to
begin our discussion, we will examine some of the traditional sociological
literature on families, as well as feminists’ critiques of the dominant
perspective in this literature.
SOCIOLOGY CONSTRUCTS FAMILY
Aulette (1994) identifies the sociologist Ernest Burgess as the founder of

family sociology, but it was the work of Talcott Parsons that essentially
shaped this subfield of the discipline from the 1940s to the 1960s.' As we
noted in chapter 1, Parsons was a structural functional theorist, and he
‘Certainly, Parsons was not the only significant family sociologist of this period,
but he is considered by many to be the most preeminent. Indeed, Aulette (1994:11)
quotes D. H. Morgan who wrote that “It would not be too much of an exaggera¬
tion to state that Parsons represents the modern theorist on the family” (original
emphasis).
184 Chapter 7
applied diis perspective to his writings on families and home life. His
focus was on what we have called the isolated nuclear family. Composed
of a husband, wife, and their dependent children, this type of family is
isolated in the sense that the members not only live apart from other
relatives (such as the spouses’ parents or siblings), but they are economi¬
cally independent from them as well. In this view, the nuclear family is
also isolated to a large extent from other societal institutions because it
no longer performs many of its earlier functions. Prior to industrializa¬
tion, many services now provided externally by social institutions for
example, education, care of the sick, production of food and clothing
were done at home by family members. In contrast, the contemporary
family has just two vital functions: “first, the primary socialization of
children so that they can truly become members of the society into which
they have been born; second, the stabilization of the adult personalities
of the population of the society” (Parsons 1955:16).
From this functionalist perspective, the best way to accomplish these
tasks is for the two spouses to carry out distinct specialized roles—one
instrumental, the other expressive. The instrumental family role entails
leadership and decision-making responsibilities, and it is filled by the
spouse who is the economic provider for the family, the husband/father.
The wife/mother, then, assumes the expressive role, which means she does
the housework, cares for the children, and sees to it that the emotional
needs of the family members are met. Although Parsons and other func¬
tionalists acknowledged that some married women, even a few with small
children, were employed outside the home, even in the 1950s, they
maintained that these women held jobs in the lowest occupational cate¬
gories so as not to compete with or displace their husbands as chief
“status-givers” and wage earners.
Of course, one might ask why this particular role differentiation
came about. Why can’t men sometimes be expressive and women some¬
times be instrumental leaders? For structural functional theorists, the
answer is simple and obvious: '
In our opinion the fundamental explanation for the allocation of the

roles between the biological sexes lies in the fact that the bearing and
early nursing of children establish a strong presumptive primacy of the
relation of mother to the small child and this in turn establishes a
presumption that the man, who is exempted from these biological
functions, should specialize in the alternative instrumental direction
(Parsons 1955:23).
Although much of the functionalist family literature was written in

the 1950s, it warrants a careful look for two reasons: first, because much
of the sociological writing on families that followed it bears its imprint;
and second, because, as we noted at the outset of this chapter, we hear
these ideas today echoed in the “pro-family” rhetoric of the political right
(see also chapters 11 and 13). Not surprisingly, this perspective has also
had its critics, and feminists have been among the most vociferous.
To begin, the historical accuracy of the structural functionalist argu¬
ment has been called into question. As Allan (1985) points out, it is
unlikely that families before industrialization were ever able to provide
the services that structural functionalists claim they did, given that most
families had limited resources at their disposal and typically lived under
poor conditions.
The emphasis on the isolation of the contemporary nuclear family
from other kin has also been criticized. Implicit in the functionalist
position is an image of the preindustrial family as an extended one—that
is, grandparents, parents, children, and perhaps other relatives sharing a
common household and its attendant economic burdens. Although cross-
cultural research indicates that such arrangements are common in many
non-Western preinclustrial societies, historical evidence shows that in the
preindustrial societies of the Western world, extended families were rare,
except perhaps among the aristocracy. A short life expectancy precluded
the possibility of even a three-generation family for most people. Rather,
it is more likely that “three-generation families actually developed as a
consequence of industrialization rather than being destroyed by it” (Allan
1985:6). Moreover, recent research indicates that contemporary families
are not nearly as isolated from extended kin as functionalists made them
out to be. For example, most senior citizens live near family members,
including their adult children and grandchildren; about half see a family
member daily and more than 85 percent have at least weekly contact with
their children (Taeuber 1992). Family members continue to turn first to
kin for advice, emotional support, and financial help. Among minorities,
including African Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Asian Americans,
and among the working class and the poor, researchers have found
extensive kin and friendship neUvorks in which resources are pooled so
that families can survive in hard times (Segura and Pierce 1993; Stacey
1990; Chatters et al. 1989; Height 1989; Glenn 1987; Stack 1974).
Harsher criticism has been leveled against functionalists’ rigid dif¬
ferentiation of roles between the sexes. In chapter 1, we critiqued the role
concept as depoliticizing the analysis of gender. Here we take up other
problematic aspects of the functionalists’ depiction of the roles women
and men are supposed to fill. First, this depiction erroneously separates
public life—what functionalists see as the masculine world of work, gov¬
ernment, and so on—from the private (feminine) world of the family.
Critics refer to this false dichotomy as the public/private split. In their
everyday experiences, families do not experience these spheres as sepa¬
rate; rather, the public and the private are intertwined. What family
members do during their leisure time, how much time they have to spend
186 Chapter 7
\
together, the economic survival of a family—all depend to a large extent
on employment outside the home. At the same time, activities centered
in the home—e.g., housework, consumption, and child care help to
maintain and reproduce the labor force (Pavalko and Elder 1993, Thorne
1992). There are, of course, social class differences. For instance, poor
families must frequently interact with the state through social service
agencies and the welfare system in an effort to meet their daily survival
needs, whereas middle-class families can utilize savings, pensions, or bank
loans to handle financial demands. Despite the variations, however, it is
clear that families of all social classes are in continuous interaction with
other social institutions (Thorne 1992).
The notion of the public/private split poses other problems as well.
In particular, it masks the reality that work performed in the home
housework—is socially and economically necessary work. Labeling house¬
work private and expressive legitimates the fact that it is unpaid
labor—indeed. Parsons maintained that housework should be a labor of
love—and the fact that the burden of this unpaid labor falls squarely on
the shoulders of women. Furthermore, placing primary responsibility for
housework on women makes their participation in the paid labor force
more difficult, and this, in turn, helps keep them in a position of depen¬
dence and inequality vis-a-vis men. In addition, the image of the home as
a private, emotionally nurturing world also serves to hide the conflict and
physical and psychological abuse that frequently takes place there, with
women and children being the most common victims. These two issues—
the division of labor in the home and domestic violence—are, in fact,
central to an accurate understanding of family relationships, so we will
discuss them in greater detail shortly.
Another major difficulty with functionalists’ rigid role differentia¬
tion is that it portrays instrumental and expressive activities as being
mutually exclusive and thus assumes that their assignment on the basis of
sex is natural. In other words, we are offered the male role and the female
role, which are biologically based, and from this it follows that this ar¬
rangement is both normal and unchanging (see also chapters 1 and 3).
This concept of the natural extends to family forms and thus constructs
the family as well. One outcome of this, however, is that individuals and
families who by choice or chance do not conform to these models come
to be seen as deviant or abnormal. Attention is then focused on treating
them, rather than on solving the structural problems that confront them,
such as prejudice and discrimination.
As we learned in preceding chapters of this text, gender and family
arrangements are not biologically given, but, rather, culturally prescribed
and socially learned. In chapter 3, for instance, we examined extensive
cross-cultural evidence that demonstrates wide variation in gender norms
and family forms. But we need not look to other societies for alternatives.
for within the United States there are numerous variations in family
structure and composition. In fact, the type of family described by struc¬
tural functionalists as universal and natural represents only a minority of
households in the United States today. By 1986, only 7 percent of U.S.
households fit the mold of breadwinning father, full-time home¬
maker/ mother, and at least one child under the age of eighteen (Thorne
1992). More prevalent are families with dependent children and both
adult partners in the labor force. As Table 7.1 shows, the percentage of
employed married women with children has increased significantly over
the last tw'o decades; by 1992, 67.8 percent of married women with
children under eighteen were in the labor force (U.S. Department of
Commerce 1993). Several other types of households have been increasing
in recent years; single-parent households, unrelated persons living to¬
gether, and individuals living alone.
This last category, as we will .soon see, has grown partly as a result of
the growing population of elderly persons, particularly elderly widows. At
the .same time, however, the increase also reflects the larger number of
women and men who are choosing to remain single or, more typically,
who are delaying marriage longer than people delayed it in the past.
Included in the category of unrelated persons living together are those in
domestic partnerships: heterosexual and gay and lesbian cohabiting couples.
We will discuss each of these family forms in turn. For now, however,
our point is that diversity rather than uniformity is the best way to char¬
acterize family composition in the United States. Indeed, the family forms
we have discussed so far do not even cover all the various family forms
TABLE 7.1 Trends in Employment of Married Mothers
Percentage of Married Mothers WTo Are in the Labor Force and Have
Children under 18, 1970-1992
Age of
youngest child 1970 1975 1980 1985 1992
1 year or younger 24% 31% 39% 49% 56.7%

2 years 31 37% 48 54 60.9
3 years 35 41% 52 55 63.5
4 years 39 41% 51 60 62.1
5 years 37 44% 52 62 65.7
Total under 6 years 30% 37% 45% 54% 59.9%
Total 6 to 17 years 49% 52% 62% 68% 75.8%
Total with children 40% 45% 54% 61% 67.8%
under 18 years
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 1991;.S91, and 199.S:633.

188 Chapter 7
and kinship networks researchers have recently identified. For example,

sociologist Judith Stacey (1990), in her study of working-class families in
California’s Silicon Valley, discovered what she calls accordion households
that is, households that expand and contract in size as the needs of
various kin, including “ex-familia” (e.g., siblings or parents of divorced
spouses), change over time. In accordion households, as kin are taken in
and as they leave, resources are pooled and distributed, as a survival
sti'ategy as well as a demonstration of caring and love.
The diversity and complexity of contemporary families has actually
forced a redefinition of the family in some official arenas. For example,
in a landmark case in 1989, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that a
homosexual couple who had lived together for ten years could be consid¬
ered a family under New York City’s rent control regulations. In reaching
its decision, the court recognized that families are signified not only by
signed marriage licenses, but also by long-term, exclusive relationships
with the emotional and financial commitment of those involved (Cutis
1989).
Let us turn our attention, then, to an examination of this diversity,
beginning with a look at issues relating to sexuality and sexual behavior.
SEXUALITY AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM
“I’m a virgin and proud of it,” proclaimed a seventeen-year-old to a

reporter recently {Netv York Times 21 June 1993:A12). The teenager was
one of several hundred young women and men who had signed “chastity
pledges”—that is, an index card bearing the promise to remain “sexually
pure” until marriage. However, while the Southern Baptist Convention,
which developed the abstinence program, attempted to get at least
100,000 teenagers to sign the pledges within a single year, research indi¬
cates that these young people are a minority. A growing number of young
women and men are engaging in premarital sex, and attitudes toward
premarital sex have become more liberal.
In one recent survey, for example, 41 percent of the respondents
said that premarital sex is “not wrong at all,” compared with just 27
percent who gave that response in 1972. Conversely, in 1972, 37 percent
of the respondents stated that premarital sex is “always wrong,” but only
26 percent held that view in 1988 (Kain 1990), Moreover, the Children’s
Defense Fund (1993a) reports that by age nineteen, 89 percent of females
and 92 percent of males have had intercourse. Among girls, in particular,
\ average age at first intercourse has dropped considerably in recent years
(Children’s Defense Fund 1993a), and the gap in sexual experience
between young men and women also has been closing over the last few
decades (Darling et al. 1992).
According to Carol Darling and her colleagues (1992), findings such

as these indicate that the sexual double standard is, for the most part, a
thing of the past. The sexual double standard refers to the tradition in
our society, and in many others, of permitting young men to engage in
sexual activity—or at least ignoring, overlooking, or forgiving their sexual
escapades—^while simultaneously condemning and punishing the same
behavior by girls. Despite the liberalization of attitudes toward premarital
sex, however, a considerable amount of research indicates that the sexual
double standard is still alive and well. It continues to be common practice,
for instance, for young men to brag about their sexual conquests and to
win approval as “studs” for being sexually active. Although young women
may engage in sexual activity more freely than in the past, they are still
expected to do so within a committed relationship, a romance. Girls with
multiple partners or bo)Triends are regarded as “easy” or as “sluts” (Rubin
1991; Thompson 1984).
There may also remain a gender difference in young men’s and
women’s assessment of sexual intercourse. For instance, both Rubin
(1991) and Thompson (1984) report that the majority of young women
they interviewed did not find sexual intercourse very pleasurable or
satisfying, and that foreplay or sexual petting was actually preferred over
intercourse. Most young women, in fact, express disappointment after
first intercourse—a finding which may help explain why, after first inter¬
course, their rates of sexual activity are relatively low (Rubin 1991;
Thompson 1984).
Interestingly, despite all the talk about the sexual promiscuity of
youth in the United States, research indicates that U.S. teens are not more
sexually active than their European peers. One significant difference
between young people in the United States and Europe, however, is that
the latter have easier access to contraceptives and better education pro¬
grams and counseling services available (Jones 1989). One consequence
of this difference, as we see in Box 7.1 on pages 190-191, is a high rate of
teenage pregnancy. In fact, the United States currently has the highest
rate of teenage pregnancy among Western industrialized countries, and
it is the only one of these countries where the rate is rising.
Before considering reproductive freedom in greater detail, however,
it is important to turn our attention to the issue of sexual orientation,
especially since our discussion so far has focused on heterosexual sex. We
tend to think of sexual orientation in dichotomous terms—one is either
heterosexual or homosexual—but research conducted over many years
indicates that sexuality is far more diverse and fluid than this (Blumstein
and Schwartz 1990). Eor instance, a sizable percentage of the population
that self-identifies as heterosexual reports having engaged in sexual activ¬
ity with an individual of the same sex, just as many self-identified homo¬
sexuals report having had sex with someone of the opposite sex. In
190 Chapter 7
30X 7.1 Children Having Children: The Problems of Unwanted Teen

Pregnancy and Parenthood
The rates of pregnancy and birth among U.S. teens are twice those in England,
Wales, and Canada; three times those in Sweden; and seven times those in the
Netherlands (Children’s Defense Fund 1988). Although the number of births
to teen mothers in the United States declined during the 1970s, it began to
rise again sharply in the 1980s and, by 1990, the birth rate for girls fifteen to
nineteen years old was 59.9 births per 1,000 girls—the highest rate in nearly
two decades (Children’s Defense Fund 1993b). While young women nowadays
are likely to engage in sexual intercourse at a younger age than those in the
1970s, the percentage of sexually active teens who use a contraceptive at first in¬
tercourse remains dangerously low: about half of African-American teenage
girls and about two-thirds of white teenage girls (Children’s Defense Fund
1993a).
As alarming as these statistics are, the general public remains largely mis¬
informed or uninformed about adolescent pregnancy and parenthood. A num¬
ber of prevalent myths, in fact, cloud our understanding of these problems.
For instance, it is commonly believed that most teen pregnancies occur among
youth who live in large urban centers. However, the ten states ranking highest
for births to unmarried teens are mostly in the South and are less urbanized
than the northern states (Children’s Defense Fund 1988).
It is also widely thought that teen pregnancy is a problem primarily
among racial minorities. Although racial minorities are disproportionately rep¬
resented among teen parents, they do not account for the majority of teen
births. Nevertheless, given their relative numbers in the population, an African-
American teenager is five times more likely than a white teenager to become
an unwed parent. Brewster (1992) reports that this finding is directly related to
the fact that minority youth are disproportionately represented among the
poor and are more likely than their white peers to live in communities that of¬
fer few avenues for status attainment besides early parenthood. In other words,
she found that white girls who lived under similar structural conditions were
equally as likely as their African-AmeriG^n counterparts in those communities
to become pregnant and have a child.
Does this mean, as some have argued, that the availability of welfare, in
particular Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), encourages teen
pregnancy and parenthood among economically disadvantaged youth? Re¬
search has found no relationship between the level of welfare benefits in a
state and the number of teen pregnancies and births in that state (Children’s
Defense Fund 1988). In addition, this argument overlooks the fact that our
European allies have lower rates of teen pregnancies and births, yet their
welfare benefits typically are far more generous that those in the United
States. In her study of African-American teen mothers, Constance Williams
(1991) found that although most of the young women in her study received
AFDC at some point, they could not be characterized as welfare dependent.
Many were working, but remained poor; most received assistance, such as
Gender and. Intimate Relationships 191
30X 7.1 Continued
housing and food, from their own mothers and other kin (see also Furstenberg
etal. 1987).
This is not to say that poverty is unrelated to adolescent pregnancy and
parenthood. As we have already noted, most of these young women live in com¬
munities that are impoverished in numerous ways: they lack employment and
other economic opportunities that would raise these women above the poverty
line; they have weak school systems with few educational resources; they lack af¬
ter-school, recreational, and other social programs for teens and younger chil¬
dren. As Williams (1991) maintains, most teenagers in these communities do
not begin to receive any kind of help until after they are in trouble. The young
women in her study, for instance, began to receive attention from local health
care agencies once they became pregnant and attended schools for unwed
mothers. Although dropping out of school is often identified as a consequence
of teen pregnancy which further disadvantages adolescent parents, Williams
(1991:134) emphasizes that the young women in her study “welcomed preg¬
nancy as a good excuse to leave a disorderly, unfriendly school experience.”
There is no evidence that African-American teens who do not become moth¬
ers but who attend such unhelpful schools are any more likely to go to college
and raise their standard of living than those who do become pregnant (Wil¬
liams 1991).
Williams (1991) and others report that teens who become pregnant and
give birth often state that having a baby made them feel good about themselves
and gave them a sense of accomplishment. Indeed, these young women fre¬
quently have high levels of self-esteem and resist marrying the fathers of their
children so that they can remain independent. Findings such as these are an in¬
dication that teenagers living in high-risk communities need a variety of ser¬
vices and support programs if the teen pregnancy rate is to be reduced. Some
high schools in large urban areas have begun to offer contraceptives to their
students, including the surgically implanted contraceptive, Norplant (see, for
example, DeWitt 1992). However, research shows that making contraceptives
available is not enough; in addition, adolescents must be motivated to make
use of them, and this motivation may have much to do with whether other
avenues of achievement and status, besides becoming a parent, are open to
them.
addition, although a self-identified heterosexual may not actually engage

in sex with a same-sex partner, he or she may nonetheless report that they
find viewing sex between same-sex partners arousing (Aulette 1994).
Only a small percentage of the population self-identifies as exclu¬
sively homosexual, although researchers are in disagreement over pre¬
cisely what that percentage might be. Since the 1940s, the accepted
figure, 10 percent, has been based on the work of the famous sex re-
192 Chapter 7
searcher, Alfred Kinsey, who found that about 10 percent of white Ameri¬
can men between the ages of 16 and 55 reported relatively exclusive
sexual activity with same-sex partners over a three-year period. Research
reported during the 1990s, however, puts the estimate below 10 percent
some studies put it as low as 1 percent, others as high as 5 percent, most
slightly above 3 percent for women and 4 percent for men (Barringer
1993). Studies in Great Britain and France have arrived at similar findings
(Waite 1992).
Sexual orientation is usually measured through survey questions
that ask about one’s sexual partners over a given period of time, such as
within the past year, the past three years, or the past ten years. The longer
the time period asked about, the less likely the respondent is to have been
exclusively homosexual or heterosexual, underlining the point made
earlier about the fluidity of sexuality. More important, however, is the fact
that any figures obtained through such surveys are likely to be underesti¬
mates, since the subject of sexuality is highly sensitive and the behavior in
question is highly stigmatized. As methodologists have shown, the way
such questions are asked—in face-to-face interviews, over the phone, or
on anonymous mail questionnaires—affects the likelihood of respon¬
dents reporting particular behaviors. In all cases, however, respondents
tend to overreport socially desirable behavior and underreport socially
stigmatized or disapproved behavior (Babbie 1992).
Given the high level of homophobia in our society, it is not surpris¬
ing that gay men and lesbians are reluctant to be forthright about their
sexual orientation when asked by strangers in interviews or on question¬
naires. Such revelations could have damaging consequences if discovered
by an employer or a relative, for instance. In some states, homosexual
behavior is still outlawed (Robson 1992).
There is evidence, as we will see shortly, that at least in some arenas
—through changes in state and city laws and policy changes by some
employers and businesses—gay and lesbian domestic partnerships are
beginning to be accorded the same recognition and benefits as hetero¬
sexual domestic partnerships. Before we examine these changes, however,
we will discuss one additional issue related to sexual behavior—reproduc¬
tive freedom—an issue relevant to sexually active individuals regardless of
their sexual orientation.
Reproductive Freedom
Most discussions of reproductive freedom center on an individual’s desire
\ not to have a child. We start our discussion with this point as well, but as
we will soon learn, the issue of reproductive freedom is not unidimen¬
sional and also includes concerns that arise as a result of the desire to have
children.
Contraception and abortion The desires to prevent pregnancy and to

control family size are not recent concerns. Historical and archeological
evidence provides abundant proof that contraceptive methods and abor¬
tive techniques have been known and widely practiced for thousands of
years. In the United States, though, most methods of contraception,
along with abortion, were made illegal by 1850. It has been argued that
the outlawing of abortion was in part the result of efforts by professionally
trained physicians to take control of the provision of health care by, at
least initially, displacing midwives (see chapter 12). Historically, midwives
performed or assisted with abortions as well as attended to women during
childbirth. Outlawing abortion eliminated a substantial proportion of
midwives’ medical practice. In addition, some analysts have pointed out
that abortions were most common among middle- and upper-class white
women and that they were increasing at a time when racist fears about the
growing numbers of foreign immigrants and African Americans was wide¬
spread. Thus, the outlawing of abortion was a means to prevent “race
suicide” among women of “native” (i.e., white middle- and upper-class)
stock. In both cases, however, the abortion controversy was clearly political,
rather than moral or religious (Luker 1984; Mohr 1978; Gordon 1976).
Women have long taken—some would say, have been forced to
take—responsibility for birth control, so it is hardly surprising that they
have led the social movements for planned parenthood and the legaliza¬
tion of contraception and abortion. Many women became active on these
issues because they or someone close to them had experienced the stigma
of illegitimacy or had suffered the painful, often tragic, consequences of
illegal abortions. Minority women, in particular, frequently contributed
to these causes with their health and lives as the knowing or unwitting
subjects in early medical research on the Pill, the lUD, and other contra¬
ceptive devices (see chapter 12).
Supporters of reproductive freedom won major victories in the
1970s when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in a series of cases that the
decision to bear a child is part of an individual’s constitutionally pro¬
tected right to privacy. The Court’s landmark ruling in Grisivoldv. Connecti¬
cut (1971) served as a precedent for later cases. In Griswold, the Court
invoked the right to privacy in invalidating laws that prohibit the use of
contraceptives by married couples. One year later, the Court applied this
principle in a case involving the distribution of contraceptives to unmar¬
ried adults {Eisenstadt V. Baird). Finally, in 1977, the Court ruled in Carey
V. Population Services International that minors, too, are protected by the
same constitutional right to privacy. Therefore, the state cannot interlere

in their decision not to bear children by denying them access to contra¬
ceptives.
Many young people now find it hard to believe that the distribution
and use of contraceptives in the United States was illegal a little more
194 Chapter 7
than thirty years ago—and relatively few would like to see these decisions
reversed. However, other Supreme Court rulings have generated more
controversy, especially those dealing with abortion. The most important
abortion case—Roe y. Wade—was decided in 1973 with the Court ruling
seven to two that women have a constitutionally protected right to choose
abortion, and that the state cannot unduly interfere with or prohibit that
right. In this much misunderstood and hotly debated case, the Court
actually made three rulings, one for each trimester of pregnancy. More
specifically, the Court ruled that during the first trimester, the decision to
abort is a strictly private one to be made by a woman in consultation with
a physician; the state has no authority or compelling reason to interfere
at this point. During the second trimester, however, abortion involves
more health risks to women, so the state may impose some restrictions,
but only if they are intended to safeguard women’s health. It is in the
third trimester that the state’s role is greatest; then, the Court ruled, the
state may prohibit abortions (except when necessary to preserve a
woman’s life or health) because of the viability of the fetus—that is, the
ability of the fetus to survive outside a woman’s womb. Importantly,
though, in a companion case—Doe v. Bolton—the Court ruled that any
restrictions imposed by the state must be reasonable and cannot inhibit
a physician’s duty to provide medical care according to his or her profes¬
sional judgment. Thus, in Doe v. Bolton, the Court invalidated a number
of state restrictions, including two-doctor concurrence in the abortion
decision and committee approval of the decision.
Undoubtedly, legalization of contraception and abortion has pro¬
vided women with greater control over their sexual and reproductive
lives. However, legalization has not meant that contraception and abor¬
tion are equally available to all women. Who has greater reproductive
freedom and why?
To begin to answer these questions, we must first understand that
although the courts have declared the decision to bear children a per¬
sonal and private one, it is nevertheless a decision made in the context of
structural (i.e., social, political, and economic) constraints. One of the
most frequently cited examples of this is the national one-child family
policy of China, instituted in 1980 The policy was adopted because
population growth was inhibiting the country’s economic development
and threatening to keep its people in poverty. But one need not look as
far away as China to find structural constraints on reproductive freedom;
they are extensive in the United States as well.
One of these constraints is imposed by religion. The Catholic
\ Church, for example, forbids its members to use any form of artificial
contraception. In addition. Catholic authorities and others vehemently
oppose abortion, believing that life begins at conception and abortion is,
therefore, murder. Since surveys show that a majority of Catholics do not
support the Church’s teachings on contraception, and that many (more

than 50 percent in some surveys), including some members of religious
communities, take a pro-choice position on abortion. Catholics face con¬
siderable strain and difficulty in reconciling their loyalty to their church
with their desire to exercise reproductive freedom (U.S. Department of
Justice 1993a; Ferraro and Hussey 1990; Greeley 1990; Gallup and Castelli
1989).
Contraception and abortion are also political issues. Political con¬
servatives have argued, for instance, that allowing young people access to
contraceptives encourages immorality and premarital sex. They favor,
instead, teaching youth to abstain from sex, and they have taken an active
stand against the distribution of contraceptives to minors. At the same
time, public opinion polls show that our attitudes toward abortion are
fairly complex. In one 1992 general survey, for example, only 14 percent
of respondents nationwide expressed the opinion that abortion should be
completely outlawed. The majority (53 percent) said that abortion should
remain legal, but they favored some restrictions; 31 percent of respon¬
dents said that abortion should be unrestricted (U.S. Department of
Justice 1993a). Other surveys have shown that a majority of U.S. citizens
support a woman’s right to choose as provided by the Roev. decision.
However, a majority also favor a fetal viability test on women seeking
abortions who are five months pregnant or more, and most also favor
parental consent requirements for minors seeking abortions {Family Plan¬
ning Perspectives 1989; Gallup 1989a).
Despite these diverse (and frequently ambivalent) public opinions,
anti-abortion groups, such as the national Right to Life Gommittee and
Operation Rescue, have been somewhat successful in winning support for
their conservative position through intense lobbying of state and local
politicians. They also have taken to utilizing less orthodox means—some
of which are illegal—to prevent women from obtaining abortions and to
prevent doctors from performing them. These tactics have included dem¬
onstrations outside of clinics; blocking patients trying to enter clinics;
picketing outside of doctors’ homes; putting up “Wanted” posters in
doctors’ neighborhoods, identifying the doctors as murderers; stalking
doctors and members of their families; making threatening and harassing
phone calls to doctors and their neighbors; putting glue in the locks on
clinic doors; releasing butyric acid in clinics, which produces noxious
fumes that induce nausea, vomiting, dizziness, and headaches; and fire¬
bombing clinics (Sydell 1993). In 1993 alone, there were fifteen clinic
arsons and one clinic bombing. In addition, one physician was seriously
injured when he was shot by an anti-abortion activist; another physician
was murdered by an anti-abortion activist outside an abortion clinic
(Wines 1993). Although many anti-abortion activists have denounced the
use of violent tactics, a number of prominent group leaders see the
196 Chapter 7
violence as justified and Viave openly encouraged their followers to target

doctors and do “everything ... to torment these people” (quoted in Sy-
dell 1993:26; see also Johnson 1993).
Importantly, in November, 1993, Congress passed a bill that makes
it a federal offense to attack abortion clinics, to assault, threaten or
obstruct the people who use them, and to threaten or assault abortion
providers. Nevertheless, there remain numerous legal obstacles that pre¬
vent many women from exercising their right to an abortion. Although
the Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed the basic principles un¬
derlying B-oe V. Wade, and refused to overturn that decision, most of its
recent decisions have served in effect to rescind the reproductive rights
of some groups of women.
In 1992, for example, in a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey that states may require women seeking abortions to
listen to a presentation with an anti-abortion message and then delay the
abortion for twenty-four hours while they rethink their decision. While it
struck down a provision that required a married woman to inform her
husband of her decision to have an abortion, the Court upheld a provi¬
sion requiring that minors obtain parental consent before getting an
abortion. In the case of minors, the Court reaffirmed a position it took
in earlier decisions: as long as a state law allows for a judicial hearing for
minors who are unable to obtain their parents’ consent or who, for
various reasons, cannot tell their parents of their intent to get an abor¬
tion, required parental consent does not impose an “undue burden” and,
therefore, is constitutional.
President Clinton has lifted several restrictions on abortion imposed
during the Reagan and Bush administrations. In 1988, for instance, a
regulation was imposed that prohibited recipients of federal funds from
providing their clients with abortion referrals and counseling; the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld this regulation in 1991 {Rustv. Sullivan). After just
three days in office, however. President Clinton rescinded this regulation.
He also signed orders to permit abortions to be performed in military
hospitals if paid for with private funds, to restore aid to international
family-planning programs that provide abortions and abortion counsel¬
ing, and to permit federal funding of research that utilizes fetal tissue. In
addition, the president asked federal regulators to reassess prohibitions
on the importation and testing of the French drug RU 486, known as the
“abortion pill.” After ingestion, the drug causes fertilized eggs to be shed
with the uterine lining, thus inducing abortion in very early pregnancies
(see Klitsch 1989). As a result of the president’s request, plans for testing
RU 486 in clinical trials in the United States were announced in March
1993 {New York Times 18 March 1993:A18).
Nevertheless, in response to our question of which women have
greater reproductive freedom, we must reply that despite substantial
progress under the Clinton administration, the answer remains those who
are adults and who can afford it. First, it does not appear that restrictions
on minors will be lifted in the near future (Donovan 1992). Second,
although the Clinton administration has ordered states to use Medicaid
funds to pay for abortions for poor women who became pregnant as a
result of rape or incest, the Hyde Amendment remains in effect. The
Hyde Amendment, which was enacted in 1981, prohibits the use of fed¬
eral Medicaid funds to pay for abortions unless a pregnant woman’s life
is in danger.
We must also remember that since African Americans and other
racial minorities are disproportionately represented among the poor,
women of color, in particular, have seen their reproductive freedom
severely curtailed in recent years. In addition, while a large percentage of
poor women live in urban areas, many also live in rural regions of the
country. A recent survey of abortion providers found that women who live
in rural communities have more difficulty obtaining abortions than ur¬
ban women. By 1988, 93 percent of all rural counties had no abortion
provider (Henshaw and Van Vort 1992). Consequently, many rural
women must travel long distances to get an abortion, and this imposes
further hardship if they are poor. In addition, it must be noted that
throughout the country, the number of abortion providers has been
steadily declining over the last ten years, and one reason frequently cited
for this decline is the growing unwillingness of physicians to subject
themselves to the threats and harassment of anti-abortion activists in
exchange for relatively low pay (approximately $50 per abortion in some
cases) (Rimer 1993a; Henshaw and Van Vort 1992).
One of the consequences of this steady decrease in licensed abortion
providers is the growth in unlicensed abortion clinics where incompetent
doctors perform illegal abortions (e.g., third trimester abortions or abor¬
tions on minors who have not obtained parental or judicial consent).^
These clinics are also sought out by poor women because the fees are
sometimes less than half those of licensed providers, and by immigrant
women who do not speak English and who cannot navigate the main¬
stream health care system. The end product is an increase in women
harmed by botched abortions.
^Third trimester abortions constitute only one tenth of one percent of all abortions
performed each year in the United States. They are usually performed only when a
pregnant woman’s life or health is endangered. However, because of fetal testing
procedures now available, women sometimes learn during the last three months of
their pregnancies that they are carrying fetuses with severe deformities and, as a
result, they wish to terminate their pregnancies. In 1992, there were only three
physicians in the United States who would perform third trimester abortions in such
cases (Kolata 1992a).
198 Chapter 7
President Clinton has promised that all pregnancy-related services,

including abortion, will be covered under his national health plan. This
is likely to reduce much of the inequality in reproductive freedom pro¬
duced by the uneven availability of abortion services. However, the Clin¬
ton health plan may undergo substantial revision before it is passed, and
its final form will likely bear the scars of intense political battles and
negotiations. Meanwhile, it is important to recognize that reproductive
freedom is not only about contraception and abortion. Perhaps even
more controversial than abortion are some of the new reproductive tech¬
nologies designed to assist women in becoming pregnant rather than
preventing pregnancy.
New reproductive technologies It is estimated that 15 percent of couples

in the United States are unable to conceive or maintain a pregnancy
(Andrews 1989; Diamond 1988). In addition, there are women, married
and unmarried, who wish to have children, but for whom pregnancy and
childbirth pose severe health risks because these women have various
physical disabilities (Asch 1989). Post-menopausal women who want to
have a child are unable to become pregnant by conventional means.
Physically able single women may also wish to have children, but not to
marry or even enter into an intimate relationship with a man in order to
become pregnant. And finally, an increasing number of lesbian and gay
couples are expressing a desire to become parents. For members of
these groups, the new reproductive technologies represent a potential solu¬
tion to what was, less than two decades ago, basically an unsolvable problem.
Following the birth of the first “test tube” baby in 1978, reproductive
technology developed rapidly. Today, there are an array of options avail¬
able, with one of the most popular being in vitro (“test tube”) fertilization
(IVF). In the standard IVF procedure, a woman takes a prescribed dosage
of a fertility drug (commonly Pergonal) in order to stimulate the produc¬
tion of egg-containing follicles in her ovaries. The eggs are subsequently
removed and fertilized with the woman’s husband’s sperm. Some of the
embryos—typically three or four—that result from the laboratory fertili¬
zation are then implanted in the woman’s uterus. Any remaining embryos
are usually frozen.
There are a number of variations on this procedure. One that has
received considerable attention lately involves the use of eggs donated
(often anonymously) by a woman who, for a fee (usually $2,000), under¬
goes the drug regimen and egg “harvesting” procedure instead of the
woman who wishes to bear the child. This is the form of IVF used with
post-menopausal women who wish to become pregnant. In 1993, a fifty-
nine-year-old British woman gave birth to twins and in 1994, a sixty-one-
year-old Italian woman delivered a child—both had undergone FVT with
donated eggs fertilized by their husbands’ sperm.
Male infertility accounts for about 40 percent of fertility problems.

This, however, does not rule out the possibility of IVF, since eggs can be
fertilized using donor sperm, typically from a sperm bank. (Donated
sperm is also often used in artificial insemination, a less complex reproduc¬
tive strategy that has been successfully used by married and unmarried
heterosexual women and by lesbians.) Of course, the embryos themselves
may be donated. Recall that following a standard IVF, the leftover em¬
bryos are frozen. The couple to whom the embryos belong may opt to
keep them frozen for a specified period (and for a fee of about $1,000),
so that they might use them in the future (thawing costs about $2,500).
Alternatively, they may request that these embryos be destroyed, or they
may donate them to others with fertility problems. The latter rarely
occurs, however, and the vast majority of those seeking IVF wish to have
a child with at least some of their own genetic material. In 1990, there
were an estimated 23,865 frozen embryos being stored at 129 fertility
clinics across the United States.
A highly controversial reproductive strategy that involves either IVF
or artificial insemination is surrogacy. With surrogacy, a couple contracts
with a woman who agrees to undergo embryo implantation or artificial
insemination, and to carry the resulting pregnancy to term. The surro¬
gate, or gestational mother, also agrees to relinquish her parental rights
when the baby is born and give sole custody to its father (who is typically,
but not necessarily the biological father). Flis partner then legally adopts
the baby.
In 1992, it was estimated that 4,000 babies in the United States had
been born through surrogacy (Belkin 1992). In two recent instances, a
forty-two-year-old South Dakota woman and a fifty-three-year-old New
York woman served as surrogates for their adult children, thus giving
birth to their own grandchildren. Such cases are rare, however. In most
surrogacy arrangements, the gestational mother is a stranger who has
been recruited by a broker (the broker may be paid as much as $16,000
in advance). The couple contracting with the surrogate agree to pay all
of her expenses—medical, legal, living, necessary travel, and so on—re¬
lated to the pregnancy and birth and not covered by the surrogate’s
medical insurance. They also pay the surrogate a fee of $10,000 to
$20,000 after the baby is born. In addition, the surrogacy contract may
specify such items as a prorated fee for the surrogate in the event that she
miscarries, and her consent to an abortion if fetal abnormalities are
detected during the pregnancy (Belkin 1992).
Perhaps the best known surrogacy contract resulted in a lawsuit
known as the Baby Mc2ise. In this case, the gestational mother, Mary Beth
Whitehead Gould, changed her mind about relinquishing her parental
rights after the baby was born and refused to give William Stern, the
baby’s biological father, sole custody so that his wife, Elizabeth Stern,
200 Chapter 7
could then adopt the baby. In ultimately deciding this case, the Newjersey
Supreme Court, in February 1988, voided the surrogacy contract,
awarded the Sterns custody of the baby, and gave Ms. Whitehead Gould
visitation rights. Although the court did not outlaw surrogacy completely,
it ruled that surrogacy arrangements could be legal only if there was no
fee paid to the gestational mother and if she retained the right to change
her mind about giving up the baby after birth.^
Following the Baby M decision, bills were introduced in every state
to regulate or outlaw surrogacy, but as of mid-1992, only eighteen states
had enacted legislation. Most of these laws contain provisions similar to
those specified by the Newjersey Supreme Court in the Baby M case, but
the laws do not appear to be enforced in many states, and individuals and
their lawyers frequently find loopholes that allow them to go forward with
legally questionable surrogacy arrangements (Belkin 1992). Moreover,
provisions that allow the gestational mother to change her mind after the
baby’s birth may not be applied by the courts in some surrogacy cases. In
1990, for example, a California court denied parental rights to a surro¬
gate mother who had no genetic relationship to the baby she had agreed
to bear. In this case, the egg had been taken from Crispina Calvert and
the sperm from her husband Mark Calvert; after in vitro fertilization, the
embryo was surgically implanted in Annk Johnson, who had agreed to
carry the child to term and then relinquish custody to the Calverts. Like
Mary Beth Whitehead Gould, though, Ms. Johnson changed her mind
when the baby was born, but in this case the judge ruled that Ms. Johnson
was similar to a foster parent: “her womb was little more than a home in
which she had sheltered and fed the legal offspring of the genetic par¬
ents” (Mydans 1990a:6E). This case raised concerns among many ob¬
servers, including many feminists, that with the widespread availability of
reproductive technologies, women’s bodies could come to be seen as
“interchangeable fetal containers,” with little regard for the emotional
attachment that a gestational mother may develop for the fetus she is
carrying (Blankenship et al. 1993; Mydans 1990a; Andrews 1989).
Indeed, the new reproductive technologies have ethicists engaged
in heated debates. Among the questions they are addressing are: Vô
should decide the fate of frozen embryos stored at fertility clinics, espe¬
cially if one or both of the biological parents dies? If a couple divorces,
who should be awarded custody of the embryos (see, for example. Smoth¬
ers 1992)? Should an age limit be imposed for pregnancy, even though
men well into their seventies have fathered children without interference
^Shanley (1993) points out that the decision hy the court to prohibit payment for
surrogacy angers many feminists, even those who oppose surrogacy, because such a
position devalues women’s reproductive labor much the same way it devalues
women’s household labor. Both are viewed as unpaid, noneconomic labors of love.
from the medical community or government? Does a woman’s right to

bear a child take precedence over society’s interest in ensuring that a
child is raised by “able” parents? Do fetuses have rights independent of
their parents? What is a “parent” anyway?
Answering such questions is not likely to get easier as scientific
“progress” in reproductive technologies continues to expand the bounda¬
ries of the possible. In 1993, for example, researchers at George Washing¬
ton University announced that they had cloned human embryos.
Although all of the embryos were genetically abnormal, “improvement”
in the procedure raises the possibility that a couple could give birth to
identical twins with each twin being born several years apart. Perhaps if
they don’t like the first child, they might opt to have the cloned embryos
destroyed. Or, since embryos can be frozen indefinitely, a woman could
give birth to her own identical twin (Kolata 1993). Consider, too, the
implications of a 1994 announcement by a scientist in Scotland that
within three years it may be possible to transplant the ovaries of aborted
female fetuses into adult infertile women so that they could bear children.
As one ethicist responded, “Should we be creating children whose [bio¬
logical] mother is a dead fetus?” (quoted in Kolata 1994:A16).
But while ethicists have been grappling with many of the thorny
issues raised by the new reproductive technologies, the federal govern¬
ment for the most part has taken a hands-off approach toward regulation.
In 1992, Congress passed legislation to establish federal standards for
fertility clinics, but these focus primarily on truth in advertising by the
clinics in terms of their success rates. How “success” is measured has
varied from clinic to clinic, but if one uses the number of deliveries per
I\T attempt, the national average is below 15 percent (Cowan 1992;
Rothman 1992). Given that each IVF attempt costs about $8,000, a clinic’s
success rate is valuable information for the “consumer.”
The new reproductive technologies have also raised public health
concerns. For one thing, IVF has dramatically increased the number of
multiple-birth babies (i.e., twins, triplets, etc.) born in the United States
and abroad. Recall that several embryos are implanted in a woman’s
uterus in each IVF attempt. Sometimes, more than one embryo matures,
resulting in multiple births. Although physicians sometimes suggest “fetal
reduction”—that is, the selective abortion of several fetuses—to make
pregnancy and delivery safer and more manageable, many women and
their partners do not feel comfortable with such a practice. However,
multiple fetuses increase the likelihood of complications during preg¬
nancy and delivery. Multiple-birth babies are almost always premature
and, therefore, have low birthweights. This in turn increases the prob¬
ability of other medical problems that require extensive and expensive
treatment and care (Rosenthal 1992). At the same time, little research has
been undertaken to investigate the long-term health implications of vari-
202 Chapter 7
ous reproductive technologies on the women who undergo them. Some

observers, for example, have asked whether the heavy drug regimen
necessary for IVF poses an increased cancer risk for women. The answer,
however, awaits the results of systematic research (Rothman 1992).
Clearly, the issues surrounding the new reproductive technologies
pose some difficult dilemmas, not only forjudges, legislators, physicians,
and ethicists, but also for the individuals who are utilizing these technolo¬
gies to have children. It must be kept in mind, however, that for many
people who wish to have a baby but cannot, these issues are moot; they
simply cannot afford any of these alternatives. We have already noted the
steep costs of the new reproductive technologies. Few insurance plans
cover even part of the expense. But even more conventional strategies,
such as adoption, may be prohibitively expensive for many. The costs of
adoption are estimated at between $5,000 and $12,000 (Cole 1987), but
private adoptions are usually more costly.
In short, social class once again plays a major role in determining
who will and who will not bear children. It is sadly ironic that poor women
and women of color are one and a half times more likely to experience
infertility, but because of the expense, are the least likely to be able to
utilize any of the reproductive strategies we have discussed here (Roth¬
man 1992). Many people are concerned that poor women who can have
children and are in desperate need of income will be vulnerable to
exploitation by wealthier couples who are seeking to have children. In¬
deed, although some feminists see the new reproductive technologies as
potentially liberating for women by giving them greater control over the
reproductive process, others ai'e deeply concerned that such technologies
turn children into commodities and may also give rise to a “breeder class”
of women composed primarily of poor women who rent their bodies
to the wealthy (Shanley 1993; Raymond 1990; Rothman 1989; Dia¬
mond 1988). The debate, even among feminists, is unlikely to be resolved
soon.
What is more certain is that the new reproductive technologies will
continue to contribute to the growing diversification of family forms in
this country. Let us now turn our attention to an examination of the
various types of families and intimate relationships that are already com¬
mon in our society.
GENDER, INTIMACY, AND POWER
\ The origin of the word family has important implications for the nature
of contemporary intimate relationships. Family derives from the Latin
wordmeaning “household servant or slave.” This notion of family
was sanctioned historically by custom and law throughout most of the
Western world, for a man s family—his wife, children, and slaves—were,

like his material possessions, defined as his property. His legal obligation
was to provide their economic support at a standard he saw fit in ex¬
change for their service to him.
Certainly, few of us today think of families in these terms, but we may
discern in some contemporary intimate relationships remnants of this
supposed bygone theme. We can see these remnants best by examining
the institution of heterosexual marriage, and so our discussion of contem¬
porary family forms will begin with this, the more traditional of the
intimate relationships we will consider.
Heterosexual Marriages
As in the past, our government continues to regulate marriage and to
define the rights and responsibilities of spouses. Every state has a set of
laws specifying who may marry in terms of age, sex, and health require¬
ments. In addition, the states formulate the conditions of the marriage
contract. Like any contract, the marriage contract is a legally binding
agreement, but unlike most other contracts, most of its conditions cannot
be changed or negotiated by the two parties involved—only the state has
that prerogative. In fact, the contracting parties rarely even review the
conditions of the agreement before entering into it. The marriage con¬
tract is imposed, rather than negotiated.
Although there is tremendous variation among the fifty states as to
the specific conditions of their marriage contracts, several common as¬
sumptions underlie these contracts. Interestingly, these assumptions ring
of that original meaning of the word family. One of the most important
assumptions is that the husband is the head of the family. Although a
number of U.S. Supreme Court cases decided during the 1970s and 1980s
overturned state laws that impose the sex-based hierarchy in marriage
implied by this assumption, several rules lemain that strip women of
status and individual identity upon marriage. For instance, while women
are no longer required to take their husbands’ surnames when they
marry (see also chapter 6), they still may not be legally able to give their
children their name. As Lindgren and Taub (1993:336) explain, “Some
states have explicit provisions allowing parents to give children their
mother’s surname, but problems arise when parents do not agree.” If the
courts adhere to common law principles, they give the father the right to
name the children, “as part of that system, wherein he was sole legal
representative of the marriage, its property, and its children” (quoted in
Lindgren and Taub 1993:336).
Similarly, in most states, the husband continues to retain the right
to decide domicile (place of residence). In fact, in the majority of states,
women are automatically assigned their husbands’ domicile upon mar-
204 Chapter 7
\
riage, even if they live apart from their husbands because of their careens
or to attend school. There are several significant consequences if a
woman’s husband’s domicile is different from her premarital domicile:
for example, the woman must re-register to vote; she may lose the right
to attend a university in her own state as a resident student and, thus, have
to pay higher tuition as an out-of-state student; and she may be unable to
run for public office in her home state (Lindgren and Taub 1993; Kay
1988). Exceptions have been made by some courts and state legislators;
one court, for instance, ruled that if the wife is the chief breadwinner, she
may determine her domicile (Kay 1988). “As a general matter, however,
courts have yet to recognize the right of married women to choose their
own domicile” (Lindgren and Taub 1993:336).
In short, marital relations are fundamentally power relations—usu¬
ally the power of husbands over wives. As we noted previously, when we
speak about power, we are essentially speaking about the ability to influ¬
ence others so that they do what we want them to do whether they want
to do it or not. It is the ability to get one’s own way. When we think of
marriages, however, we think of partnerships, not power struggles. We
like to think that each spouse has equal input and, if there is a disagree¬
ment, the two compromise. To what extent does available research sup¬
port such a view?
In answering this question, we are immediately confronted with
another: how do we measure power in intimate relationships such as
marriages? A strategy developed in 1960 by sociologists Robert Blood and
Donald Wolfe looks at couples’ decision making in order to determine
which partner has more power. Blood and Wolfe asked more than 900
wives who had the final say in such decisions as where to go on vacation,
what car to buy, how much money to spend on food, whether the wife
should get a job, where to live, or what doctor to consult. In general, their
findings showed husbands to be more powerful than wives in that it was
they who made most family decisions even though they usually talked
matters over with their wives. There were conditions, however, under
which this tended to vary. More specifically, the spouse who brought more
“resources” to the marriage—for example, income, social status, or edu¬
cation—was likely to be more powerful. Typically, this was the husband,
but Blood and Wolfe discovered that as a wife’s resources increased, she
gained leverage relative to her husband.
Although Blood and Wolfe’s study was conducted more than thirty
years ago, their findings have been substantiated by more recent research.
For example, in their 1983 study of more than 12,000 couples in the
United States, Blumstein and Schwartz found that in most cases, the
partner who earns more money tends to be the more pov/erful as mea¬
sured by decision making. Like Blood and Wolfe, the researchers report
that at least among married (and cohabiting) heterosexual couples, the

more women earn relative to their partners, the more power they acquire
in the relationship; the full-time ^homemaker tends to be relatively power¬
less. One important exception to this general rule occurs among couples
who adhere to the belief that men should be the primary family bread¬
winners. In these relationships, men are the more powerful regardless of
the earnings of either partner. The prevailing logic in such relationships
is that if it is the man s role to be the family provider, then he should have
the final say in most decisions. In fact, Thompson and Walker (1989)
report that among couples in which the wives earn more than the hus¬
bands, most exhibit traditional attitudes and behaviors with respect to
men’s and women’s roles in marriage. Similarly, Pyke (1994) argues that
a significant intervening variable in determining women’s power in the
marital relationship is the meaning con^Xes give to women’s paid employ¬
ment and unpaid household labor. For example, in her study of women
in second marriages, Pyke found that some women, upon remarriage,
moved out of the paid labor force into the role of full-time homemaker,
but simultaneously increased their marital power. This is because during
their first marriages, the women were employed in low-paying, dead-end
jobs and the economic resources they brought to the marriage were
devalued by their husbands. Their paid employment was not a source of
marital power, but rather a source of exploitation and domination by
their first husbands. Consequently, they viewed their withdrawal from the
labor market upon remarriage as an indication of their greater marital
power and of the increased support of their new spouses. The value their
second husbands attached to their unpaid work in the home was evi¬
denced by their husbands’ expressions of gratitude to their wives for this
work and by powersharing between the marital partners.
Such findings alert us to the fact that there is more to marital power
than can be discerned by simply asking questions about family decision
making. Indeed, this method of measuring marital power has been amply
criticized on this and related grounds. For one thing, the decision-making
measure tends to treat all decisions as if they carry equal weight. But as
Allan (1985) points out, some decisions must be made fairly regularly,
whereas others may be made only once or twice in a lifetime. Obviously,
such decisions vary in their consequences and in their import.
A second criticism centers around the nature of power itself. Power
includes not only authority in decision making, but also the right to
delegate responsibility for certain decisions to others. For instance, Blum-
stein and Schwartz (1983) found that among the married couples they
surveyed, wives frequently made the decisions about the purchase of
expensive items, such as furniture for the home. However, they also
discovered that in most cases, the wives were acting as agents for the
couple; the husbands assigned the wives this responsibility. The words of
one husband they interviewed illustrates this nicely:
We don’t argue about money because she pays all the bills. I don t have
to worry about it, do I? I don’t see the bills so I don’t worry about them,
so it’s a copout on my part. I let her worry about them. . . . I m giving her
all the responsibility and she enjoys it, apparently, it gives her a sense of
power. It’s beautiful.
As Blumstein and Schwartz (1983:65) accurately conclude, this husband

“regards the delegation of control to his wife as giving her ^ false sense of
power” (emphasis added).
A third related criticism can be summed up in the old adage, “Actions
speak louder than words.” More precisely, critics have pointed out that
some social practices are so taken-for-granted, so deeply embedded in ideol¬
ogy and family structure, that decisions do not have to be made about
them. Rather, they are automatically carried out and rarely questioned
(Allan 1985). From this perspective, more can be learned about power in
marriages by observing the division of labor in the home and who bene¬
fits from it than from asking couples who decides what. Maintaining that
this criticism has considerable merit, we turn now to a discussion of the
division of household labor among heterosexual married couples.
Gender and the politics of housework While in graduate school, one of

the authors of this text was part of a research team working on a project
that involved telephone interviewing. One of the last questions asked in
each interview was, “What kind of work do you do?” She was startled by
the number of women who replied, “1 don’t work; I’m just a housewife.”
What is so striking in such a response is that despite the fact that
housework is socially and economically necessary work, it is not consid¬
ered real work, not even by the women who have primary responsibility
for doing it. First, housework is unspecialized work—covering, by some
estimates, more than eighty different tasks—but it is also repetitive work.
By repetitive we mean that housework is never fully finished in the tradi¬
tional sense of the word; no sooner is a chore completed than it must be
done again. This is because housework involves production for immedi¬
ate consumption. There is, though, another sense in which housework
never ends:
Unlike industrialized workers who sell their labor power for a fixed
period of time, the housewife cannot watch the clock in the sure
knowledge that work will soon be over. There is no formal end to the
working day (Allan 1985:35).
Homemakers, then, rarely get time off, not even holidays—^who, for
instance, cooks those large holiday meals? What is more, homemakers
tend to be on twenty-four-hour call: who usually gets up in the middle of

the night to tend to a sick or frightened child?
There are several other reasons housework is not typically viewed as
real work. One is that it is intertwined with love and feelings of caring.
Another is that it is privatized. We see people leaving their houses to go to
work; we see them in public on the job. But housework is done in isolation
in the home, and much of it is done while other family members are
elsewhere (e.g., in the labor force or at school). A third reason that
housework is not considered “real” work is because it is unpaid. In a
society like ours, individuals’ status—how much persons are valued by
others as well as by themselves—typically is measured by how much
money they make. Homemakers do not receive wages in exchange for
their labor; rather, they are “provided for” by a family wage earner. “Their
work is not worth money, is therefore valueless, is therefore not even real
work” (Benston 1969:282).
The absence of a rigid hourly schedule and the privatized nature of
housework do give it an advantage over many jobs outside the home in
that they afford homemakers a fair degree of autonomy. It is this freedom
that homemakers report as one aspect of housework they appreciate most
(Doyal 1990b; Thompson and Walker 1989; Allan 1985). In addition,
most homemakers derive some satisfaction from meeting the needs of
those they love (Thompson and Walker 1989). Still, the homemaker
status is a devalued one, and the actual tasks that constitute much house¬
work are menial, monotonous, stressful, and often unappreciated (Doyal
1990b; Thompson and Walker 1989).
Of course, whenever complaints about housework are raised, some¬
one is usually quick to point out how much easier it is today compared
with the past; after all, contemporary homemakers have a vast array of
labor-saving appliances at their disposal. Interestingly, however, research
indicates that the contemporary homemaker spends about as much time
on household chores as the 1780s homemaker did (Ogden 1986; Cowan
1984). This is largely because of two factors. First, our standard of living
has risen dramatically, and with it, so have our expectations with regard
to the comfort and cleanliness of our household environment. To this we
may also add that we have become a society of consumers. For example,
the average family dwelling today is much larger than that of two centu¬
ries ago, with the consequence that there are more rooms to clean.
Within its walls, we find far more personal possessions, all of which we
expect to be well maintained—along with the house and ourselves. Thus,
household chores have perhaps become more sophisticated over the last
two hundred years, but they have not seemed to lessen or to grow less
time-consuming.
Historian Ruth Schwartz Cowan (1984) offers a second reason why
housework remains demanding: women’s chores in the home have mul-
208 Chapter 7
tiplied over the years, whereas men’s chores have largely been industrial¬
ized. In eighteenth century households, for example, wives cooked meals
and baked bread, while husbands grew and milled the gram, butchered
the meat, and cleaned the hearth. Today, we rely on commercially pro¬
duced food, a convenience that benefits both husbands and wives, but
wives retain responsibility for cooking and now have the added task of
cleaning the oven. • • u
Lest we be misunderstood, our intent here is not to romanticize the
past, nor are we suggesting that families would be better off if we could
turn back the clock. Rather, our point is that housework, despite techno¬
logical advances and modern convenience, continues to be arduous and
time-consuming work, and in most households, more of women s time
than men’s time is consumed by it. For the most part, housework contin¬
ues to be viewed as women’s work, and the division of labor within the
home—in terms of time spent doing household chores and the types of
chores done by each partner—is clearly gendered.
Consider first that among heterosexual married couples, the num¬
ber of hours wives and husbands spend doing housework is significantly
different. Studies conducted for more than a decade have shown that
wives may contribute as much as five times as many hours per week to the
completion of household chores than tHeir husbands do (Shelton and
John 1993; Levant et al. 1987; Hartmann 1981). This may not seem so
unfair if spouses are exchanging services according to the traditional
marriage contract—she does the housework and child care, he works in
the paid labor force and financially supports the family—but we have
already noted that this model applies to only a minority of contemporary
families in the United States. Most married women today are employed
outside the home. Is the division of household labor in these households
more egalitarian?
Recent research indicates that there are differences in the amount
of time spouses in two-earner households spend on housework compared
to those in marriages in which only'the husband is in the paid labor force.
However, significant gender differences in the division of household
labor persist. According to Shelton (1992), from the mid-1970s through
the 1980s, the number of hours women and men spent in the paid labor
force converged more than the number of hours each spent doing house¬
work. Moreover, the slight convergence in men’s and women’s housework
hours that did occur during this period was primarily due to a decrease
in the number of hours employed women spent on housework rather
than an increase in employed men’s housework time. Shelton’s (1992)
analysis revealed that employed women spend on average thirty-five hours
per week doing housework, compared with an average of only twenty-one
hours per week by employed men, although she adds that these are
conservative findings since they do not include time spent on child care.
Nevertheless, this gendered time gap in the division of household labor

indicates that employed wives shoulder a double work load, or they work
what sociologist Arlie Hochschild (1989) has called the second shift: they
are wage earners and they continue to do a significantly greater share of
housework as well.
Simply looking at the relative number of hours husbands and wives
spend on housework, however, reveals only one dimension of the gen¬
dered di\ision of household labor. It is also the case that the types of
chores that women and men do in the home are different. Although
husbands may do about one-third of household chores, these usually are
not daily chores. Wives do most of the daily chores, such as cooking and
routine cleaning (Shelton 1992; Hochschild 1989). A major difference,
then, betwêen women’s work in the home and men’s work in the home
lies not only in the relative contributions each spouse makes to house¬
work, but also in the amount of control they have over when they do the
work. The jobs women do in the home are those that tend to bind them
to a fixed schedule, whereas men’s household chores are more discretion¬
ary and are done less regularly. The housework done by husbands is also
less repetitive than the housework done by wives. Thus, for example, most
wives prepare their families’ meals, which must be done at least once or
twice a day every day, whereas husbands typically take responsibility for
such chores as car repair, “do-it-yourself’ home repairs, and mowing the
lawn (Shelton 1992; Coltrane 1989; Hochschild 1989; Thompson and
Walker 1989).
But what of all the attention that has been given recently to the
supposedly increasing number of “househusbands” and “Mr. Mom’s” in
the United States, and the greater egalitarianism in the division of house¬
hold labor between spouses in contemporary marriages (e.g.. Fleck
1983)? A careful review of available evidence indicates that “househus-
bandry” is not common nor is it even growing in popularity. Many “house-
husbands,” it appears, are either temporarily out of work or, like many
women, are actually wage earners who have offices in their homes (Mi-
rande 1991; Johnson and Firebaugh 1985; Beer 1983). In addition, the
research we have reviewed so far certainly does not suggest that the
traditional division of household labor between heterosexual married
partners is on the wane. Instead, what the research indicates is that in the
majority of cases, husbands are expressing a greater willingness to “help”
their wives with the housework, but that the prevailing attitude among
both women and men is still that housework is primarily women’s respon¬
sibility regardless of whatever other demands they have on their time
(Wilkie 1993; Ferree and McQuillan 1992; Shelton 1992). In fact, Kane
and Sanchez (1992) have found that men tend to be more critical of
gender inequality in the workplace than they are of gender inequality in
the home. They argue that this is because women’s entry into the paid
210 Chapter 7
labor force is less threatening to male dominance especially, we may

add, if employed women remain largely segregated in low-paying, low-
status jobs (see chapter 8)—than is the prospect of sharing household
responsibilities (see also Wilkie 1993). Men have more to lose from an
egalitarian division of household labor, and most strongly resist doing
tasks that they consider “feminine” (Hochschild 1989; Thompson and
Walker 1989). Of course, there are marriages that are relatively egalitar¬
ian, with a more even division of household labor between the spouses.
Interestingly, in these marriages, one of the most important factors influ¬
encing an equal division of household labor is husbands and wives
beliefs that housework is not “women’s work, but rather something
family members do for one another (Coltrane 1989).
Researchers have suggested a number of additional factors that may
influence the extent to which the division of household labor is more or
less egalitarian, but the empirical evidence tends to be inconsistent and
often contradictory. With regard to age, for instance, some studies indi¬
cate that older husbands spend more time on housework than younger
husbands, but other studies show just the opposite (Thompson and
Walker 1989). In Hochschild’s (1989) study, for example, the spouses
were in their late twenties and early thirties. Brubaker (1991) and Szino-
vacz (1989) report that the division of household labor between older
spouses is a reflection of the division of household labor earlier in their
marriages. Given that both Kane and Sanchez (1992) and Dennehy and
Mortimer (1992) discovered rather traditional attitudes toward the divi¬
sion of household labor among their young male respondents, it may be
some time before gender equality in the home prevails.
Social class and racial variations in the gendered division of house¬
hold labor have also been studied. While it has been reported that higher-
income husbands do more housework than lower-income husbands,
other studies indicate that the reverse may be true (Stacey 1990; Berardo
et al. 1987). Thompson and Walker (1989), in fact, maintain that high-in-
come husbands are the least likely to participate in housework when their
wives are also employed. Although the research on nonwhite couples is
limited, some studies show that minority husbands are significantly more
likely than white husbands to share housework with their wives (Hossain
and Roopnarine 1993). Other researchers, however, have been unable to
substantiate this finding (Wilson et al. 1990; Thompson and Walker
1989). Barnes (1985) reports that among African-American couples, mid¬
dle-class husbands were most likely to share housework with their wives,
although not equally. In her study, African-American husbands in both
the highest and lowest educational, occupational and income categories
tended to view housework as demeaning to their manhood. Hartmann
(1981), however, found that neither social class nor race and ethnicity
had a significant impact on the number of hours devoted to housework.
even among full-time homemakers. It does appear that as a wife’s own

earnings increase, the amount of time she spends on housework de¬
creases, but as we have already noted, this is not necessarily because her
husband is doing more. Instead, she is in a better financial position to
hire someone—usually a poor, minority woman (see chapter 8)—to do the
housework for her (Shelton and John 1993; Thompson and Walker 1989;
Bernardo et al. 1987).
One factor that has consistently been shown to impede an egalitar¬
ian division of household labor between spouses is the presence of chil¬
dren in the household. However, before we consider the impact of child
care, let’s discuss some of the consequences that an unequal division of
household labor has on women and men. First, Shelton (1992) points out
that women’s double work load lessens the amount of time women have
for leisure activities. In fact, Shelton discovered that while men tended to
spend their leisure time watching television or listening to the radio,
many women’s leisure activities—for example, canning and preserving
fruits and vegetables, baking—could actually be classified as housework.
In addition to a reduction in leisure time, women also must find ways
to coordinate household and employment responsibilities in ways that
men do not. The work world, as we will see in chapter 8, is still structured
around the traditional nuclear family ideology with its wife/homemaker-
husband/ provider dichotomy. Although the majority of married women
are now in the paid labor force, employers, husbands and others continue
to view their primary role as that of homemaker; the dominant role for
men is breadwinner. Consequently, as Shelton (1992:153) argues, men’s
relative freedom from household labor affords them greater employment
opportunities, while conversely women’s greater responsibility in the
home often constrains their employment opportunities—or is cited as
Justification for employers’ imposed constraints on women’s advance¬
ment (see chapter 8). This, in turn, helps to preserve inequality between
spouses, since it denies women an important resource for equalizing
power in the marriage. Ironically, the employed wife frequently finds
herself precariously balancing her double work load rather than the
distribution of power in her marriage: if she spends too much time on
her paid job, she may experience guilt or complaints from family mem¬
bers about her neglect of them, but if she devotes too much attention to
her responsibilities at home she risks becoming trapped in a relatively
unrewarding low-paying job or losing her job altogether (Shelton 1992;
Vannoy-Hiller and Philliber 1989; Barnett and Baruch 1988). As Pyke
(1994) points out, employment can be more a source of oppression than
power for some married women.
As we previously noted, the presence of children also appears to
have a negative effect on an egalitarian division of household labor.
There remains a strong belief that since women bear children, they
212 Chapter 1
should also be children’s primary caregivers. Childrearing, though, im¬

poses severe limitations on one’s ability to pursue other activities, espe¬
cially paid employment outside the home. Yet, as we will see next and
again in chapter 8, this too is viewed as a problem for women, for both
women and men.
Caregiving Despite the widespread belief that the birth of a child brings
marriage partners closer together, sociologists, as well as marriage and
family counselors, have learned from their research that the addition of
children to a household increases stress and lowers marital satisfaction
(Larson 1988; Cox 1985). If we think about it for a moment, we can see
that this observation is really not puzzling. Although new parents are
typically excited about the birth of their baby, they are rarely prepared for
the level of disruption that a baby causes in their lives. For example, their
sleep is frequently interrupted and lessened. There is, by necessity, less
spontaneity in the relationship and less time to pursue outside interests.
Financial pressures increase, as do household chores and, as the couple
becomes immersed in parental roles, the partner/lover roles get
“squeezed” (Cowan and Cowan 1992).
But just as we have seen that within every marriage there are really
two marriages, his and hers (Bernard 1972), so too we find that men and
women experience parenthood differently. Most men today are present
at the birth of their children, but they continue to be significantly less
involved than women in primary child care (e.g., bathing, changing
clothes, feeding). This is not to say that their involvement in such activi¬
ties has not increased in recent years. In the early 1970s, for instance,
researchers reported that fathers spent on average about one hour per
week taking sole responsibility for child care compared with forty hours
per week spent by mothers (Snarey 1993). In contrast, more recent
research shows that women’s increased participation in the labor force
has dramatically altered these figures. In households in which both
spouses are employed, the amount of time fathers assume sole responsi¬
bility for child care is more than double that of fathers in households in
which the husband/father is the sole wage earner (Crouter et al. 1987).
In 1991, the U.S. Census Bureau reported that in 20 percent of house¬
holds with preschool-age children whose mothers are employed, fathers
provide sole care while the mother is at work (Chira 1993a; see also
chapter 8). Fathers today also are expected to be more nurturant. Never¬
theless, the so-called new fathers, who are as equally involved in the care
of their children as are their wives are still relatively rare (Snarey 1993).
The division of child care responsibilities between mothers and
fathers shifts somewhat as children get older. Fathers tend to be least
involved in primary care when their children are infants. They become
more involved when the children are around eighteen months old and
walking and talking. Their greatest level of involvement occurs during the
middle childhood period, when the children are five to fifteen years old.
Even then, however, the time fathers spend with their children is more
oriented to recreation or academics—playing, reading to them, teaching
them something—than to primary caregiving (Snarey 1993; Thompson
and Walker 1989). It is mothers, even those who are employed full-time,
who still provide the majority of primary care needed by their children in
addition to caring for their husbands and their homes. Significantly,
studies show that the pattern is consistently found in relatively egalitarian
households as well as traditional ones. In fact, there is evidence that
egalitarian marriages tend to become more traditional in terms of role
division once children are born (Cox 1985; Eiduson et al. 1982; but for
an exception, see Coltrane 1989).
Some theorists have argued that women’s greater role in parenting
is a product of a natural or biologically based predisposition toward
caregiving—an updated version of the old notion of the “maternal in¬
stinct.” But while the findings from research that test this theory are
provocative (see, for example, Rossi 1984; 1977), they do not provide
conclusive evidence for an innate biological basis to caregiving behaviors
and abilities. Other social scientists maintain that women’s primary re¬
sponsibility for caregiving derives from gender socialization. That is, from
the time they are young children, women are trained—through, depend¬
ing on one’s perspective, identification, modeling, or the gender schemas
and metamessages of their environment—to be caregivers (see chapter 4).
Certainly, socialization plays an important part in reproducing the
gendered dhision of caregiving responsibilities. In our society, and in
many others, social norms traditionally have conveyed the message that
parenting is synonymous with mothering; fathers have been, at best,
marginal participants in the parenting process. In fact, when fathers are
actively involved in the primary care of their children, it is said that they
are “mothering” the children; “fathering” a child refers to the act of
insemination. As Cohen (1987:72) maintains, “Men’s [and women’s]
notions of appropriate role behaviors are produced and then reinforced
or challenged by a culture that is still less than wholehearted in embrac¬
ing the idea of family-oriented men.”
This is an important point because it recognizes that while attitudes
may change, particular social arrangements may constrain attempts to
alter behavior. There is evidence, for instance, that some men welcome
greater involvement in the care of their children, but that the structure
of work in our society makes this difficult, if not impossible, for most
(Weisner et al. 1994; Snarey 1993; Shelton 1992; Cohen 1987). As we will
see again in chapter 8, and have mentioned already, the occupational
structure of our society operates on the ideology that men are the eco¬
nomic providers of families, while women are the caretakers. Men are
214 Chapter 7
expected to invest time and energy in their jobs, while women are ex¬
pected to do so in their families. The federal Family and Medical Leave
Act now requires companies with more than fifty employees to provide
women and men in their employ with up to twelve weeks unpaid leave,
with no loss of seniority, after childbirth or adoption or to care for a sick
family member. Nonetheless, the pervasive view of men’s role as provider
makes the majority of employers continue to express the view that male
employees should not take family leaves (Chira 1993b). Indeed, if one
accepts the traditional gendered model of employment and parenting,
there is no need for family leaves, child care facilities, or equal pay for
women and men.
This latter factor is particularly relevant, for even in two-earner
households, few families could afford to have fathers assume full-time
caregiving responsibility given that women, on average, earn only about
76 percent of what men earn (see chapter 8). As Erikson and Gecas
(1990:125) report, although there is a positive relationship between fa¬
thers’ level of education and their participation in child care, if high
educational achievement translates into a high-paying job, fathers’ in¬
volvement in the care of their children declines considerably. “[W]hen
push comes to shove, it seems that the objective circumstances of income
and work commitment will have the strongest impact on the actual behav¬
ior of fathers.”
This gendered division of caregiving has advantages and disadvan¬
tages for both women and men. On one hand, women reap the benefits
of developing close bonds with their children, and of watching and
contributing to their children’s growth and development. These are ex¬
periences most mothers find gratifying and emotionally fulfilling. At the
same time, through their ties to their children, and through ties to their
own parents and siblings, women are also kinkeepers in families; that is,
they link the generations within the families and, therefore, are instru¬
mental in preserving family cohesion. Kranichfeld (1987:48) has identi¬
fied this kinkeeping role as a source of family power in that as kinkeepers
“women do not just change the behavior of others, they shape whole gen¬
erations of families” (see also di Leonardo 1992; Collins 1990; Stacey 1990).
However, this almost exclusive responsibility for child rearing and
caregiving also denies women much personal autonomy. Housework can
at least be postponed, but a child’s needs must be met immediately. Child
rearing, then, imposes severe limits on a mother’s time and ability to
pursue other interests, such as paid employment, and this, in turn, we
have noted, often lowers her power in the marital relationship. The
woman who mothers full-time may also come to feel isolated and trapped
by her caregiving responsibilities, which helps to explain why full-time
mothers, particularly those with preschool children, often report bouts of
severe depression (Doyal 1990b). But women who combine mothering
with paid employment, either by choice or necessity, may experience role

strain or overload, even though they may simultaneously be proud of
their accomplishments and satisfied with their work (Crosby 1991).
Also noteworthy is the stress that can stem from the kinkeeper role.
For instance, women’s mid-life options may be constrained because their
adult children need assistance with their own households and families, or
because elderly parents need care (Gerson et al. 1984). As Thorne (1992)
points out, it is now common practice for hospitals to discharge patients
earlier than they used to, under the assumption that someone at home—
typically a woman—will be available to provide care. Ninety-five percent
of the elderly and 90 percent of the disabled elderly live at home and rely
on family members to provide virtually all of their care. Recent research
shows that women are 75 percent of caregivers to elderly family members.
More than half are between the ages of thirty-five and sixty-four with a
median age of forty-five. More importantly perhaps, 42 percent are em¬
ployed full-time and an additional 13 percent are employed part-time; 39
percent still have their own children in their househoMs. This responsi¬
bility adds significantly to women’s caregiving burden; as one study
pointed out, women now spend an average of seventeen years of their
lives caring for their children and eighteen years assisting their elderly
parents (Montgomery and Datwyler 1990; New York 26 January 1989;
Older Women’s League 1989; Sanchez-Ayendez 1986). Lee et al. (1993)
maintain that the sex differential in caregiving to elderly parents is largely
a function of the fact that the elderly prefer their caregivers to be the
same sex as themselves. Therefore, since elderly women outnumber el¬
derly men, the caregiving burden is more likely to be assumed by adult
daughters or another female relative or friend. Wliile this may be the
case, we also cannot overlook the fact that in our society caregiving
responsibilities continue to be gendered and to fall disproportionately on
women’s shoulders not because of the sheer number of elderly who need
care, but because of gender norms and the social structural conditions
that perpetuate and reinforce them.
Men, on the other hand, escape many of the burdens of family care.
They are relieved of the drudgery and the time constraints so that they
may join the labor force to financially support their families. Besides the
provider role, parenting for most men is typically limited to occasionally
playing with and disciplining the children. But if fathers are freer to give
their time and energy to their jobs, the trade-off is social and emotional
distance from their children. One study, for example, reported that 50
percent of the preschoolers questioned said they would rather watch
television than be with their fathers. Among seven- to eleven-year-olds,
one in ten told researchers that their father is the person they fear the
most (Pogrebin 1982). Although we are speaking here of intact two-par¬
ent families, there is a sense in which they are “father-absent.” The loss
216 Chapter 7
for men can perhaps best be found in the words of fathers who have taken
responsibility for the care of their children; according to these men, child
care has made them more sensitive, less self-centered, and more complete
as human beings (Snarey 1993; Coltrane 1989; Greif 1985). And what if
fathers do not have jobs that adequately meet the financial needs of their
families? Stress, health problems, shame, guilt, lowered self-esteem, and
increased family conflict are all likely outcomes (Erikson and Gecas 1990,
Glenn 1987).
Of course, many fathers—and mothers—prefer a traditional gen¬
dered parenting arrangement (Thompson and Walker 1989; Barnett and
Baruch 1988), but others have made serious efforts to become involved
parents by, for example. Joining fathers-only groups with their children
or by drawing the line at work in order to spend more time at home and
to more equally participate in child care (Snarey 1993; Coltrane 1989;
Cohen 1987). These fathers, though, are still the exceptions, and many
fathers simply accept uncritically, or resist changing, their marginal pa¬
rental involvement.
Single-Parent Families
The issue of shared parenting is irrelevant in single-parent families; in
such households, there is only one parent present to meet all the needs
of the children. Although the percentage of dependent children living
with their fathers only has more than doubled since 1970, 88 percent of
dependent children living in single-parent households live with their
mothers only: 84 percent of white children in single-parent families, 94
percent of African-American children in such families, and 89 percent of
Hispanic-American children in single-parent families (U.S. Department
of Commerce 1993).
The number of single-parent families has increased dramatically
over the last two decades, rising from just 11.9 percent of families with
dependent children in 1970, to 27.2 percent of families with dependent
children in 1992 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993). A significant
share of this increase has resulted from the sharp rise in the percentage
of women who have children, but who remain unmarried. In 1970, un¬
married mothers represented only 0.8 percent of families with dependent
children, but by 1992, they constituted 8.0 percent of such families. Some
of these women had children as a result of unintended or unwanted
pregnancies, and many of these women are teenagers (refer back to Box
7.1). Others, however, are well educated, gainfully employed, financially
secure heterosexual or lesbian women who have chosen to utilize one of
the reproductive options we discussed earlier in the chapter, or who have
chosen to adopt children. For these women, single parenthood repre¬
sents a viable alternative to marriage. They have the resources to lessen
the financial burden of being a single parent, but they still often struggle
with the problems associated with juggling career and caregiving respon¬
sibilities, problems that most married women confront (Miller 1992;
Renvoize 1985).
Both women and men may become single parents by being widowed,
although the percentage of single-parent families in which the parent is
widowed has declined since 1970. The most common way women and
men become single parents is when their marriages are dissolved by
divorce (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993). Prior to the Industrial
Revolution, fathers were far more likely than mothers to be awarded legal
custody of their children in the event of divorce, basically for two reasons.
First, fathers had the economic means to support their children. Second,
“there existed betwêen a father and his children an unwritten but binding
contract; children w'ere entitled to a father’s economic support and pro¬
tection during minority in exchange for services at majority and for
products of labor during minority (Brown 1984:203; see also Stearns
1990). However, as the Industrial Revolution progressed, moving much
production away from home, and as compulsory schooling was intro¬
duced, the ideology of childhood changed. Children were no longer
Mewed as miniature adults, but rather as helpless dependents in need of
nurturing. The childrearing experts began to emphasize the superiority
of the mother in caregiving, so that by the turn of the twentieth century,
it was commonly accepted that a child needs to be with its mother. The
courts also adopted this principle, which became known as the tender years
presumption, and which resulted in a dramatic shift in custody decisions
against fathers and for mothers. “The bias toward the mother during the
middle fifty years of this century was such that the only way the father
could obtain custody was to prove her unfit,” which was extremely diffi¬
cult to do (Greif 1985:7; see also Lindgren and Taub 1993).
Today, most courts favor the sex-neutral joint custody award in which
both parents have equal decision-making authority regarding the rearing
of their children. In addition, many joint custody arrangements include
joint physical custody of the children, where, if possible, the children
spend equal amounts of time living in the homes of each of their parents.
Little research has been undertaken to determine the impact of joint
custody on either parents or children, but some analysts have argued that
the arrangement is successful only if divorced parents are able to main¬
tain a high level of cooperation with one another, if they both agree to
joint custody rather than having it imposed, and if they can live within
close geographical proximity to one another so that the frequent moving
of the children between homes does not disrupt the children’s schooling
(Lindgren and Taub 1993). Critics also have argued that joint custody
arrangements do not offer women and children adequate protection
from husbands/fathers who are abusive.
218 Chapter 7
Among those favoring sex-neutral custody awards, an alternative to

a presumption favoring joint custody is for the courts to use a best interests
of the child standard. However, critics of this approach maintain that it may
be biased against women whose financial resources are not as great as
those of their husbands, or who do not conform to the courts expecta¬
tions of appropriate behavior for mothers. Many who hold this position
argue that the courts should utilize a standard of maternal deference in
making custody decisions, given that mothers typically are the primary
caretaking parent and the relationship between children and their pri¬
mary caretaker should be preserved (Becker 1992).
To a large extent, the disputants agree on the underlying theme
of many of the debates over the principles that should be utilized in
making custody awards: that the family members involved, including
the children, should have more input into the determination of cus¬
tody arrangements, rather than these being imposed by an external
authority, the court. Nevertheless, in the majority of cases, mothers
continue to receive at least physical custody of their children with
responsibility for their everyday care, even in cases in which the par¬
ents share legal custody—that is, equal say in decision making—be¬
cause typically fathers do not contest this arrangement. In cases in which
fathers do seek custody—and more fathers today than in the past are
contesting maternal custody awards—they are awarded it about 50 to 66
percent of the time (Hanson 1988; Greif 1985; Brown 1984). In many of
these cases, however, the father has remarried or is about to do so and,
therefore, may not actually become the primary caretaker of his children
(Becker 1992).
Still, as we noted earlier, the number of children living only with
their fathers has more than doubled since 1970, even though male¬
headed single-parent families remain a small minority of all single-parent
households. Research indicates that the experiences of solo fathers and
solo mothers are quite different. For one thing, solo fathers are often at
least middle-class and frequently well-educated; they also typically are
employed full-time. As a result, financial difficulties in rearing children is
not one of the common complaints of solo fathers. In addition, solo
fathers usually receive considerable support from friends, relatives, and
neighbors who tend to view them as somewhat extraordinary for parent¬
ing alone, but as needy when it comes to handling housework, cooking,
and childcare (Teltsch 1992). In fact, single fathers’ most frequent com¬
plaints are that others treat them as incompetent parents (for example,
teachers may ask to meet with an ex-wife instead of the father) and that
they feel constrained in their social lives and careers due to the demands
of parenting (Hanson 1988; Greif 1985).
Single mothers also confront many problems in parenting alone,
but these are often different from those of single fathers. Because we have
alieady discussed the circumstances of women who choose to be mothers

without marrying, we will focus here on those who become single mothers
through divorce; many of these points will also apply to women who
become single mothers through widowhood. First, single mothers may
receive little or no help and support from others; many report feelings of
isolation (Kamerman and Kahn 1988). Second, given the number of
women in the labor force who have children, it is clear that single moth¬
ers, like their male counterparts, also must struggle to fulfill employment
responsibilities without sacrificing the well-being of their children. Some
of these women encounter career dilemmas similar to those of single
fathers, but because women are less likely to hold high-status, high-in-
come occupations (see chapter 8), their employment constraints are
more often inflexible work schedules, inadequate salaries, and unaf¬
fordable or inadequate childcare facilities. Simply finding a job is fre¬
quently difficult for a single mother, particularly if she has been out of
the labor market as a full-time homemaker for a number of years, has
little work experience, or has developed few salable skills. Not surpris¬
ingly, then, the biggest problem of most single mothers is money (Holden
and Smock 1991; Quinn and Allen 1989).
We get a better sense of the dimensions of this problem when we
consider the median income of various types of families. In 1991, the
median annual income of two-parent families was $40,995 ($48,169 for
two-parent families in which both parents were employed and $30,075 in
families in which the father was the sole breadwinner). In male-headed,
single-parent families, the median annual income in 1991 was $28,351. In
contrast, in female-headed, single-parent households in 1991, the median
annual income was $16,692 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993). The
low median income of female-headed families alerts us to the extent of
poverty among them. Mother-only families represent 55.5 percent of poor
families with children under eighteen. As we see in Table 7.2 on page 220,
when race is taken into account, the figures are even more alarming.
Some observers have blamed no-fault divorce laws for the poverty of
many female-headed households. Under no-fault statutes, either husband
or wife may file for divorce on the grounds of “irreconcilable differences,”
and neither is blamed for the failure of the marriage. However, although
the elimination of the question of fault has made divorce somewhat easier
and maybe a bit less painful, it has also changed the economic outcome.
No longer is the wronged or offended spouse compensated, for example.
Instead, financial awards, such as alimony and child support are deter¬
mined primarily by need, the spouses’ ability to work and be self-support¬
ing, and by spouses’ relative ability to pay. Alimony awards, in particular,
are now frowned upon by the courts. In short, the courts have increas¬
ingly attempted to treat divorcing husbands and wives as equals even
though in reality, as we have seen, they are rarely equal (Lindgren and
220 Chapter 7
TABLE 7.2 Pistribution of Poor Children, Six Years Old, by Fa mily Type and Race,
1991
Percentage of Children Poverty
Race and
Family Type below Poverty Line Rate
White
Two-parent 51.1 8.6
Single-parent* 49.0 42.7
Mother-only 45.7 47.3
African American
Two-parent 14.5 20.2
Hispanic American
Two-parent 53.6 29.9
Încludes father-only, relative-only, and nonrelative-only families.

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 1993:470.
Taub 1993; Kay 1990). Sociologist Lenore Weitzman (1985:xi) explains

further:
Since a woman’s ability to support herself is likely to be impaired during

marriage, especially if she is a full-time homemaker and mother, she may
not be “equal to” her former husband at the point of divorce. Rules that
treat her as if she is equal simply serve to deprive her of the financial
support she needs. In addition, rules that require an equal division of
property often force the sale of the family home, and compound the
financial dislocation and impoverishment of women and children. When
the legal system treats men and women “equally” at divorce, it ignores
the very real economic inequalities that marriage creates. It also ignores
the economic inequalities between men and women in the larger society.
Adding to this is the fact that in dividing marital property, the courts
usually take into account only tangible assets, which besides a house may
include items like furniture and cars. Given that most divorcing couples,
like most married couples, have mortgages and other debts, by the time
the bills are paid, there may be little left to divide. There are, however,
other types of assets—for example, pensions and retirement benefits,
licenses to practice a profession, medical insurance, or the value of a
business—that only infrequently figure into property settlements. This
means that one spouse—usually the husband—retains control of some of
the family’s most valuable assets (Lindgren and Taub 1993; Weitzman
1985). Based on her research on the impact of no-fault statutes, Weitzman
(1985:323) concludes that within the first year after a divorce, women and
their dependent children suffer a 73 percent drop in their standard of
living, while men enjoy a 42 percent rise. Others estimate the decline in
income for women following divorce to be between 30 and 50 percent
(Holden and Smock 1991).
Some researchers have challenged Weitzman’s contention that no¬
fault statutes per se are responsible for the substantial decline in the
standard of living of divorced women and their children. Instead, they
maintain that inadequate child support laws and other gaps in public
policy are more likely to blame for these circumstances (Jacob 1989;
Kamerman and Kahn 1988). Child support payments historically have
done little to offset the financial decline that women and children expe¬
rience after divorce. For one thing, less than 60 percent of all divorced
mothers are awarded child support by the courts. Second, average awards
are relatively small—$2,995 in 1989—representing less than 8 percent of
the average earnings for men aged twenty-five and older. But even among
those who are awarded child support, only about half (51 percent) receive
the full amount due; 25 percent receive none at all. Fathers, in fact, pay
child support only for an average of about six months. White women and
women with college degrees are more likely than minority women and
women with less education to be awarded child support and to actually
receive payments (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993; Kamerman and
Kahn 1988).
In 1988, as part of a welfare reform package. Congress passed the
Family Support Act that allows states to automatically deduct child sup¬
port payments from parents’ paychecks to ensure that they do not fall
behind in their support payments. In addition, the new law requires the
states to set and utilize consistent formulas for determining the amount
of a support award so that the awards are not only fair, but also do not
vary from Judge to judge. Since these provisions did not go into effect
until 1994, their effectiveness has yet to be evaluated. Some observers,
however, are skeptical, emphasizing that the courts’ approaches to the
division of property in most divorce cases as well as a long history of
nonenforcement of support laws have been major contributing factors in
the feminization of poverty. The feminization of poverty refers to the
recent economic trend of a steady increase in the percentage of the total
poverty population composed of women and their children (see also
chapter 8).
Swelling the ranks of the poverty population are the new poor: a
group of people, largely women, who were not born into poverty but who
have been forced into it by recent events in their lives. In fact, according
to researchers, a change in family composition, such as separation, di-
222 Chapter 7
vorce, marriage, remarriage, or becoming a parent, is the single most

important factor affecting the economic well-being of families, the sec¬
ond most important factor is the labor market decisions of a family, that
is, who will work outside the home (Holden and Smock 1991, Kamerman
and Kahn 1988). Consequently, Bane (1986) refers to the poverty of many
recently divorced women and their children (especially white women and
children) as “event-driven poverty.”
The feminization of poverty and the notion of the new poor are
important ingredients in our understanding of the consequences of gen¬
der inequality in our society, and in particular, the forms it takes in
marriage and divorce. Nevertheless, these concepts have been criticized
for being both color-blind and class-blind. More specifically, critics charge
that the feminization of poverty perspective assumes that women are a
homogeneous group. Clearly, they are not, and one significant factor that
divides them is social class:
It is true that, in the case of divorce, [middle- and upper-class women]
may experience a fairly dramatic drop in income and standard of living.
However, many of these women have the independent property, financial
resources, education and skills to live comfortably with or without men.
Furthermore, the majority of these women remarry. And when they do, it
is generally to men of their class. . . . There are, to be sure, millions of
women whose lives are shaped by sex-segregated, low-paying, low-status
jobs; unemployment; and cutbacks in social services. But these are not
women in general—they are women of the working class (Alliance
Against Women’s Oppression [AAWO] 1986:241).
Even within the working class, though, there are divisions; the most
important is race. Women of color not only suffer the indignities of
sexism, but of racism as well. These women are disproportionately more
likely than white women to be poor, regardless of the type of family in
which they live. Their poverty status is often independent of their marital
and family status and, in this sense, they have more in common with
minority men than with white women (AAWO 1986; see also chapter 8).
Thus, as Bane (1986) points out, the poverty of many minority female¬
headed families is “reshuffled poverty.” In other words, poor families
dissolve and the women and children form new, but still poor families.
The considerable economic differences among female-headed house¬
holds of different races become apparent when we consider the total net
worth of these households instead of simply income. In 1988, the median
net worth of white female-headed households was $22,100 compared with
$760 for African-American female-headed households and $740 for His¬
panic female-headed households. These figures largely reflect the fact
that white female householders are more likely to live in a house in which
they have established some equity (U.S. Department of Commerce 1991).
As Bane (1986:277) points out, “Reshuffled poverty as opposed to event-
caused poverty for blacks challenges the assumption that changes in

family structure have created ghetto poverty. This underscores the impor¬
tance of considering the ways in which race produces different paths to
poverty.”
This is not an insignificant point, for sociologists and others tradi¬
tionally equated female-headed families in general, and minority female¬
headed families in particular, with pathology (Smith 1993). It has been
argued that the female-headed family form itself causes poverty as well as
a variety of other social problems, including juvenile delinquency, drug
abuse, and alcoholism. According to this perspective, the “deviant” sub¬
cultural values of minorities are said to cause the high percentage of
female-headed families in these groups. But recent research has failed to
uncover anything inherently “pathological” or “abnormal” in the female¬
headed family structure. In fact, researchers have argued that the black
female-headed family has historically been a source of strength and resis¬
tance to oppression (Collins 1990; Height 1989; Jewell 1988; McAdoo
1986; Ladner 1971). Sociologists who emphasize a particular family form
or subculture as the source of social problems are blaming the victim and
reinfoi'cing institutionalized discrimination. Indeed, available evidence
indicates that the key to understanding the rise of female-headed minor¬
ity households, as well as the plethora of social problems that dispropor¬
tionately affect minority families of all types, lies with institutionalized
discrimination itself (Mirande 1991; Baca Zinn 1989; Collins 1989;
Gresham 1989). Thus, an analysis of single-parent households must take
into account not only the impact of gender inequality, but also social class
and racial inequalities. The kinds and levels of stress experienced by
single-parent families, and the families’ methods and chances of success
in dealing with them, are intimately tied to these variables (Brewer 1988;
McAdoo 1986).
From this discussion it is clear that there is an imbalance of power
between families as well as within families. Certain family forms are still
deemed more legitimate than others in our society. This point is under¬
lined in the sections that follow, as we continue our examination of
diversity in intimate relationships.
Singles and Domestic Partnerships

When we think of singles, most of us probably think of young heterosex¬
ual women and men who have not yet married. The single population in
the United States, however, is far more diverse. In addition to never-
married heterosexuals, as well as single parents with dependent children
whose special concerns we have already discussed, the single population
includes gay men and lesbians who are not involved in a committed
relationship, divorced and separated women and men without dependent
224 Chapter 7
children, and women and men who are widowed. There are also women
and men, heterosexual and homosexual, who are unmarried, but who are
living with an intimate partner in what we identified earlier in the chapter
as domestic partnerships.
With regard to never-married heterosexuals, there are two prevail¬
ing gender stereotypes. One is of the swinging bachelor who plays the
field” and cherishes his independence. The other is of the unmarried
woman, struggling with loneliness and desperate to find a man to marry
her before her “biological clock” runs out of time. Similar stereotypes are
applied to divorced and separated men and women who are without
children; the women are depicted as anxious to remarry and always “on
the prowl” for an eligible bachelor, whereas the men are portrayed as
liberated and wary of reattaching the “ball and chain.” The media, of
course, contribute to these images, but as with most stereotypes, the
reality of life is quite different. In fact, as we will see shortly, with respect
to some groups of divorced women and men, real life is typically the
opposite of what the gender stereotypes would lead us to believe.
Bedard (1992) provides an exceptionally thorough overview of the
never-married single population today. She emphasizes that for most
heterosexual young adults, singlehood is still temporary. The vast major¬
ity eventually marry, but they are delaying marriage longer than in the
past. In 1970, for example, the median age at first marriage was 20.6 for
women and 22.5 for men; by 1988, it was 23.7 for women and 25.5 for
men (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993). We see this delay reflected
in the increasing percentage of the never-married population in several
older age groups as well (see Table 7.3).
Bedard (1992) offers a variety of reasons for these changes, includ¬
ing more positive social attitudes toward singlehood, greater caution in
light of a high divorce rate and growing awareness of the problem of
domestic violence, widespread availability of contraceptives, and realistic
concerns of young adults about the quality of life in contemporary soci¬
ety. One of the most important reasons for prolonging singlehood, how¬
ever, is changes in the economy. For many young adults, she points out,
delaying marriage is an economic necessity. Over the last three decades,
there has been a decline in the number of jobs that pay a wage adequate
for an individual to establish an independent household. No longer is a
college degree a guarantee to a well-paying entry level job. Young adults
without a college degree are finding jobs in the service sector of the
economy, jobs which pay at or just slightly above the minimum wage
(which itself has not kept pace with inflation) (Curran and Renzetti
1993). Consequently, in contrast to the image of the swinging single’s
“pad,” a substantial percentage of young adults—54 percent of those aged
eighteen to twenty-four and 12 percent of those aged twenty-five to thirty-
TABLE 7.3 Never-'Married Persons as a Percent of the Total Population by

Sex and Age, 1970 and 1992
' Sex
Male Female
Age 1970 1992 1970 1992
Total 18.9% 26.2% 13.7% 19.2%
18-19 years old 92.8 97.7 75.6 90.0

20-24 years old 54.7 80.3 35.8 65.7
25-29 years old 19.1 48.7 10.5 33.2
30-34 years old 9.4 29.4 6.2 18.8
35-39 years old 7.2 18.4 5.4 12.6
40-44 years old 6.3 9.2 4.9 8.4
45-54 years old 7.5 7.3 4.9 5.3
55-64 years old 7.8 5.6 6.8 4.0
65 years old and over 7.5 4.2 7.7 4.9
Source: U.S. DeparUnent of Commerce 1993:53.
four—are living in their parents’ homes (U.S. Department of Commerce

1993).
Bedard (1992) also makes the point that for some individuals find¬
ing a marriage partner may be especially difficult. In particular, she notes
the problems that women with disabilities confront. Women with disabili¬
ties, more so than men with disabilities, are viewed as unattractive and
sexless (Hall 1992). As Bedard (1992:66) writes, “if a disabled woman
does manage to form a relationship with a man, many people will assume
that he is either a ‘saint,’ a ‘martyr,’ or is ‘kinky’ in finding a disabled
woman sexually attractive.”
African-American women also face some difficulty in finding mar¬
riage partners because of the high mortality rate of young African-
American men (see chapter 12). “Middle- and upper-class Black
women often delay or forego marriage for the same reasons as white
women in these socioeconomic classes, but the combined effects of pov¬
erty and racism on Black male mortality from infancy on have substan¬
tially reduced the pool of potential marriage partners for Black women
of all socioeconomic classes” (Bedard 1992:68). Consider that in 1989, for
every 100 women aged twenty to twenty-nine, there were 102 white men
but only 92 African-American men of the same age (U.S. Department of
Commerce 1993).
226 Chapter 7
As we have already noted, another reason that young adults may

delay or forego marriage is their concern about the likelihood that their
marriages will last a lifetime. Statistics indicate that their skepticism is not
unfounded. Half of all marriages end after just seven years. In 1988, the
divorce rate dropped slightly to 4.7 per 1,000 of the population from a
high of 5.3 per 1,000 in 1981. Nevertheless, the 1988 rate was more than
double the rate in 1960 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993).
Analyses of gender differences in the divorce experience are com¬
plicated by a number of factors. First, one’s feelings are likely to vary
depending on who initiated the divorce and the reasons underlying the
divorce, and they are also likely to vary at different points in the divorce
process. For example, research indicates that for most women, the most
difficult emotional period occurs prior to the couple’s separation. It
appears that many women during this time try hard to hold the marriage
together, whereas men show a much lower level of awareness of marital
difficulties. Research indicates that following separation and divorce,
women generally adjust better than men—a point to which we will return
shortly (Diedrick 1991).
A second difficulty in discerning gender differences in the divorce
experience is that many studies utilize large aggregate samples, but the
impact of divorce on the divorcing couple is different for various sub¬
groups of women and men. For example, research indicates that those
who experience the greatest difficulty in adjusting to divorce are women
with dependent children, especially those with children under six years
old (Mauldin 1991). These women experience higher levels of depression
than childless women or women with grown children and, as we have
already seen, this depression is likely a direct result of their realistic
assessment of their financial circumstances. Indeed, a number of corre¬
lates of economic status, including educational background, employment
status prior to the divorce, and marketable job skills are all related to
women’s post-divorce adjustment. Women who were poor prior to the
divorce, who were unemployed, on who have few marketable job skills
experience the greatest economic crises following divorce (Mauldin
1991). Although women in all socioeconomic groups are likely to experi¬
ence a drop in financial status following divorce, middle- and upper-
income women, women who were employed prior to the divorce, and
women who have good prospects for employment following the divorce
are more likely than other women and men to report that they are
satisfied with their financial situations (Gross 1992c; Diedrick 1991;
Holden and Smock 1991; Mauldin 1991). In fact, according to Holden
\ and Smock (1991), one of the best predictors of the relative well-being of
divorced wives and husbands is the economic independence of the indi¬
vidual spouses. That finding goes a long way in explaining the exception-
ally high level of well-being reported by divorced women who are middle-
aged, with a professional career, and either childless or without depen¬
dent children (Gross 1992c).
Race and ethnicity tend to intersect with economic factors and other
variables to influence individuals’ adjustment during and after divorce.
African Americans, for instance, have higher separation and divorce rates
than whites. Greater marital instability among African Americans has
been related to their higher levels of financial instability (Holden and
Smock 1991). Moreover, as we noted previously, because African-Ameri¬
can women are more likely than white women to be poor prior to divorce,
and less likely to be employed, their post-divorce life situations tend to be
more difficult. At the same time, however, these difficulties may be medi¬
ated somewhat by the extended kin network within the African-American
community which provides social integration and support. In contrast.
Song (1991) points out that Asian-American women who strongly identify
with their traditional ethnic community experience serious difficulty in
adjusting to divorce. This is because within traditional Asian culture,
adult women who are unattached to men are regarded as “social nonper¬
sons.” They receive little emotional and financial support from others,
who tend to blame them for the failure of their marriages. They also
frequently become socially dislocated from social activities and friend¬
ships because other married women see them as potential seducers of
their husbands, and married men worry that their behavior will increase
their own wives’ willingness to divorce. It is hardly surprising, therefore,
that these women tend to experience severe depression and other forms
of distress following divorce (Song 1991).
Although men almost always fare better than women economically
following a divorce (Holden and Smock 1991), they do not appear to do
as well emotionally or psychologically. One indication of this is the higher
remarriage rate of divorced men compared with that of divorced women.
Although the remarriage rates of both divorced men and women have
declined considerably since 1970, divorced men are almost one and a half
times more likely to remarry than divorced women (U.S. Department of
Commerce 1993). Some men remarry rather quickly after they divorce—
indeed, the opportunity to do so may have been the motivation for the
divorce. Because most divorced men, as we have seen, do not have custody
of their children, it is also easier for them to engage in social activities
where they may meet potential remarriage partners; they do not have to
worry about arranging child care before they go out. It is also the case,
however, that because of the prevailing gender norms in our society, men
have more to gain from remarriage than women do. In light of our
discussion of the typical division of household labor in heterosexual
marriages, at least one benefit of remarriage should be apparent. As one
228 Chapter 7
divorced man stated in a recent interview, what he missed most about

marriage was “having a wife to ‘keep the social life running’ and to tend
to ‘certain little touches’ that make a house a home” (quoted in Gross
1992c:A14). It is also the case that husbands more so than wives rely on
their spouses as their sole confidants (see also chapter 12). It is perhaps
not surprising, then, that although women’s best chances for improving
their financial status after divorce is to remarry, divorced women more so
than divorced men express reluctance to do so (Gross 1992c).
Many of the findings with respect to divorce parallel those obtained
in research on widowhood. The economic status of the individual spouses
is once again a crucial determinant of v/ell-being for those who are
widowed. Men are far less likely than women to experience financial
difficulties during widowhood. This is a direct consequence of the fact
that men traditionally have had longer and more stable employment
histories than women, that they earn on average more than women do,
and that they are more likely than women to be employed in occupations
that carry such benefits as pensions (Holden and Smock 1991; see also
chapter 8). As with divorce, however, certain groups of women are more
likely than others to be negatively impacted by being widowed. For exam¬
ple, women who had low incomes before widowhood are likely to sink
further into poverty after their husbands'die. Since minority couples are
at greater risk of living in poverty, being widowed is more likely to have a
detrimental economic impact on minority women (Holden and Smock
1991; Davis et al. 1990).
Because of men’s higher mortality rates even at middle age, the
majority of those widowed are women; widowed women, in fact, outnum¬
ber widowed men five to one. It is also the case, similar to those who
divorce, that men who are widowed are more likely to remarry than
women are who are widowed. Widowed men have a larger pool of poten¬
tial partners available to them, especially since men often marry women
who are several years younger than themselves. In addition, men who are
widowed, like men who are divorced, have more to gain through remar¬
riage in terms of having their daily household needs met (Bedard 1992).
Many women, however, especially if they have established careers, individ¬
ual identities, and financial independence, do not find life as a widow
debilitating. This is not to say that they do not experience tremendous
sorrow when their husbands die; the death of a spouse is one of life’s most
emotionally traumatic experiences. Rather, it appears that widowed
women adjust to widowhood better than widowed men, especially if they
have been involved in activities outside the marriage and are financially
secure (Nemy 1992). Unfortunately, most married couples do not have
adequate life insurance nor substantial savings to guarantee this financial
security; and Social Security as well as other government programs are
also inadequate. Consequently, widowhood doubles the poverty rate of
women and substantially lowers women’s standard of living in most socio¬

economic groups (Holden and Smock 1991).^
As we noted earlier, another group of singles is composed of gay
men and lesbians. However, because of the exceptionally negative stereo¬
types surrounding gay and lesbian relationships, we will discuss them in
a separate section. Before we do that, let’s consider one other group of
singles: heterosexual women and men who are unmarried, but living
together.
Heterosexual domestic partnerships Cohabitation, or living together

without marriage in what we call today a domestic partnership, appears
to be an increasingly appealing lifestyle for many heterosexual couples.
The Census Bureau reports that in 1992 there were more than 3.3 million
unmarried heterosexual couples living together in the United States, an
increase of about 1.5 million since 1980 and almost 3 million since 1970
(U.S. Department of Commerce 1993). Although the number is still small
compared with that in other countries—in Sweden and Norway, for in¬
stance, it is estimated that 12 percent of all couples form domestic part¬
nerships (Blanc 1987; Kammeyer 1987)—the increase is nevertheless
substantial. Moreover, current estimates of the number of domestic part¬
nerships in this country are likely to be conservative, since many people
do not report their cohabitation status to census takers and other offi¬
cials, and some partners maintain separate addresses even though they
live together (Bedard 1992).
Unfortunately, our understanding of many facets of heterosexual
domestic partnerships is limited by the fact that most of the research has
focused on college students or other young people. Only about 20 per¬
cent of domestic partnerships involve couples under twenty-five years old.
Most (61 percent) are partners aged twenty-five to forty-four; 14 percent
are aged forty-five to sixty-four; and 4.4 percent are sixty-five or older, the
only age group in which the number of domestic partnerships has de-
®Importantly, it is younger widows without children who may experience the greatest
financial difficulties, since they have little economic protection. They are not eligible
for Social Security. Although their husbands may have had pensions at work, they may
not have worked long enough at the job to be vested, or the pension may not pay
benefits to the widow until the year in which her deceased husband would have been
eligible for retirement benefits. Most young couples have little or no savings, and few
have mortgage insurance that pays for their home if one spouse dies. Even though
younger women are more likely than older women to have income from their own
jobs, their salaries may not be sufficient to meet all the expenses they incurred during
marriage. But while young widows, like older widows, experience a substantial decline
in their standard of living immediately following their husbands’ deaths, their long¬
term prospects for improvement are better than those of older widows (Holden and
Smock 1991).
230 Chapter 7
dined since 1970 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993). Thus, as Blum-

stein and Schwartz (1983:38) conclude, “When we consider the effect age
has on lifestyles and personal needs, we can see how misleading it would
be to think of all cohabitors as wanting the same things or behaving in
the same ways for the same reasons.” Still, there are some general trends
that characterize heterosexual domestic partnerships.
First, researchers have found that most domestic partnerships are of
relatively short duration, that is, two years or less (Bumpass and Sweet
1991; London 1991). Most domestic partners, then, either break up or
marry instead of adopting cohabitation as a permanent lifestyle. Perma¬
nent cohabitation is far more common in countries such as Sweden and
Norway (Blanc 1987). It is also the case that most heterosexual domestic
partners in the United States are childless, although there may be one or
more children in the home from a previous marriage of one or both
partners; only about a third of these households include children under
fifteen years old (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993). It appears that
when domestic partners consider adding children to their household,
they typically decide to marry first (Blumstein and Schwartz 1983).
Perhaps the absence of children contributes to the greater egalitari¬
anism evident in heterosexual domestic partnerships compared with con¬
ventional marriages. We have seen that even gender “liberated” couples
tend to become more traditional when they have children. Bedard (1992)
also argues that without an official marriage contract imposed on them,
domestic partners are perhaps less likely to feel bound by the gender
norms that have characterized most traditional marriages. In addition, in
most domestic partnerships, both partners are employed outside the
home and, although women still earn on average less than men do, their
employment status allows them to bring greater resources to the relation¬
ship and, therefore, to have more leverage in maintaining power relative
to their partners (see also Shelton and John 1993).
A majority of domestic partners (56 percent) have never been mar¬
ried, and many have divorced parents (U.S. Department of Commerce
1991). Research indicates that young adults whose parents are divorced
express greater support for cohabitation than those whose parents are
married (Black and Sprenkle 1991). Slightly more than a third of domes¬
tic partners are divorced themselves (U.S. Department of Commerce
1991). Many of these report that they prefer cohabitation to traditional
marriage, at least temporarily, because it affords them the benefits of
intimacy without the legal or economic entanglements that marriage
entails. However, domestic partners may have more legally binding ties to
one another than they think, especially if they acquire property and other
assets together, as some recent “palimony” suits have shown (Blumstein
and Schwartz 1983). In addition, a handful of city governments are now
allowing domestic partners to officially register their relationships, al-
though in most cases such registration has little legal significance. While
many attorneys advise domestic partners to draw up contracts, some
courts have been reluctant to enforce them because they see such agree¬
ments as potentially undermining the institution of marriage. Other
court rulings have been inconsistent. Consequently, if a domestic partner¬
ship breaks up, one partner may lose out financially, or a battle may ensue
over the division of assets. But even if the relationship endures, other
difficulties may surface. “If one partner becomes ill, for example, the
mate may be barred from visiting that person in the hospital or from
participating in decisions about medical care. And if the person dies
without a will, property that the deceased may have wanted to go to his
or her partner may go instead to estranged family members” (Rankin
1987:F11).
Although these are difficulties sometimes confronted by heterosex¬
ual domestic partners, they may prove to be less problematic for them
since they at least have the option to legally marry. Gay and lesbian
partners do not have that option, and so for them the dilemmas posed by
domestic partnerships in general tend to be exacerbated by the social
stigma attached to their intimate relationships. Let’s turn our attention,
then, to a discussion of gay and lesbian relationships.
Gay and lesbian singles and domestic partners As we noted previously,

there is no way to determine how many homosexual men and women live
in our society. Because of the tremendous social stigma attached to ho¬
mosexuality, many gay men and lesbians hide or “closet” their sexual
orientation at least from some people or in certain situations, such as at
work. Because of this, and because of the tradition of heterosexism in the
social sciences, accurate knowledge and genuine appreciation of gay and
lesbian relationships are still goals, rather than realities. Much of what was
written prior to the 1960s was written by heterosexuals and written from
a psychoanalytic or psychiatric perspective, which historically has assumed
that homosexuality is pathological and that homosexuals are “sick” or
“abnormal” (Krieger 1982). Based largely on clinical work with patients
who sought treatment for a variety of psychological troubles, this position
blamed the patients’ problems on their homosexuality, rather than seeing
them as the effects of widespread discrimination or of having to hide
from others a basic part of one’s self. In this view, homosexuals, though
not responsible for their “condition,” are nevertheless in need of a “cure,”
such as aversion therapy, hormone injections, “conversion” therapy, or
psychotherapy, to bring about a “heterosexual readjustment” (Berliner
1987; Williams 1987; Barnhouse 1977).
Unfortunately, the work undertaken from this perspective has done
little more than reinforce homophobia and heterosexist stereotypes and
fuel myths about homosexuals and the homosexual lifestyle. However,
232 Chapter 7
studies conducted since the 1960s—many carried out by gay and lesbian
researchers—have illuminated the errors in much of this earlier work.
For example, a long-standing preoccupation in both the popular and
professional literature was answering the question, “What causes homo¬
sexuality?” Although the correct response to this question is the subject
of heated debate among homosexuals themselves—Is homosexuality a
choice or a biological condition? (see chapter 2)—much of the new
research sees this question as misguided. This new research attempts to
redirect attention to other, more appropriate questions, such as how
heterosexuality is enforced in our society, and what the consequences of
this enforcement are (Rich 1980). In other words, among some re¬
searchers the focus is no longer on homosexuality as a social problem,
but rather on institutionalized discrimination against homosexuals as a
social problem.
Recent research has provided empirical evidence that debunks
many damaging myths about homosexuals and homosexuality. First, it is
now clear that there is as much diversity among lesbians and gay men as
there is among straight women and men; there is no homosexual lifestyle.
A second popular misconception is that since homosexuals are attracted
to partners of the same sex, they must really wish they were members of
the opposite sex. Those who subscribe to this belief typically look for
cross-gender clues in the behavior or appearance of individuals to detect
their sexual orientation—for example, signs of femininity in men and
masculinity in women. In addition to the fact that outward appearances
are poor guides to sexual orientation, this idea confuses homosexuality
with transsexuality. Moreover, the majority of homosexuals are quite sat¬
isfied with what sex they are and do not have confused gender identities.
Another common assumption is that gays and lesbians are sexually
promiscuous and unable to form lasting relationships with a partner.
Research indicates that although gay men do have more partners on
average than straight men, most also establish enduring relationships
(Meredith 1986; Zuckerman and Myers 1983). Lesbian couples as a group
appear to have more stable relationships than either heterosexual cou¬
ples or gay male couples (Blumstein and Schwartz 1983). However, as
Bedard (1992) points out, researchei s have not found a distinct “homo¬
sexual” value orientation toward love relationships. Instead, what appears
to be more important than sexual orientation is one’s sex—being male
or female—and one’s background. According to Peplau (1986:118),
“Women’s goals in intimate partnerships are similar whether the partner
is male or female. The same is true of men.” Women, in general, place a
high value on emotional expressiveness in their intimate relationships. It
is not surprising, therefore, that researchers have found a high level of
emotional closeness, or what is often called dyadic attachment, in lesbian
relationships. In gay male relationships, but even more so in lesbian
relationships, equality between partners is also highly valued (Peplau

1986) . This is not to say that egalitarianism is always achieved in these
relationships (see, for example, Renzetti 1992; Caldwell and Peplau
1984), but a significantly higher percentage of lesbians than heterosexual
women report being treated equally by their intimate partners (Hite
1987) .
The question also arises as to whether gay and lesbian relationships
are being held to a higher standard than heterosexual relationships. After
all, as we previously pointed out, about half of all heterosexual marriages
end in divorce within seven years, a statistic that hardly indicates relation¬
ship stability. Further, as Kath Weston found (1991:120) in her research
on gay and lesbian families, when many gay and lesbian partners break
up, they frequently maintain a close relationship with one another by
making a transition from being lovers to being friends, without alienating
the kinship tie. Consequently, Weston argues that “one could make a
good case that gay relationships endure longer on average than ties
established through heterosexual marriage. If two people cease being
lovers after six years but remain friends and family for another forty, they
have indeed achieved a relationship of long standing.”
WTiat is perhaps surprising to many observers is that gay and lesbian
relationships can be so long-lasting given the destructive potential of
institutionalized discrimination. Homosexuals can be denied the right to
parent, an issue to which we will return shortly. They can also be denied
equal access to housing, employment, credit, and other civil rights, be¬
cause in most legal jurisdictions the courts have refused to extend the
constitutional protection of the Fourteenth Amendment to homosexuals.
In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court gave its tacit approval to this discrimina¬
tion when, in 1986, it ruled in the case of Bowers v. Hardwick that states
may criminalize homosexual acts such as sodomy even if they are engaged
in by consenting adults in the privacy of their own homes.
During the first half of the 1990s, homosexuals did make some
progress in securing equal protection of their civil rights, despite wide¬
spread backlash. In 1992 and 1993, the religious New Right (see chapter
11) mounted aggressive political referendum campaigns in at least four¬
teen states with the goal of dismantling existing civil rights protections for
homosexuals and preventing the enactment of future anti-discrimination
legislation. The referendum in Oregon, known as the “Abnormal Behav¬
ior Measure,” was especially insidious in that it would not only have
overturned laws that protected homosexuals from discrimination in hous¬
ing and employment, but it also would have mandated that the state and
public institutions actively discourage homosexuality by teaching that it is
“wrong, unnatural, and perverse” (Rhoads 1993). Although the Oregon
measure was defeated at the polls and the state legislature subsequently
enacted a law prohibiting discrimination against homosexuals, several
234 Chapter 7
towns in the state adopted their own anti-homosexual rights measures. At

the same time, an amendment to the Colorado state constitution, Amend¬
ment 2, was passed by that state’s voters and became the nation s first
statewide ban on homosexual rights laws. By the close of 1993, eight states
and approximately 130 local governments had adopted similar measures.
However, many of these initiatives were challenged in court and never
went into effect. In December 1993, a district judge in Colorado ruled
that Amendment 2 violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and, therefore, was unconstitutional. Although the impact
of this decision on measures in other states and cities remains to be seen,
challenges to these laws may eventually result in a review by a more
receptive U.S. Supreme Court and, finally, a nationwide extension of
equal protection to lesbians and gay men.
In at least twenty-five cities, counties or states, gay and lesbian cou¬
ples, along with heterosexual couples, may officially register their domes¬
tic partnerships, although nowhere in the United States may gay and
lesbian partners legally marry.Although some have argued that these
registrations are largely symbolic, others maintain that public recognition
of the legitimacy of gay and lesbian relationships is not insignificant. In
addition, registration offers important practical benefits, including tax
considerations, insurance coverage, family leaves, family membership
rates, inheritance protection, visitation rights at hospitals or prisons, and
protection from housing discrimination (Robson 1992).
Some cities as well as a number of businesses have extended certain
benefits to domestic partners without requiring official government reg¬
istration. Many universities, for example, extend some family benefits to
the gay and lesbian partners of their employees, such as library privileges
and use of recreation and sports facilities, but few extend health insur¬
ance or tuition benefits. Companies and municipal governments, too,
În 1989, Denmark became the first cotintry in the world to legalize homosexual
unions; it extended to legally registered homosexual couples all but a few of the rights
and responsibilities of legally married heterosexual couples. In 1993, however, the
Hawaii State Supreme Court issued a ruling which stated that because marriage is a
basic civil right, the state’s ban on homosexual marriages may be unconstitutional
tmless the government can provide a compelling state interest that justifies the ban.
Thus, while not overturning the ban, die court was the first in the United States to
open the legal door to homosexual marriage. Such a decision has far-reaching
implications, since all states recognize as legal marriages performed in any other
state. Consequently, a homosexual couple legally married in Hawaii would have to be
recognized as legally married by the other forty-nine states (Schmalz 1993a). In 1994,
however, the Hawaii state legislature exacted a law that defines marriage as the union
of a man and a woman, but the legislature also established an advisory commission
to formulate laws to extend to homosexual domestic partners the legal and financial
benefits currently enjoyed by married heterosexual partners {New York Times 27 April
1994:A18).
Gender and In timate Relationships 235
often stop short of extending health insurance coverage to domestic

partners, heterosexual as well as homosexual, stating that such benefits
are too expensive. However, Lotus Development Corporation—the larg¬
est company to offer gay and lesbian domestic partners family benefits—
maintains that health insurance coverage is not prohibitively expensive.
Lotus, in fact, offers family benefits, including health insurance, only to
gay and lesbian domestic partners and not to unmarried heterosexual
couples, reasoning that the latter have the option to marry, while the
former do not (Sugawara 1991).
Concern over the need for legal recognition of domestic partner¬
ships has heightened as a result of the AIDS epidemic. Many gay men
have had their dying partners removed from their care by an estranged
and angry parent, have been excluded from decisions regarding their
partner’s care or even where their partner will be buried, and, in the
absence of a will, have seen their deceased partner’s belongings inherited
by estranged parents or siblings. The case of Sharon Kowalski and Karen
Thompson also drew attention to this issue. Kowalski and Thompson had
exchanged rings and pledged to be life partners, but because they were
not—could not be—legally married, they were, as Robson (1992) puts it,
legally strangers. MTen Kowalski was severely disabled in a car accident in
1983, her parents removed her from the home she shared with
Thompson, put her in a nursing home, and barred Thompson from even
visiting her. Thompson subsequently went to court asking to be made
Kowalski’s legal guardian. A lower court ruled in favor of the parents, but
in 1991, an appeals court ruled that the medical testimony indicated that
Kowalski was able to express a preference as to where and with whom she
wanted to live, and she had consistently chosen to live at home with her
partner. In addition, the appeals court stated that Kowalski and
Thompson were a “family of affinity,” a relationship that deserves to be
respected.
While such decisions generally have been regarded as victories by
gay and lesbian rights advocates, some observers are more cautious about
endorsing domestic partnership registration or even relationship con¬
tracts. Robson (1992), for instance, argues that marriage historically has
been a repressive institution which subjects an intimate relationship to
the rule of law. She questions the desirability of this. In addition, she
maintains that state-approved marriage divides homosexuals into those
who are good—that is, those who are monogamous and restrict their
sexuality to the marital bed—and those who are deviant. Others have
raised questions about the consequences of choosing not to register. If
a certificate of registration becomes evidence of a committed relation¬
ship, then will those who do not register be denied certain rights and
benefits? “For example, if a couple who did not register tried to adopt a
child, someone who opposed the adoption could use their failure to
236 Chapter 7
register as evidence that\hey did not have a serious relationship” (Bennet

1993:B3). . • • • u r
This latter point is an important one, since it is in the area ot
parental rights that lesbian and gay domestic partners continue to en¬
counter the greatest acrimony and resistance to equal treatment. For
instance, while opinion polls consistently show that over three quarters of
the general public thinks homosexuals should have equal employment
rights and opportunities, this endorsement is qualified when the jobs in
question involve physical contact (e.g., a physician) or contact with chil¬
dren (an elementary school teacher). In a 1993 New York Tmc^/CBS poll,
55 percent of respondents said they would object to their child having a
homosexual elementary school teacher. More than half also said they
would not permit their child to watch a prime-time television comedy that
had homosexual characters in it, read a book about a homosexual couple,
or play at the home of a friend whose parent is homosexual (Schmalz
1993b). To a large extent, these views stem from continued widespread
acceptance of various myths about relationships between homosexual
adults and children. Many people, for example, think that male homo¬
sexuals frequently try to seduce young children, but a careful look at the
data on child molesters reveals that about 90 percent are heterosexual
men (Gelles and Cornell 1985). It is also widely believed that homosexu¬
als try to “recruit” children to their “lifestyle,” and that simply seeing
homosexual couples leads children into immorality. These beliefs, in
particular, have been used repeatedly to prevent lesbians and gay men
from becoming foster or adoptive parents and to deny them custody of
or visitation rights to their own children (see, for example, Neu) York Times
1 January 1994:8; Ayres 1993; Robson 1992). Currently, only six states
permit adoptions by same-sex couples, raising serious legal problems for
many who have custody of their children from a previous heterosexual
marriage or who have given birth to a child through artificial insemina¬
tion (Robson 1992). Despite persistent beliefs in the myths, however,
research consistently shows that children raised by gay and lesbian par¬
ents are no more likely to experience psychological difficulties, such as
gender-identity conflict and confusion, than children raised by heterosex¬
ual parents (Patterson 1992; Bozett 1988; Creer 1986).
Thus, while the opinion polls show that gay men and lesbians are
gaining more acceptance among the non-homosexual general public in
the United States, the attitude among many segments of the population
can be described as tolerant at best. Our culture, it appears, is still a long
way from affirming homosexuality and homosexual relationships. How-
ever, lesbians and gay men are becoming more visible in the United
States, and more importantly, they are taking a stronger, more active
stand in demanding protection of their human rights. We will take up this
topic in subsequent chapters, particularly in chapter 13.
THE DARK SIDE OF INTIMACY:

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
It has only been in the last thirty years that social scientists have given
serious attention to the problem of domestic violence among family
members. The early clinical work in the 1960s done by C. Henry Kempe
and his colleagues with children who had been battered by a parent or
foster parent helped raise public and professional awareness about child
abuse (Gelles and Maynard 1987). The women’s movement has been
instrumental in focusing attention on spouse abuse as well as incest and
sexual abuse of children. Today, research on domestic violence has mush¬
roomed, but even though more is now known about its causes and effects,
the problem remains widespread. Although some of us may comfort
ourselves with the belief that domestic violence is rare and only occurs in
families in which a parent or partner is “sick” or mentally ill, we will learn
here that this problem is more common than we would like to think and
is usually perpetrated by people who are thought to be quite normal.
Partner Abuse in Heterosexual Relationships

The problem of violence between intimate adult partners has long been
a rather contentious issue among both professionals and members of the
general public, but recent discussions of this topic have been tinged with
more controversy than usual. A good bit of this controversy has been
fueled by claims that most cases of spouse or partner abuse involve mutual
battering; that is, far from being a one-sided attack, most domestic violence
involves an exchange of physical and psychological abuse between part¬
ners. This is not a new argument; in the late 1970s, for instance, one
sociologist claimed that “husband abuse” was the most underreported
form of family violence (Steinmetz 1978). However, the “mutual combat”
or “mutual abuse” debate has gotten more attention lately, particularly in
the wake of the trials of John and Lorena Bobbitt in 1993 and 1994. Even
before the Bobbitt cases reached the courts, though, newspaper articles
and television talk shows were featuring men’s rights advocates (see chap¬
ter 13) who called for equal protection for battered men, citing findings
that appear to show that women assault their male partners as much as
men assault women (see, for example, Lewin 1992a).
Does empirical research support such a claim? Studies that have
surveyed women and men about whether they have used violence against
their partners do show that the rate of wife-to-husband assault is about the
same as the rate of husband-to-wife assault. Straus (1993), whose research
is most frequently cited as evidence of the prevalence of husband batter¬
ing, even reports a slightly higher assault rate for wives than for husbands:
approximately 124 assaults by wives per 1,000 couples compared with 122
238 Chapter 1
assaults by husbands per 1,000 couples. Taken at face value, then, these
statistics might lead one to argue that the violence of wives against hus¬
bands should be prosecuted more vigorously by the police and other
branches of the criminal justice system. The difficulty, however, is that it
is impossible to determine from such figures how many of the women
involved in assaulting their husbands are acting in self-defense or are
retaliating against their husbands’ abuse. Other research shows that hus¬
bands initiate the violence in the majority of cases, and if they kill their
partners, it is less often in self-defense than wives who kill their partners
(Saunders 1989). In addition, given the differences in size, strength, and
resources between husbands and wives, some have questioned the appro¬
priateness of labeling wives’ abusive behavior toward their husbands “bat¬
tery” (Kurz 1993; Saunders 1989; Gelles and Cornell 1985). Certainly, in
terms of the damage inflicted, it is wives who are most victimized. Straus’s
(1993) own findings show that when resulting injuries are taken into
account, the rate of serious assaults by wives against their husbands is
significantly lower (0.6 per 1,000) than serious assaults by husbands
against their wives (3.7 per 1,000). In fact, battery is the single major
cause of injury to women in the United States. What is more, 2,000 to
4,000 women are killed each year by their husbands and lovers. So wide¬
spread is the problem that a woman has a higher probability of being
assaulted by her partner in her own home than a police officer has of
being attacked on the job (U.S. Department of Justice 1994; U.S. House
of Representatives 1988; Browne 1987).
This latter finding also highlights another aspect of partner abuse
that is evident from research: violence among intimates is rarely an
isolated incident. Instead, partner abuse tends to follow a pattern or a
cycle in a relationship. After the first incident, the batterer is likely to be
remorseful and loving, but researchers warn that once the inhibition
against violence is broken, the likelihood of subsequent abuse is high. As
it becomes more frequent, it may also become more severe (Walker 1989;
Cedes and Cornell 1985). Yet, the public and some professionals have
often expressed only limited sympathy for women abused by their hus¬
bands and boyfriends, asking instead, “If it’s really so bad, why do they
stay? They’re adults; they can just leave.”
Research does show that women may remain with an abusive partner
for a number of years. Raising the question of why they stay has tradition¬
ally brought the response that they must enjoy the violence. It is also
commonly believed that many women provoke or cause the violence
perpetrated against them. In responding to these claims, it is important
\ to note that abused women themselves frequently come to accept such
ideas and blame themselves for the abuse. They frequently try to change
themselves or the circumstances that they think led to the abuse, and
most hold out hope that their husbands or boyfriends will change. How-
ever, they usually find that the abuse is unpredictable and that virtually
anything may trigger it (Walker 1989). Their lives become increasingly
controlled by their partners’ demands; most abusive husbands and boy¬
friends, for example, restrict their partners’ contacts with relatives and
friends, effectively isolating them from those who might provide help.
Many also exhibit irrational jealousy, accusing the women of infidelity
even though they monitor their every move (Walker 1989). It is not
difficult to understand that living under such conditions lowers self¬
esteem and generates severe depression and feelings of helplessness.
Intimidation and the threat of violence are often sufficient to keep women
paralyzed with fear in an abusive relationship (Edelson et al. 1985).
A second dimension of this intimidation arises when battered wives
assess their chances of financially supporting themselves and their chil¬
dren. In chapter 8, we will learn how various forms of employment and
wage discrimination keep women in low-paying, low-status jobs. We noted
earlier in this chapter that women experience a substantial drop in their
standard of living when they separate from their husbands. Not infre¬
quently, women’s economic dependence on men helps keep them
trapped in \iolent family relationships. This point is underscored by
research that shows that women who are quick to escape abusive mar¬
riages tend to be gainfully employed or have high chances for employ¬
ment, possess above-average resources, and have relatives nearby who are
willing and able to help them (Pagelow 1981).
Finally, Loseke and Cahill (1984:304-305) argue that many battered
wives remain with their abusers because of a personal commitment to the
relationship. They point out that experts and others who appear preoc¬
cupied with the question of why battered women stay assume that the
“normal” or rational response to abuse is to simply leave the marriage.
Yet, in our society a high value is placed on marital stability and women
are the ones who are expected to keep the family together, even at great
cost to themselves. Many marriages remain intact even though the part¬
ners may have lost their admiration or respect for one another. “Because
a large portion of an adult’s self is typically invested in their relationship
with their mate, persons become committed and attached to this mate as
a uniquely irreplaceable individual. Despite problems, ‘internal con¬
straints’ are experienced when contemplating the possibility of terminat¬
ing the relationship with the seemingly irreplaceable other. . . . [If] this is
the case, then women who remain in relationships containing violence
are not unusual or deviant; they are typical.”
In short, it is clear that battered women do not precipitate their
abuse, nor do they enjoy it. Many try to escape, some eventually do, and
more would probably leave sooner if realistic options were available or if
their personal commitment to the relationship was weaker. Feminists
have played a vital role in helping women escape from abusive relation-
240 Chapter 7
ships by working to establish safe space for them and their children in
shelters and by organizing a variety of other social services, including
counseling and permanent relocation assistance. In its 1991 directory of
domestic violence service providers, the National Coalition Against Do¬
mestic Violence listed more than 1,500 programs operating throughout
the United States. According to Dobash and Dobash (1992), U.S. shelters
for abuse victims house about 300,000 women and children annually.
Although these programs and shelters take diverse approaches to the
problem of domestic violence (Dobash and Dobash 1992), they are in¬
valuable in providing women with an alternative to remaining in an
abusive relationship.
Although we have spent considerable time examining the question
of why battered women stay in abusive relationships, we must emphasize
that we share the view of Loseke and Cahill (1984) that this really is not
the crucial question to be addressed. Instead, one must ask what factors
make it possible—even permissible—for husbands and boyfriends to
abuse their intimate partners? To respond to that question, we turn to the
literature on the causes of heterosexual partner abuse.
Much of the initial research on the causes of domestic violence
focused on the personal characteristics of batterers. One hypothesis was
that batterers were uneducated, lower-dass men, usually members of
racial minority groups, whose poor status made violence the only way they
could assert their masculinity and dominance in relationships. Sub¬
sequent research has shown, however, that although partner abuse
among lower-class and minority couples is more likely to be reported or
to come to the attention of the police, the problem is found in all racial
groups and crosses all socioeconomic and educational lines (U.S. Depart¬
ment ofjustice 1994). Lockhart (1991), for example, found no significant
differences between the percentages of African-American and white
women who reported being victimized by their husbands. Similarly,
Walker (1989) reports that in terms of socioeconomic and educational
status, there is no “typical” battered woman.
A second popular argument is that alcohol and drug abuse cause
battering. There is a relationship between substance abuse and family
violence, but it does not appear to be causal. Rather, drinking and drug
abuse tend to justify or excuse battering—for example, “I didn’t know
what I was doing; I was drunk.” Most batterers are not alcoholics or drug
addicts (Gelles 1993; Herman 1988). But perhaps they are psychologi¬
cally disturbed? The evidence for this is contradictory; although some
studies find that batterers tend to have a variety of psychological difficul-
^ ties, such as depression and poor self-concepts, and certain personality
disorders, others report no significant psychological differences between
batterers and nonbatterers (O’Leary 1993; Edelson et al. 1985). The
dangers with this hypothesis, as well as the two others, are that they
exonerate batterers from responsibility for their behavior and they isolate
domestic violence from the social context in which it occurs. “[M]en’s
violence toward their partners has been part of world culture for most of
written history and should be understood both as an individual and as a
sociocultural phenomenon (Edelson et al. 1985:238; Dobash and Dobash
1979).
Wife beating historically has been condoned in Western societies.
English Common Law permitted husbands to “correct” their wives
through domestic chastisement in the same manner that a man is al¬
lowed to correct his apprentices or children” (quoted in Kay 1988:192).
The law even prescribed the method for doing so: with a stick no thicker
than the husband’s thumb, hence the phrase “rule of thumb” (Browne
1987; Dobash and Dobash 1979). In the United States, until the late
1800s, husbands could legally beat their wives.
Although the laws have changed, prevalent attitudes remain remark¬
ably similar. Violence in our society is viewed by many as a normal part of
everyday life; research shows that violence between husbands and wives is
often seen as a positive and necessary component of marriage. Consider,
for example, that in one national survey, more than a quarter of the
respondents (27.6 percent) indicated that slapping a spouse is necessary,
normal, or good (Dibble and Straus 1990). This approval extends to
premarital relationships, too. Research indicates that one out of ten high
school students and two to three out of ten college students experience
courtship violence, but 29 to 36 percent of them interpret the abuse as
love and as helping to improve their relationships (Flynn 1987. See also
DeKeseredy and Kelly 1993; but for a different view, see O’Leary 1993).
To this we must add the notion of family privacy. Among the general
public, social science agencies, police, and judges, there is a continuing
reluctance to violate the privacy of the home and family life. There seems
to be an unwritten rule that what goes on between family members, even
if it is violent, is no one else’s business. This unwillingness to intervene
makes it difficult for wives to get help and also sends husbands the
message that they will rarely be held accountable for their violence.
Medical staff, for example, often do not believe spouse abuse is a legiti¬
mate medical problem and frequently are reluctant to label the women
they treat as battering victims (Easteal and Easteal 1992; Kurz 1987).
Many battered women’s advocates have been highly critical of the
police for failing to take domestic violence calls seriously and respond to
them effectively. Since the late 1970s, however, law enforcement practices
with respect to domestic violence have changed considerably as a result
of pressure from women’s groups, several lawsuits brought against the
police by battered women, and the publication of research findings indi¬
cating that arresting batterers acts as a deterrent to future abuse (Buzawa
and Buzawa 1993). In fact, according to Sherman (1992), mandatory or
242 Chapter 7
preferred arrest policies for dealing with domestically violent offenders

have been adopted by about 84 percent of urban police agencies in the
United States; fifteen states and the District of Columbia have policies
mandating arrest when there is probable cause that domestic violence has
occurred.
While such changes have been hailed by some observers as a victory
for battered women, others are more cautious, citing findings from sub¬
sequent analyses showing that arrest is no more effective than other forms
of police intervention such as advising and separating the partners and
mediating the dispute (Buzawa and Buzawa 1993). A number of recent
studies indicate that arrest appears to be effective only with certain
groups of domestically violent men and only under certain circumstances.
For example, arrest seems to be an effective deterrent among batterers
who have a high stake in conformity—that is, they are employed or they
have strong ties to friends and relatives who would not react well to their
arrest. Not surprisingly, it is ineffective with repeat offenders and, in some
cases, such as when it is followed by rapid release and little or no follow¬
up, arrest may actually increase the probability of future domestic violence
(Berk 1993; Sherman 1992). Buzawa and Buzawa (1993) argue that arrest
alone is insufficient to deter domestic violence; rather, arrest must be
combined with a variety of other “treatments”: the batterer should be
held in jail for a period of time, both the batterer and the victim should
receive long-term counseling, and restraining orders against batterers
should be issued automatically upon arrest.
It is also the case that battered women sometimes do not wish their
abusive partners to be arrested. For example, arrest may cause financial
hardship for some women by eliminating a source of income from the
household. In addition, mandatory arrest policies may actually inhibit
some women from calling the police. Middle- and upper-class women may
be reluctant to call because of the potential embarrassment. In some
Jurisdictions, police arrest reports are published in the local papers,
which may cause battered women and their children to be stigmatized
along with the batterers. Minority women who have had bad experiences
with the police or who have witnessed incidents of police brutality against
members of their communities may also be reluctant to ask for police
intervention (Buzawa and Buzawa 1993).
Mandatory or preferred arrest policies also raise the question of
enforcement. Sherman (1992) notes that even though the vast majority
of urban police agencies have adopted such polices, they are not uni¬
formly enforced (see also Ferraro 1989). At the same time, recent re¬
search indicates that a disturbing byproduct of mandatory arrest policies
is an increase in the number of battered women who are being arrested
along with their abusive partners (Buzawa and Buzawa 1993). Such
women, in fact, may have behaved violently and, therefore, technically
meet the probable cause criterion. Realistically, however, these women

were most likely fighting back or defending themselves against their
abusers, in which case arrest is clearly inappropriate. It is also not uncom¬
mon for the judges before whom these women eventually appear to
“sentence” them to treatment programs for batterers (see Hamberger
and Potente, forthcoming, for a description of one such program). In¬
deed, there is evidence that battered women often fare worse than batter¬
ers in court. For instance, according to a report by the House of
Representatives Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families
(1988:2), “A battered woman who kills her husband to protect the lives of
her children or herself is more likely to be convicted of murder than the
husband who beats his wife to death.”
The trend toward favoring mandatory arrest is likely to grow given
congressional passage of the Violence Against Women Act, which offers
incentives to states that arrest batterers. However, this legislation also
mandates harsher penalties for batterers, imposes federal penalties on
batterers who cross state lines in pursuit of a fleeing partner, and substan¬
tially increases federal funding for battered women’s shelters and pro¬
grams. The impact of the new law remains to be seen, but it is hoped that
it will finally turn the tables on batterers who historically have been
afforded more legal protection in our society than those they victimize.
Partner Abuse in Lesbian and Gay Relationships

Much less is known about partner abuse in lesbian and gay relationships
because, until quite recently, the problem has been either ignored or
denied. To a large extent this neglect is a result of widespread heterosex¬
ism within the social sciences and other academic disciplines; partner
abuse among same-sex couples was a problem not deemed worthy of study
by most researchers. The accepted model of domestic violence has been
one in which partner abuse is something men do, and they do it only to
women. It is also the case that members of the lesbian and gay communi¬
ties have had a stake in preserving this model. They have been (not
unjustly) concerned that open discussion of the problem of partner abuse
in lesbian and gay relationships would fuel homophobic stereotypes and
tarnish the image of gay, and especially lesbian, relationships as egalitar¬
ian and free from the power struggles of heterosexual relationships.
During the 1980s, however, lesbians and gay men who had been abused
by their partners began to tell their stories (Lobel 1986), and empirical
research on the problem soon followed.
It is impossible to know at this point the frequency of violence in
lesbian and gay relationships. Some writers argue that it occurs at about
the same rate as violence in heterosexual relationships (Island and Letel-
lier 1991; Brand and Kidd 1986). However, we must be cautious in accept-
244 Chapter 7
ing such findings since t\iey are derived from studies of lesbians and gay
men who volunteered to participate in such research and, therefore, may
not be representative of the general lesbian and gay populations. Never¬
theless, research with battered lesbians and gay men does indicate that,
like heterosexual domestic violence, homosexual partner abuse does not
appear to be a one-time situational event, but rather, once it has oc¬
curred, it is likely to recur and also to grow more severe over time
(Renzetti 1992).
Homosexual partner abuse may take the same forms as heterosexual
partner abuse. It may be physical, psychological, or financial; usually, it is
a combination of these. However, one form of abuse unique to lesbian
and gay relationships is “outing” or the threat of outing—that is, revealing
or threatening to reveal one’s partner’s sexual orientation. In one study,
21 percent of the respondents reported that their partners had threat¬
ened to “out” them (Renzetti 1992). As we noted earlier, lesbians and gay
men confront widespread discrimination such that outing could result in
the loss of a job, abandonment by relatives and friends, and a host of
other negative consequences.
Research indicates that in most abusive same-sex relationships, the
abuse begins less than six months into the relationship, but that these
relationships may last from one to five years or more (Renzetti 1992). If
observers have been somewhat suspicious of battered heterosexual
women who stay with their abusive partners for any length of time, they
may be characterized as totally unsympathetic toward battered lesbians
and gay men who fail to quickly leave their abusive partners. As we noted
previously, there is a prevalent belief that lesbian and gay relationships
are highly unstable. Given that lesbians and gay men do not have the
same legal ties to one another that heterosexual married women usually
have to their husbands, shouldn’t it be even easier for them to simply
leave an abusive partner?
In response to that question, we wish to reiterate an earlier point:
raising the question of why someqne stays in an abusive relationship is
misguided; what should concern us is the question of why abuse is so
prevalent in intimate relationships of all kinds. Setting that issue aside for
the moment, however, we will consider the question of why abused lesbi¬
ans and gay men might stay with abusive partners, since it is one of the
questions that is most frequently asked.
First, as we pointed out in a previous section, research indicates that
gay men, and especially lesbians, have a high level of closeness and
attachment to their partners. Notions of widespread promiscuity and
^ relationship instability appear to be largely inaccurate. It should not be
surprising then that the reasons battered lesbians and gay men give for
remaining with their abusive partners are the same as those most fre¬
quently offered by battered heterosexual women: “I love my partner,”
I thought my partner would change,” “I thought I could do something

to change my partner” (Renzetti 1992; Island and Letellier 1991). Bat¬
tered lesbians and gay men have difficulty leaving abusive partners be¬
cause they have a deep personal commitment to them and to the
relationship.
Second, as we also mentioned earlier, many lesbians and gay men
are involved in domestic partnerships in which they share housing with
their partners and have made joint purchases—sometimes expensive
ones. Leaving an abusive partner, then, may result in a substantial finan¬
cial loss which may or may not be recoverable through legal action should
the abused partner choose to take such action; most, for obvious reasons,
do not feel comfortable turning to the courts for help. For some battered
lesbians and gay men, leaving an abusive partner would mean leaving
one’s own house or abandoning cherished possessions. Others exhaust
their financial resources during the relationship and feel economically
trapped (Renzetti 1992).
Finally, Island and Letellier (1991) point out that the problem of
AIDS increases the difficulty that gay males who are abuse victims con¬
front in trying to leave their batterers.® On the one hand, an abuse
victim whose batterer has AIDS may feel tremendous guilt about leav¬
ing a dying partner with no one else to care for him. On the other
hand, an abuse victim who also has AIDS may be so dependent on his
batterer for financial support and for assistance with the tasks of everyday
life that he decides it is better to remain in the relationship than risk
living alone.
It is ironic that so many observers expect battered lesbians and gay
men to quickly leave abusive relationships when there are so few services
available to assist them if they do leave. Most of the programs and services
available to battered heterosexual women are not perceived by battered
lesbians and gay men to be available to them. These perceptions are not
inaccurate. For example, few battered lesbians and gay men feel comfort¬
able calling the police. Given that the police have not been very effective
in responding to domestic violence calls generally, and that there is
widespread homophobia in many police departments (see chapter 9), it
is hardly surprising that when battered lesbians and gay men do call the
police, they report that the police usually either do not take their com-
Âlthough this is not a problem that affects gay men exclusively, it is particularly
relevant to their situations since they constitute the largest percentage of people with
AIDS (see chapter 12). Island and Letellier (1991) express concern that AIDS—or,
more specifically, the stress induced from the fear of contracting AIDS, from dealing
with the disease if one has contracted it, or in trying to care for an infected partner—
is becoming an excuse for gay male violence.
246 Chapter 7
plaints seriously or they respond with hostility (Renzetti 1992). Shelters

and similar programs also are not a viable alternative for most battered
lesbians and gay men. One recent survey of 1,505 domestic violence
service providers showed that although the môrity indicated that they
would accept lesbians as clients, only 53 reported any direct outreach to
lesbian victims. In addition, only 40.6 percent of the service providers
reported that their volunteers receive any training specifically about part¬
ner abuse in same-sex relationships, and just over 50 percent provide
anti-homophobia training (Renzetti, forthcoming). And if battered lesbi¬
ans typically feel unwelcome in many programs, it is not difficult to
understand why most battered gay men do not even attempt to utilize
such services (Island and Letellier 1991).
While many abused heterosexual women turn to their relatives for
help, this is not an option for many abused lesbians and gay men. Some
have not come out to their relatives about their sexual orientation. Others
have severed ties with their relatives. And still others report that although
their relatives are aware of their sexual orientation, they do not feel
comfortable asking them for help because their relatives disapprove of
their homosexuality. To these women and men, confiding in their rela¬
tives about the abuse would likely reinforce the relatives’ negative and
hostile views of homosexual relationships. 4n fact, some have stated that
their parents’ disapproval of their relationships actually motivated them
to try to save it despite the abuse, just so their parents could not say, “I
told you so” (Renzetti 1992).
Most abused lesbians and gay men do seek help from counselors and
friends, and many who do so report that these individuals are helpful to
them in many ways—for example, by giving them a place to stay tempo¬
rarily. However, it is also the case that counselors and friends often
minimize the violence in gay, and especially in lesbian, relationships,
adhering to the traditional model of domestic violence that we outlined
earlier. It is commonly reported that counselors and friends are reluctant
to label abusive behavior in lesbianxand gay relationships as “battering”
(Renzetti 1992; Lobel 1986). It is also the case that counselors and friends
try to help partners get back together and preserve the relationship,
rather than encouraging abuse victims to leave their partners (Renzetti
1992).
In sum, available evidence indicates that partner abuse does occur
in lesbian and gay relationships and that when it does occur, it is fre¬
quently severe. The data also show, however, that lesbian and gay victims
of domestic violence are inhibited from leaving abusive partners not only
because of their personal commitments to their relationships, but also
because the homophobia rampant in our society cuts them off from
most alternatives. Indeed, it may be argued that homophobia and
discrimination have combined with our society’s at least tacit approval
of violence to help generate and perpetuate lesbian and gay domestic

violence.
Child Abuse
We have already pointed out that historically children have been re¬
garded as the property of their parents, in particular their fathers. The
view of children as property, coupled with the notion that children will
behave like wild animals if they are not subdued and tamed, has through
much of Western history served as a justification for beating them. Con¬
sider, for example, the thirteenth century statute that maintained that “If
one beats a child until it bleeds, then it will remember, but if one beats it
to death, the law applies” (de Mause 1974:42). In Puritan America, par¬
ents were instructed to “beat the devil” out of their children (Gelles and
Cornell 1985). Kammeyer (1987) reports that the beating of children
with rods, straps, paddles, and other instruments by caretakers and par¬
ents was routine in the United States and Europe into the first half of the
nineteenth century. Importantly, this was a childrearing practice common
among families of all social classes, as a 1755 journal entry by Ester Burr,
wife of the president of Princeton College, indicates. According to Kam¬
meyer (1987:343), Burr wrote that she had “whipped” her ten-month-old
daughter for doing something wrong and “ ’tis time she should be
taught.” Although changes in ideology about childhood and childrearing
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries helped to discourage
severe and routine beatings, corporal punishment continued to be
viewed, as it is today, as an acceptable method of disciplining children.
Most people still believe that children need to be hit (Dibble and Straus
1990; Gelles and Cornell 1985).
There is, of course, a major difference between a light pat on the
behind and physical abuse. In addition, children may be harmed as much
by neglect as by physical punishment. How prevalent, then, are incidents
in which children are killed, injured, or put at serious risk of injury?
Based on available data, it is estimated that about 6.9 million children are
abused by parents each year in the United States and 1.5 million are
seriously assaulted by their parents (Straus and Gelles 1990). These
estimates were based on a national survey of the general U.S. popula¬
tion; other estimates are considerably lower, ranging from 500,000 to
1.5 million cases of child abuse and neglect annually. However, most
analysts agree that the latter figures are conservative estimates since they
are usually derived from cases known to police, social service agencies,
and health-care professionals. As many as one third of all abuse and
neglect cases may go unreported or undetected, particularly if they in¬
volve middle-class or wealthy families. Even the conservative estimates,
though, are alarming, but they help to explain why homicide is the fourth
248 Chapter 7
highest cause of death among children (U.S. Department of Commerce

1993).
Most studies show that male and female children are equally suscep¬
tible to neglect and abuse with just one exception: girls are significantly
more likely than boys to be sexually abused. Although the sexual exploi¬
tation of children may be perpetrated by strangers, most victims know
their abusers; abusers are frequently a relative, stepparent, family friend,
or close neighbor. Again, estimates of child sexual abuse vary, but it has
been argued that conservatively, about 19 percent of girls and 9 percent
of boys have been sexually abused by the time they turn eighteen, about
40 percent of them by a relative (Hodson and Skeen 1987; Finkelhor
1984). In one study, sociologist Diana Russell (1986) found that 16 per¬
cent of a random sample of 930 adult women had been sexually victim¬
ized as children by a relative, including 4.5 percent who had been abused
by their fathers or stepfathers. Russell’s work is especially important
because it helps refute the myth that incest occurs only in lower-class
households; in her study, more than half the victims were from middle-
class families. The extensive evidence of physical and sexual abuse intro¬
duced by the defense during the recent murder trials of Eric and Lyle
Menendez also underscores this point.
Wliat are the factors associated with child abuse and neglect? Al¬
though it is beyond the scope of this text to examine all of these, we will
focus on the ones that are related to the issues we have been discussing
in this chapter. For instance, there is considerable evidence that un¬
wanted or unplanned children are at high risk for abuse and neglect
(Zuravin 1987). Recognizing this, participants in the 1985 Surgeon Gen¬
eral’s Workshop on Violence and Public Health concluded that “the
starting point for effective child abuse prevention is pregnancy planning”
(Cron 1986: 10). Most studies also show that mothers are as likely or more
likely than fathers to abuse their children, even though as we will see in
chapter 9, women’s rates of violence in general are significantly lower
than those of men. This finding may simply be an artifact of the amount
of time mothers spend with their children. But it may also be due to the
greater social isolation of women in the home, since research indicates
that parents who are socially isolated are more likely to abuse their
children (Straus and Smith 1990; Gelles and Cornell 1985). In addition,
although mothers more often than biological fathers abuse their chil¬
dren, stepfathers and boyfriends of single mothers are also frequent
abusers, especially sexual abusers (Gordon and Creighton 1988; Hodson
and Skeen 1987).
Finally, we must not forget that child abuse occurs in a specific
historical and social context. Contemporary approval of parental control
over children is rooted in our history. Moreover, we live in a society in
which the credo “might makes right” guides much social interaction as
well as public policy, and in which females are routinely objectified sexu-
ally (see chapter 9). People learn that violence is a way to solve problems
and that the powerless are appropriate victims.
Elder Abuse
Research on child abuse and partner abuse has prompted interest in

other forms of violence between intimates, including elder abuse. Although
experts disagree on a precise definition of elder abuse, for our purposes
the term refers to physical, psychological, or financial maltreatment or
neglect of a senior citizen by an adult caretaker. Obviously, such abuse can
be inflicted by anyone entrusted with the care of an elderly person—for
example, nurses, physicians, bankers, or lawyers—but research indicates
that the typical abuser is a family member (Kosberg 1988; Pillemer and
Finkelhor 1988).
Like domestic violence in same-sex relationships, much less is
known about elder abuse than child or heterosexual partner abuse largely
because the research is more recent, most of it undertaken during the
1980s. In addition, many of these studies failed to yield generalizable
findings because they are based on small, nonrandom samples or official
police and social service agency reports (Steinmetz 1993; Callahan 1988;
Kosberg 1988). The only large-scale random survey published to date
produced an estimate of between 700,000 and one million abused elderly
in the United States (Pillemer and Finkelhor 1988).
Despite the serious theoretical and methodological weaknesses of
the available research, it nevertheless provides us with clues as to who is
at greatest risk of being abused and who are the likely abusers. Of particu¬
lar interest to students of gender relations is the observation that women
aged seventy-five and older who are infirm and physically or financially
dependent on others for meeting their basic daily needs are most suscep¬
tible to abuse (Kosberg 1988; Pillemer and Finkelhor 1988). Women may
have higher rates of victimization simply because they outnumber elderly
men (see chapter 12), but it is also likely because of their inability to resist
abuse, their greater vulnerability to sexual assault (see chapter 9), and
their devalued status in our society. One study, however, reported little
difference in the victimization rates of women and men, but found that
women suffered more serious physical and psychological harm from the
abuse (Pillemer and Finkelhor 1988).
Evidence regarding abusers is less conclusive. Initial research find¬
ings showed that although frequently the abuser is an adult son, it is more
often an adult daughter who has taken on the difficult task of caring for
a severely impaired aged parent who lives with her. As we noted earlier in
this chapter, women are significantly more likely than men to assume
responsibility for the care of an elderly relative and they add this burden
to other daily responsibilities, including paid employment, care of their
own children, and housework. Typically they receive little or no outside
250 Chapter 7
assistance. Eventually, tlie stress induced from these circumstances be¬

comes so great that some caregivers grow angry and resentful and lash
out against their elderly parent (Steinmetz 1993).
Additional research supports these findings, but also shows greater
diversity among abusers than was originally thought. For example, a
sizeable percentage of abusers are the victims’ spouses. The violence may
be a continuation of a pattern of abuse in the marriage or, as it has been
hypothesized in the case of abusive wives, revenge for previous abuse by
the husband. Pillemer and Finkelhor (1988), however, point out that
more elderly people live with a spouse than with an adult child, and when
this is taken into account, the data show children to be more likely
abusers than spouses. Some of these adult children were themselves
abused when they were growing up and thus learned that violence toward
intimates is acceptable behavior, or they may be acting in retaliation
against their abusive parents (Kosberg 1988). Others, rather than having
an elderly parent dependent on them, are instead still dependent on
their parent for income or housing. Consequently, the abuse may stem
from “the relative dependency and sense of powerlessness of the abuser.
In fact, powerlessness experienced by a child who is still dependent on an
elderly parent may be especially acute, as such a situation goes so strongly
against society’s expectations of normal adult behavior” (Pillemer
1985:155), especially for men (see also Pillemer 1993).
At least thirty-seven states have enacted laws to deal with elder abuse
by making reporting of incidents of abuse or neglect of senior citizens
mandatory. Callahan (1988) and others (e.g., Kosberg 1988), though,
question the effectiveness of such laws, given that they address the prob¬
lem only after the fact and the programs they create are usually too
underfunded to adequately meet the needs of elderly victims. A more
successful strategy might be preventive measures, such as providing adult
children with greater institutional assistance and support in caring for
their elderly parents (Steinmetz 1993). In addition, given the evidence
examined here, it is unlikely that Îder abuse can be eliminated unless
other forms of family violence are also dealt with effectively. Finally, the
elderly are ascribed a devalued status in our society and this, in turn,
increases their vulnerability to abuse. Research and public policy, there¬
fore, must focus on how gender inequality intersects with ageism to
produce and perpetuate domestic violence.
INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS: THE IDEAL

AND THE REAL REVISITED
The material presented in this chapter illuminates for us the disparity

between traditional images of ideal intimate relationships and their real-
ity in everyday life. We have seen that the social construction of The
Family—that is, the isolated, nuclear household of husband/breadwinner,
wife/homemaker, and dependent children—is not only an inaccurate
depiction of the majority of families in the United States, but also pro¬
motes the misconception that other family arrangements and relation¬
ships, including homosexual ones, are inherently deviant or abnormal.
Compounding this image is the notion of the family as a private
retreat from the harsh public world. First, this idea masks the very serious
problems that members of intimate relationships confront as the gender
inequality of the larger society is replicated and preserved in the home:
the power imbalance between partners, an unequal division of household
labor and caregiving responsibilities, women’s double work load, the
economic difficulties of female-headed families, and domestic violence.
Many of these problems are made worse by racism, ageism, heterosexism,
and social class inequality, creating power differences between families in
addition to those within them. Second, this idea of family privacy ignores
the many ways in which other social institutions impinge upon intimate
relationships. For example, we have seen here that the official policies of
governments and churches serve to constrain even the most personal and
private decisions, including how and with whom we may have sexual
relations and whether or not we will bear children.
Similarly, a recurring theme in this chapter has been the intersec¬
tion of family life and work. Indeed, we have argued that one cannot
examine intimate relationships in isolation from employment issues. In
the next chapter, we turn to the topic of gender and the occupational
work world, but our discussion will often require us to reiterate many of
the points made here.
KEY TERMS
domestic partnership couples who are cohabiting or living together without

being married
double work load a problem faced by women who are in the paid labor force
but who also maintain primary responsibility for housework and caregiv¬
ing
feminization of poverty the position that poverty is increasingly becoming a
problem affecting primarily women and tbeir dependent children
isolated nuclear family a family form in which the husband/father,
wife/mother, and their dependent children establish a household sepa¬
rate from other kin, and private in the sense that production no longer
takes place there
new reproductive technologies a variety of laboratory techniques, including in
vitro fertilization, that allow those who are infertile, who are physically un¬
able to conceive or sustain a pregnancy, or who are able to get pregnant
252 Chapter 7
but do not have a male partner or do not wish to enter into a committed
relationship with a man, to become parents
no-fault divorce a form of marital dissolution that allows either spouse to di¬
vorce the other on the ground of irreconcilable differences and without
fixing blame for the marital breakdown
public/private split the notion that the world of the family is private and
therefore separate from and uninfluenced by the public world of work
and other social institutions
second shift (see double work load)
sexual double standard the tradition of permitting young men to engage in
sexual activity while simultaneously condemning and punishing the same
behavior by young women
SUGGESTED READINGS
Bedard, M. E. 1992. Breaking with Tradition. Dix Hills, NY: General Hall.
Bozett, F. W., and S. M. H. Hanson (Eds.) 1990. Fatherhood and Families in Cultural
Context. New York: Springer.
Cardarelli, A. P. (Ed.) 1995. Violence Among Intimate Partners: Patterns, Causes and
Effects. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Hochschild, A. 1989. The Second Shift. New York: Viking.
Martin, A. 1993. The Gay and Lesbian Parenting Handbook. New York: Harper
Collins.
Rothman, B. K. 1989. Recreating Motherhood. New York: W. W. Norton and Com¬
pany.
Thorne, B. (Ed.), with M. Yalom 1992. Rethinking the Family: Some Feminist Ques¬
tions. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
Weston, K. 1991. Families We Choose: Lesbians, Gays, Kinship. New York: Columbia
University Press.
\
Chapter
Gender, Employment,
and the Economy
254 Chapter 8
\
When we speak of a society’s economy, we are referring to its system of
managing and developing its resources, both human and material. The
human resources of the economy constitute the labor force. Sociologists
have long emphasized the significance of work in humans lives. At the
most basic level, work is necessary to meet one’s survival needs. Most
work, though, is not done by individuals laboring in isolation, but rather
entails the coordination of the activities of a group. Work, in other words,
is social as well as economic, and in the United States, as in other indus¬
trialized capitalist societies, the social organization of work is hierarchical.
People do different jobs that are differentially valued and rewarded.
Ideally, the value and rewards attached to a particular job should reflect
its intrinsic characteristics: for example, the degree of skill required, the
amount of effort expended, the level of responsibility involved, and the
conditions under which it is performed. In practice, however, the value
and rewards of a job often have more to do with the ascribed traits of
workers—their race, for instance, and/or their sex.
Our focus in this chapter is on the different economic and employ¬
ment experiences of women and men and the differential values and
rewards that have been attached to their work. Both men and women
have always worked, but the kinds of work opportunities available to them
and the rewards they have accrued have typically depended less on their
talents as individuals than on culturally prescribed and enforced notions
of “women’s work” and “men’s work.” We know from our discussion in
chapter 3 that such prescriptions vary from society to society. They also
vary historically within a single society. We will begin our discussion here,
then, with a brief historical overview of men’s and women’s labor force
participation in the United States.
U.S. WORKING WOMEN AND MEN

IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Men’s and women’s participation in the wage labor force has been shaped
by a number of factors, not the least of which have been changes in
production and demographic changes. These, too, have influenced pre¬
vailing gender ideologies of men’s and women’s appropriate work roles.
Undeniably, one of the most important changes occurred during
the nineteenth century when the American economy shifted from being
predominantly agricultural to becoming industrialized, moving produc¬
tion off the farms and into factories. Interestingly, industrialization is
frequently discussed only in terms of its effects on male workers, the
common assumption being that women did not accompany men into the
factories, but instead remained at home as family caretakers. This,
though, was true only in certain households. Overall, men entered the
Gender, Employment, and the Economy 255
paid labor force in significandy greater numbers than women. At the

same time, dominant middle-class ideology dictated that the so-called
true woman was the woman at home who supposedly did not work. But
among particular groups of women—women in poor and working class
families, women rearing children alone, minority women, and white im¬
migrant women—few could afford to stay at home. The exigencies of
survival required that they find paid employment, and the harsh reality
of their work world stood sharply juxtaposed to the prosperous middle-
class image of genteel womanhood (Glenn 1992; Cott 1987; Stansell
1986).
A substantial number of early factory workers were women. In the
New England textile mills, for instance, most of the labor force was female
by 1850 (Werthheimer 1979). In urban areas such as New York City
women were heavily concentrated in the garment industry as seamstresses
(Glenn 1990; Stansell 1986). Other women did piece work, such as fold¬
ing books, rolling cigars, or making flowers for wealthier ladies’ hats.
They labored fourteen to eighteen hours a day under extraordinarily
unsafe conditions for a daily wage of 10 to 18 cents. Of course, factory
work for men was unpleasant and dangerous too, but from the outset men
and women were largely segregated into different jobs with the more
skilled—and better paid—work open only to men. Widespread stereo¬
types about women’s innate passivity and physical weakness and their
greater tolerance for tedium legitimated offering women work that was
usually the most boring and repetitive. In addition, despite the fact that
many women’s wages were crucial to their families’ welfare, the belief that
women worked only temporarily until they married was used to justify
their lower wage rates (Kessler-Harris 1990; Reskin and Hartmann 1986).
Labor organizers and male workers themselves capitalized on the notion
that paid work was “unladylike” and argued that no woman would have to
work if men were provided a “family wage.” Trade unions systematically
excluded women or organized them into separate unions. Far fewer
women than men were unionized. Even in unions with large numbers of
female members the union leadership typically was male, although sev¬
eral recent historical analyses show that in some unions women did
gain valuable organizing and leadership experience (Gabin 1990; Glenn
1990). Nevertheless, until the 1930s, most unions were racially segregated
as well as sex segregated (Gabin 1990; Hine 1989).
Jobs in manufacturing, however, were available primarily to white
women. Minority women, though more likely than white women to be in
the paid labor force, historically have found their employment opportu¬
nities largely limited to agricultural work (e.g., fruit and vegetable har¬
vesters), domestic work (e.g., house maids), and laundry work (Amott
and Matthaei 1991). For instance, in 1890, 38.7 percent of black female
workers held agricultural jobs, 30.8 percent were domestics, 15.6 percent
256 Chapter 8
\
were laundresses, but only 2.8 percent worked in manufacturing. Three
decades later, agriculture, domestic service, and laundries still employed
75 percent of black female workers and, although more black women
were in manufacturing, they faced widespread segregation and discrimi¬
nation in the factories: “White women were sometimes able to start work
one hour later, and when amenities such as lunchrooms, fresh drinking
water, and clean toilets were available, they were available primarily to
white women” (Sidel 1986:60; see also Glenn 1992).
The experiences of Asian and Hispanic women workers were similar
to those of black women with the important exception, of course, that
black women had also been enslaved in the United States (Glenn 1992;
Romero 1992; Zavella 1987). It is true, too, that the dirtiest, most menial,
and lowest paying jobs went to minority men as well as minority women,
but while minority men received considerably lower wages than white
men, they were paid more than minority women (see, for example,
Zavella 1987). Historically, minority women have been the lowest paid
members of the labor force.
Ironically, one can argue that the social disorganization wrought on
many groups by nineteenth century industrialization, urbanization, and
immigration, actually created new job opportunities for white middle-
class women, especially the college educated. Extending their domestic
roles to the larger society, they took up “civic housekeeping” and lobbied
for a variety of social welfare reforms, including wages and hours laws,
child labor prohibitions, improved housing for the poor, and public
health measures. Some supported these causes by forming or joining
voluntary organizations, but others made a career of it by entering the
“female professions” of nursing, teaching, and social work (Cott 1987;
Evans 1987). Such jobs were not perceived as a threat to genteel woman¬
hood since women were expected to perform good works and to nurture
and care for others. To these were added other stereotypes when, as
production expanded and the need for service workers grew, women
were recruited for secretarial and other clerical positions. It was argued,
for instance, that women’s natural dexterity and compliant personalities
made them ideally suited for office work (Kessler-Harris 1982). The
ideology that women’s work was temporary or secondary to men’s re¬
mained intact and helped to keep jobs sex segregated and women’s wages
depressed.
Table 8.1 shows men’s and women’s labor force participation rates
from 1900 to 1993. The early decennial statistics, however, mask some
important changes in the labor force during the first half of this century,
especially during the Great Depression. You will notice in Table 8.1 that
between 1920 and 1930, men’s labor force participation rate declined
slightly, whereas women’s rose slightly. During the Depression, many
married women entered the paid labor force to support their families
TABLE 0.1 Labor Force Participation Rates by 0ex,

1900-1993 (7o of population 16 and older)*
Year Male Female
1900 53.7 20.0

1920 54.3 22.7
1930 53.2 23.6
1940 55.2 27.9
1945 61.6 35.8
1950 59.9 33.9
1955 60.4 35.7
1960 60.2 37.8
1965 59.7 39.3
1970 61.3 43.4
1975 78.4 46.4
1980 77.8 51.6
1985 76.3 54.5
1993 75.6 58.2
*Prior to 1947, the Census Bureau included in these figures all persons
14 years and older in the labor force.
Source: U.S. Department of l^bor 1993a; U.S. Department of Commerce
1990; 1976; Taeuber and Valdisera 1986.
when their husbands were out of work. Unfortunately, these women were
often accused of stealing jobs from men, although “in reality, the perva¬
sive sex segregation of the labor force meant that women and men rarely
competed for the same jobs” (Evans 1987:46). In fact, the clerical and
service jobs in which these women were concentrated have traditionally
been less sensitive to economic downturns than male blue-collar jobs in
manufacturing and the building trades (Reskin and Hartmann 1986).
Nevertheless, “numerous states, cities, and school boards passed laws
prohibiting or limiting the employment of married women. And since
cultural norms still ascribed the breadwinner’s role to men, those women
who lost paid jobs, or were unable to find paid work, found that relief
programs for the unemployed consistently discriminated against them”
(Evans 1987:47).
With the outbreak of World War II, the U.S. economy reversed itself,
and the wartime production boom created jobs for millions of Americans,
but especially for women. The enlistment of a large percentage of men
into the military resulted in critical labor shortages and forced employers
to recruit women to take men’s places. Women entered the labor force in
unprecedented numbers between 1940 and 1945 but, more importantly,
they were given jobs previously held only by men—for example, welding.
258 Chapter 8
riveting, ship fitting, tool making, and so on. Minority women, though
still severely discriminated against, also had new job opportunities
opened to them during the war, not only in blue-collar work, but in
clerical fields and in nursing as well. For the duration of the war, the
federal government campaigned aggressively to recruit women for the
labor force by appealing to their sense of patriotism—but also on a more
practical level by urging employers to pay them the same wages men
would have received and by sponsoring public day care centers (Gluck
1987; Milkman 1987; Bergmann 1986).
Once the war ended, women were laid off to make room in the labor
force for returning servicemen. Federal war programs, such as public
child care facilities, were abruptly discontinued, and new government-
issued propaganda told women to return to their “normal” roles as wives
and mothers at home. Some women did quit their jobs, and marriage and
birth rates soared in the early postwar years. But public opinion polls
showed that as many as 80 percent of the women who held jobs during
the war wished to keep them, and a substantial number simply moved into
the traditionally female-dominated—and lower paying—service sector
rather than leave the labor force altogether (Kesselman 1990; Evans 1987;
Milkman 1987).
As we see in Table 8. 1, women’s labor force participation rate never
returned to its prewar level. In fact, since 1950, even though men’s labor
force participation rate has fluctuated in response to dips in the economy
and calls to service during military conflicts, women’s labor force partici¬
pation rate has risen steadily. The greatest increase, however, occurred
after 1965. To some extent, this was due to an important demographic
change: women’s life expectancy increased and their fertility rate (even
during the baby boom years) decreased compared with earlier genera¬
tions. This has meant that middle-class women who have been full-time
homemakers can expect to spend fewer years rearing children and, there¬
fore, have greater freedom to pursue other activities including paid em¬
ployment, although this freedom 'may be tempered as an increasing
number of women take on the responsibility of caring for aging parents
in their homes (see chapter 7). The rising divorce rate coupled with
changes in divorce laws discussed in the previous chapter also resulted in
more women being forced to support themselves and their children
without the financial help of a spouse. In addition, recent economic
changes have played a major part. For one thing, the service sector of the
economy expanded rapidly after the war and much of the job growth
occurred in fields labeled “women’s work”—primarily clerical work, but
also health care and education (Glenn 1992). Later economic recessions
fueled women’s labor force participation as two incomes became a neces¬
sity to make ends meet in many families (Smith 1987). Finally, political
and social changes were important, particularly those prompted by the
feminist movement. The feminist movement itself called into question

traditional notions of women’s “proper place” and encouraged women to
redefine their roles and to seek paid employment. Moreover, feminist
activists were instrumental in securing the passage of legislation that
facilitated women’s greater participation in the labor force.
Today, the typical woman, like the typical man, is in the paid labor
force and is working full-time, year-round. However, there are significant
differences between women’s and men’s employment experiences. For
example, one of the most dramatic increases in labor force participation
has been among married women with children under the age of six; only
12 percent of such women were employed in 1950 compared with 59.9
percent in 1992 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993). But, as we
pointed out in chapter 7, employed married women, especially those with
children, carry a double work load; unlike employed married men, they
not only hold jobs outside the home, but also shoulder primary responsi¬
bility for housework and child care. We will see momentarily how such an
arrangement constrains women’s employment opportunities.
A second important difference between women’s and men’s employ¬
ment experiences lies in the kinds of jobs they do. Women and men
remain largely segregated in different occupations which are considered
women’s work and men’s work respectively. Despite tremendous changes
in the U.S. labor market historically as well as fluctuations during specific
periods, occupational sex segregation has been relatively stable since the
turn of the century (Reskin and Hartmann 1986). Occupational sex
segregation has serious consequences for both female and male workers,
so we turn now to examine it more closely.
SEX SEGREGATION IN THE WORKPLACE
It should be clear from our discussion so far that occupational sex segre¬
gation refers to the degree to which men and women are concentrated in
occupations in which workers of one sex predominate. A commonly used
measure of occupational sex segregation is the dissimilarity index, also
called the segregation index. Its value is reported as a percentage that tells
us the proportion of workers of one sex that would have to change to jobs
in which members of their sex are underrepresented in order for the
occupational distribution between the sexes to be fully balanced (Reskin
and Hartmann 1986).
Using the index of dissimilarity in Table 8.2 on page 260, we see the
extent of occupational sex segregation in the United States as well as
eleven other industrialized countries. First, we find that the United States
ranks eighth on the list, with a high dissimilarity index of 46.8. This means
that nearly 47 percent of the female labor force in the United States
260 Chapter 8
TABLE B.2 Occupational Sex Segregation in Twelve Industrialized Nations
Country Index of Dissimilarity

Japan 27.6
Austria 37.4
Finland 41.2
Norway 41.8
Germany 42.6
Northern Ireland 43.6
Israel 45.8
United States 46.8
Netherlands 50.2
Denmark 50.4
Great Britain 51.1
Sweden* 60.0
*The index of dissimilarity for Sweden was calculated with data available before that country established
national policies and programs designed to reduce occupational sex segregation. Still, recent research
indicates that occupational sex segregation remains high in Sweden (Rosenfeld and Kalleberg 1991).
Source: Adapted from Roos 1985.
would have to change jobs in order to equalize their representation across

occupations. For the most part, however, occupational sex segregation is
extensive in all these industrialized countries, with the exception of Ja¬
pan. The low level of sex segregation in the Japanese labor force, though,
may simply be a function of the way occupations are classified there.
Japan uses very broad occupational categories (such as professional, tech¬
nical, and managerial), while the other countries use more detailed ones
(such as physician or nurse) (Roos 1985). A major weakness of the index
of dissimilarity is its sensitivity to types of occupational classifications: the
broader the occupational categories, the lower the index tends to be
(Reskin 1993; Sokoloff 1992). Thus, in the United States alone, the
dissimilarity index was only 40 when 10 broad occupational categories
were used, but rose to 62.7 on the basis of 426 detailed occupational
categories (Jacobs 1983). A second serious problem with the index of
dissimilarity is that it masks both industry-wide and establishment sex
segregation, a point to which we will return later (Reskin 1993; Carlson
1992).
Another way to gauge occupational sex segregation is simply to look
at the percentage of workers of each sex that holds a specific job. Table
\ 8.3 provides us with such information by showing the ten occupations
employing the largest numbers of men and women. One of the most
striking features of this table is the lack of overlap in the jobs held by men
and women. Men, we find, are concentrated in the skilled crafts, opera-
TABLE 6.3 Top Ten Occupationo for Men and Women, 1992
Men # Employed % Occupation Male
Construction worker 4,699,000 98.1

Mechanic 4,078,000 96.9
Truck driver 2,570,000 95.4
Salesperson, retail and personal 2,114,000 34.5
services
Agricultural worker 1,701,000 82.8
Engineer 1,602,000 91.5
Janitor/cleaner 1,483,000 70.0
Freight, stock, or material 1,414,000 81.4
handler
Salesperson, financial and
business services 1,348,000 60.0
Carpenter 1,224,000 99.0
Women # Employed % Occupation Female
Salesperson, retail and personal 4,014,000 65.5

services
Secretary 3,663,000 99.0
Cashier 1,998,000 79.3
Prekindergarten, kindergarten.
or elementary school teacher 1,877,000 92.0
Registered nurse 1,702,000 94.3
Bookkeeper/auditing clerk 1,670,000 90.7
Information clerk 1,466,000 88.7
Food server (Waitress) 1,090,000 79.6
Textile, apparel, and 917,000 76.4
furnishings machine operator
Salesperson, financial and 899,000 40.0
business services
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 1993:405-407.
Live jobs, and labor (e.g., construction). Women, in contrast, are primarily
in clerical and other service occupations. Three of every four full-time
women workers are secretaries and, as was the case just after World War
II, the service sector continues to be an area of high job growth for
women as well as racial minorities (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993;
Glenn 1992; Rothschild 1988; Taeuber and Valdisera 1986).
A second significant point to be made with regard to Table 8.3 is the
extent to which the jobs listed employ one sex relative to the other. Of
the ten largest occupations for women, eight were more than 75 percent
262 Chapter 8
female, compared with a total civilian labor force in 1992 that was 45.7
percent female. Of the ten largest occupations for men, seven were more
than 80 percent male and five were more than 90 percent male. Men also
tend to be concentrated in supervisory positions, even in areas that
otherwise are predominantly female, such as sales and clerical work. In
the former category, 65.2 percent of supervisors and proprietors are
male; similarly, 43.3 percent of clerical supervisors are male, although
98.4 percent of clerical staff (secretaries, typists and stenographers) are
female (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993; Reskin and Hartmann
1986).
This is not to say that there has been no improvement in occupa¬
tional sex segregation in recent years. Returning once more to Table 8.3,
we find that sales jobs, in particular, appear to be relatively well-balanced
in terms of their sex contribution. Studies of long-term trends in occupa¬
tional sex segregation indicate, furthermore, that appreciable shifts oc¬
curred during the 1970s, largely because of modest successes by women
attempting to move into a small number of male-dominated occupations.
The gains of the 1970s, however, eroded during the 1980s (Reskin 1993;
Carlson 1992). One reason for this was a significantly reduced federal
commitment to gender equity in employment. In addition, while women
entered certain male-dominated occupations in large numbers, many
more women and men entered sex-typical jobs. At the same time, there is
evidence that workers who held sex-atypical jobs left them at a dispropor¬
tionate rate and, as we will discuss shortly, some jobs that had been fairly
balanced, became sex segregated (Reskin 1993). In short, these factors
combined to reinforce occupational sex segregation during the 1980s.
Consequently, the labor market in the United States continues to be
a dual labor market, that is, a labor market characterized by one set of
jobs employing almost exclusively men and another set of jobs, typically
viewed as secondary, employing almost exclusively women. The extent of
this occupational sex segregation may come as a surprise to some readers
in light of the extensive media coverage recently being given to “the new
professional women” and to women now holding nontraditional blue-col¬
lar jobs (e.g., carpenters, and miners). Certainly we are not suggesting
here that women have not made inroads into the high-status, high-paying
professions as well as the skilled trades. To the contrary, available data
indicate that they have. For instance, between 1962 and 1992, the per¬
centage of female engineers increased from 1 to 8.5 percent, the percent¬
age of female physicians from 6 to 20.4 percent, and the percentage of
female college and university teachers from 19 to 40.9 percent (U.S.
Department of Commerce 1993; Sidel 1986). In just fifteen years, from
1974 to 1989, the percentage of female attorneys increased more than
sevenfold—from less than 3 percent to 21.4 percent (U.S. Department of
Commerce 1993). One of the most dramatic gains reported was among
underground miners: in 1978, 1 in every 10,000 underground miners was

a woman, while in 1980, owing largely to pressure on mine operators from
the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 1 in every 12
underground miners was a woman (Reskin and Hartmann 1986). By
1990, 1 in every 20 craft workers, operatives, and laborers in the mining
industry was a woman (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
[EEOC] 1991).
Still, what we must keep in mind here is that the number of women
in many occupations historically has been so low that to say it doubled,
tripled, or even increased sevenfold does not mean that large numbers of
women now hold these jobs or that the jobs are no longer male-domi¬
nated. Eor example, women constituted 21.4 percent of lawyers in 1992,
but that translated into less than 162,000 female lawyers in the United
States (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993). Even though the number
of women employed in skilled trades increased by almost 80 percent
between 1960 and 1970, by 1992 women constituted only 1.0 percent of
carpenters, 1.3 percent of electricians, 0.8 percent of auto mechanics, 0.6
percent of plumbers, and 4.9 percent of painters (U.S. Department of
Labor 1993; Sidel 1986).
As we have already noted, much of the reduction in the overall rate
of occupational sex segregation is due to the entry of a significant num¬
ber of women into relatively few male-dominated occupations. The ma¬
jority of workers, however, continue to be employed in sex-typical
occupations. At the same time, several female-dominated occupations
grew even more female dominated. Eor instance, women went from being
56.8 percent of food counter and fountain workers in 1970 to being 72.6
percent of such workers in 1992. Women were 77.7 percent of bookkeep¬
ers in 1950, but 90.7 percent in 1992 (U.S. Department of Commerce
1993; Reskin and Hartmann 1986). Thus, although media reports may
sometimes give the impression that substantial numbers of women and
men are now working side by side in the same jobs, these data indicate
that such a claim is largely overstated (see also Reskin 1993; Burris 1989;
Robinson and Mcllwee 1989; Blum and Smith 1988). These, though, are
not the only factors that must be considered when assessing current levels
of occupational sex segregation.
More specifically, we find important differences in the degree of
occupational sex segregation among various groups of workers, first, the
ages of workers are significant. Young workers, aged twenty to twenty-four,
who are new to the full-time labor force show a moderately lower dissimi¬
larity index than older workers. It is young women, in particular, who
appear most likely to enter the male-dominated fields of engineering,
science, management and administration (Commission on Professionals
in Science and Technology 1992; Reskin and Hartmann 1986). Neverthe¬
less, women aged twenty-five to thirty-four, still relatively young workers.
264 Chapter 8
tend to remain concentrated in female-dominated fields (Taeuber and

Valdisera 1986). Education may be an intervening variable. Women’s
level of education has been found to be negatively correlated with level
of occupational sex segregation (Reskin 1993). Moreover, Reskin (1993)
reports that although higher education does not appear to be related to
female high school graduates’ movement between sex-typical and sex-
atypical jobs, it does seem to have an influence on whether or not they
remain in a male-dominated occupation once they have entered one.
Another factor to be considered is race. As Carlson (1992:271)
argues, “Sex and race simultaneously structure individuals’ labor market
experiences and their concrete material outcomes” (author’s emphasis).
Dramatic drops in the dissimilarity index were reported for racial minori¬
ties, especially for Hispanic Americans and Asian Americans, during the
1970s. Like whites, these gains eroded during the 1980s (Carlson 1992).
Unlike whites, only a small part of the decline in occupational sex segre¬
gation for minorities appears to have been the result of minority women
moving into professional occupations, “indicating that much of the in¬
crease in integration by sex for nonwhites occurred at the lower end of
the occupational distribution” (Reskin and Hartmann 1986:23; see also
Glenn 1992).
Although there are important differences between specific ethnic
groups within broad racial categories—for example, between Japanese
Americans and Vietnamese Americans—a good deal of the occupational
shifting among minority women workers in recent years has been from
one female-dominated service Job to another. For instance, while His¬
panic women remain concentrated in poorly paying, female-dominated
Jobs in food processing, electronics, garments (sewing and stitching), and
domestic service, their numbers have increased in female-dominated
white-collar work, especially in secretarial and clerical Jobs (EEOC 1991;
Zavella 1987). Such shifts have been greater among African-American
women who went from being 70 percent of domestics in 1940 to Just 3.6
percent of such workers in 1987, and from 1 percent of clerical workers to
26.4 percent during the same time frame. African-American women, though,
have made less progress than white women in moving into male-domi¬
nated professions. Overall, only 13 percent of African-American women
hold professional Jobs (U.S. Department of Labor 1993a; Woody 1992).
Sokoloff (1992) reports that during the period 1960 to 1980, some
professions did become more integrated in terms of both the sex and race
of the Job holders, but the majority did not. In fact, her research shows
that the employment of white men in most of the professions increased
at a faster rate during this period than did the employment of women and
minorities so that white men’s dominance of the professions has actually
increased. Although African-American men made greater inroads into
the professions than African-American and white women, their success
was mitigated by the fact that during this period they experienced a drop
in their labor force participation rate by more than 10 percent. Collins
(1989) further cautions that the. gains of many African Americans in the
business professions were racially oriented. They were also in such fields
as personnel and public or urban relations, which makes these executives
marginal and uniquely vulnerable to economic recessions. According to
Collins (1989:329):
Black entry into these specialties during the 1960s and 1970s occurred in
an atmosphere of economic expansion and intense social upheaval. In
the 1980s, upheaval has been quelled, and competition for market share
has intensified; racial functions especially have lost their value. In an era
of corporate mergers and acquisitions, heavily leveraged debt will be
reduced by reducing the cost of management. The lack of a strong push
by government on the one hand and the need to reduce staff costs on
the other will eradicate these positions.
Collins’s emphasis on changing economic conditions and the govern¬

ment’s severely curtailed commitment to ensuring racial and gender
equity in employment during the 1980s are important points to which we
will return later in the chapter.
A third issue worth raising here is the extent to which occupational
shifts have occurred among workers of both sexes. Up to this point, we
have been discussing declines in occupational sex segregation because of
women moving into male-dominated jobs. But occupational sex segrega¬
tion may also be reduced by increases in male employment in female-
dominated jobs. This latter scenario, though, has been far less frequent
than the former. Although women made gains of 20 percentage points or
more in twenty-one male-dominated occupations between 1970 and 1980,
men’s representation in most female-dominated occupations rarely in¬
creased by more than 2 or 3 percentage points during the same period
(Reskin and Roos 1990). This pattern remained unchanged during the
1980s. For example, men constituted 2.7 percent of registered nurses in
1970, 4.1 percent in 1980, and 5.7 percent in 1992. In some cases, slight
gains in male representation in female-dominated occupations were lost
during the 1980s. For instance, men increased their employment as pre¬
kindergarten and kindergarten teachers from 2.1 percent to 3.6 percent
between 1970 and 1980, but by 1992, men were 1.4 percent of prekinder¬
garten and kindergarten teachers. Some notable exceptions were chief
communications operators, which went from 18.2 percent male in 1970
to 65.6 percent male in 1980 to 88.3 percent male in 1992, and hand
engravers and printing operators, which during the same periods rose
from 18.4 male in 1970 to 68.3 male in 1980 to 86.2 percent male in 1988
(U.S. Department of Commerce 1993; U.S. Department of Labor 1990;
Reskin and Hartmann 1986).
266 Chapter 8
Occupational shifts like these last two have caused concern among
some observers about trends toward occupational resegregation. As Reskin
and Hartmann (1986:31) explain, “Perhaps after reaching some tip¬
ping point’ integrated occupations become resegregated with mem¬
bers of one sex replaced by members of the other” (see also Reskin
and Roos 1990). Historically, this has most frequently occurred as a
result of men leaving occupations as women entered them. Why this
occurs remains open to speculation, although some analysts attribute it
to the belief among male workers that the presence of large numbers
of women workers would lower the prestige and pay of the occupa¬
tions. Strober and Arnold (1987) report that bank telling shifted from a
male to a female occupation as men were lured to other jobs by higher
salaries and as bank telling was de-skilled to entail fewer responsibilities
and thus less prestige. We also saw an example of this in chapter 5 where
we discussed the transition of teaching from a male-dominated to a
female-dominated profession. It was certainly the case that female teach¬
ers were paid less than their male counterparts, but it is unclear whether
the entrance of women into teaching prompted men’s exodus from the
profession. Further research is needed with regard to this and other
occupations, such as secretary and computer programmer, in order to
better understand the phenomenon of occupational resegregation
(Reskin 1993; Fine 1990).
Finally, any beneficial effects on workers from declines in occupa¬
tional sex segregation may be undermined by other forms of workplace
sex segregation, in particular industry sex segregation and establishment sex
segregation. For example, about half of all assemblers in manufacturing are
women, indicating at first glance that employment in this occupation is
balanced between the sexes. Upon closer examination, however, we find
that within the manufacturing industry, women are 70 percent of electri¬
cal assemblers, but only about 17 percent of motor vehicle assemblers, the
latter being better paid than the former (EEOC 1990; U.S. Department
of Labor 1990). Similarly, although'women and men may be employed in
the same occupation, such as lawyer, they may work for different types of
firms, with men being hired at the larger, more prestigious, and better
paying firms (Sokoloff 1992). Other researchers have documented the
emergence of “female ghettos” within various fields, such as medicine,
management, and the insurance industry, in which women have fewer
opportunities for promotion and little authority or power (Hartmann
1987; Rosenfeld 1984; Harlan and O’Earrell 1982). Some companies hire
workers of only one sex, or they hire men and women for totally different
jobs or work shifts (Reskin 1993; Bielby and Baron 1986, 1984). Also
common within an individual establishment is for men and women to be
segregated into different departments, such as in department stores
where men typically sell “big ticket” items like large appliances and furni-
ture and women sell clothing and housewares (Reskin 1993; Hartmann
1987; Reskin and Hartmann 1986).
In sum, although occupational sex segregation seems to have de¬
clined somewhat in recent years, it has declined more for certain groups
than for others; for the majority of workers, it remains a fact of everyday
work life. Moreover, what gains have been made are frequently minimized
by industry-wide and establishment sex segregation in combination with
other factors. At this point, most readers are probably wondering why this
is true, especially since so much public attention has been given to
policies such as affirmative action that are supposed to remedy employ¬
ment discrimination. However, before we explore the reasons behind the
persistence of workplace sex segregation, let’s examine some of its most
serious consequences.
Consequences of Workplace Sex Segregation

Workplace sex segregation limits the employment opportunities of both
sexes, but it is most disadvantageous to women workers. This is because
what is typically labeled “women’s work” has some very negative features
attached to it. For one thing, there is considerable evidence that much of
women’s work, such as data-entry and secretarial and clerical tasks, is
more stressful than most male-dominated jobs. At first glance this may be
puzzling; these jobs do not appear to be highly stressful. Consider, how¬
ever, that the most stressful jobs are those that provide workers with
minimal opportunities for creativity and autonomy and require them to
complete tasks under pressure, within a limited period of time, and with
minimal errors. In addition, service jobs such as these are increasingly
being electronically monitored by work-site supervisors, thereby increas¬
ing the pressure on the job holders. These jobs also offer few rewards in
the forms of compensation, mobility, union protection, benefits, or pres¬
tige. Workplace sex segregation keeps more women than men locked into
such jobs (Doyal 1990a; Burris 1989; Reskin and Hartmann 1986).
Workplace segregation is also associated with greater susceptibility
to unemployment for women workers. This also is somewhat paradoxical
given that, as we noted earlier, female-dominated occupations, such as
clerical and sales jobs, historically have been less affected by cyclical
dips in the economy than male-dominated jobs in manufacturing and
construction. During the most recent recession, however, the female-
dominated service sector was negatively affected. Moreover, since female-
dominated jobs, especially those in the service sector, have high labor
turnover rates, women workers tend to have put in less time on a specific
job than men workers, making them more vulnerable to layoffs.
Nevertheless, it is also important to consider the effect of race on
both occupational segregation and unemployment. In her study of a large
268 Chapter 8
insurance firm, for example, Hartmann (1987) found that race had a
greater negative impact than sex, but that black female woikers experi¬
enced the greatest segregation, being relegated primarily to back office
jobs that entailed little or no contact with clientele (see also Glenn 1992).
Looking at unemployment rates, we also find that race has a stronger
negative effect than sex. In 1993, the unemployment rates of white men
and white women were essentially equal: 5.7 percent and 5.8 percent
respectively. The unemployment rates of black men and black women
were also similar, with the unemployment rate of black women being
slightly lower than that of black men. For both, however, unemployment
rates were significantly higher than those of whites: 12.9 percent for black
men and 12.3 percent for black women. Likewise, for Hispanic-American
men and women, the unemployment rates in 1993 were 9.4 percent and
11.0 percent respectively (U.S. Department of Labor 1993b).
Another significant point to consider is that a history of sex segre¬
gation in the workplace also affects those who obtain employment in jobs
nontraditional for their sex. In her classic study of women and men in
corporate management, Rosabeth Moss Ranter (1977:209) discussed this
problem in terms of tokenism., the marginal status of a category of workers
who are relatively few in number in the workplace. Tokens, according to
Ranter, are “often treated as representatives of their category, as symbols
rather than as individuals.”
Ranter identified a number of serious consequences for token work¬
ers. For instance, because of their conspicuousness in the workplace, they
are more closely scrutinized by others. This places intense pressure on
them to perform successfully, creating a work situation that is highly
stressful. In addition, tokens experience what Ranter calls boundary height¬
ening; that is, dominant workers tend to exaggerate the differences be¬
tween themselves and the tokens and to treat the tokens as outsiders.
Thus, researchers have noted that women workers frequently find them¬
selves excluded from formal information networks that help them do
their jobs. More often, they are shut out of informal social networks that
may be just as crucial for their job performance and advancement. As
male workers are well aware, important business is conducted not only in
board rooms or at union meetings, but also on golf courses and in local
taverns. However, it is these sorts of informal social/business activities in
which women workers are least likely to be included by their male co¬
workers or supervisors (Couric 1989; Schur 1984).
Ranter makes the argument that tokenism is a problem of numbers
and, therefore, the employment experiences of women in sex-atypical
\ occupations should become more positive as more women enter such
positions. Zimmer (1988:72) and others (e.g., Blum and Smith 1988;
Franklin and Sweeney 1988), however, maintain that “men’s negative
behavior toward women in the workplace . . . seems to be much less mo-
tivated by women s presence in a numerical minority than by men’s

evaluation of women as a social minority—an opinion based on notions
of inferiority rather than scarcity.” In other words, “the crucial factor” that
determines employment experiences “is the social status of the token’s
group—not their numerical rarity” (Williams 1992:263).
Sociologist Christine Williams’s (1992) fascinating study of men in
female-dominated occupations strongly supports this argument. Williams
found that although women and men in sex-atypical jobs encounter
discrimination, its forms and consequences differ significantly depending
on the job holder s sex. Researchers who have studied women in sex-atypi¬
cal occupations report that they usually are disadvantaged in hiring and
promotions and that they encounter a “glass ceiling” as they attempt to
navigate their way up the occupational hierarchy. The glass ceiling refers
to the invisible barriers frequently imposed on women, primarily because
of their sex, that limit their upward occupational mobility. One of Wil¬
liams’s most intriguing findings is that men in sex-atypical occupations
receive preferential treatment in hiring and, instead of encountering a
glass ceiling, often ride a glass escalator up the hierarchy of these profes¬
sions. According to Williams (1992:256), men in sex-atypical jobs fre¬
quently encounter invisible and sometimes less subtle pressures to move
up in their professions. “As if on a moving escalator, they must work to
stay in place.” These pressures may take quite positive forms, such as close
mentoring and encouragement from supervisors (who, as we have already
noted, are often men even in female-dominated fields), but they may also
be the result of prejudicial attitudes by those outside the profession—i.e.,
the public, clients—who question the masculinity of men in a tradition¬
ally female occupation.
Williams (1992) reports that the men she interviewed indicated that
their supervisors were more likely to discriminate against female employ¬
ees than against them. An important exception, however, was men who
were openly gay; gay men did not receive the favorable treatment af¬
forded their straight male colleagues. For instance, Williams relates the
experience of a male nurse who worked in a hospital where one of the
physicians preferred to staff the operating room exclusively with male
nurses as long as they were not gay.
Another difference between men’s and women’s experiences of
tokenism that Williams (1992) discovered was that men reported feeling
“in control” in a female-dominated work environment. In contrast,
women in male-dominated work environments report feeling intimidated
and controlled. These differential experiences are further reflected in
the incidence of sexual harassment in the workplace. You may recall that
in chapter 5 we defined sexual harassment as any unwanted leers, com¬
ments, suggestions, or physical contact of a sexual nature, as well as
unwelcome requests for sexual favors. Men rarely experience sexual ha-
270 Chapter 8
rassment; there were no incidents of sexual harassment, for example,

reported by the men in Williams’s study. Women, on the other hand,
routinely experience sexual harassment in the workplace. Studies in the
United States and Great Britain reveal that from one-fifth to four-fifths of
female workers have experienced sexual harassment at work. In a 1989
study of 918 female attorneys in the United States, among whom one-
third earned more than $100,000 a year, 60 percent reported that they
had experienced unwanted sexual attention at work. Thirteen of these
respondents stated that they had been victims of rape, attempted rape, or
assault while at work; the assailants in most cases were their supervisors
(Couric 1989). In a 1992 survey of 640 women journalists working at
19 small, medium and large newsrooms throughout the United States, 1
of every 3 respondents reported having been sexually harassed at work
{MRTW\993k). And in a 1993 survey of 417 female family practitioners
in Ontario, Canada, 75 percent said they had been sexually harassed by
patients: slightly more than half reported that the harassment took the
form of suggestive looks and sexual remarks; about 25 percent re¬
ported suggestive gestures, offers of dates, and inappropriate gifts (e.g.,
g-strings, tapes of love songs); almost one-third reported patients had
exposed themselves in sexually suggestive ways; and 4 percent reported
that patients touched them inappropriately (Phillips and Schneider
1993).
Perhaps no other recent incident did more to highlight the problem
of sexual harassment for women than the testimony of Anita Hill to the
Senate Judiciary Committee during the confirmation hearings for
Clarence Thomas’s nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1991.
Although Thomas was ultimately confirmed as a U.S. Supreme Court
Justice, Hill’s recounting of his harassment of her raised public awareness
of the seriousness of the problem and encouraged more women to report
harassment incidents. In the first six months of 1992 alone, the number
of workplace harassment complaints increased by more than 50 percent
(Gross 1992b).
Although women in all types of occupations confront sexual ha¬
rassment, some observers claim that it is especially pervasive in male-
dominated jobs to which women are new hires, since it may serve as a
means for male workers to assert dominance and control over women
who otherwise would be their equals (Gruber and Bjorn 1982; Westley
1982; Enarson 1980). However, regardless of the types of jobs in which it
occurs, the consequences of sexual harassment for female workers are
serious and harmful. Harassed women report a number of physical re¬
sponses to the harassment, including chronic neck and back pain, upset
stomach, colitis and other gastrointestinal disorders, and eating and
sleeping disorders. Harassed women also become nervous and irritable.
Psychologically,
they feel humiliated; they feel they cannot control the encounters with
the harassei (s) and thus feel threatened and helpless. Many develop
techniques to protect themselves, through, for example, avoidance
(particularly difficult if the woman works in the same location as the
harasser(s) or through changing their dress or behavior (acting ‘coolly’).
These women describe the daily barrage of sexual interplay in the office
as psychological rape (Stanko 1985:61).
Such feelings of powerlessness often intensify when women workers

attempt to report the harassment. Although sexual harassment is a viola¬
tion of equal employment laws, enforcement is difficult given an em¬
ployer s economic power to reward or punish a female employee on the
basis of her response to his sexual overtures. Employers also tend to
prefer to handle harassment of coworkers quietly, through private media¬
tion. Thus, many harassers are left publicly unaccountable for their ac¬
tions. Despite the recent increase in reports, which we noted previously,
most women do not report incidents of sexual harassment on the job.
Instead of filing reports, many women feel forced to quit their Jobs in
order to end the harassment, although given the extent of the problem,
this is no guarantee that they will not encounter a similar situation at
another work site. In November 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court unani¬
mously (and, some observers noted, ironically) approved the use of a
broad definition of sexual harassment in lawsuits, thus making it much
easier for harassment victims to win such suits against their employers.
The Court defined as a violation of sexual harassment laws any action that
creates an environment that would be reasonably perceived as hostile or
abusive. Harassed workers no longer have to prove that the harassment
caused them severe psychological injury. It remains to be seen, however,
whether this ruling, coupled with Anita Hill’s courageous example, will
continue to increase the number of official sexual harassment complaints
filed by workers.
Each of the issues discussed here demonstrates convincingly the
negative effects of workplace sex segregation on workers—particularly
women workers. But there is one additional consequence that deserves
special attention because of the harm it, in turn, produces. This is the
economic impact of sex segregation, or what is perhaps better known as
the wage gap.
THE MALE/FEMALE EARNINGS GAP
In their longitudinal analysis of the economic well-being of women and

children, Corcoran et al. (1984:233-234) quote a biblical verse in which
God, speaking to Moses, said, “When a man makes a special vow to the
Lord which requires your valuation of living persons, a male between
272 Chapter 8
twenty and sixty years old shall be valued at fifty silver sheckels. If it is a
female, she shall be valued at thirty sheckels.” As Corcoran and her
colleagues subsequently note, this biblical custom of valuing women’s
labor at three-fifths that of a man appears to have carried over into the
contemporary work world. From 1960 to 1990, year-round female workers
earned on average between 59 and 70 percent of what males workers
earned. In other words, for every dollar a male worker made, a female
worker made on average between 59 and 70 cents. For more than three
decades, this ratio fluctuated within these boundaries (U.S. Department
of Commerce 1991; Taeuber and Valdisera 1986). In 1993, however, the
earnings gap closed to 76 percent, a figure not worth celebrating, but an
indication of progress (U.S. Department of Labor 1993c).^
Once again, however, race is an important intervening variable. The
wage gap between African-American men and women (88 percent) as
well as that between Hispanic-American men and women (also 88 per¬
cent) is narrower than that between white men and women (76 percent).
In contrast, looking only at the wage gap by race, we find that African
Americans earn about 78 percent of what whites earn, while Hispanic
Americans earn on average only about 68 percent of what whites earn. By
making within-sex comparisons by race, we get a better picture of how
race interacts with sex to depress the wages of minorities and women.
More specifically, black women on average earn 87 percent of what white
women earn, whereas Hispanic-American women earn 75 percent of what
white women earn. For black and Hispanic-American men, the wage gap
relative to white men is 75 percent and 65 percent respectively. Thus,
although Hispanic-American women have the lowest median weekly earn¬
ings of all groups, the gap between their earnings and those of women in
other racial groups is actually narrower than the earnings gap between
minority men and white men (U.S. Department of Labor 1993c).
One’s earnings, of course, are affected by the type of work one does.
As we have already noted, women and minorities continue to experience
widespread occupational segregation. The jobs in which they predomi¬
nate tend not only to be less prestigious than those dominated by white
men, but also tend to pay less. Recent statistics also indicate that minori¬
ties and women are more likely than whites and men to be hired as
temporary employees or to work part-time even though they desire per-
lOur calculations of the earnings gap, unless otherwise indicated, are based on weekly
median earnings of full-time workers. The gap varies depending on the type of wages
one examines; the widest gap is found in annual wages because these figures usually
include factors like overtime and, therefore, reflect the differences in the total annual
hours worked by women and men. We are grateful to Jane Hood for pointing out this
variation to us.
manent or full-time employment. About 25 percent of women work part-

time because they cannot find full-time employment (Reskin 1993). In
addition, women are more likely than men to be employed in minimum-
wage as opposed to salaried occupations. In 1992, almost twice as many
female workers as male workers held jobs that paid at or below the
minimum wage. Among workers being paid hourly wages, 50.3 percent of
male hourly wage workers earned the minimum wage or less; the median
hourly wage of male hourly wage workers in 1992 was $8.79. In contrast,
59.4 percent of female hourly wage workers earned the minimum wage
or less; the median hourly wage for female hourly wage workers in 1992
was $6.98 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993).
The monetary rewards to the employers of these workers are obvi¬
ous; not only do temporary, part-time, and minimum-wage employees
receive lower salaries, but they also typically are not entitled to costly
employment benefits such as medical insurance plans, disability insur¬
ance and paid vacations. These workers also are rarely unionized. But
regardless of the economic benefits for employers, the effects on women
and minority workers are overwhelmingly negative. Indeed, given these
data, it is hardly surprising that women and minorities are disproportion¬
ately represented among the poor.
The Earnings Gap, Poverty, and Welfare Policy

Ten percent of the white population in the United States is officially poor,
whereas 30 percent of the black population, 25.3 percent of the Hispanic-
American population, 31 percent of the Native American population, and
14 percent of the Asian-American population are officially living below
the poverty line. As we learned in chapter 7, female-headed households
also are disproportionately represented among the poverty population,
with a poverty rate more than four times that of male-headed households.
When the race of female-headed households is taken into account, the
figures are even more alarming: 48.2 percent of white female-headed
households live below the poverty line, but 67.2 percent of black and 70.3
percent of Hispanic female-headed families are officially poor (U.S. De¬
partment of Commerce 1993, and 1991).
Importantly, the majority of women who head households are em¬
ployed, and of those who are employed, 85 percent are employed full¬
time. Nevertheless, in 1993, the median weekly earnings of women who
maintained families was just $324, which amounts to $16,848 per year
(U.S. Department of Labor 1993b). If we take into account deductions
for social security and employment-related expenses (e.g., child care,
transportation, food, clothing), disposable income is significantly re¬
duced. These families are thus placed precariously close to, if not below
274 Chapter 8
the official poverty line, which in 1993 was approximately $12,000 for a
family of three. It is important to emphasize, too, that we are speaking
here of median earnings, which means that half of all females who head
households and work full-time, year-round earn less than $16,848 per
year. Of course, race is again a môr factor to be considered. Families
maintained by black women have annual median earnings of about
$4,000 less than families maintained by white women, while families
maintained by Hispanic-American women have median annual earnings
of about $5,000 less than families maintained by white women (U.S.
Department of Labor 1993b).
Comparing the median earnings of women who maintain families
with those of other heads of households, we see that married-couple
families in 1993 earned $815 per week or $42,380 per year, and men who
maintained families earned $543 per week or $28,236 per year (U.S.
Department of Labor 1993b). Married-couple families and families main¬
tained by men have median earnings higher than those of families main¬
tained by women regardless of race, but the median annual earnings of
black and Hispanic married-couple families are respectively $6,000 and
$12,000 less than those of white married-couple families. Families main¬
tained by black and Hispanic men have median annual earnings respec¬
tively of $7,000 and $6,000 less than families maintained by white men
(U.S. Department of Labor 1993b). Nevertheless, in light of these data it
is not difficult to see how employment is hardly a safeguard against
poverty for women raising children alone, nor is it surprising that the
inadequacy of their wages makes welfare benefits more appealing than
jobs to some women who head households.
Consider, for example, that in 1987, an unemployed mother of two
in Pennsylvania was eligible for $4,584 a year in Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC), $1,549 in food stamps, and Medicaid (fed¬
erally financed medical insurance) valued at $1,637. While the total of
$7,670 is hardly an adequate sum of money on which to live and raise two
children, it is, in many ways, more attractive than the alternative of a
full-time, year-round minimum-wage Job, which in 1987 paid about
$8,000. Although the woman with two children who held such ajob would
also have received a $742 earned income tax credit, that would have been
offset by the $740 she would have had to pay in Social Security and other
taxes. Moreover, while she would still have received $1,306 in food
stamps, she would have lost Medicaid for herself and her children. If we
then subtract from her earnings child care and other work-related ex¬
penses (estimated quite modestly at $2,000), she would have been left
with about $500 less in income than if she had remained on welfare
(Curran and Renzetti 1993).
This example illustrates several points. First, it debunks the myth
that welfare recipients can live quite well on the benefits they receive.
Second, it highlights the sex bias inherent in our nation’s welfare policies,
which is overlooked by critics of the system who maintain that most
welfare recipients are able-bodied adults capable of, but too lazy to work
(see also Fraser and Gordon 1994). Third, it calls into question the
appropriateness of proposed welfare “reforms” that would require recipi¬
ents to receive employment training and ultimately to work in public
service or another job as a condition of receipt of benefits. “Reforms”
such as these are not likely to be successful if individuals are trained for
jobs that do not exist, or if the jobs they receive pay only the minimum
wage or slightly more. Nor do they address the problem of child care (a
need of 60 percent of AFDC recipients), and unless a national health
insurance program is enacted, they do not address the problem of lost
medical insurance. Not surprisingly, then, preliminary evaluations of
such programs indicate that “large numbers of women will remain un¬
served, excluded, given short-term training or meaningless experience in
low-paying jobs, provided with few or no auxiliary services, and remain
poor” (Miller 1990:66).
Finally, these findings support the argument of some welfare critics
that the welfare system “functions so that men and women are differently
rewarded or punished for different circumstances and behaviors” (Miller
1990:3). According to Miller, in fact, the welfare system as well as pro¬
posed welfare “reforms” act not to raise women out of poverty, but rather
to keep women dependent—either dependent on the government or,
more preferable in the eyes of policy makers, dependent on husbands.
While we have emphasized the intersection of racism and sexism in
the generation and reproduction of poverty, it is also important to con¬
sider a third factor, age. Women are disproportionately represented
among individuals living in poverty, but the statistics mask the fact that
among these individuals, a large percentage are elderly women who live
alone. Although the poverty rate of the elderly population has declined
significantly since the late 1960s—from 28.5 percent or more than twice
the rate of the general population in 1966, to 12.4 percent, slightly less
than the 14.2 percent rate for the general population, in 1991—improve¬
ment has been slower for elderly women (U.S. Department of Commerce
1993; U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging, hereafter Committee on
Aging, 1991). About 60 percent of the population aged sixty-five and
older is female, but females constitute more than 70 percent of the
elderly poor and more than 80 percent of the elderly poor who live alone.
Two-thirds of the elderly who live alone are widows and, in contrast with
the stereotype of the “old, rich widow,” most elderly widows are poor.
Overall, the poverty rate of elders who live alone is 22 percent, compared
with a 5.4 percent poverty rate for elders who live with a spouse and a 12
percent rate for elders who live with others. Importantly, however, as
Table 8.4 shows, race intersects with sex to increase the risk of elderly
276 Chapter 8
---
TABLE 8.4 Percent of the Elderly Population Living beiow the Poverty Line
by Race, Sex, and Living Arrangement, 1989
Living Arrangement of People below the Poverty Line
With With
Race and Sex Total Alone Spouse Others
All races
Men 7.8% 17.4% 5.6% %10.4%
Women 14.0 23.3 5.2 12.7
Total 11.4 22.0 5.4 12.0
Wliite
Men 6.6 13.9 5.0 7.2
Women 11.8 20.0 4.6 8.5
Total 9.6 18.8 4.8 8.1
Black
Men 22.1 48.2 13.7 21.0
Women 36.7 60.6 13.0 29.6
Total 30.8 57.3 13.4 26.6
Hispanic
Men 18.6 34.7 . 15.1 19.5
Women 22.4 41.9 12.4 20.4
Total 20.6 39.5 13.9 20.2
Source: U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging 1991:53.
poverty. For example, elderly black men who live alone have a poverty
rate more than double that of elderly white women who live alone; the
poverty rate of elderly black women who live alone is the highest of all
the groups examined, triple the poverty rate for elderly white women
(Committee on Aging 1991). Thus,'as Davis and her colleagues (1990:43-
45) point out:
As these figures suggest, elderly women living alone, often nonwhite

widows of advanced age and declining health, are most vulnerable to
poverty. . . . When elderly people living alone are categorized by sex, age,
and race, the lowest poverty rate is for white men aged 65-74, at 9
percent, and the highest is for nonwhite women age 85 and above, at 59
percent. . . . Even more troubling is evidence indicating that the
concentration of poverty among elderly women living alone will worsen
as we move into the next century. . . . Wliile most of the older population
will fare well economically over the next 30 years, the proportion of
women with incomes below 150 percent of poverty will remain high: 45
percent in 1987, and 38 percent in 2020. . . . Among widows the situation

is slightly worse, with the proportion who are poor or near-poor rising
until the turn of the century. . . . [B]y 2020 poverty among the elderly
will be almost exclusively a problem among elderly women.
The economic difficulties of these women are directly related to

their employment patterns, the wages they earned during their work lives,
and their job benefits. For example, women are less likely than men to be
employed in jobs that have private pension plans. In addition, since
women earn less than men, their Social Security benefits, as well as any
other retirement benefits they may have accrued, will also be lower
(Holden and Smock 1991). Women must frequently interrupt their labor
force participation because of caregiving responsibilities (see chapter 7);
in fact, women on average spend 11.5 years out of the paid labor force
because of careghing, whereas men spend an average 1.3 years out for the
same reason. Employment interruptions not only limit job opportunities,
but also prevent women from accruing sufficient retirement benefits
(Davis et al. 1990). At the same time, government programs such as Social
Security and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) have been found in
some cases to actually increase widows’ risks for poverty. More specifically,
when her spouse dies, a widow’s Social Security benefits decline substan¬
tially, from one-third to one-half of their previous level when the spouse
was alive. “At lower levels of income, then, the survivor’s benefit may be
inadequate to meet the remaining spouse’s needs” (Davis et al. 1990:44),
and because women typically outlive men (see chapter 12), this policy
disproportionately affects them (see also Holden and Smock 1991). Al¬
though SSI was designed to assist those not covered by Social Security or
those for whom Social Security benefits are inadequate, the program has
stringent eligibility requirements that disqualify many individuals even
though they are poor. This, coupled with the fact that many eligible
persons do not apply for SSI because they are unaware of the program or
do not understand it, explains why less than one-third of the elderly poor
who live alone receive SSI (Davis et al. 1990).
Another segment of the poverty population is made up of those who
are homeless. However, as we learn in Box 8.1 on pages 278-280, the
homeless, like the poverty population as a whole, is hardly homogeneous.
Moreover, women’s and men’s experiences of homelessness differ, as do
those of single individuals and families.
At this point it is clear that the wage gap contributes to many
pervasive and serious problems. A question that remains, however, is how
the wage gap is related to occupational segregation? To answer this
question, we need to explore possible reasons for the wage gap itself In
addressing this topic, we will concentrate primarily on the gender gap in
wages, but we will also consider to some extent the racial gap in wages.
278 Chapter 8
30X 3.1 Gender and Homelessness
It has been argued that in the minds of those of us with homes, myths rather
than facts about the homeless predominate (Golden 1992). Consequently, the
first question that must be addressed is: Who are the homeless?
Research reveals a far more diverse group than one might suppose. It is
commonly believed that the majority of the homeless are unemployed single
men and women who are alcoholics, drug addicts, or mental patients indis¬
criminately released from mental hospitals. Although it is certainly the case
that some of the homeless fit into these categories, they are not the majority.
Moreover, it is far less clear whether substance abuse and symptoms of mental
illness (e.g., hearing voices, “antisocial” behavior, hoarding) emerge before or
after an individual becomes homeless—that is, whether these behaviors are ad¬
aptations to homelessness rather than causes of homelessness. Consider care¬
fully for a moment what life on the streets or in public shelters might be like.
The demoralization and disorientation that result from having to keep moving
without having any place to go and having no structure to one’s life are likely
to psychologically weaken even the emotionally strong. As Golden (1992) dis¬
covered, however, most of the homeless are not severely mentally disturbed nor
do they have drug and alcohol problems.
Instead, research indicates that what all homeless people share in com¬
mon is abject poverty. Since certain groups, such as racial minorities, are dis¬
proportionately represented among the poor, they are also at greater risk of
becoming homeless. Rossi (1989), for example, reports that nationally nearly
46 percent of the homeless are African Americans, almost 12 percent are His¬
panic Americans, and about 5 percent are Native Americans. Additional re¬
search indicates that the majority of homeless adults are high school graduates
and more than 24 percent have attended college. A considerable number of
homeless adults hold full-time jobs, but these are typically minimum-wage jobs
that do not provide enough income to obtain housing, especially in major met¬
ropolitan areas. However, homelessness is not solely an urban problem; it is in¬
creasing in the nation’s suburbs as factories close, throwing thousands out of
work, and it is increasing in rural regions as a result of farm foreclosures (Van-
derstaay 1992; Kozol 1988; Schmitt 1988).
Importantly, the fastest growing segment of the homeless population is
young families with dependent children (Kozol 1988; U.S. House of Repre¬
sentatives 1987). “The average homeless family includes a parent with two or
three children. The average child is six years old, the average parent is twenty-
seven” (Kozol 1988:4). The vast majority of homeless families are women with
children. Often this reflects the higher rate of poverty among single-parent, fe¬
male-headed households, but it is also sometimes a result of the fact that fami¬
lies are broken by homelessness. In many cities, for example, men must stay in
shelters separate from those designated for women and children (Kozol 1988).
The primary causes of homelessness among families are the rising cost of hous¬
ing, the shortage of low-income housing units, and the decline in manufactur¬
ing and well-paying industrial jobs (Kozol 1988; U.S. House of Representatives
1987).
30X 3.1 Continued
Although these factors also have contributed to homelessness among

both single men and single women, Golden (1922) maintains that there are im¬
portant gender differences in the causes of homelessness among these seg¬
ments of the homeless population. She points out, for example, that the
deinstitutionalization movement of the 1970s made more women than men
homeless because more women than men were residents of psychiatric facili¬
ties during this period. More recently, however. Golden found that the primary
reason for homelessness among women was loss of relationships. More specifi¬
cally, the majority of women Golden met as a shelter volunteer had adhered
to a traditional feminine role of financial dependency on someone else,
usually a husband, boyfriend, or father. When, because of death or some
other reason, these relationships dissolved, the women simply could not fend
for themselves.
Those women in Golden’s study who worked had no economic security.
They held marginal jobs that paid poorly and offered no benefits. Once they
became homeless, they had greater difficulty than men getting work. Jobs open
to women, even those in domestic service, typically required that they maintain
a certain decorum in dress and appearance that was virtually impossible for
homeless women to maintain. For many jobs for which references and appear¬
ance were irrelevant—day laborer, for example—women were not included in
the labor pool; such jobs were not considered “women’s work.”
It has been argued by some—former President Ronald Reagan, for in¬
stance—that those who are homeless choose their “lifestyle.” It is the case that
some women and men do make a rational decision to go out on the street, but
this can hardly be considered a preference or a “lifestyle choice.” Rather, it is a
response to a specific set of life circumstances that they are confronting at a
particular point in time that make life on the street a better alternative than re¬
maining inside. As Golden (1992) found, however, these circumstantial factors
also are often different for women and men. Women, for example, are signifi¬
cantly more likely than men to “choose” the street over living with an abusive
partner or parent. For abused women, living on the street may be a survival
strategy.
There is also considerable evidence that women’s and men’s everyday ex¬
periences of homelessness differ in significant ways. Although it certainly may
not be said that life on the street is easy for men, it is nevertheless the case that
street life is more difficult for women. For one thing, it is more dangerous.
Women are more vailnerable to physical assault, and researchers who have
talked with homeless women report that rape and other sexual assaults are
not uncommon (Golden 1992; Vanderstaay 1992). Moreover, only women run
the risk of becoming pregnant as a result of a forced or consensual sexual en¬
counter.
It appears, too, that even the most routine aspects of daily living are
more difficult for homeless women than for homeless men. This largely
results from the virtual absence of privacy afforded the homeless, and the
fact that in our society women more than men are socialized to value privacy,
especially when carrying out basic hygienic functions. Thus, relieving oneself
280 Chapter 8
\
30X 3.1 Continued
in public is not only physically, but also psychologically more difficult for
women. Cleaning oneself in a public washroom or showering with others in a
public shelter have a similar psychological effect on homeless women. And, as
Golden (1992:160) notes, “Any woman can imagine the potential for agonizing
humiliation in having one’s period on the street...”
While it is true that many of those with homes tend to blame the home¬
less for their own plight. Golden (1992) argues that homeless women are espe¬
cially stigmatized, and much of this stigma is sexually charged. It is assumed,
for example, that they are promiscuous and immoral. If they have children,
they are stereotyped as “welfare mothers” who freeload off the system and
promiscuously reproduce. If they are alone, they do not escape the label of
promiscuity—in fact, they are frequent targets of sexual harassment because of
it—but it is also assumed that their problems would be solved if they could just
find a “good man.” Ironically, what is overlooked in these cases is the fact that
it was their relationships with men that often initially propelled these women
into homelessness.
Explaining the Wage Gap

Table 8.5 shows median weekly earnings of selected occupations in 1990.
The table contains a broad range of jobs that require different levels of
training, skill, effort, and responsibility, but one consistent observation
that can be made is that female-dominated occupations typically pay
significantly less than male-dominated occupations. Recent research indi¬
cates, in fact, that occupational sex segregation alone accounts for about
35 to 40 percent of the difference in men’s and women’s earnings. These
studies document a strong inverse relationship between the extent to
which women are represented in "a specific job and that job’s median
earnings. Typically, the higher the percentage of female representation,
the lower the salary (Reskin 1993; Rosenfeld and Kalleberg 1991; Reskin
and Hartmann 1986).
Many employers, economists, and public policy makers acknowledge
that “women’s work” almost always pays less than “men’s work,” but they
maintain that the reason particular jobs have become female-dominated
is because large numbers of women have freely chosen to enter them.
Central to their argument is the assumption that women’s primary alle¬
giance is to home and family; thus, they seek undemanding jobs that
require little personal investment in training or skills acquisition so that
they can better tend to their household responsibilities. In other words.
TABLE 5.5 Median Weekly Earnings of Seiected Maie-Dominated and

Female-Dominated Occupations, 1990
Median Weekly
Occupation Eemale (%) Earnings ($)
Secretary 99.1 343
Dental assistant 98.7 300
Receptionist 97.1 273
Child care worker 96.1 203
Private household worker 95.6 190
Registered nurse 94.6 608
Bookkeeper 92.1 338
Bank teller 91.0 273
Textile sewing machine operator 90.1 214
Nursing aide 89.8 251
Data entry keyer 88.2 316
Librarian 85.4 489
Elementary school teacher 84.8 519
Cashier 82.2 215
Architect 14.6 695
Police officer or detective 13.4 645
Engineer 7.3 814
Eurnace operator 6.9 467
Truck driver 4.3 430
Logger 4.2 314
Material-moving equipment 4.1 415
operator
Airplane pilot or navigator 3.1 898
Eire fighter 2.9 595
Aircraft engine mechanic .7 576
Source: U.S. Department of Labor 1991.
women choose to invest less than men in employment outside the home,
so they get less in return. This explanation is called human capital theory.
In evaluating human capital theory, we will focus first on the issue
of women’s “choice” of occupations. It is certainly the case, as we learned
in chapter 7, that women bear primary responsibility for home and family
care, but what is less clear is the extent to which this is voluntary. A major
weakness in human capital theory is that it fails to distinguish between
self-imposed job restrictions and structurally imposed ones. For instance,
are nonemployed mothers who cannot find affordable and reliable child
care really making a “free choice” to stay out of the labor market? Studies
282 Chapter 8
indicate that five of every six nonemployed women would enter the labor
force if they could find adequate child care (Barrett 1987; Reskin and
Hartmann 1986). The decision to remain at home or to accept low-paying
jobs because they better suit one’s child care responsibilities is most often
a response to a structurally imposed constraint on women’s occupational
opportunities—that is, our government s failure to enact a national child
care policy (see Box 8.2).
The fact is, as we have already seen, the majority of women with very
young children do work outside the home. Moreover, research shows
that, contrary to the argument of human capital theorists, women’s prob¬
ability of working in a nontraditional occupation increases with the num¬
ber of children they have. Although mothers of young children do try to
avoid jobs with rotating shifts because of the child care difficulties they
pose, having children has been positively correlated with women’s efforts
to leave female-dominated jobs for male-dominated ones (Reskin 1993).
The simple explanation for these findings is that the higher pay, better
benefits, and greater opportunities for promotion found in male-domi¬
nated jobs make them especially attractive to women who make a major
financial contribution to their families’ support (Padevic 1992; Rosenfeld
and Spenner 1992; Padevic and Reskin 1990).
While women’s marital and motherhood statuses do not appear to
negatively influence their desire to work in male-dominated jobs, the
choice to take such a job obviously is constrained by its availability. We use
the term availability here to refer not only to a job opening, but also to
the extent to which a job seeker perceives that she has a fair chance of
being hired for the job, feeling welcome on the job, and succeeding in
the job. Research shows that workers’ decisions to take specific jobs
reflect the occupational opportunities available to them. Historically,
women have not been hired for jobs such as coal mining and shipbuild¬
ing, but evidence indicates that once employers began to open job oppor¬
tunities in these fields, women responded by seeking such jobs
(Kesselman 1990; Reskin and Hartmann 1986). However, the number of
women already working in a particular job also has been shown to be
important because such women serve as role models and mentors to
other female job aspirants (Ferguson and Dtinphy 1992; see also chapter
5). If few or no women hold particular jobs then “[t]he impression would
be that these jobs are off-limits for women, and so other women would be
less likely to aspire to them. Perhaps they thought their chances of success
were low simply because fewer other women had succeeded before them”
(Riger 1988:898-899). Or, as Riger goes on to point out, perhaps some
% women choose not to enter certain occupations because they do not want
to subject themselves to discrimination on the job and to a working
environment that is hostile to women. Research has documented male
(text continues on p. 286)
The Child Care Dilemma 30X 3.2

Work in the United States is still organized under the assumption that workers
are men who, if they have children, also have a wife at home to care for them
(Shelton 1992). As we have seen, however, this is not the case; the number of
single-parent families in the United States has increased significantly during
the last twenty-five years alone, and women with preschool-aged children have
been one of the fastest growing segments of the labor force. Nevertheless, the
federal government and most employers have responded ineffectively at best to
these demographic changes. The United States, unlike at least 117 other coun¬
tries, has no official government policy mandating paid parental leave, and we
are one of the few advanced industrialized countries that lacks a government-
mandated child care system (Haas 1992; Hewlett 1986).
It was not until August 1993 that the United States had any federal legisla¬
tion mandating parental leave. Currently, the Family and Medical Leave Act re¬
quires that employers with fifty or more employees offer both women and men
up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave following the birth or adoption of a child or
to care for a sick child or family member. This policy contrasts sharply with
that of Sweden, which instituted a national policy of paid parental leave for
both mothers and fathers in 1974—the first country to do so and still the coun¬
try with the most comprehensive policy. The Swedish government mandates
twelve months of paid parental leave which can be shared by mothers and fa¬
thers, although parents cannot be on leave concurrently, and an additional
three months leave paid at a substantially lower wage rate (equal to about $6
per day in 1989). Although the vast majority of parents take this leave during
their child’s first year of life, the policy allows them to take it at any time until
the child enters school (age seven). Sweden also provides numerous additional
parental benefits, including “daddy days,” which permit fathers ten days off
with pay after childbirth; “temporary parental leave for child care,” which al¬
lows parents time off with pay to care for sick children and is separate from
workers’ own sick leave benefits; and “contact days,” which allow each working
parent two days off with pay per year per child aged four to eleven, typically for
the purpose of visiting the child’s school or child care setting (Haas 1992).
Despite the generosity of the Swedish leave policy, research shows that
while the vast majority of mothers in that country take advantage of it, only
about half of all fathers do. Moreover, among those fathers who do take leave,
most take only about one and a half months of the twelve available to them
and their partners, and less than 10 percent share leave equally with their part¬
ners (Haas 1992). The most common reason offered for this inequality is
men’s employment. According to Haas (1992:98), “Employers are assumed to
view male employees as indispensable, more so than female employees, who
are in key positions less often and whose staying at home for child care pur¬
poses is taken for granted more.”
If this is the case in Sweden, where the national government has actively
tried to encourage fathers to play a more equal role in parenting, what is the
likely impact of the much less comprehensive Family and Medical Leave Act in
the United States? First, preliminary research indicates that men are far less
284 Chapter 8
\
3ox 3.2 Continued
likely than women to take the leave, primarily for two reasons. One of these is
money. As we have already learned, there is a substantial wage gap between
women and men; few families can afford to have fathers, who typically earn
more than mothers, stay at home on an unpaid parental leave. Second, though
employers are required to offer the leave to both male and female employees,
research indicates that men fear that their employers will view them as less
dedicated to their careers and their companies if they take more than just a
few days off following the birth of a child. The men worry that their employers
may “punish” them for taking parental leave (Shelton 1992). These percep¬
tions are not unfounded, since studies also show that the majority of employers
think that their male employees should take no parental leave (Chira 1993b).
But the provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act may also be unfea¬
sible for many female workers as well, and again the reason is economic. Few
single women who have babies can afford to take much unpaid time off from
work. Among the working class and working poor, even in two-parent house¬
holds, both partners’ incomes are necessary for the economic survival of the
family, thus making an unpaid leave for a woman even in a low-paying job fi¬
nancially unfeasible. Consequently, women in such circumstances, as well as
workers in companies with fewer than fifty employees, must often return to
work within days of their child’s birth, arranging for some form of child care
for the infant.
It is not overstating the point to say that working parents in the United
States typically confront a child care crisis. Public child care centers are rela¬
tively few; most nursery schools and child care facilities are private, with costs
ranging from as little as $2,000 or $3,000 a year to more than $12,000 per year
per child. At many private child care centers, there are long waiting lists of par¬
ents who wish to enroll their children; in fact, the use of day care centers as a
child care option for preschool-age children increased from 13 percent in 1977
to 23 percent in 1991 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993). For many par¬
ents, however, the cost of such arrangements is prohibitive. According to a re¬
cent study, it is working-class and poor families that face the greatest shortage
of preschools and child care facilities (,Chira 1993c). Moreover, the facilities
that are available may be unsafe and unsanitary (Pear 1994). Consequently,
most parents in the United States depend on a patchwork of care providers
that includes relatives and friends as well as unlicensed home-based “centers”
(U.S. Department of Commerce 1993; Nelson 1988).
Some major corporations have opened their own child care centers, in
recognition of the importance of family concerns and as means to attract and
retain workers. Other corporations provide child care referral services or a
child care subsidy as a job benefit. Still others permit “flextime” (i.e., employ¬
ees may set their own work schedule as long as a requisite number of hours are
\ worked per day or week) and “flexplace” (i.e., employees may work out of their
own homes during at least part of the work day or week). Most of those who ex¬
ercise one of these options are female employees and, as Shelton (1992:151)
30X &.2 Continued
has pointed out, “Simply allowing women to schedule work to accommodate

household demands is likely to be insufficient because it retains the difference
between women and men.” Regardless of the advantages or disadvantages of
any of these options, though, a more important point perhaps is that they re¬
main exceptions. Most employers continue to view the parenting needs of their
employees, female and male, as a “private” rather than a business matter. Only
about 6,000 of the nearly 6 million employers in the United States offer their
employees any kind of child care assistance (Lawson 1990).
In 1989, business analyst Felice Schwartz suggested another solution to
the child care dilemma. Schwartz urged companies to establish two separate
(and unequal) career tracks for their/mafe employees. One, a primary career
track, would be for career-oriented women who, like men, are willing to com¬
mit themselves completely to meeting their employers’ needs and demands. A
second, slower track—which has come to be called the “mommy track”—would
be for family-oriented women who prefer to put the needs of their spouses and
children before those of their employers (Schwartz 1989). Not surprisingly, this
recommendation sparked a heated debate (Ferguson and Dunphy 1992). Many
corporations praised the suggestion, arguing that it highlights a significant dif¬
ference between male and female workers. However, critics point out that this
proposal encourages employers to track their female employees into dead-end
jobs, and it reinforces the notion that caregiving is women’s responsibility. In¬
deed, it overlooks research findings that show that the majority of men, like
the majority of women, derive greater personal satisfaction from their families
than from their careers, and that a still small, but growing number of young
men are expressing a desire to interrupt their careers in order to care for
young children (Snarey 1993; Dennehy and Mortimer 1992; Haas 1992).
The federal government’s response to the child care crisis has largely
taken the form of tax credits that allow families to deduct a specific percentage
of their child care expenses from their annual taxes. In 1990, the Earned In¬
come Tax Credit program was expanded so that poor working parents whose
credits exceed their taxes are refunded the difference. In addition, as a result
of the legislation passed in 1990, the states were allocated more money to subsi¬
dize child care, especially for poor families, and the Entitlement Funding for
Child Care Services program enabled states to give money to welfare families
or families about to go on welfare because they cannot afford child care. Al¬
though this legislation provided child care for many more children, it will need
to be expanded if President Clinton’s proposed welfare reforms requiring wel¬
fare recipients to get jobs or receive education or training are adopted.
The limited government response to the child care dilemma has led
many observers in the United States to question whether, despite ideological
claims to the contrary, we are a nation that truly cares about the well-being of
our children. After all, other countries, such as France, whose taxes are higher
and whose gross national product is lower, provide high-quality child care
and preschool education that are either free or extensively subsidized by the
286 Chapter 8
3ox 3.2 Continued
government. In France, for example, 99 percent of children ages three, four,

and five attend full-day preschools where they receive exactly the same educa¬
tional program and level of services regardless of whether they come from
poor families who are required to pay nothing or from wealthy families who
still only pay about $5,300 a year (Greenhouse 1993).
We do not mean to suggest that the French or Swedish programs and
policies should be transplanted to the United States, nor that they would work
here as effectively as they do in those countries. Rather, our point is simply to
emphasize that a society that makes a commitment to providing at least ade¬
quate care for all its children must also commit the public funds necessary to
make that goal a reality. At the same time, it must come to recognize that child
care is a concern for all workers, not just female workers, so that its policies
and programs are family-responsive and not, at best, only mother- or woman-
responsive (Shelton 1992).
workers’ efforts to exclude women fropa certain occupations by, for

instance, deliberately excluding them from particular activities or even
sabotaging their work (Reskin 1993). Reskin and Roos (1990) found that
the greater the power of male workers in the workplace—^with power
being measured in terms of male workers’ average job tenure and the
percentage of the male employees who are white, speak English, and are
prime-age—the lower the presence of women in the occupation. Histori¬
cal research has also shown how the actions of some unions have success¬
fully excluded women from certain occupations, although the findings of
more recent studies are mixed with regard to unions’ positions on sex
integration of particular jobs (see, for example. Cobble 1991; Cabin
1990). Interestingly, however. Reskin (1993) notes that one strategy used
by unions to exclude women has Ibeen to demand that employers pay
them wages equal to those of men for the same work, thereby making the
hiring of women less financially attractive to employers.
Clearly the evidence we have discussed so far does not lend support
to human capital theory, but for the sake of argument, let’s assume for
the moment that the theory is correct: women choose jobs that involve
fewer skills, fewer time demands, and less training than the jobs men
choose. To what extent does this explain the differential in women’s and
men’s wages? Based on the findings of recent studies, the answer is very
little. For example, in one of the most thorough tests of human capital
theory, Corcoran et al. (1984) calculated how much the differences in
men’s and women’s education, work experience, work continuity, self-im¬
posed restrictions on work hours and location, and rates of absenteeism
contributed to differences in their salaries. Significantly, they found that

self-imposed restrictions on work hours and location explained almost
none of the wage gap. Large differences in patterns of job tenure between
male and female workers also explained little of the wage gap. “Although
discontinuous employment [caused, for example, by temporary with¬
drawal from the labor force to bear and raise children] did reduce
women’s work experience, they apparently were not handicapped by
having ‘rusty’ skills when they returned to the work force. After adjusting
for the effects of lost experience, we found that labor force interrup¬
tions never significantly lowered wages for either women or white men”
(Corcoran et al. 1984:238). In fact, all of the factors they analyzed,
taken together, accounted for less than a third of the wage gap between
white men and white women and only about a quarter of the wage gap
between white men and African American women. Subsequent studies
confirm their findings (see, for example. Reskin 1993; Rosenfeld and
Kalleberg 1991). Wdiat human capital theory assumes is that women and
men have different levels of commitment to their jobs. There is evidence
of sex differences in work commitment, but contrary to what human
capital theorists would predict, the research shows that women are
slightly more committed to their jobs than are men with similar family
ties, job attributes, and career variables (Reskin 1993; Bielby and Bielby
1988).
Additional research indicates that sex differences in education have
little to do with the wage gap. In a recent study of engineers, for instance,
Robinson and Mcllwee (1989) found that educational attainment, as well
as experience in the work force and job tenure, failed to explain the lower
status of the female engineers in their sample relative to the male engi¬
neers. With respect to education, the women and men in this study were
virtually identical. In fact, Robinson and Mcllwee note that female engi¬
neering students typically outperform male engineering students in their
classes and have slightly higher grade point averages. Yet, for their sam¬
ple, “[t]he educational achievements of these women . . . appear to yield
fewer occupational rewards than do the men’s” (Robinson and Mcllwee
1989:463). Indeed, as Reskin and Roos (1990) argue, women appear to
have to overqualify themselves in order to compete successfully for male-
dominated jobs.
Looking at Table 8.6 on page 288, we find that women’s earnings
are significantly lower than men’s across educational levels. Women who
have college educations can expect to earn on average just slightly more
than male high school dropouts and less than men with only high school
diplomas. Race is also a significant factor in wage differentials irrespective
of employees’ educational levels. White males at every level of education
have higher incomes than African American men and both African-
American and white women (U.S. Department of Labor 1993b). Asian
288 Chapter 8
TABLE 8>.6 Mean Money Earnings by Sex and Educational Attainment of Full-Time,
Year-Round Workers. Age Twenty-five and Older. 1991_
Earnings
Level of Educational Attainment Female Workers Male Workers
8 years or less $12,570 $19,632

Some high school, no diploma 15,352 23,765
Graduated high school 19,336 28,230
Some college, no degree 22,833 33,758
Associate degree 25,554 35,500
Bachelor’s degree or 1 or more
years of postgraduate training 33,144 50,747
Source: U.S, Department of Commerce 1993:467.
women have a higher educational attainment level than women in any

other racial group, yet 70 percent of them work in clerical, service, and
blue-collar occupations which, as we have already seen, pay low salaries
(Taeuber and Valdisera 1986).
This leads us to another difficulty in human capital theory: it as¬
sumes that women’s work automatically entails lower skill, effort, and
responsibility than traditional men’s work. It fails to account for the fact
that female-dominated jobs that require basically the same (and some¬
times more) skill, effort, and responsibility as male-dominated jobs still
pay less. To understand this point, return to the figures in Table 8.5. Here
we find, for instance, that a child care worker earns $127 less per week
than a truck driver and $264 less than a furnace operator. Additional
examples are abundant. As Reskin (1993:258) points out, there are two
significant issues that muddy our understanding of how training and skills
affect the sex composition of jobs and the wage gap. One is that “sex bias
in conceptualizing and measuring skill vitiates the concept’s explanatory
power.” As she and others (e.g., Steinberg 1990) have found, male work¬
ers have had consistently greater success than female workers in promot¬
ing and enforcing the definition of their jobs as skilled. In addition, the
job evaluation systems typically used to determine wages are highly sub¬
jective and often contain many gender stereotypes (Hartmann et al. 1985;
Steinberg and Haignere 1985; Beatty and Beatty 1984). For example,
skills that are utilized in predominantly female occupations, such as
teaching, nursing, and social work, are frequently not recognized as
compensable skills in job evaluation systems at least in part because they
are viewed as an extension of women’s unpaid work in the home. Histori¬
cally, women’s work in the home “was taken for granted, looked simple,
and was not thought to need any particular formal education or training.”
Gender, Employmeyit, and the Economy 289
The incorporation of such stereotypes into job evaluation programs has

sometimes produced nonsensical results—for example, the rating of
nursery school teachers’ skills as lower than those of dog trainers (Briggs
1975:204; Feldberg 1984). Consequently, salaries set on the basis of com¬
parable worth—that is, the principle that differentjobs of similar value to
an employer should be paid equally—are not likely to successfully close
the wage gap because the work women do is systematically devalued.
The second issue identified by Reskin (1993) is that a worker’s sex
as well as the sex composition of a particular occupation affects a worker’s
chances of acquiring specific job skills and of gaining access to jobs
defined as skilled. Reskin (1993) points out, for instance, that in the crafts
and the professions, men have controlled job training and this, in turn,
has enabled them to prevent women from acquiring certain skills.
In sum, what we have found here is that occupational sex segrega¬
tion and the wage gap have little to do with the preferences or free
choices of individual workers. A competing explanation of these prob¬
lems focuses less on the choices and behaviors of workers (the “supply-
side” of the labor market) and more on the choices and behaviors of
employers (the “demand-side” of the labor market), including the em¬
ployers’ tendency toward sex discrimination as well as other forms of
discrimination. We turn now to an evaluation of this alternative perspec¬
tive, but as Reskin (1993) cautions, it must be kept in mind that in the
everyday operations of workplaces, both demand-side and supply-side
factors likely interact with one another in producing particular employ¬
ment outcomes.
THE WORK WORLD: IDEOLOGY

AND THE ROLE OF LAW
A demand-side explanation for occupational sex segregation and the

wage gap emphasizes how the actions of employers combine with struc¬
tural aspects of the workplace to lessen the chances for sex integration
and to widen sex differences in earnings. Among the factors considered
crucial are the extent to which gender stereotypes come into play in
hiring and promotion decisions as well as in the assignment of specific
work tasks, in institutionalized recruitment and promotion proce¬
dures, and in pressures from regulatory agencies. Let’s consider each of
these.
Gender Stereotypes at Work

In our earlier discussion, we saw how beliefs about women s and men s
“appropriate” roles historically helped give rise to a dual labor market. To
290 Chapter 8
review, the prevalent ideology was that a * proper lady did not work unless
she was unmarried or, if married, then childless. A wide range of occupa¬
tions were open to men, but women entered a limited number of jobs that
supposedly matched their “natural” traits and talents and simply ex¬
tended their family roles into the public arena. These, as we have noted,
were occupations in the “helping professions” and in blue-collar and
low-level service fields (e.g., clerical work, sewing, assembling, and can¬
ning). This ideology gave rise to a corollary set of beliefs: that women did
not need to work; that they worked only briefly until they married or had
children (things all women should do); and that if they worked after
marriage or the birth of children, it was only for “pin money” or to “help
out” financially.
In short, employers and employees alike, women as well as men,
came to see women’s employment as secondary to that of men and to view
women workers as less serious about or less committed to their jobs. The
fact that such ideas stood in stark contrast with the reality of many
women’s everyday lives did not make these beliefs any less powerful or
any less widely held. To the majority, it appeared that women deserved to
be relegated to the lower rungs of the job hierarchy and to be paid less
than men. What is more, the ideology of “true womanhood” was never
extended to minority women. As Glenn (1987:359-360) notes, “Racist
ideology triumphed over sexist ideology. Women of color were not
deemed truly women, exempting them from the protective cloaks of
feminine frailty or womanly morality.”
Interestingly, in recent discussions with students, the attitude that is
often expressed is that these ideas are “old-fashioned” and no longer
prevalent in the work world. “People just don’t think like that anymore,”
we are frequently told. However, research indicates that these ideologies
have not disappeared from the workplace, although they may now be
more subtle than in the past. Recent research reviews, for example, show
that both the public and employers continue to believe that there are
certain jobs for which women and’ men are naturally unsuited (Reskin
1993; Riger 1988; Reskin and Hartmann 1986). Studies have shown that
employers not infrequently make hiring decisions on the basis of their
beliefs about the kinds of jobs women like. It is commonly believed, for
example, that women like jobs that are clean and relatively easy. Conse¬
quently, employers considering applicants for a traditionally male job
may justify their decision not to hire a woman on the grounds that she
wouldn’t like the job or wouldn’t be happy in it because the work is dirty
or difficult. But such decisions are likely rationalizations, since the re¬
search indicates that while women do like clean working conditions—and
so do men—the jobs in which women are concentrated are no cleaner
than male-dominated jobs (Jacobs and Steinberg 1990). Additional re-
Gende); Employment, and the Economy 291
search shows that workers in male-dominated jobs are more likely than
those in female-dominated jobs to describe their own jobs as easy (Glass
1990).
When employers make employment decisions about an individual
on the basis of characteristics thought to be typical of a group to which
that individual belongs, the employers are engaging in what is called
statistical discrimination. “According to this model, employers do not hire
anyone who is a member of a group thought to have lower productivity;
statistical discrimination serves for them as a cheap screening device”
(Reskin and Hartmann 1986:66). On the face of it, statistical discrimi¬
nation may not seem unfair; it certainly does not appear to be inher¬
ently sex-biased. However, as Reskin and Hartmann convincingly
demonstrate, it is often premised on gender stereotypes. “For example,
employers may refuse to hire a woman in the childbearing years for
certain jobs—especially those that require on-the-job training—because
they assume that many young women will leave the labor force to have
children, irrespective of any individual applicant’s childbearing or labor
market intentions” (Reskin and Hartmann 1986:66). It also assumes that
men have little interest in or responsibility for childrearing—that men
who have children also have a spouse to care for them. Although such
assumptions may reflect the family lives of a majority of men, they never¬
theless disregard individual circumstances and work against single fathers
and men who prefer an equal or primary parenting role (see Box 8.2 and
chapter 7).
Sexist workplace ideology also operates to preserve industry-wide
sex segregation. Because femaleness, as we noted previously, is a devalued
trait in some workplaces, a concern over loss of prestige or status may
prompt some firms or businesses to restrict their hiring of women (and
racial minorities) either to “back office” jobs that have little contact
with clientele (Hartmann 1987) or to a few “tokens” (Reskin and
Hartmann 1986). An example of this was provided recently by a colleague
who works in a department of three men and three women at a small,
private college. She recounted to us how one of her co-workers had
objected to the hiring of another woman on the ground that the depart¬
ment would then be female-dominated and consequently lose status
within the institution.
There is evidence that some work-related gender stereotypes have
weakened in recent years and that women who have entered male-domi¬
nated occupations have positively changed many workplaces (see, for
example, Lunneborg 1990). Consequently, it is sometimes argued that
sexist workplace ideology, although slow to change, will eventually
break down as more women and men enter occupations nontradi-
tional for their sex. However, there is also evidence that as particular
292 Chapter 8
\
gender stereotypes are refuted, new ones may develop to replace them.
As Reskin and Hartmann (1986:65-66) explain, “A single woman
worker who violates the stereotype can be explained as an exception;
when the behavior of many women clearly belies a particular stereo¬
type, a different one may emerge to maintain the gender homogeneity
with which members of an occupation have become comfortable.”
Ironically, traits or behaviors admired in workers of one sex may be
negatively redefined when exhibited by workers of the opposite sex so as
to make the latter fit a stereotyped image. A male worker, for example,
may be complimented for being aggressive in his work, while a female
worker exhibiting the same behavior is likely to be derided for being “too
pushy. ”
In addition to gender stereotyping, other factors having to do with
the economics of the labor market and the organization of the workplace
contribute to an increase or decline in occupational sex segregation and
the wage gap. As we noted earlier, for example, an increased demand for
workers, such as during wartime, can help to integrate traditionally seg¬
regated jobs. A rise in the demand for workers may also result from the
rapid growth of an industry. Jacobs (1992) reports, for instance, that a 25
percent reduction occurred in overall occupational sex segregation dur¬
ing the two decades 1970 to 1990 simply as a result of the rapid growth of
managerial jobs. With respect to organizational aspects of the workplace.
Reskin (1993) points out that employers’ reliance on informal networks
to recruit new employees—that is, depending on current employers to
tell people they know about specific job openings—usually preserves sex
segregation, especially in already segregated workplaces, because such
networks themselves tend to be composed of individuals of the same sex.
In addition, she argues for the importance of integrating lower-level
positions, particularly in workplaces where employers rely on the internal
labor market to fill high-level positions through promotion up the job
ladder. If jobs on the lower rungs are not integrated, even gender-neutral
promotion procedures cannot deduce segregation in higher-level
positions. As Steinberg and her colleagues (1990) discovered in their
study of the New York civil service system, one of the primary reasons
women and minorities were not being integrated into upper-level posi¬
tions was that they were concentrated in lower-level jobs ineligible for
promotion; the majority of workers in promotion-track lower-level jobs
were white men.
Reskin (1993) suggests a variety of ways in which hiring and promo¬
tion practices can be changed in order to reduce occupational segrega¬
tion and thereby narrow the wage gap. These include waiving seniority
requirements for promotion for women and minority job holders, ex¬
panding job posting throughout a workplace so that workers will be made
aware of position openings in areas that may not be closely related to the
ones in which they are currently working, and establishing job “bridges”
so that career paths in different areas (e.g., clerical, technical, adminis¬
trative) may be connected. However, while such strategies may prove
effective, a number of analysts maintain that many employers lack
sufficient motivation to implement change. Employers, they argue,
must be forced to change discriminatory policies and procedures. One
important impetus for such changes has come from legislation. During
the past three decades, several laws have been enacted in an effort to
remedy workplace segregation and its consequences, especially the wage
gap. However, as we shall learn next, there sometimes has been a
disparity between the written law and the law in action, producing
uneven results.
Legislation for Equality in the Workplace

Until the 1960s, the legal system functioned largely to reinforce gender
discrimination in the workplace, rather than to remedy it. For the most
part, law and judicial actions simply codified widespread gender stereo¬
types about women’s innate weaknesses, which as Justice Bradley argued
in 1872, “unfits [women] for many of the occupations of civil life” {Brad-
well w. Illinois 1872). Legislators and judges maintained that women were
a “special class” of citizens in need of protection: “That her physical
structure and a proper discharge of her maternal functions—having in
view not merely her own health, but the well-being of the race—justify
legislation to protect her from the greed as well as the passion of man”
{Muller Oregon, 1908). Consequently, most states enacted laws restrict¬
ing women’s working hours and the kind of work women could do. In
many states, for instance, women were prohibited from working at night
or from performing a work task that involved lifting more than a pre¬
scribed maximum weight. Other states forbade employers from hiring
women for jobs ruled dangerous or morally corrupting (e.g., bartend¬
ing) . Initially, a variety of reform groups, including suffrage and feminist
organizations, endorsed protective labor laws in the belief that they would
benefit women workers, but as the decades passed, it became clear that
such legislation usually served to severely restrict women’s employment
(Christensen 1988).
In the 1960s, owing in part to the efforts of the feminist and civil
rights movements, the federal government acted to outlaw sex discrimi¬
nation in employment.^ The first important piece of legislation in this
regard is Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Title VII forbids discrimi¬
nation in hiring, benefits, and other personnel decisions (such as promo-
20ur discussion of these laws is, by necessity, simplistic. For a more detailed and
thorough treatment, see Blankenship 1993; Deitch 1993; and Lindgren and Taub
1993.
294 Chapter 8
\
tions or layoffs) on the basis of sex, race, color, national origin, or
religion, by employers of fifteen or more employees. There are, though,
a few exceptions permitted by the law. For instance, an employer may hire
an employee on the basis of sex (or religion or national origin, but never
race or color) if the employer can demonstrate that this is a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ), that is, a qualification “reasonably nec¬
essary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.”
However, since the courts have interpreted the BFOQ exception nar¬
rowly, there are few occupations to which it applies (Lindgren and Taub
1993; Christensen 1988). According to guidelines issued with the law, for
example, sex is considered a bona fide occupational qualification in those
instances where authenticity and genuineness are required, such as roles
for actors and actresses (Kay 1988). Title Vll has been implemented and
enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
which can bring suit on behalf of an employee or class of employees who
have been discriminated against by their employer. It is estimated that an
average of 50,000 new charges of discrimination are filed with the EEOC
each year (Reskin and Hartmann 1986).
A second important federal anti-discrimination policy is Executive
Order 11246, better known as Affirmative Action, which was amended in
1968 to prohibit sex discrimination in addition to discrimination on the
basis of race, color, national origin, and religion. Executive Order 11246
applies to employers who hold contracts with the federal government. It
states that employers may be fined or their contracts may be terminated
or they may be barred from future contracts if discrimination is found.
But Executive Order 11246 goes beyond the mere prohibition of employ¬
ment discrimination by requiring employers to take affirmative actions to
recruit, train, and promote women and minorities. Since 1978, contractor
compliance has been monitored by the Office of Eederal Contract Com¬
pliance (OECCP) in the Department of Labor. Besides this enforcement
agency, the U.S. Department of Justice may also bring suit against dis¬
criminating employers, although'it has rarely done so (Lindgren and
Taub 1993).
The impact of both Title VII and Executive Order 11246 is visible
and far-reaching. Peruse the “want ads” of your local newspaper and you
will see one result; employers may no longer advertise sex-labeled or
sex-specific jobs. Employers also may not use customer preference as a
justification for sex discrimination. Eor instance, in Diaz v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc. (1971), the Eifth Circuit Court ruled that men could
not be denied employment as flight attendants on the ground that pas¬
sengers expect and prefer women in this job (see also Wilson Southwest
Airlines Co., 1983). In addition, employers may not: utilize sex-based
seniority lists; administer discriminatory pre-employment selection tests;
set different retirement ages for workers of each sex; utilize double
standards of employment, such as policies requiring only female employ¬
ees to remain unmarried; penalize women workers who have children; or
discriminate on the basis of pregnancy (Lindgren and Taub 1993; Chris¬
tensen 1988; Reskin and Hartmann 1986; Renzetti 1983). Under these
regulations, the courts have also struck down most state protective labor
laws and have ruled that sexual harassment is a form of employment
discrimination.
Although it is impossible to determine the precise impact of these
laws, research indicates that when they are consistently enforced, they do help
to reduce workplace segregation and its consequences. For example,
“when the EEOC pursued systemic cases involving large employers, the
visibility of such cases presumably had a deterrent effect, and, in fact, a
survey of major employers revealed that managerial awareness of enforce¬
ment efforts at other companies was positively related to having effective
programs to enhance women employees’ opportunities at their own com¬
panies” (Reskin and Hartmann 1986:84). What puzzles us, however, is
why, thirty years after the passage of this legislation, workplace sex segre¬
gation is still pervasive.
At least part of the solution to this paradox lies with the limitations
of the laws and the inconsistency with which they have been enforced. Eor
one thing. Title VII and Executive Order 11246 define employment dis¬
crimination in limited, but complex terms, leading judges to arrive at
varying interpretations of both these regulations and appropriate affirm¬
ative measures to remedy past discrimination (Blankenship 1993;
Lindgren and Taub 1993; Greene 1989). Moreover, since the mid-1980s,
the U.S. Supreme Court has handed down rulings that have substantially
increased the burden of employees in proving they have been discrimi¬
nated against. Essentially, there are two types of discrimination that can
be addressed in Title VII and affirmative action cases. One is disparate
impact in which discrimination occurs because a seemingly neutral or fair
employment practice has detrimental impact on women or racial minori¬
ties (Lindgren and Taub 1993). In 1989, the Court ruled in a 5-4 decision
in the case of Wards Cove Packing Company v. Atonio that employees must
prove that the specific employment practices of their employers caused
sex or racial discrimination in their employment. This decision made it
easier for employers to defend themselves against charges of sex or race
discrimination. In a second case the same year, the Court ruled, again
in a 5-4 decision that white males who claim to have been adversely
affected by affirmative action programs could challenge those plans in
court by filing reverse discrimination suits {Martin w. Wilks). Fortunately,
the Civil Rights Act passed by Congress in 1991 contains measures that
essentially override these two decisions, so that their potentially negative
296 Chapter S
impact on women and minority workers for the most part has been
avoided.^
In 1993, however, the Court handed down another 5-4 ruling which
addressed a second type of discrimination, disparate treatment, in which an
employer is accused by an employee of directly discriminating against her
or him. Prior to the Court’s 1993 decision in the case of St. Mary’s Honor
Centerv. Hicks, disparate treatment cases were litigated in three steps. The
employee first provided prima facie evidence that she or he had been dis¬
criminated against in an employment decision (e.g., hiring, promotion,
dismissal). The accused employer then presented evidence that there was
a legitimate (i.e., nondiscriminatory) reason underlying the decision in
question. Finally, the employee had to demonstrate that the reason given
by the employer was not credible, but rather a pretext for discrimination
(Lindgren and Taub 1993). In the St. Mary’s Honor Center c?Lse, though,
the Court ruled that the employee must do more than simply show that
the employer’s underlying reason was not credible; instead, the employee
must now provide direct evidence of discrimination (e.g., witnesses, or a
letter or memo). Since employers, wary of the possibility of lawsuits, have
become increasingly careful about being blatantly discriminatory, em¬
ployees rarely possess this kind of evidence and, consequently, now face
a much lower probability of winning such lawsuits. Although the Clinton
administration supported the employee in the St. Mary’s Honor Center
it does not appear at this time that Congress will again pass legislation (as
it did in 1991) to overturn the Court’s decision.
It is also significant that lawsuits brought under the anti-discrimina¬
tion regulations discussed here, particularly Title VTI class action suits, are
typically complex and may drag on for a number of years before a
settlement is reached (Reskin and Hartmann 1986). Consider, for exam¬
ple, the (in)famous case oiEEOCv. Sears, Roebuck and Co. finally decided
in 1986. Sears was first charged in 1973 with discriminating against
women in hiring for and promotion to commission sales positions, but
the case was not heard until 1984.'During this eleven-year delay, at least
two relevant changes took place. First, Sears instituted an affirmative
action program in 1974 that helped increase the number of women in
commission sales jobs by the time the case was actually heard (although
the EEOC maintained that Sears continued to discriminate between 1974
and 1980). Second, the administration of the federal government shifted
to the political right. The conservative Reagan administration voiced its
opposition to class action suits such as the Sears case, favoring instead
3The Civil Rights Act of 1991 also provided for the creation of the Glass Ceiling
Commission, a twenty-one member commission chaired by the Secretary of Labor,
which is investigating barriers to the advancement of women and minorities in the
workplace as well as strategies for increasing worker diversity in the workplace. The
Commission is scheduled to complete its work by the close of 1995.
cases in which individual vicdms of discriminadon could be idendfied.

The director of the EEOC in 1984 was a Reagan appointee who himself
openly supported the administration’s position. The federal district judge
who eventually decided the case in favor of Sears was also a Reagan ap¬
pointee (Lindgren and Taub 1993; Madden and Erikson 1987; Cooper
1986; Milkman 1986).^
This latter issue is important, too, because it alerts us to the fact that
law enforcement is directly influenced by changes in government and
political climate. This point is underscored by available statistics on fund¬
ing and staffing at the agencies responsible for Title VTl and Executive
Order 11246. Between 1977 and 1981, the EEOC, with an increased
budget and staff along with the adoption of more efficient procedures,
reduced a huge backlog of cases while simultaneously increasing case
settlements and lowering the number of cases dismissed for no cause. In
1981, however, the Reagan administration cut the EEOC’s budget and
staff with the result that the settlement rate dropped from 43 percent in
1980 to 28 percent by 1983, while the no-cause dismissal rate rose from
29 percent to 43 percent during the same period. The total number of
suits filed by the EEOC was halved by 1983. A similar pattern is found at
the OECCP with a similar outcome. Therefore, the stall in progress to¬
ward workplace integration that occurred during the 1980s was to a
considerable extent due to lax law enforcement by federal regulatory
agencies. “\\Tien regulatory agencies fail to enforce laws, they send a
message to employers, condoning segregative personnel practices”
(Reskin 1993:249). The recent Supreme Court decisions discussed here
have a similar effect.
4The Sears case is notable for another reason as well: in emphasizing the question of
gender differences, the case drew attention to the equality versus difference debate in
feminism (see chapters 1 and 13). Feminist historian Rosalind Rosenberg testified for
the defense (Sears) that the reason women were not hired for or promoted to
Commission sales jobs within the retail chain was that women themselves chose not
to pursue such jobs. Their decisions against seeking such jobs, according to Rosen¬
berg, derived from distinct “female” values. In short, the female employees were
simply behaving like women. In contrast, feminist historian Alice Kessler-Harris testi¬
fied for the plaintiff (the EEOC) that women choose particular jobs not because of
some innate value differences that distinguish them from male employees, but rather
because their employment opportunities are constrained in a discriminatory labor
market. Given truly equal opportunities, Kessler-Harris testified, women will make
employment choices similar to those of men because their values are similar. The
Sears case, then, highlighted questions that are currently the focus of vigorous debate
among feminists themselves; What are the best strategies for eliminating gender
discrimination? Must women think and behave like men in order to be treated
equally? What are the dangers in the feminist promotion of a “women’s culture”?
These are questions we will explore further in chapter 13. Eor a more thorough
treatment of this debate in the context of the Sears case, see Scott 1988; Milkman
1986. Vogel (1993) also analyzes this debate in the context of pregnancy policies in
the workplace.
298 Chapter 8
\
Clearly, then, while Title VII and Executive Order 11246 have made
visible dents in our society’s discriminatory work structure, the effects of
these policies have been limited for at least two reasons. First, the inher¬
ent weaknesses and complexities of the laws themselves promote lengthy
litigation with sometimes negative consequences; they also give judges
considerable discretion, which frequently produces contradictory deci¬
sions in obviously similar cases. Second, and more significantly, these poli¬
cies, like all public policies, are vulnerable to political change. Given the
antifeminism and hostility to affirmative action displayed by the Reagan/
Bush administrations, it is not surprising that the modest, but hard-won
employment gains of the 1960s and 1970s were eroded during the 1980s.
Hopefully, the Clinton administration will act to reverse this decline.
A note about other antidiscrimination laws We have focused here on

laws that primarily address the problem of workplace sex segregation.
Since we know that workplace sex segregation contributes to the male/fe¬
male wage gap, we may expect that laws designed to remedy the former
will also have a positive impact on the latter and, indeed, there is evidence
to support this hypothesis (Reskin and Hartmann 1986). But the wage
gap has also been attacked directly by legislation that outlaws discrimina¬
tory pay policies. Perhaps the best known and most frequently utilized law
of this type is the Equal Pay Act of 1963.
The Equal Pay Act prohibits employers from paying employees of
one sex more than employees of the opposite sex when these employees
are engaged in work that requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility
and that is performed under similar working conditions. This prohibition
extends to other forms of discrimination in compensation, such as over¬
time. However, pay need not be equal if the difference is based on
employees’ relative seniority, merit, the quantity or quality of their pro¬
duction, or “any other factor other than sex” such as the profitability of
their work (Lindgren and Taub 1993; Christensen 1988).
The courts have determined fhat the work performed by employees
of the opposite sex does not have to be identical to require equal pay, but
must only be substantially equal. In addition, the courts have ruled that
employers may not Justify unequal pay for their male and female workers
by creating artificial job classifications that do not substantially differ in
content (England 1992). A major difficulty with the Equal Pay Act, how¬
ever, is that it does not address the problem of sex-segregated employ¬
ment which, we have argued, is a root cause of the wage gap. The benefits
of a law designed to provide equal pay for equal work are limited, there¬
fore, if, as we have found, men and women are largely segregated into
different jobs and predominantly female jobs are systematically devalued.
Of course, it is for this reason that women workers and others have
increasingly called for comparable worth, which we defined earlier as
Gender, Employ ment, and the Economy 299
equal pay for different jobs of similar value. Since 1985, several compara¬
ble worth cases have been brought on behalf of women workers, but in
general, the courts have not looked favorably upon comparable worth as
a means to remedy gender inequities in pay (England 1992). According
to Christensen (1988:340), their reluctance is due to two reasons: they do
not wish to punish employers who rely on the market in setting wages
and who are not individually responsible for societal discrimination” and
they do not wish “to become involved in trying to evaluate the worth of
different Jobs.”
The first, and probably the most well known comparable worth suit
was AFSCME v. State of Washington. In 1983, a federal district Judge ruled
in this case that the state of Washington had discriminated against its
female employees who worked in female-dominated Jobs by paying them
less than male employees who worked in comparable, but male-domi¬
nated Jobs. The state appealed, however, and subsequently won the case
in 1985, when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that “comparable
worth is not a viable theory under our present laws and that employers
are not required to remedy societal wage disparities that they did not
create” (Christensen 1988:341). Nevertheless, the state did agree to make
pay equity adjustments in its female employees’ salaries. By mid-1987,
twenty-eight states were conducting Job evaluation studies, twenty states
had budgeted for and were in the process of implementing some form of
comparable worth policy, and 167 local Jurisdictions—in addition to
those in the state of Minnesota where comparable worth has been imple¬
mented most extensively—had adopted comparable worth policies
(Evans and Nelson 1989).
Although there is evidence that comparable worth may make a
significant contribution to closing the gender gap in wages (Hartmann
1985), the value of its broad use as an antidiscrimination strategy has
been debated by many analysts, including feminists (England 1992).
Some researchers caution against seeing comparable worth, as well as
Title Vll and affirmative action, as panaceas for solving gender inequality
in the workplace. Steinberg and Cook’s (1988:326) conclusions in this
regard are worth quoting at length:
[E]qual employment requires more than guaranteeing the right to equal

access, the right to equal opportunity for promotion, or the right to
equal pay for equal, or even comparable worth. Additionally, it warrants a
broader policy orientation encompassing social welfare laws that assume
equality within the family; widespread use of alternative work
arrangements that accommodate the complexities of family life within
two-earner families; and a rejtivenated union movement, with female
leadership more active at work sites in defending the rights of women
workers. Social welfare laws, family policy, and government services must
create incentives toward a more equal division of responsibilities for
300 Chapter 8
family and household tasks between men and women. Increasing child
care facilities, as well as maintaining programs to care for the elderly,
would help alleviate some of the more pressing demands made on adults
in families. . . . This also means that tax policy, social security laws, and
pension programs must be amended to make government incentives to
family life consistent with a family structure in which husbands and wives
are equal partners.
Few countries have even attempted such ambitious reforms, let

alone been successful in implementing them. In socialist societies, poli¬
cies such as these were set as goals, at least in the official rhetoric.
Unfortunately, realizing these goals often proved insurmountably diffi¬
cult. Of greater concern, however, is evidence that the political transfor¬
mations currently being undertaken in many formerly socialist countries
are having a disproportionately negative impact on women in those socie¬
ties. We turn our attention to this topic now.
GENDER AND WORK IN

POST-SOCIALIST SOCIETIES
The preceding discussion highlights sorhe of the problems inherent in

attempts to legislate equality in the workplace. There are, though, a number
of countries that have pursued this strategy more aggressively than the
United States. Among them are socialist societies, and their approach to
the “woman question” is useful in developing a thorough understanding
of the relationships among gender, employment, and economies.
Writing more than a century ago, Karl Marx and Frederich Engels
recognized women as an oppressed and exploited group. Their plan for
women’s liberation depended on women’s mass participation in the
paid labor force and a concomitant decline in the time they spent on
unremunerated household tasks (Engels 1942). Consequently, in coun¬
tries that adopted some form of socialism—for example, the former
Soviet Ufiion, various Eastern European nations, Cuba, the People’s Re¬
public of China, and several African countries—political leaders pro¬
moted these goals and even codified them into law. Available evidence,
however, indicates that in practice, most countries found this easier said
than done.
In the former Soviet Union, for exanaple, despite women’s high
representation in the paid labor force, they were concentrated in posi¬
tions labeled “women’s work” in Soviet society (e.g., teaching, child care,
medicine, food processing, janitorial work, highway construction, and
warehouse work). More than half of all Soviet women workers were
employed as manual laborers or low-skilled industrial workers. Even in
the professions, women were concentrated at the lower levels and had
little representation in decision-making positions. For instance, while
more than 80 percent of school teachers were women, two-thirds of

school superintendents were men. Seventy percent of engineers and
skilled technical workers were women, but 94 percent of the work collec¬
tives leadership posts were held by men. About 77 percent of physicians
were women, but the medical profession in the former Soviet Union had
little prestige and low wages; most physicians, in fact, could not afford to
hold just one Job (Gray 1989; Andors 1983). And, although the former
Soviet Union, like other socialist countries, had enacted laws requiring
equal pay for equal work, female workers earned about 70 percent of what
male workers earned. This earnings gap existed in both the industrial and
agricultural sectors of the labor market and held regardless of the criteria
used to evaluate specific jobs (Gray 1989; Holland 1985; Andors 1983).
Even more resistant to change than the gender division of paid labor
was the gender division of labor in the home (Gray 1989; Holland 1985;
Mamanova 1984). To free women from domestic chores and thus facili¬
tate their labor force participation, the former Soviet Union, like most
socialist countries, initially attempted to socialize housework and child
care by opening public nurseries, dining rooms, and other services. Un¬
fortunately, such programs quickly became prohibitively expensive for
governments with limited resources and developing or underdeveloped
economies. As a result, housework and child care remained primarily the
responsibilities of socialist women in addition to their paid employment.
For example, one study conducted during the late 1980s in the former
Soviet Union found that women’s work week averaged seventy-four hours
because of their double burden of employment and household responsi¬
bilities, whereas men’s average work week was about fifty-four hours (Po-
sadskaya 1993). Not surprisingly, some analysts concluded that socialist
women were not more liberated than their sisters in democratic capitalist
societies such as the United States, just more tired (Gray 1989; Scott 1974).
In 1985, former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev introduced sweep¬
ing changes in his country’s economic strategy with his new policies of
glasnost or an openness to other societies and cultures, especially those in
the West, and perestroika or a restructuring of the economy to allow for
more free enterprise and less state control. While many in the former
Soviet Union welcomed reform, particularly as long as they thought such
strategies would stimulate their country’s faltering economy, many female
social scientists expressed concern about the impact of such policies on
women. After all, in his writings, Gorbachev argued that the time had
come for women to leave the labor force and return to their “natural”
responsibilities in the home (Posadskaya 1993; Waters 1993).
Following the political transformation of the Soviet Union into the
Gommonwealth of Independent States in December 1991, these women’s
concerns have intensified, particularly in Russia. Indeed, recent research
indicates that rather than opening new opportunities for women, glasnost,
perestroika and other “democratic reforms” have resulted in the closing of
302 Chapter 8
opportunities that women in Russia previously enjoyed. According to one

analyst, there is a widespread attitude that what was considered good or
beneficial under socialism is bad or detrimental to democracy and free
enterprise. Consequently, if the emancipation of women from the home
and into the labor force was a major goal under socialism, the return of
women to the home is a major goal for the new political regime (Posad-
skaya 1993). This new goal is reflected in two 1993 legislative proposals,
one of which would restrict the work hours of women with children under
the age of fourteen and disqualify such women for high-ranking jobs, and
another which would close almost a third of Moscow s day care centers,
thereby forcing many women to quit their jobs. In 1993, 75 percent of
Russia’s unemployed were women, one-third of whom were between the
ages of thirty and fifty, and a large segment of whom were highly educated
professionals (e.g., engineers, economists, scientists) {USA Today ^ March
1993:4A). These dismal employment prospects not surprisingly have had
a dampening effect on young women’s career aspirations and their desire
to pursue higher education (Posadskaya 1993).
Russian economist Anastasia Posadskaya (1993) argues that, for Rus¬
sian women, the political and economic transformations that have taken
place in their country since 1991 have resulted in a change from one
form of patriarchy to another form of patriarchy. Blatant sexism, which
under socialism was taboo, currently is not only rampant, but also viewed
as progressive, “modern, ” and “Western.” Employers now decide a priori
for which jobs they will hire men and for which they will hire women, and
they place employment ads with patently sexist (and ageist) job qualifica¬
tions. For instance, advertisements for high-level executive and manage¬
ment positions routinely state that only men between the ages of
thirty-five and forty-five should apply, whereas advertisements for secretar¬
ies or “director’s assistants” specify female applicants between the ages of
twenty and thirty and commonly add such “qualifications” as “a good bust
size,” “long blonde or red hair,” “attractive,” and “without hang-ups.” One
employment ad placed by an advertising firm seeking a secretary required
applicants to submit a full-size photograph of themselves wearing a bikini.
Other ads for secretarial and similar “women’s jobs” state that successful
applicants are required to wear mini-skirts as “uniforms” (Posadskaya
1993; USA Today 9 March 1993:4A).
Although we have focused our discussion on Russia, research indi¬
cates that these trends are prevalent in other post-socialist societies as well
(Posadskaya 1993).^ While such reports are disheartening, one of the
50f course, it is important to recognize that there are significant differences between
the post-socialist countries of Eastern Europe in terms of their histories, cultures,
levels of modernization, and so on. Eor a detailed comparison, see the essays in Funk
and Mueller 1993.
great ironies of glasnost and perestroika is that while they allowed Russians
and others to view socialism critically for the first time in decades, this
new critical eye looked beyond socialism to examine too the new regimes.
For women, one important consequence of this social and political intro¬
spection has been the growth of feminism, although the analyses, strate¬
gies, and goals of this feminism are not the same as those of Western
feminism (Lissyutkina 1993). Memberships in women’s groups are still
small, but such organizations have begun to lobby politicians on behalf
of women, meet with government officials to voice women’s concerns,
stage public protests over sexist policies and practices, and expose the
activities of crime groups who exploit the economic vulnerabilities of
women by promising them good jobs in Western Europe only to sell them
into prostitution rings. In Moscow, the Centre for Gender Studies is
undertaking research on a wide variety of gender issues and conducts
seminars for women in diverse fields and situations, such as those who
wish to start their own businesses (Posadskaya 1993; Simons 1993c; USA
Today 9 March 1993:4A). The impact of these initiatives remains to be
seen, but it appears that some of the most significant feminist struggles
of the twenty-first century are likely to be waged in post-socialist societies.
THE INTERSECTION OF HOME

AND THE WORK WORLD
Our discussion of the difficulties faced by women workers in socialist and

post-socialist societies highlights one of the major themes of this and the
preceding chapter: the interrelationship between family life and the work
world. Men and women possess different levels of power in the family,
with women typically being the less powerful partners. In chapter 7, we
learned that differences in power between intimate partners are directly
related to differences in their income and other resources. The work
women do in the home is unremunerated and, therefore, not even re¬
garded as “real” work. As we saw in this chapter, however, the division of
labor in the home also often constrains women’s opportunities to earn
outside income.
For one thing, since employed women continue to bear primary
responsibility for housework and child care, they shoulder a double work
load compared with employed men, but receive fewer rewards. The un¬
availability of adequate and affordable child care, we have learned, is a
major obstacle to employment for many women. But regardless of their
objective circumstances, the widespread belief among employers and
co-workers that “a woman’s place is in the home” serves to justify discrimi¬
nation against women in hiring, promotion, and other employment-re¬
lated opportunities and to constrain men from assuming equal caregiving
304 Chapter 8
responsibilities within families. In fact, the evidence discussed in this

chapter shows that persistent stereotypes about women’s and men’s “ap¬
propriate” roles reinforce and perpetuate workplace sex segregation and
its attendant consequences, including the male/female earnings gap.
The prevailing assumption seems to remain that the public world of work
is men’s domain, whereas the private world of home belongs to women.
If women are in the labor force, their employment is secondary to that of
men. From our discussions in chapters 7 and 8, we know that these
assumptions are patently false. We know, too, that both women and men
suffer negative consequences from blind adherence to them.
Legislation such as Title VII, Executive Order 11246, and the Equal
Pay Act is designed to protect workers of both sexes and racial minorities.
It has, in fact, primarily benefitted white women as well as men of color.
Although this legislation has fallen far short of equalizing the job oppor¬
tunities and salaries available to female and male workers, and among
workers of different racial groups, there is evidence that when it is strin¬
gently enforced, it can help to lessen employment inequities. Still, this
legislation was not designed to alter the gender division of unpaid house¬
hold labor. Since we know that this is directly tied to sex-based employ¬
ment discrimination, we cannot expect women or men to be free to
choose the work that best suits them as individuals unless the simultane¬
ous elimination of both these inequities becomes a central goal of our
nation’s public policy.
KEY TERMS
comparable worth the policy of paying workers equally when they perform dif¬
ferent jobs that have similar value
dissimilarity index (segregation index) a measure of occupational sex segrega¬
tion, reported in percent, that indicates the proportion of workers of one
sex that would have to change |o jobs in which members of their sex
were underrepresented to achieve a balanced occupational distribution
between the sexes
dual labor market a labor market characterized by one set of jobs employing
almost exclusively men and another set of jobs, typically lower paying
with lower prestige, employing almost exclusively women
economy the system for the management and development of a society’s hu¬
man and material resources
Equal Pay Act of 1963 forbids employers from paying employees of one sex
more than employees of the opposite sex when these employees are en¬
gaged in work that requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility and is
performed under similar working conditions, although exceptions, such
as unequal pay based on seniority, merit, the quality or quantity of pro¬
duction, or any other factor besides sex, are allowed
Executive Ordei 11246 (Affirmative Action) forbids federal contractors from

discriminating in personnel decisions on the basis of sex, as well as race,
color, national origin, and religion, and requires employers to take affirm¬
ative measures to recruit, train, and hire women and minorities; since
1978, implemented and enforced by the OFCCP
human capital theory explains occupational sex segregation in terms of
women s free choice to work in jobs that make few demands on workers
and require low personal investment in training or skills acquisition
based on the assumption that women’s primary responsibility is in the
home
occupational sex segregation the degree to which men and women are con¬
centrated in occupations that employ workers of predominantly one sex
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act forbids discrimination in employment on
the basis of sex, race, color, national origin, or religion, by employers of
fifteen or more employees, although exceptions, such as the BFOQ, are
allowed; implemented and enforced by the EEOC
SUGGESTED READINGS
Funk, N., and M. Mueller 1993. Gender Politics and Post-Communism. New York:
Routledge.
Miller, D. C. 1990. Women and Social Welfare: A Feminist Analysis. New York: Praeger.
Reskin, B. F., and P. A. Roos 1990. Queues, Gender Queues: Explaining Women’s
Inroads into Male Occupations. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Romero, M. 1992. Maid in the U.S.A. New York: Routledge.
Sokoloff, N. J. 1992. Black Women and White Women in the Professions: Occupational
Segregation by Race and Gender, 1960-1980. New York: Routledge.
Waring, M. 1991. If Women Counted: A New Feminist Economics. New York: Harper
and Row.
\
Chapter
Gender, Crime, and Justice

Gender, Crime, and Justice 307
Equality before the law is a constitutional guarantee in the United States.

Yet, we know from our discussions so far that the laws of our land have
allowed indeed, even prescribed—discriminatory treatment of different
groups of citizens. Women, for example, were historically defined by law
as men s property and were systematically denied their civil rights, includ¬
ing the right to vote. In fact, in 1894, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
women were not “persons” under the law. The case. In re Lockwood, was
heard on appeal from the State of Virginia where Belva A. Lockwood had
been denied a license to practice as an attorney even though state law
permitted any “person” licensed as an attorney in any other state to
practice in Virginia. The Supreme Court upheld a lower court opinion
that the word “person” meant “male.” Consequently, “from 1894 until
1971 states could maintain that women were not legally ‘persons’ by virtue
of this single Supreme Court decision” (Hoff-Wilson 1987:8; Sachs and
Wilson 1978).
Most of the court cases we discuss in this text fall within the realm
of civil law, that is, the body of law that focuses on settling private disputes,
such as divorces, contracts and private property issues, and conflicts in the
workplace. In this chapter, however, we will focus on gender and criminal
law. Criminal law encompasses behaviors that supposedly imperil the
general welfare of the society and, consequently, it is the state which
prosecutes the offender, not the individual citizen who has been harmed
by the offending behavior. In other words, the violation of a criminal law
is Mewed, in theory at least, as a transgression against society as well as
against an individual citizen.
What gets defined in law as criminal, though, does not necessarily
represent the interests of all segments of society. Rather, criminal law
typically represents the interests of lawmakers. Historically, those who
have had the power to make laws in the United States have been wealthy
white men (see chapter 10). Not surprisingly, therefore, the experiences
of women and men in the criminal justice system tend to be different.
Compounding these sex differences are differences in race, social class,
age, and sexual orientation.
This chapter begins with a discussion of men and women as offend¬
ers. First, we will examine men’s and women’s relative crime rates. In
addition, we will address their differential processing through the crimi-
naljustice system—from arrest to prosecution to conviction to sentencing
to imprisonment. In studying the administration of justice, we will also
have the opportunity to discuss issues pertaining to men’s and women’s
roles as criminal justice professionals. Finally, we will conclude the chap¬
ter by examining differences in the criminal victimization of men and
women, with special attention given to sexual assault and other violent
crimes against women.
308 Chapter 9
WOMEN AND MEN AS OFFENDERS

Among the questions most often addressed by criminologists, two in
particular seem most relevant to our present discussion: Who commits
crime? and why? Traditionally, a common response to the first question
has been men, especially young men. Indeed, a careful survey of crimino¬
logical research conducted prior to the mid-1970s would probably lead
you to conclude that women are rarely criminal. The little attention that
was given to female offenders was largely limited to three contexts:
(1) comparisons to underscore women’s low crime rates relative to those
of men; (2) studies of prostitution; and (3) analyses of the depravity of
violent women, the rationale being that since “normal women are pas¬
sive, the few women who do commit violent crimes must be sick (Ed¬
wards 1986). Clearly, in the minds of criminologists and the general
public, “criminal” was equated with “male.”
In 1975, however, this perception began to change, owing largely to
the publication of two books—Freda Adler’s Sisters in Crime and Rita
James Simon’s Women and Crime—each of which received widespread
attention in both the academic and popular presses. A central theme in
both books is that women’s crime had begun to change both in its
nature and in the number of offenses cbmmitted. In fact, according to
Adler, the United States at that time was in the midst of a female crime
wave. Although men were still committing a greater absolute number
of offenses, the female crime rate was increasing more than the male
crime rate. Thus, for example, Adler cites statistics from the F.B.I. Uniform
Crime Reports (UCR) that show that between 1960 and 1972, women’s
arrest rates for robbery increased 277 percent compared with a 169
percent increase for men. Statistics on juvenile offenders revealed similar
changes. What is more, Adler argued that females were not only engaged
in more crime than previously but also their criminal activity had assumed
a more serious and violent character: women were committing crimes
that traditionally had been committed by men. In this respect, Simon’s
work closely resembles Adler’s, with the exception that Simon saw the
increase in women’s crime limited primarily to property offenses rather
than violent crimes against persons. Still, she maintained that women
were committing more crimes generally characterized as masculine, par¬
ticularly white-collar and occupationally related offenses such as fraud
and embezzlement.
These claims did not cause the greatest stir, however. Indeed, what
received the most attention, especially from the popular media, were
^ Adler’s and Simon’s explanations of their findings. Specifically, both
argued that the changes they uncovered in the rate and character of
female crime were logical outcomes of the women’s liberation movement.
As Adler (1975:10) phrased it, “Is it any wonder that once women were
armed with male opportunities they should strive for status, criminal as
well as civil, through established male hierarchical channels?” Simon’s
position was a bit more complex. She argued that violent crimes by
women had actually decreased because of feminism. “As women feel more
liberated physically, emotionally, and legally, and less subjected to male
power, their frustrations and anger decrease . . . [which results] in a de¬
cline in their desire to kill the usual objects of their anger or frustration;
their husbands, lovers, and other men upon whom they are dependent,
but insecure about” (Simon 1975:40). The down side, however, is that the
feminist movement, by encouraging women’s participation in the paid
labor force, had also contributed to the rise in female property crime. “As
women increase their participation in the labor force their opportunity
to commit certain types of crime [e.g., white-collar and occupational
crimes] also increases” (Simon 1975:40). Because of its emphasis on the
women’s movement, Adler’s and Simon’s perspective has become known
as the emancipation theory of female crime.
Actually, this argument is not totally new; as Meda Chesney-Lind
(1986:78) points out, “Since the 1800s, criminologists have been issuing
warnings that the emancipation of women would result in a dramatic
change in the character and frequency of women’s crime.” What is of
greatest value in Adler’s and Simon’s work is that it forced a contempo¬
rary reassessment of the relationship between gender and participation
in criminal activity. In critiquing Adler and Simon, subsequent analyses
shed light on the extent to which female crime had actually changed in
recent years, and the degree to which the women’s movement may have
contributed to such a change.
One of the most serious weaknesses in both Adler’s and Simon’s
work is their reliance on official crime statistics. These statistics represent
only those crimes known to the police. A substantial amount of crime,
however, goes undetected (see, for example, Inciardi et al. 1993). “It is
well known that these official records are not a true representation of
criminal behavior; there are many omissions, an overemphasis on certain
types of offenses and an under-representation of white-collar crime. In
addition, there are the influences and modifications in policing and
prosecution policies and the effects of moral panics on particular crime
rate figures” (Smart 1982:108). A second difficulty stems from the way
Adler, in particular, utilizes the UCR data. In comparing male and female
rates of increase for specific crimes, she fails to control for the large
difference in the absolute base numbers from which the rates of increase
are calculated. Consequently, if one base figure is small, even a slight rise
will exaggerate the rate change. Conversely, a sizeable increase in a large
base figure is likely to appear as only a minor change (Smart 1982; Terry
1978). An example should make the point clearer. Between 1965 and
1970, the number of arrests of women for homicide increased almost 79
310 Chapter 9
percent; during the same^ period, the number of homicide arrests for men
increased 73 percent. However, in absolute terms, the number of homi¬
cides committed by women rose from 1,293 to 1,645, whereas for men,
the figures were 6,533 and 8,858 respectively. Clearly, if we look only at
percent changes without taking into account these major absolute base
differences, we end up with a very distorted picture of men’s and women’s
involvement in crime.
A more accurate measure of changes in men’s and women s criminal
activity is to calculate sex-specific arrest rates, that is, the number of men
arrested for a crime per 100,000 of the male population and the number
of women arrested for the same crime per 100,000 of the female pop¬
ulation. The sex differential in arrest rates can then be determined
by calculating women’s share of all arrests, male and female, for a spe¬
cific offense. Steffensmeier (1982), for example, used this method to
analyze the sex differential in arrest rates from 1965 to 1980. During
this period, there was neither a significant widening nor a significant
narrowing of the gender gap in arrests, with the important exception
of certain types of property crimes—an issue to which we will return
shortly.
Simon and Landis (1991) report findings similar to those of Stef¬
fensmeier. For instance, in an analysis of arrest data for the period 1963
to 1987, they report that, contrary to media accounts and popular
thought, women have not been committing more violent crimes in recent
years. During the two and a half decades they examined (1963-1987),
arrest rates for homicide, aggravated assault, and robbery showed little
fluctuation. Also contradicting popular media portrayals of the contem¬
porary crime problem is their finding that the majority of female offend¬
ers are not being arrested on drug charges, although the number of
arrests of both males and females for drug abuse violations did sub¬
stantially increase during the overall period 1982-1991 (see Table 9.1).
Importantly, however, as we learn in Box 9.1 on pages 312-313, the
drugs-crime relationship is a complex one, which is further complicated
when gender is taken into account.
A number of researchers (for example, Chesney-Lind and Shelden
1992; Simon and Landis 1991; Steffensmeier 1982) report that the excep¬
tions to the generally stable sex differential in arrest rates lie in the area
of property crime, particularly larceny (for both adults and juveniles) and
fraud and, to a lesser extent, embezzlement and forgery/counterfeit¬
ing. Indeed, Simon and Landis (1991:55) argue that if the rate of
increase in female arrests for fraud, embezzlement, and forgery/coun-
\ terfeiting continues at its present pace, female arrests for these crimes
will come to roughly equal those of men within the next decade or two.
{text continues on p. 313)
TAgLE 9.1 Male and Female Arreat Ratee by Offense Charged, United States, 1902-1991
Males Females
% %
Offense Charged 1982 1991 Change 1982 1991 Change
Murder & nonnegligent 12,624 15,308 21.3 1,868 1,758 -5.9
manslaughter
Forcible rape 22,216 26,318 18.5 209 300 43.5
Robbery 104,636 118,485 13.2 8,265 11,088 34.2
Aggravated assault 177,849 286,496 61.1 26,570 45,197 73.7
Burglary 322,005 265,410 -17.6 23,947 26,570 11.0
Larceny-theft 622,462 717,967 14.1 269,622 229,180 25.8
Motor vehicle theft 82,343 131,346 59.5 8,075 14,523 79.9
Arson 12,028 11,261 -6.4 1,769 1,699 -4.0
Index Crimes
Total* 1,363,163 1,572,591 15.4 339,774 440,315 29.6
Other assaults 298,435 573,138 92.0 50,379 113,037 124.4
Forgery & 44,233 44,213 21,354 23,717 11.1
counterfeiting
Fraud 121,657 149,977 23.3 78,533 108,815 38.6
Embezzlement 4,338 5,651 30.3 1,957 3,492 78.4
Stolen property (buying,
receiving, possessing) 83,088 102,699 23.6 10,881 13,789 26.7
Vandalism 145,775 194,424 33.4 15,216 23,921 57.2
Weapons 120,144 147,686 22.9 10,000 11,359 13.6
Prostitution &
commercialized vice 24,065 25,628 6.5 64,971 50,242 -22.7
Drug abuse violations 386,128 581,184 50.5 61,432 116,248 89.2
Gambling 23,969 10,265 -57.2 2,892 1,582 -45.3
Offenses against family
& children 28,457 46,315 62.8 3,817 11,302 196.1
Driving under the
influence 1,002,453 925,267 -7.7 122,615 139,795 14.0
Drunkenness 797,552 542,380 -32.0 71,898 62,882 -12.5
Disorderly conduct 366,052 391,517 7.0 68,573 99,710 45.4
Vagrancy 24,052 26,360 9.6 3,235 3,170 -2.0
All other offenses 1,748,137 2,247,711 28.6 363,874 531,021 45.9
(except traffic)
Total Arrests 6,581,698 7,583,006 15.2 1,291,401 1,754,397 35.9
*The Index Crimes are the eight crimes considered most serious by the F.B.I.
**Less than one-tenth of 1 percent.

Sowrcc; Federal Bureau of Investigadon 1992:218.
312 Chapter 9
30X 9.1 Drugs, Crime, and Gender
The media in recent years have given considerable attention to the relation¬
ship between illicit drug use and other criminal behavior. Typically, this rela¬
tionship is depicted as unidirectional and causal—that is, the use of drugs
causes people to commit other crimes either because it lowers their inhibitions
and distorts their judgment, or because it forces addicts to use desperate mea¬
sures to get money to feed their habit. This view is reinforced by reports that a
growing number of arrestees test positive for various drugs, especially mari¬
juana and cocaine, or admit to regular drug use during the month preceding
their arrest (Innes 1988). Empirical research, however, indicates that the
drugs/crime relationship is multidimensional and that gender is an important
intervening variable.
Consider, for example, the findings of James Inciardi and his colleagues,
who have done extensive research on street-addict lifestyles, in particular
women’s use of crack-cocaine. Inciardi et al. (1993) point out that involvement
in both drugs and crime seem to begin together, usually during adolescence.
Most adolescents eventually “age-out” of drug use and criminal activity, but for
those who continue, escalation of both activities is likely (see also Sommers
and Baskin 1991). While increased crime to finance greater drug usage is one
likely outcome, the relationship can also occur in the opposite direction—a lu¬
crative criminal career can make it financially easier to buy drugs, thus increas¬
ing drug use. “Over time, any single heroin or cocaine addict experiences
many of these drug/crime interactions, leading to a sometimes chaotic exist¬
ence. Anything that changes one factor—drug use or crime—will have an im¬
pact on the other” (Inciardi et al. 1993:112).
In comparing male and female street addicts, Inciardi and his colleagues
(1993) found that in many ways they are similar. The greater their drug use,
the more likely they are to be involved in other types of crime. They are also
likely to engage in a wide variety of offense types, primarily property crimes
and drug dealing, for which the probability of arrest is very low. There are,
however, some important differences as well. Men overall are more likely to
perpetrate and be victimized by violent crimes, but while women are less likely
to commit violent crimes, they are frequent violent crime victims (see also Som¬
mers and'Baskin 1991). Women are also more likely to engage in prostitution
to earn money for drugs or in direct exchange for drugs, and the sex-for-drugs
phenomenon is especially high among female crack addicts. It is unclear why
this is the case, since research also indicates that contrary to the popular belief
that crack-cocaine induces hypersexuality, heavy usage actually produces nega¬
tive effects on sex, such as greater insensitivity and numbness as well as sexual
dysfunction. One likely reason is that prostitution offers greater financial gains
than street-level drug sales, shoplifting, or other petty offenses. Female addicts,
like most women, have fewer economic resources than their male peers. In¬
deed, female crack addicts are more likely than other drug users to turn to
crime to meet not only their drug expenses, but also their routine living ex¬
penses. At the same time, the social and financial arrangements of most crack
30X 9.1 Continued
houses also encourage prostitution. It is the case, too, that a female addict is
more highly stigmatized than a male addict, and is expected to be a prostitute,
not only by the general public but also by male drug users. “This label, of
course, has some self-fulfilling prophecy aspects, encouraging a woman who
‘has the name’ to ‘play the game’ as well” (Inciardi et al. 1993:36).
The sex-for-drugs phenomenon that Inciardi and his colleagues observed
as being so prevalent among female crack addicts on inner-city streets led them
to conclude that this, in fact, is the one way that cocaine, relative to other
drugs, has had a unique impact on women. They found that the exchange of
sex for drugs, particularly in crack houses, routinely included extreme physical
and psychological abuse of the women “like nothing ever seen in the annals of
drug use, street life, prostitution, or domestic woman-battering” (Inciardi et al.
1993:39). As w'e will discuss later in this chapter and in chapter 12, it appears
unlikely that this situation will be remedied any time soon, given that research
to understand the causes and dynamics of women’s addictions has only re¬
cently been undertaken, that there are few drug treatment programs designed
to meet female addicts’ specific needs, and that key elements of the current
war-on-drugs strategy are simply to make more arrests and impose harsher
punishments.
“In no category listed in the UCR (except prostitution) are women as

highly represented.”
What is the relevance of these findings in terms of the emancipation
theory of female crime? Do the data support the contention that these
are occupationally related offenses committed by “liberated” women in
the labor force?
Evidence in response to these questions derive from at least two
sources. First, studies of female offenders reveal that they are “least likely
to respond to ideologies of sex-role equality” (Sard 1986:91). Rather,
these women tend to be quite traditional in terms of gender orientations
(Campbell 1984; Giordano and Cernkovich 1979). In fact, Adler’s (1975)
own work indicated that female offenders often expressed a strong dislike
of the women’s movement and not infrequently considered feminists
“kooks.”
Second, as we saw in chapter 8, although women’s labor force par¬
ticipation has risen dramatically over the past twenty-five years, women
remain segregated in low prestige, low-paying clerical, sales, and service
occupations. Simon and Landis (1991:56) argue that the influx of women
into these types of jobs does afford them greater opportunities to embez¬
zle, defraud, and forge: “They [are] not in a position to steal hundreds of
314 Chapter 9
thousands of dollars, but they [are] in a position to pocket smaller

amounts.” However, it is the low level of financial gain attached to these
offenses, as well as characteristics of the offenders themselves, that have
led others to maintain that to label them “white-collar” crimes is mislead¬
ing. For instance, in her study of male and female white-collar offenders,
Daly (1989a) found that the number of women involved in corporate crime
(e.g., insider trading, advertising fraud) was low. Moreover, while the men
had committed both serious and petty crimes, almost all of the women’s
crimes were petty offenses. This was likely related to the relative employ¬
ment status of the men and women. While more than half the male
offenders held professional or managerial positions, most of the female
offenders who had been employed were clerical workers. A higher per¬
centage of the female offenders, though, had no ties to the paid labor
force; they were involved in offenses that were not occupational, but
instead included such activities as defrauding banks through loans or
credit cards, or defrauding the government by obtaining benefits to
which they were not legally entitled. The motives of the female and male
offenders also differed, with the former more frequently citing family
responsibilities rather than personal excesses or corporate profit¬
making as the underlying reasons for their behavior. Consequently,
Daly (1989a:790) concludes that, “The Wbrhen’s socioeconomic profile,
coupled with the nature of their crimes, makes one wonder if ‘white-
collar’ aptly describes them or their illegalities” (see also Zeitz 1981).
Certainly, they do not appear to be “liberated” women in any sense of
the term.'
Findings such as these suggest an alternative explanation for recent
increases in the number of women involved in property crime, an expla¬
nation supported by the research of many feminist criminologists. This
explanation centers on the increasing economic marginalization of
women, especially minority women who are raising children alone (see
chapters 7 and 8). Significantly, research indicates that the typical female
offender is young, nonwhite, poor,-a high school dropout, and an unmar¬
ried mother. As we learned in chapter 8, the economic downturns of the
1980s, along with the general economic discrimination against women,
impacted most severely on young, single, women of color and, as Ches-
ney-Lind (1986:94) has argued, “perhaps propelled them directly into
property crimes.” In other words, the rising rates of women in property
crime are likely indicative of the increasingly difficult struggle for survival
for some groups of women. Arnold’s (1990) and Jurik’s (1983) research
in the United States supports this position, as does Alder’s (1986) with
'Nor are women well represented in blue-collar occupations such as truck driver,
warehouse or dock worker, or delivery person, occupations that would provide them
with opportunities for grand larceny, drug dealing, or the fencing of stolen merchan¬
dise (Steffensmeier 1982).
unemployed female youth in Australia and Carlen’s (1988) research in

Great Britain.
In sum, the claims of the emancipation theorists seem overstated at
best. With the exception of a few property offenses, women have not
made significant gains on male rates of crime, nor do they appear to be
engaged in more violent, masculine, or serious offenses. Larceny-theft,
which includes crimes traditionally committed by women (e.g., shoplift¬
ing), remains the crime for which females are arrested most often. In
1991, this offense alone accounted for 19 percent of all female arrests
(U.S. Department of Justice 1993a). Returning to Table 9.1 we see that
crime remains, for the most part, a male enterprise, virtually untouched
by feminism and the women’s movement. Eighty-one percent of those
arrested in the United States in 1991 were males; males accounted for
88.4 percent of those arrested for violent crimes and 74.6 percent of those
arrested for property crimes (U.S. Department of Justice 1993a). Recent
research indicates, in fact, that most of the increase in arrests between
1960 and 1991 can be accounted for by the rise in arrests of 15- to
29-year-old nonwhite males. Particularly in urban areas of the United
States, it is this group that has for several decades dominated official
arrest statistics, although the debate continues as to why this has been so.
Is it because young black males are engaged in more criminal behavior
than members of other demographic groups (Wilbanks 1987; Byrne and
Sampson 1986)? Or, are they more susceptible to arrest and criminal
justice processing because of their race and sex? That is, do their higher
arrest rates simply reflect racism and sexism inherent in the American
criminal justice system (Mann 1993; Flowers 1988)? These are important
questions which we will take up in the next section.
Given that women, poor and non-poor alike, are fairly law-abiding
and that when they do offend, their crimes are relatively minor, one
might expect that those women who are apprehended and processed
through the criminal justice system would be treated relatively leniently.
This position is known as the chivalry hypothesis. To evaluate its accuracy,
as well as the charge which we raised earlier that the criminal justice
system may be racist, we need to turn to an examination of the admini¬
stration of justice in the United States.^
Mhe chivalry hypothesis has also been offered as an explanation for the rise in female
arrest rates. Specifically, proponents of this position contend that historically police,
attorneys, and judges have been reluctant to process women through the criminal
justice system. Those women who were prosecuted were supposedly treated leniently
or “chivalrously.” However, the recent emphasis on gender equality in society could
not help but penetrate the criminal justice system, with the result that male and
female offenders are now more likely to be treated similarly. Thus, the rise in female
arrest rates is simply an artifact of an increased willingness among criminal justice
personnel to apprehend and prosecute women. These claims are addressed by the
data presented in the next section.
316 Chapter 9
WITH JUSTICE FOR ALL?
Criminologists emphasize that crime and criminals are, to a large extent,

socially and legally produced or constructed. Edwin Schur (1984:224)
explains:
The production of “criminals” involves the creation of crime definitions

by legislation, and the application of those definitions to particular
persons through the various stages of criminal justice processing. At
every stage decisions are being made by ordinary, fallible, and sometimes
biased human beings.
Thus, in assessing the issue of differential treatment of male and female

offenders, one should first consider some of the relevant characteristics
of those charged with administering justice.
The Administration of Justice

One of the most salient features of the criminal justice system in the
United States is male dominance. Historically, the overwhelming majority
of police, attorneys, judges, corrections officers, and other law enforce¬
ment personnel have been white men. As Tables 9.2 and 9.3 (p. 318)
indicate, the contemporary picture is much the same.
Traditionally, a variety of reasons were offered to justify the exclu¬
sion of women from careers in law. It was said, for instance, that women
were too weak and timid to enforce the law or to serve as corrections
officers. Others maintained that women were too emotional and senti¬
mental, easy “push-overs.” Still others claimed that women were too
“good” or righteous for such work; shortly before the turn of the century,
one judge said, “Our profession has essentially and habitually to do with
all that is selfish and extortionate, knavish and criminal, coarse and
brutal, repulsive and obscene. Nature has tempered women as little for
the judicial conflicts of the courtrdom as for the physical conflicts of the
battlefield” (quoted in Reid 1987:225). Of course, there were those who
used similar arguments to promote women’s involvement in law enforce¬
ment, the legal professions, and prison reform. It was argued, for exam¬
ple, that women would have a civilizing influence on the courtroom and
the prison because of their “higher morality” and their innate need to
help relieve the suffering of others. Interestingly, this conception of
female morality and sentiment is still with us in scholarly as well as
popular literature (Kerber et al. 1986; Gilligan 1982; see also Worden
1993 for an excellent discussion of this debate).
Within police training academies, law enforcement agencies, and
correctional facilities, widespread assumptions of the supposed innate
differences between women and men continue to be used to justify
TABLE 9.2 Full-Time Sworn Personnel in Local Police Departments by Size of the Population Served,
Race and Sex, 1990
Percent of Full-Time Sworn Personnel*
White Black Hispanic Other**

Population Served Total M F M F M F M F
All sizes 100 77.5 5.5 8.5 2.0 4.7 0.5 1.2 0.1
1,000,000 or more 100 65.4 7.0 12.4 4.2 8.4 1.5 0.9 0.1
500,000-999,999 100 62.9 5.7 15.6 4.4 5.6 0.5 5.0 0.4
250,000-499,999 100 68.0 6.8 13.0 3.2 7.2 0.7 1.0 0.1
100,000-249,999 100 76.7 6.0 9.1 1.8 4.1 0.4 1.9 0.1
50,000-99,999 100 84.2 4.9 5.7 0.8 3.4 0.2 0.7
25,000-49,999 100 85.8 4.4 5.6 0.5 2.9 0.1 0.6 ***
10,000-24,999 100 89.4 4.3 3.5 0.3 2.1 0.2 0.3 0.1
2,500-9,999 100 88.2 4.6 3.6 0.4 2.6 ^ H' 0.5 0.1
under 2,500 100 87.6 3.8 4.5 0.2 2.4 0.3 1.2 0.0
^Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

**Includes Native Americans, Alaska Natives, Asian Americans, and Pacific Islanders.
***Less than 0.05 percent.
Source: U.S. Department of Justice 1993a:46.
policies and practices that prevent the full integration of women into
criminal justice and law-related occupations. Male coworkers and super¬
visors alike still tend to consider women physically and psychologically
weaker than men, as manipulative and untrustworthy, as requiring and
requesting special treatment, and as either “good” (supportive wives and
mothers) or “bad” (seductresses and sex objects). Although Title VII
successfully eliminated the patent exclusion of women from law enforce¬
ment and other occupations (see chapter 8), ideas such as these continue
to manifest themselves in behaviors that are nonetheless discriminatory
against women and create at best an uncomfortable and at worst a hostile
work environment for them. These behaviors include sexual harassment
and other forms of harassment, differential assignment of duties, closer
scrutinization of the work and appearance of women, and exclusion of
women from informal activities.
Consider police work, for example. Although women have consti¬
tuted an increasing number of police recruits since the 1970s, they con¬
tinue to be marginalized in training at many police academies (Pike
1992). Instructors frequently use sexist (and typically sexual) humor to
“liven up” the classes. They also commonly refer to female recruits as
“girls” and “gals,” while the male recruits are “men” and “guys.” They tell
318 Chapter 9
TA3LE 9.3 Correctional Officers and Judges by Sex
Correctional Officers
Adult State Systems
Total number of employees 309,361
Percent female, 1992 28.8
Juvenile State Systems

Percent, female, 1992 36.6
Federal Bureau of Prisons^

Percent female, 1992 27.1
Judges (includes all judges in criminal and civil courts)

Federal
Supreme Court, percent female, 1992 22.2^
Circuit Courts of Appeal, percent female, 1990 11.3
District Courts, percent female, 1990 9.2
U.S. Magistrates (full-time only), percent female, 1990 18.8
State
Courts of Last Resort, percent female, 1991 9.8
Intermediate Appellate Courts, percent female, 1988 9.4
^The Federal Bureau of Prisons does not operate facilides for juveniles.
9
Of a total of nine Supreme Court Justices, two are women, Sandra Day O’Connor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg
(see chapter 10),
Sources: National Center for State Courts 1993; U.S. Department of Justice 1993a:95-96; Ries and Stone
1992:410.
recruits that female victims and suspects are more troublesome than male
victims and suspects. Female victims are portrayed as helpless, but also
unpredictable—they may turn on an officer. Special care must be taken
with female suspects; for instance, they may act seductively in an encoun¬
ter and then become violent, or they may unjustifiably claim they were
molested during a search, although, recruits are told, male suspects do
not seem to mind being searched by female officers. In her observations
at two police academies. Pike (1992:266) found that training films and
slides often showed scantily dressed or nude women; one film listed
special groups officers must deal with as “drug addicts, the mentally ill,
females, and suicides.” Both male recruits and instructors routinely
teased and flirted with female recruits, frequently quite aggressively, and
although both felt there is a place for women in police work, they often
did not think it could be equal to that of men.
Not surprisingly, these attitudes and behaviors carry over into police
departments. As we see in Table 9.2, the number of female police officers
in the United States remains small, but these figures represent significant
increases since the 1970s. Martin (1992; 1990) credits this change to affirm¬
ative action programs, efforts to professionalize and unionize the police,
an emphasis on community policing, legal limitations on the use of
violence and physical force by officers, and the adoption of formal proce¬
dures for allocating assignments and promotions. These factors have also
helped to improve the status of women in policing. Nevertheless, she and
others (e.g., Worden 1993) identify serious problems that remain.
The belief in male superiority, for instance, is still strong within
police departments. There are also double standards of behavior for
women and men and different criteria for evaluation. When a female
officer makes a mistake, for example, the consequences may be exagger¬
ated. Department members also continue to make references to women’s
physical size and strength and to question the impact of these physical
qualities on the effectiveness of female officers. Martin (1992) reports,
however, that the physical appearance and conditioning of male officers
receive considerably less attention from coworkers and supervisors. For
example, she recounts an incident in which a female detective was re¬
moved from a case by her supervisor because she was overweight, whereas
the weight of the male detectives was overlooked. Although she notes that
most male officers no longer engage in blanket stereotyping or rejection
of women in police work, they continue to view women’s routine compe¬
tence as exceptional. Moreover, female officers face a double bind: if they
conform to the men’s conceptions of “good” women, they will be viewed
as too weak to do a competent job, but if they behave like the men, they
will be labeled “bitches” and “dykes.
This point raises one final way that male officers attempt to assert
their superiority: by sexualizing the workplace. Sexual teasing, jokes, and
innuendo are routine in police departments, and female officers typi¬
cally join in this behavior. Sexual harassment, however, remains a serious
problem (Martin 1992), and it occurs not only in local and state
departments, but in federal agencies as well. In October 1993, for
example. Agent Suzanne J. Doucette resigned from the F.B.I. after nine
years of service, stating that the agency did not take seriously her com-
^Despite recent reports that lesbians and gay men are finding greater acceptance in
some police precincts in a few large cities (see, for example, Blumenthal 1993; Egan
1992), homophobia remains a predominant characteristic of most police depart¬
ments (Leinen 1993). In addition, although there is evidence of less racism among
white male officers toward minority male officers, minority female officers report
experiences of both racism and sexism. As Martin (1989) points out, the impact of
these experiences is more complex than what is conveyed by the term “double
jeopardy,” since these women confront racism on the part of white male and female
officers and sexism on the part of white and minority male officers.
320 Chapter 9
plaints of sexual harassment by a supervisor and, in fact, blocked her oppor¬

tunities for career advancement, telling her she needed to improve her
relations with her male coworkers (Johnston 1993; see also Mydans 1994).^
Despite the prevalent stereotypes about female police officers, there
is little evidence that they differ from their male colleagues in their
attitudes toward police work and toward citizens. Experience, measured
in years spent on the force, appears to be more important than an
officer’s sex in affecting her or his attitudes. Female officers do report
lower levels of self-confidence than male officers (Worden 1993), but this
is hardly surprising; as we noted previously, a hostile environment con¬
tributes to lower self-confidence. However, this lessened self-confidence
does not appear to interfere with female officers’ ability to perform their
duties effectively. Price and her colleagues (1989) found that female
officers do seem to have a less aggressive style of policing than do their
male counterparts. They tend to use reason and verbal negotiation more
often than physical force to resolve disputes and diffuse potentially vio¬
lent situations. But while some administrators may view this negatively,
there is evidence that citizens hold a different view; women police are
judged by citizens who have interacted with them as more competent,
pleasant, and respectful than their male peers (Sichel et al. 1977). What
is more surprising, however, especially given the work environment we
have described here, is the research finding that female police officers
express greater job satisfaction than do male officers (Worden 1993).
Research indicates that female correctional officers have experi¬
ences similar to those of women in police work (Zupan 1992). As with
other law enforcement occupations, the number of female correctional
officers has increased since the 1970s (see also Table 9.3). While women
have a shorter history of employment at all-male facilities than at all-
female facilities, their numbers in such institutions have risen in recent
years. To a large extent, this is the result of affirmative action programs,
successful Title VII lawsuits brought by women seeking positions as cor¬
rectional officers at all-male facilities, and a decline in job applications by
men (Zupan 1992)Still, the increased presence of women in corrections
Whe F.B.I. only began to hire women as agents in 1972. Of the 10,300 agents in 1993,
11 percent were women (Johnston 1993).
Âccording to Zupan (1992), the 1977 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Dothard v.
jeopardized women’s progress in gaining ernployment in all-male correc¬
tional institutions. In that case, the Court ruled (without supporting proof) that for
security reasons women could be barred from jobs that required contact with inmates
\ in maximum-security prisons. Despite this ruling, however, and others brought by
male inmates arguing that the employment of opposite sex guards infringed on their
right to privacy (see, for instance, Fort\. Ward, 1979), most states continued the trend
begun earlier in the 1970s of increasing the employment of women at their all-male
correctional facilities (Zupan 1992).
has not led to their full integration in the workplace. Interestingly, female
correctional officers appear to confront more resistance and harassment
from male administrators and coworkers than from inmates. According
to Reid (1987:428):
One study found that female guards were tested more often by male
officers than by inmates, that male officers were uneasy and unaccept¬
ing of female officers in male pi isons, and that male officers believed
females were not physically strong enough for the job. ... In spite of the
negative attitudes in their work environment, it appears that female
correctional officers are able to establish and maintain personal authority
in a prison setting; they are not manipulated by inmates any more often
than male officers [see also Zupan 1992; Van Voorhies et al. 1991;
Zimmer 1986].
Similar to police officers, female and male correctional officers show few
differences in their attitudes toward their work and toward inmates.
Female correctional personnel do appear to value rules and structure
more than their male coworkers do, and they experience more job-
related stress—both of these findings are likely related to the pressure,
criticism, and harassment they receive from their male colleagues
(Lawrence and Johnson 1991; Van Voorhies et al. 1991; Jurik and
Halemba 1984). Nevertheless, they do not express lower job satisfaction
or career commitment than male correctional officers (Zupan 1992; Jurik
and Halemba 1984).
Women in more prestigious positions, female attorneys, for in¬
stance, are no less likely to escape such prejudices and discriminatory
treatment. Recent research, in fact, demonstrates a pervasive bias against
women in our nation’s law firms and courtrooms (Bernat 1992; Couric
1989; Morello 1986). A recent study in southern Arizona, for example,
revealed that female attorneys are frequently subjected to disparaging
and offensive remarks and behaviors by colleagues and judges, both
inside and outside the courtroom. These may have the effect not only of
making their work unpleasant and stressful, but also of lowering their
credibility in the eyes of clients and the courts, which in turn might
jeopardize their chances of winning their cases (MacCorquodale and
Jensen 1993). Such discrimination occurs not only in the lower courts,
but at the federal level as well {New York Times 7 August 1992:A17), and in
private law firms more often than in public sector workplaces (Rosenberg
et al. 1993). Minority women often fare the worst. For example, they are
sometimes mistaken as defendants (Bernat 1992). As one black female
attorney recently recounted, “I once appeared before a judge in Middle¬
sex Superior Court [Massachusetts] who refused to address me until I
showed proof that I was a lawyer, something not requested of any other
322 Chapter 9
attorney there that day” (quoted in the New York Times 10 August 1986:37;
see also MacCorquodale and Jensen 1993).
To what extent, then, do such attitudes affect the disposition of
cases? Do prejudices like these disadvantage male offenders by affording
their female counterparts greater leniency before the law? Or are male
offenders advantaged by sexism in the criminal justice system? As a pre¬
liminary response we can say that the sex of the offender does appear to
play a part in the disposition of a case. However, a number of other factors
interact with sex in producing certain outcomes. These include the of¬
fender’s age and race as well as the offense with which he or she is
charged and the number of previous criminal convictions. We can under¬
stand this better by comparing conviction rates and sentencing patterns
for male and female offenders.
Do the Punishments Fit the Crimes?

About a decade and a half ago, criminologist Clayton Hartjen (1978:108)
observed that, “Although a suspect’s behavior is of primary importance
in determining his or her chances of being arrested, in most cases the
decision to arrest a person is based on factors that have little to do with
the degree of a person’s behavioral criminality. ... It is not so much what
a person does as what kind of person he [or she] is (or is seen by the
police to be) that affects official labeling.” Hartjen’s argument can be
extended to other stages of criminal justice processing that follow arrest,
including the arraignment (at which time a plea is entered by the defen¬
dant), the trial (either by a judge—^which is known as a bench trial—or by
a jury), and sentencing. This treatment of defendants occurs because
official actors within the criminal justice system—that is, the police, attor¬
neys, and judges—exercise considerable discretion in deciding how par¬
ticular cases—and, therefore, particular defendants—^will be handled.
This discretion may lead to widespread disparities in the treatment of
offenders, disparities that have le^s to do with the offenders’ behavior
than with their membership in specific groups, such as their social class,
their race, and their sex.
Consider, for instance, the practice of plea negotiation, better known
as plea bargaining. This occurs when the prosecutor and the defense
attorney work out an agreement whereby the defendant will plead guilty
in exchange for some prosecutorial or judicial concession, usually a
reduced charge (and, therefore, a reduced sentence), the reduction of
multiple charges, or a recommendation of leniency by the prosecutor
(which also has the effect of reducing the severity of the potential sen¬
tence) (Inciardi 1993). It is estimated that about 98 percent of all crimi¬
nal convictions are the result of negotiated guilty pleas (U.S. Department
of Justice 1993a) . However, research indicates that plea bargaining may

operate differently for different groups of offenders. Specifically, Mann
(1993) points out that poor people and racial minorities (who are dispro¬
portionately represented among the poor) experience greater pressure
to enter a guilty plea because the public defenders assigned to them wish
to dispose of as many cases in their overwhelming caseloads as quickly as
possible. Whether they are guilty or not, Mann argues, they are encour¬
aged to enter a guilty plea so as not to run the risk of going to trial and
being comicted of a more serious offense.® In addition, because the poor
and minorities are less likely to be able to post bail, they remain incarcer¬
ated in local jails until their trial, and thus may prefer to plead guilty in
order to secure their release from what are typically deplorable condi¬
tions in these facilities.
Figueira-McDonough (1982) reported that although women com¬
mit less serious offenses than men, they are less successful than men in
negotiating for sentence reductions. Simon and Landis (1991), however,
found that when cases got to court, there were no significant sex differ¬
ences in convictions. Steffensmeier and his colleagues (1993) also report
that there appear to be no sex differences in decisions regarding case
dismissals nor in convictions. The one area in which sex differences
frequently have been found is sentencing. The sentence imposed on an
offender has been shown to be related not only to the offender’s sex, but
also to her or his race, age, marital status, and a host of other nonlegal
factors. This leads to sentencing disparity: the imposition of different
sentences on offenders convicted of similar crimes. It is not difficult to
understand why sentencing disparity is problematic; it results in unfair
and inappropriate sentences that may be disproportionate to the severity
of the crime or the offender’s criminal history, and are based instead on
irrelevant factors, such as the offender’s sex and race.
Early studies of sentencing disparities between male and female
offenders reported that women were given preferential treatment by the
courts and were less likely than men to receive prison sentences for their
crimes (Faine and Bohlander 1976; Nagel and Weitzman 1972). However,
as Chesney-Lind (1986) points out, the difficulty with much of this early
research is that it did not control for the less serious nature of female
criminality. More recent research that takes into account such factors as
type of offense and prior convictions has obtained inconsistent findings;
some studies show that certain groups of female offenders are treated
^Research has revealed what has come to be called the jury trial penalty. This refers to
the fact that defendants who insist on a jury trial, if found guilty, are sentenced more
harshly than defendants who plead guilty and thus avert a jury trial (see, for example,
Spohn 1990).
324 Chapter 9
\
more leniently than male offenders, while other studies show no differ¬
ences or that certain groups of female offenders are actually more harshly
treated than their male peers. For instance, although one would expect
seriousness of offense and prior record to be strong predictors of sen¬
tence severity, some studies have shown that this is moie often the case
for male offenders than for female offenders (Butler and Lambert 1983;
Figueira-McDonough 1982). This research shows that women are as likely
to receive severe sentences for property crimes as for violent crimes
(Myers and Talarico 1986; Figueira-McDonough 1982), and when placed
on probation, their probationary period is typically longer than that of
men convicted of similar crimes (Gold 1989). In contrast, however, Stef-
fensmeier et al. (1993) found that offense severity and prior record have
the largest effects on sentencing for both male and female offenders, and
that when men and women appear in court under similar circum¬
stances—that is, charged with similar crimes and coming from similar
backgrounds—they are treated alike.
Other researchers have found that the perceived respectability of
the offender, in terms of conformity to traditional gender norms, influ¬
ences sentencing. For example, Nagel et al. (1982) discovered that mar¬
ried women were less likely than single or “independent” women to be
sentenced to prison. In this study, marital status was unrelated to sentenc¬
ing for male offenders, but we will see shortly that additional research
contradicts this finding. Kruttschnitt (1982) and others (Sarri 1986;
Schur 1984; Armstrong 1982; Parisi 1982) report that women who con¬
form to a traditional model of femininity—for example, economic de¬
pendence on a man, no evidence of drug or alcohol use, no evidence of
sexual deviance—tend to receive lighter sentences than women deemed
less “respectable” by the courts.’ Daly (1989b) refers to this pattern of bias
injudicial decision making 2iS familial-based justice. She reports that defen¬
dants with family ties, especially those who are the primary caregivers of
children, are treated more leniently by the courts than nonfamilied de¬
fendants. Based on interviews with fcourt officials, she concluded that the
protection of families and children, not the protection of women.
^The female prostitute, of course, represents in many ways the antithesis of respect¬
able femininity. She is independent and promiscuous so, not surprisingly, she is the
victim of routine harassment within the criminal justice system. But her customers,
although also guilty of breaking the law, are rarely prosecuted (Schur 1984; James 1982).
Unfortunately, there is very little data available on male prostitution, to a large extent
because researchers have focused on prostitution as exclusively a female crime (for
\ an exception, see Luckenbill 1986). However, given that male prostitutes violate our
culture’s gender prescriptions for men, they, too, might be treated more harshly than
the average male offender. Clearly, research that compares their experiences at the
hands of criminal justice officials with those of female prostitutes would add to our
understanding of the impact of gender stereotyping on the processing of offenders.
influence much judicial decision making. (This may help to explain the
inclination of criminal justice officials to prosecute pregnant drug addicts
for passing drugs to their unborn children; see chapter 12.) Daly’s find¬
ings are further supported by those of Steffensmeier and his colleagues
(1993), who also interviewed judges. According to the officials with whom
they spoke, women were less likely than men to be sentenced to prison,
even if they had committed the same crimes, if the women were less
“blameworthy” (that is, they appeared to have been involved because of
inducements from husbands or boyfriends), if they showed remorse, or if
it was impractical to imprison them because, for example, they had
children to care for. Steffensmeier et al. found that women received
slightly shorter sentences for serious offenses, but slightly longer sen¬
tences for minor offenses. The judges they interviewed explained the
latter disparity in terms of their reluctance to incarcerate women in
county jails where staffing typically is inadequate and the facilities un¬
pleasant. State prisons, according to these justices, are better, but require
a sentence of two or more years. A number of judges also indicated that
they were unlikely to give female drug offenders a “break” because they
perceived them as being as likely as male drug offenders to get in trouble
again.
Steffensmeier et al. (1993:417) attribute the differences between
their findings, of a very limited sex disparity in sentencing, and those of
other researchers, who found a more pronounced sex disparity, to the
availability of better data and a more complex and thorough statistical
analysis. It is also the case that Steffensmeier et al. used data from Penn¬
sylvania where a fairly strict sentencing guidelines system was enacted in
1982. They point out that the enactment of the sentencing guidelines
system in Pennsylvania “standardized the calculation and presentation of
the defendant’s prior record to the court, improved the likelihood that
information about prior record will be collected and recorded accurately,
and ensured that sentencing judges would be informed of the defen¬
dant’s prior record and conviction-offense gravity score.” Under such
circumstances, it is not surprising that prior record and seriousness of
offenses weighed so heavily in sentencing decisions in Pennsylvania
courts. However, these researchers note that such uniformity and accu¬
racy are not characteristic of judicial operations in most states, even those
that have adopted a sentencing guidelines structure in order to reduce
sentencing disparity. There is evidence, in fact, that in some states judges
bypass or ignore sentencing guidelines. For example, in Minnesota,
where sentencing guidelines were established in 1980 so that sentences
would be neutral with respect to sex as well as race and social class, the
percentage of incarcerated female offenders rose by 32.8 percent within
three years, compared with a 7.7 percent increase for male offenders
during the same period. These increases were found to be unrelated
326 Chapter 9
to offense severity; low-severity crime, the crimes for which women are
most likely to be convicted, showed the highest increase in incarcera¬
tion—a direct violation of the sentencing guidelines (Sarri 1986).
A number of researchers have also questioned the effectiveness of
sentencing guidelines in reducing sentencing disparities between white
and minority offenders (Mann 1993). In general, incarceration rates in
the United States have risen steadily since the 1980s, but as we see in
Table 9.4, the rate for minorities is disproportionately higher than that
for whites, with the exception of Asian Americans who are the least likely
group to be incarcerated. In 1991, for example, whites comprised about
75 percent of the U.S. population, but less than half of the state and
federal prison population. African Americans, however, constitute just
over 12 percent of the U.S. population, but 48 percent of the state and
federal prison population. Similarly, Hispanic Americans, who make up
about 9 percent of the U.S. population, made up nearly 14 percent of the
state and federal prison population in 1991. Native Americans are slightly
less than 1 percent of the U.S. population and slightly less than 1 percent
of the state and federal prison population, although Native American
women are somewhat overrepresented among state and federal prison
inmates. An examination of incarceration rates by sex and race further
highlights the disparities. The overall incarceration rate for the U.S.
population in 1991 was 310 per 100,000 of the population. For women,
the incarceration rate was 37 per 100,000 of the female population, far
below the male rate of 639 per 100,000 of the male population. However,
the rate for white women was 21 per 100,000 of the white female popula¬
tion, whereas for black women it was 145 per 100,000 of the black female
population. The rate for white men was 300 per 100,000 of the white male
population, but for black men, the rate was 2,557 per 100,000 of the black
male population (U.S. Department of Justice 1993a and b; U.S. Depart¬
ment of Commerce 1991).
In a recent review of research that examines the intersection of race
and sex on sentencing and punishfhent, Mann (1989) found that not only
were African-American women and Mexican-American women more
likely to be sentenced to prison, but the actual time served was longer for
minority women than white women. For instance, she reports that al¬
though white women convicted of crimes against the person received
sentences almost twice as long as those of African-American women con¬
victed of the same crimes, African-American women actually stayed in
prison longer than white women. As criminologist Doric Klein (1973)
observed, chivalry has never been extended to minority women.
So far, we have focused on adult offenders, but research indicates
that the age of the offender is also an important variable. For instance,
the mere suspicion of sexual impropriety typically results in more severe
TABLE 9.4 Prisoners under State or Federal Jurisdiction by Race and Sex, December 31,1991
All
Race Prisoners (percent)* Male (percent) Female (percent)
White 385,347 (46.8) 363,274 (46.8) 22,073 (46.4)
Black 395,245 (48.0) 371,864 (47.9) 23,381 (49.1)
Native American or
Alaska Native 7,407 (00.9) 6,860 (00.9) 547 (01.1)
Asian American or
Pacific Islander 3,423 (00.4) 3,240 (00.4) 183 (00.4)
Unknown 32,711 (04.0) 31,312 (04.0) 1,399 (02.9)
Hispanic** 112,520 (13.7) 106,979 (13.8) 5,541 (11.6)
*Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

**Hispanic is listed apart from the other racial categories because of wide variation in racial categorization practices across states. In
New York, for example, Hispanic prisoners are categorized as white; in California, only Mexican-American prisoners are classified as
Hispanic. In still other states, Hispanic prisoners are listed as “race unknown.” The percentages presented here for Hispanic
prisoners were calculated using a total prison population of 824,133; a total male prison population of 776,550; and a total female
prison population of 47,583.
Source: U.S. Department of Justice 1993b:57-60.
sentences for juvenile female offenders relative to their male counter¬

parts. Girls are more likely than boys to be charged with status offenses—
that is, behavior which if engaged in by an adult would not be considered
a violation of the law. These include, for example, running away from
home, incorrigibility, truancy, being a ‘juvenile in need of supervision”
(JINS), and being in danger of becoming “morally depraved.”
But more to the point, the function of these offense categories in female
delinquency cases is to serve as “buffer charges” for suspected sexuality.
. . . Even if juvenile justice personnel are not themselves concerned about
sexual misconduct, the uncritical acceptance of familial authority
represented by these offense categories means that parents, who may well
be anxious to control a daughter’s sexuality, will bring her to court for
behavior that they would ignore or endorse in their sons (Chesney-Lind
1982:90-91; see also Lees 1989; Maquieira 1989).
Studies indicate that parents are significantly more likely to bring a

daughter to court for her behavior than to bring a son for his (Chesney-
Lind and Shelden 1992; Feinman 1992). More importantly, however,
research has also revealed that many young women charged as runaways
are attempting to escape from physically and sexually abusive homes.
Unfortunately, because of the juvenile courts’ commitment to preserving
parental authority, they frequently have forced these girls to return to
their abusers, routinely ignoring girls’ complaints about abuse (Davis
328 Chapter 9
1993; Chesney-Lind and Shelden 1992; Arnold 1990). Ironically, then,

“statutes that were originally placed in law to ‘protect’ young people have,
in the case of girls’ delinquency, criminalized their survival strategies”
(Chesney-Lind 1989b:24).
Females charged with status offenses are more harshly treated at
every step of criminal justice processing and are more likely than males
to be institutionalized for status offenses (Chesney-Lind and Shelden
1992). The juvenile courts, like their adult counterparts, have seen a
number of sentencing reforms enacted in recent years to reduce such
disparities. For instance, one federal policy, the Juvenile Justice and De¬
linquency Prevention Act of 1974, required states receiving funds for
delinquency prevention programs to divert status offenders away from
juvenile correctional facilities. Since girls are most frequently charged
with status offenses, this policy at least initially helped to reduce their
incarceration rates (Teilmann and Landry 1981). Unfortunately, in 1980,
those rates again began to climb as a “get tough” attitude toward juvenile
offenders started to take hold in the nation’s family courts. In many
jurisdictions, attempts were made to close what many viewed as loopholes
permitted by the 1974 Act by reclassifying many status offenses as criminal
offenses. Research indicates that this reclassification has impacted more
negatively on girls than on boys (Curran 1984). Similarly, Feinman’s
(1992) analysis of reforms in New Jersey’s juvenile statutes shows how the
legal mandates that remove female status offenders from secure juvenile
facilities—a practice that is undoubtedly beneficial to them—has also
resulted in widespread “hidden incarceration” rather than freedom for
female juveniles in need of supervision. As Feinman (1992:66) explains,
‘JINS offenders are usually placed under the supervision of the Dmsion
of Youth and Family Service, DYFS, for placement in a ‘structured envi¬
ronment’ for care and for their own good. Due to the double standard of
justice based on the sexual double standard, JINS females are more likely
than JINS males to be arrested and come before the courts, and are more
likely to be referred to the courts for agency care and supervision than
are JINS males” (see also Alder 1984).
To sum up, it appears that a number of extra-legal factors frequently
come into play in the administration of justice. As Chesney-Lind
(1986:92) concludes, “Taken together, these research findings suggest
that the criminal justice system has been involved in the enforcement of
traditional sex-role expectations as well as, and sometimes in place of, the
law.” In some cases, if the offender is respectably feminine, this works to
the woman’s advantage. Some groups of females, however, are at a disad¬
vantage relative to males in the criminal justice system; this is especially
true for juveniles.
This is not to say, however, that gender stereotyping is never applied
to male offenders. According to Miethe and Moore (1986), married.
employed men with no prior offense record—that is, those who conform
to the gender prescription of “respectable” masculinity—are sentenced
more leniently than single, unemployed men with previous arrests or
convictions. This is especially true for black men; for instance, single
black men are sentenced more harshly than single white men (see also
Daly 1989b). Interestingly, Myers and Talarico (1986:246) found that
although severity of sentence increases with the seriousness of the offense
as one would expect, the relationship is stronger for white offenders than
for black offenders. They hypothesize that this may be because criminal
justice officials hold whites to a higher standard of behavior simply be¬
cause they are white; “black criminality could be more expected and
tolerated than crime by whites.” However, their findings, along with those
of others (e.g.. Flowers 1988; Berk 1985; LaFree 1980) indicate that the
treatment that nonwhites receive in the criminal justice system is at least
partially determined by the characteristics of their victims. In Myers and
Talarico’s study (1986:248), for example, “one district attorney dismissed
assaults that involve just one nigger cutting up another,’ as junk’ cases,”
illustrating quite clearly the racism of some criminal justice personnel
and the low value they attach to black lives. Those who victimize whites
are sentenced severely.
We will take up this last issue again momentarily. First, however, it is
important to examine how the sexism we have observed in criminal
sentencing carries over into corrections.
Gender and Corrections

Historically, women have constituted only a small fraction of the U.S.
prison and jail populations. For example, at the turn of the century,
women were just 4 percent of the prison population in the United States;
in 1970, they made up only 3 percent of this population. The “lock ’em
up” mentality of the 1980s and 1990s, however, has swelled the total U.S.
prison population, so that the country currently has one of the highest
incarceration rates in the world (Immarigeon and Chesney-Lind 1990).
According to Immarigeon and Chesney-Lind (1990:5), “Women have
been hit hard by our nation’s punitive policies. In recent years, female
populations in jails and prisons have increased disproportionately to the
increase in women’s involvement in serious crime.” A report by the U.S.
Department of Justice (1991) states that the rate of growth in the incar¬
ceration of females has exceeded that of males every year since 1981.
From 1980 to 1989, the male inmate population increased by 112 percent,
whereas the female inmate population increased by 202 percent. Women
are now 5.8 percent of the state and federal prison population and 9.3
percent of the U.S. jail population (U.S. Department of Justice 1993a
and b).
330 Chapter 9
Traditionally, the small numbers of incarcerated women have been

offered as a rationale for paying little attention to them in both research
and policy making. At the same time, the physical plant of women’s
prisons appeared less harsh than facilities that housed men and, there¬
fore, less “problematic.” The rapid rise in the number of female prisoners
and jail inmates, however, has brought increasing attention not only to
the problems of incarceration in general, but also to the special problems
faced by incarcerated women. For example, although women’s prisons
often are less secure and more physically attractive than men’s facilities,
living conditions are not necessarily less harsh, less regimented, or less
degrading (Baunach 1992). Most states have only one correctional
facility for women—there are 51 state institutions for women, 536 for
men, and 19 that are coed (Simon and Landis 1991)—and these tend to
be located in rather remote rural areas. Thus, women’s prisons also tend
to be more geographically isolated than men’s prisons, and this poses
problems in terms of programming, meeting the medical needs of
women, and visitation.
According to Moyer (1991), perhaps the best evidence of the ne¬
glect and misunderstanding of female offenders is revealed when educa¬
tional and vocational training programs in women’s prisons are
examined. Traditionally grossly underfunded—the rationale being that
large numbers of programs for small numbers of women would not be
cost-efficient—these programs tend to reinforce gender stereotypes and
to conform to the turn-of-the-century philosophy that the rehabilitative
goal of women’s prisons should be to teach “fallen women” how to be
good wives and mothers. Consequently, these programs ill-equip women
for the contemporary work world and for successfully meeting the chal¬
lenge of economic survival for themselves or as primary providers for
their families. Although recent surveys show an increase in the number
of vocational programs for women, such improvements have not been
uniformly made across all institutions in the country. Simon and Landis
(1991) found, for instance, that the number of training programs avail¬
able ranged from one to twenty-five depending on the institution. In
addition, they found that the number of industries available to provide
work experience within women’s institutions ranged from zero to nine.
These are far fewer than in men’s institutions, although like those pro¬
vided to men, the skills imparted may be useless for meaningful employ¬
ment outside the institution since often the prisoners w'ork with outdated
technology. However, in contrast with vocational programs in men’s pris¬
ons which at least focus on skilled trades such as carpentry, electronics,
plumbing, and construction, most vocational programs in women’s pris¬
ons train inmates in clerical/office skills, domestic skills (such as cooking
and laundry), and garment manufacturing. Since, as we noted previously.
female inmates ai e likely to be poor minority women who are heading

households alone and who are less likely than men to have been em¬
ployed before going to prison, it is doubtful, especially in light of what we
learned in chapter 8, that such training will do much to improve their
economic and employment prospects upon release (see also Chesney-
Lind and Shelden 1992).
A number of observers have also expressed concern over the lack of
adequate medical facilities and treatment programs in women’s prisons.
Although as Moyer (1991:11) points out, “health care in all prisons tends
to be disorganized and crisis oriented with a heavy reliance on part-time
doctors and mental health pei'sonnel,” there is evidence that fewer medi¬
cal services are available in women’s prisons and that these services are
provided by medical personnel who are not as well trained as those
working in men s facilities. Pollock-Byrne (1990), however, also makes the
important point that simply offering female inmates the same medical
services as those offered to male inmates is an inappropriate solution to
this problem, since the health care needs of women are different from
those of men. Women, for instance, need gynecological and, not infre¬
quently, obstetrical care while in prison. The mental health needs of
female inmates are also different from those of men. Few institutions, for
example, offer programs that effectively address the problems associated
with physical and sexual abuse, despite the fact that more than 40 percent
of women in prison report having been previously physically or sexually
abused (U.S. Department of Justice 1991; see also Chesney-Lind and
Shelden 1992).® In addition, a number of researchers argue that when
drug treatment programs are offered to female inmates, they usually are
inadequate and ineffective because they are modeled on men’s programs;
women, as we will see in chapter 12, abuse drugs and alcohol for reasons
different from those of men (Applebome 1992b). Two of the most fre¬
quent medical complaints of female inmates are anxiety and depression,
which are frequently treated with psychotropic drugs such as tranquiliz¬
ers. Such drugs are over-prescribed for nonincarcerated women who seek
medical help for these problems (see chapter 12), but this treatment may
be especially problematic for incarcerated women, since studies show that
®In November, 1992, fourteen employees at the Georgia Women’s Correctional Insti¬
tution (ten men and fotir women) were indicted on charges of rape and sexual abuse
of at least 119 female inmates (Applebome 1992a). Although the scope and severity
of the problem in the Georgia institution is unprecedented, similar cases in other
states serve to remind tis that the abuse that female inmates suffer prior to their
incarceration does not end within the prison walls. Such cases also highlight the fact
that although attention has been focused on the problem of sexual abuse of inmates
by other inmates, the perpetrators may also be prison officials.
332 Chapter 9
a considerable proportion of female inmates have substance abuse prob¬

lems (U.S. Department of Justice 1991; Moyer 1991).
Finally, the separation of inmates from their families presents acute
problems for women. Despite the fact that some judges, as we noted
earlier, express a reluctance to imprison women with children (unless
they are drug offenders), an increasing number of female inmates are
mothers with dependent children. While about 60 percent of male in¬
mates have children (54.4 percent have children less than eighteen years
old), more than 76 percent of female inmates have children (67.5 percent
have children less than eighteen years old). Among male inmates with
children under eighteen, about half report having lived with them before
being incarcerated. In contrast, almost four out of five female inmates
with children under eighteen lived with them before going to prison. As
we noted in chapter 7, few children live with their fathers only. If a man
with children is sent to prison, it is likely that the mother of the children
will retain custody of them and provide them with care; 88.5 percent of
imprisoned men with children under eighteen report that the children
are living with their mother. When a woman with children is sent to
prison, however, it is often the case that the children’s father played a
small role in the children’s lives and that their mother was their sole
caretaker and provider. Consequently, ralher than living with their father
(22.1 percent), children of imprisoned mothers usually live with a grand¬
parent (45.4 percent) or other relative (22.1 percent); about 10 percent
are placed in foster homes or institutional care. Twenty-eight percent of
incarcerated women with children under eighteen report that they lost
legal custody of their children when they entered prison (U.S. Depart¬
ment of Justice 1991).
The amount of time imprisoned mothers are permitted to visit with
their children varies widely from institution to institution. A small minor¬
ity allow visitation seven days a week (Simon and Landis 1991). Among
these is the Bedford Hills Correctional Facility in New York, which estab¬
lished the first state prison nursery program that allows imprisoned moth¬
ers to care for their infants within the correctional facility until the infants
are one year old or for eighteen months if the mother is to be paroled
within that period. This program also provides incarcerated mothers with
parenting classes and provides child care for the infants while the moth¬
ers go to prison jobs or prison classes to earn high school diplomas
(Harris 1993). In contrast, most facilities aUow visitation once a week,
while a few allow it only once or twice a month. The length of the visits
in these institutions also varies, but most institutions report that they do
N not have rooms equipped for the visits of very young children (e.g., high
chairs, cribs) or even rooms to talk privately or perhaps to listen to music
with older children (Simon and Landis 1991). While a majority of insti¬
tutions report that they do have furlough programs that allow incarcer-
ated mothers to visit with their children at home or halfway houses,

Simon and Landis found that most of these have stringent eligibility
requirements.
Apart from the economic consequences of imprisoning women who
are the sole economic providers for and caretakers of their children,
incarceration also has serious psychological consequences for both the
women and the children. The separation lowers the mothers’ self-esteem
and generates feelings of emptiness, helplessness, anger and bitterness,
and guilt, as well as fear of losing the children or being rejected by them
(Baunach 1992). The children, depending on their age, experience a
sense of failure and a range of feelings of traumatic loss and abandon¬
ment, anger, guilt, and fear (Huie 1994).
The plight of imprisoned mothers and their children has fueled the
debate over women’s imprisonment in general. Given that most female
inmates have committed relatively minor nonviolent crimes, a number of
criminologists and advocates have questioned the appropriateness of
imprisoning them in the first place. Immarigeon and Chesney-Lind
(1990) identify several innovative programs designed to reduce women’s
imprisonment, but emphasize that these are rare. In most states, they
note, systematic planning is atypical and female inmates continue to be
neglected by policy makers. However, even when planning is involved,
incarcerative policies still dominate. Unfortunately, this is likely to remain
the case, since the U.S. Congress in its recent deliberations over crime
control measures has not favored preventive or diversionary programs,
but instead has favored building more prisons and imposing longer
prison terms on offenders.
In sum, it seems that law enforcement agencies, the courts, and the
correctional system are applying a double standard of justice—one for
men, another for women—that is exacerbated by racial and age-based
discrimination. As we will see next, this double standard also affects the
treatment of male and female crime victims.
CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION: GENDER,

POWER, AND VIOLENCE
Recent opinion polls indicate that fear of being victimized by crime has
increased substantially among the general U.S. population. In a 1993 USA
Tbcfoy/CNN/Gallup poll, for example, more than a third of the respon¬
dents stated that they worry about themselves or a family member being
sexually assaulted. More than a third also worry about their homes being
burglarized, and more than a quarter worry about being mugged. Re¬
spondents living in urban areas expressed the highest levels of fear, and
African Americans were more fearful than whites (USA Today 28 October
334 Chapter 9
1993:6A). According to^Riger and Gordon (1988), the fear of criminal

victimization falls disproportionately on minority women living in urban
areas.
Criminologists have long made a distinction, however, between fear
of crime and an individual’s actual chances of becoming a crime victim.
Looking at Table 9.5, we see data from the National Crime Survey show¬
ing rates of criminal victimization by sex, age and race. The National
Crime Survey is a semiannual federal study that questions a random
sample of American households about their criminal victimization expe¬
riences. Looking only at the variable of sex, we see that men are more
likely than women to be victimized by both violent crime and theft. It is
estimated, in fact, that 89 percent of all males now twelve years old will be
the victim of a violent crime at least once during their lifetime, compared
with 73 percent of females. However, when we take race and age into
account, we see that it is young minority men—those between the ages of
twelve and twenty-four—who have the highest victimization rates (see also
Box 9.2 on pages 336-337).
Although the National Crime Survey is considered to be a fairly
good indicator of the extent of criminal victimization in the United
States and is the most widely utilized source of victimization statistics,
there are several factors that make it problematic when considering
the gendered nature of criminal victimization. As Gerber and Weeks
(1992) point out, much of the crime—especially violent crime—of
which women are the most likely victims goes unrecorded by the Na¬
tional Crime Survey. For example, the survey does not ask about the
crimes of spouse abuse and incest. In addition, although women report
more crime to survey interviewers than to the police, they have difficulty
reporting certain crimes, such as rape, to anyone. Consequently, many
analysts estimate that official victimization data represent perhaps only 10
to 25 percent of the rapes that actually occur (Riger and Gordon 1988).
In fact, a recent study financed by the federal government found that the
number of completed sexual assaults in a given year may be more than
five times as high as that reported in the National Crime Survey
(Johnston 1992).
There are other ways, too, that women’s criminal victimization is
rendered invisible. For instance, Gerber and Weeks (1992) maintain
that women have always been the victims of corporate crime—indeed,
in cases such as the Daikon Shield and silicone breast implants (see
chapter 12), women have been the only victims of such crimes—but
criminologists have overlooked the role of gender in their analyses of
corporate criminality. Similarly, criminologists studying homicide have
traditionally focused almost exclusively on male victims as well as offend¬
ers, often including women only in discussions of crimes of passion.
{text continues onp. 337)
TA3LE 9.5 Estimated Rate of Personal Criminal Victimization (per 1,000

persons in each age group) by Type of Victimization. Sex, Age, and Race of
Victim, 1991
Sex, Age, and Race Total Crimes of Crimes of

of Victim Population Violence Theft
White Males
12-15 years 5,610,640 84.3 107.6
16-19 years 5,394,180 118.7 97.7
20-24 years 7,396,080 93.5 122.2
25-34 years 17,977,320 37.1 77.1
35-49 years 22,877,720 23.7 57.0
50-64 years 13,919,410 10.3 36.5
65 years 8c older 11,456,900 2.7 18.6
White Females
12-15 years 5,392,640 35.2 95.1
16-19 years 5,292,160 60.1 105.6
20-24 years 7,479,530 53.5 120.4
25-34 years 17,780,590 29.6 67.0
35-49 years 23,071,390 15.8 55.8
50-64 years 14,947,140 8.1 35.2
65 years 8c older 15,880,860 3.4 17.9
Black Males
12-15 years 1,137,690 133.9 133.3
16-19 years 1,060,590 147.5 69.5
20-24 years 1,060,630 118.5 89.3
25-34 years 2,571,740 41.4 82.0
35-49 years 2,638,450 31.9 64.5
50-64 years 1,555,720 19.6 22.8
65 years 8c older 1,034,810 17.7* 35.5
Black Females
12-15 years 1,081,950 28.4 63.5
16-19 years 1,054,050 65.1 54.6
20-24 years 1,348,880 56.2 79.1
25-34 years 2,947,870 53.2 66.8
35-49 years 3,211,190 11.9 47.9
50-64 years 1,895,370 9.3* 38.1
65 years 8c older 1,538,320 7.2* 29.7
*Estimate is based on about 10 or fewer sample cases.
Source: U.S. Department of Justice 1993a:264.

336 Chapter 9
30X 9.2 Hate Crimes

Hate crimes, which are also called bias crimes, are crimes in which the offender s
actions are motivated by hatred, bias, or prejudice, based on the actual or
perceived race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, or sexual orientation of the
victim. Hate crimes often take the form of slurs and vandalism, but not infre¬
quently they involve violent physical attacks against individuals. In fact, victims
of hate-motivated assaults typically suffer greater physical and psychological
harm than victims of other assaults (National Institute Against Prejudice and
Violence [NIAPV] 1990). For instance, they are four times more likely to re¬
quire hospitalization than victims of other assaults (Goleman 1990), and they
also experience significantly high levels of feelings of personal isolation
(NIAPV 1990).
There is evidence from a variety of sources that the number of hate
crimes committed in the United States has risen dramatically in recent years
(Jenness forthcoming). Importantly, however, not all individuals are equally
likely to be victimized by hate crimes. Reports indicate that the most frequent
victims are members of racial minority groups, and that they are usually victim¬
ized by young white males. Interracial couples also appear to be at especially
high risk of victimization (Jenness forthcoming). In addition, incidents involv¬
ing gay and lesbian victims have been one of the fastest growing types of hate
crimes in the United States. In recent surveys, as many as 92 percent of gay
men and lesbians have indicated that they have been the targets of verbal abuse or
threats because of their sexual orientation, and as many as 24 percent have re¬
ported physical attacks (Herek and Berrill 1992). In 1988 alone, there were 70
murders documented that were “gay motivated” or “gay-related (Herek 1989).
Some of this increase, of course, may be due to improved documentation and
reporting methods, but it is not unlikely that it reflects, at least in part, the anti¬
gay backlash in this country or what one observer has called the “cruel cru¬
sade” against lesbians and gay men (Rhoads 1993; see also chapter 7).
In considering hate crimes, it is especially important for us to note that
the official definition of hate crime codified in the federal Hate Crime Statistics
Act of 1990 does not include actions’motivated by the sex of the victim. In
other words, specific acts or threats against women that are intended to intimi¬
date, harass, induce fear, coerce, or punish them because of the perpetrators’
misogynistic feelings or hostility toward them as women are not counted as
hate crimes and, therefore, are outside the bounds of redress provided in hate
crimes statutes (Miller 1994). This glaring omission has led to considerable
criticism by many feminists who point out that much violence against women is
gender-motivated and has the purpose of intimidating not just an individual
woman, but women as a group, just as hate crimes directed against those cov¬
ered by the law intimidate individuals because of their group affiliation (Cen¬
\
ter for Women Policy Studies 1991b).
To understand this position better, consider one recent and particularly
dramatic example: the shooting deaths of fourteen female engineering stu¬
dents in Montreal in 1991 by a man who left a note proclaiming his hatred of
Gender, Cri me, and Justice 337
30X 9.2 Continued
women and his desire to “kill the feminists.” Though many would argue that
such an incident is rare, the fact remains that women are harassed, beaten, and
raped daily because they are women.
Obviously, not all crimes involving female victims can be considered hate
crimes; as Miller (1994) points out, women victimized by crimes such as bur¬
glary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and similar crimes are not usually singled
out as targets because of their sex. However, in instances when it is clear that
women were \dctimized because of their sex, the advantage of having the cate¬
gory of sex included in hate crimes laws would be that offenders would be
more severely ptinished for their actions. This is because offenses prosecuted
as hate crimes carry additional penalties above those normally prescribed for a
specific offense. At the same time, the inclusion of the category of sex in hate
crimes statutes would mandate funding for public education programs, victim
services, prevention efforts, and special training for criminal justice personnel.
Finally, women might be more willing to report incidents of harassment and
violence if they believe that law enforcement officials recognize gender-moti¬
vated crime as a problem (Miller 1994).
In November 1993, the U.S. Senate approved The Violence Against
Women Act, legislation sponsored by Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.). The mea¬
sure, which is also expected to be passed by the House, includes a provision
that extends civil rights protection to rape victims and defines rape as a gender-
motivated crime. The act also includes a provision for monetary restitution for
victims of sex crimes, the establishment of new federal penalties for spouse
abusers who cross state lines, and the creation of a national task force to de¬
velop a strategy to address violence against women (Committee on the Judici¬
ary, U.S. Senate 1993). Though .some critics maintain that The Violence
Against Women Act represents a case of too little too late, it nevertheless may
prove to be a significant step toward legislative recognition of not only rape,
but also other forms of violence against women, as hate crimes.
Yet the Department of Labor recently reported that while women account
for only 7 percent of on-the-job deaths, 40 percent of women who die on
the job are murder victims, compared with just 15 percent of men who
die at work—a finding that begs for further analysis (U.S. Department of
Labor 1994).
Considering these data, women’s greater fear of crime becomes
more understandable. As Stanko (1988) emphasizes, women’s greater
fear of crime stems both from their greater physical vulnerability and
from the fact that their victimization is more likely to be hidden, over¬
looked, or trivialized relative to men’s victimization (see also Chesney-
Lind 1989). This point is underlined when we consider the crime of rape.
338 Chapter 9
Rape
Research indicates that it is the crime of rape that women fear more than
any other (Riger and Gordon 1988; Warr 1985). This fear is present even
among very young women, as a recent survey of elementary school stu¬
dents revealed when it asked the questions, “Would you rather be a man
or a woman? Why?” One 10-year-old girl responded, “The worst thing
about being a woman is we get raped and killed. Women can get killed by
their prettiness” (quoted in Snow 1992:1E). As this girl indicates, the fear
of rape derives not only from the fact that rape is a serious crime but also
because it is a crime associated with other serious offenses, such as
robbery and homicide, and with gratuitous violence in addition to the
rape itself (Riger and Gordon 1988). The fear of contracting AIDS
through rape also adds to women’s fear of this crime (Center for Women
Policy Studies 1991a).®
In addition, women’s high fear of rape is related to their perceived
risk of being raped, and statistics on sexual assault indicate that their fears
are hardly irrational. The U.S. Department of Justice (1987) has esti¬
mated that one woman in twelve will be the victim of rape or attempted
rape during her lifetime. According to the F.B.l.’s “crime clock,” one
forcible rape is committed every five minutes in the United States (Fed¬
eral Bureau of Investigation 1993). During the 1980s, the rate of rape in
the United States rose four times faster than the total crime rate (U.S.
House of Representatives 1990; see also DeKeseredy et al. 1993). Yet,
sexual assault is one of the violent crimes least likely to be reported to the
police (Center for Women Policy Studies 1991a). Rape also has one of the
lowest arrest and conviction rates of any crime (Committee on the Judi¬
ciary, U.S. Senate 1993). For instance, although rape accounts for about
6 percent of violent crimes, arrests for rape are less than 2 percent of
arrests for violent crime (U.S. House of Representatives 1990). “Fewer
than 40 percent of reported rapes result in charges against perpetrators,
and only 3 percent of these cases result in convictions” (Center for
Women Policy Studies 1991a;3-4). In 1990, there were 102,555 rapes
reported to police, but only 18,024 individuals were convicted of rape
(Federal Bureau of Investigation 1991). Those convicted receive com¬
paratively light sentences, serving on average a year or less in prison or
^The statistical probability of contracting AIDS as a result of rape is unknown at this

time. According to the Center for Women Policy Studies (1991a:6), “in cases of sexual
violence, research seems to assume that a rape survivor may already be infected with
HIV, thus emphasizing the survivor’s sexual history and deemphasizing the crime of
rape.” There is currently a debate over mandatory HIV testing of convicted rapists,
with test results being provided to both the rapists and their victims. For a thorough
discussion of both the merits and disadvantages of such a policy, see Center for
Women Policy Studies I99Ia.
jail (Committee oil the Judiciary, U.S. Senate 1993). One cannot help hut
ask what factors give rise to such startling statistics.
Rape legally occurs when a person uses force or the threat of force
to have some form of sexual intercourse (vaginal, oral, or anal) with
another person. This rather straightforward definition might lead us to
conclude that the prosecution of rape cases is fairly simple, especially
given current medical technology and modern evidence collection tech¬
niques. However, although at first it may appear that rape may be thought
of in dichotomous terms (that is, a specific encounter is or is not a rape),
research indicates that what is defined as rape differs widely among
various groups, including victims and perpetrators (Bourque 1989; Wil¬
liams 1985). Unfortunately, the crime of rape is still prevalently viewed in
our society in terms of a collection of myths about both rapists and rape
victims. These include the notions that women enjoy “being taken” by
force; that many women provoke men by teasing them and therefore
these women get what they deserve; and that most rapes are committed
by strangers who attack lone women on isolated streets or in dark alleys.
As a group of college students stated during a recent discussion about
rape, if a woman is raped while she’s walking alone late at night, what
does she expect? She should have been more sensible, more cautious.
Thus, rape victims face a predicament unlike that of victims of any other
crime; it is they who must prove their innocence rather than the state
proving the guilt of the rapist (Estrich 1987). To understand this better,
let’s examine several rape myths more closely.
It is commonly believed that most rape victims have done something
to invite or precipitate the assault. Therefore, in reporting the crime,
complainants must first demonstrate that they are “real” or “worthy”
victims. To do so successfully and thus have the complaint acted upon by
the criminal justice system, victims must report the assault promptly, show
emotional as well as physical trauma and, most importantly, convince
authorities that they were in no way responsible for the crime (Bourque
1989; Schur 1984). This last condition is an especially difficult one to
fulfill since even the slightest deviation from “respectable behavior” may
be taken as evidence of the victim’s culpability. Men, for example, are
even less likely than women to report that they have been raped—after
all, men are supposed to be able to defend themselves. If they are gay,
reporting the assault may do more harm than good. Gays are rarely
deemed “worthy” rape victims by virtue of their choice of a “deviant”
lifestyle, and reporting could lead to harassment by the authorities and
others.
Men, though, are estimated to constitute less than 10 percent of
rape victims (U.S. House of Representatives 1990). It is women, then, who
are routinely the double victims: first, by their assailants and second, by
the criminal justice system. Because of the victim precipitation myth.
340 Chapter 9
female rape victims typically find that if they have violated any of the
stereotyped standards of respectable femininity if they were hitchhik¬
ing, drinking or using drugs, walking alone at night, visiting a bar un¬
escorted, or dressed “seductively”—the probability increases that their
complaint will not be prosecuted or, if it is, that their assailant will be
acquitted (see, for example, the Nexu York Times 3 June 1990:30). The
police unfound four times as many rape cases reported to them as they
do other reported index crimes; that is, they officially declaie that
these crimes, previously thought to have occurred, did not occur, usually
because they deem the cases unprosecutable (Federal Bureau of Investi¬
gation 1993).
The victim precipitation myth also appears to render some groups
of women unrapeable in a sense. Consider, for example, a 1986 California
case in which a Superior Court judge dismissed charges of rape and
sodomy brought by a thirty-year-old Hispanic prostitute against a white
male with whom she agreed to have oral sex, but who subsequently
became violent and forced her to engage in sexual intercourse and
sodomy. Upon dismissing the case, the Judge stated that a working pros¬
titute could not be a rape victim even if she was forced to have inter¬
course, although the district attorney’s office and a majority of the Jury
disagreed with this opinion (Bourque 1989). In October, 1990, it was
reported that more than 200 sexual assault cases were being reopened in
Oakland, California after the police chief there admitted that the cases
had been closed without proper investigation because most of the victims
were prostitutes or drug addicts. According to Gross (1990:A14), rape
complaints brought by prostitutes and addicts are routinely dismissed by
police. “In New Haven, feced with a prostitute dressed for work, the police
have said, ‘What do you expect? Look at you.’ In Houston, officers have
shut their notebooks after a victim said that she was raped in a crack
house. In the Atlanta suburbs, victims have been told they will be given a
lie detector test and sent to Jail if,pny part of their story is untrue.”
Historically, the myths that women enjoy forced sex, that they really
mean “yes” when they say “no,” and that they often falsely accuse men of
rape out of shame or revenge, led to strict rules of evidence in rape cases
that essentially placed the burden of proof on the victim. For instance,
the victim’s testimony had to be supported by other witnesses, and the
state had to establish that she had tried sufficiently to resist her assailant.
Today, many of these requirements have been revised or abolished both
in the United States and abroad. But despite legal reforms, both Judges
and Juries still seem reluctant to believe rape victims and to convict and
punish accused rapists (Bourque 1989; Herman 1988). Consider, for
example, the instructions that one British Judge gave to a Jury Just prior
to its deliberation of a verdict in a 1982 rape trial:
Women who §ay no do not always mean no. It is not just a question of
saying no, it is a question of how she says it, how she shows it and makes
it clear. If she doesn t want it she only has to keep her legs shut and she
would not get it without force and there would be marks of force being
used (quoted in Temkin 1987:19-20).
This quotation highlights the fact that in the majority of rape cases,
the central issue is not whether the complainant and the accused engaged
in sexual intercourse, but rather whether the complainant consented to
the act. As most prosecutors know quite well, it is the victim’s consent that
is most difficult to disprove, particularly in cases in which she and the
accused know one another (Schur 1984; Bloom 1981). A case involving a
victim who knows or is familiar with her assailant is known as acquain¬
tance rape. According to the U.S. Department of Justice (1994) at least
55 percent of rapes are acquaintance rapes. The younger the victim, the
more likely she is to know her assailant; acquaintance rapes account for
63 percent of reported cases involving victims twelve to eighteen years of
age, and 80 percent of cases in which the victim is under twelve (Kulp
1981). Yet the vast majority of acquaintance rapes go unreported; women
raped by strangers are ten times more likely to report the crime than
women raped by acquaintances (U.S. House of Representatives 1990).
Acquaintance rapes are especially common on college campuses.
Despite Roiphe’s (1993) claims that the term “date rape” is being widely
misapplied to cases involving boyfriends verbally coercing their girl¬
friends or to intercourse that occurs because the woman is intoxicated
and becomes “sexually confused,” empirical research indicates that the
incidence of acquaintance or date rape on college campuses is hardly
trivial. In an extensive three-year survey of college students, for example,
Koss and her colleagues (1987) found that one in eight female college
students reported being victimized during the preceding twelve-month
period; 84 percent of those who had been victims of completed rapes
knew their assailants (see also DeKeseredy et al. 1993).
So prevalent is acquaintance rape that Rigor and Gordon (1988)
argue that even if women do not go out alone at night and even if they
stay away from certain parts of town, they are not necessarily well pro¬
tected from the danger of being sexually assaulted. More than 47 percent
of rapes take place at or in the victim’s home or the home of one of the
victim’s friends, relatives or neighbors (U.S. Department of Justice
1993a).
Acquaintance rapes are often treated as private squabbles or misun¬
derstandings, rather than as prosecutable crimes (Bourque 1989; Estrich
1987). If a case reaches the courtroom, the complainant typically finds
that among judges and juries “old myths die hard: if a woman accepts a
342 Chapter 9
dinner-date from a man, she should be expected to hold up her end of

the bargain later, or if she is friendly to the gas man or flirts with her
neighbor at the laundromat, well what can she expect?” (Bloom 1981:7).
Especially difficult are cases in which the victim and the assailant had a
previous sexual relationship: “[judges and juries] might think that the
rapist had certain ‘rights’ to the woman, or that, conversely, the woman
gives up the right to say no when she just entered into a sexual relation¬
ship with him, or anyone” (Bloom 1981:6; Bourque 1989). This view was
reflected in the law of at least five states in which, as of 1987, an exemp¬
tion froih prosecution for rape was extended to voluntary social compan¬
ions with whom the victim had previously had sexual contact (U.S. House
of Representatives 1988).
One form of sexual assault that has received considerable attention
recently is marital rape. Historically, a husband could not be charged with
raping his wife even if he used physical violence to force her to have sex
with him, or even if they were legally separated. For the most part, this
was because of the fact that a wife was considered the property of her
husband; certainly no man could be prosecuted for a personal decision
to use his property as he saw fit. It was not until 1977 that the Oregon
state legislature repealed the marital exemption to its rape statute. Two
years later, James K. Chretien became the Tirst person in the United States
to be convicted of marital rape (Reid 1987).
Research indicates that marital rape is a common form of family
violence. According to one study of 644 married women, 12 percent
reported having been raped by their husbands (Russell 1990). Finkelhor
and Y116 (1985) found in their study of 393 randomly selected women that
half their sample reported more than twenty incidents of marital rape
and 48 percent indicated that rape was part of the common physical
abuse their husbands inflicted on them. The most commonly cited statis¬
tic is that rape occurs in 9 to 14 percent of all U.S. marriages (Kennedy
Bergen 1994; Hoffman 1993; Johnston 1992). It is important to empha¬
size that what we are discussing here is not a situation in which one spouse
wishes ta have sex and the other does not, but gives in out of love or to
please. Marital rape is a brutal physical assault that may have a graver
impact on a victim than stranger rape given that the assailant is a person
whom she knows and, at least at one time, loved and trusted (Finkelhor
and Y116 1985).
Indeed, it is probably the severe level of brutality in these assaults
that accounts for the fact that when they are prosecuted, the conviction
rate is significantly higher than in cases of rape by a stranger (Reid 1987).
Still, although all states now have criminal statutes prohibiting forced sex
between a husband and wife, most also include numerous spousal exemp¬
tions from prosecution under a wide variety of circumstances, largely
because of lingering doubts about the ability to prove nonconsent in a

marital relationship. In some states, for instance, a woman may charge
her husband with rape only if he used a weapon to force her to have sex;
in other states a married woman must report the crime within a short
period of time of its occurrence in order for a rape charge to be lodged
against her husband. In four states, a woman may charge her husband
with rape only if they are not living together; other states require that the
partners be legally separated or have filed for divorce. Only seventeen
states have totally eliminated spousal exemptions (Kennedy Bergen 1994;
Hoffman 1993). However, in three states, exemption from prosecution
for rape extends to unmarried cohabiting partners as well as married
couples (Small and Tetreault 1990).
Another factor that affects the prosecution and outcome of rape
cases is the race composition of the offender-victim dyad. We have already
noted that blacks accused of victimizing whites are treated more harshly
within the criminal justice system. This is especially true in rape cases in
which a black man is charged and convicted of raping a white woman
(Flowers 1988). For example, sociologist Gary LaFree (1980) analyzed
881 cases of sexual assault in a large midwestern city, comparing official
reactions to rape in intraracial cases (i.e., black offender/black victim;
white offender/white victim) to those in interracial cases (i.e., black
offender/white victim; white offender/black victim). LaFree found that
black men suspected of sexually assaulting white women received the
harshest treatment at various stages of criminal processing. They were
more likely, for example, to have their cases filed as felonies (as opposed
to the less serious category of crime, misdemeanors); to be sentenced to
prison (rather than probation); to receive longer prison sentences; and
to be incarcerated in a state penitentiary (as opposed to a local Jail or
minimum security facility). White men involved in interracial rapes were
among those treated most leniently. However, black suspects in interracial
cases were no more likely than other suspects to be arrested or found
guilty; in fact, LaFree reports that less than 32 percent of all the suspects
arrested were eventually convicted. LaFree concludes that “the severity of
official sanctions imposed on men for the sexual violation of women will
depend on the relative power oi the victim and of the suspect, determined
in part by the race of each” (pp. 852-853, emphasis added).
Over the last fifteen years or so, the treatment of rape victims has
improved. Most police officers, for example, now receive special training
to sensitize them to the trauma of victims, and there are innumerable
victim support and advocate services throughout the country. None of
this, though, has produced a measurable decrease in the rape rate, and
rape is still typically viewed as a “woman’s problem” with little attention
given to the men involved (Johnson 1980). WTien rapists are discussed.
344 Chapter 9
they are usually depicted as psychologically disturbed individuals who

need special medical treatment. Interestingly, however, researchers have
been unable to uncover evidence of widespread psychological distur¬
bance in rapists, nor can they consistently discriminate between rapists
and nonrapists using psychological tests (Scully and Marolla 1985; Abel
et al. 1980; Rada 1978). In fact, as Herman (1988:702-703) points out,
“The most striking characteristic of sex offenders, from a diagnostic
standpoint, is their apparent normality. Most do not qualify for any psychi¬
atric diagnosis.” The psychopathological perspective serves largely to divert
our attention and resources away from the structural causes of rape and
encourages us “to ignore both the cultural meanings of the behaviors in
question and the overall context of power relations within which the behav¬
iors occur” (Schur 1984:147, author’s emphasis; see also Herman 1988).
But if most rapists are not mentally ill, why do they rape? Herman
(1988) has argued that the propensity to commit sex offenses should be
viewed as an addiction similar to alcoholism. Perhaps she is correct, but
her explanation begs the questions of how one becomes an addict and
why some individuals become addicted to committing sexual assaults and
others do not. Consequently, we think that an answer to the question of
why rapists rape lies within the culture and social structure of a society.
Consider, for instance, anthropological studies of societies that may be
characterized as virtually “rape-free” (Lepowsky 1994; Sutlive 1993; Reiss
1986; Sanday 1981; Broude and Green 1976). The most striking feature
of these societies is their relatively egalitarian gender relations. Neither
sex is viewed as more important or as more highly valued than the other,
and both are considered powerful, although in different spheres of activ¬
ity. Moreover, women in these societies are not socially and economically
dependent on men; they control resources and act as autonomous deci¬
sion makers. Finally, in most rape-free societies, nurturance and nonag¬
gression are valued traits in individuals, and women typically are highly
regarded not for their sexuality, but for their wisdom.
Compare these societies with our own—one of the most “rape-
prone” industrialized societies in the world (U.S. House of Repre¬
sentatives 1990; Scully and Marolla 1985). The contrasts are glaring. First
of all, we live in an extraordinarily violent society. Not only is the rape rate
exceptionally high, but also the United States has the highest homicide
rate relative to its industrialized allies. Yet we know that violence is not
condoned for everyone; it is expected of, even encouraged among men,
not women. This is just one dimension of unequal gender relations in our
society. Men control greater resources and, therefore, are more powerful
than women. Not infrequently, they use violence to expand their power
further. One of the few “bargaining chips” women have in our society is
their sexuality, and male violence can deprive them of personal control
over even that. As one convicted rapist told an interviewer:
Gender, Crime, and Justice
Rape is a man s light. If a woman doesn’t want to give it, the man should
take it. Women have no right to say no. Women are made to have sex. It’s
all they are good for. Some women would rather take a beating, but they
always give in; it s what they are for (quoted in Scully and Marolla
1985:261).
This quote also reveals the “conquest mentality” toward sex that is
part of American culture in general, but which is particularly prominent
in male peer group subcultures (DeKeseredy and Schwartz 1993; see also
Mydans 1993). Sex is something men get or take from women. Sometimes
force is necessary to get women to “put out.” It appears, then, that in the
United States there is a very fine line between “normal” masculine sexual
behavior and rape (Schur 1984). Indeed, the rapist quoted here, like
most rapists, did not think he had done anything wrong. Importantly, a
large segment of the U.S. public agrees with him. The fact that large-scale
studies of high school and college students, for example, have found that
a majority of young males and females believe that under some circum¬
stances it is all right for a man to force a woman to have sex illustrates the
extent to which sexual violence against women is an acceptable part of
our culture (Koss et al. 1987; Goodchilds and Zellman 1984; Age ton
1983). DeKeseredy and Schwartz (1993) as well as Sanday (1990) have
found that among all-male social networks, especially those such as frater¬
nities where heavy drinking is normative (see chapter 12), certain
women, particularly those who are intoxicated, are considered “legitimate
sexual targets” and that the behavior of assaultive men is “appropriate”
under such circumstances. Such attitudes and behaviors are given tacit
approval through the low probability that the complaints of victims
deemed unworthy will be taken seriously and that assailants will be
harshly punished (DeKeseredy and Schwartz 1993).
Finally, the words of the rapist quoted here reflect the degree to
which women are sexually objectified in our society. Unlike women in
rape-free societies, women in the United States and similar countries are
viewed as sex objects, and female sexuality itself is treated as a commodity.
Clearly the most common form of objectified, commoditized female
sexuality is pornography. We will now briefly discuss pornography and
attempt to assess its relationship to the high incidence of violence against
women in our society.
Pornography
In 1969, the President’s Commission on the Causes and Prevention of
Violence concluded in its report that media portrayals of violence can
induce individuals to behave violently. In 1971, the Presidential Commis¬
sion on Obscenity and Pornography concluded in its report that there is
346 Chapter 9
\
no causal relationship between exposure to pornography and subsequent

sexual violence against women. Pornography, it said, is basically harmless.
In 1986, the Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography (also
known as the Meese Commission) brought the issue full circle by conclud¬
ing that violent pornography is causally related to both sexual violence
and discrimination against women.
The inconsistency that characterizes these official reports reflects
the general confusion that historically has clouded debates about pornog¬
raphy and its effects. Much of the problem stems from conflicting defini¬
tions of what is pornographic. Certainly, few would be willing to argue
that any pictured nude or any description of a sexual act is pornographic,
but where does one draw the line? As Supreme Court Justice Douglas
once noted in an obscenity trial, “What may be trash to me may be prized
by others” (quoted in MacKinnon 1986:69).
Still, we can discern important objective differences between por¬
nography and what may be called erotica. Gloria Steinem (1978:54) pro¬
vides us with a useful starting point:
“Pornography” begins with a root [porne'\ meaning “prostitution” or

“female captives,” thus letting us know that the subject is not mutual love,
or love at all, but domination and violence against women. (Though, of
course, homosexual pornography may imitate this violence by putting a
man in the “feminine” role of victim.) It ends with a root [graphos]
meaning “writing about” or “description of’ which puts still more
distance between subject and object, and replaces a spontaneous
yearning for closeness with objectification and a voyeur.
In contrast, erotica is derived from the root eros meaning “sensual love”
and implying the mutual choice and pleasure of the sexual partners. We
can see here, then, at least two distinct features of pornography. First, it
depersonalizes sex and objectifies women. Second, and more importantly,
pornography is not even about sex, per se, but rather the degradation of
women and often children through sex. In fact, the sex depicted in
pornography is secondary to the violence, humiliation, and dominance it
portrays (see also Russell 1993; Mayall and Russell 1993).
Significantly, the Meese Commission distinguished among four
types of sexually explicit material: sexually violent material; nonviolent
materials that depict degradation, domination, subordination, or humili¬
ation; nonviolent and nondegrading materials; and materials depicting
nudity. In reviewing available evidence on the potentially harmful effects
\ of such materials, the Commission concluded that with regard to the
latter two categories, research indicates no causal connection to rape or
other acts of sexual violence. However, the Commission maintained that
material of these two types represents only a small percentage of the
market. Instead, they argued that the market in sexually explicit material
is largely composed of that which we have defined as pornography: sexu¬

ally violent material and nonviolent but degrading materials (U.S. Depart¬
ment of Justice 1986).
At its most extreme form, violent pornography takes the form of
snuff and slasher films in which women are tortured, disfigured,
murdered, or dismembered for sexual pleasure (Russell 1993; Barry
1981). In addition, a common theme in these and other forms of violent
pornography is rape. “[N]ot only is rape presented as part of normal
male/female relations, but the woman, despite her terror, is always de¬
picted as sexually aroused to the point of cooperation. In the end, she is
ashamed but physically gratified” (Scully and Marolla 1985:253). Re¬
search indicates that this kind of pornography is harmful. Donnerstein
(1983), for example, reports that exposure to violent pornography in¬
creases male research subjects’ sexual arousal and rape fantasies, lessens
their sensithity to rape and rape \dctims, increases their acceptance of
rape myths, and most importantly, increases their self-reported possibility
of raping. “It is of further interest to note that these increases in arousal
and changes in rape attitudes are also highly correlated with actual ag¬
gression against women” (Donnerstein 1983:141). As Scully and Marolla
(1985:253) found in their interviews with convicted rapists, “The images
projected in pornography contribute to a vocabulary of motive which
trivializes and neutralizes rape and which might lessen the internal con¬
trols that otherwise would prevent sexually aggressive behavior. Men who
rape use this culturally acquired vocabulary to Justify their sexual vio¬
lence.” Norris and Kerr (1991) found that this vocabulary of motive is
especially prevalent among men who may be described as hypermascu¬
line—that is, men who glorify and engage in exaggerated “performances”
involving masculine affects, particularly violence, anger, and excitement.
Russell and Trocki (1993) have also found that exposure to violent
pornography is related to rape and other forms of sexual abuse of
women. In their study of a random sample of 930 women, 10 percent of
the respondents said they had been upset by someone trying to get them
to enact what had been seen in pornographic pictures, movies, or books.
Furthermore, they found that pornography appeared to play a major role
in cases of marital rape, with more than a third of marital rape victims
reporting that their husbands made attempts to reenact what they had
seen in pornography.
What of material that may be considered nonviolent, but degrading?
According to the Meese Commission, the bulk of available pornography
comprises this kind of material and “depicts people, usually women, as
existing solely for the sexual satisfaction of others, usually men, or that
depicts people, usually women, in decidedly subordinate roles in their
sexual relations with others, or that depicts people engaged in sexual
practices that would to most people be considered humiliating
348 Chapter 9
[e.g., women are urinated or ejaculated on or shown having sex with

animals]” (U.S. Department of Justice 1986:331). Although acknowl¬
edging that the evidence is more tentative than that regarding violent
pornography, the Commission reached a similar conclusion: exposure to
nonviolent but degrading pornography increases acceptance of rape myths.
In addition, the Commission (U.S. Department of Justice 1986:334) con¬
cluded that “substantial exposure to materials of this type bears some
causal relationship to the incidence of various nonviolent forms of dis¬
crimination against or subordination of women in our society.’ Russell
and Trocki’s (1993) research supports the Commission’s conclusions.
The Commission’s report did little to settle the pornography debate
and much to fuel it. There was disagreement among Commission mem¬
bers themselves regarding the conclusions expressed in the official re¬
port, and the association of the Commission with a highly conservative
political administration that had close ties to the religious right added to
many observers’ distrust of the Commission’s interpretation of testimony
given before it. The conclusions of the Commission also heightened the
concerns of many who worry about potential infringements on the First
Amendment right of free speech and who fear that the report could be
used to legitimate government censorship of any sexually explicit mate¬
rial including information on contraception, “safe sex,” and so on. Re¬
cent governmental efforts to censor art exhibitions, such as the Robert
Mapplethorpe photography exhibit, are frequently cited as examples.
Still, efforts to actually outlaw pornography have not been successful.
Antipornography laws that were passed in Indianapolis, Minneapolis, Los
Angeles, Cambridge (Massachusetts), and Bellingham (Washington)
have been overturned by the courts on the ground that they did violate
First Amendment free speech guarantees. Currently, however, at least one
state (Massachusetts) as well as the federal government are considering
legislation that would allow individuals who were coerced into appearing
in pornography or whose name or image was used without their consent
in pornography to bring civil suits against pornography producers. In
addition, if one can prove that a specific piece of pornography caused
one to be attacked or assaulted, one can sue either the pornography
producer or the attacker. It remains to be seen whether these bills, if they
are enacted, fare any better before the courts than previous measures.
It is important to note that the pornography debate is not one being
waged only between feminists and nonfeminists. Feminists themselves are
divided over the questions of whether pornography is harmful and
should be outlawed (see Berger, et al. 1991). There are those who main¬
tain that pornography, even in portraying sadomasochism, is potentially
liberating for women in that through it, women may become less puritani¬
cal and sexually passive and more open or aggressive about their sexual
desires. Others label this approach male-identified and anti-woman. To
them pornography is itself “a form of forced sex, a practice of sexual

politics, an institution of gender inequality” (MacKinnon 1986:65; Russo
1987). And to those who worry about encroachment on the First Amend¬
ment, antipornography feminists ask if they would maintain the same
position if the material in question was violently racist or anti-Semitic. As
Russell (1993:11) argues:
Indeed, there would be a public outcry—and rightly so—if there were

special nonpornographic movie houses where viewers could see whites
beating up people of color, or Christians beating up Jews, and where the
victims were portrayed as enjoying or deserving such treatment. But if it’s
called pornography and women are the victims, then it is considered sex
and those who object that it is harmful to women are regarded as prudes.
Certainly it is unlikely that the debate over pornography will be

resolved any time soon. Meanwhile, however, the porn industry remains
a multibillion dollar a year enterprise that is branching out into new
areas. Phone pornography, or “phone sex” as it is sometimes called, is one
new form, although federal legislation requires that phone companies
block access to phone pornography services unless a customer specifically
asks in writing to receive them (Russell 1993). Another, more lucrative
new form of pornography is computer porn. Pornographic software pack¬
ages sell for $15 to $50 each and many are quite violent, giving users the
options, for example, of handcuffing, gagging, and shackling the ani¬
mated, anatomically correct woman on the screen. The violence, espe¬
cially \iolence against women, in many video games has prompted
Congress to consider mandating the implementation of a rating system
that would require certain game packages to be labeled with warnings.
However, the biggest market in violent pornography is in videocassettes
which may be rented or purchased in neighborhood video stores. Accord¬
ing to one report, sales and rentals of adult videotapes from general
interest (as opposed to “adult”) video stores amounted to $992 million in
1989 (Russell 1993). In addition, an increasing number of American
households own video cameras—7.2 percent in 1988, up from 2.2 percent
in 1985 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1991)—making it possible for
individuals to make their own pornographic home movies (Russell 1993).
It has been argued that pornography has become more respectable
with the proliferation of home video equipment. Viewers no longer have
to visit seedy peep shows or adults-only outlets; they can watch X-rated
videotapes from the neighborhood retailer (or ones they’ve made them¬
selves) in the comfort and privacy of their own homes. It has also been
argued that this has allowed women greater freedom to view pornogra¬
phy, since they would be most reluctant to visit an adults-only movie
theater or retailer. According to one report, 15 percent of X-rated video¬
tapes in 1989 were rented by women (Russell 1993). Research indicates.
350 Chapter 9
however, that while women may go to the video store to rent the movie,
the idea to watch it most often originated with their male partners.
Women usually describe such films as boring, unimaginative, offensive,
and exploitative of women (Rubin 1991). Indeed, studies show that
women do not react to pornography the same way men do and are more
often upset and negatively affected by it (Senn 1993). Producers have
made a similar discovery in their efforts to market sexually explicit mate¬
rial to women. To do so successfully, they have found, they must develop
a plot, reduce the number of close-ups, and add foreplay and afterplay to
the sex scenes—in short, depict more affection, romance, and emotional
relationships which research shows are sexually stimulating to women
(Senn 1993; Kristoff 1986; Morgan 1978).
The argument that “pornography for women” is liberating or that it
represents a reversal in the traditional gender hierarchy is misleading in
that it fails to consider the significant differences between this type of
sexually explicit material and pornography in the form we have defined
here, which is marketed almost exclusively to men (see also Margolis and
Arnold 1993). Nevertheless, Edwin Schur has made the important point
that the “pornography-is-now-respectable” argument has some merit in
that it “suggests that the link between pornography and the objectified
use of female sexuality in ordinary ‘respectable’ advertising may be very
close indeed. It could be that until women’s bodies are no longer used to
sell commodities, the treatment and sale of women’s bodies as commodi¬
ties through pornography is bound to persist” (Schur 1984:179, author’s
emphasis; see also chapter 6). Extending this position, we may argue that
in a society in which women are regarded as sexual property and are
denied equal access to wealth, power, prestige, and other resources, both
rape and pornography are likely to flourish. The same can be said with
regard to other forms of violence against women, as we shall see next.
Institutionalized Violence against

Women: Custom or Crime?
The historical accounts left by colonists and missionaries along with the
ethnographies of anthropologists testify to the extent to which violence
against women has been an institutionalized component of the cultures
of many societies throughout the world (see also Box 9.3).
Erom the tenth to the twentieth centuries, for example, the Chinese
engaged in the practice of binding the feet of young girls. This was
accomplished by bending all of the toes on each foot (except the big toes)
under and into the sole, then wrapping the toes and the heel as tightly
together as possible with a piece of cloth. Every two weeks or so the
wrapped feet were squeezed into progressively smaller shoes until they
Violence against Women as Human Rights Violations 30X 9.3

Histoiically, the physical and psychological abuse of women, though wide¬
spread in many societies throughout the world, has not been considered a hu¬
man rights problem. According to Chapman (1990), there has been a high
level of official and social tolerance of taolence against women, with most gov¬
ernments and official agencies viewing the problem as an individual matter or
simply as a consequence of being female. For example, when nineteen teenage
girls were killed and seventy-one others were raped by male classmates during a
protest over fees at a boarding school in Kenya in 1991, school officials told re¬
porters that rapes of female students by males were not unusual at their school
or others. The deaths were accidental, they claimed; as the deputy principal of
the school explained, “The boys never meant any harm against the girls. They
just wanted to rape” (quoted in Perlez 1991 :A7). However, officials have not
only excused or ignored such violence, they also have participated in it. The
rape and sexual abuse of female political prisoners while in official custody has
been documented by human rights advocates (Sontag 1993; Amnesty Interna¬
tional 1991; Chapman 1990).
Violence against women as a human rights issue began to command
greater public attention when, in 1993, media in the United States and Europe
began to report on the systematic rape, sexual enslavement, torture and mur¬
der of Bosnian Muslim women and children by Serbian military forces in the
former Yugoslavia. According to a report by a team of European Community in¬
vestigators, it is estimated that 20,000 Muslim women were raped by Serb sol¬
diers since the campaign against Muslim communities in the former Yugoslavia
was initiated (Riding 1993). Rape, the investigators concluded, was being used
as a weapon of war. It has served as a central element in the Serbian “ethnic
cleansing” campaign; Bosnian men are murdered, while the women are raped
with the goal of impregnating them to produce offspring with the “desirable”
genetic material. At the same time, the rapes also are intended to demoralize
and terrorize the Muslim communities and to drive Muslims from their home
regions. According to the European Community investigative team, rapes were
often carried out in especially sadistic ways with the intent of inflicting the
greatest humiliation on the victims. The investigators collected evidence that
indicated that many Muslim women and children died during or after their
rapes (Riding 1993).
Reports such as these rightfully have produced widespread calls in the
U.S. and abroad for international sanctions against the Serbian military and
for efforts to bring the perpetrators to trial as war criminals. It is important to
note, however, that systematic violence against women is not unique to the for¬
mer Yugoslavia, nor is it a new strategy. Two decades ago, Susan Brownmiller
(1975) showed that throughout history, sexual abuse of “enemy” women has
been a common state-supported warfare tactic. This abuse has most frequently
involved rape, but it also has taken other forms, such as sexual enslavement.
In 1993, for instance, the Japanese government issued a report in which it
admitted that during World War II, it was involved in coercing women into
352 Chapter 9
30X 9.3 Continued
prostitution to sexually service Imperial Army soldiers. Though in reality the

women were sex slaves, they were euphemistically called “comfort women.” It is
estimated that from 100,000 to 300,000 women were enslaved. Most were from
South Korea, but some were from Indonesia, China, Taiwan, the Philippines,
and the Netherlands (McGregor and Lawnham 1993).
More recently, attorneys assisting refugees seeking political asylum in the
United States and Canada have documented extensive state-supported violence
against women, including gang rape by police and military personnel, in nu¬
merous countries, including Haiti, Honduras, El Salvador, and Iran (Sontag
1993). As a result, the United Nations High Commission on Refugees has is¬
sued special guidelines for government agencies to follow when evaluating
women’s applications for asylum. Canada has already adopted a policy that al¬
lows women to be granted asylum if they can show persecution on the basis of
their sex, but the United States has not yet followed suit (Sontag 1993).'° The
United Nations has also issued a Convention on the Elimination of All Eorms
of Discrimination Against Women which, although it doesn’t include a specific
provision on violence, does include a number of provisions that in their effect
impose sanctions for violence against women. Significantly, 101 countries as of
1990 had ratified this convention, but the United States was not one of them
(Chapman 1990). In 1994, however, the United States, for the first time, specifi¬
cally addressed violence against women as human rights abuses in its annual
human rights report, an indication perhaps that this problem is finally receiv¬
ing some recognition in official government circles in the United States (U.S.
Department of State 1994).
'°In 1994, however, a gay man was granted asylum in the United States on the ground that he
was harassed and raped by police in his native country, Mexico, because he is homosexual.
This case marked the first time that the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service has
granted an individual asylum because of persecution stemming from the individual’s sexual
orientation.
were shrunk to the desirable size of just three inches. Typically, the feet
would bleed and become infected, circulation was cut off, and eventually
one or more toes might fall off. Needless to say, the process was extremely
painful and countless women were crippled by it. Yet, they endured and
perpetuated the custom—usually from mother to daughter—for 1,000
years in the belief that it made them beautiful, and beauty ensured a good
and lasting marriage (Dworkin 1983a). In a society in which all roles
other than wife and mother, or prostitute, are closed to women, we may
expect them to pursue whatever means are necessary for personal and
economic security (Blake 1994).
It was the case that men did not look favorably on natural-footed
women. For one thing, they felt that tiny feet were feminine, so that
binding helped differentiate women from men. In addition, the immo¬
bile woman was a status symbol, “a testimony to the wealth and privilege
of the man who could afford to keep her” (Dworkin 1983a: 181). Aspira¬
tions to higher status, however, prompted the lower classes to copy the
tradition which originated with the nobility. And finally:
Footbinding functioned as the Cerbrus of morality and ensured female

chastity in a nation of women who literally could not “run around.”
Fidelity, and the legitimacy of children, could be reckoned on. . . .
Women were perverse and sinful, lewd and lascivious, if left to develop
naturally. The Chinese believed that being born a woman was payment
for e\ils committed in a previous life. Footbinding was designed to spare
a woman the disaster of another such incarnation (Dworkin 1983a:
181-182).
A similar rationale was offered for suttee or widow burning, a custom

practiced in India for approximately 400 years until it was officially out¬
lawed in 1829. Suttee was a sacrificial ritual in which a widow climbed the
funeral pyre of her deceased husband and set herself or was set on fire.
Although the practice was supposed to be voluntary, records indicate that
extreme measures were taken to prevent escape in case the widow
changed her mind, such as “scaffolds constructed to tilt toward the fire
pit, piles designed so that exits were blocked and the roof collapsed on
the woman’s head, tying her, weighting her down with firewood and
bamboo poles. If all else failed and the woman escaped from the burning
pile, she was often dragged back by force, sometimes by her own son”
(Stein 1978:255). Since polygamy was also practiced and marriages be¬
tween child-brides and men of fifty or older were not uncommon, some
wives, still in their teens, were burnt alive with dead husbands they had
rarely seen since their wedding day (Daly 1983; Stein 1978).
It appears that most women did not have to be coerced into suttee,
especially in light of their alternatives. “Since their religion forbade re¬
marriage [of widows] and at the same time taught that the husband’s
death was the fault of the widow (because of her sins in a previous
incarnation if not in this one), everyone was free to despise and mistreat
her for the rest of her life” (Daly 1983:190). Religious law required that
unburnt widows live a life of extreme poverty, shaving their heads, wear¬
ing drab clothes, eating just one bland meal a day, performing the most
menial tasks, never sleeping on a bed, and never leaving their houses
except to go to the temple. Obviously, death might have seemed more
appealing to many. Certainly, relatives and in-laws preferred it. Since it
was widely believed that women were by nature lascivious, the widow was
viewed as a possible source of embarrassment to her family and in-laws
354 Chapter 9
\
who feared she would become sexually involved with other men and perhaps
even get pregnant. In addition, suttee ensured that she would make no
claim to her husband’s estate. Thus, the Indian widow had to decide
between a miserable life of poverty and harassment or an honorable but
excruciatingly painful death that elevated her status in the community:
The widow on her way to the pyre was the object (for once) of all public
attention. She distributed money and jewels to the crowd. Endowed with
the gift of prophecy and the power to curse and bless, she was immolated
amid great fanfare, with great veneration (Stein 1978:254).
For most, there was little choice.

Although, as we have noted, suttee was outlawed in the early 1800s,
there is evidence that the cultural view of widows has not changed much
in some regions of India. Daly (1983), for instance, reports that in some
areas widows are still expected to abide by the old religious laws (e.g.,
living in poverty and shaving their heads), and that surveys indicate that
a substantial portion of the population continues to approve of this
tradition.
Another custom that has generated considerable controversy in
recent years {^female circumcision. Female circumcision actually takes sev¬
eral forms, the mildest being Sunna, in which the hood of the clitoris is
cut analogous to the practice of male circumcision. The most extreme
form, infibulation, involves the removal of the clitoris, labia minora, and
most of the labia majora, after which the vagina is stitched closed save for
a tiny opening to allow for the passage of urine and menstrual blood. The
most common form, however, is excision whereby the clitoris as well as all
or part of the labia minora are removed (Lightfoot-Klein 1989; McLean
1980). Currently, this custom is practiced in about forty countries, primar¬
ily in East and West Africa, and in many of these societies, it is not
uncommon for as many as 90 to 98 percent of the female population to
"Another serious problem in contemporary India is doivery abuse. Although the

Indian government outlawed the custom of dowery in an effort to remedy this
problem, it remains widespread (Chapman 1990). The problem stems from the
traditional practice of a woman’s family agreeing to pay a man and his family a dowery
in the form of money and goods, so that the woman and the man may marry. A good
marriage—that is, one in which the woman marries a prosperous, or at least economi¬
cally secure man—often involves substantial dowery demands from his family, some¬
times in an amount beyond the means of the woman’s family, but which they agree
to pay anyway in order for the marriage to take place. Following the marriage, if the
dowery payments are not forthcoming, both the man and his family may begin to
harass the bride. The harassment may be verbal, but frequently it is also physical. The
abuse may drive the bride to suicide, but it is also the case that brides are murdered
by their husbands’ families, usually by being burned to death in a “cooking accident”
in which kerosene for the stove or some other flammable liquid “spills” on the bride
and her clothing is ignited. So widespread is the problem that it is estimated that a
dowery death occurs in India every twelve hours (Bumiller 1990).
have undergone one form of the operation (Ebomoyi 1987; Renzetti and
Curran 1986).
In the Western world, publicity regarding female circumcision has
triggered angry protests by feminists who have denounced the tradition
as oppressive and barbaric, and who have insisted that governments
immediately outlaw the practice (Walker and Parma 1993). Few African
governments have passed laws prohibiting the practice, but a number of
governments in Western Europe (e.g., France, Switzerland, Sweden, and
Great Britain) have outlawed it in response to the importation of the
practice into their countries by African immigrants. In October 1993, a
bill prohibiting the practice was introduced in the U.S. Congress (Simons
1993a).Despite these laws, however, France remains the only Western
nation to actually prosecute and punish violators (who are virtually all
women who are either the mothers of circumcised daughters or midwives
who have performed the circumcisions) (Simons 1993b).
Given the way the operation is usually done and the serious medical
problems that frequently result, the shock and indignation of Westerners
is understandable. More specifically, the circumcision is performed on
young girls—sometimes as infants, but usually between the ages of seven
and thirteen—by an elder village woman or traditional birth attendant
using various nonsurgical instruments such as a razor, a knife, or a piece
of broken glass. Typically, no anesthetics are available. Once the opera¬
tion is completed, dirt, ashes, herbs, or animal droppings may be applied
to the wound in the belief that they will stop the bleeding and aid in
healing. Not surprisingly, complications are common and include shock,
hemorrhage, septicemia, and tetanus (Lightfoot-Klein 1989; Ebomoyi
1987; McLean 1980). At the very least, those who have undergone the
procedure are unlikely to ever experience sexual pleasure; in fact, circum¬
cision frequently makes sexual intercourse quite painful.
A small, but growing group of African women has been working to
eliminate the practice in their own countries (Walker and Parma 1993;
Simons 1993b). Significantly, however, African women frequently have
been critical of their African and Western sisters for sensationalizing this
custom and for presenting it out of its cultural context (Graham 1986).
To understand their perspective, consider the reasons given for female
circumcision. For some, the custom is a religious obligation; for others, it
has an aesthetic purpose—that is, the clitoris, believed to be a masculine
organ in some cultures, is removed to ensure sexual differentiation and
to enhance a girl’s beauty and femininity by giving her a smooth and
clean skin surface (McLean 1980; Epelboin and Epelboin 1979). For most
1994, a Nigerian woman applied for asylum on the ground that if she is returned
to her native country, her two daughters, both U.S. citizens, would be forced by
relatives to undergo circumcision. The outcome of this case was unknown as of March
1994.
356 Chapter 9
women, though, the motivation to undergo circumcision, or to circum¬

cise one’s daughters, derives from attitudes about moral purity and fe¬
male sexuality. Among many practicing societies, there exists an elaborate
mythology which serves to buttress firmly entrenched beliefs about the
insatiable nature of female sexual desire. Circumcision, then, is a preven¬
tive measure taken to protect a girl from sexual temptations and thereby
preserve her marriageability. Consequently, although some writers have
argued that circumcision causes severe psychological trauma for a young
girl, others have pointed out that remaining uncircumcised may result in
far greater social and psychological damage. The uncircumcised are con¬
sidered “dirty” and unmarriageable, making them unfit to fulfill what are
considered in their societies to be women’s two most valued roles, wife
and mother (Renzetti and Curran 1986). As one Ghanian activist ex¬
plained, “To put it cynically, not to go through mutilation is to commit
economic suicide” (Graham 1986:18). No wonder, then, that the majority
of women in practicing societies state that they will carry on the tradition
with their daughters, although many are opting to have the operation
performed under more sterile conditions in a hospital (Lightfoot-Klein
1989; Ebomoyi 1987; Myers 1986).
In sum, female circumcision, like foot-binding and suttee, is a prac¬
tice of institutionalized violence against Wornen which many observers
have labeled criminal (Simons 1993a; Morgan and Steinem 1980; Hosken
1979; Russell and Van de Ven 1976). Yet efforts to outlaw it rarely have
been successful, and women themselves perpetuate this tradition. To
most Westerners this appears irrational, but what we must consider is
women’s status in practicing societies. Female circumcision is one of the
few means by which these women exercise power and achieve recogni¬
tion. It is hardly surprising that women would cling to one of their only
avenues of power and status, regardless of how damaging it may be. It may
be argued, in fact, that their behavior is no less rational than that of
Western women who very frequently seek harmful treatments or follow
unhealthy diets for the sake of “beauty” (see chapter 12).
If our goal, then, is the elimination of violence against women, laws
banning particular practices are unlikely to be effective without simulta¬
neous policies and programs to implement and ensure gender equality.
In the final analysis, violence against women, whatever its form, is a direct
outgrowth of the devaluation of women.
POWER, CRIME, AND JUSTICE
We have seen here that in societies that have accepted or condoned

violence against women, whatever its form—rape, pornography, footbind¬
ing, suttee, or infibulation—^women are viewed as innately inferior to men
and are deprived of valued resources. Indeed, women may even pardci-
pate in their own victimization as a means to exercise some power in their
lives and to acquire a higher status.
Powerlessness, we have also suggested, may help to explain crime
rates and the differential treatment of offenders by the criminal justice
system. It is the relatively powerless—young, poor, minority men and
women—^who are disproportionately represented in the official crime
statistics and who receive the harshest treatment within the criminal
justice system. They, too, are most likely to be victimized by crime.
We have emphasized in this chapter that the content of laws and the
way they are enforced have a lot to do with the values and interests of the
powerful. The vast majority of lawmakers and law enforcement personnel
are white men. In the next chapter, we will explore this issue further
through an examination of politics and government.
KEY TERMS
acquaintance rape an incident of sexual assault in which the victim knows or

is familiar with the assailant
chivalry hypothesis the belief that female offenders are afforded greater leni¬
ency before the law than their male counterparts
emancipation theory posits that female crime is increasing and/or becoming
more masculine in character as a result of the women’s liberation move¬
ment
sentencing disparity widely varying sentences imposed on offenders convicted
of similar crimes, usually based on irrelevant factors, such as the of¬
fender’s sex or race, or other inappropriate considerations
status offenses behavior considered illegal if engaged in by a juvenile, but le¬
gal if engaged in by an adult
SUGGESTED READINGS
Chesney-Lind, M., and R. G. Shelden 1992. Girls, Delinquency, and Juvenile Justice.
Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Herek, G. M., and K. T. Berrill (Eds.) 1992. Hate Crimes: Confronting Violence
against Lesbians and Gay Men. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Lightfoot-Klein, H. 1989. Prisoners of Ritual: An Odyssey into Female Genital Circum¬
cision in Africa. New York: Harrington Park Press.
Mann, C. R. 1993. Unequal Justice: A Question of Color. Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press.
Russell, D. E. H. (Ed.) 1993. Making Violence Sexy: Feminist Views on Pornography.
New York: Teachers College Press.
Sanday, P. R. 1990. Fraternity Gang Rape: Sex, Brotherhood, and Privilege on Campus.
New York: New York University Press.
Chapter
Gender, FoUtics, Government, and

the Military
Gendei] Politics, Government, and the Military 359
In the spring of 1776, Abigail Adams wrote to her husband John, “I long
to hear that you have declared an independency—and by the way in the
new Code of Laws which I suppose it will be necessary for you to make I
desire you would Remember the Ladies, and be more generous and
favourable to them than your ancestors.” But his response revealed that
the designers of the new republic had no intention of putting the sexes
on an equal political footing. “As to your extraordinary Code of Laws,”
John Adams wrote back to his wife, “I cannot but laugh. . . . Depend upon
it. We know better than to repeal our Masculine systems” (quoted in Rossi
1973:10-11).
That Adams’s sentiments were shared by his fellow revolutionaries is
clear from their declaration that all men are created equal, although, at
the same time, they considered some men (white property holders) more
equal than others (blacks. Native Americans, the propertyless). Of course,
it has been argued that the Founding Fathers used the masculine noun
in the generic sense, but the fact is that when the Constitution was
ratified, women lost rights instead of gaining them. For instance, prior to
ratification, women were permitted to vote in some areas, including
Massachusetts and New Jersey, a right that was lost in the former state in
1780 and in the latter in 1807 (Simon and Danziger 1991). As we will
learn in chapter 13, ratification of the Constitution did not enfranchise
women in the states; female citizens did not win the constitutional right
to vote until 1920.
In this chapter, we will focus on some of the similarities and differ¬
ences in women’s and men’s political roles and behavior historically
and in contemporary society, primarily in the United States, but also
elsewhere. As sociologists have repeatedly pointed out, when we speak
about politics, we are essentially speaking about power—the power to
distribute scarce resources, to institutionalize particular values, and to
legitimately use force or violence. To the extent that men and women
have different degrees of political power, they will have unequal input
into political decision making and, consequently, their interests and
experiences may be unequally represented in law and public policy.
What is the political power differential between the sexes today? We
will address that question on one level by assessing men’s and women’s
relative success in winning public office and securing political appoint¬
ments. In addition, we will examine the roles of men and women in
defense and national security by discussing the issue of gender and
military service. To begin our discussion, however, we will first take a
look at differences in men’s and women’s political attitudes and par¬
ticipation, or what has become known in government circles as the
gender gap.
360 Chapter 10
THE GENDER GAP: POLITICAL ATTITUDES

AND ACTIVITIES
There are few certainties for political candidates on election day, but
since women were granted full voting rights in 1920, there have been two
things they could always count on: fewer women than men would vote,
and those women that did vote would vote similarly to men. Between 1920
and 1960, men’s rate of voting exceeded women’s rate by a considerable
margin, although there was a gradual increase in women’s voting rates
over the four decades. During the 1960s, there was a sharp increase in
women’s voting rates and, by 1978, the margin of difference between
women’s and men’s voting rates was just about 2 percent. Lake and
Breglio (1992) attribute this change to the rise in women’s level of
educational attainment during this period as well as the rapid increase in
the number of women working outside the home. Nevertheless, though
more women were going to the polls during the 1960s and 1970s, their
voting behavior continued to parallel that of men.^
In the 1980 presidential election, however, two significant changes
occurred: more women than men cast ballots, and women voted signifi¬
cantly differently than men. Although 51' percent of the votes cast went
to Ronald Reagan, we see in Table 10.1 that he got just 47 percent of
women’s votes compared with 55 percent of men’s votes. This 8 percent¬
age-point gap between women’s and men’s votes was the largest gap
recorded since 1952 when such statistics began to be collected. (John
Anderson, the third candidate in the 1980 presidential election received
equal support from women and men, garnering just 7 percent of their
votes.)
Political analysts were uncertain as to whether such differences were
merely a fluke or represented a genuine shift in women’s and men’s
voting patterns. Subsequent elections confirmed the existence of what
has come to be known as the gender gap: the differences in voting
patterns of women and men, as well as the differences in their opinions
on key political issues. Again turning to Table 10.1, we see that in the 1984
presidential election, there also was a gender gap in voting, but it was
smaller than in 1980—6 percentage points. In 1988, following the spring
primaries, there was an unprecedented gender gap of 20 percent, with
significantly more women than men favoring Michael Dukakis over
George Bush. By November, however, Bush had successfully narrowed the
4t is important to note that much of the information available on women’s political

behavior and opinions dates only to the early 1950s. It was not until 1952 that
polltakers began to analyze political opinion data by sex. To gauge women’s political
activities and opinions, historians and political scientists have relied on other data
sources, such as the archives of women’s organizations.
Gender, Politics, Government, and the Military 361
rA3LE 10.1 The Gender Gap in Presidential Elections, 1952--1992
Election Candidate % Women Supporting % Men Supporting

Year Elected This Candidate This Candidate
1952 Eisenhower 58 53
1956 Eisenhower 61 55
1960 Kennedy 49 52
1964 Johnson 62 60
1968 Nixon 43 43
1972 Nixon 62 63
1976 Carter 50 50
1980 Reagan 47 55
1984 Reagan 56 62
1988 Bush 50 57
1992 Clinton 46 41
Sources: New York Times b November 1992:B9; CAWT 1987.
gap to just 7 percent, an issue we will examine shortly. Finally, in the 1992
presidential election, the gender gap remained and appeared not only in
differences between men’s and women’s support for Bill Clinton, but also
their support for the third candidate, Ross Perot. While women and men
supported Bush in relatively equal proportions (37 percent and 38 per¬
cent respectively), Clinton received 5 percent more of his votes from
women, and Perot received 4 percent more of his votes from men.
In considering the gender gap, particularly in the 1980, 1984 and
1988 presidential elections, one might ask why the Republican candidates
won, if more women than men were voting and more women than men
supported the Democratic candidate. Lake and Breglio (1992:199) ex¬
plain:
The gender gap represents an important change in our political system,

but has a direct impact on the outcome of an election only when the
differences between men’s and women’s perceptions, priorities, and
agendas are so pervasive and significant that they translate into a margin
of support for a particular candidate among voters of one sex that more
than offsets the margin of support the opposing candidate enjoys among
voters of the other sex.
While this has occurred in several U.S. Congressional elections since

1980, as well as a number of state senate and gubernatorial elections
during the same period, it has not occurred in presidential elections •
(Lake and Breglio 1992).
It is also the case that the gender gap is far more complex than it at
first appears to be. The gender gap involves more than voting behavior;
362 Chapter 10
\
there are particular perspectives on political issues that underlie individu¬
als’ votes. Research consistently shows that at the heart of the gender gap
are issues of economics, social welfare, foreign policy, and to a lesser
extent environment and public safety. Women, for example, feel—and
rightfully so—more economically vulnerable than men (see chapters 7
and 8). Women more than men express concern about health care (es¬
pecially long-term care), child care, education, poverty, homelessness,
and the protection of American jobs. In contrast, men more than women
express concern about the federal deficit, taxes, energy, defense, and
foreign policy. Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, women have
expressed greater pessimism about the economic condition of the coun¬
try and have showed greater favor toward increased government activity
in the form of programs to help families, even if such programs require
increased taxes (Lake and Breglio 1992). It has been argued, in fact, that
it was George Bush’s emphasis on “family issues,” education, improve¬
ments in child support collection, and economic empowerment for
women—in short, his promise of a “kinder and gentler nation”—that
helped him close what some have called the “gender canyon” between
himself and Dukakis during the 1988 campaign (Mueller 1991).
A strong and consistent gender gap also emerges with respect to
issues of war and peace. This difference in the political opinions of
women and men can be traced as far back as World War I. Women more
than men considered the entry of the United States into both world wars
to be mistakes and also voiced greater opposition to the Korean and
Vietnam Wars (Abzug 1984; Baxter and Lansing 1983). Similarly, in the
wake of the 1983 terrorist attack in Beirut that killed more than 200 U.S.
Marines, considerably more women (62 percent) than men (34 percent)
favored the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Lebanon (Abzug 1984). Fol¬
lowing the U.S. invasion of Grenada, Ronald Reagan’s popularity in¬
creased significantly, but only among men, 68 percent of whom approved
of the military action compared with only 45 percent of women (Raines
1983). In the last war in which the'U.S. was directly involved, the war in
the Persian Gulf, more women than men favored a negotiated settlement
over military action, and fewer women than men felt that the loss of
life—both military and civilian—was worth the victory (Lake and Breglio
1992; Dowd 1990).
However, while women favor peaceful solutions over military solu¬
tions to international conflicts and favor domestic social spending over
military spending, they express greater distrust of other nations than do
men and see current international relations as posing a greater risk for
the United States. This perspective carries over into issues of public safety,
with women more than men expressing concern about crime (Lake and
Breglio 1992; Mueller 1991; see also chapter 9). Although support for the
death penalty is high among both women and men—72 percent and 81
percent respectively in favor of the death penalty for persons convicted of

murder there is nevertheless a significant gender gap. Women are also
more likely than men to favor gun control laws (U.S. Department of
Justice 1993a).
Despite sex differences in these areas, on other topics men’s and
women s political opinions are more likely to converge. For example,
women and men share similar views on protecting the environment.
.Although more women than men express negative opinions about the use
of nuclear energ\’ and the safety of nuclear power plants, differences in
their views on these topics have narrowed in recent years. Interestingly,
women’s and men’s opinions on women’s rights issues are more similar
than one might predict, although there are important areas of diver¬
gence. One such area is abortion and reproductive freedom; while a
majority of both women and men support a woman’s right to an abortion
under at least some circumstances (see chapter 7), more women than
men report that the position of a political candidate on this issue would
affect their vote. This holds for both pro-choice and anti-abortion women
(Lake and Breglio 1992).
As we learned in chapter 7, however, public opinion regarding issues
such as abortion and reproductive freedom is complex, being influenced
by a wide variety of factors besides sex, including race, age, social class,
education, and employment status (see also chapter 13). We should be
cautious, therefore, in making comparisons between all women as a
group and all men as a group, for women and men are not homogeneous
categories and frequently there are greater differences among groups of
women than between women and men (Lake and Breglio 1992; Mueller
1991; Poole and Zeigler 1985). Looking at Table 10.2 on page 364, for
example, we can see that while more women than men supported Bill
Clinton in the 1992 presidential election, race was a more significant
factor. White women were evenly divided between Clinton and Bush, but
both black women and black men overwhelmingly supported Clinton.
Black women have increased their voting rates at a much faster pace than
black men and, since 1965, have been more likely than black men to vote
(Prestage 1991). Age also intersected with race and sex in this election,
but race appears to be one of the most significant factors, with black
women and men of all ages voting almost exclusively for Clinton.
Also highly significant in the 1992 presidential election, although it
does not appear in Table 10.2, was sexual orientation. For the first time
in U.S. history, lesbians and gay men were a visible and vocal political
constituency. Lesbian and gay political organizations carried out success¬
ful voter registration drives and raised millions of dollars in campaign
funds, not only for Bill Clinton, but also for U.S. Congressional and state
and local politicians whom they supported. It was estimated that between
four million and nine million lesbians and gay men voted in the 1992
364 Chapter 10
\
TAeLE 10.2 A Statistical Portrait of the 1992 Electorate_
Percent Who Voted for:
Voters Clinton Bush Perot
Men 41 38 21
Women 46 37 17
Whites 39 41 20
Blacks 82 11 7
Hispanic Americans 62 25 14
Asian Americans 29 55 16
White men 37 41 22
Wliite women 41 41 18
Black men 77 15 9
Black women 86 9 5
Men, 18-29 years old 38 36 26

Women, 18-29 years old 48 33 19
Men, 30-44 years old 39 38 22
Men, 45-59 years old 40 ' 40 20
Men, 60 and older 49 37 14
Women, 60 and older 51 39 10
Whites, 18-29 years old 38 38 24

Blacks, 18-29 years old 83 9 8
Wliites, 60 and older 47 40 13
Blacks, 60 and older 89 7 4
Men, less than high school 49 30 21

education
Women, less than high 58 27 15
school education
Men, high school graduates 43 34 23
Women, high school 43 38 19
graduates
Men w/some college 39 37 24
Women w/some college 43 38 18
Men, college graduates 40 41 19
Women, college graduates 49 35 16
Source: Netu York Times 5 November 1992:B9.

election. This unprecedented open involvement in mainstream national

politics by lesbian and gay men was prompted in large part by outrage
over the federal government’s response (or lack thereof) to the AIDS
crisis (see chapter 12) and the blatant homophobia expressed by speakers
such as Pat Robertson at the 1992 Republican National Convention.
While Mr. Bush distanced himself from the homosexual communities, Mr.
Clinton promised to increase federal funding for AIDS research and
treatment, to enact a national health insurance program, and to lift the
ban on homosexuals serving in the U.S. military—the latter an issue we
will examine later in the chapter. It is estimated that although about 40
percent of lesbian and gay men voted for George Bush in 1988, only about
10 percent supported him in 1992 and considerably more lesbians and
gay men voted in 1992 than in 1988, thus making a significant contribu¬
tion to Bill Clinton’s victory (Gross 1994; Schmalz 1992).
The gender gap has sometimes been explained as an expression of
fundamental—some would even argue inherent—differences between
the sexes: women’s greater focus on caring, community and connect¬
edness; men’s greater focus on competition and individual rights
(Lake and Breglio 1992). The differences among various groups of
women—for instance, the differences between full-time homemakers
and women in the labor force, between white women and women of
color, between lesbians and straight women—indicate that differences
in voting and political behavior reflect the life circumstances of differ¬
ent groups of citizens. Constituencies vote in response to candidates’
expressed positions on issues salient to their lives. Nevertheless, gen¬
der stereotypes die hard, and the notion that women’s political views
will be more moralistic or humanitarian than men’s views is also typically
applied to candidates seeking political office. We will turn our attention
to public officer holders shortly. First, however, it is important that we
consider whether the gender gap is found in political activities other than
voting.
There are many other forms of political activity besides voting.
According to political scientist Lester Millbrath (1965), there are basically
three levels of political activism. The lowest level, spectator activities,
include wearing campaign buttons or putting a bumper sticker on one’s
car as well as voting. In the middle are transitional activities, such as
writing to public officials, making campaign contributions, and attending
rallies or meetings. The highest level, what Millbrath calls gladiator activi¬
ties, involves working on a political campaign or taking an active role in
a political party as well as running for public office.
Contrary to the popular myth that men are more interested and
active in politics, there are actually few differences between the sexes in
their level of political activism. In general, both women and men are fairly
uninvolved in politics. Historically, women have been slightly more likely
366 Chapter 10
than men to engage in' the spectator activities of wearing buttons and
displaying bumper stickers, while men have been more involved in tran¬
sitional activities, especially contributing money to political campaigns
(Lynn 1984). To a large extent, this latter difference has been due to the
fact that women have had significantly less discretionary income than
men, but in recent years women’s campaign contributions have increased
substantially, another issue we will look at when we discuss the quest for
political office.
It has also been the case, however, that much of women’s transi¬
tional pdlitical activism has been overlooked or devalued by researchers.
Much of this activism has taken place at the grassroots community level
by working-class and minority women (Prestage 1991). Recent studies
also reveal that a substantial portion of this activism focuses on preserving
and expanding government-funded services that the members of these
communities depend on but that are threatened by budget cutbacks and
retrenchment. Thus, during the 1970s, working-class minority and white
women organized and led rent strikes, tenant unions, school boycotts,
petition drives, and the like, in efforts to save essential social ser\4ces,
welfare benefits, and health care programs that were being withdrawn at
the same time that the need for these services and programs was growing
due to increasing unemployment and economic dislocation (Bookman
and Morgen 1988; see also chapter 13). However, because the study of
political activism has largely been limited to “the narrow realm of elec¬
tions, candidates, and lobbying,” these significant and often successful
political challenges have gone unnoticed by most scholars (Bookman and
Morgen 1988:9).
Indeed, a good deal of scholarly political research has focused on
what Millbrath identified as the highest level of political activism, gladi¬
ator activities. Here the data are also mixed. Women, as Epstein
(1983:290) observes, have long served as political “footsoldiers”: canvass¬
ing for votes door-to-door or by phone, stuffing envelopes, distributing
campaign literature, and so on. They have been almost twice as likely as
men to work for a political party or a campaign (Lynn 1984). But al¬
though women are well represented among campaign staff and volun¬
teers, men have traditionally dominated party conventions. This is
noteworthy because:
it is at party conventions that formal decisions are made about the major
presidential candidates and the party platform, which spells out the
party’s positions on public issues. At conventions various factions come
together to discuss common problems and to indulge in the bargaining
and compromising that create the coalitions that comprise our national
parties. At conventions party leaders interact with rank-and-file members
to learn about concerns and potential troublespots in the coming
election. For many party workers, a convention is viewed as a reward for

years of faithful service (Lynn 1984:409-410).
As Table 10.3 shows, until 1972, neither major party had ever had more
than 17 percent female delegates at their national conventions. In 1972,
however, the Democrats instituted affirmative action regulations that
helped to dramatically increase the representation of female delegates to
40 percent. Although their numbers dropped in 1976, women finally
achieved equal representation at the 1980 Democratic National Conven¬
tion. In contrast, the Republicans, who have never adopted affirmative
TA5iE 10.3 Percentage of Female Delegatee to the National

Political Conventione, 1900-1992
Year Democrats* Republicans
1900 ** 4=4=4:
1904 ** 4=4=4=
1908 4=4=4=
1912 ** 4=4=4=
1916 1 4=4=4=
1920 6 3
1924 14 11
1928 10 6
1932 12 8
1936 15 6
1940 11 8
1944 11 10
1948 12 10
1952 12 11
1956 12 16
1960 11 15
1964 14 18
1968 13 17
1972 40 30
1976 34 31
1980 49 29
1984 50 44
1988 49 35
1992 50 41
*Percentage.s do not necessarily reflect the proportion of convention votes held

by female delegates; many Democratic delegates have held fractional votes.
**Less than 1 percent. Actual miinbers; 1900, 1; 1904, 0; 1908, 2; 1912, 2.
***Less than 1 percent. Actual numbers: 1900, 1; 1904, 1; 1908, 2; 1912, 2: 1916, 5.
Sources: Benedetto 1992; Boston GlobeH August 1992:19; CAWT 1988.

368 Chapter 10
action rules for their conventions, continue to have delegations with a

majority of male members.
GENDER AND PUBLIC OFFICE
Women and men, it seems, have a similar interest in politics if we use their
voting rates and political activism as indicators. Yet, historically, men have
had a virtual monopoly on public officeholding. Looking at Table 10.4,
we see that this has been the case in many other countries as well.
Although women appear to have fared better outside the United States
with women in countries as diverse as Poland, Ireland, Turkey, Bangla¬
desh, Norway, and Canada being elected in recent years to their nation’s
highest office—nowhere have they achieved representation in public
office equal to that of men (Lindsey 1987; Lovenduski 1986). As one
senior British politician observed, “A few women, with a lot of luck, have
achieved what they wanted. But women as a sex are still undervalued and
under-used” (quoted in Lovenduski 1986:3).
During the eighties, women in the United States made considerable
progress in the political arena at all levels—local, state, and federal al¬
though they remained grossly underrepresented, especially in the federal
government. Before we examine the numbers more closely, however, we
will discuss some of the factors that may account for the disparity between
the sexes in public officeholding.
TABLE 10.4 Percentage of Seats Held by Women in Main Legislative Assemblies,

Selected Countries, 1993
Seats in Main Legislative Assembly

Country Held by Women
Norway ^ 38.0%
Denmark 33.5
Sweden 32.6
Netherlands 27.3
Germany 21.6
Spain 15.7
United States
Senate 7.0
House of Representatives 11.0
Britain 9.1
Italy 8.1
France 6.1
Source: New York Times 31 December 1993:A4.

One of the ways the gender gap in officeholding has traditionally

been explained is in terms of boys’ and girls’ different socialization
experiences. This argument maintains that dispositions toward politics
are formed in childhood when boys are told they can grow up to be
president some day; the best girls can hope for is to grow up to marry a
man who may one day be a president. Consequently, children learn that
politics is a masculine actmty, and this is reflected in their adult behavior:
women rarely run for public office.
This explanation has some appeal because, as we found in chapter
4, early childhood socialization does have a powerful impact on the
development of sex-typed attitudes and behaviors. Recent research, how¬
ever, found no sex differences in the political views of school-age children
(Epstein 1983). Wliat is more, if differential socialization is at work, we
would expect to find less similarity in men’s and women’s interest in
politics than what we have seen here. Still, young women aspiring to
political careers have had far fewer role models than their male counter¬
parts. This is changing slowly, though, as more women each election year
enter political races; the 1984 vice presidential nomination of Geraldine
Ferraro is also reported to have had an impact (Engel 1985). Importantly,
female officeholders frequently state that they were inspired and assisted
in their political careers by other women. According to a report by the
Center for the American Woman and Politics (GAWP) (1984), about
33 percent of female state representatives and 25 percent of state sena¬
tors, county commissioners, and local council members had female role
models.
A second explanation is that women have greater difficulty meeting
the demands of public life given their domestic responsibilities. Like most
married employed women, female politicians who are married shoulder
a double work load; their spouses do not usually assume primary respon¬
sibility for housekeeping or childcare. It is not surprising, therefore, that
women typically enter politics at a later age than men (after their children
are grown), and that female political elites are more likely than men to
be single, widowed, or divorced (Mandel and Dodson 1992; Lynn 1984;
Sapiro 1982). In Europe, too, Lovenduski (1986) found that women in
public office are less often married and have fewer children than their
male colleagues. This does not mean that men do not experience conflict
between their political careers and their family lives. Recent research
indicates that they do and that the tension may be high. However, men
are more likely to pursue their political ambitions despite the conflicts,
whereas women frequently try to manage the conflict by delaying their
political careers or by giving up one role for the other at least tempo¬
rarily.
A third, although increasingly less frequent explanation is that men
outnumber women in elected office because most women lack the neces-
370 Chapter 10
\
sary qualifications and credentials. It is certainly true that most female
officeholders prior to World War II had inherited their seats and simply
served out the terms of their deceased husbands or fathers. Even if they
were elected, they usually had less education than the men, and because
the legal and business professions were largely closed to them, they came
to politics via different occupational backgrounds, typically teaching and
social work. In recent years, however, this has changed. Female office¬
holders, in fact, are more likely than male officeholders to have attended
college, and minority female officeholders are more likely than female
officeholders overall to have attended college (Natividad 1992). The
number of women in public office who are lawyers and businesspeople
has also risen, as has the number with previous elective experience (Clark
1991). Although female officeholders still are less likely than their male
colleagues to have held previous elective offices, they are more likely to
have had other types of political experience. For example, female office¬
holders are more likely than their male counterparts to have held pre¬
vious appointed government positions and to have worked on political
campaigns before running for office themselves (Witt et al. 1994; CAWP
1984; Carroll 1985). Consequently, the “qualifications and credentials
argument” is less tenable today than in the past.
A fourth argument is that women may be relatively scarce in public
office because of prejudice and discrimination against them that may
occur on two levels: among the electorate and within political office.
Studies of sexism among the electorate have yielded mixed results, al¬
though the preponderance of the evidence indicates that, in general,
sexism has declined in recent years (Clark 1991). In one recent national
opinion poll, for example, a majority of respondents (51 percent) agreed
that in a political race between a man and a woman with equal qualifica¬
tions and skills, they would vote for the woman because the United States
needs more women in high public office (41 percent disagreed and 8
percent were undecided). However, more women (57 percent) than men
(45 percent) agreed with the statement (Time/CNN poll 29 July 1992).
A key issue here is the perception by the electorate of the equality
of skills and qualifications between female and male candidates. Research
indicates that only rarely are they perceived as equal by voters. Instead,
gender stereotypes continue to dominate voters’ images of political can¬
didates, especially female candidates (Witt et al. 1994). It is still the case,
for example, that most voters perceive female candidates, regardless of
their individual qualifications and experience, to be better than male
candidates at handling social issues, such as education, homelessness,
welfare policy, and abortion. In contrast, voters are typically predisposed
to believing that male candidates are more capable than female candi¬
dates of handling such matters as defense, foreign policy, and large
budgets. Such stereotypes may work in favor of or against both male and
female candidates, depending on what types of issues happen to be most

pressing on public awareness during an election campaign (Kahn and
Goldenberg 1991).
Of course, the media play a major role in shaping voters’ percep¬
tions of political candidates. Recent research demonstrates that female
and male candidates are covered differently by the media (Mi?7W 19931;
see also chapter 6). For one thing, female candidates receive less media
coverage than do male candidates, regardless of their status as candidates
(e.g., challenger vs. incumbent) or the competitiveness of the race. This
may negatively impact on their chances for success, since it lowers voter
recognition of them as candidates as well as voter knowledge of the
candidates’ positions on specific issues (Kahn and Goldenberg 1991).
According to Kahn and Goldenberg (1991), media coverage of female
candidates tends to focus on the viability of their campaign (i.e., their
chances of winning given their resources), whereas media coverage of
male candidates focuses more on campaign issues. Finally, regardless of
the issues salient in a specific campaign, the media give greater coverage
to female candidates’ positions on what are typically considered female
issues (e.g., education, drugs), and greater coverage to male candidates’
positions on so-called male issues (e.g., national security, trade). This is
not insignificant, since research shows that candidates, be they male or
female, who receive female-typical media coverage are perceived as less
viable than candidates who receive male-typical media coverage. In short,
the media appear to disadvantage female political candidates (see also
Witt et al. 1994).
Prejudice and discrimination against female candidates can be
found at a second level as well: within the political parties. Sexism within
the political parties is well documented (Witt et al. 1994). The over¬
whelming majority of party leaders are men, many of whom still subscribe
to traditional gender stereotypes. Historically, for example, when faced
with women’s increasing demands for greater political roles, party leaders
sometimes responded by recruiting female candidates as sacrificial lambs,
that is, as candidates in races for which their party’s nominee had virtually
no chance of winning (Carroll 1985). Recent research, however, indicates
that this practice is now rare (Clark 1991) and that the more formidable
obstacles for female candidates are incumbency and access to campaign
funds.
Incumbents, that is those who hold political office and are seeking
another term, have several advantages during an election, not the least
of which are high public visibility, recognition among voters, and the
opportunity to campaign throughout their term in office. Because fewer
women are in office, when they do run it is more often as challengers
rather than as incumbents and, not surprisingly, they lose more fre¬
quently when running against an incumbent than for an open seat. In
372 Chapter 10
\
1992, for instance, it was expected that a large number of incumbents
would lose reelection bids for the U.S. Senate and House due, to a large
extent, to what appeared to be a strong voter sentiment for a change in
government and to voter anger over recent disclosures of abuses in office
such as the House banking scandal. Nevertheless, out of 376 incumbents
who won their primaries, 349 won reelection in November. Both female
and minority candidates are more likely to win if they are running for a
seat vacated because of a resignation or retirement. Consider, for in¬
stance, that of the 48 women who won election to the U.S. House of
Representatives in 1992, 24 were incumbents and 22 ran for open seats
(CAWP 1993c) .2
Incumbent or not, every political candidate needs money to run a
campaign, and the more prestigious the office they seek, the more money
they need. The significance of monetary power in elections is evident if
one considers that in 1988, candidates for the U.S. Senate each spent an
average of more than $3 million on their campaigns (Common Cause
1989). In the 1990 congressional elections, more than $225 million was
spent by candidates on television advertising alone {Nexu York Times 7
November 1990: B2). Historically, female and minority candidates have
had difficulty securing adequate fmanqial backing from their parties
(Witt et al. 1994; Mandel and Dodson 1992; Natividad 1992; Prestage
1991). According to Clark (1991), however, studies of party organizations
provide little evidence that party elites have been discriminating against
women by withholding funds during recent campaigns.
Still, campaign fundraising remains difficult for women and minor¬
ity candidates. One of the reasons for this is that women and minorities
typically have not been members of the interlocking professional, social,
and political networks through which campaign contributions are fre¬
quently generated, and as we have already noted, the constituencies they
often represent may have little discretionary income. In addition, women
and minorities also have had difficulty securing funds and other re¬
sources from the more than 4,00t) Political Action Committees (PACs)
operating in the United States. PACs are basically lobbying groups that
contribute to the campaigns of candidates whom they think will best
represent their interests in government. In the period 1989-1990 alone.
-Also in 1992, as we will see shortly, a record number of minority candidates won
elections to the U.S. Senate and House. According to political analysts, a major factor
in their success was a provision in the Voting Rights Act that required Congressional
redistricting in the states to more accurately reflect the racial composition of those
districts. In 1993, however, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 5-4 in the case of Shaw v.
Reno that such redistricting may be unconstitutional racial gerrymandering if in effect
it denies white voters equal protection of the law. It remains to be seen what effect
this ruling will have on redistricting nationwide and on the outcome of future
elections.
PACs contributed nearly $160 million to political candidates (U.S. De¬

partment of Commerce 1993). However, women and minority candidates
receive a relatively small percentage of these contributions. PAG repre¬
sentatives maintain that the reason for this is that these candidates fre¬
quently do not solicit them {Women’s Political Times 1986). This may be
true to some extent, given that many PACs are parts of large corporations
and professional associations in fields in which the percentage of women
and minorities has been small. Nevertheless, this explanation does not
account for the fact that even when contributions are solicited, those
contributions received tend to be smaller on average than those given to
white male candidates (Carroll 1985).
By the elections of 1992, there were clear indications that this di¬
mension of the political arena was changing dramatically. For example,
women’s organizations have successfully mobilized their memberships to
support female or feminist candidates. In addition, women, racial minori¬
ties, and lesbians and gay men have established formal and informal
political coalitions as well as their own PACs, such as the National Political
Congress of Black Women’s PAC and the Women’s Campaign Fund.
Among the most powerful of the women’s PACs is Emily’s List which by
the close of 1992 had 24,000 members (up from just 3,500 in 1990) and
contributions of $6.2 million for the year (Witt et al. 1994; Friedman
1993) . Similarly, the gay and lesbian Victory Fund raised $500,000 be¬
tween 1991 and 1993 to assist homosexual political candidates (Gross
1994) . Thus, despite the many barriers that continue to hinder the politi¬
cal candidacies of women, racial minorities, and homosexuals, a steadily
growing number are making successful bids for public office. Let’s discuss
now the relative numbers of women and men in specific elected and
appointed offices and, when possible, consider the question of race and
sexual orientation as well.
Women and Men in State and Local Government

Table 10.5 on page 374 shows the number of women holding selected
state and local offices. Clearly, men continue to dominate state and local
government as they constitute the vast majority of officeholders in every
category. Still, it is at the state level that women have made their greatest
political gains in recent years.
Most important perhaps is the increase in the number of female
state legislators. Although men continue to hold almost 80 percent of all
state legislative seats, the number of women legislators has increased
more than fivefold since 1969, from 4 to over 20 percent. However, it
should also be noted that the states with the highest numbers of female
legislators also have the lowest-paid legislators. For instance, in 1989,
one-third of New Hampshire’s state legislative seats were held by
374 Chapter 10
_\__
TABLE 10,5 Women in State and Local Government. Selected Offices, 1995
Number of
Women
Officeholders
Public Office
Governor 3
11 (of 42)
Lt. Governor
Secretary of State 11
Attorney General 8
State Treasurer 17
State Auditor or Comptroller 5
State Legislator 1,517 (20.4%)
County Governing Board Official (48 states) 1,653 (8.9%)*
Municipal Council Member (or equivalent) 4,081 (20.8%)
Mayor (cities with populations over 30,000; n = 973 cities) 175 (18.0%)
*Based on 1988 data.
Source: CAWP 1993a.
women, the highest proportion in the country, but New Hampshire’s

legislature also had the lowest pay scale in the country (Foderaro
1989).
It has been at the state level, too, that racial minorities have made
significant inroads. For example, in 1992 there were 139 Hispanic state
executives and legislators, up from 110 in 1983. In 1991, there were 451
black state legislators, an increase of 135 since 1981 (U.S. Department of
Commerce 1993). Unfortunately, minority women continue to be grossly
underrepresented in state legislatures. In 1993, minority women consti¬
tuted just 2.7 percent of state legislators and 13.3 percent of female state
legislators. Black women served in the legislatures of thirty-four states;
they were 2.0 percent of all state legislators, almost 10 percent of female
state legislators, and nearly 75 percent of minority female state legislators.
Hispanic women served in the legislatures of nine states, holding a total
of 27 seats and constituting 1.7 percent of female state legislators. Asian-
American women served in four states, held eighteen seats, and were 1.2
percent of female legislators. Native American women also served in four
states, but held just six seats total, thus constituting just 0.4 percent of
female legislators. Respectively, Hispanic, Asian-American and Native
American women are 0.36 percent, 0.24 percent, and 0.08 percent of all
\ state legislators nationwide (CAWP 1993b).
Despite the paucity of these numbers, it is the case that they signify
gains for racial minorities, especially for minority women, in state elective
office. Lesbians and gay men appear to have had less success at the state
level, but they have made inroads in local elections. Tony Miller became
the first openly gay candidate to run for statewide elective office in 1994,
seeking the position of California secretary of state. Nationwide, fewer
than 150 of the country’s 450,000 elected officials are openly gay or
lesbian (Gross 1994).
Women and Men in the Federal Government

Looking at Table 10.6, we see the number of women in the U.S. Congress
from 1949 to 1993. MTiat is most striking about the figures in this table is
not so much the small number of women—most of you would probably
predict that—but rather the lack of substantial improvement in these
numbers over a four-decade period. Until 1992, it could hardly be said
that there was a strong pattern of growth in the number of female elected
officials at the federal level, particularly in the Senate. Although women
TABLE 10.6 Women in the U.S. Congress, 1949--1993
Year Congress Senate House

1949 81st 1 9
1951 82nd 1 10
1953 83rd 3 12
1955 84th 1 17
1957 85th 1 15
1959 86th 2 17
1961 87th 2 18
1963 88th 2 12
1965 89th 2 11
1967 90th 1 11
1969 91st 1 10
1971 92nd 2 13
1973 93rd 0 16
1975 94th 0 19
1977 95th 2 20
1979 96th 1 16
1981 97th 2 21
1983 98th 2 22
1985 99th 2 23
1987 100th 2 24
1989 101st 2 28
1991 102nd 2 28
1993 103id 7 47*
*Washington, D.C.’s delegate to the House also is a woman, Eleanor Holmes Norton.
Source: CAWP 1993a; U.S. Department of Commerce 1993:277.
376 Chapter 10
have served in Congress since 1916 when Jeannette Rankin was elected
to the House of Representatives, 45 percent of Congresswomen prior to
1949 came to office through widow’s succession. We alluded to widow’s
succession earlier; it occurs when a congressman dies or becomes too ill
to serve and his wife is appointed or elected to finish his term. Women
who entered congressional office this way were sometimes reelected after
their husband’s term expired. For female senators especially, this has
been the primary means to office; it was not until 1983 (the 98th Con¬
gress) that two women served in the Senate simultaneously without either
of them having gotten their seats through widow’s succession (Lynn
1984).
In 1992, however, women made substantial progress in Congres¬
sional officeholding. A record number of women were nominated for
Congressional seats in 1992: 11 for the Senate, 5 of whom won; and 108
for the House of Representatives, 48 of whom won. It was in this election
that for the first time both Senatorial seats for a state were held by women:
Barbara Boxer and Diane Feinstein, both Democrats, were elected in
California.
Political analysts maintain that a number of factors contributed to
the much improved success rate of female candidates at the federal level.
One, as we have already noted, was an increase in the number of vacant
Congressional seats, thereby alleviating the incumbency problem for
many of the women who were seeking federal office for the first time. In
addition, however, anger among the general public—especially among
female voters—over the insensitive treatment of Anita Hill by an all-male
Senate Judiciary Committee during the Clarence Thomas confirmation
hearings has also been cited as a major factor. Also significant was many
female voters’ growing concern about the erosion of abortion rights.
Many had come to believe that a guarantee of reproductive freedom was
increasingly likely to be secured through Congressional action rather
than through the Supreme Court.
When race is taken into acct)unt, 1992 appears to be a watershed
election for women and men of color as well. Although minority women
and men, like white women, remain grossly underrepresented in both the
Senate and the House, a record number of women and men of color were
elected to Congress in 1992. Ben Nighthorse Campbell (D-CO), for ex¬
ample, became our country’s first Native American Senator, and Jay C.
Kim (R-CA) the first Korean-American House Representative. Carol
Moseley Braun (D-IL) became the first black female Senator; she is,
however, the only woman of color in the U.S. Senate. In the House of
Representatives, there are now nine African-American women, one Asian-
American woman, and three Hispanic-American women, including Nydia
Velazquez (D-NY) who is the first Puerto Rican-American congressional
representative. In all, women of color held just 2.6 percent of all seats in
the 103rd U.S. Congress (GAWP 1993b; Time Mamzine 16 November
1992:20-21).
Despite the strong gains made by women in the 1992 U.S. Congres¬
sional elections, it is important to keep in mind that if the present rate of
change continues, it will take almost 400 years more for women to achieve
parity with men in Congress. In addition, we must also consider that
although women are now coming to Congress in greater numbers, what
happens when they get there may continue to be problematic. Consider,
for example, that in 1993, there were only two women in high-ranking
leadership positions (Senator Barbara Mikulski, D-MD, assistant floor
leader; and Congresswoman Barbara Kennelly, D-CT, chief deputy major¬
ity whip) and none chairing standing congressional committees. In fact,
only six women have ever chaired standing congressional committees and
they all served before 1977. No woman has ever been majority or minority
leader in the Senate. In the House of Representatives, to which women
have had greater access than the Senate, no woman has served as House
Speaker. Only three women have chaired House select committees and,
of these, only one (Patricia Schroeder, D-CO) is currently serving in the
House. Instead, women most often hold secondary positions, and al¬
though they can now be found as members of most structured congres¬
sional groups (e.g., bipartisan caucuses), they still often find themselves
excluded from various unstructured groups (e.g., sporting groups).
These latter groups have not been insignificant, for as we saw in chapter
8, they may provide members with both an informal network and oppor¬
tunities to build alliances with colleagues (CAWP 1993c; Gertzog 1984).
One of the reasons for women’s exclusion from some positions and
committees is their lack of seniority. For example, most analysts agree that
it takes a minimum of five terms in the House before election or appoint¬
ment to a powerful position is likely; floor leaders typically serve eighteen
years before securing that spot (Gertzog 1984; Lynn 1984). Such findings,
then, underline the importance of female incumbents seeking and win¬
ning reelection to consecutive terms; otherwise, though more women
may fill Congressional seats, their junior status will continue to cause
them to be underrepresented in high-level positions.
We know that every chief executive of the United States has been
male, as has every vice president. There has never been a female candi¬
date for president from either of the major political parties, although
Senator Patricia Schroeder sought the Democratic nomination in 1988.
It was not until 1984 that a woman was nominated by a major party for
the office of vice president. However, in considering the executive branch
of the federal government, we must keep in mind that those elected to
office also have the privilege of making a variety of high-ranking appoint-
378 Chapter 10
\
ments. As one r eport emphasized, presidential appointments, particularly
for women and minorities, are critical for three mtyor reasons.
p 'j’pgy provide young professionals with valuable career experience.

2. They set an example for private employers to follow in hiring person-
nel.
3. They offer opportunities for input into policy making from individuals
with diverse backgrounds and interests (Pear 1987).
There are 290 top government positions for which the president
makes appointments, subject to senate confirmation. During Ronald Rea¬
gan’s administration, support for women’s rights was equivocal at best,
but it was to Mr. Reagan’s credit that he appointed women to about 40
posts which had never before been held by a female. These included
several in nontraditional or stereotypically masculine areas; for instance,
Elizabeth Dole to Secretary of Transportation, Constance Horner to
director of the Office of Personnel Management, and Heather Gradison
to chair the Interstate Commerce Commission. Nevertheless, Mr. Reagan
had almost 300 federal Judgeships to fill and appointed women to just 26
(8.7 percent) of them. This is of special significance because federal
judges have an impact on law beyond thy administration that appointed
them since their terms are for life. At the same time, the number of
minorities, male or female, receiving political appointments declined
significantly between 1980 and 1986, from 44 to just 20 positions (Pear
1987).
George Bush increased the number of presidential appointments to
a level higher than any of his predecessors in the White House; 19.4
percent of Mr. Bush’s appointments were women (a total of 185 women).
Still, there were few women in his senior staff: 9 women to 40 men.
Mr. Bush’s most highly acclaimed female and minority appointment was
that of Antonia Novello as Surgeon General. The 7 women who were
deputy assistants to the president, however, all worked in areas tradition¬
ally considered female fields. Bush, in fact, was described by those close
to him as “a guy’s guy” and his inner circle seemed to reflect this (Dowd
1991).
President Clinton has shown a firm commitment to increasing diver¬
sity in the federal government through his presidential appointments.
Although he was criticized during his first year in office for being too slow
in naming appointments, members of the White House staff argued that
this was due largely to President Clinton’s determination to carefully
scrutinize the lists of suggested appointees submitted by cabinet members
so as to insure diversity (Jehl 1993). Certainly, President Clinton’s early
appointments demonstrated this commitment. His cabinet includes three
African-American men, two Hispanic men, and three white women.
Mr. Clinton also appointed a woman of color, Jocelyn Elders, as Surgeon

General.^
Among the most important,appointments the President may make
are those to the U.S. Supreme Court, again because the impact of these
appointments stretch well beyond the president’s own administration,
given that the justices hold life terms. Ronald Reagan nominated the first
woman to the Supreme Court, Sandra Day O’Connor, in 1981. Histori¬
cally, the all-male Court had done much to uphold and little to remedy
sex discrimination. Well into the 1960s, the Justices’ decisions in sex
discrimination cases reflected the opinion of Chief Justice Waite who, in
the 1875 case of MinorHappersett, declared that women, like children, are
“a special category of citizens,” in need of both discipline and protection.
It was not until 1973 that the Court ruled that much of the discrimination
against women was nothing more than “romantic paternalism” that, “in
practical effect, put women not on a pedestal, but in a cage” {Frontieroy.
Richardson). Nevertheless, as we have discussed elsewhere, the Supreme
Court did not subsequently strike down all forms of sex discrimination.
With O’Connor’s appointment, many feminists were hopeful that a
woman on the Court would preserve the hard-won legal support of gen¬
der equality secured in earlier cases. However, O’Connor’s record in this
area has been mixed. Although typically she has supported equality in the
area of employment, her opinions with respect to affirmative action have
been uneven. In addition, she has not acted to protect women’s abortion
rights—indeed, in her opinion in Websterv. Reproductive Health Services, she
explicitly called on the Court to reconsider its ruling in Roe v. Wade.
George Bush made two appointments to the Supreme Court. In
1990, it was rumored that he would appoint Edith H. Jones to replace
®W9iile presidential appointments usually are the subject of political debate, several
of President Clinton’s nominations have drawn attention to gender-related and mi¬
nority issues. For example, before nominating Janet Reno for Attorney General,
Mr. Clinton had nominated first Zoe Baird and then Judge Kimba M. Wood. Both
women, however, eventually withdrew from the nominations when it was disclosed
that they had hired illegal aliens as nannies for their children and had failed to pay
Social Security and other taxes for these employees. The ensuing controversy focused
attention, if only briefly, on the issue of wages for illegal immigrants as well as on the
child care problems of working women (Martin 1993). Another controversial nomi¬
nation was that of Lani Guinier as head of the Civil Rights Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice. Guinier, an eminent black female attorney whose nomination
for the post was supported by more than 400 law professors as well as the deans of
twelve major law schools, was opposed by political conservatives because of her
writings on affirmative action and quotas (Garrow 1993). President Clinton eventu¬
ally withdrew her nomination and subsequently nominated a black man tor the
position, but the incident served to re-ignite the debates surrounding affirmative
action and voting rights.
380 Chapter 10
retiring Justice Williiini Brenucin, who hs-d been considered by msny to

be the leading liberal voice on the Court. Instead, Mr. Bush chose David
H. Souter, a white man. In 1991, Mr. Bush nominated Clarence Thomas,
a black man, to the Supreme Court. Justice Thomas’s appointment, how¬
ever, has been considered a victory for neither racial minorities nor
women, given his conservative record on affirmative action and the
charges of sexual harassment leveled against him by Professor Anita Hill
during his confirmation hearings.
In 1993, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, nominated by President Clinton,
became the second female justice on the U.S. Supreme Court. Justice
Ginsburg, who replaced retired Justice Byron R. White, has a strong
record in support of gender equality and in upholding abortion rights.
She is expected to be the deciding vote in many reproductive freedom,
affirmative action, civil rights, and gender equity cases which, in the
recent past, have badly divided the Court and produced 5-4 decisions
that frequently contracted rather than expanded the rights of women,
minorities, and homosexuals. In 1994, President Clinton nominated
Stephen G. Breyer, a white man whose lower court decisions were suppor¬
tive of civil rights and reproductive freedom, to replace Justice Harry
Blackmun on the Supreme Court.
In light of the records of Justice's O’Connor and Thomas on
women’s and minorities’ rights, we are reminded of an important point:
the presence of a white woman or a person of color in government posts
does not necessarily mean that women’s or minorities’ interests will be
consistently and fairly represented or that gender and racial equality will
always be promoted. As observers of British politics during Margaret
Thatcher’s administration noted, a female leader may oppose women’s
rights and gender equality while some male leaders ardently support
them. At the same time, most women in appointed government positions
do not have an institutional mandate to actively work on gender-related
issues, and even those who do must address them in the context of the
administration’s policy preferences (Boneparth and Stroper 1988). Still,
research indicates that women in elected offices usually do have a positive
impact on the passage of women’s rights legislation and are more likely
than male legislators to give top priority to issues of particular concern to
women (Mandel and Dodson 1992; Kelly et al. 1991). This finding is
supported not only by analyses of legislators’ activities while in office, but
also by surveys of legislators’ perceptions of the influence of female
officeholders. In one such survey, for instance, 85 percent of female
legislators and 74 percent of male legislators stated that the increased
presence of women in public office affects the extent to which legislators
consider how a particular bill will impact on women as a group (Mandel
and Dodson 1992).
According to Lovenduski (1986:243), it appears that “a certain ‘criti¬

cal mass of women must exist to enable the development of a group
identity and the resistance of socialization into male norms of behavior.”
This is also essential for breaking down gender stereotypes. However, the
more sex segregated an institution is, the more difficult this is to achieve,
as we will see next in our discussion of the military. National defense and
the military are important aspects of government and, therefore, deserve
our attention here.
WOMEN AND MEN IN THE MILITARY
We noted earlier that women tend to express greater opposition than

men to military intervention and, in general, they appear to be more
pacifistic. Clearly, this is not true for all women, nor has it ever been.
Historical and cross-cultural research shows, in fact, that women have
often supported militarism and have even engaged in combat and other
military activities. During the nineteenth century, for instance, in the
West African nation of Dahomey (now Benin), the king had an all-female
fighting force of between 4,000 and 10,000 soldiers as part of his standing
army (Sacks 1979). More recently, Soviet women during World War 11
assumed combat roles as machine gunners and snipers, fighting with men
in artillery and tank crews, and Israeli women fought in combat during
the 1930s and 1940s, although their combat roles were not officially
recognized (for other recent examples, see MacDonald 1992). In Decem¬
ber 1986, Denmark became the first NATO country to allow women to
join combat forces, with the exception of those on aircraft. Currently,
women in Canada, Britain, the Netherlands, and Norway may assume jobs
in every area of their country’s armed forces with few exceptions.^
In the United States, there are accounts of women who disguised
themselves as men and fought at the front beside their husbands or
brothers: Deborah Sampson, for instance, during the American Revolu¬
tion; Lucy Brewer in the War of 1812; and Loretta Velasquez in the Civil
War (Rustad 1982). Although women have been officially prohibited
from combat duty in the U.S. armed forces, they were employed during
Although Norway permits women in all military jobs, Britain prohibits their partici¬
pation in armored and infantry divisions, and the Netherlands and Canada do not
permit women to serve on submarines. Canada, however, plans to utilize submarines
in the future that have separate living quarters for women. With the exception of
Canada, each of these countries has far fewer women serving in its military than does
the United States; 1.7 percent in the Netherlands, 2.4 percent in Norway, 3.4 percent
in Denmark, 6.0 percent in Britain, and 10.9 percent in Canada, compared with 11.5
percent in the United States {New York Times 2 May 1993:4E).
382 Chapter 10
\
World War II in espionage and as saboteurs behind enemy lines. Accord¬
ing to one researcher:
The role of females was not trivial, and it certainly was in no way token.
Indeed, this female role subjected women to risks of death or torture
exactly parallel to those for males. . . . The meager evidence we have
from the performance of women in espionage and sabotage suggests that
women can be as brave and as coldly homicidal as men, whenever their
patriotism calls for it (Quester 1982:226, 229).
For the most part, however, these American women were an exceptional
few. War-making has been and, to a large extent, remains a male activity,
and the military a male-dominated institution. This is not to deny the
widespread involvement of men historically and in contemporary society
in anti-war movements and peace activities. Throughout U.S. history, men
have been pacifists and conscientious objectors, but as we noted earlier,
in general, men tend to be much more favorably disposed to military
solutions to international conflicts than women are, despite women’s
greater sense of distrust of other nations. As Cooke and Woollacott and
others (1993) argue, war and the military are gendered and their gender
is masculine; that which is feminine is dprided in the military and con¬
sciously eliminated.
In the United States, when women were first recruited for military
service during World War I, it was to a limited number of nursing and
clerical jobs that did not carry full military status and hence none of the
benefits to which male military personnel were entitled. During the
Second World War, the Women’s Army Corps (WAC) was established and
granted women full military status with benefits throughout the war and
for six months afterward. Other military corps for women were also
begun and included the Women’s Reserve of the Navy (WAVES) and the
Women’s Air Force Service Pilots (WASPS). Yet their roles were strictly
limited, and the War Department continued to adhere to a policy of
recruiting men, no matter how uneducated, unskilled, or incompetent,
before accepting women. Despite the fact that, especially as nurses, these
women frequently faced dangerous and life-threatening conditions in war
zones—some were wounded or killed—they were often derided by serv¬
icemen, civilians, and the press. Reporters seemed most interested in
what the women were wearing right down to whether they were issued
girdles, whereas the general public and servicemen typically viewed them
as whores or lesbians in search of partners (Rustad 1982).
Until the late 1960s, women served as a reserve army in the truest
sense for the military. Recruited as a cheap source of labor when man¬
power was low, they were dismissed as soon as men were available to
replace them. Shortly after World War II, for instance, 98 percent of the
Women’s Army Corps was discharged, but because women had not been
given the same civilian reemployment rights as men, they had greater
difficulty finding work, and many were forced to take jobs well below their
skill levels. For example, women who had been pilots during wartime
found at the war’s end that the only jobs they could obtain in the airline
industry was as flight attendants or typists (Rustad 1982). In addition, as
Willentz (1991) has observed, the Veterans Administration has been (and
remains) a system established by men for men, with the needs of female
veterans largely overlooked (see also Palmer 1993).
At the same time, women who joined the military had to meet
higher enlistment standards than men; however, they were given fewer
privileges and career opportunities and were subject to stricter regula¬
tions. For example, the 1948 Women’s Armed Services Integration Act,
while establishing a permanent place for women in the military, reserved
98 percent of the positions for men and placed a cap on the term of
service and number of women who could be promoted to the rank of full
colonel or nacy captain: one. No woman could become a general or an
admiral. As part of their training, women were instructed in how to
maintain a “ladylike” appearance, how to apply makeup, and how to get
in and out of cars in their tight-fitting uniform skirts. Unlike male military
personnel, they had to remain childless—pregnancy was grounds for
discharge—and, if married, they had to prove that they were their hus¬
bands’ primary source of financial support in order to receive depend¬
ents’ benefits (Stiehm 1985).
In the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, a series of events took
place that greatly expanded both the number and the roles of female
military personnel. First, in 1967, Congress passed Public Law 90-30,
which removed the limits on the number of enlisted women and the
number of promotions for women officers. In addition, the women’s
movement was actively promoting the equal integration of women into all
areas of life and, with the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment by
Congress in 1972, many thought that this would extend to female military
personnel as well. Also in 1972, congressional hearings were held on the
role of women in the military, and the report that followed encouraged the
Defense Department to recruit and utilize women on a more equal basis
with men. In 1973, the military draft was replaced by the all-volunteer
Force, causing worried military planners to turn to the recruitment of
women as a means to keep enlistments up. Adding to this were several
court cases, such as Frontierow. Richardson (1973), in which the Supreme
Court, in fairly strong language that we have already quoted, overturned
the military’s policy of awarding dependents’ benefits to female person¬
nel using different standards from those applied to male personnel. Later
in a federal court, the navy’s policy of barring women from sea duty was
also struck down {Owens Brown, 1978). By 1976, ROTC was accepting
women, as were the military academies, and air force women joined those
384 Chapter 10
\
in the army and navy in having flight schools open to them. Perhaps the
most important change, though, occurred one year earlier in 1975 when
the Defense Department lifted its ban on parenting for female personnel
and made discharge for pregnancy available on a voluntary basis (Stiehm
1985).
In light of this dramatic turn of events, it is hardly surprising that
the number of women who entered the military rose substantially during
the 1970s. Between 1972 and 1976, the number of military women tri¬
pled; by 1980, it had increased almost fivefold. Most of the increase
occurred in the enlisted ranks which, by 1980, accounted for 87 percent
of female military personnel. However, like most men who enlisted, these
women rarely stayed for more than one tour of duty and, in 1980, there
were actually fewer women in the higher enlisted ranks (E-8 and above)
than in 1972 (Stiehm 1985).
During the Carter administration, there appeared to be a strong
commitment to recruit women for the military, and the president even
favored requiring women to register for the military draft when registra¬
tion was reinstated. Interestingly, despite Ronald Reagan’s more “hawk¬
ish” attitudes and his support of military buildup, he took a more
conservative stance toward women in the, military and, shortly after his
election, the Defense Department scaled down their recruitment of fe¬
male enlistees (Quester 1982).
Nevertheless, looking at Table 10.7 we find that the number of
women in the military increased with the number of men during the
1980s. Today, women make up 11.5 percent of the armed forces. We also
see here that the number of minority women in the military has increased
somewhat, at least between 1982 and 1985, the latest years for which data
on race are available. As Enloe (1987:533) points out, “It may well be that
the militarization of American society in the 1980s is increasing the
vulnerability of precisely those women who are most precariously posi¬
tioned in the economic system, enhancing the appeal of the military’s
offers of shelter, health benefits for children, and a steady income.” Given
the exceptionally high unemployment rates of young minority men, we
might expect Enloe’s argument to apply to them as well, but as we see in
Table 10.7, minority male enlistments decreased between 1982 and 1985.
There were charges of racism in the military, however, when it was re¬
ported in January 1991 that, although one of eight Americans is black,
one of four U.S. troops serving in the Persian Gulf was black. African
Americans compose 11.3 percent of the civilian population over the age
of sixteen, but at the outbreak of the war, they were 20.5 percent of
military personnel on active duty and 24.6 percent of troops in the
Persian Gulf (Wilkerson 1991a).
In recent years, until 1994, the U.S. military utilized what was called
the risk rule to determine the military jobs from which women would be
TABLE 10.7 Men and Women on Active Military Puty, by Race, 1982—1990
(in thousands)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1990*

Total 2,096.4 2,112.1 2,123.4 2,137.4 2,043.7
Men 1,908.1 1,915.9 1,922.6 1,928.0 1,816.7
Officers 267.1 273.7 274.9 278.8 262.4
WTiite 237.5 245.7 248.2 251.4 n.a.
Black 13.7 14.4 15.3 16.1 n.a.
Hispanic 3.5 3.7 3.9 4.2 n.a.
Enlisted 1,641.0 1,642.3 1,647.6 1,649.2 1,554.3
Wliite 1,094.8 1,164.2 1,177.7 1,181.1 n.a.
Black 351.7 341.4 334.5 331.7 n.a.
Hispanic 67.6 67.8 66.5 66.3 n.a.
Women 188.5 196.1 200.8 209.4 227.0
Officers 25.3 27.0 28.7 30.3 34.2
MTite 20.9 21.9 23.6 24.9 n.a.
Black 2.8 3.2 3.5 3.7 n.a.
Hispanic .4 .5 .5 .5 n.a.
Enlisted 163.2 169.1 172.2 179.0 192.8
WTiite 106.7 110.5 11.6 173.1 n.a.
Black 45.9 50.1 49.8 53.1 n.a.
Hispanic 5.2 5.7 5.4 5.7 n.a.
*The enlisted category for this year includes cadets and midshipmen.
Sources: U.S. Department of Defense 1990:7, 16; U.S. Department of Commerce 1987:327.
barred. For the most part, these were ground combat and combat support
jobs that entailed a substantial risk of being killed in action or captured
as a prisoner of war, but since these jobs represent only a small proportion
of all military jobs, about 95 percent of military posts have been open to
women (Lamar 1988).^ Still, the exclusion of women from combat roles
has had important consequences for female military personnel, since
such positions command substantially higher salaries on average than
support positions do. They are also critical for promotion to the highest
military ranks, which helps to explain why women have been concen¬
trated at the bottom and middle ranks (Lamar 1988; Enloe 1987). In fact,
a 1989 report to Congress from the General Accounting Office stated that
®In 1994, it was reported that about 200 women in the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) were preparing a class-action lawsuit against the agency, charging that they are
systematically denied access to high-level positions as covert operatives in the agency’s
Directorate of Operations. The positions command high salaries and significant
power (Weiner 1994).
386 Chapter 10
combat exclusion constituted women s greatest impediment in achieving

promotions (Sciolino 1990).
Many recent analysts have argued that the difference between many
combat roles and combat support roles is more a matter of semantics than
a reflection of the actual danger attached to the positions. Women, for
example, were not permitted to fly combat aircraft, but they regularly
piloted the tanker aircraft that refuel fighters, making them targets for
enemy fire (Lamar 1988:27). Indeed, female pilots engaged in aerial
refueling operations during the U.S. raid on Libya in 1986. Women also
actively participated in the U.S. invasion of Panama and, for the first time,
a female army captain commanded U.S. soldiers in combat. One military
official who reviewed the attack led by Capt. Linda Bray against Panama¬
nian Defense Forces was quoted as saying that, “What has been demon¬
strated is the ability of women to lead, for men and women to work
together as a team without distractions, and for women to react in an
aggressive manner” (quoted in Gordon 1990:A12). In 1990 and 1991,
women accounted for more than 10 percent of the military troops de¬
ployed in the Persian Gulf crisis. Ironically, in this last instance, U.S.
female military personnel risked their lives (five, in fact, were killed and
two were taken prisoners of war) in defense of a country in which women
are afforded few civil rights—where, in' fact, they are still considered
men’s property.
In 1992, a government panel composed of both military personnel
and civilians issued a report in which it endorsed (by a narrow margin of
8-7 votes) the continuation of the ban on female military personnel
flying combat missions and engaging in ground combat, but in which it
also recommended that women be permitted to serve on combat ships,
with the exceptions of submarines and amphibious vessels (Presidential
Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces 1992).
In 1993, then Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, on behalf of the Clinton
administration, asked Congress to lift the ban on military women serving
on warships, but also issued a directive to the armed services which
ordered them to permit women to fly aircraft in combat. In early 1994,
Mr. Aspin replaced the risk rule with a new standard that bars women
from ground combat positions “only if troops in those jobs have a high
probability of fighting enemy forces in close combat under hostile fire
near or at the front lines” (Schmitt 1994a:A22). Despite several excep¬
tions—including the prohibitions of women from serving in units where
the cost of renovations to accommodate them would be prohibitively
expensive and in support jobs that operate and remain with direct
ground combat troops—the new policy is expected to open between
15,000 and 20,000 new military positions to women. In February, 1994,
both the Air Force and the Navy announced that they had female pilots
who were combat-ready.
Although many within the military and among the general public
have praised the Defense Department’s greater openness to women,
other observers caution that simply permitting women to hold more
military jobs does nothing to address the rampant sexism that continues
to plague the military (see also Box 10.1 on pages 388-390). One of the
most serious manifestations of this problem is widespread sexual harass¬
ment of female military personnel. The findings of a major study con¬
ducted by the Pentagon and issued in 1990, for example, showed that 64
percent of female military personnel and 17 percent of male military
personnel out of more than 20,000 surveyed had experienced some form
of sexual harassment, ranging from teasing to sexual assault, in the pre¬
vious year from someone with whom they work (Schmitt 1990; see also
Schmitt 1992). In 1994, female military personnel detailed these experi¬
ences in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, and
stated that when they reported the harassment to military authorities,
they were the ones who were punished (e.g., transferred to dead-end
jobs) and ostracized (Schmitt 1994b). The problem of sexual harassment
in the military, however, is most vividly illustrated by the recent Tailhook
scandal in the Navy. According to the report issued by official investiga¬
tors, at least 175 members of the Tailhook Association, an organization of
Navy pilots, were involved in incidents ranging from verbal harassment to
sexual assault at their 1991 convention in Las Vegas, Nevada. More impor¬
tantly, the report argues that the current Tailhook scandal is not an
isolated problem, but rather that such abuses had occurred at previous
conventions and were condoned by the Navy’s civilian and military lead¬
ers (Gordon 1993). The Tailhook scandal forced the resignation of a Navy
Secretary and the retirement of two admirals. The Pentagon has censured
admirals and taken milder administrative action against thirty additional
senior officers for their failure of leadership at the 1991 convention.
However, apart from the Navy severing all official ties to the Tailhook
Association (which continues to hold annual conventions), and giving
its personnel some sensitivity training and a handbook on preventing
and dealing with sexual harassment, it does not appear that many steps
have been taken to address the long-term problem of sexual harassment
throughout the military.
It has been argued that “the changing nature of warfare, which is
based on technology rather than brute force, does not justify the exclu¬
sion of women” (Rustad 1982:230), and recent opinion polls show that a
majority of the general public thinks that women should not be barred
from combat (The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research 1992). But
in light of incidents such as the Tailhook scandal and given the onerous
tasks that military personnel are often called upon to perform, especially
during wartime, the question remains, should women really want to fully
participate with men in all aspects of the military, including waging war?
388 Chapter 7 0
30X 10.1 Homoeexuals in the U.S. Military
During his presidential campaign, Bill Clinton promised to lift the ban on ho¬
mosexuals serving in the military—a promise that won him the support of gay
and lesbian rights groups, but unleashed a furious debate among politicians,
military personnel, and the heterosexual general public. According to most
opinion polls, members of the general public when surveyed were almost
evenly split over the issue of homosexuals serving in the military; one 1992 Gal¬
lup poll, for instance, showed 49 percent in favor, 45 percent against, and 6 per¬
cent undecided (The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research 1992).
Members of Congress were also divided over the issue, but military leaders, es¬
pecially those in the highest ranks of the armed services, were almost unani¬
mously opposed to lifting the ban. What eventually emerged from the
controversy was a political compromise between the Clinton administration.
Congress, and the Pentagon, but which differs remarkably little from the policy
that was in place prior to Mr. Clinton’s election.
The new policy, which went into effect February 5, 1994, has been re¬
ferred to as the “don’t ask, don’t tell, don’t pursue” policy. Basically, it permits
lesbians and gay men to serve in the military as long as they are not open
about their sexual orientation and do not engage in homosexual acts. A homo¬
sexual act is defined broadly as human contact to satisfy sexual desires between
members of the same sex as well as any bodily contact that a reasonable person
would see as demonstrating a propensity towards homosexual behavior (e.g.,
holding hands with a person of the same sex). Consequently, men and women
who join the military will no longer be asked if they are homosexuals, nor will
they be discharged from the military if they admit to being a homosexual. How¬
ever, such an admission would constitute a sufficient basis on which to begin in¬
vestigating an individual’s behavior to determine if he or she also engages in
homosexual acts.
The confusing and often broad wording of the new policy is one reason
for concern among individuals and groups in favor of lifting the ban on homo¬
sexuals serving in the military, especially gay and lesbian rights groups, but
what is more outrageous to most is President Clinton’s apparent betrayal of his
campaign promise. If one compares the new policy with the old one, it is not
difficult to understand this perception. The old policy, directive No. 1332.14,
prohibited “persons who engaged in homosexual conduct,” or who “demon¬
strate a propensity” to do so, from military service. Under this policy, military
officials conducted aggressive investigations of individuals suspected of being
homosexual. The suspects were frequently harassed, subjected to humiliating
interrogations, and coerced into naming others in the military who might be
homosexual. As Shilts (1993) has documented, these investigations can be bet¬
ter characterized as persecutions which resulted in about 1,400 women and
men being discharged annually from military service_ without the benefit of ju¬
dicial proceedings. Many of these women and men had outstanding service
records and were decorated veterans.
Although it has been argued by members of the Clinton administration
and Congress that the new policy will prevent the military from launching such
30X 10.1 Continued
aggressive, often arbitrary investigations to ferret out homosexuals, it is clear

the policy is not significantly different from directive No. 1332.14. What
may be less clear, however, is why the resistance to homosexuals serving
in the military remains so strong, especially among heterosexual military
leaders.
According to the leaders themselves, homosexuals should be banned
from military service because they adversely affect the ability of the armed
forces to maintain discipline, good order, and morale. In addition, it is con¬
tended that they disrupt the system of rank and command, discourage hetero¬
sexuals from enlisting and remaining in the military, and endanger national
security because they may be blackmailed into disclosing military secrets (Wells-
Petry 1993). In examining these objections more closely, however, there does
not appear to be much data to support them. In fact, studies commissioned by
the Pentagon itself—one as early as 1956—have uncovered no evidence that
indicates that homosexuals disrupt the military. In fact, these studies have
shown that in terms of performance, there is no basis for barring homo¬
sexuals from military service (Shilts 1993). Recent testimony before the Senate
Armed Services Committee also indicates that in other countries where homo¬
sexuals are permitted to serve in the military, including Denmark the Nether¬
lands, Canada and Australia, there have been no morale or recruitment
problems.
There are those who have expressed concern that heterosexual women
and men in the military might be sexually harassed by lesbian and gay person¬
nel. Two recent incidents in which gay military personnel sexually assaulted
other male soldiers are often cited in support of this fear (see Rohter 1993).
However, given the high incidence of hate crimes committed by heterosexual
military personnel against gays and lesbians (see, for example, Shilts 1993;
Sterngold 1993), it seems more likely that homosexuals in the military are at
greater risk of harassment or assault at the hands of heterosexual soldiers and
sailors than vice versa.
The concern with sexual morality and sexual assault that has been in¬
jected into the debate about homosexuals serving in the military at first ap¬
pears puzzling given the numerous reports of widespread sexual harassment
and abuse of female military personnel by military men, including the 1991
Navy Tailhook scandal. This is less of a paradox, however, when one considers
our earlier points that the military is gendered, its gender is masculine, and re¬
inforcement of the military’s ideology of masculinity requires that the feminine
be extinguished. Official denunciations of homosexuality serve these purposes;
so does the sexual harassment of women. The common use of homosexual epi¬
thets by drill sergeants when training new recruits is a further example (Enloe
1993; Shilts 1993). A primary component of the military’s ideology of masculin¬
ity is that to be a military man, one cannot be homosexual. When this ideology
is threatened—such as when heterosexual women enter the military in large
numbers or assume jobs previously reserved for men only, or when gay men
and lesbians are permitted into the military—reactionary behaviors, including
hate crimes and sexual harassment, are likely to increase. This theory also
390 Chapter 10
30X 10.1 Continued
helps to account for the fact that although male and female homosexual mili¬
tary personnel have been subjected to homophobic harassment, Pentagon data
show that lesbians have been discharged at a rate almost ten times higher than
that of gay men (Robson 1992). As Shilts (1993:418) argues, “All women suf¬
fered from the discrimination and harassment meted out by confused and inse¬
cure men, but no group suffered as much as lesbians, because no group so
embodied [heterosexual] men’s fears.”
This question spotlights a feminist dilemma concerning women’s and

men’s involvement in the military. As Rustad (1982:5) phrased it, “Does
the inclusion of women in martial roles mean greater opportunities or
does it mean only that women will have the same rights as males to
perform strenuous, dangerous, and obnoxious tasks?” There are those
who maintain that if women want full equality with men, then they must
accept the fact that that status entails obligations, including defending
their country, as well as privileges. Others concur that this may be the only
way for women to prove that they deserve to be equal with men. Oppo¬
nents of these views emphasize, in contrast, that feminism’s goal is not to
turn women into men, but rather to establish a new value system in which
nurturing instead of aggression is rewarded for both women and men. As
political scientist Cynthia Enloe (1993) argues, an increase in the number
of women in the military should not be viewed as a feminist victory.
Women in the military are pressured to fit in, to become “one of the
boys,” which in turn legitimates rather than changes the masculinization
of the military.
Although it is unlikely that this debate will be settled soon, there are
at least two important points that should be kept in mind. The first is that
there are some women who wish io participate on an equal footing with
men in the military, just as there are men who would welcome the combat
exemption now afforded to women. Inasmuch as feminism encourages
individuals to exercise control over their lives, one feminist approach to
the dilemma is to lobby the government to allow both women and men
the right to choose whether they will serve in the military as well as in
what capacity they wish to serve.
At the same time, however, feminism does not mean adherence to
total relativism. That is, feminists do not need to see every life choice as
positive or beneficial simply because some individuals favor it. It is possi¬
ble to oppose militarism, but also hold that while the military estab¬
lishment remains a central institution in our society, those women and
men who participate in it should have equal roles. While we work to
change the masculinization of the military, to end mandatory registration

for military service, and to prevent military solutions to international
conflicts, we should not make a choice “between our daughters and our
sons,” a choice that “robs women as well as men. In the long and short
run, it injures us all” (quoted in Rustad 1982:4).
THE POLITICS OF GENDER
The purpose of this chapter was to examine the different political roles
and attitudes of men and women primarily in the United States, but in
other parts of the world too. We have seen that women have been ne¬
glected in most discussions of government and politics. Denied the right
to vote until 1920 and denied equal protection of the laws until the 1970s,
American women have long been excluded from the practice of politics
on the grounds that they were too stupid, too frail, too emotional, and
too irrational.
As we have learned in this chapter, this situation is finally beginning
to change. Once it was documented that women are as interested and
active in politics as men are and, more significantly, that they are more
inclined than men to vote, political analysts and campaign strategists began
to sit up and take notice of female constituents and candidates. Differ¬
ences in the political opinions of men and women received more careful
study, and a gender gap on certain issues—economics, social welfare, and
foreign policy, in particular—^was revealed. Currently, more women are
running for and being elected to public office, and more are obtaining
political appointments, than ever before. Along with white heterosexual
women, women and men of color as well as lesbians and gay men are
increasing their numbers in public officeholding and making themselves
known as powerful political constituencies. Nevertheless, the percentage
of women in general in government decision-making posts and in the
military remains small. Even more underrepresented in government are
women and men of color and lesbians and gay men. Indeed, it could take
several centuries longer for parity among these groups to be achieved.
Historically, the exclusion of women as well as other oppressed
groups from elected or appointed political and military leadership roles
was Justified on the ground of Divine will—that it was part of God s plan,
in other words, and not “in the nature of things” for members of these
groups to have authority over white, heterosexual men. Indeed, in the
United States, despite the constitutionally established separation of
church and state, sociologists have long recognized that religion and
politics are highly interactive. In this chapter we have examined the role
of government in perpetuating and often justifying inequality. In the next
chapter, we will consider the church’s role.
392 Chapter 10
KEY TERMS
gender gap differences between the voting patterns and political opinions of
men and those of women
gladiator activities the highest level of political activism in Millbrath s typol¬
ogy; include working on a political campaign, taking an active role in a
political party, or running for public office
spectator activities the lowest level of political activism in Millbrath s typology;
include voting, wearing a campaign button, or displaying a political
bumper sticker
transitional activities the mid-range of political activism in Millbrath’s typol¬
ogy; include writing to public officials, making campaign contributions,
and attending rallies or political meetings
SUGGESTED READINGS
Bookman, A., and S. Morgan (Eds.) 1988. Women and the Politics of Empowerment.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Enloe, C. 1993. The Morning After. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Shilts, R. 1993. Conduct Unbecoming: Gays and Lesbians in the Military. New York: St.
Martin’s Press.
Witt, L., K. M. Paget, and G. Matthews 1994. Running as a Woman: Gender and
Power in American Politics. New York: Free Press.
In addition, the Center for the American Women and Politics (CAWP), National
Information Bank on Women in Public Office (NIB), of the Eagleton Institute of
Politics at Rutgers University (New Brunswick, NJ 08901), has available numerous
fact sheets and other publications on gender-related issues in politics. The phone
number of the Center is 201-828-2210.
\
Chapter
Gender and Spirituality

394 Chapter 11
\
There is no doubt that religion or religious teachings play an important
part in most people’s lives. Consider, for example, that in the United
States alone, there are currently more than 1,300 different religious
denominations, sects, and cults; 65 percent of the population are mem¬
bers of a church or synagogue, and over 90 percent profess beliefs in a
personal God (Princeton Religious Research Center 1992; Robertson
1987). Western religious beliefs differ significantly from those held by
people in other parts of the world, but regardless of the specific content
of religious teachings, religion appears to be a cultural universal:
Some form of religion has existed in every society that we know of.
Religious beliefs and practices are so ancient that they can be traced into
prehistory, perhaps as far back as 100,000 years ago. Even the primitive
Neanderthal people of that time, it seems, had some concept of a
supernatural realm that lay beyond everyday reality (Robertson 1987:397).
Why is religion so appealing? The answer lies in the fact that all
religions, despite the tremendous variation among them, respond to
particular human needs. First, virtually everyone seeks to understand the
purpose of their existence as well as events in their lives and environments
that seem unexplainable. Religion offers some answers to these puzzles,
thus giving meaning to human existence and easing somewhat the psy¬
chological discomfort caused by life’s uncertainties. Second, religion pro¬
vides its followers with a sense of belonging, for it is not usually practiced
alone, but rather, as the social theorist Emile Durkheim put it, in a
“community of believers.” And finally, religion lends order to social life
by imposing on its adherents a set of behavioral standards. These include
both prescriptions and proscriptions for how the faithful are to conduct
themselves and relate to others. Importantly, however, religions typically
establish different rules and often different rituals for men and women,
and it is upon these differences that we will focus in this chapter.
Obviously, given the sheer number of religions currently in practice,
it is impossible for us to examine the gendered teachings of them all.
Instead, we will limit our discussion to what many consider the major
religious traditions in the world today: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.
Throughout this discussion we will find that historically, despite women’s
often greater religious devotion, the major religious traditions have been
overwhelmingly patriarchal, according men higher spiritual status and
privileges and frequently legitimating the subordination of women. But
although religion has contributed to the oppression of women and other
minorities, religious principles have also inspired many to work for social
change as well as spiritual liberation. Therefore, this chapter would not
be complete without a look at the efforts of both religious feminists and
nonfeminists to influence not only religious attitudes and practices, but
also social policies and social structure. We will begin with a general
discussion of the relationship between gender and religion.
Gender and Spirituality 395
GENDER AND RELIGIOSITY
Sociologists use the term religiosity to refer to the intensity of commit¬

ment of an indhidual or group to a religious belief system. We noted at the
outset of this chapter that 65 percent of persons in the United States claim
membership in a church or synagogue. Importantly, however, church
membership as well as one’s level of commitment to a professed religion
(i.e., one s religiosity) vary in terms of a number of factors. Looking at
Table 11.1, for example, we find that most people, regardless of sex or
race, hold some religious identification. Additional data indicate that
slightly more women (91 percent) than men (88 percent) identify them¬
selves as members of a particular religion, and 5 percent fewer women
than men state that they have no religious identification. Race is signifi¬
cant in terms of which t\pe of religion one is likely to belong to. Black
Protestants outnumber both white and Hispanic Protestants, whereas
Hispanic Catholics outnumber both white and black Catholics. Neverthe¬
less, almost identical percentages of each group state a religious affili¬
ation.
These broad statistics, though, mask some important differences in
religiosity among the groups listed in Table 11.1, particularly between
women and men. Religiosity may be measured in a number of ways, but
on most measures, women appear more religious than men. Table 11.2
on page 396 shows differences between women and men on several
TABLE 11.1 Religious Identifications by Race and Sex in the United States*
Religious All Men Women Whites Blacks Hispanics

Identification (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Protestant 56
Baptist 48 52 70 29 2
United Methodist 43 57 97 3 1
Lutheran 48 52 98 1 3
Episcopalian 40 60 94 3 1
United Church of Christ 45 55 95 4 3
Disciples of Christ 47 53 94 5 4
Other 42 58 86 11 5
Unspecified 50 50 90 8 6
Catholic 28 49 51 86 4 17
Jewish 2 49 51 99 1 1
Other 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Unaffiliated 9 61 39 86 10 5
^Percentages do not add to 100 due to rounding and tlie way in which questions were asked on some surveys. Not all religions are
included.
Sources: Compiled from U.S. Department of Commerce 1990; Gallup and Castelli 1989,
396 Chapter 11
TA3LE 11.2 Comparing Religiosity by Sex__
Church Attendance
Question: Did you, yourself, happen to attend church or synagogue in the

last seven days?
Women: 44% Yes
Men: 36% Yes
Importance of Religion_
Question: How important would you say religion is in your life: very
important, fairly important, or not very important?
Women: 63% Very important
28% Somewhat important
9% Not very important
Men: 48% Very important
32% Somewhat important
18% Not very important
Confidence in the Church or Organized Religion_
Question: Would you please tell me how much confidence you have in the
church or organized religion: a great deal, quite a lot, some, or
very little?
Women: 69% A great deal or quite a lot
Men: 64% A great deal or quite a lot
Belief in Religion as an Answer to Contemporary Problems
Question: Do you believe that religion can answer all or most of today’s
problems, or that religion is largely old-fashioned and out of date?
Women: 65% Can answer most of today’s problems
18% Old-fashioned/out of date
17% No opinion
Men: 50% Can answer most of today’s problems
32% Old-fashioned/out of date
18% No opinion
Sources: Princeton Religious Research Center 1992; Gallup and Castelli 1989.
measures of religiosity commonly used by sociologists. Here we see that

more women than men actually go to church or synagogue; that more
women than men consider religion to be very important in their lives;
that women have more confidence in the church or organized religion
than men do; and that considerably more women than men believe that
religion can answer all or most of today’s problems. In short, for each of
these measures, women show greater religiosity than men. Moreover,
these data are supported by additional research that indicates that, when
race is also taken , into account, minority women have especially high
levels of religiosity. In some black churches, for example, women make
up from 70 to 90 percent of the congregations (Gallup and Castelli 1989;
Grant 1986; Gilkes 1985).
Age also appears to be a significant factor. Those eighteen to twenty-
nine years old are least likely to belong to a church or synagogue (57
percent) and least likely to attend religious services on a weekly basis (29
percent). Those fifty and older are most likely to belong to a church or
synagogue (74 percent) and most likely to attend religious services on a
weekly basis (50 percent). These findings are perhaps predictable, but the
generation of greatest interest to researchers is the baby boom genera¬
tion—individuals born in the post-World War II era between 1946 and
1964. It is the baby boomers who show the greatest ambivalence to
organized religion and religious institutions, but who nevertheless have a
strong religious interest and also express a desire for a system of ethics to
guide their lives, especially if they have children (Roof 1993; Princeton
Religious Research Center 1992). Clearly, religiosity is more complex
than many one-dimensional survey measures would lead us to believe.
One’s religious beliefs may also strongly influence one’s views on
social and political issues, as we will see shortly. That religious beliefs bear
such a strong relationship to our other attitudes and our behavior should
not be too surprising. After all, religious values and concepts are among
those first instilled in us as children, and such deeply ingrained ideas are
hard to shake. For instance, most, if not all, of us have been taught to pray
to a male God, and to envision the deity as female probably seems silly,
even unnatural, to many. Indeed, as Table 11.3 shows, most of us conceive
TA3LE 11.3 Gendered Images of God
Question: Which of the following images do you associate with God?
Image Percent surveyed who image God this way
Master 48.3
Father 46.8
Judge 36.5
Redeemer 36.2
Creator 29.5
Friend 26.6
King 20.6
Healer 8.3
Lover 7.3
Liberator 5.5
Mother 3.2
Spouse 2.6
Source: General Social Survey 1989:156-159.

Chapter 11
of God in masculine terms. Most think of God as Father. Few image God
as Mother, although research indicates that more women than men con¬
ceptualize God as Mother (Roof and Roof 1984) and there is evidence
that women who define God in their own terms experience significant
improvements in their self-esteem (Saussy 1991). There is also consider¬
able evidence that in previous historical periods and in other cultures,
images of God were feminine or androgynous. We will now turn from
contemporary Western images of the deity and venture to the time when
God was believed to be a woman.
OF GODDESSES AND WITCHES
Astarte, Anat, Anahita, Asherah, Attoret, Attar, and Au are names few of
us recognize today, but each name was intimately familiar to worshippers
thousands of years ago. These are a few of the names in different lan¬
guages and dialects for the Great Goddess, known also as the Queen of
Heaven and the Divine Ancestress. Archeologists have discovered relics of
worship to her among the cultural remains of peoples as disparate as the
ancient Babylonians and pre-Ghristian Celts, at sites as distant as northern
Iraq and southern France, and dating asTar back as 25,000 B.C.E. (Gadon
1989; Carmody 1989; Stone 1976). For example, at sites of what are
thought to be “the earliest human-made dwellings on earth” belonging to
the Aurignaican mammoth hunters (Upper Paleolithic period), archeol¬
ogists have found stone, clay, and bone figurines of women they think
were the idols of “a great mother cult” (Stone 1976:13). Similarly, among
the ruins of later cultures, such as the Catal Huyak who, around 6000
B.C.E. inhabited part of what is now Turkey, excavators have recovered
sculptures of women depicted in various life stages and forms, leading
them to conclude that one of the principal deities was a goddess who was
associated with creativity, fertility, death and regeneration (Carmody
1989; Stone 1976). Although as we pointed out in chapter 3, we must be
cautious in our interpretations of archeological finds, it is the case that
representations of goddesses are abundant in sites throughout the world,
especially some of the best preserved Old European caves (Carmody
1989).
That the females we have described so far were associated with
fertility may lead one to mistakenly conclude that goddesses were only
ascribed traditional feminine roles, such as mother. It is important to
point out first that in goddess-worshipping societies, motherhood was not
devalued like it is in our own society. Second, even in societies that also
worshipped male gods, female gods were believed to wield as much and
often more power than male gods, and were ascribed roles and traits,
such as wisdom and courage, that only later were typed masculine. “Pre-
Christian Celts, for example, worshipped Cerridwen as the Goddess of

Intelligence and Knowledge. The Greek Demeter and the Egyptian Isis
were lawgivers—^wise dispensers of good counsel and justice. Egypt also
celebrated Maat, the Goddess of Cosmic Order, while Mesopotamia’s
Ishtar was the Prophetess, the Lady of Vision and Directoress of the
People (Carmody 1989:20). In India, Ireland, and Sumer, goddesses
were credited with the invention of the alphabet, language, and writing
(Carmody 1989).
Evidence of widespread goddess worship is abundant and convinc¬
ing. MTiat is less clear is why and how male or father-centered religions
came to displace it. To better understand this change, some theorists draw
on the factors that may have originally given rise to matriarchal religions.
Matriarchal religions are thought to have emerged out of early humans’
concern for survival as well as their desire to explain the generation of
life and the phenomenon of death. Significantly, these early peoples did
not understand the relationship between sexual intercourse and child¬
bearing, and therefore assumed that women were the sole possessors of
creative life forces. Women, then, were revered not only as producers of
future generations, but also as the primal ancestor. In addition, since
women alone were considered parents, children took the maternal name
and traced descent along the mother’s line. Although these theorists
caution us not to romanticize or glorify this period as a golden matriar¬
chal age, there is ample evidence that the status of women in these early
human communities was high (Gimbutas 1989; Stone 1976).
The speculation follows that as the male role in reproduction came
to be better understood, the appeal of matriarchal religions diminished.
Once it was certain that the reproductive process could not take place
without the help of a man, the status of the father became significant, and
male generative power was more highly valued. With this realization
occurred a concomitant decline in women’s status. They came to be seen
merely as the carriers and caretakers of future generations, whereas men
provided the generative “seed,” making them the true sources of life.
This, of course, is not the only theory of how patriarchal religions
eventually supplanted matriarchal ones. Another plausible explanation,
for instance, begins with the observation that female-centered religions
were just one of many religious orientations adhered to in ancient socie¬
ties. Besides monotheistic matriarchal religions, there were polytheistic
religions that worshipped male and female deities; other monotheistic
religions that worshipped a male deity; and even religions that wor¬
shipped the “sacred androgyne,” a deity that was simultaneously female
and male (Carmody 1989). It has been argued that the displacement of
most of these religious traditions by one that favored the worship of a
single male god may have been the result of ongoing political battles
among various societies—for example, disputes over land or over who
400 Chapter 11 \
should rightfully rule, as well as military conquests aimed at empire

building. The victors in these struggles would, m all likelihood, impose
their own standards and traditions—including religious ones—on t e
vanquished (Gimbutas 1989; Christ 1983). The fact that members of
goddess cultures tended to be pacifistic may have made them especially
vulnerable to aggression from other societies (Carmody 1989; Gimbutas
1989). . .
Regardless of whether both or neither of these theories is correct, it
is perhaps more significant that attempts to eradicate worship of female
gods have never been completely successful. Research indicates that
throughout history, groups continued to pay homage to a variety of
female deities and spirits, although they were frequently forced to prac¬
tice their rites and rituals secretly because of violent persecutions by those
of the dominant faith (Gimbutas 1989). During early Christian times, for
example, several groups claimed to be the disciples of Christ and wrote
their own gospels of Christ’s teachings. Among these were the gnostic
Christian sects whose practices and beliefs were rich in female symbolism
(Christ 1983). Some gnostic groups described God as a divine Dyad: the
Primal Father and the Mother of All Things. Others spoke of the Holy
Spirit as Mother, or as Wisdom, the female element in God. Women in
the gnostic sects also held positions of authority; they were preachers and
prophets and even ordained priests (Pagels 1979). However, other, more
patriarchal sects, led by those who eventually established themselves as
the Church Fathers, suppressed the gnostics and branded them heretics.
Although researchers emphasize that the gnostics were not declared
heretical simply because of the high status they accorded women, the
practical effect of their suppression was the exclusion of much female
symbolism and leadership from what became the recognized Christian
Church (Christ 1983).
Scholars have argued, too, that witchcraft was a carryover of the
beliefs and traditions of the Great Goddess religions (Ginzburg 1991).
Although nowadays most people associate witchcraft with evil and devil
worship, the meaning of the word luitch, “wise one,” hints at the truer
character of this practice. Witchcraft was popular among plain, rural folk
whose survival depended on good crops and healthy livestock. Because of
women’s long and close association with nature, fertility, and health, most
witches were women. Their careful study of nature “enabled them to tame
sheep and cattle, to breed wheat and corn from grasses and weeds, to
forge ceramics from mud and metal from rock, and to track the move¬
ments of the moon, stars and sun” (Starhawk 1979:261). Appropriately,
then, it was the witches who led the annual planting and harvesting
celebrations. They also practiced folk magic and medicine, using herbs to
cure the sick and relieve pain. Not surprisingly, many people sought their
help and looked to them for comfort (Starhawk 1979; Ehrenreich and
English 1973).
Interestingly, it appears that witchcraft peacefully coexisted with the
established Christian churches for quite some time. Many people, it
seems, elected to observe the traditions of both, and there is evidence
that country piiests were sometimes reprimanded by their superiors for
participating in the seasonal “pagan” festivals (Starhawk 1979). Neverthe¬
less, witchcraft clearly posed a threat to Church authority. Carol Christ
(1983:93-94) explains:
The wise woman was summoned at the crises of the life cycle before the
pi iest, she delivered the baby, while the priest was called later to perform
the baptism. She was the first called upon to cure illness or treat the
dying, while the priest was called in after other remedies had failed, to
administer the last rites. Moreover, if the wise woman had knowledge of
herbs which could aid or prevent conception or cause abortion, she had
a power over the life process which clearly was superior to that of the
priest, and which according to official theology made her a rival of God
himself. If, moreover, she appealed to pagan deities, some of them
probably female, in the performance of divinations or blessings and
spells used to promote healing and ward off evil, then it is not difficult to
see why she was persecuted by an insecure misogynist Church which
could not tolerate rival power, especially the power of women.
Indeed, by the late fifteenth century, the Pope had officially de¬
clared war on witches. The two Dominican theologians who were put in
charge of routing out and prosecuting the witches, Heinrich Kramer and
James Sprenger, maintained that women were more attracted to witch¬
craft because they were less intelligent, more impressionable, and more
lascivious than men. It was Kramer and Sprenger who most actively pro¬
moted the notion of witchcraft as a Satanic cult (Christ 1983). Tragically,
in their zeal to rid the world of witches, Catholic and Protestant authori¬
ties tortured and killed between one half million and 9 million people
during the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries, about 80 percent of whom
were women (Barstow 1992; Nelson 1979; Starhawk 1979).
The worship of female deities survives today in some Native Ameri¬
can religious rituals and in Aboriginal Australian and various African
societies, although Western anthropologists have typically devalued these
practices, labeling them “primitive” (Carmody 1989). In addition, how¬
ever, many feminists have revived or developed woman-centered spiritual
traditions as part of their effort to make religion more responsive and
relevant to female experience. But before we discuss feminist spirituality,
let’s examine the traditional teachings on gender espoused by the pre¬
dominant patriarchal religions that we identified at the opening of this
chapter.
402 Chapter 11 \
TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUS TEACHINGS

ON GENDER
In our attempt to summarize the gendered teachings of even the major
religious traditions, we immediately confront a number of probkms^For
one thing, although many denominations and sects share a few basic
tenets—for instance, all Christians believe Jesus was the Son of God—they
tend to diverge considerably when it comes to more specific religious
principles and practices, including those that concern appropriate roles
for women and men. Southern Baptists, for instance, take a conservative
stance regarding the proper role of women in religious and social life, but
Quaker women have been called the “mothers of feminism” (Bacon
1986). Nonetheless, members of both groups are undeniably Christians.
Similarly, the rules governing male and female behavior among Ortho¬
dox Jews are very different from those adhered to by Reform Jews, as we
will see shortly.
This latter point serves to remind us also that the beliefs, attitudes
and practices of individuals who claim membership in a particular reli¬
gion often are quite diverse. Research, for example, shows that it is
inaccurate to assume that all Catholics accept and respond to the offi¬
cial teachings of their church in the same way; Catholics, like those
who identify with other religious traditions, are a heterogeneous group
(Greeley 1990).
Our brief discussion, therefore, is intended merely as an overview of
the general attitudes toward men and women expressed in the teachings
of three very broad religious traditions. We cannot address all the fine
distinctions among the many sects and denominations that identify with
a particular tradition, but we will try to show within each some gradations
in attitudes—conservative, moderate, and liberal—with respect to three
main topics: (1) appropriate behavior and rituals for the male and female
faithful; (2) the regulation of sexuality; and (3) the relative positions of
men and women as church leaders or authorities.
A second problem arises, however, in interpreting scriptures and
religious teachings. We will find that a single passage of sacred text may
be translated or edited to legitimate gender oppression or to promote
gender equality. As Virginia Sapiro (1986:191) found, “The same Bible
has proven to some people that women and men are equal and should
take full leadership roles in religions and society, and it has proven to
others that women are inferior, periodically unclean, dangerous, and
subordinate to men.” These contradictions are especially significant given
that religious leaders cite scripture or other sacred texts as the source of
their authority and as the foundation of church doctrine. Thus, in evalu¬
ating a particular religious teaching and the official rationale behind it.
we must also consider alternative interpretations of the sacred writings on

which church leaders claim it is based. These reinterpretations are often
the products of feminist religious scholarship.
With these qualifiers in mind, then, let’s examine the gendered
teachings of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.
Judaism
Jewish history spans more than 3,500 years. Throughout much of this
period, Jewish women and men have been governed by a set of laws
(halakhah) spelled out for them in the Talmud. The Talmud, thought to
have been compiled around C.E. 200, records the oral interpretations of
scripture by ancient rabbis and forms the crux of religious authority for
traditional Judaism. However, in response to changing social conditions
and political upheavals, such as diaspora and countless persecutions,
Jewish leaders over the years have modified and reinterpreted Jewish law.
In fact, as Paula Hyman (1979:112) points out, “Much of the strength of
the Jewish tradition has derived from its flexibility and responsiveness to
the successive challenges of the environments in which it has been des¬
tined to live.”
Contemporary Judaism is largely congregational. That is, “public
rituals [are] practiced in local synagogues whose congregations selected
a mode of worship and expressed their preference for certain Jewish
theological interpretations” (Pratt 1980:207-208). There are three major
types of congregations: Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform.^ Orthodox
Jews most strictly adhere to the traditional teachings of the Talmud, and
we will begin our discussion with them. Then we will see how the practices
and strictures of the Conservative and Reform congregations differ.
Orthodox men and women have separate and very clearly defined
rights and obligations under Jewish law. As one commentator expressed
it, “Men and women are expected to follow different routes in the pursuit
of the ideal life that God has prescribed for them” (Webber 1983:143).
Orthodoxy requires that men preserve and carry on Jewish tradition
through communal worship and daily prayer at specified times, and
especially through religious study. Theirs is clearly the scholarly and
spiritual realms. Women, in contrast, are exempt from these religious
duties {mitzvot) on the ground that fulfilling them would interfere with
W fourth, more recent congregation is Reconstructionist Judaism which is the most

liberal congregation, emphasizing the importance of humanist values rather than
revelation. This congregation allows the fullest participation of women, and about 20
percent of Reconstructionist rabbis are women. However, it is a much smaller branch
of Judaism than the three major congregations (Carmody 1989).
404 Chapter 11
\
their primary roles as wives, mothers, and homemakers. Women, then,

control the domestic realm where they tend to the needs of their hus¬
bands and children. It is essentially because of his wife’s household labor
that the Orthodox man is free to pursue religious study and to fulfill his
other mitzvot. Women must also see to it that their children, especially
their sons, receive sound religious training. Orthodox women have their
own mitzvot to fulfill, including separating bread dough in preparation for
the Sabbath, lighting the Sabbath and holiday candles, assuring that the
dietary laws are followed, and observing the rules of modesty {tznoit) and
female bodily cleanliness—an issue to which we will return shortly (El-Or
1993; Carmody 1989; Pratt 1980).
It is important to emphasize here that Orthodox Jews do not see this
separation of roles as the relegation of women to an inherently unequal
or inferior status. To the contrary. Orthodoxy maintains that in preserv¬
ing the moral purity of their households, women engage in a form of
religious expression comparable to that of men, and for this they are
honored and respected both within the tradition and by their husbands
and children (Kaufman 1991). Nevertheless, critics have countered that
the exemptions accorded to women effectively serve to exclude them
from public ritual—“the real heartland of Judaism”—and, therefore,
from full participation in the religious community (Webber 1983:143;
Umansky 1985; Neuberger 1983). Women are not permitted to be or¬
dained Orthodox rabbis. Laying this issue aside, however, how else does
the participation of women and men in public Orthodox worship differ?
We have already noted that women’s exemption from particular mitzvot,
especially the one calling the faithful to religious study, serves to curtail
their active participation in public ritual. More specifically, women are
not called to read the Torah during worship; even though no law prohibits
this, it is not done in order to preserve “the dignity of the congregation”
(Carmody 1989). Nor may women sing in the synagogue; “the ancient
rabbis considered the female voice to be profane” (Pratt 1980:211). A
woman also may not lead a prayer service; in fact, only men can be
counted in a minyan, the quorum needed to hold a prayer service (Car¬
mody 1989; Berman 1979). Mehitzah mandates a seating division between
men and women in synagogues. Orthodox women are relegated to the
back of the synagogue, although this arrangement is considered an im¬
provement over earlier practices whereby women were forced to sit “up
in a gallery, or behind a curtain, or even in some Eastern communities in
a separate room or outside the building altogether” (Neuberger
1983:138; Berman 1979).
Non-Orthodox feminist Jews have been especially critical of the laws
governing male-female relations within the Orthodox family. Both
women and men are permitted to acquire and inherit property, but wives
may not bequeath their property while they are married without their
husbands’ consent. Women may not formally initiate marriage, although

once wed they are entitled to adequate support from their husbands
(Webber 1983). Perhaps the most disabling laws for women, however, are
those regulating divorce and remarriage. Within Orthodoxy, divorce is
unilateral: only a husband may divorce his wife, not vice versa. A woman
may institute divorce proceedings by charging her husband with “matri¬
monial offenses” before the religious court, which in turn can pressure
the husband to grant his wife a get (a religious divorce). But until the
husband grants the get, the Orthodox woman is not free to remarry
according to Jewish law, even if she has obtained a civil divorce (Neuber-
ger 1983).
Similar restrictions apply to the woman whose husband is “missing,
presumed dead.” According to Jewish law, an agunah (the “forsaken wife”)
cannot remarry unless a witness testifies to her husband’s actual death.
Under strict Jewish codes, such a witness must be a male Jew, but it has
not been uncommon, especially during wartime and persecutions, for
rabbis to bend the rules a bit by “accepting the testimony, for instance, of
women, minors, slaves, and non-Jews in this matter” (Neuberger
1983:136-137). Still, if the woman could not muster evidence of any sort,
she remained married in the eyes of Orthodox authorities.
Importantly, however, Jewish law recognizes the rights of both
women and men to sexual fulfillment in marriage. Religious scholars, in
fact, often contrast what they consider to be a more positive attitude
toward sexuality within Judaism with the more negative Christian view
that we will discuss shortly. But others have argued that “it is precisely in
this area that the second-class status of women within Judaism is high¬
lighted,” and they typically cite the laws of family purity to illustrate this
point. These include the rules of bodily cleanliness that we mentioned
earlier, which revolve around a woman’s menstrual cycle. For a two-week
period each month, the Orthodox woman is considered impure. During
this time, anything the niddah (menstruating woman) touches also be¬
comes impure. Consequently, she must be physically segregated from
men, and contact with her is permitted only after she has stopped men¬
struating for seven days and has been ritually purified in a mikveh (a
special bath) (Webber 1983; Hyman 1979).
Orthodox scholars and authorities justify such laws on a number of
grounds: for example, they protect women s health, they spiritualize
sexual relations, and they help to “renew a marriage through a kind of
monthly honeymoon” (Webber 1983:144). Less sympathetic observers
have characterized them as the products of patriarchal religious leaders’
fears and hatred of that which they can neither do nor understand. It may
come as a surprise to many, however, that what appears to be repressive
religious law to non-Orthodox and feminist observers is considered quite
liberating in a sense by most Orthodox Jewish women. In her fascinating
406 Chapter 11
\
Study of newly Orthodox Jewish women (or ba’alot teshuvah), for example,
Kauffman (1991:8) found that these women valued the family purity laws
as well as other halakic prescriptions because such rituals “put them in
touch with their own bodies, in control of their own sexuality, and in a
position to value the so-called feminine virtues of nurturance, mutuality,
family, and motherhood.” Most of the women Kaufman interviewed were
young and well-educated with middle-class, non-Orthodox backgrounds.
Prior to their conversion to Orthodoxy, some had been married, but all
had experienced what might be called the downside of sexual freedom:
frequent, casual, uncommitted sexual relationships with men. In Ortho¬
doxy, they told Kaufman, they regained control over their sexuality, they
felt an enhanced status as women and as mothers, and they considered
the men in their lives more respectful, supportive, and committed to their
relationships.
It may appear to some readers that the Orthodox women in Kauf¬
man’s (1991) study were feminists. One of her most significant findings
was that although the women said they rejected feminism as antifamily,
the way they described their Orthodox lives had a great deal in common
with many of the values espoused by radical feminists. Particularly inter¬
esting are Kaufman’s analyses of sex-segregated living under Orthodoxy
and of the mikveh as establishing a “women’s community” and rituals that
compose a “women’s culture.” While Kaufman makes clear that the
women who participated in her study certainly were not radical femi¬
nists, her research highlights the importance of attempting to under¬
stand a group’s behavior and experiences from the members’ own
perspective.
Some Orthodox Jewish women have been less satisfied than those in
Kaufman’s (1991) study with various halakic proscriptions on women’s
religious participation and have tried to change these. For example, some
Orthodox women have formed women-only davening (prayer) groups
which, though not technically a ^minyan, bring women together to wor¬
ship, to sing, and to read the Torah and the rabbinical commentaries in
an effort to develop their own understanding of them. Such groups,
however, have received strong negative reactions from Orthodox rabbis
and other members of the congregation (Snyder 1986). At times,
women’s attempts to pray as men do have been met by violence. In 1989,
for example, a group of Jewish women attempting to hold a prayer service
at the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem, considered the holiest Jewish site, were
physically attacked by angry Orthodox men. The women, some of whom
% wore prayer shawls, were forced to flee from the wall after police fired tear
gas at the men who were shouting insults and throwing heavy metal chairs
at the women. Although the women vowed to return. Orthodox officials
defended the ban on women’s prayer services, arguing that it is a religious
tradition that cannot be changed {Neut York Times 21 March 1989:A3). As
Gender and Spirituality
Kaufman (1991:68) points out, “The inviolability of thejewish code of law

mitigates against the possibility of women challenging a legal system
developed, defined, and continuously refined by males. Moreover, if
women are not encouraged or given the opportunities to study the very
texts . . . from which interpretations of those laws derive, there is no
opportunity for them to challenge those laws in a manner the community
will perceive as authentic or legitimate, or to develop female leadership.”
In contrast with Orthodox Judaism, Reform Judaism emphasized
the importance of equal and integrated roles for women and men as early
as 1845 (Neuberger 1983). By the turn of the century. Reform Judaism
had made strides toward this goal. The mehitzah (seating division) was
abolished; women were permitted to sing in synagogue choirs and to be
counted in a minyan; girls were included in religious education programs
and confirmed along with boys; and the prayerbook eliminated many of
the blatantly sexist prayers, including men’s daily thanksgiving that God
had not made them women. The Reform Movement also established
many social service and educational organizations in which women and
men worked together. Women were even admitted to the rabbinical
seminary, although when a woman first sought to become a Reform rabbi
in 1922, authorities sternly rejected her (Briggs 1987; Pratt 1980).
It was not until 1972 that Reform Judaism opened rabbinical ordi¬
nation to women. Today, there are more than 100 women rabbis in the
United States. Moreover, on June 26, 1990, Reform Judaism’s Central
Conference of American Rabbis voted to accept sexually active homo¬
sexuals into the rabbinate (Goldman 1990a).
According to Norma Pratt (1980), Conservative Judaism grew out of
the need for religious expression by Jews for whom Orthodoxy was no
longer appealing, but to whom Reform seemed too radical. Conservatism
lies midway between Orthodox and Reform Judaism in terms of how
strictly it adheres to traditional Jewish law (Cummings 1986). It is under¬
standable, then, that Conservative Judaism has moved considerably
slower than Reformism toward equality between the sexes.
Early on. Conservatism permitted women and men to sit together
during worship, and women were encouraged to participate in the reli¬
gious education of children and in the care and upkeep of the synagogue
itself. “Women, however, still were excluded from significant parts of the
worship, for instance the rituals surrounding the handling and reading
of the Torah” (Pratt 1980:213). In 1973, this also changed, and today
women may be ordained as Conservative rabbis (Umansky 1985). By
1986, there were only five women Conservative rabbis in the United
States, and just one of them served a major Conservative congregation
(Cummings 1986). But their ordination was, nonetheless, an important
step by Conservative Judaism toward equalizing and integrating the roles
and statuses of its male and female believers. An even more significant
408 Chapter 11
\
step was taken in 1990 when the leadership of the Cantors Assembly, the
professional organization of 400 Conservative Jewish cantors, voted to
admit women. Cantors chant liturgy on behalf of the congregation during
religious services and so are considered to play a more central role in
worship than rabbis whose job it is to teach and preach (Goldman 1990b).
The Conservative movement, however, continues to prohibit the
ordination of homosexual women and men as rabbis. Conservative Jewish
authorities do welcome lesbians and gay men as individual members of
Conservative congregations, but leave the decision of whether to hire
homosexuals as teachers or youth leaders up to individual rabbis in each
Conservative synagogue.
Within Conservative and Reform Judaism, as in other religious con¬
gregations, there are many believers who identify themselves as feminists
and who attempt to integrate their feminist values into their religious
practices. For example, Jewish feminists have rediscovered and begun to
teach others about the Biblical heroines among the Israelites. These
include Deborah, who was not only a ruler, judge, priestess, and prophet¬
ess, but also a military commander who led the Israelites to victory in a
major battle against the Canaanites (Pogrebin 1992). In addition, Jewish
feminists are revising old rituals and developing new ones that emphasize
the shared humanity and equal participation of women and men. Many
of these focus on solemnizing significant stages in a girls’ life just as those
in boys’ lives are solemnized: for example, celebrating a daughter’s birth
with a special blessing, giving gifts on the occasion of a girl’s “redemp¬
tion,” and celebrating the transition from childhood to womanhood
through has mitzvah (Pogrebin 1992; Carmody 1989).
We will return to a discussion of feminist religious ritual at the
conclusion of this chapter. Now, however, we will turn to the gendered
teachings of two other major religious traditions: Christianity and Islam.
Christianity '
It is not uncommon for Christian church leaders and theologians to cite
the teachings of St. Paul when delineating the proper roles of Christian
women and men. In one frequently quoted passage, for example, Paul
instructs the Christians of Ephesus:
Let the wives be subject to their husbands as to the Lord; because a

husband is head of the wife, just as Christ is head of the Church, being
himself savior of the body. But just as the Church is subject to Christ, so
also let wives be to their husbands in all things (Ephesians 5:22-24).
Elsewhere, Paul explains why women must cover their heads at religious
gatherings, but men need not:
A man indeed ought not to cover his head, because he is the image and
glory of God. But woman is the glory of man. For man is not from
woman, but woman from man.'For man was not created for woman, but
woman for man (I Corinthians, 11:7—9; the latter two lines appear to be
references to the Genesis creation story).
The sexism in Paul s writings, though hotly debated, is perhaps less

important than the fact that they have been repeatedly used by church
fathers and Christian theologians to legitimate and even promote the
subordination of women.
There is considerable evidence that the leadership of the early
Christian movement was shared by men and women. Both served as
missionaries spreading the “good news of salvation.” Both sheltered the
persecuted, studied and interpreted scriptures, and prophesied (Car-
mody 1989; Schussler Fiorenza 1979). Within the first hundred years,
however, an all-male hierarchical structure was firmly in place. Some¬
where along the line, it seems, the example and teachings of their first
leader, Jesus, were forgotten or ignored. Feminist Biblical scholars and
theologians emphasize that there is no evidence that Jesus was in any way
sexist. Instead, there is considerable evidence that he rejected the sexist
norms of the society in which he lived by, for example, holding men and
women to the same standard of morality and by not deriding women’s
nature or their abilities. It appears, in fact, that he related to women as
he related to men: as individuals who needed his help, as colleagues, and
as friends (Carmody 1989).
The rationale for the decision of male church authorities later to
exclude women from leadership roles remains open to speculation. We
have already discussed their efforts to suppress gnosticism, which could
have been related to it. Soon we will examine some of the more recent
arguments in favor of continuing this exclusion. What is clear at this
point, however, is the effect of their choice: women were relegated to a
second-class citizenship within Christianity, a status that persists to this
day.
Within the Christian tradition, both men and women have been
characterized in contradictory ways. Men are supposed to be rational,
authoritative, and in control, yet they are depicted as weak-willed when
confronted with women’s feminine charms. Indeed, women are por¬
trayed as temptresses—“the devil’s gateway” according to one church
father—^who will cause men to sin much the same way Eve supposedly led
Adam into the original sin in the Garden of Eden. At the same time,
though, the virgin, pure of heart and body, has been extolled by Christi¬
anity, as has the good (i.e., docile, modest, and long-suffering) mother.
Both are exemplified by Mary, the mother of Jesus, who is said to have
been both virgin and mother simultaneously. In 1988, Pope John Paul II
410 Chapter 11
reaffirmed this rather narrow view of Christian femininity. In an apostolic

letter on the “dignity of women,” the Pope characterized female identity
in terms of the “vocations” of motherhood or virginity (Pope John Paul
II 1988).
Such images hint at the Christian church’s attitudes toward sexual¬
ity. Traditionally, sex has been discussed as an activity to be avoided if
possible, except for the purpose of procreation. Celibacy has been re¬
garded by many as a better way of life. For instance, “John Chrysostom, a
very influential Eastern father, urged virginity because marriage was only
for procreating, the world was already filled [he was writing about C.E.
382], and marriage therefore tended to function as a concession to sin”
(Carmody 1989:171). Similarly, according to Augustine, a highly influen¬
tial father of the Western church, sexual intercourse was the means by
which original sin was transmitted across generations. The Protestant
reformers, such as Luther and Calvin, were more temperate in their views
of sex. While restricting sex to married couples, they recognized both
husbands’ and wives’ needs for the “medicine for venereal desire,” but
they warned against “overindulgence” and reminded their followers that
women could only attain salvation through childbearing (Carmody
1989).
Today, Christian teachings on sexuality remain mixed. Virtually all
sects and denominations continue to frown on nonmarital sex, although
groups within various churches have recommended more open-minded
discussion of sexuality issues. In 1992, for instance, a study group of the
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America issued a report, “The Church
and Human Sexuality: A Lutheran Perspective,” in which the group urges
the church to consider more carefully what it calls the “created goodness”
of sexuality. The study group, not surprisingly, affirms marriage and
committed love relationships; recommends that young people refrain
from sex until they are ready to make a permanent commitment; de¬
nounces adultery, promiscuity, pornography, sexual abuse, and media
exploitation of sexuality. However, it also expresses the views that mastur¬
bation is healthy, that teenagers who are sexually active should use con¬
doms, and that the church should consider affirming committed
same-sex relationships by blessing them (Lewin 1992b).
Although the Lutheran study group’s report is simply a document
circulated among church leaders and members for discussion and will be
revised at least once before its recommendations are voted on by dele¬
gates to the church’s national assembly in 1995, many observers see it as
a signal that more positive attitudes toward sexuality are developing
among the Christian leadership of at least some churches. Certainly, a
report such as this is especially significant for homosexuals who have been
openly condemned and often persecuted by Christianity. It is unlikely
that the condemnation of homosexuals will soon disappear from the
teachings of most Christian churches (Berliner 1987; Heyward 1987). To

the contrary, as we will discuss later in this chapter, some fundamentalist
sects are calling for greater repression. However, even more moderate
church leadeis, such as those in the United Methodist Church and the
Presbyteiian Church in 1991, have recently reaffirmed their denomina¬
tions bans on the ordination to ministry of self-avowed, practicing homo¬
sexuals.
Nevertheless, recent actions within a few churches indicate that
significant changes are in the making. In 1988, the United Church of
Canada, that country’s largest Protestant denomination, voted to admit
homosexual men and women to its clergy. In 1989, an openly homosexual
man was ordained an Episcopal priest (although he was later dismissed),
and in 1991, a lesbian involved in a monogamous relationship also was
ordained an Episcopal priest. Finally, in 1992, members of a Baptist
church in North Carolina voted to give a preaching license to a gay
divinity student, thus furthering him in the process toward ordination,
and members of a second Baptist church in the same state voted to allow
what the church calls the “blessing of holy union” for two gay men.
Even though a few Protestant churches appear open to reconsider¬
ing their official teachings on sexuality, the Catholic Church represents a
denomination that has remained steadfastly resistant to change in this
area. The Catholic Church, in fact, speaks as one of the most conservative
denominations in this regard. It recently reiterated its strong disapproval
of homosexuality, calling it “an objective disorder” (Williams 1987), and
in 1992, it directed its bishops to oppose legislative efforts that appear to
promote public acceptance of homosexual relationships. The latter docu¬
ment, issued by the Vatican’s Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith,
argued that discrimination against homosexuals in the area of adoption,
foster care placement, military service, and employment as teachers and
coaches is not unjust (Steinfels 1992; however, see also Archdiocesan
Gay/Lesbian Outreach 1986).
In addition to its condemnation of homosexual relationships, the
Catholic Church also continues to require celibacy on the part of clergy
and nuns, and it prohibits the use of artificial contraception. Its opposi¬
tion to abortion is well known, but the Vatican has also voiced objections
to artificial insemination and in mfro fertilization (see chapter 7). Church
authorities hold that it is “the right of every person to be conceived and
to be born within marriage and from marriage” (The Congregation for
the Doctrine of the Faith 1987:703). Medical intervention is acceptable
only when it assists “the conjugal act,” not when it replaces it. That the
semen needed for both procedures is typically obtained through mastur¬
bation is itself objectionable. But with regard to in vitro fertilization, the
church also condemns the cultivation of “spare” zygotes that are sub¬
sequently destroyed or frozen if the initial implantation is successful.
412 Chapter 11
\
Catholic Church officials see the destruction of the extra fertilized eggs
as analogous to abortion. In 1992, the Vatican issued a new catechism, the
first since the universal catechism prepared by the Council of Trent in the
sixteenth century, that was designed to clarify church teachings and
doctrine on contemporary scientific, social and economic issues. The
catechism contains a list of behaviors considered “sinful” by the church,
including, not surprisingly, artificial insemination, artificial contracep¬
tion, and genetic engineering (Riding 1992).
The U.S. Catholic bishops have also condemned safe sex campaigns
as a strategy for preventing the transmission of AIDS. Calling the use of
prophylactics “technically unreliable” and a means, in effect, of “promot¬
ing behavior which is morally unacceptable,” the bishops argued that
chastity and marital fidelity are the best ways to prevent the transmission
of AIDS (U.S. Catholic Bishops 1989).
The Catholic Church has also stood firm in its opposition to the
ordination of women to the priesthood.^ Church authorities argue that
priests act in the name of Jesus and represent him physically; therefore,
they must be men. Moreover, they maintain, Jesus called twelve men to be
his apostles, not twelve women, nor twelve men and women. Proponents
of ordination to the priesthood counter \vith evidence that, in fact, many
of the disciples of Jesus were women who held central leadership roles in
the early Christian church. Junia, for example, is referred to in Romans
16:7 as apostle, and Phoebe was a missionary coworker with St. Paul
(Hilkert 1986; Schussler Fiorenza 1983).
The issue of the ordination of women to the priesthood is without a
doubt one of the most divisive issues in the Catholic Church today and is
hardly likely to be resolved soon. Nevertheless, it is the case that women’s
ministerial roles within the church are increasing. For example, as the
number of men entering the seminary declines and retirements and
deaths lower the number of active priests, more Catholic parishes in the
United States are relying on women to lead them. Currently, of the nearly
În 1989, Rev. George A. Stallings, a black Catholic priest, broke away from the church
and established the African American Catholic Congregation, which currently has
temples in at least six major U.S. cities and a total membership of approximately
5,000. The new sect is an attempt to infuse African American culture and styles of
worship into Catholic ritual. The Roman Catholic hierarchy has not infrequently
been accused of racism. In 1991, Stallings ordained the first woman priest in his sect
(Steinfels 1991). In 1994, the Anglican Church of England also began ordaining
\ women as priests. The Anglican Church was established by King Henry VIII 460 years
ago when the pope refused to annul his marriage to Katherine of Aragon so that he
could marry Anne Boleyn. In recent years, authorities from both churches had
undertaken discussions about reuniting, but with the Vatican expressed strong oppo¬
sition to the Anglican Church’s decision to ordain women and stated that it was a
major obstacle now blocking the churches’ reunion.
300 Catholic parishes in the United States without a priest, 75 percent are
headed by women, either layworrien or nuns, who perform all the duties
of a pastor except administer the sacraments (Wallace 1992). Even in
parishes with priests, much of the daily ministry, including counseling,
preaching, and giving Communion, is done by laywomen and nuns. Still,
the women in these positions report that their greatest source of job
dissatisfaction stems from the stringent limits that are imposed on them
by the church hierarchy, especially the church’s prohibition against these
women performing rituals performed by male clergy (Ebaugh 1993).
Historically, nuns were expected by church leaders to be silent and
obedient helpmates of the bishops (Weaver 1985). At the same time,
however, religious sisters played an active role in secular society, especially
in Catholic schools and hospitals (Ebaugh 1993; Briggs 1987). Since the
mid-1960s, largely because of widening roles for laypeople within the
church, but also as a result of a growing feminist consciousness, the
number of women joining religious orders dropped dramatically. Today,
there are only slightly more than 100,000 nuns in the United States and
their median age is 66 (Ebaugh 1993). The women entering convents
nowadays are, on average, older than in previous decades, many have had
professional careers and hold higher degrees, and many are feminists who
support the ordination of women and challenge the sexism of the church
from within the organization itself—a point to which we will return
momentarily (Ebaugh 1993; Wallace 1992; Briggs 1987; Weaver 1985).
Unlike the Catholic Church, virtually all the Protestant churches
now ordain women to their ministries (Weaver 1985), and on February
11, 1989, the Episcopal Church consecrated its first female bishop, Bar¬
bara C. Harris, despite strong opposition from some Episcopal Church
leaders. Table 11.4 on page 414 shows the percentage of women clergy in
U.S. Protestant denominations as of 1986, the most recent year for which
data are currently available. Of the major denominations, the United
Church of Christ, which began ordaining women in 1853, had the highest
percentage of women in its ministry and it was only 14.5 percent. Between
1977 and 1986, the number of ordained women ministers doubled, but
relative to the overall number of ordained clergy, the percentage increase
was from 4.0 percent to 7.9 percent Qacquet 1988). However, there is
evidence that more women are considering careers as ministers. The
number of women enrolled in seminaries and divinity schools has been
increasing, from just 10.2 percent in 1972 to 31 percent in 1992 (Bedell
1993).
Still, women ministers know that their ordination has done little to
eliminate the sexism prevalent in most Christian churches. These women
continue to confront discrimination in access to leadership positions,
ministerial assignments and responsibilities, and salary (Jacquet 1988;
Briggs 1987). A study by the National Council of Churches, for instance,
414 Chapter 11
\
TA3LE 11.4 Women Clergy by Denomination, 1936

Total % Women
Denomination Clergy Clergy
Advent Christian Church 568 3.0

American Baptist Churches 7,698 5.6
American Lutheran Church* 7,671 4.0
Apostolic Faith Mission Church of God 38 13.2
Apostolic Overcoming Holy Church of God 295 25.4
Assemblies of God 26,837 13.9
Baptist General Conference 1,700 0.1
Bible Church of Christ 40 40.0
Brethren in Christ Church 227 0.9
Christian Church (Disciples) 6,806 10.9
Christian Congregation 1,455 19.9
Christian Nation Church, U.S.A. 23 8.7
Church of the Brethren 1,963 6.1
Church of the Nazarene 8,667 4.1
Conservative Congregational Christian Conference 424 0.2
Episcopal Church 14,111 4.5
Evangelical Lutheran Churches, Association dP 672 3.7
Evangelical Presbyterian Church 177 0.6
Eree Methodist Church of North America 1,079 6.4
Eriends United Meeting 595 10.1
Eundamental Methodist Church 23 4.3
General Association of General Baptists 1,444 0.6
International Church of the Foursquare Gospel 3,482 19.1
Lutheran Church in America* 8,586 5.6
Mennonite Church 2,399 2.0
Mennonite Church, The General Conference 365 9.0
Moravian Church (Northern Province) 174 7.5
Moravian Church (Southern Province) 83 3.6
Pentecostal Church of Christ, International 128 23.4
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) 19,514 7.8
Reformed Church in America 1,636 2.6
Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter
Day Saints 16,535 5.2
Salvation Army 5,195 62.0
Seventh Day Baptist General Conference 69 2.9
Southern Baptist Convention 37,072 1.2
United Church of Christ 10,071 14.5
United Methodist Church 37,808 5.0
Wesleyan Church 2,596 9.8
*This body merged in 1987 to form the Evangelical Lutheran Church of America, which began operating
January 1, 1988.
Sowrce; Jacquet 1988:5-6.
found that the median salary of clergywomen is $6,000 less than the
median salary of clergymen, “even though their educational level is gen¬
erally higher, with 90.8 percent having seminary degrees, three years
beyond college, against 72.2 percent of the men” {New York Times 29
March 1984:22). These gender disparities in ministerial assignments,
promotions, and salaries have led some observers to argue that women
clergy encounter a stained glass ceiling” within their churches which is
thicker, more opaque, and less permeable that the glass ceiling encoun¬
tered by lay working women (Goldman 1992; see chapter 8). Importantly,
however, Protestant clergywomen are breaking through the stained glass
ceiling, as the appointment of the Rev. Joan Brown Campbell to the
position of general secretary of the National Council of Churches in 1990
attests. Rev. Campbell is the first female minister in the organization’s
history to hold this top leadership position (Goldman 1990c).
The inequality inherent in most Christian denominations leads one
to wonder how church leaders can reconcile this with their professed
concern for social justice. It has also caused many believers to question
the relevance of organized Christianity to their own lives and to the
contemporary world (Welch 1985). Consequently, some have abandoned
the Christian faith altogether or at least have stopped practicing their
religion in any formal sense. This is particularly true for Catholics who
disagree with the Vatican’s position on birth control (Hout and Greeley
1987). In a 1986 Gallup poll, a sample of U.S. Catholics was asked how
well the church was handling the role of women within it. Only 37 percent
responded excellent or good; 60 percent said fair or poor (Gallup 1987).
Nevertheless, other church members, as we have noted, have chosen to
stay and work for change from within their religious institutions by chal¬
lenging church teachings and “depatriarchalizing” religious language,
symbols, and ritual. This latter group, of course, includes Christian femi¬
nists.
One of the most significant innovations of Christian feminism has
been the establishment of the Women-Church movement. The Women-
Church movement is a coalition of feminist faith-sharing groups which,
although ecumenical, is composed largely of Roman Catholic women.
Women-Church offers a feminist critique of traditional Christianity while
providing members with alternative, woman-centered rituals and forms of
worship (Farrell 1992; Hunt 1991). For example, there are liturgies for
the celebration of a young woman’s first menstrual period as well as other
natural stages in a woman’s life. In addition, like all religions, Women-
Church practices rites of repentance and forgiveness, but Women-Church
members pray that patriarchal church members will repent the sins they
commit against women (Ruether 1988).
In addition to the woman-centered aspects of its rituals, Women-
Church appeals to Christian feminists because of its nonhierarchical
416 Chapter 11
\
organization and its emphasis on identifying with and serving all op¬
pressed people in a “discipleship of equals” (Farrell 1992; Hunt 1991;
Ruether 1988; Schussler Fiorenza 1983). Nevertheless, Women-Church
has been criticized from within for being predominantly white and middle
class and for failing to incorporate religious forms of worship valued by
women of color. Hunt (1991:32, emphasis added) has argued that Women-
Church, in fact, may not be the best way for minority women to articulate
their faith, but that Women-Church should “listen to and learn from
these women whether or not they are participants in owr movement.”
We will address these issues again in a little while; now, though, we
will examine the gendered teachings of Islam.
Islam
One-fifth of the world’s population follows the religious traditions of
Islam; it is considered to be the world’s fastest growing religion (Car-
mody 1989; Robertson 1987). Islam was founded by the prophet Mo¬
hamad around the year C.E. 610 in Mecca (now the capital of Saudi
Arabia). Mohamad is said to have received over the course of his
lifetime a series of revelations from Allah (God), which he in turn passed
on to his followers in the form of rules of behavior. These are compiled
in the Qur’an (Koran) which Muslims accept literally as the word of God.
In addition, Mohamad’s teachings and those of his immediate successors
are recorded in the Hadith, which along with the Qur’an, serves as the
basis for shari a (Islamic law). Taken together, these three sources consti¬
tute a religious framework that governs every aspect of Muslims’ daily
lives, including interactions between women and men. Indeed, 80 per¬
cent of the Qur’an is devoted to prescriptive and proscriptive verses
concerning proper relations between the sexes (Engineer 1992; Haddad
1985).
It is clear that Islam radically altered male-female relations, al¬
though whether for better or for worse is a point still disputed by religious
scholars. It appears that in the days of Mohamad, a variety of sociosexual
arrangements coexisted. Some groups were decidedly patriarchal, valuing
males above females (female infanticide was common) and allowing men
as many wives as they could buy or steal irrespective of the women’s
consent or the men’s ability to support them (Carmody 1989). Within
other groups, though, women enjoyed considerable independence and
practiced polyandry (had more than one husband). However, by the
seventh century, there was movement away from gender equality among
even some of these groups, particularly the ones in Mecca, as commercial
expansion provided increasing contacts with northern societies whose
religions (Judaism and Christianity) were already strongly patriarchal.
Islam, some scholars maintain, consolidated this trend toward patriarchy.
although Mohamad did not totally divest women of their rights (Engineer
1992; Ahmed 1986).
Mohamad declared that a woman’s consent had to be obtained
before a marriage and that she be paid the brideprice instead of her
father. He also recognized women’s conjugal rights, their rights to own¬
ership of their jewelry and earnings, their right to initiate divorce, and
their right to inheritance (although their share was half that of male
heirs). Women, like men, were expected to adhere to the five “pillars” of
Islam, which include prayer five times a day and fasting during the holy
month called Ramadan, and they worshipped with men in the mosques
(Engineer 1992; Carmody 1989).
Mohamad permitted men to have more than one wife, imposing a
generous limit of four as long as they could be supported. He opposed
female infanticide, but gave men unconditional custody rights to their
children (boys at age two, girls at age seven). Moreover, despite the
Qur’an’s verses on the centrality of justice and the equal worth of all
human beings, it declares men to be women’s “guardians” and “a degree
above” them (Ahmed 1986:678-679). A wife’s duties, then, include obe¬
dience to her husband (Higgens 1985). According to the Qur’an, “Men
are in charge of women because God has made one to excel over the
other and because they spend their wealth” [referring to men’s financial
support of women] (quoted in Haddad 1985:294). Unfortunately, Mo¬
hamad’s successors took these words to heart and used them to justify the
suspension of many rights the prophet had allowed women, so that “by
the second and third centuries of Islam, ‘the seclusion and degradation
of women had progressed beyond anything known in the first decades of
Islam’ ” (Ahmed 1986:690).
Today, many Islamic leaders maintain that men and women hold
equal status, although they are quick to emphasize that this equality does
not derive from sharing the same privileges and responsibilities, but
rather from the complementarity of their roles. “In this world view men and
women are equal before God, but they have somewhat different physical,
mental, and emotional qualities, somewhat different responsibilities in
the family and society, and therefore somewhat different rights and pre¬
rogatives” (Higgens 1985:491).
Men are the undisputed heads of both the sacred and secular
realms, including the household. Theirs is the public sphere, where they
conduct religious and worldly affairs and assume a variety of roles with
few restrictions. Women, in contrast, are largely confined to the private
sphere, the home, but even there they are not in charge. Their duties are
to serve their husbands, to keep house, to bear many children, and to
instruct the children in the ways of Islam. “Not only is [the Muslim
woman] created to be pregnant [she is an “envelope for conception”
according to one Islamic leader], but more specifically all her roles are
418 Chapter 11
defined by her relations to the men in her life. . . . Thus is created the
ideal of a self-sacrificing individual whose existence is fulfilled only in the
service of others and whose joy is completed by making others happy”
(Haddad 1985:286).
Although Islamic doctrine continues to uphold the rights of both
spouses to sexual pleasure and gratification, sex outside of marriage is
condemned as harmful to the individual involved and as potentially
dangerous to the moral fiber of Islamic society as a whole. Because
women are thought to possess an innate capacity for sexual allurement,
extraordinary measures (by Western standards at least) are taken to
prevent them from tempting men. The most obvious examples of this are
purdah and the chador. Purdah refers to the practice of severely restricting
women’s access to public life by secluding them in their homes and
permitting them to venture out only in cases of emergency or out of
necessity. In some Islamic societies, such as Saudi Arabia, women are
prohibited from traveling alone and must be accompanied by their fa¬
thers, brothers, or a close male relative, unless they have written permis¬
sion from one of these individuals that states they may travel alone
(Goodwin 1994; Ahmed 1992). When a Muslim woman appears in public,
she must dress “modestly” that is, veiled and clothed in a loose-fitting
garment (the chador) that covers her from head to toe. Originally, such
restrictions were imposed only on Mohamad’s wives, but after his death
they were extended to all Muslim women, a practice that continues today
(Ahmed 1986; Haddad 1985).
This does not mean that there are no women in public life, but every
effort is made to insure that they do not mingle with the opposite sex—
that they are, in effect, invisible to men. There are female physicians, for
instance, but they treat only female patients, just as female teachers
instruct only female students (Harrow 1985; Higgens 1985). In Saudi
Arabia, all banks have women’s branches where only female tellers and
lending officers work and attend to an all-female clientele (Goodwin
1994). “In the Islamic nation of Oman, women are permitted to attend
the country’s only college—but they have to enter segregated classes
through their own back door, and the entire campus has a system of
overhead walkways for the exclusive use of women, so that contact with
men can be avoided at all times” (Robertson 1987:320). Women are also
excluded from the mosques and from most religious rituals, although
they do make regular visits to the sanctuaries of Islamic saints where men,
though permitted, rarely go (Goodwin 1994; Mernissi 1977).
\ There are less orthodox sects of Islam, such as Sufi and Qarmati,
that are somewhat more liberal towards women. It is also the case that the
level of orthodoxy varies by country as well as sect. Lebanon, for example,
appears to be more liberal than Saudi Arabia. The Saudi religious police,
the Committee for Commendation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice,
patrol city streets and shopping malls, stopping women if strands of hair
are showing, ensuring that women do not drive, and arresting those who
are acting immorally (e.g., talking to young men to whom they are unre¬
lated) (Goodwin 1994; Hedges 1993). In 1994, Islamic fundamentalists in
Algeria killed two young women who appeared in public unveiled {New
York Times 31 March 1994:2).
However, while fundamentalism remains the rule rather than the
exception in most Islamic societies, Islam has not heen left untouched by
feminism (Afshar 1993; Ahmed 1992). In Saudi Arabia and other Islamic
countries, as well as within Muslim communities in the United States,
small groups of women have begun to organize and develop strategies on
how to obtain more rights and freedom, including more job opportuni¬
ties and the right to study the Qur’an at the mosque. Feminist Islamic
scholars have also begun reinterpreting sacred texts, arguing on the basis
of their research that the Qur’an does not dictate a patriarchal society;
rather, it has been interpretations of the Qur’an by patriarchal men that
have produced such dictates (Ahmed 1992; Miller 1992).
Nevertheless, the revolutions that have taken place in recent years
in several Islamic countries have meant for most a return to orthodox
practices after an interlude of Western modernization. Interestingly,
while some young women and men have expressed their displeasure over
this renewed orthodoxy, there have been few signs of resistance among
the majority of the countries’ populations. Most women, in fact, have
donned the veil and chador with, a willingness that puzzles many Western
observers. Ironically, however, it appears that they are motivated by many
of the same factors that prompted the women in Kaufman’s (1991) study
that we discussed earlier to convert to Orthodox Judaism. More specifi¬
cally, many Muslim women explain their openness to orthodoxy in terms
of institutional protection. A veiled woman is recognized by all as reli¬
giously devout and off limits to men. She may go about her business
without fear of being molested or harassed (El-Or 1993; Ahmed 1992;
Miller 1992).
It is also the case that for some women donning the veil and chador
is a political statement—an expression of militancy, rebellion, and protest
against oppressive political regimes and Western imperialism in their
countries (Afshar 1993; Ahmed 1992; Harrow 1985; Higgens 1985). To
these women, the enemy is not male oppression, but rather outside forces
that threaten to destroy the Islamic way of life. Through their devotion to
Islam, as evidenced by their adherence to its laws and customs, many
Muslim women see themselves on the front lines of the revolution (Had¬
dad 1985).
In some ways, then, the conservative politicization of Islamic women
gives them more in common with Orthodox Jewish women and American
Christian fundamentalist women than would at first be thought. Each of
420 Chapter 11
these groups has a particular vision of how their society should be struc¬
tured and women’s distinct place within that structure—a vision shaped
by their religious beliefs. Importantly, both Islamic and Christian funda¬
mentalists integrate their religious beliefs into political activity in an
effort to make their vision a reality. Let’s consider this issue further by
discussing the political activism of two religious movements in the United
States: the Evangelical New Right and the liberation theology of minority
churches.
RELIGION, POLITICS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE
As we noted at the conclusion of chapter 10, theoretically at least, the

church and the government in the United States are supposed to consti¬
tute separate spheres of influence. Yet, sociologists have long recognized
that the ideology of the separation of church and state is largely a myth.
In practice, the affairs of the state and the interests of organized religion
are closely and complexly intertwined. Historians tell us, for example,
that Christian fundamentalists or “Evangelicals” as they are sometimes
called, were active in the American Revolution, the abolitionist move¬
ment, the campaign for prison reform in the late 1700s, and a number of
other political causes and social reforms (Pohli 1983).
Today, Evangelicals remain politically active, constituting what many
refer to as the “New Right.” It is estimated that the New Right as a political
constituency comprises 25 percent of the U.S. adult population and that
a large percentage of this group identifies itself as Evangelicals or funda¬
mentalist Christians. Put another way, the Evangelical New Right has
about 43 million members, which, although small relative to the total U.S.
population, is still a sizeable number. More importantly, this group has
taken a strong public stand on what it calls “family issues”; for example,
abortion and reproductive freedonj, sex education, homosexual rights,
and gender equality—in short, issues that feminists strongly support
(Pohli 1983). Because of the New Right’s political activism on these issues
and the political impact it could have on any progress that has been made
toward gender equality, it deserves our serious attention here. However,
we will also see that while religion as represented by groups in the New
Right seeks to preserve the status quo, it can also inspire resistance to
oppression and promote liberating social change.
The Politics of Gender in the Evangelical New Right

Fundamentalist Christians or Evangelicals interpret the Bible literally,
taking it to be truly God’s word. At the same time, they believe that one
can only attain eternal salvation by living one’s life in accordance with the
teachings of the Bible and thus developing a personal relationship with

Jesus Christ. Evangelical leaders also exhort their congregations to be
soldiers of Christ” by combatting the erosion of biblical values in the
secular world. According to the New Right, feminism, homosexual rights,
and other liberal political and social movements are at the core of this
erosion of values (Klatch 1988; Pohli 1983).
Not surprisingly, the fundamentalist Christian churches, along with
other conservative Christian groups such as the predominantly Catholic
Right to Life Movement, have been at the forefront of political opposition
to feminist-supported policies and programs. For instance, they lobbied
aggressively and successfully against the Equal Rights Amendment (see
chapter 13), and they have spearheaded campaigns to remove feminist
and other types of “objectionable” books and materials from school li¬
braries and classrooms. Since 1973, they have lobbied Congress for a
Human Life Amendment that would overturn Roe\. Wade and once again
outlaw abortion. In 1990, Catholic bishops in the United States even
hired a public relations firm to present their anti-abortion message more
favorably to the general public.
In the view of the religious New Right, feminism and its goals, as well
as other movements such as gay rights, undermine the Christian family by
promoting lifestyles and values inimical to “God’s plan” for men and
women. More specifically, they adhere strongly to the belief that a man’s
role is to provide for and protect his family, while a woman’s appropriate
place is at home caring for her husband and children. And just as men
are subordinate to God, so are women subordinate to men (Klatch 1988;
Connover and Gray 1983; Pohli 1983).
The religious New Right has won some impressive political victories.
In local elections throughout the United States in 1992, for example,
fundamentalist Christian candidates won about 40 percent of the political
races in which they entered (Mydans 1992). Some analysts attribute this
success to New Right leaders’ masterful use of computer-generated
mailing and telecommunications not only to promote their political
positions, but also as fundraising tools. “Nearly a thousand American
radio stations and eighty television stations are devoted to religious pro¬
gramming, most of which promote the fundamentalist message” (Robert¬
son 1987:414). In a 1989 Gallup survey, nearly one-half of adults
questioned reported that they had watched religious programming on
television at least once, while 21 percent identified themselves as weekly
viewers (Colasanto and De Stefano 1989). The Evangelicals’ telecommu¬
nications network has also helped to generate contributions that provide
the Christian Coalition—the political organization of televangelist Pat
Robertson—^with an annual budget of $8 million to $10 million (Sullivan
1993). It has also become more politically savvy. Recognizing, for in¬
stance, that many moderate voters shy away from extremist groups, fun-
422 Chapter 11
\
damentalist Christian candidates have employed what they call “stealth

tactics” in their campaigns. That is, they hide or downplay their ties to
organizations such as the Christian Coalition, thereby making themselves
more appealing to a wider range of voters (Sullivan 1993). Finally, the
Religious Right has narrowed its goals, focusing primarily on winning
control of the Republican Party, defeating all homosexual rights mea¬
sures, and recriminalizing abortion (Rhoads 1993; Sullivan 1993; Sydell
1993).
Although sexual and financial scandals involving New Right church
leaders damaged the movement’s credibility among some of its followers,
it has enjoyed a resurgence since 1990. While some analysts have argued
that the strength and popularity of the religious New Right is overstated,
most feminists and gay rights activists view the religious right as a power¬
ful political foe—an issue we will take up again in chapter 13.
Minority Churches: Resistance and Liberation

The Evangelical New Right represents a religious organization opposed
to both liberal social change and social equality. For minority group
members, however, the church has often'been the source of inspiration
and strength in their struggles to overcome discrimination and to secure
equal rights and opportunities. The black churches, for example, have
produced many prominent and influential political leaders and social
activists, such as the late Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Rev. Leon
Sullivan. A number of black politicians were first ministers in black
churches: the Rev. Jesse Jackson, for instance, and former Congressman
William Gray of Pennsylvania. The black churches, in particular, have
historically provided an organizational center within the black commu¬
nity where members could develop programs of action to overcome racial
oppression; the Rev. King’s strategy of nonviolent civil disobedience and
direct action is an example (Lincoln and Mamiya 1990).
Even before the Rev. King’s leadership, however, minority churches
were centers of social and political activism for women of color. As we
noted earlier, for example, women historically have constituted the ma¬
jority of members of many black churches (Grant 1986; Gilkes 1985). As
historian Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham (1993) has documented, African-
American churchwomen’s activities have long been a means by which
they nurtured the survival of their communities, articulated a group
consciousness, and organized resistance to oppression. Hunt (1991:32)
\ refers to their “holy boldness” as religious agents in their community
churches, and Natividad (1992) even attributes the contemporary pre¬
dominance of African-American women in politics relative to other
women of color to their long-term experiences as community and church
leaders (see also Prestage 1991; and chapter 10).
Yet despite their numbers and their level of participation in and

support of their churches, minority women have encountered sexism and
considerable resistance from black male church leaders to their assuming
leadership roles within the church. “Most often this takes the form of
barring women from a formally defined ministerial office even when they
may already be performing its functions. Hence, in some Afro-American
Pentecostal Churches, the male ministers hold the title ‘preacher’ but
women ministers are called ‘teacher’ although their tasks may be identi¬
cal” (Briggs 1987:411; Lincoln and Mamiya 1990; Grant 1986).
It is estimated that just 5 percent of black clergy are female (Lincoln
and Mamiya 1990). Currently, African Americans represent just 8.8 per¬
cent of theological school enrollments, and 25 percent of these black
students are females. However, almost half of the black female students
are enrolled in only two-year programs. The numbers are similar for
other racial minorities. Hispanics constitute 2.6 percent of theology stu¬
dents and Asian Americans 4.9 percent (Bedell 1993; Briggs 1987).
It appears, then, that while minority churches have served as cata¬
lysts for social action against racial oppression, this has not typically
extended to the problem of gender inequality within society or within the
churches themselves (Grant 1986). This disparity has not lessened minor¬
ity women’s identification with their churches nor their community activ¬
ism through their churches. In fact, minority churchwomen themselves
have been reluctant to identify their activities and concerns as feminist,
since they generally see feminism as a white, middle-class women’s move¬
ment (Briggs 1987; see also chapter 13). Nevertheless, minority feminist
theologians have joined with white feminist theologians in critiquing the
sexism of the dominant religious traditions and in working to depatriar-
chalize these religions. To conclude our discussion, therefore, we turn to
an examination of these efforts.
CHALLENGES TO PATRIARCHAL RELIGIONS:

FEMINIST SPIRITUALITY
It is really inaccurate to speak of feminist spirituality in the singular or to

depict it as a unified religious movement, for within it one hears a
plurality of voices professing different beliefs and advocating different
strategies for change and reconstruction. Yet there are some common
themes, perhaps the most important being the rejection of the dualism of
patriarchal religions. More specifically, the major patriarchal religious
traditions separate God and the world, and spirit and body (or nature),
viewing them as distinct and placing human beings in tension between
them. According to feminists, “This [dualistic model] is a model for
domination, because [it divides reality] into two levels, one superior and
424 Chapter 11
one inferior” (Christ and Plaskow 1979:5). In contrast, feminists empha¬

size the unity of spirit and nature and see experience as the source of
spirituality. Experience includes the events of the life cycle (e.g., men-
arche, coupling or marriage, parenthood, and so on) as well as develop¬
ing an awareness of one’s location in the social structure: recognizing
oppression, confronting it, and acting to bring about liberation (Ander¬
son and Hopkins 1991; Ruether 1988; Welch 1985). It is over the issue of
how to implement this principle, however, that feminist spiritualists part
company with one another.
There are those who consider the Judeo-Christian traditions and
other patriarchal religions as so hopelessly mired in sexism that they have
abandoned them altogether. In their stead, some have turned to ecology
(see Box 11.1), others are rediscovering the ancient prebiblical goddess
traditions, and still others are reviving the practice of witchcraft (Christ
1987; Adler 1983; Starhawk 1979). Some advocate a complete break with
men and all that is male-identified (e.g., Daly 1984; 1978), but many
welcome women and men into their traditions on the ground that patri¬
archal religions may oppress members of both sexes through hetero¬
sexism, racism, and class bias, for example. From this perspective,
women’s experiences may provide the foundation for a feminist spiritual¬
ity, but simply substituting female religious supremacy for male religious
supremacy offers little potential for liberation for members of either sex
(Anderson and Hopkins 1991).
As we have noted throughout this chapter, however, not all feminists
are completely disenchanted with the Judeo-Christian traditions. Some,
often called “reformers,” have chosen instead to challenge patriarchal
religious forms and to reclaim Judeo-Christian history, language, symbols,
and ritual as their own (Christ and Plaskow 1979). To them, Judaism and
Christianity contain “the seeds of [their] own renewal” and, more impor¬
tantly, “these feminists believe that the church [and synagogue are] worth
renewing” (Weidman 1984:2, author’s emphasis).
The first line of attack by this camp is to rename t\\c elements of their
religions so that they speak to women as well as to men (Chopp 1989). At
the most basic level, this means divesting God-talk and religious symbol¬
ism of its he/man qualities—for example, depicting the deity as both
female and male, referring to God as She or Mother, or using gender-
inclusive or gender-neutral language such as Mother and Father or simply
Holy One.
Once God is no longer imaged solely as male, the next step is to
rediscover women’s contributions to Judeo-Christian heritage by critically
rereading scriptures and examining other available evidence. From such
careful study, we now know of the wealth of feminine imagery in the Old
Testament and of the many ancient Hebrew heroines, wisewomen, and
Ecofeminiem 30X 11.1
Ecofeminism emerged during the 1970s as a branch of feminism that celebrates

what its adherents see as innate personality traits of women—caring, nurtur-
ance, gentleness—and women’s close association with nature. As Irene Dia¬
mond (1992:371) explains, it is “an ethic and politics which sees a connection
between the domination of women and the domination of nature.” It is an
earth-based spirituality movement that draws heavily on goddess imagery and
ritual—not surprisingly given that, as we learned earlier, goddess worship cele¬
brated many aspects of female biology, but especially women’s sexuality and re¬
productive capacities. There is an emphasis on healing, ecological balance, an
equality of all Imng beings (human and nonhuman), and regeneration.
Ecofeminism combines its spiritual emphases with direct political action
to bring about a more harmonious, ecologically balanced society. Because of
women’s biology—as reproducers and nurturers—they are closer to the earth.
Similarly, because women have been exploited and denigrated, they more fully
understand the exploitation and denigration of the biosphere, as well as the ex¬
ploitation and denigration of Third World peoples through Western imperial¬
ism and economic development models. Consequently, it is women who are
best suited to lead the ecology movement and to develop a nonhierarchical soci¬
ety based on respect for all living things. To be effective leaders, however,
women must get back in touch with their bodies and discover the full power of
their natural femaleness. Hence, the return to goddess spirituality.
It is hardly surprising that ecofeminism is a controversial movement, even
among feminists. While it has been praised for highlighting the dangers of envi¬
ronmental exploitation, it has been criticized for biologizing traditional West¬
ern femininity and glorifying the notion of a universal female nature. This
criticism once again goes to the heart of the equality vs. difference debate
within feminism. A number of feminist theorists see a serious danger in
ecofeminists’ emphasis on women’s biologically based differences from men. As
one feminist critic (Biehl 1990:9, 11) explains:
When sociobiological justifications of androcentrism build reproductive

differences into elaborate theories of “female nature,” feminists have
traditionally shown that they unjustly shore up sexist institutions and
ideologies. . . . When ecofeminists root women’s personality traits in
reproductive and sexual biology, they tend to give acceptance to those
male-created images that define women as primarily biological beings-
Indeed, ecofeminism’s healthy impulse to claim women’s biology has in
many cases become an acceptance of the same constricting stereotypes of
“women’s nature” that have long been used to oppress them.
Despite these objections to ecofeminism—and they are by no means insig¬

nificant—most feminists agree that this movement makes important contribu¬
tions to both feminist spirituality and the political liberation of the oppressed.
First, it provides women with another option for religious expression one
426 Chapter 11
\
3ox 11.1 Continued
which, like the orthodox religions we have discussed, accords them dignity and
a special revered status. At the same time, and perhaps more importantly, it ex¬
tends this dignity and status to the oppressed Third World. Consequently, it has
succeeded in forging ties between Western feminists and Third World people,s—
something mainstream feminism has long failed to do (see chapter 13).
religious leaders; we have already mentioned Deborah, but there was also
Vashti, Esther, Huldah, and Beruriah to name just a few examples
(Pogrebin 1992; Brooten 1982; Gendler 1979). We also noted Jesus’
female disciples and their central leadership roles in the early Christian
church; among them were Junia who is referred to in Romans 16:7 as
apostle, and Phoebe who was a missionary coworker with St. Paul.
In addition to renaming and rediscovering, feminist reformers are
restructuring religious ritual so that it is relevant to women as well as men.
Jewish feminists, in particular, have beeji active in developing women’s
services and ceremonies for the Sabbath, Haggadah, Rosh Hodesh, Pass-
over, and other holidays (Pogrebin 1992; Brozan 1990; Briggs 1987;
Ehrenberg et al. 1983; Agus 1979; Zuckoff 1979). Christian feminists have
written women’s prayers, organized women’s prayer groups, and told
women’s stories and perspectives from church pulpits (Byrne 1991; n.a.
1982). In some cases, their efforts have resulted in changes in mainstream
religious practices, such as the adoption of gender-neutral language in
church services (see, for example, Canadian Bishops’ Pastoral Team
1989).
Like those who have broken with Judeo-Christian traditions, reli¬
gious reformers are split on the^ issue of whether feminist spirituality
should be a women-only enterprise or a joint venture that includes mem¬
bers of both sexes. There are some who maintain that women need
separate places and methods for worship, at least until they have fully
reclaimed their religious heritage and reestablished a position of equal
status and authority within Judaism and Christianity. Others are con¬
cerned that feminist spirituality is dominated by white heterosexual
women, while the diverse traditions and spiritual needs of minority
women and men along with lesbians and gay men are being overlooked.
Consequently, there are those (e.g., Isasi-Diaz 1991; Mollenkott 1991)
who are calling on members of these groups to rediscover or to con¬
struct new religious traditions and rituals that better express the spiritu¬
ality of their life experiences. Still others, however, argue that separatism
itself gives rise to and perpetuates inequality, and that the goal of
feminist spirituality should be the building of a nonhierarchical hu¬
man fellowship irrespective of individuals’ sex, race, social class, or sexual
orientation.
Of course, it may be that this issue is tmresolvable, but we do hope
that through the struggle to come to grips with it, people will develop
better ways to fulfill what appears to be a basic human need, religious
expression. WTiat we must keep in mind, however, is that a resurging
religious fundamentalism threatens to negate even the most modest steps
that have been taken toward gender equality. Despite the appeal that
orthodoxy has for some women, it is nevertheless the case that religious
fundamentalists vehemently oppose liberal trends, especially in gender
relations, and they are becoming more active politically so as to get
their position represented in civil as well as religious law. Increasingly,
feminism is being held up as a devil to be combatted, rather than as a
movement for liberation. In Israel, religious leaders are arguing that
orthodoxy is a unifying force central to national security. In the Arab
world, women’s liberation is described as a United States-Zionist plot
to weaken Islamic nations and eventually overthrow them. In the
United States, pro-choice advocates are pitted against those who oppose
abortion on religious grounds (Klatch 1988; Haddad 1985). Perhaps the
underlying message in all this is that more can be gained by feminist
spiritualists working together—women and men, homosexuals and het¬
erosexuals, all races and social classes—than by each group going its
separate ways.
KEY TERMS
feminist spirituality a religious movement comprising diverse segments with

differing beliefs and strategies for change, but unified in rejecting the du¬
alism characteristic of traditional patriarchal religions; dualism is re¬
placed with the theme of the unification of spirit and nature and the
principle that human experience is the source of spirituality
Qur’an (or Quran, variation of Koran) the book of sacred writings accepted
by Muslims as revelations made to Mohamad by Allah; understood by
Muslims to be literally the word of God.
religiosity the intensity of commitment of an individual or group to a reli¬
gious belief system
Talmud constitutes the foundation of religious authority for traditional Juda¬
ism
witchcraft naturalistic practices with religious significance usually engaged in
by women; includes folk magic and medicine as well as knowledge of
farming, ceramics, metallurgy, and astrology.
428 Chapter 11
SUGGESTED READINGS
Ahmed, L. 1992. Women and Gender in Islam. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Gimbutas, M. 1989. The Language of the Goddess. New York: Harper and Row.
Heyward, C. 1989. Touching Our Strength: The Erotic as Power and the Love of God.
New York: Harper Collins.
Higgenbotham, E. B. 1993. Righteous Discontent: The Women’s Movement and the
Black Baptist Ghurch, 1880-1920. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Kaufman, D. R. 1991. Rachel’s Daughters: Newly Orthodox Jewish Women. New Bruns¬
wick: Rutgers University Press.
Pogrebin, L. C. 1992. Deborah, Golda, and Me: Being Female and Jewish in America.
New York: Crown Publishers.
\
1
Gender and Health

430 Chafittr 12
A top prioiitv on the national agenda right now is health cate and. in
particular, access to health care. .\s health care costs rose dining the
1980s at a rate of nearly 8 percent a year (compared with an average
increase of 4.6 percent for all items on tiie Consumer Price Index), access
to health care shrunk for large segments of the U.S. population. By 1991.
15.7 percent of the U.S. population (39 million people) were medically
nninsnred, a 27 percent increase since 1980. An additional 15 to 25
million people were nnderinsnred, and about 63 million people dining
any two-year period lose their medical insurance tempoiaiih (Hilts 1991,
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1991; Johnson et al.
1988). At the same time that access to health care was shrinking tor
specific segments of the population, there was increasing interest in how-
diet and lifestvle choices contribute to health. In response to reports that
diet, exercise, and other aspects of an indh-iduafs lifestyle affect her or
his health, many .\mericans quit smoking, began eating low-tat high-fiber
foods, and spent millions of dollars on health chib memberships and
exercise equipment.
Importantly, the individuals who make up the first group we have
discussed—the uninsured and nnderinsnred—have little in common ivith
those who make up the second group. .Almost one fifth ot the nninsnred
are children under the age of 15 ivho live with an unemployed parent or
a parent who is ivorking part-time or full-time in a job that provides no
medical benefits. The number of workers who have emplover-proHded
health insurance has been declining since 1982 (Children's Detense
Fund 1991; Johnson et al. 1988). More than 58 percent of the uninsured
have annual family incomes less than $25,000 per vear; more than a third
have incomes below $14,000 per vear. And about 80 percent ot the
uninsured are women and men of color (U.S. Department of Health and
Human SerMces 1991). In contrast, the “health chib set" is predominantlv
white, ivith middle-class or higher average annual incomes, and between
the ages of tiventv-five and fortv-fonr (National Demographics and Life-
styles"l994).
In short, although research has established direct links between diet
and lifestyle and health, what ive eat and hoiv ive live is less of a choice for
some people than for others. One’s health and one’s access to health
care, along w'ith one’s diet and one’s lifestyle, are intlnenced to a consid¬
erable extent by a number of factors over which individuals have little
control: most importantly, race and ethnicity, social class, age and. as we
ivill learn in this chapter, sex.
In this chapter, we will consider how sex and gender relations affect
health status and how’ they interact isith other factors—race, social class, age.
sexual orientation—to shape not only health status, but also the phvsician-
patient relationship and one’s treatment within the health care svstem.
Gender and Health 431
It is important to keep in mind that our conception of health

encompasses more than simply the absence of illness. Health is, as the
World Health Organization (1960:1) has told us, multi-dimensional. It is
a complete state of physical, mental, and social well-being.” We will begin
with a discussion of physical health. Later in the chapter we will take up
the issue of mental health.
GENDER AND MORTALITY
One of the most consistent sex differences that can be observed across
contemporary industrialized societies is that women, on average, live
longer than men (see Box 12.1 for a discussion of sex and life expectancy
in Third Wbrld countries). Looking at Table 12.1 on pages 434-435, we
see first that the United States ranks low relative to many other countries
in terms of both female and male life expectancy. (Life expectancy refers
to the average number of years an individual may be expected to live from
a given age or from birth.) The United States ranks fifteenth in terms of
both female and male life expectancy. (The U.S. rankings declined dur¬
ing the 1980s.) However, in all the countries listed, women have a longer
life expectancy than men. The gap is narrowest in Greece, but even there,
the difference is more than five years.
As Table 12.2 on page 433 shows, even though life expectancy for
both sexes has improved over the decades, women’s advantage increased
significantly from the turn of the century until 1975. In the United States,
for example, there was only a two-year difference in female and male life
expectancies in 1900. By 1970, the life expectancy gap between the sexes
had widened to 7.7 years. Since 1975, this trend has slowed somewhat for
women and men in particular age groups; for instance, “in 1980, the sex
differential for persons aged 55 to 64 was lower than it was in 1970”
(Cleary 1987:57).
We also see in Table 12.2 a consistent racial disparity in life expec¬
tancy. Whites enjoy a six-year advantage over blacks in terms of life
expectancy. In fact, the life expectancy of black males in 1990 was only
slightly better than the life expectancy of white males in 1940. Similarly,
the life expectancy of black females in 1990 was little better than the life
expectancy of white females in 1950. The gender gap in life expectancy
has not narrowed as much for blacks as it has for whites, indicating that
race is a more significant factor than sex in the life expectancies of
African Americans. Nevertheless, a significant sex difference in life expec¬
tancy persists regardless of race.
A number of theories have been offered to account for the sex
differential in life expectancy. At least part of the difference appears to
432 Chapter 12
\
TA3LE 12.1 Life Expectancy at Birth, by Sex, for Selected Countries*

Female Life Expectancy Male Life Expectancy
(in years) (in years)
Country
82^5 76.2
Japan
81.5 73.1
France
81.3 74.1
Switzerland
81.1 73.7
Netherlands
80.6 73.7
Canada
80.3 73.6
Spain
Sweden 80.1 74.2
80.1 74.3
Hong Kong
Norway 80.0 73.3
79.9 73.3
Italy
Australia 79.6 73.3
Greece 79.4 74.3
Germany 79.2 72.6
Finland 79.0 70.9
Austria 78.9 72.1
United States 78.6 71.8
England and Wales 78.4 , , 72.9
Portugal 78.2 71.1
Belgium 78.2 71.4
Denmark 77.9 72.2
*Data cover the period 1983-1990.

Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1993;42-43.
be caused by genetic factors. As we learned in chapter 2, humans have

twenty-three pairs of chromosomes, one of which determines sex. If an
individual is male, his sex chron;iosomes are XY; a female has two X
chromosomes. Scientists know that the X chromosome carries more ge¬
netic information than the Y, including some defects that can lead to
physical abnormalities, but instead of making females more vulnerable to
X-linked disorders, this seems to give them a genetic advantage. A female
typically needs two defective X chromosomes for most genetically linked
disorders to manifest themselves; otherwise, one healthy X chromosome
can override the abnormal one. On the other hand, a male who has a
defective X chromosome will have the genetically linked disease because
that is the only X chromosome he has. This is thought to account for the
higher number of miscarriages of male fetuses and the greater ratio of
male to female infant deaths (146:100) and deaths at all ages due to
congenital abnormalities (120:100) (Holden 1987; Harrison 1984).
TA3LE 12.2 Life Expectancy at Birth, by Sex and Race. 1900-•1990

All Races White Black*
Year Male Female Male Female Male Female
1900 46.3 48.3 46.6 48.7 32.5 33.5
1920 53.6 54.6 54.4 55.6 45.5 45.2
1930 58.1 61.6 59.7 63.5 47.3 49.2
1940 60.8 65.2 62.1 66.6 51.5 54.9
1950 65.6 71.1 66.5 72.2 58.9 62.7
1960 66.6 73.1 67.4 74.1 60.7 65.9
1970 67.1 74.8 68.0 75.6 60.0 68.3
1975 68.8 76.6 69.5 77.3 62.4 71.3
1980 70.0 in A 70.7 78.1 63.8 72.5
1985 71.1 78.2 71.8 78.7 65.0 73.4
1990 71.8 78.8 72.7 79.4 64.5 73.6
*Data for the years 1920, 1930, and 1940 include other nonwhite populations in addition to the black
populadon.
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1993:44; 1986:84; U.S. Department of Commerce
1990:72; 1987:69.
Some have hypothesized that hormonal differences between the

sexes contribute to the life expectancy gap; however, research in this area
has not produced consistent findings, so the role of hormones remains
unclear (Holden 1987; Waldron 1986; Verbrugge 1985). Marital status is
also related to life expectancy, at least for men. In one recent study, for
instance, researchers found that after controlling for crucial intervening
variables, such as income, education, smoking, drinking, and obesity, men
between the ages of forty-five and sixty-five who lived alone or with
someone other than a spouse were twice as likely to die within ten years
as men of the same age who lived with spouses. This relationship did not
hold for women; women were more negatively affected by low income
than by lack of a spouse. Although the researchers are not certain why
marriage appears to be so important to the health of men, previous
studies have shown that married men express a higher level of well-being
than their nonmarried peers. There appears to be no difference, how¬
ever, in the level of contentment expressed by married versus nonmarried
women (Davis et al. 1990; see also Hu and Goldman 1990; chapter 7).
We will return to the relationship between marital status and well¬
being later in this chapter. Importantly, though, this relationship may be
an indicator of another major component in men’s and women’s life
expectancy differential: behavioral differences between the sexes. More
434 Chapter 12
30X 12.1 6ex and Life Expectancy in the Third World

In Third World countries, life expectancy in general is considerably lower than
it is in developed and industrialized countries, and the gap between male and
female life expectancies is narrower. Average male and female life expectancies
in low-income (undeveloped) economies (excluding China and India) are
fifty-four and fifty-six respectively, whereas in high-income (industrialized)
economies they are seventy-three and seventy-nine respectively (World Bank
1991). *-
It appears that sex differences in life expectancies in the Third World are
related to gender norms and also to the feminization of poverty in these coun¬
tries. This is not to say that men in the Third World are not poor; poverty
touches the lives of Third World men as well as women. But as Doyal
(1990b:509) points out, “it is women who must manage the consequences of
poverty for the whole family” and this impacts on their life expectancy as well
as their general health.
Consider, for example, that women in the Third World are responsible
for securing water and fuel daily for their families. This usually means traveling
great distances by foot and carrying back (typically on their heads) heavy loads
while also often holding babies or small children. They also are involved in the
production of food for their families, usually through subsistence agriculture,
and because modern technology is rarely available to them, this means that
they must cultivate and harvest their crops by hand or using crude tools, such
as digging sticks. Grains must be husked and ground by hand, a process that
takes many hours and is physically exhausting. In addition, cooking the food
exposes the women to the hazards of inhaling wood smoke or emissions from
biomass fuels, such as cattle dung. “Emissions from biomass fuels are major
sources of air pollution in the home, and studies have shown that cooks inhale
more smoke and pollutants than the inhabitants of the dirtiest cities” (Doyal
1990b:510).
Customs also contribute to sex differences in health and life expectancy.
For instance, in some societies women are prohibited by religious and moral
teachings from being seen defecating,^so they must wait until dark to relieve
themselves. This, though, can lead to constipation and other bowel and intesti¬
nal problems and also increases their risk of assault. In many countries, cus¬
toms governing the distribution of food dictate that women and children will
eat less than men. According to Doyal (1990b:511);
In some cultures, it is common for boys to be breastfed considerably

longer than girls and for girl children to be fed less well than boys, thus
reducing their chances of surviving infancy. Adult men often sit down to
eat before their women and children, who get what remains. . . . Thus,
food which is itself in scarce supply is distributed according to the pres¬
tige of family members rather than their nutritional needs. As a result,
many women become anemic, especially during pregnancy, due to a lack
of basic nutrients.
30X 12.1 Continued
Consequently, it is hardly surprising tliat in some Third World countries, such

as Bangladesh and Nepal, the sex difference in life expectancy is the reverse of
that in industrialized countries; that is, in some Third World countries, men on
average outlive women (World Bank 1991; see also U.S. Department of State
1994).
specifically, we can observe a relationship between life expectancy and

conformity to traditional gender stereotypes. To understand this better,
we will examine male and female mortality rates for particular causes. (A
mortality rate is simply the number of deaths in proportion to a given
population.) Table 12.3 on page 436 provides sex- and race-specific mor¬
tality rates for a variety of causes. Let’s look at some of these more closely.
Heart Disease and Stroke
Male deaths from heart disease and stroke are about 60 percent higher
than female deaths due to these causes. It is estimated that these causes
of death combined account for 40 percent of the sex differential in
mortality (Waldron 1986). Why is there such a prevalence of these par¬
ticular diseases among men? Scientists maintain that a number of behav¬
ioral and cultural factors are responsible.
First, men are more likely to smoke than women. Twice as many
men, in fact, are heavy smokers, and cigarette smoking does lead to and
exacerbate heart disease. Yet, although cigarette smoking obviously plays
a major role, other factors are also at work since the differential is
substantial even among nonsmokers.
A second reason, which receives less consistent support in medical
research, is that men are more likely to adopt the Coronary Prone Behavior
Pattern, or what many call the Type A personality. Research indicates that
Type A individuals are more than twice as likely as laid-back Type B person¬
alities to suffer heart attacks, regardless of whether or not they smoke.
Interestingly, the characteristics of Type A closely parallel those typical of
traditional masculinity: competitiveness, impatience, ambition, and aggres¬
siveness (Spielberger and London 1985). Not surprisingly, then, some
physicians have reported that their coronary patients tend to appear
more masculine in a negative sense than other men (Helgeson 1990).
The findings with regard to Type A personalities are useful because
they illuminate the detrimental impact that stress can have on health.
436 Chapter 12
\
TA3LE 12 3 Mortality Rates for Selected Causes of Death, by Sex and Race, 1966
Mortality Rate
(deaths per 100,000 resident population)
Males Females
White Black White Black

Cause of Death
664.3 1061.3 369.9 581.6
All causes
202.0 275.9 103.1 168.1

Diseases of the heart
27.7 56.1 23.8 42.7
Cerebrovascular disease
160.3 248.1 111.2 137.2
Malignant neoplasms (cancer)
59.0 91.0 26.5 27.5
Respiratory system
16.5 21.6 10.9 15.5
Colorectal
27.4 26.5 15.2 10.7
Chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases
17.5 28.7 10.6 13.7
Pneumonia 8c influenza
11.5 20.0 4.8 8.7
Chronic liver disease 8c cirrhosis
11.3 23.6 9.5 25.4
Diabetes mellitus
Human immunodeficiency virus infection (AIDS) 15.0 44.2 1.1 9.9
46.4 62.4 17.6 20.4
Unintentional injuries
Motor vehicle accidents 26.3 28.9 11.0 9.3
20.1 12.4 4.8 2.4
Suicide
Homicide 8c legal intervention 8.9 68.7 2.8 13.0
Drug-induced causes 4.2 8.4 2.5 3.4
Alcohol-induced causes 9.9 26.6 2.8 7.7
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1993:45-46.
However, the relationship between stress and heart disease is still poorly
understood, and research is frequently colored by stereotypes. For exam¬
ple, early reports depicted heart, disease as a health problem of execu¬
tives, a middle- and upper-class disease, or as some referred to it, a
“disease of affluence.” Those most likely to be stricken were said to be
hardworking, successful professional men—men striving to “keep up with
the Joneses” and to get ahead. Blue-collar workers and housewives were
thought to be less susceptible, supposedly because they were less pres¬
sured, although it was predicted that women’s rates of coronary heart
disease would rise as more women entered professional fields (House
1986; Ehrenreich 1983).
Research based on such assumptions ignores the serious stressors
confronted by blue-collar workers: for example, speed-ups, little or no
control over work, and low rewards. This may partially account for the
higher CHD mortality rate among African American men who, as a
group, are underrepresented among white-collar professionals and over-
represented among unskilled laborers. In addition, as we noted in chap¬

ter 8, female-dominated jobs have been found to be among the most
stressful (LaCroix and Haynes 1987; Fleishman 1984), and female heart
attack patients do report having experienced more stressful life events
than male heart attack patients (Helgeson 1990). As we will see in our
discussion of mental health, the traditional homemaker role also can be
debilitating for women (Doyal 1990a; Rosenberg 1984).
Significantly, though, while employed women face the doubly stress¬
ful burden of job responsibilities coupled with home and family care,
there is no evidence that they are more likely than full-time homemakers
to develop coronary heart disease. Indeed, empirical research indicates
that just the opposite may be the case. Women employed outside the
home appear to be healthier than nonemployed women, even when
employed women must fulfill multiple roles, such as worker, parent,
spouse, and homemaker. According to LaCroix and Haynes (1987:103),
“the employment role is the strongest correlate of good health for
women,” although it is unclear why; there is evidence that role quality may
be more important for well-being than role occupancy per se (Barnett
and Baruch 1987). More research is needed—for instance, on sex differ¬
ences in social support networks among coworkers, relationships between
supervisors and their employees, the socioeconomic benefits of working
outside the home, and sex differences in access to and use of health care
services—before the gender-specific relationships between stress and
health are more fully understood.
Although women’s mortality rates from heart and cardiovascular
diseases are lower than those of men, these are still the primary causes of
death for women. Moreover, when age is taken into account, as many
women as men die from heart disease and related disorders. Although
heart attacks are rare for premenopausal women under the age of fifty,
the heart attack rate for postmenopausal women climbs quickly, soon
equaling the heart attack rate for men over fifty years old. It appears that
women actually develop heart disease at a rate similar to that of men, but
six to ten years later in life, and that the symptomatic manifestation of
heart disease in women may follow a different pattern than that in men
(Henig 1993). Women also constitute two-thirds of those who suffer a
heart problem known as Syndrome X. Syndrome X appears to be caused by
hypersensitivity in the nerves leading to the heart, esophagus, and chest,
but it is still a poorly understood and underresearched problem (Cannon
1993). In fact, some medical researchers have argued that far less is
known about heart disease in women because until quite recently studies
of heart disease focused exclusively on male subjects, thus perhaps
erroneously generalizing from the findings on one sex to both sexes
and reinforcing the false notion that women are unlikely to suffer from
heart disease and its effects (Nechas and Foley 1994). This is a point
438 Chapter 12
to which we will return when we discuss the physician-patient relation-

ship.
Looking back at Table 12.3 for a moment we see that African-Ameri¬
can men’s and women’s mortality rates from heart and cerebrovascular
diseases are considerably higher than those of white men and women,
although the rate for African-American women is still far below that of
African-American men. Recent research suggests that racism may be a
contributing factor to the higher mortality rates of African Americans for
these causes of death. Studies indicate that suppressed anger over racism
may lead to elevated blood pressure and hypertension in African Ameri¬
cans, which in turn may contribute to their higher rates of death from
CHD and related causes. A number of studies (e.g., Klag et al. 1991;
Armstead et al. 1989) have shown that experiences of racism are an
especially powerful trigger of anger in African Americans, but that the
anger frequently is suppressed for fear of losing one’s job, for example,
or of being victimized by more overt violence. This suppressed anger,
along with other risk factors prevalent among African Americans (e.g., a
greater probability of retaining salt under emotionally stressful condi¬
tions) can, over a period of years, lead to hypertension, chronic high
blood pressure, and CHD.
Cancer
Men’s death rate due to cancer is more than 60 percent higher than
women’s cancer death rate, with the exception of breast cancer and other
sex-specific cancers (e.g., ovarian cancer). Again, men’s smoking habits
contribute to this difference. Not only do men smoke more than women,
but also historically they have begun smoking at younger ages, they inhale
more deeply, and they smoke more of each cigarette they light (Waldon
1986). There is evidence that rates of smoking by both men and women
are declining, although women’s rate of smoking appears to be declining
more slowly than that of men (Biener 1987; Cleary 1987); the fastest
growing group of smokers in the United States is young women under the
age of twenty-three. It is estimated that each day, 2,000 young women start
smoking (U.S. House of Representatives 1990). Moreover, the tobacco
industry has moved aggressively to counter anti-smoking campaigns by
marketing new brands of cigarettes to specific groups in the United States
and abroad. In India, for example, the Golden Tobacco Company intro¬
duced a new cigarette brand, Ms., in 1990 with advertisements aimed at
Indian women who want to pursue a “modern, liberated” lifestyle—ads
reminiscent of the Virginia Slims ad campaigns in the United States
(Crosette 1990). Also in 1990, the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company test-
marketed a new cigarette brand called Uptoiun targeted mainly at African
Americans, a group that suffers from higher rates of all forms of cancer.
However, after considerable government and public pressure, the com¬

pany withdrew the cigarette.
Adding to the risk of developing cancer are industrial hazards,
especially the inhalation of particular dusts such as asbestos, and expo¬
sure to toxic fumes and chemicals (Waldron 1986). Men are more likely
to experience toxic workplace exposures—another byproduct of occupa¬
tional sex segregation. However, certain female-dominated jobs—such as
micro-chip and electronic component assembly, which is more than 90
percent female, a majority of whom are women of color—involve exten¬
sive exposure to toxic chemicals (Fox 1991). Yet, less is known about
occupationally related cancers and female mortality, since most research
involving women has focused on their reproductive health. This is an
important point that deserves further attention.
Occupational Hazards to Male and Female Workers

There’s a certain irony in the phrase, “to work for a living,” given that
many workplaces are quite hazardous, even deadly. Historically, a recog¬
nition of this led to the enactment of laws prohibiting the employment of
women in particular occupations. The stated rationale for such measures
was not simply that women are “the weaker sex,” but also that their
childbearing function warranted them special protection so as to insure
the health and viability of future generations. In practice, “protective”
legislation has had two major effects: (1) legitimation of employment
discrimination against women; and (2) neglect of the potential risks
posed by workplace hazards to male workers’ health, including their
reproductive health.
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1981 forbids employment dis¬
crimination against women workers solely on the basis of pregnancy. If a
hazard can be shown to affect a fetus through either the mother or the
father, then excluding only women from the workplace is illegal. It is
estimated that over 14 million U.S. workers each year are exposed to
known or suspected reproductive hazards in the workplace. Not surpris¬
ingly, then, reproductive disorders are among the ten most frequent
work-related injuries and illnesses in the United States. However, little is
known about the effects of most workplace toxins and other occupational
hazards on the reproductive health of either sex, and male workers in
particular have been virtually ignored (Blakeslee 1991; Paul et al. 1989).
Although it is true that “in the female reproductive system there are many
more points at which, one can speculate, external agents could act,” it is
not implausible that workplace toxins could damage sperm or be trans¬
mitted through semen, causing visible congenital malformations as well
as the possibility of childhood or adult cancer in the offspring (Beilin and
Rubenstein 1983:90; Williams 1988; Hatch 1984).
440 Chapter 12
Unfortunately, many researchers, employers, and policy makers tra¬

ditionally operated under the assumption that women are more impor¬
tant than men in the reproductive process. Until 1991, most employers
simply excluded women from certain hazardous jobs or employed only
infertile or surgically sterilized women in such Jobs (Williams 1988,
Chavkin 1984a; Scott 1984). In other words, employers have typically
addressed the problem by removing women from the workplace instead
of rendering the workplace safe for both female and male workers (Paul
et al. 1^89). This is no solution at all, for the fact of the matter is that
“toxic chemicals do not discriminate—they affect both female and male
hearts, muscles, livers, and kidneys—and both female and male reproduc¬
tive systems. . . . Men, women, and their offspring, are all at risk from
toxic exposures; we do not know whether these risks are sufficiently
different to justify the selection of one of them as needing more protec¬
tion than the other” (Beilin and Rubenstein 1987:87, 97).
We suspect that protection of women and their offspring was less a
motivating factor in the adoption of exclusionary policies than employ¬
ers’ concern with corporate liability and the advantages they accrued
from a sex-segregated labor force (see chapter 8). For one thing, exclu¬
sion from the workplace does not necessarily protect women from expo¬
sure to toxins. Men may transport residues home on their hair, skin, and
clothes, with women being exposed through their daily unpaid activities
as housewives (Rosenberg 1984; Robinson 1982). Indeed, housework
itself is hazardous, but it is rarely considered in discussions of occupa¬
tional health and safety because it is not recognized as “real work”
(Chavkin 1984b; Rosenberg 1984).
Second, exclusionary policies have been common in male-domi¬
nated industries, but not in equally hazardous female-dominated occu¬
pations (Doyal 1990a; Goldhaber et al. 1988; Scott 1984; Beilin and
Rubenstein 1983). We know from our discussion in chapter 8 that women,
especially minority women, have always worked at dangerous jobs. In fact,
racial discrimination in the workplace has meant that black workers of
both sexes “have a 37 percent greater chance than whites of suffering an
occupational injury or illness. Black workers are one and one-half times
more likely than whites to be severely disabled from job injuries and
illnesses and face a 20 percent greater chance than whites of dying from
iob-related injuries and illnesses” (quoted in Mullings 1984:122; see also
Fox 1991).
Recently, exclusionary policies have been successfully challenged in
the courts. In March 1991, the United States Supreme Court reversed a
lower court’s decision that women could be barred from jobs that might
potentially harm a fetus, ruling that such a policy constitutes sex discrimi¬
nation. The case. Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, involved a battery
company that prohibited fertile women, pregnant or not, from working
Gender- and Health 441
at jobs that entail exposure to lead. The company argued that the exclu¬
sionary policy was not discriminatory because it is in the public’s interest
to protect the health of unborn children. However, the Supreme Court
maintained that although employment late in pregnancy may sometimes
pose a risk to the fetus, it is up to the woman to decide whether or not
she will continue to work. Employers, ruled the Court, may not force a
woman to choose between having a job and having a baby. Although this
ruling generally has been praised as a victory for female workers, it
remains to be seen how employers will comply with it. They could make
the workplace safer for employees of both sexes or they may simply leave
it up to the workers themselves to decide whether or not to risk working
in an unsafe, unhealthy work environment.
Exposures to workplace toxins, however, are not the only hazards
women and men face on the job. Accidents and homicides also claim
workers’ lives, although not surprisingly male and female workers face
different levels of risk. Eor example, although men make up 55 percent
of the labor force, they account for 93 percent of workers who die from
job-related causes. Most of these men, however, die accidentally—for
example, in vehicle accidents, from falls, and in fires or explosions.
Importantly, while women are far less likely than men to die in a work-re¬
lated incident, one of the major causes of work-related death for women
is homicide. Forty percent of women who die on the job are murder
victims; their deaths are largely a result of their being exposed to crime
while working late at night (U.S. Department of Labor 1994).
Women and men also have significantly different rates of death from
non-job-related accidents and homicides, a point that we will take up
next.
Other Causes of Death

For the remaining causes of death listed in Table 12.3, only two—specifi¬
cally, diabetes mellitus, and pneumonia and influenza—are not associ¬
ated with behavioral differences between the sexes. For example, chronic
liver disease and cirrhosis of the liver are frequently caused by excessive
alcohol consumption and related malnutrition. Since men are four times
more likely than women to drink excessively—an issue to which we will
return later in the chapter—it is little wonder that their mortality rate
from chronic liver disease and cirrhosis is nearly twice as high as women’s
(Waldron 1986).
Men’s drinking habits also contribute to their higher accidental
death rate. According to Waldron (1986), 50 percent of all motor vehicle
deaths involve drunk drivers, mostly men. Even when not drinking,
though, men drive more recklessly than women. Despite the unflattering
stereotype of “the woman driver,” women not only have fewer accidents
442 Chapter 12
\
than men, but they are also less likely to break traffic laws. This, at least
in part, accounts for their lower rate of accidental deaths. Females, of
course, are socialized to act safely, to seek help, and to avoid risks. Males,
in contrast, are encouraged at an early age to be adventurous, inde¬
pendent, and unafraid of taking risks. Consequently, they, more often
than females, are involved in the kinds of dangerous situations that may
lead to accidental death (Waldron 1986; Harrison 1984).
Masculinity, we also know, is equated in many people s minds with
aggressiveness. Men are expected, even encouraged, to behave violently,
and this in turn is reflected in their higher suicide rate and their higher
death rate due to homicide. Although women make twice as many suicide
attempts as men, they are less likely to succeed in killing themselves,
largely because the methods they use are less effective. More specifically,
women tend to ingest drugs or poisons in their suicide attempts, whereas
men typically shoot themselves. Some have interpreted this to mean that
most women who attempt suicide do not really wish to kill themselves, but
rather to seek help, while more men actually kill themselves because they
have difficulty seeking help (Waldron 1986). Possibly, however, women
and men attempt suicide using items from their environment with which
they are most familiar and to which they'have easiest access. “Masculine
items, such as guns, tend to be more lethal than “feminine” items, such
as pills (Kushner 1985).
The mortality rates from homicide are particularly illuminating for
they are products of the intersection of sexism, racism, and social class
inequality. In general, men are nearly five times more likely than women
to be murdered or to die from “legal intervention.” Significantly, 87.1
percent of homicides involving male victims are committed by other men;
89.4 percent of female victims are murdered by men (U.S. Department
of Justice 1993a; see also chapter 9). Looking carefully at Table 12.3,
though, we see that race is a more important variable than sex. Although
black females are far less likely than black males to be murdered, they
have a higher rate of victimization than either white males or white
females. Most of the excess of male mortality caused by homicide,
however, is accounted for by black male victimization. Indeed, since
1978, homicide has been a leading cause of death for young black
males aged fifteen to twenty-four (U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services 1989). In fact, according to a recent report issued by
the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), “In some areas of the [United
States], it is now more likely for a black male between his 15th and 25th
birthday to die from homicide than it was for a United States soldier to
be killed on a tour of duty in Vietnam” (quoted in Mydans 1990b:A26).
This in no small part reflects their residential concentration in urban,
high-crime neighborhoods and their disadvantaged economic position
(Lee 1989). To paraphrase one observer, there appears to be incestuous
relationships between racism, sexism, poverty, crime, and ill health (Hol¬
loman 1983).
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)

Another fatal sex-linked disease is acquired immune deficiency syndrome
or AIDS. The Centers for Disease Control reported the first cases of AIDS
in June 1981. By January, 1993, almost 340,000 AIDS cases had been
reported in the United States; about 60 percent of these individuals had
already died. Eight years elapsed between the first reported case of AIDS
and the announcement of the 100,000th case; the second 100,000 cases,
however, were reported in only twenty-six months. An additional 800,000
to 1.3 million people in the United States are estimated to have been
infected and thus are carriers of the AIDS virus (Selik et al. 1993; U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services 1993). By 1993, AIDS was the
leading cause of death in the United States for men aged twenty-five to
forty-four, and the fourth leading cause of death for women in that age
group (Selik et al. 1993). Globally, it is estimated that 5 to 10 million
people have been infected. Experts predict that by the year 2000, 40
million people worldwide will have been infected with the disease and
most of them will be from developing or Third World countries (Altman
1992).
It is important to keep in mind, however, that all estimates of the
incidence of AIDS are conservative since they are based on the number of
cases reported to authorities. There is evidence that a considerable num¬
ber of cases go unreported. The Centers for Disease Control estimate that
10 to 30 percent of AIDS cases are not properly reported to health
officials {Netu York Times November 1989:C15).
There are a number of reasons for this underreporting, first, indi-
Uduals infected may be unaware of their infection or may test negative
when in fact they are positive. Also, some physicians, concerned about the
stigma attached to the disease, may decide not to report it to protect their
patients. Underreporting is especially likely in the Third World, where
medical services are inadequate and recording is more difficult. More¬
over, since the disease has a five-to-ten-year incubation period, a tally of
cases in 1993 is indicative of the number of infections that occurred
between 1983 and 1988, but not the present rate of infection (Drake
1989; Lambert 1987). In 1993, the Centers for Disease Control expanded
the definition of AIDS to include three new indicator diseases (recurrent
pneumonia, pulmonary tuberculosis, and cervical cancer), so as to get a
more accurate picture of the scope of the disease and its rate of increase
(Selik et al. 1993).
An individual infected with the AIDS virus may show no physical
symptoms of the disease, but is nonetheless a carrier who can infect
444 Chapter 12
\
others. Some develop AIDS-related complex (ARQ in which they exhibit

some symptoms of the disease (for example, swollen glands, loss of appe¬
tite, acute fatigue, and low resistance to infections), but have not yet
developed any of the fatal diseases that result from full-blown AIDS. AIDS
itself is a virus that attacks a person’s immune system, destroying his or
her ability to fight off other diseases, such as pneumocystosis (a form of
pneumonia) and tuberculosis. People with AIDS also often develop vari¬
ous cancers, such as Kaposi’s sarcoma (a rare skin cancer).
There are actually very few ways one can contract AIDS (see Box
12.2). The most common way is through sexual contact with an infected
person. The AIDS virus is found in several body fluids, but especially in
blood, semen, and vaginal secretions. The riskiest form of sexual contact
is anal intercourse because it frequently causes tears in the rectal lining
and blood vessels, allowing the virus to pass from the semen of the
infected partner into the blood of the other partner. Vaginal sex, al¬
though less risky, is still a means of transmission. Another common way is
through the use of contaminated needles by intravenous (IV) drug users.
If an IV drug user injects himself or herself with a used needle or syringe
that has traces of blood containing the AIDS virus, the likelihood of
contracting AIDS is high.
About 2 percent of those with AIDS who are thirteen years or older
were infected by medical transfusions of contaminated blood. The major¬
ity of those with AIDS are homosexual or bisexual men, IV drug users, or
members of both these groups. However, the disease has been increasing
most rapidly among women and racial minorities, the vast majority of
whom contract the disease through IV drug use or unprotected hetero¬
sexual sex with an infected partner (Osmond, et al. 1993; Selik et al.
1993).
More than 80 percent of those who have contracted AIDS through
heterosexual sex are female. This is due in part to the fact that heterosex¬
ual women have a greater probability than heterosexual men of being
exposed to an infected sexual partner, since so many more men than
women have been infected. Hispanic American and African American
women who are poor are especially at risk. For impoverished women, a
disproportionate percentage of whom are women of color, sex may be a
significant source of income (Osmond et al. 1993). In addition, since
impoverished minorities are more likely than whites to be fV drug users,
their risk of infection is greater. Health experts also are concerned about
the growing use of crack cocaine and the rising incidence of other
sexually transmitted diseases in poor urban areas. Crack users, a signifi¬
cant percentage of whom are women, often engage in promiscuous or
risky sex in exchange for money or drugs (Inciardi et al. 1993). At the
same time, the presence of other sexually transmitted diseases, such as
AIDS Prevention 30X ]2.2
Health officials have given us clear and simple advice with regard to prevent-
ing AIDS: practice safe sex, and if you are an IV drug user, do not share nee¬
dles or other injection devices. The following are some additional facts about
AIDS and AIDS prevention:
• AIDS is transmitted primarily through sexual contact—homosexual and het¬

erosexual. You can help prevent infection by practicing safe sex: use a con¬
dom during (from start to finish) every act of sexual intercourse (vaginal as
well as anal). Currently, there is little evidence that AIDS can be contracted
through oral sex. However, the Surgeon General advises that if you or your
partner are at high risk for AIDS or either of you has sores or cuts in or
around your mouth or genitals, oral sex should be avoided. There is no dan¬
ger of contracting AIDS from kissing.
• Do not rely on a potential sexual partner’s word as a safeguard against
AIDS, especially if you are a woman. A recent study of sexually active eigh¬
teen- to twenty-five-year-olds in southern California found that 35 percent of
the men surveyed admitted that they had lied to a woman in order to have
sex with her. Twenty percent of the men said they would lie to a woman who
asked if they had been tested for AIDS; they would say they had been tested
and that the results were negative (Cochran and Mays 1988).
• Since the mid-1980s, a number of clubs and dating services have opened
throughout the country for individuals who have tested negative for AIDS.
This, however, is not a reliable indicator that a potential partner is not in¬
fected for at least three reasons: (1) a small percentage of AIDS tests turn
out to be false-negatives (i.e., the individual actually has the AIDS antibodies
in his or her blood even though the test results are negative); (2) the individ¬
ual may have been infected shortly before being tested, in which case the an¬
tibodies may not be detected, or he or she may become infected after the
test; and (3) some individuals—no one knows how many—simply do not pro¬
duce the AIDS antibodies detected by the tests even though they may have
been infected.
• If you do not inject drugs, you have eliminated one of the main sources of
AIDS infection. Anyone who does inject drugs should use only a clean, pre¬
viously unused needle, syringe, or other injection device.
• There is no risk of contracting AIDS by donating blood. At the same time,
the risk of infection from a blood transfusion is extremely low since all
blood donors now are screened and blood donations are not accepted from
members of high-risk groups. In fact, some health officials maintain that the
blood supply is safer than it ever was because of the increased general
screening.
• There is no risk of contracting AIDS through social contact, for example,
hugging, shaking hands, crying, coughing or sneezing; sharing beds, cups,
eating utensils, or other personal items; using toilets, telephones, swimming
pools, furniture or equipment. In short, you cannot contract AIDS from any
446 Chapter 12
\
&0X )2.2 Continued
nonsexual contact, except intravenous drug use with an AIDS-contaminated

needle.
Recent research indicates that factual knowledge about AIDS has in¬
creased significantly since the 1980s, especially within the general gay male
population and among both heterosexual and homosexual college students.
Nevertheless, studies also show that while safe sex practices among members of
these groups have increased, there is still a high level of risk-taking behavior
(Osmond, et al. 1993; Ames, et al. 1992; Bearden 1992).
syphilis, seems to facilitate transmission of AJDS (Hilts 1990). African-

Ajnerican women constitute about 56 percent of women with AIDS; His-
panic-American women account for about 16 percent of the female AIDS
population (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1993).
Given the greater risk faced by minority women, it is not surprising
that most pediatric AIDS cases are among nonwhite children. Although
African-American children represent about 15 percent of the child popu¬
lation in the United States (under thirteen years of age), they constitute
more than 57 percent of pediatric AIDS cases. Hispanic-American chil¬
dren represent 10 percent of the U.S. child population, but are 20 per¬
cent of pediatric AIDS cases (U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services 1993). Between 13 and 30 percent of babies born to women
infected with the AIDS virus are also infected. Currently, AIDS is the
ninth leading cause of death among children aged one to four; however,
if present trends continue, it will be one of the top five causes of death
for children in this age group before the close of the 1990s (Selik et al.
1993; U.S. House of Representatives 1989).
The federal government and agencies within the United States have
responded far more slowly and much less effectively to the AIDS crisis
than the governments and agencies of many other countries. During the
conservative Reagan and Bush administrations, public service announce¬
ments with instructions on safe sex and the use of condoms were prohib¬
ited, while sexual abstinence was advocated. Even in 1994, when public
promotion of condom use was permitted, ads that were considered too
explicit were refused by the national television networks—the same net¬
works, it should be added, that in the name of free speech have resisted
regulation of violent programming (see chapter 6). Our government has
not been receptive to clean needle programs in which IV drug users
exchange used syringes for new ones, and AIDS advocacy groups fre¬
quently charge that research on AIDS vaccinations and treatments are
lagging, largely because of lack of government funding. Not unrelated to

these issues is the fact that our government and social institutions have
perhaps been most neglectful in addressing discrimination against people
with AIDS and in assisting them and their partners, families, and friends
in coping with the traumatic consequences of the disease. The level of
misinformation about AIDS is still high among the general public, and
this not infrequently has led to tragic consequences: street violence
against gay men has risen; infected children and their families have been
harassed to keep them out of schools and neighborhoods; and people
with AIDS have lost their jobs and have been denied housing and insur¬
ance. Meanwhile, people with AIDS and those close to them must cope
with not only the physical devastation wrought by the disease, but also in
many cases with the psychological trauma of devastated social networks
and increased social isolation (see, for example, Weitz 1991). Certainly,
public anxiety about a disease like AIDS is understandable, but discrimi¬
nation against and isolation of people with AIDS and their families as well
as benign neglect of the crisis by our government is hardly an acceptable
solution.
Women, Men, and Morbidity

We have seen that, on average, women outlive men by about seven years.
But interestingly, despite their longer life expectancy and lower mortality
rates, women have higher morbidity (i.e., illness) rates than men. Women
have higher rates of illness from acute conditions and nonfatal chronic
conditions. They are slightly more likely to report their health as fair to
poor, they spend about 40 percent more days in bed each year, and their
activities are restricted due to health problems about 25 percent more
than men. In addition, they make more physician visits each year, and
they have twice the number of surgical procedures performed on them
as men do (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1993; Doyal
1990b; Cleary 1987; Waldron 1986). Cleary (1987:55) reports that “Those
differences are largest during women’s reproductive years (ages seven¬
teen to forty-four) but even when reproductive conditions are excluded,
there is a residual gender difference in short-term disability.”
The higher morbidity of women may be related to their longer life
expectancy. The older one is, the more likely one is to suffer from a
chronic illness that restricts one’s activities. Women comprise 59.2 per¬
cent of the population over 65 and 72 percent of those 85 and older
(Committee on Aging 1991). Low income adds to the health problems of
the elderly, particularly elderly women (Davis et al. 1990). As we learned
in chapters 7 and 8, elderly women, especially women of color, are signifi¬
cantly more likely than elderly men to live below the poverty line. There
is a direct relationship between poverty and ill health (Holloman 1983).
448 Chapter 12
\
Moreover, official measures of poverty miss a considerable number of the

elderly poor who are housed in public institutions and nursing homes.
Almost 75 percent of nursing home residents are female (U.S. Depart¬
ment of Commerce 1991).
A second explanation of women’s higher morbidity is that it is
simply an artifact of their greater use of medical services. That is, men
may experience as many or more symptoms as women, but they ignore
them. Such behavior is again compatible with traditional gender norms:
men are stoic and physically strong, while women are frail and need
assistance (Calderwood 1985). There is some evidence to support this
hypothesis. For example, although women delay as long as men before
getting medical attention for some disorders, men tend to underestimate
the extent of their illness more than women do, and they utilize preven¬
tive services less often (Waldron 1986). In addition, the medical commu¬
nity itself is not free of these gender stereotypes and may serve to
reinforce them. Historical research, in fact, indicates that physicians have
frequently equated normal femininity with the sick role (Ehrenreich and
English 1986). To understand this better, however, we need to discuss the
differential treatment of the sexes within the health care system.
SEXISM IN HEALTH CARE
Medical practitioners in the United States subscribe to a functional model

of health which sees the human body as analogous to a machine. Illness
temporarily disrupts the normal functioning of this “machine,” prevent¬
ing its owner from fulfilling his or her usual responsibilities. Curative
medicine specializes in the scientific repair (i.e., diagnosis, treatment,
and cure) of the malfunctioning human machine. “Once ‘fixed’ the
person can be returned to the community” (Rothman 1984:72).
Sociologist Barbara Katz Rothman (1984) argues that this model
makes women especially susceptible to “illness labeling” by the medical
establishment. This is because historically women in general have not
been considered contributing members of society—“as people doing
important things”—since their primary roles were performed outside the
public sphere. “[WJomen were more easily defined as sick when they were
not seen as functional social members” (1984:72, author’s emphasis).
This was particularly significant during the nineteenth and early twenti¬
eth centuries when physicians were competing with other healers for
patients. The “nonfunctional” woman was a status symbol as well as a
symbol of femininity. This image, though, was class- and race-specific;
only middle- and upper-class white women (physicians’ best paying cus¬
tomers) were viewed as delicate and frail. Poor and working-class women,
immigrant women, and women of color were thought to be more robust;
it was argued that their less civilized nature made them strong and ahle
to withstand pain. Of course, these women could hardly afford to be sick,
even if their wealthy mistresses and employers had permitted it (Ehren-
reich and English 1986; Rothman 1984).
At the same time, many women of that period did display symptoms
of physical weakness, for example, fatigue, shortness of breath, fainting
spells, chest and abdominal pains. These, though, were probably the
consequences of stylishness:
A fashionable woman’s corsets exerted, on the average, twenty-one

pounds of pressure on her internal organs, and extremes of up to
eighty-five pounds had been measured. Add to this the fact that a
well-dressed woman wore an average of thirty-seven pounds of street
clothing in the winter months, of which nineteen pounds were
suspended from her tortured waist (Ehrenreich and English 1986:285).
Physicians at the time, however, overlooked the effects of clothing styles

on women’s health and took these symptoms instead as further evidence
of women’s inferior constitutions. It was obvious to them that women
needed special care, and they responded with the medical specialties of
obstetrics and gynecology. Essentially, these specialties medicalized the
natural biological events in women’s lives: menstruation, pregnancy and
childbirth, lactation, and menopause.
There is substantial evidence that early on, physicians’ services were
more detrimental than beneficial to women’s health. Medical interven¬
tion in childbirth provides an excellent example. Prior to the nineteenth
century, the birth of a child was looked upon as a family event, not a
medical event. Women gave birth in the presence of female friends,
relatives, and midwives who took a noninterventionist approach, letting
nature take its course. Eor the most part, their role was supportive, trying
to ease the labor of the birthing woman by making her as comfortable as
possible. But when competition for patients began to intensify during the
nineteenth century, physicians, who were virtually all men, began to
deride midwives as uneducated “quacks.” Physicians claimed to have sci¬
entific expertise in the area of childbirth. Only they had access to the
specialized knowledge and medical instruments that would make child¬
birth safer, easier, and quicker. Eager for relief from the birthing trauma,
women who could afford it increasingly gave birth with a physician, rather
than a midwife, in attendance. The physician, having made his claims, felt
pressured to “perform,” especially if witnesses were present. “The doctor
could not appear to be indifferent or inattentive or useless. He had to
establish his identity by doing something, preferably something to make
the patient feel better” (Wertz and Wertz 1986:140). These were the days,
however, before asepsis, anesthesia, and other important medical devel¬
opments, and the doctors’ interventions were typically crude and harm-
450 Chapter 12
\
ful: for instance, bloodletting until the laboring patient fainted, the ap¬
plication of leeches to relieve abdominal and vaginal pain, the use of
chloride of mercury to purge the intestines, and the administration of
emetics to induce vomiting (Wertz and Wertz 1986).
Given these techniques, it is hardly surprising that births attended
by physicians had higher maternal and infant mortality rates than those
attended by midwives (Rothman 1984). Nevertheless, the physicians suc¬
ceeded in convincing state legislators—men with socioeconomic back¬
grounds similar to their own—that midwifery was dangerous and
unscientific. After 1900, the states enacted strict licensing laws that, in
effect, drove midwives out of the business of birthing babies. Between
1900 and 1957, the number of practicing midwives in the United States
declined dramatically from about 3,000 to 2 (Barker-Benfield 1976).
Today, obstetricians and gynecologists retain their virtual monopoly
on women’s health care. Women, in fact, are encouraged to obtain their
general medical care from these specialists. Note that there are no com¬
parable medical specialties devoted to “men’s diseases” or men’s repro¬
ductive health, but about 80 percent of obstetricians/gynecologists are
men. The overwhelming majority are also white (American Medical Asso¬
ciation 1990).
Advances in medical science and technology have clearly benefitted
women and saved many lives, but much medical intervention into
women’s normal biological functioning continues to be unnecessary, and
medical technology inappropriately used or inadequately tested harms,
and often kills, thousands of women and their offspring each year. Con¬
sider, once again, medical intervention into pregnancy and childbirth.
During pregnancy, women normally gain weight, retain fluids, and expe¬
rience nausea. Doctors sometimes respond to these changes by prescrib¬
ing special diets and medications. These may prove helpful, but not
infrequently drugs, such as thalidomide and Bendectin, have produced
severe fetal deformities and illness. The drug diethylstilbestrol (DES), a
synthetic estrogen, was once widely prescribed to prevent miscarriages,
but was taken off the market when it was found to cause cancer in the
daughters of women who had taken it (Rothman 1984).
Studies also show that doctors may intervene in pregnancy for the
sake of convenience—their own and the mother’s—as well as for profit
(Davis-Floyd 1992). For example, the rate of caesarian deliveries in the
United States has more than doubled since 1975 when it was just 10.4
births per 100. Today, nearly one quarter of all births involve caesarean
delivery, although the Centers for Disease Control maintain that a rate of
15 caesarean births per 100 is more medically appropriate. Most caesari¬
ans are scheduled, rather than emergency deliveries, and the Centers for
Disease Control maintain that about 36 percent of caesarean deliveries
are medically unnecessary (Centers for Disease Control 1993). Some
physicians and hospitals, for example, will not permit a woman who has
had one caesarian delivery to attempt a vaginal delivery for a subsequent
birth even though many experts claim such a policy is medically un¬
founded (Martin 1987). The primary reasons that the federal govern¬
ment has become more concerned about the high rate of caesarian
deliveries is their contributions to rising health care costs; caesarians
are almost twice as expensive as vaginal deliveries. Interestingly, the ma¬
jority of caesarian deliveries are performed in for-profit hospitals on
women covered by private medical insurance (Centers for Disease Con¬
trol 1993).
The increasingly widespread use of electronic fetal monitoring has
also contributed to the rise in caesarian deliveries. Physicians, fearing
malpractice suits, have taken to routinely using fetal monitors, even for
low-risk deliveries, and are quick to intervene with a caesarian section at
the first signs of “fetal distress” (Rothman 1986). Increasingly common is
the use of home fetal monitoring to detect early labor. Home fetal moni¬
toring costs about $100 to $300 per day, an average of about $5,000 per
pregnancy. Medical corporations that are offering the service encourage
physicians’ use of it by allowing them to be shareholders in the company.
For the relatively small investment of $1,000, physicians receive from the
largest monitoring company a return of 15 percent of the payment on any
of the company’s services they prescribe. However, studies indicate that
the use of electronic home fetal monitoring is no more beneficial or
effective in preventing premature delivery than simple daily telephone
contact between the pregnant woman and a nurse. Rather, electronic
home fetal monitoring can best be described as a thriving business—one
in which an increasing number of physicians are investing (Meier 1993).
The medicalization of pregnancy and childbirth is just one example
of often unnecessary medical intervention into normal biological events
in a woman’s life; there are numerous others. Menopause, for instance,
is still viewed as a disease by many physicians who treat it as a hormone
deficiency. Synthetic estrogens are frequently prescribed to help women
overcome the side effects of menopause—for example, hot flashes, de¬
pression, irritability—even though some analysts have expressed concern
that such drugs may increase the risk of endometrial cancer. Physicians
tout these treatments in ageist as well as sexist terms, promising women
eternal femininity and youthfulness (Greer 1992; McCrea 1986).
Poor and minority women, however, have suffered the most at the
hands of the medical establishment. Historically, these women have been
treated by physicians as little more than training and research material.
In fact, gynecological surgery was developed by physicians who first prac¬
ticed their techniques on black and immigrant women. It has been docu¬
mented, for example, that J. Marion Sims, the “father of gynecology” and
one of the early presidents of the American Medical Association, kept a
452 Chapter 12
number of black female slaves for the sole purpose of surgical experimen¬
tation. “He operated [without anesthesia] on one of them thirty times in
four years. . . . After moving to New York, Sims continued his experimen¬
tation on indigent Irish women in the wards of New York Women’s
Hospital” (Ehrenreich and English 1986:291).
Researchers have also documented recent widespread sterilization
abuse perpetrated against poor and minority women “because of the
personal biases of physicians and social policies reflecting race and class
discrimination” (Ruzek 1987:187). Davis (1981) reports, for instance, that
in 1972 alone, 100,000 to 200,000 sterilizations took place under the
auspices of federal programs. The majority of these involved poor minor¬
ity women who allegedly underwent the surgery voluntarily, although
evidence indicates that many had been misled or coerced. “Women were
sterilized without consent, or consent was obtained on the basis of false
or misleading information—commonly that the operation was reversible
or that it was free of problems and side-effects. Information was given in
languages women did not understand; women were threatened with loss
of welfare or medical benefits if they did not consent; consent was solic¬
ited during labor; and abortion was conditioned upon consent to sterili¬
zation” (Committee for Abortion Rights and Against Sterilization Abuse
1988:27-28). Although the federal government issued regulations in
1979 to prevent involuntary sterilizations, research indicates that other
more subtle, but nevertheless coercive conditions remain that encourage
sterilization among the poor. One of these is the virtual elimination of
federal funding for abortions. “The federal government assumes 90 per¬
cent of the cost of most sterilizations under Medicaid at the same time
that it pays for only a minuscule number of abortions. This funding
disparity amounts to a government policy of population control targeted
at poor people and people of color” (Committee for Abortion Rights and
Against Sterilization Abuse 1988:28). It is little wonder, then, that recently
released statistics show the numbey of sterilizations of minority women
still exceeding those of white women by a considerable margin (Mosher
1990).!
Sexism in health care is not only found in obstetrics and gynecology,
but in other medical specialties as well. Cardiology, for instance, is male-
dominated in terms of both physicians and patients. We have already
^Minority men also have been subjected to abuses by the medical establishment. One
especially egregious example is the “Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis in the
Negro Male,” conducted from 1932 to 1972 in rural Alabama. In this study, more than
400 black men diagnosed with syphilis were denied treatment for the disease so that
researchers from the U.S. Public Health Service could observe the disease’s effects
on black men over the course of their lifetimes. The study was conducted without the
informed consent of the research subjects. For a thorough discussion of the Tuskegee
study, see Jones 1993.
noted the widespread belief among the general public, reinforced by

physicians, that women are at lo,w risk for heart disease and its conse¬
quences, including heart attacks. Recent studies show that most physi¬
cians do not respond as quickly to female patients’ symptoms of heart
disease as they do to male patients’ symptoms. Frequently, women must
prove that there is a genuine problem with their hearts by being signifi¬
cantly sicker (e.g., having a heart attack or congestive heart failure) in
order for their complaints to be acted upon by a physician (Nechas and
Foley 1994). This in large part helps to explain why women are less likely
than men to survive heart bypass surgery. By the time they undergo the
operation, they are usually much sicker and slightly older than the male
patients (Kahn et al. 1990). Additional studies show, in fact, that when
women do go to emergency rooms with complaints about chest pains,
they wait twice as long as men to see a doctor, twice as long for an
electrocardiogram, and are 50 percent less likely to be given medications
that inhibit further damage to the heart and other parts of the body
following a heart attack (Henig 1993).
In short, research reveals a legacy of negative and stereotypic atti¬
tudes among physicians toward women, especially poor women, minority
women, and elderly women. Women’s health concerns not infrequently
are trivialized. This, in turn, leads to less than humane treatment and less
effective health care for women (Nechas and Foley 1994). These preju¬
dices are learned by physicians during their medical training. A recent
study of advertisements in widely read medical journals, for example,
found that women and men are portrayed in gender stereotyped ways,
with men appearing to be more serious than women are, and women
appearing to be younger than men (Leppard et al. 1993). In addition,
much medical research, apart from that in obstetrics and gynecology,
utilizes all-male samples (Nechas and Foley 1994). For example, one of
the largest studies of “normal human aging” was conducted with primar¬
ily male subjects, despite the fact, as we have learned in this chapter,
women, on average, live seven years longer than men (Nechas and Foley
1994). Another well-known study found that taking an aspirin every other
day could prevent heart attacks. However, since those studied were 22,000
men, it remains uncertain whether the aspirin regimen will have the same
beneficial effects for women. This latter study was funded by the National
Institutes of Health, which has as official policy the inclusion of women
in biomedical research. Yet, NIH has been found to have funded several
important studies recently that have excluded women. In response to this
criticism, NIH established an Office of Research on Women’s Health in
September 1990 to ensure that their sex-inclusive policy is followed, and
announced in 1993 the Women’s Health Initiative, a ten-year program of
studies involving 160,000 women, one in five of whom will be a woman of
color. The studies will focus on the causes of heart disease, cancer, and
454 Chapter 12
\
osteoporosis as well as various measures that might prevent these diseases

in women {New York Times 31 March 1993:A21). Finally, the role models
available to medical students have also been steeped in this sexist tradi¬
tion and many incorporate it into their teaching. Nechas and Foley
(1994) cite numerous examples, such as anatomy professors who spend
several days lecturing on male genitalia, but only a few minutes on female
genitalia, or who tell students they can learn about the female sexual
organs on their own time. According to Nechas and Foley (1994:47):
A
Sexual remarks, jokes, and innuendos are everywhere [in medical

school]. One resident remarked in amazement how, even among these
highly educated professional men, it is completely acceptable to make
jokes at the expense of women.
Clearly, the traditional doctor-patient relationship itself appears to

be unhealthy for women seeking medical care. It has been argued,
though, that this relationship will gradually change as more women enter
the medical profession. According to some analysts, “Women physicians
should be more capable of treating the health problems presented by
women with respect, if only because the female body would be less alien
and the female mind less mysterious” (lêe 1983:20; Klass 1988). Still,
others are unconvinced by this argument and call for more radical
changes. We will examine their alternatives shortly, but first let’s look at
the distribution of the sexes in the health care professions.
The Patriarchal Hierarchy of Health Care Work

In chapter 7, we discussed how functionalist sociologists, such as Talcott
Parsons, differentiate between male and female roles as instrumental and
expressive, respectively. Within the traditional patriarchal family, men are
the instrumental leaders of the household and command greater power
in decision making primarily becaifse they are the breadwinners. Women,
in contrast, are housekeepers and nurturers. Interestingly, critics of tradi¬
tional medical practice in the United States draw parallels between patri¬
archal relations in the family and the male-female relations dominant in
the delivery of health care. “The doctor/father runs a family composed
of the nurse (wife and mother) and the patient (the child). The doctor
possesses the scientific and technical skills and the nurse performs the
caring and comforting duties ...” (Fee 1983:24).
The sex distribution of workers across specific health care fields
\ makes this parallel even sharper. Health care historically has been an area
of high female employment because many health care jobs are viewed as
an extension of women’s roles in the home. Not surprisingly, therefore,
women constitute about 89 percent of health service workers today, al¬
though they make up only 20.4 percent of practicing physicians (U.S.
Department of Commerce 1993). Women are concentrated in the “help¬

ing, nurturing,” and housekeeping jobs in health care. For example,
they constitute 94.3 percent of registered nurses; 89.8 percent of dieti¬
cians and nutritionists; and 89.4 percent of nursing aides and attendants
(U.S. Department of Commerce 1993). These positions have lower pres¬
tige and lower incomes than male-dominated health professions, such as
physician, although the acute shortage of nurses during the 1980s did
result in substantial pay raises and other benefits for members of the
nursing profession. This, in turn, attracted more men to the field, al¬
though the profession has consistently remained more than 90 percent
female. The least prestigious and lowest paying jobs are filled largely by
minority women (Glenn 1992; Doyal 1990a; Aries and Kennedy 1986;
McKinney 1986).
We have already seen how male physicians drove female health care
providers, such as midwives, out of practice early in this century. In
addition, women and racial minorities historically were excluded from
medical schools or discouraged from entering or completing medical
training, either through blatant or, more recently, subtle forms of dis¬
crimination (Nechas and Foley 1994). Since 1971, however, the number
of female and minority medical school students and graduates has in¬
creased significantly (see Table 12.4 on page 456). In 1971, for example,
women were just 10.9 percent of medical school students; by 1989, their
numbers had more than tripled to 36.2 percent. In 1990, women were
34.0 percent of all medical school graduates, compared with just 13.4
percent in 1975 (Commission on Professionals in Science and Technol¬
ogy 1992).
Although such trends are encouraging, some observers question the
extent to which they will have an impact on sexism and other inequalities
in health care. This skepticism stems from the recognition that female
and minority medical students receive their training in the same sexist,
racist, class-biased, and homophobic system of medical education that
white males do. What is more, they have very few role models other than
white men, since women and minorities make up only about one-fifth of
medical school faculty. The representation of women among medical
school faculty has improved somewhat since 1975, from 15.1 percent to
21.5 percent. However, although the number of minority faculty has
increased significantly since 1975 as Table 12.4 shows, the number of
white faculty has also increased, thereby keeping the proportion of mi¬
nority faculty fairly constant (between 19 and 21 percent) since 1975
(Commission on Professionals in Science and Technology 1992).
Importantly, recent research indicates that female physicians do
appear to care for female patients better than male physicians do. For
example, female physicians have been found to more often perform Pap
tests on their patients and to order significantly more mammograms. This
TA3LE 12.4 Minority and Minority Female Medical Studente, Medical Graduates, and Medical
School Faculty, Selected Years, 1971-1991
First-Year Medical Students

Asian/Pacific
Black Hispanic Native American Islander
Year # %Female # %Female # %Female # %Female
1971 882 22.6 158 10.1 23 34.8 217 19.4

1981 1196 43.2 405 33.8 70 27.1 765 n.a.
1985 1117 52.1 467 35.9 60 50.0 1295 34.1
1991 1304 56.4 794 39.0 93 57.0 2727* 37.0*
Total Medical School Enrollment

Asian/Pacific
Black Hispanic Native American Islander
1971 2055 20.4 328 11.3 42 23.5 647 17.9

1979 3627 42.7 1247 26.7 212, 23.9 1777 29.2
1985 3849 46.6 1571 33.6 235 40.4 4289 7.4
1990 4241 55.8 2742 39.3 277 42.6 8436 3.6
Medical School Graduates
Asian/Pacific
Black Hispanic** Native American Islander
1984 818 46.2 522 30.5 59 33.9 679 31.9

1986 824 42.5 322 33.9 49 30.6 909 32.5
1988 850 48.1 353 31.2 58 34.5 1119 35.1
1991 918 56.2 362 36.5 X 46 32.6 1687 36.9
Medical School Faculty
Asian/Pacific
Black Hispanic** Native American Islander
1975 733 26.9 349 21.5 14 14.3 2383 18.6

1981 810 30.4 416 26.4 37 18.9 3319 22.7
1988 1103 33.8 548 24.6 52 19.2 4437 24.4
1991 1374 35.4 644 30.6 64 26.6 4016 32.3
* 1990 data
**Data for Mexican Americans and Puerto Rican Americans only
Source: Commission on Professionals in Science and Technology 1992:236, 239.
is especially true when the practices of younger female and male physi¬
cians are compared (Franks and Clancy 1993; Lurie et al. 1993). Never¬
theless, some analysts continue to express concern that as long as medical
students are socialized into a physician role that is paternalistic and
authoritarian, the detrimental aspects of the physician-patient relation¬
ship, particularly for female and minority patients, are not likely to im¬
prove (Fee 1983). From this perspective, the solution to the inequities in
health care is not simply to put more women and minorities in positions
of power within the current medical system, but rather to change the
system itself. As we will see next, this goal is a cornerstone of the feminist
health care movement.
Feminist Health Care

The feminist health care movement emerged during the 1960s as an out¬
growth of the broader feminist struggle against sexism and gender in¬
equality (see chapter 13). Women meeting in small consciousness-raising
groups began to relate their individual medical experiences, which con¬
tained some common themes: “[the doctor-patient relationship] was all
too often characterized by condescension and contempt on the part of
the doctor, and feelings of humiliation on the part of the patient...”
(Marieskind and Ehrenreich 1975:39). Out of this grew the realization
that “they had to begin by developing their own standards of normalcy
based on the study of their own and other women’s bodies” (1975:38). By
1975, these early efforts had spawned more than 1,200 feminist health
care groups in the United States alone.
The feminist health care movement combines self-help with political
practice (Withorn 1986). According to health education specialist Sheryl
Ruzek (1987:188), feminist health activists “educate themselves and other
women about health issues, provide alternative services, and work to
influence public policies affecting women’s health.” They accomplish
these things in a wide variety of ways. With regard to education, for
instance, feminists have produced a large and impressive body of litera¬
ture covering diverse health and medical issues in a nontechnical, highly
readable style and format. Perhaps the best known example is the Boston
Women’s Health Book Collective’s Our Bodies, Ourselves (1973), which was
published in a revised edition in 1992. Feminist health activists have also
organized “know-your-body courses” in which women not only learn
about their bodies—thereby demystifying them—but also learn how to
provide themselves with basic care through, for example, breast self-ex¬
ams and pelvic self-exams. In the way of alternative medical care, women
have opened their own clinics to provide a variety of services, such as
gynecological care, pregnancy testing, counseling, and abortion services.
The distinctive features of such clinics are twofold: (1) “the bulk of a
458 Chapter 12
\
patient’s encounter, from initial intake to the final counseling, is with

women like herself;” and (2) “the woman is not the object of care but an
active participant” (Marieskind and Ehrenreich 1975:39). Finally, in
terms of influencing public policy, feminist health activists have formed
organizations, such as the National Women’s Health Network, which has
a membership of more than 20,000. Such groups lobby local, national,
and international decision makers regarding policies affecting women’s
health throughout the world (Ruzek 1987).
The feminist health care movement has not been free of problems.
For one thing, women’s clinics often face severe staffing shortages and
funding difficulties. Such clinics are among the first to lose during gov¬
ernment budget cuts (Withorn 1986). In addition, the movement in
general has sometimes been criticized for not posing a more serious
challenge to the medical establishment. “Many health activists believe
that it is virtually impossible to create a truly humane health care sys¬
tem for women in a capitalist society. Yet none of the strategies used
directly attack the underlying economic organization of society” (Ruzek
1987:195). Most still focus on individual treatment, rather than institu¬
tional change. And there is the added danger that an emphasis on self-
care may simply serve to relieve the state bf any responsibility for insuring
the health of its citizens, female and male (Ruzek 1987; Withorn 1986).
Most clinics also offer only obstetrical and gynecological care.
Despite these difficulties, the feminist health care movement is to be
applauded for providing many women with safe, affordable, and affirm¬
ing medical services. Equally important is the movement’s central role in
identifying and publicizing the inadequacies and inequities of our tradi¬
tional health care system. Although the movement’s focus has been on
women, its analysis of the problems inherent in traditional health care
delivery has also been beneficial to men, especially poor, working-class,
and minority men who not infrequently are also subjected to inhumane
and condescending treatment at >the hands of an elitist medical estab¬
lishment.
Another contribution of the feminist health care movement has
been to give women “a sense of pride and strength in their bodies”
(Marieskind and Ehrenreich 1975:38). We will begin to explore this issue
through a discussion of gender, physical fitness, and athletic participation.
GENDER, SPORT, AND FITNESS
Knowing the particular strengths and weaknesses of one’s body, feeling

fit and energized, being comfortable with and appreciative of one’s
body—all are empowering. What is more, developing one’s physical po¬
tential instills a sense of achievement that encourages an individual to
undertake othei types of challenges (Lenskyj 1986). A recognition of this

undeilies the much quoted adage, “sports builds character.” Unfortu¬
nately, the missing, but nevertheless understood adjective here has long
been masculine character. Consider, for instance, the 1971 case of Hol¬
lander V. Connecticut Conference, Inc. in which a female student was barred
from competing on her high school’s boys’ cross country team, even
though she had qualified, because the state interscholastic athletic con¬
ference piohibited coed sports. In deciding in favor of the athletic con¬
ference, the Judge stated, ‘Athletic competition builds character in our
boys. We do not need that kind of character in our girls, the women of
tomorrow” (quoted in Lawrence 1987:222).
The Judge s statement reflects the traditional belief that athletics
and fitness are masculine pursuits incompatible with our cultural stand¬
ards of feminine beauty and female heterosexual attractiveness. In one
sense, this is true; the ways in which sporting and fitness activities are
typically organized and played out represent the antithesis of our cul¬
ture’s definition of femininity. The main ingredients of sport in our
society are competition and domination, self-control and toughness, and
\iolence and aggression. From their earliest encounters with sports, males
are taught to develop a “killer instinct” on the playing field or court.
Winning, they learn, is everything, and their success in sports is taken as
an indication of their ability to succeed in the work world (Messner 1987;
Sabo and Runfola 1980). Men and boys, in fact, typically approach sports
and fitness as work. Exercise, for example, is a “workout” that must entail
a certain degree of pain, exhaustion, and sweat to be satisfying (Sabo
1980). A few men—the professional athletes—even play sports as their
Jobs. And sports, we know, is big business, yielding more than $23 billion
a year (U.S. Department of Commerce 1991).
Females have not been excluded from sport and physical fitness
activities altogether, but their participation historically has been limited.
They have been encouraged to assume a supportive role as cheerleaders
rather than as direct participants. Those who have participated directly
have been channeled into “feminine sports,” such as swimming and div¬
ing, skating, gymnastics, and aerobic dancing. Those women who seri¬
ously pursue sports have often done so under great stress, being labeled
“mannish” and “unfeminine” or inept by others (Blinde and Taub 1992;
Nelson 1992;Jarratt 1990). For instance, in one study, audience reactions
to an announced basketball score (41-40) showed that when the audi¬
ence was told that the players were women, they attributed the low score
to lack of skill, but when they thought the players were men, the low score
was explained in terms of strong defense (Cheska 1981). Another recent
study shows that the labeling of female athletes as lesbians remains wide¬
spread and operates to control the number of women in sports and the
behavior of female athletes. “Women athletes are seen as something less
460 Chapter 12
than ‘real women’ because they do not exeinplify traditional female

qualities (e.g., dependency, weakness, passivity) . . . ^
1992:163). The exception, according to one writer, is the black fema e
athlete who, in the black community, “can be strong and competent in
sport and still not deny her womanliness” (Hart 1980).
In the early 1970s, a number of developments began to transform
both women’s and men’s participation in sport and fitness activities.
Perhaps the most important was the enactment in 1972 of Title IX of the
Education Amendments Act. You may recall from chapter 5 that Title IX
prohibits sex discrimination in educational programs, including sports,
That receive federal funding. In effect. Title IX forced United States
educational institutions to broaden their athletic programs for women and
to spend more money on women’s sports. The effects have been signifi¬
cant: for example, the percentage of varsity athletes who were female rose
from 16 percent in 1971 to 33.7 percent in 1989; the number of athletic
scholarships awarded to women at the highly competitive National Colle¬
giate Athletic Association (NCAA) Division I schools increased from 20
percent in 1977 to 26.4 percent in 1989; and the proportion of college
athletic budgets earmarked for women’s programs rose from 1 to 2
percent in 1972 to 18 to 46 percent in 1989 (Raiborn 1990; Dunkle 1987).
Nevertheless, in a report issued just three months prior to the twentieth
anniversary of the passage of Title IX, the NCAA showed that disparities
between the sexes persist and that most schools remain far from achieving
parity. For example, the average Division I NCAA-member school spends
$849,130 per year on men’s athletic scholarships and $372,800 per year
on scholarships for female athletes. The average base salary for a men’s
head basketball coach was $71,511 in 1991 compared with $39,177 for a
women’s head basketball coach (NCAA 1992; see also Therberge 1993 for
a discussion of sex disparities among coaches in Canada).
Although it is argued by some that men’s sports produce greater
revenues, such a position overlooks our culture’s devaluation of women’s
sports and women athletes as well as the dominant ideology of sport as
masculine. The media contribute to this devaluation in at least two ways.
First, the media provide little coverage of women athletes and women’s
sporting events except during the Olympic Games or other major inter¬
national competitions (Messner et al. 1993; Robinson 1992). For exam¬
ple, Messner and his colleagues (1993) found that men’s sports get 92
percent of televised sports news coverage in the United States, whereas
women’s sports get just 5 percent of such coverage; the remaining cover¬
age is mixed or gender-neutral. According to Robinson (1992) sport is
used by the media to promote a certain type of “orthodox masculinity.”
Women athletes not only do little to sell this kind of masculinity, they also
pose a serious challenge to it. Second, when women are highlighted in
the media, it is frequently as sex objects or as victims. For example, in a
content analysis of Sports Illustrated covers between February 1993 and
Februaiy 1994, Ryan (1994) found that over the fifty-two-week period,
only six women were featured. On one occasion, the women were not
athletes, but models; this, of course, was the famous “swimsuit issue.”
Another issue also showed women who were not athletes; it showed the
widows of two professional baseball players who had been killed in a
boating accident. The other three women were athletes, but they were
featured as victims rather than victors: Monica Seles, the professional
tennis player, who was shown with a knife protruding from her back after
she had been stabbed by a spectator at a match; Mary Pierce, another
tennis player, who was featured in a special report on her father’s abuse
of her; and Nancy Kerrigan, the Olympic figure skater who was featured
after she had been attacked by associates of a rival skater. Clearly, the
media do not contribute much to positively enhance the image of women
athletes and women’s athletics in the eyes of the general public (see also
Messner et al. 1993).
Despite the continued gender stereotyping of athletes, considerable
research has emerged from the fields of sports medicine and sports
psychology that debunks many of the myths about the physical and emo¬
tional consequences of athletics for men and women. One of the first
fallacies to come under attack, for instance, was the notion of “no pain,
no gain” in exercise. Sports medicine specialists were quick to point out
that men—more likely to subscribe to this tenet than women—by ignor¬
ing the signals their bodies send them through pain, were likely to injure
themselves, sometimes permanently. Sports medicine researchers also
demonstrated that participation in sports and vigorous exercise do not
“androgenize” women’s muscles, nor do they harm the female reproduc¬
tive system. To the contrary, exercise may lessen menstrual discomfort
and ease childbirth (Christensen 1993). Third, the notion that men are
naturally better athletes than women because of biological differences in
their physical size and strength is also being called into question, espe¬
cially for certain sports. Recent analyses, for instance, show that in track,
although men’s running times have been improving since the turn of the
century, women’s running times have been improving at more than
double the men’s rate, so that if such trends continue women’s and men’s
track performances will be comparable in the near future (Whipp and
Ward 1992).
Meanwhile, sports psychologists have found no evidence that ath¬
letic participation builds “character” or leads to work success or personal
happiness. In fact, studies suggest that for men the opposite is true: sports
frequently engender a sense of failure in men since so few ever reach the
top of the athletic hierarchy. Messner (1987) notes, for instance, that only
6 to 7 percent of high school football players play in college and of those
that do, about 8 percent are drafted into the pros, but only 2 percent
eventually sign a professional contract. The odds are similar for basketball
players. Moreover, even for those who reach the top, success may be
462 Chapter 12
shortlived: the average NFL career is 4 years, and the average NBA career
is 3.4 years. Messner goes on to cite sports sociologist Hary Edwards, who
has highlighted the disproportionate impact this has had on young ri-
can-A^rican men, since they are typically channeled into sports but
rarely have a “social safety net” to protect them if they fail. Indeed,
Edwards and others have played a major part in uncovering both the
exploitation of African-American athletes and the racism that continues
to permeate organized sports. As one writer expressed it, “In sports, as in
the plantation system of the Old South, the overseers are white and the
workers are black” (Runfola 1980:93).
There is evidence, however, that although most female athletes are
highly competitive, females in general tend to approach sports differently
than males in general. Studies, for example, indicate that women and
girls tend to be more flexible and cooperative players of team sports and
have a greater concern for the fairness of the game rather than winning
at all costs” (Nelson 1992; Jarratt 1990; Gilligan 1982). In a sense, then,
women and girls actually have been freer to approach sports in the way
that at least theoretically they are supposed to be approached: in the spirit
of play and for the purpose of personal enjoyment and enrichment.
Developments such as these have prompted a number of reforms in
athletic programs and have led many women and men to challenge the
U.S. sport system itself “that too often glorifies violence, cheating, com¬
mercialism, and a win-at-all-costs mentality” (Lenskyj 1986:145). But de¬
spite the strides that have been made recently in “demasculinizing” sports
and exercise, there are indications that the gains are already being
eroded. For example, women’s increased interest and participation in
fitness activities have been co-opted to a large extent by manufacturers
and entrepreneurs who promote products and programs that promise
youthfulness, thinness, and sex appeal rather than health and physical
strength (Lenskyj 1986). As we will see shortly, the commercial tendency
to imbue women (and increasingly, men) with insecurity about their
bodies and appearance often results in serious psychological as well as
physical harm.
THE POLITICS OF MENTAL HEALTH

AND MENTAL ILLNESS
Up to this point, we have been discussing physical health and illness. We

will now explore gender issues in mental health and illness.
Gender provides a strong link between physical and mental health
since physicians have tended to view women’s physical complaints as
psychosomatic, that is, as “all in their heads.” Research reveals a propen-
sily on the part of physicians to see women’s use of medical services as

one of the ways women typically cope with psychological problems (Kurtz
and Chalfant 1984). Consequently, physicians commonly prescribe psy¬
chotropic drugs for women who visit them with complaints of physical
ailments. According to Nechas and Foley (1994), for example, women
receive about 66 percent of psychoactive drug prescriptions. These pre-
•scriptions are typically written by internists, general practitioners, and
obstetricians/gynecologists rather than psychiatrists (Fidell 1980). This is
an important point that we will take up again shortly.
Historically, it also has not been uncommon for physicians to assume
that malfunctions” in women’s reproductive systems cause psychological
disturbances. Around the turn of the twentieth century, for instance,
physicians maintained that ovarian dysfunctions caused “personality dis¬
orders” in women—specifically, troublesomeness, eating like a plough¬
man, masturbation, attempted suicide, erotic tendencies, persecution
mania, simple “cus.sedness,” and dysmenorrhea. The “cure” physicians
devised was ovariotomy (i.e., removal of the ovaries, or “female castra¬
tion”). Ehrenreich and English (1986:290) report that:
In 1906 a leading gynecological surgeon estimated that there were

1.50,000 women in the United States who had lost their ovaries under the
knife. Some doctors boasted that they had removed from fifteen hundred
to two thousand ovaries apiece. . . . Patients were often brought in by
their husbands, who complained of their unruly behavior. . . . The
operation was judged successful if the woman was restored to a placid
contentment with her domestic functions.
Today, many physicians argue that menstruation and menopause precipi¬

tate personality disorders in women, ranging from depression to violent
behavior, even though there is little evidence to support this and much to
refute it (Gitlin and Pasnau 1990; see also chapter 2). Drugs, such as
synthetic hormones that have been found to cause cancer, have super-
.seded surgery as “treatment.”
The preceding examples highlight the difficulties we must consider
in examining issues of mental health and illness: specifically, the prob¬
lems of definition, identification, and appropriate treatment. First, psy¬
chiatrists themselves disagree as to what does and what does not
constitute mental illness. At one extreme are those who claim that most
mental disorders are objective conditions that have identifiable organic
or genetic causes. In contrast, there are those such as Thomas Szasz
(1974), who argue that mental illness is a political and moral label, not a
medical one, and that mental institutions are not hospitals, but rather
facilities to control those singled out as deviant.
Although most mental health specialists hold a position somewhere
in between these two extremes, the disagreement itself makes it obvious
464 Chapter 12
that the identification of mental illness is a difficult enterprise at best. Just

how difficult it is was demonstrated by D.L. Rosenhan and his colleagues
in a classic experiment conducted in 1973. Rosenhan and seven associates
were admitted to several different mental hospitals by claiming they were
hearing voices. Their symptom, though, was contrived, as were the names
and occupations they gave; however, they made no other changes in their
life histories or regular behavior. Each of these pseudopatients expected
to be identified quickly as an imposter by hospital personnel, but none
was. Instead, the hospital staffs reinterpreted their normal behavior and
previous life experiences to coincide with the mental illness diagnosis.
They spent an average of nineteen days in the hospital, with all but one
diagnosed schizophrenic.
The Rosenhan experiment illustrates that what is identified as men¬
tal illness “may be in the culturally filtered eye of the beholder rather than
in the malfunction of the physiology or psyche of the person whose
behavior is being judged” (Little 1983:345). Because mental health prac¬
titioners, like all other human beings, are not immune from social condi¬
tioning and therefore cannot be completely objective, we may expect
their clinical judgments to reflect, at least in part, aspects of the culture
to which they belong. Throughout this text, we have pinpointed a variety
of cultural stereotypes regarding gender, sexual orientation, race, age,
and social class. How do such stereotypes impinge upon clinical assess¬
ments of mental health and illness? We will address this question now.
The Double Standard of Mental Health

More than fifteen years ago, a group of social scientists asked seventy-nine
mental health professionals (forty-six men and thirty-three women) to
describe “a healthy, mature, socially competent (a) adult, sex unspecified,
(b) a man, or (c) a woman” (Broverman et al. 1970:1). What they dis¬
covered was that the characteristics of mental health in the responses
differed according to the sex of the person being described. More
importantly, however, they found that traits considered healthy for an
adult j&moTz were almost identical to those judged healthy for men, includ¬
ing independence, a sense of adventure, and assertiveness. In contrast,
the healthy, mature, socially competent adult woman was described as
submissive, dependent, excitable in minor crises, and conceited about
her appearance. As Broverman et al. (1970:5) concluded, “This constel¬
lation seems a most unusual way of describing any mature, healthy indi¬
vidual.”
Since 1970, this study has been replicated a number of times under
a variety of circumstances and with different subjects (Hansen and Reekie
1990; Philips and Gilroy 1985; Wise and Rafferty 1982; Brooks-Gunn and
Fisch 1980). These replications have yielded results that support Brover-
man et al.’s original findings. What we see here, then, is that stereotypical
masculine behavior is assumed by many clinicians to be the norm or the
ideal standard of mental health. This, in turn, puts women in a double
bind. On the one hand, if they choose to behave as a healthy, mature
adult, they risk being labeled abnormal (i.e., masculine women). On the
other hand, women who follow the cultural script for the healthy, mature
woman may find themselves unhappy, dissatisfied, and psychologically
troubled (Tavris 1992).
Robertson and Fitzgerald’s (1990) research demonstrates how this
stereotype may also work against men who choose to deviate from tradi¬
tional norms of masculinity. Robertson and Fitzgerald showed one of two
versions of a videotaped conversation between a male patient (in reality,
an actor) and his therapist to forty-seven other therapists. In one of the
tapes, the patient stated he was an engineer with a wife at home who cared
for their children. In the other tape, he indicated that his wife was an
engineer and he stayed home with the children. Therapists who viewed
the first tape attributed the man’s problems to job or marital pressures or
to biological causes. However, those who saw the second tape typically
diagnosed the man as severely depressed and attributed the depression
to his adoption of the domestic role, even though he reported to his
therapist in the tape that his staying at home had worked out well for the
family. In addition, these therapists tended to focus on the man’s adop¬
tion of the domestic role as something to be treated through therapy
and some appeared hostile toward the patient, questioning his notion
of what it means to be a man. In short, this study indicates that men who
choose not to adhere to the traditionally prescribed masculine role are at
risk of being labeled mentally ill (see also Tavris 1992; Hansen and Reekie
1990).
Besides sex, an individual’s race may influence whether he or she is
labeled mentally ill as well as the particular disorder that is diagnosed.
Loring and Powell (1988), for example, found that mental health profes¬
sionals were more likely to diagnose blacks than whites as violent, even
though the cases they were evaluating were identical in all other respects
(see also Littlewood and Lipsedge 1989; Fulani 1988).
Finally, it is also the case that definitions of mental illness and
standards of mental health change over time as a behavior gains greater
acceptance by the general public or as a result of successful lobbying on
the part of a particular group. For instance, in its 1980 revision of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders—ihc official psychiat¬
ric classification scheme—the American Psychiatric Association (APA)
voted to delete homosexuality from the listing. This demedicalization was
chiefly the result of tireless campaigning and political confrontation be¬
tween gay rights activists, such as the National Gay and Lesbian Task
Force, and the APA (Btisfield 1986).
Chapter 12 \
466
In the sections that follow, we will examine several mental disorders

that have a higher incidence among members of one sex than the other.
We will pay particular attention to how traditional gender relations may
foster these disorders and how gender stereotypes may affect clinicians’
diagnoses and treatments of patients. In addition, we will consider how
other factors, for example, a patient s race, age, social class, or sexual
orientation, may influence diagnosis and clinical outcomes.
Depression, histrionic personality, and agoraphobia Each of us, at one

time or another, has felt depressed. In everyday usage, depression refers to
feeling down, “blue,” or sad. Depression as a clinical syndrome, however,
is more severe and prolonged. It entails persistent feelings of discontent
or displeasure accompanied by at least four of eight symptoms (poor
appetite or weight loss, insomnia or increased sleep, psychomotor agita¬
tion or retardation, loss of interest in usual activities, loss of energy or
fatigue, feelings of worthlessness, diminished concentration, and suicidal
ideation) that are present daily for at least two weeks without evidence of
any other disorder (Rothblum 1982).
Women have consistently higher rates of depression than men, ac¬
cording to studies of both clinical populations and the general public. For
every case of clinical depression among men, there are two among
women (Cleary 1987), and this sex difference begins to emerge as early
as puberty (Allgood-Merton et al. 1990). “The life-time risk for develop¬
ing depression ranges from 2 percent to 12 percent for men and from 5
percent to 26 percent for women” (Rothblum 1982:5). However, the
incidence of depression among men and women also varies by race, social
class, and marital status.
More specifically, minority women and poor women who head
households (among whom racial minorities are disproportionately repre¬
sented) have the highest rates of depression of any group (McGrath et al.
1990; American Psychological Association 1985). Cannon and her col¬
leagues (1989) report, though, that social mobility and race interact to
have an impact on rates of depression among middle-class women. In
their study of 200 female professionals and managers employed full-time,
they found that black women who had been raised in middle-class house¬
holds and white women who had been raised in working-class households
had the highest levels of depressive symptoms. Their study also shows that
single women and women with children are more likely to be depressed
than married women or childless women.
However, other researchers have found that married women are
more susceptible to depression than both never-married women and
married men. Interestingly, the reverse is true for men: never-married
men are more likely to suffer depression than married men. According
to the American Psychological Association (1985:8), “marriage is associ- 1
ated with a 71 percent reduction in illness for minority men, 63 percent

for white men, 28 percent for white women, and 8 percent for minority
women. Also of special interest is the observation that among divorced
women and men, the former experienced more depression during the
marriage, whereas the latter grew depressed during the marital separa¬
tion (Rothblum 1982; see also chapter 7).
A number of theories have been forwarded to explain these differ¬
ences. One is that the difference is merely a statistical artifact of women ’s
greater likelihood to seek help for their problems. There is evidence of
bias among psychiatrists, especially male psychiatrists, toward diagnosing
depression in women (Loring and Powell 1988). This, though, leaves
unexplained women s higher rate of depression as reported in general
community surveys in which respondents, regardless of sex, have not
usually sought help (Cleary 1987; Weissman 1980). It also cannot explain
the variation in depression by age, race, social class, and marital status.
A second argument focuses on hormonal differences between the
sexes, but evidence in support of this is sparse. There is a strong relation¬
ship between postpartum hormonal changes and depression (see chapter
2), but this can account for only a small portion of the rate variation
between the sexes, nor does it explain the variation between white and
minority women.
It seems more likely that social factors are responsible for the differ¬
ences in depression rates that we have observed. There are two major
psychological explanations: the learned helplessness hypothesis and the social
status hypothesis. According to the former, females are socialized to re¬
spond passively to stress, but males are taught to respond assertively.
Consequently, when confronted with a stressful life event, men are more
likely to take some kind of action, whereas women tend to become
depressed. At first glance, this argument is appealing, but if we look at it
closely, we see that it amounts to little more than victim blaming. “Many
women find their situation depressing because real social discrimination
[not faulty socialization] makes it difficult for them to achieve by direct
action and self-assertion, further contributing to their psychological dis¬
tress” (Weissman 1980:102; Miller and Kirsch 1987). For instance, re¬
search indicates that an important contributing factor to women’s
increased risk of clinical depression is their greater vulnerability to physi¬
cal and sexual abuse. According to Nechas and Foley (1994), if one
controls for the incidence of physical and sexual abuse among depressed
women, the rates of depression for women and men are equalized. Thus,
it appears that the social and economic conditions under which particular
groups of women live, not certain inherent or learned feminine traits,
puts them at greater risk for clinical depression.
This is precisely the premise of the social status hypothesis, which
also emphasizes that the traditional roles afforded to women (i.e., home-
468 Chapter 12 \
maker, mother) offer limited sources of personal satisfaction compared

with the diversity of jobs available to men (Doyal 1990b). Given their
double burden of housework and paid work, one would expect employed
women to experience greater psychological distress than full-time home¬
makers, but interestingly, research shows that just the opposite is usually
the case (Thoits 1987). Moreover, women who have high-income, high-
status jobs also have high levels of psychological well-being and few
symptoms of psychological distress, irrespective of marital status (Gold¬
ing 1988; Horwitz 1982). And if we consider the stress and disad¬
vantages imposed by poverty, sexism, and racial discrimination, the
depression so prevalent among low income and minority women is easy
to comprehend.
These findings are not unrelated to those regarding the lower inci¬
dence of depression in married men compared with never-married men.
Research suggests first of all that married men usually have someone
available in whom to confide: their wives. Women, who are socially ex¬
pected to give others emotional support, typically display a willingness to
listen to their husbands’ problems and try to help. Interestingly, hus¬
bands are not inclined to reciprocate wfien their wives are troubled (Lott
1987). In addition, as we learned in chapter 7, men’s traditional roles as
husbands and fathers place relatively few demands on them in the home
and permit them considerable control over the demands that are made
of them. In contrast, women’s traditional roles as wives and mothers
afford them fewer options, thereby combining high demands with little
control, an inherently stressful situation that obviously could foster de¬
pression (Doyal 1990b; Barnett and Baruch 1987). In short, one’s level of
psychological well-being within a marriage is strongly affected by one’s
marital power (Steil and Turetsky 1987; see also chapter 7).
Two other disorders that are more prevalent among women than
men are histrionic personality and agoraphobia. Histrionic personality re¬
fers to what was formerly called hysteria. In ancient times, as well as more
recent ones, hysteria was thought to be caused by the movement of the
uterus through the body. Thus, by definition, all hysterics were women.
More recently, the ratio of females to males exhibiting histrionic person¬
ality was estimated to be between 2:1 and 4:1 (Chambless and Goldstein
1980), although some psychologists continue to argue that the clinical
description of histrionic personality in diagnostic manuals virtually guar¬
antees that it will be applied more frequently to women than to men
(Tavris 1992).
What are the characteristics of the histrionic personality? The his¬
trionic personality is commonly described as demanding, dependent,
manipulative, melodramatic, scatterbrained, and seductive but frigid.
Hysterics may also exhibit a conversion reaction: that is, they exhibit a
physical illness or disorder that has no apparent organic cause. Most
frequently, this takes the form of pain, hyperventilation, fainting, violent

fits and convulsions, and paralysis.(Chambless and Goldstein 1980).
Given the close resemblance of the histrionic personality to our
culture s conception of normal femininity, some analysts have argued that
females are socialized into careers as hysterics. That is, because women
have been taught to derive their sense of self worth from others’ reactions
to them, some may resort to extreme measures, such as the histrionic
traits described previously, to attract attention and win approval
(Wolowitz 1972). Although there is some support for this hypothesis, it is
also possible that hysteria is a response to a highly stressful situation that
an individual perceives to be extremely threatening but that he or she
feels powerless to change. In other words, hysteria may be a form of
rebellion, especially when conversion reaction is taken into account
(Ehrenreich and English 1986). Consider, for example, that conversion
reactions are most common among men during wartime. In addition, for
the married woman, conversion reaction renders her “incapable of carry¬
ing out her responsibilities and renders her dependent on her family.
These behaviors as well are more easily tolerated in women and may cause
less conflict for the hysteric and her family than would an overt rejection
of onerous duties” (Chambless and Goldstein 1980:116-117). In any
event, care must be taken to insure that the terms histrionic personality and
hysteria are accurately applied and not simply used to denigrate women or
to dismiss their real physical symptoms as unfounded. A recent example
of the latter is employers who maintain that the physical ailments of their
female industrial workers are psychosomatic (“assembly-line hysteria”)
rather than products of an unhealthy working environment (Doyal 1990a;
Harris 1983).
Agoraphobia is sometimes referred to as anxiety hysteria. Agoraphobia
is commonly defined as fear of open spaces, but this may mean a fear of
crowds, public places, expressways, being away from home—in short, “any
situation in which escape to safe territory or to a trusted companion
might be hindered; the more confining the situation, the more anxiety-
provoking” (Chambless and Goldstein 1980:119). If agoraphobics per¬
ceive themselves to be in such a situation they often experience a panic
attack, that is, an episode of terror during which they may hyperventilate,
experience tightness in the chest, and a number of other symptoms that
they interpret as evidence of “impending doom.” In fact, Chambless and
Goldstein (1980) hypothesize that agoraphobia is really not a fear of open
spaces or of separation, but of panic attacks and the consequences. Thus,
; agoraphobics avoid places in which they think panic attacks will occur.
About 80 percent of agoraphobics are women, and it is estimated
I that more than one million women suffer from agoraphobia. Just why this
i is so remains speculative since systematic research only began during the
1970s. It may be that since females are not typically encouraged to con-
470 Chapter 12 \
front fear in the way males are, they become “helpless in the face of stress
and more easily trapped in situations from which they see no escape”
(Chambless and Goldstein 1980:123). Agoraphobics tend to be passive
and dependent and to have difficulty expressing their needs—traits fos¬
tered in females. In addition, researchers have noted that many agora¬
phobics are women in their twenties and thirties who are unhappily
married and who have young children. Usually, these women have never
been on their own, and their parents and husbands reinforce their de¬
pendency (see, for example, Hafner and Minge 1989). Often, they are
quite literally trapped in their marriages since they do not have the
money or the skills to survive on their own. Even if the means to leave are
available, the prospect of being alone—something they have never expe¬
rienced—frightens them into remaining in their marriages. Agoraphobia
symptoms may be the result of these circumstances (Chambless and
Goldstein 1980).
Although these hypotheses are provocative, further research is
needed to deepen our understanding of both agoraphobia and histrionic
personality. Even more important, this research must examine race and
social class differences, in addition to sex differences, among those af¬
flicted.
Alcohol and drug addictions We noted previously some researchers’

claims that in reacting to stress, women tend to be passive, whereas men
typically take some sort of action. In the extreme, males may respond by
“acting out,” for example, by fighting or becoming abusive, and by alco¬
hol or drug abuse. Men have consistently higher rates of problem drink¬
ing and illicit drug use than do women.
With respect to alcohol use, men outnumber women among heavy
drinkers, irrespective of race. In general, men are three times more likely
than women to be heavy drinkers (Robert Wood Johnson foundation
1993). The ratio of male to female heavy drinkers is estimated to be 4.5:1
among Native Americans, 4.3:1 among Hispanics, 3.5:1 among whites,
and 1.4:1 among African Americans. Men do more public drinking than
women, so they are less likely to drink alone. They also engage in more
“binge drinking” or episodic heavy drinking (Leland 1984).
According to Morrissey (1986:159), “The availability of and accessi¬
bility of alcohol to specific groups is symbolic of the positions of those
groups in a hierarchy.” She notes that at the turn of the century, the
sociologist Thorstein Veblen observed that the taboo against women
drinking was one of the ways men in the United States symbolically
demonstrated their higher status. In other words, drinking for men his¬
torically has been a kind of status symbol, and male dominance in society
affords men greater access to alcohol which, in turn, increases their
likelihood of developing drinking problems.
Alcohol consumption certainly appears to be compatible with

stereotyped masculinity (Lemle 1984). Two researchers found, for in¬
stance, that males who exhibit exaggerated masculinity (“hyper-masculin¬
ity ) are more likely to be substance (i.e., alcohol and drug) abusers
(Mosher and Sirkin 1984). Males also receive greater indirect social sup¬
port for drinking. Parents, for example, are more tolerant of the drinking
of adolescent sons than of adolescent daughters (Thompson and
Wilsnack 1984). Similarly, wives are more tolerant of their husbands
drinking than vice versa. About 90 percent of wives remain with alcoholic
husbands compared with just 10 percent of husbands who stay with
alcoholic wives (American Psychological Association 1985).
In recent years, there has been growing concern that the drinking
behavior of men and women is converging. Many have argued that as
traditional gender prescriptions change and more women occupy pre¬
viously male-dominated positions, they will confront greater stress that
may lead to increased drinking, or they may be encouraged to adopt male
drinking patterns. Such concerns have been fueled by liquor advertise¬
ments designed to appeal to “liberated women” and by advice books that
urge women seeking corporate success to keep up with the social drinking
of their male colleagues (Morrissey 1986). There is, though, no evidence
to support the convergence hypothesis, and there is much evidence that
refutes it. For one thing, there has been no significant increase during
the past twenty years in women’s drinking or in the number of women
with alcohol problems (Fillmore 1984; Thompson and Wilsnack 1984).
Second, although employed women are less likely than unemployed
women to be total abstainers, this does not mean that they engage in
more stress-related drinking. Their drinking habits may simply reflect
their greater opportunity to drink socially or their greater exposure to
alcohol in both work-related and social settings (Biener 1987). In fact,
success-oriented women appear the least likely to become substance abus¬
ers in reaction to stress (Snell et al. 1987). As one observer recently put
it, “If female drinking problems are increasing, it is most likely not
because women’s liberation has arrived but because it has not” (Sandmair
1980:242).
These findings indicate that there are a number of variables inter¬
vening in the sex-alcohol use relationship. One of these is sexual
orientation. Although as we have noted that women are less likely than
men to be heavy drinkers, lesbians are significantly more likely than
heterosexual women to engage in heavy drinking, have drinking prob¬
lems, or become alcoholic. It is estimated that 25 to 35 percent of
lesbians have a drinking problem compared with 5 to 7 percent of
heterosexual women. Alcoholism is also a serious problem among gay
men (Nicoloff and Stiglitz 1987; Weathers 1980; Diamond and Wilsnack
1978). This is due at least in part to the fact that because bars historically
472 Chapter 12 \
have been relatively safe havens for lesbians and gay men, they assumed
a central role in gays’ and lesbians’ social lives and leisure activities. In
addition, societal homophobia and oppression of homosexuals generate
feelings of alienation and isolation among lesbians and gay men which,
in turn, are associated with increased alcohol consumption (Nicoloff and
Stiglitz 1987).
Race is also an important variable to consider. Research shows that
black women and men, for example, are more likely than whites to be
abstainers from alcohol. Among blacks and whites who drink, rates of
heavy drinking appear to be similar for women (about 7 percent), but
higher for black men (31 percent) compared with white men (23 per¬
cent) . However, age and social class intersect with race and sex in influ¬
encing drinking patterns. For instance, if we use education as an
indicator of social class, we find that black men with less than a high
school education drink three times as much as white males with this
educational background. As a general rule, the higher the men’s educa¬
tional attainment, the lower their rates of drinking, regardless of race.
However, highly educated black men who do drink are more likely than
similarly educated white men who drink to develop a serious drinking
problem. It has been hypothesized that this may be due less to the fact
that they are actually more likely to become alcoholic than it is to the fact
that as high-status minorities their behavior is more closely scrutinized
and, therefore, any deviance is more easily detected. Finally, it has been
found that heavy drinking by black males increases as they grow older, in
particular from young adulthood to middle age, whereas the reverse
pattern is true for white males. It has been argued that this difference is
most likely the result of white males’ greater probability of increasing
economic stability as they age compared with the cumulative effect of
black males’ experiences of discrimination and economic marginaliza¬
tion (Barr et al. 1993).
Once again, therefore, it appears that the social-structural condi¬
tions in which particular groups of women and men live affect the likeli¬
hood that they will develop drinking problems. It is important to note,
however, that with regard to sex, there are physiological factors that also
must be taken into account. More specifically, when women do drink
heavily, they suffer greater impairment than do men who are heavy
drinkers. Recent medical research has shown that females have less of a
particular stomach enzyme that helps the digestion of alcohol before it
passes into the bloodstream. Consequently, more alcohol goes into
women’s bloodstreams than into men’s, even if women drink the same
amount as men relative to body size. More importantly, heavy drinking
further inhibits the production of the enzyme, so that alcoholic men lose
some of their ability to digest alcohol, but alcoholic women lose this
ability completely because their stomachs have virtually none of the en-
zyme. As a result, women are more susceptible to liver damage and other
physical problems if they become alcoholic (Freeza et al. 1990).
Despite such findings, the fact that more males than females develop
drinking problems has led to the view that alcoholism is a “male disease.”
Consequently, alcoholism treatment programs typically have been de¬
signed by men for men (Ettorre 1992; Tavris 1992). Moreover, women
alcoholics suffer greater stigmatization than do male alcoholics at least in
part because excessive drinking violates traditional gender norms for
women. Not surprisingly, then, women alcoholics express greater reluc¬
tance than male alcoholics about entering treatment programs. The most
frequent reason underlying this reluctance is fear of the adverse conse¬
quences (e.g., losing custody of their children) of being officially labeled
alcoholic (Ettorre 1992).
Just as alcohol has been more readily available to men, so too have
men had greater access to illicit drugs. Men, in fact, control the illicit
drug trade in the United States and abroad, which is not surprising given
their greater involvement in virtually all forms of criminal activity (see
chapter 9). Men use illicit drugs more than women and they are more
likely to be regular or habitual users. As is the case with alcohol consump¬
tion, there is no evidence that male and female patterns of drug use are
converging, although greater publicity has been given in recent years to
women’s use of cocaine, especially crack cocaine. Inciardi and his col¬
leagues (1993:38-39) attribute this publicity to the application of a sexual
double standard. “Women’s cocaine use is seen as more alarming than
men’s because it is connected to both old ideas about women’s drug use
(but not men’s) being a source of sexual corruption and newer ideas
about women’s work-force participation leading to new pressures and
temptations for women—including drug use—because they are taking on
male role characteristics.” Thus, although there are no empirical data to
support these claims, women’s drug use, like their alcohol use, is more
negatively stereotyped and more highly stigmatized than similar behavior
by men (Inciardi et al. 1993).
This is further reflected in traditional analyses that argued that
female drug abusers exhibit greater psychological maladjustment than
their male counterparts; that is, they are sicker than male drug abusers.
Recent research, however, fails to support this claim. Eemale and male
drug abusers score similarly on tests of psychological adjustment and
report similar routes to their introduction to drug use. Both males and
females are likely to be motivated to first try illicit drugs because of peer
or social pressure (Sutker et al. 1981). Eor men, though, this pressure
comes from same-sex peers; for women, it comes from men, primarily
boyfriends (Inciardi etal. 1993; Prather and Eidell 1978). Once they have
been initiated into illicit drug use, men’s and women’s reasons for con¬
tinued use differ. Men are more likely to continue to use drugs for thrills
474 Chapter 12.
or pleasure; women are more likely to continue to use drugs as self-medi¬

cation—that is, “as a coping mechanism for dealing with situational fac¬
tors, life events, or general psychological distress (Inciardi et al.
1993:25). Consequently, drug treatment programs for women must be
designed to address women abusers’ unique needs and concerns—an
important issue to which we will return momentarily.
One official response to female drug abusers that became increas¬
ingly popular during the 1980s was to subject them to a sex-specific form
of criminal prosecution (Green 1993). As of February 1990, about thirty-
five women in the United States had faced criminal charges—typically,
delivering drugs to a minor—for having abused drugs (or alcohol) while
pregnant. Only one woman, though, a twenty-five-year-old in Florida, has
been convicted; she was sentenced to fifteen years probation. Prosecutors
argue that they are motivated by a concern over the alarming increase in
the number of drug-addicted babies being born in the United States—
about one in ten live births in 1990. Criminal prosecution, they maintain,
is a way to force drug-addicted women to get help for their problem, while
simultaneously protecting the unborn infant.
Needless to say, this approach is controversial. Apart from the con¬
stitutional issues, what the prosecutors’ argument seems to ignore is the
lack of drug treatment programs for women, especially pregnant women.
Out of approximately 7,000 drug treatment programs available nation¬
wide, only about fifty provide female patients with obstetric and child care
as well as special counseling (Diesenhouse 1990). In one survey of New
York City programs, 54 percent excluded all pregnant women, 67 percent
excluded pregnant women on Medicaid, and 82 percent excluded crack-
addicted pregnant women on Medicaid (Chavkin 1990). Thus, as one
observer has argued, “Prosecuting [the female addict] for failing to get
help no one would provide hardly seems fair” (quoted in Lewin
1990c:A14).
It is also the case that, like alcohol treatment programs, drug treat¬
ment programs are usually designed to address the needs and concerns
of male drug addicts. These, we have noted, are typically different from
those of female addicts. Inciardi and his colleagues (1993:29) explain:
One problem is the subject matter included in therapy. An obvious

example is that chemically dependent men often have a problem
controlling their behavioral expression of anger, while women are much
more likely to be troubled by not having ever learned to express anger in
the first place. Or the type of therapy may need to be quite different.
Successful group therapy for chemically dependent men, for example,
often involves confrontations with peers in order to help them recognize
and admit their underlying problems, while women tend to react badly to
confrontational techniques and instead benefit from intensive mutual
support from peers.
It is support fiom peers as well as family members that women drug

abusers are least likely to get. Research indicates that women who enter
treatment encounter opposition and less support from their families and
friends than men who enter treatment (U.S. House of Representatives
1990). According to one researcher, only one woman in ten leaves her
addicted male partner, whereas nine out of ten men leave addicted fe¬
male partners (Hinds 1990). In one study in which addicts were asked
about family and friends who would help them end their drug habits, the
most common response for female addicts was no one; 50 percent more
female addicts than male addicts reported that they had no friends or
family members to provide them with that kind of support (Inciardi et al.
1993).
Significantly, the same reason which underlies women’s dependence
on illicit drugs—responding to the stressful and depressed circumstances
of their lives—also appears to be responsible for their dependence on
prescription drugs. The one form of drug addiction more common
among women than men involves the use of prescription drugs. Unlike
illicit drugs, women have easy access to prescription drugs. We noted
earlier doctors’ propensity to prescribe mood-altering psychotropic drugs
to women. The most frequently prescribed drugs are minor tranquilizers
and sedatives, such as benzodiazepines (Ettorre 1992). Such drugs are
highly addictive even when taken in normal therapeutic doses (Ettorre
1992; Cooperstock 1980). About half of all American women use psycho¬
tropic drugs; they constitute 70 percent of habitual tranquilizer users and
72 percent of antidepressant drug users (Gold 1983; see also Inciardi et
al. 1993).
A final note: women are more likely than men to suffer cross-addic¬
tions—that is, simultaneous addiction to both alcohol and drugs (Nechas
and Eoley 1994; Ettorre 1992). This appears to be due to women’s greater
likelihood to report alcohol-related problems to their physicians. The
physicians, in turn, often prescribe tranquilizers, assuming that they will
help women “cope” better and, therefore, stop drinking. Unfortunately,
this frequently exacerbates the problem. Benzodiazepines and alcohol
are the second most common overdose combination in the United States
and Canada (Cooperstock 1980), illustrating clearly the tragic conse¬
quences of sexist health care.
Eating disorders In considering eating disorders, it is useful to think in

terms of a continuum (Wooley and Wooley 1980). At one end is obesity; an
individual is obese if he or she is 25 percent above the average weight for
someone of his or her age and height. More women than men are obese
and the problem is especially acute for poor women and African-Ameri¬
can women (whom we know are disproportionately represented among
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476 Chapter 12
the poor). According to Freedman (1986:151), “obesity occurs seven

times more frequently in American women of the lowest socioeconomic
levels than in those of the highest” (see also Gortmaker et al. 1993).
The obese are usually blamed for their condition. It is assumed that
they lack self-control, are lazy, and engage in overeating. However, re¬
search indicates that often the obese eat no more than those who are thin;
sometimes, they eat much less. It appears that for many, obesity is due to
factors over which they have little or no control: heredity, metabolism,
and nutrition (which helps to account for the social class dimension of
the problem) (Bouchard et al. 1990; Stunkard et al. 1990). Nevertheless,
tremendous pressure is put upon the obese to lose weight. For example,
they are discriminated against in the job market, made the brunt of jokes
by the media and others, and judged by the general public to be sloppy,
stupid, and ugly (Attie and Brooks-Gunn 1987; Freedman 1986; Wooley
and Wooley 1980). Women, however, suffer more negative consequences
from being obese than men do. According to one recent study, for
example, obese women are more likely than obese men to lose socioeco¬
nomic status independently of their family’s social status and income;
they were also 20 percent less likely tha'n non-obese women to marry. In
contrast, the negative impact of obesity on men’s socioeconomic status
and chances of marrying were much smaller. This does not mean that
men are not stigmatized for deviating from cultural norms of male physi¬
cal attractiveness. Although we will return to this issue later in the chap¬
ter, suffice it to say here that short stature more than obesity had a greater
negative impact on men (Gortmaker et al. 1993).
The findings of Gortmaker et al.’s study as well as others are also
important in understanding why the vast majority of people with other
eating disorders are women. In the United States, fat is equated with
ugliness, whereas thinness is associated with beauty and high social status.
(Consider, for instance, the often-quoted adage, “You can never be too
rich or too thin.”) It also appears that our cultural standard has idealized
an increasingly thinner body since the 1920s (Tavris 1992; Attie and
Brooks-Gunn 1987: Freedman 1986; Silverstein et al. 1986). This is true
for men as well as women, but men, as we have already seen, are given
considerably more leeway with regard to their weight. Women, moreover,
are frequently judged less by what they do than by how they look.
Not surprising, therefore, is the fact that women tend to evaluate
their self-worth in terms of their appearance. Unfortunately, their esti¬
mates of themselves are often unrealistically negative. Women consis¬
tently express dissatisfaction with their bodies, and most frequently they
couch this dissatisfaction in terms of weight. In one study, for example,
70 percent of the female college students questioned perceived them¬
selves as slightly overweight or overweight, although only 39 percent
actually were (Miller et al. 1980). Interestingly, although women typically
overestimated their weight, men tended to underestimate theirs. Mintz

and Betz (1986), for instance, found in their study of college students that
the majority of women felt that, on average, they were ten pounds over¬
weight, whereas the majority of men considered themselves an average of
three pounds underweight. The overweight men in this study perceived
themselves to be thinner than they actually were, whereas the only women
who judged themselves as being of normal weight were really slightly
underweight. Similar findings were obtained by McCaulay et al. (1988).
Significantly, more women than men, the research tells us, are obsessed
with the desire to be thin (Hesse-Biber 1989).
This cultural and personal obsession with weight can lead to eating
disorders. One is chronic dieting. One of every two women reports being
on a diet “most of the time” (Freedman 1986). Although this may not
appear to be serious, it can have severe physical and psychological conse¬
quences (Attie and Brooks-Gunn 1987). The chronic dieter tries dozens
of different diet plans—many of which are dangerously unhealthy—over
the course of ten to forty years, often beginning as an adolescent. Ironi¬
cally, the dieting may have the opposite effect of what was intended;
restricting food intake can lower one’s metabolic rate which, in turn,
requires that the dieter eat even less to sustain further weight loss. This is
why after one stops following some diets, one may regain lost poundage
quickly, prompting the start of another diet (Polivy and Herman 1985).
Thus, a vicious cycle ensues with the chronic dieter perpetually dissatis¬
fied with her appearance:
In its most extreme form, the effort to be slender becomes so central to

self-acceptance that all other life activities are relegated to relative
unimportance. If weight is too high, the patient will avoid seeing friends,
refuse to attend social events, avoid sex, and postpone or drop out of
training or careers. The plan is always to begin or resume these activities
once weight is lost, but for many that day never comes, or, if it does, it is
short-lived (Wooley and Wooley 1980:137).
Some people turn to eating as a way to handle stress. Women are

more likely to do this than men are (Ettorre 1992), perhaps because food
shopping and preparation have been women’s responsibilities and be¬
cause women’s magazines highlight food by presenting tempting recipes
and advertisements (Silverstein et al. 1986). However, since women also
tend to be preoccupied by the fear of weight gain, some may develop the
disorder known as bulimia. Bulimics engage in binge eating, consuming
large quantities of food (usually “junk” food) in a short period of time.
Afterwards, fearful that they will gain weight, they purge themselves of
the food by fasting, taking laxatives (sometimes a dozen or two dozen a
day), exercising excessively, and most commonly, by inducing vomiting
(Sparkman 1985; Wooley and Wooley 1980).
\
478 Chapter 12
Bulimia is difficult to detect because bulimics usually do not show

extreme weight loss. Bulimia, though, causes serious psychological and
physical damage. The binge-purge cycle may take on the character of an
addiction, like alcoholism (Ettorre 1992). Frequently, the gastrointestinal
tract is damaged due to the overuse of laxatives, and the esophagus is
harmed by the effects of repeated vomiting (Kmetz 1985; Wooley and
Wooley 1980). Reports indicate that bulimia may currently be an epi¬
demic, particularly on college campuses. Estimates are that from 4 to 20
percent of college students, virtually all of them women, are bulimic to
some degree (Boskind-White 1985). Some researchers argue, in fact, that
bulimia is becoming, in a sense, a “communicable disease” in that many
bulimics report having been taught how to vomit by a friend or by media
stories about the illness (Brumberg 1988; Attie and Brooks-Gunn 1987).
Finally, at the other extreme end of the eating disorders continuum,
opposite obesity, is anorexia. Anorectics have a compulsive fear of becom¬
ing fat and literally starve themselves to prevent weight gain or to lose
more weight. Anorectics—an estimated 90 to 95 percent of whom are
women—have an exceptionally distorted body image, feeling or consid¬
ering themselves to be fat even when tHey are emaciated. The symptoms
of anorexia include a 25 percent loss of original body weight with con¬
comitant refusals to eat (Freedman 1986; Sparkman 1985).
Until quite recently, most of the research on anorectics indicated
that they were usually young women in their teens and twenties who came
from middle-class or wealthy families, and most were white. Studies are
now showing that there has been an increase in the disorder among
working-class and minority women (Root 1990; Rosen et al. 1988) and
among some groups of men (Striegel-Moore et al. 1986). It is unclear
whether these changes represent a true increase in anorexia among these
populations, or whether the widespread stereotype of the anorectic as a
young, wealthy, white woman prevented clinicians from seeing anorexia
in members of these groups. In any event, research now indicates that
although rates of diagnosed anorexia are still higher among middle-class
and wealthy white women, diagnoses of anorexia and related eating
disorders are increasing among African-American, Hispanic-American,
and Native American young women in rural and low-income areas (Root
1990; Snow and Harris 1989; Rosen et al. 1988) , as well as among gay men
(Gettleman and Thompson 1993; Striegel-Moore et al. 1986).
In concentrating on white, middle-class clinical samples, researchers
found that anorectics often had difficulty expressing their personal needs
and desires, and may feel they have little, if any, control over their lives.
Their weight becomes the one thing they can control. Controlling their
appearance is also a way to please others (Sparkman 1985). It is not
difficult to see how this theory could also be applied to young women of
color and to gay men. In explaining the predominance of women with
the disorder, however, clinician^ often resorted to the psychoanalytic

literature claiming that female anorectics were trying to deny their wom¬
anhood by making their bodies masculine (i.e., noncurvacious). An alter¬
native perspective, however, argues that anorectic women actually
embrace an exaggerated image of womanhood. “Anorectics are seeking
beauty through body transformation (just as most ‘healthy’ women do).
The goal is not to reject womanliness but to enact it by becoming thinner
and lovelier than anyone else” (Freedman 1986:156). Of course, different
cultures have different standards of beauty (see Box 12.3 on pages 480-
482), and more research is needed to determine the validity of this theory
across racial and ethnic groups.
Unfortunately, in studying anorexia and other eating disorders, cli¬
nicians and researchers have often focused on the pathologies of indi¬
viduals rather than on the cultural and social environment in which they
live. It is important not to lose sight of the fact that the predominance of
eating disorders among women is a political issue as well as a clinical one.
As one researcher has argued, “It is political because it keeps women
attending to their looks instead of the circumstances of their lives, it pits
woman against woman, it destroys physical fitness and energy. And, sad¬
dest of all, it represents a rejection of the female body” (quoted in Tavris
1992:35). Studies show that this rejection is beginning in women at
increasingly younger ages. For example, it has been found that girls as
young as twelve are experiencing clinical depression induced largely by
their anxiety over whether they are physically attractive (Allgood-Merton
et al. 1990; see also Whitaker et al. 1990). There is also evidence, how¬
ever, that young men are becoming increasingly discontent with their
bodies, although in different ways (Richmond 1987). We explore this
phenomenon in greater detail in Box 12.3.
Sexism and Mental Health Services

We noted at the outset of our discussion of mental health and illness that
diagnosis and, therefore, treatment of psychological disturbances may be
highly subjective processes. Clinicians bring to their work particular bi¬
ases that derive from their personal backgrounds and characteristics, as
well as from their training in a specific institutional system. We have
already observed that clinicians tend to utilize a masculine model of
mental health. That this persists today is not surprising given that the
mental health professions, like medicine in general, are hierarchically
structured and men predominate at the top of the hierarchy. For exam¬
ple, only about 22 percent of psychiatrists are women (American Medical
Association 1990). What are some of the other salient features of tradi¬
tional mental health care, and what are their implications for the treat¬
ment of female and male patients?
480 Chapter 12
30X 12.3 Beauty Norms

What is beauty, and who is beautiful? Although it has been claimed that stand¬
ards of beauty transcend culture (see, for example, Perrett et al. 1994), most
research indicates that beauty norms vary cross-culturally as well as historically
(Wolf 1991). Normative standards of beauty are also gendered and, in our soci¬
ety, women, much more so than men, are valued by others and derive their self-
worth from how well they match up to our culture’s idealized image of the
beautiful woman.
What does the beautiful woman in our society look like? As we have al¬
ready discussed, she is thin. In addition, however, since the mid-1980s, the ide¬
alized female body has become curvier; the beautiful woman is thin, but has
large breasts. And, of course, beauty is equated with youth; as a woman grows
old in our society, she does not grow more beautiful. Consider the super¬
models of recent years. They possess what has been dubbed the “waif look.” Or,
as one observer put it, the waif is the child-woman: infantile, unthreatening,
and, therefore, sexually appealing to many men, in an age when the majority
of women are striving to be recognized as strong, independent adults (Kaye
1993; see also. The New York Times Magazine'5 December 1993:76-79, and 19
December 1993).
Some would argue that the appearance of the waif look is hardly coinci¬
dental at a time when women are seeking gender equity and, in some ways, are
making gains in this struggle (see, for instance. Wolf 1991). Nevertheless, in
our society, and in others, women have long been held to an unrealistic stan¬
dard of beauty—whatever the specific characteristics of the ideal happen to be
at the time—and young, physically attractive women historically have been
prized by men of all ages. A young, beautiful woman, in fact, increases in the
eyes of others the prestige of the man to whom she “belongs”; consider, for in¬
stance, that young, attractive women married to older men, attractive or other¬
wise, are often referred to as “trophy brides.” Men, then, appear to benefit
from the beauty norms imposed on women in our society, but what are the ef¬
fects of these norms on women themselves?
As we have already noted, since body image is strongly linked to self-es¬
teem, rigid, unattainable beauty norms cultivate in women anxiety about and
dissatisfaction with their appearance (Ussher 1989). They also induce women
to engage in unhealthy—sometimes even life-threatening—practices, in order
to try to attain the unrealistic ideal. Such practices include not only constant di¬
eting, which may lead to eating disorders as we have discussed, but also plastic
surgery, typically to enlarge breasts, reduce or straighten noses, and remove
wrinkles and body fat. For example, each year in the United States, about
150,000 women undergo breast implant surgery. While some do so for a
medical reason, such as breast reconstruction following a mastectomy,
approximately 80 percent of women who undergo this procedure do so for
nonmedical reasons, usually to enlarge their breasts. In fact, in 1990, breast
augmentation was the second most common form of cosmetic surgery in the
United States. The most common type of cosmetic surgery is now liposuction.
30X t2.3 Continued
a procedure in which a suction tube is inserted into the body through a tiny in¬
cision, usually in the thighs or abdomen, and fat is literally sucked out (Wil¬
liams 1992). Of course, such procedures are available only to those who can
afford them, since most cosmetic surgery is not covered by the majority of
medical insurance plans. The popularity of cosmetic surgery, however, is evi¬
denced not only by how many people undergo it each year, but also by re¬
search that shows that at least 30 percent of women (and 12 percent of men)
would undergo cosmetic surgery just to eliminate skin wrinkles if they could fi¬
nancially afford to do so (Freedman 1986). The negative effects of many of
these procedures are now well knowm, especially in light of recent lawsuits
against silicone breast implant manufacturers after it was found that silicon gel
that leaked from its plastic enclosure after implantation had caused serious ill¬
ness and disfigurement in thousands of women. Nevertheless, such incidents
do not seem to deter substantial numbers of women from risking their health,
and sometimes their lives, so that they can better conform to our society’s ideal¬
ized image of beauty for women.
Minority women are especially disadvantaged by the dominant culture’s
beauty norms, for a central component of idealized beauty is whiteness. De¬
spite the positive impact of the “Black is beautiful” movement of the late 1960s,
a number of analysts have observed a return to racist beauty standards within
the African-American community during the 1980s and 1990s. As Sandler
(1992) points out, historically in this country light-skinned black people, espe¬
cially black women, have enjoyed higher status than dark-skinned black people.
In her interviews with African Americans, Sandler found that light-skinned
black people were considered privileged within the black, as well as the white
communities. Light-skinned women were preferred as partners by most black
men, regardless of the darkness of the color of the men s skin. In fact, one
woman recounted to Sandler how her boyfriend’s mother insisted that he find
a lighter-skinned girlfriend so that some day he could lighten up the family.
Light-skinned black women are preferred not only because of the skin color,
but also because they often have “good hair, that is, hair that s not nappy,
and narrower noses. Sandler documents the negative impact racist beauty
norms have on women of color as well as the lengths to which some minority
women go to try to more closely resemble the idealized image of white beauty.
The use of creams that purport to lighten one’s skin along with chemical
treatments to “process” or straighten one’s hair are two of the most common
“beauty techniques” that black women use. However, cosmetic surgery to
“Caucasianize” the nose—that is, narrow the nostrils and build the bridge—
is growing in popularity among middle-class black women. Asian women,
too, are turning to cosmetic surgery to “Caucasianize their eyelids (Sandler
1992).
It is the case that men also are increasingly using plastic surgery to
better conform to our society’s idealized image of male physical attractiveness.
This image emphasizes the musculature of the body, so that a growing num¬
ber of men are turning to cosmetic surgery to enhance their calves, chests.
\
482 Chapter 12
30X t2.3 Continued
and buttocks with silicon implants. In addition, an increasing number of men

are having liposuction, face lifts, and hair implant surgery. Nevertheless, it is
important to keep in mind that men, unlike women, are not encouraged by
their parents or the media to be obsessed with their appearance nor to con¬
sider their bodies a material resource. Moreover, while more men are becom¬
ing more conscious of their body image, attractiveness norms for men are
hardly as arbitrary, capricious, or dangerous as those for women. Few men die
trying to be beautiful; it is estimated that about 15 percent of women who suf¬
fer from anorexia alone die from the disorder (Van Buskirk 1977).
Critics of traditional mental health care have given special attention

to what they see as its emphasis on conformity to dominant cultural
standards and its corresponding intolerance of diversity or uniqueness
(Ballou and Gabalac 1985). More specifically, mental health practitio¬
ners, while claiming to be objective medical experts, often function sim¬
ply as upholders of the status quo. Their Judgment of what constitutes
mental health is conformity to dominant (i.e., white, middle-class, hetero¬
sexual, male) expectations, although for many individuals these are op¬
pressive. Conversely, any departure from these norms is taken as a
symptom of pathology or mental disorder. The traditional clinician, then,
sees the source or cause of a problem as existing within the patient; the
goal is to change the patient rather than the external conditions that may
be affecting the patient. Treatment is considered successful when the
patient “adjusts” to (i.e., uncritically accepts and conforms to) her or his
circumstances. This can be accomplished with a variety of techniques, for
example, psychoanalysis, behavior modification, or drug therapy.
Critics are quick to point out that this model is more progressive and
humane than previous treatment models. It also seems to be a beneficial
approach to the most severe cases of mental illness. However, it is not
appropriate for the majority of patients who seek therapy or mental
health care (Ballou and Gabalac 1985). Consider, for example, tradi¬
tional clinical evaluations of homosexuals. Many gays and lesbians enter
therapy because of low self-esteem and depression. Mental health practi¬
tioners frequently assess these troubles as resulting from homosexuality
itself, rather than societal discrimination against homosexuals. To them,
the first sign of “healthy adjustment” is for the patient to acknowledge his
or her sexual orientation as the problem or “disorder” to be treated. We
have presented other examples throughout this chapter.
Even more disturbing is the high incidence of sexual abuse of
patients by their therapists. Research reveals that about 10 percent of
male therapists and 3 percent of female therapists have been involved in

at least one “incident of intimacy” with a patient; 80 percent of male
therapists who have had intimate involvements have done so with more
than one patient. In one study, half of the 1,320 clinical psychologists
surveyed reported that they had treated patients who had had sexual
relations with a previous therapist. Such patients frequently experience
emotional problems similar to those of incest victims. About 10 percent
of these patients are so severely affected that they must be hospitalized; 1
percent commit suicide (Sonne and Pope 1991). Not infrequently, victim¬
ized patients are children; more than 50 percent of youthful victims are
females. One recent study showed that under-age female victims ranged
in age from three to seventeen and under-age male victims ranged in age
from seven to sixteen. The research indicates that neither threats of
malpractice nor felony convictions have been effective in deterring thera¬
pists from having sex with their patients. However, more victimized pa¬
tients are choosing to sue their therapists, and the courts have ruled that
consent of a patient to sexual relations is not an acceptable defense for
therapists. In addition, the American Psychological Association has
established a new panel on sexual impropriety which is charged with
the task of developing guidelines on appropriate therapist-patient inter¬
action (Ethics Committee of the American Psychological Association
1988).
Feminist Therapy
Because more females than males make use of mental health services, the
biases and problems inherent in the traditional system are especially
detrimental to them. Recognizing this, some practitioners have sought to
reform mental health care delivery through the adoption of nonsexist
counseling. “Nonsexist counseling seeks to treat clients as human beinp
and actively to refute sex ascription in theory and in practice, that is, in
options offered to the clients and in the values espoused by the therapist”
(Ballou and Gabalac 1985:30). Others, though, see nonsexist counseling
as only the first step in a series of necessary changes. These practitioners
are striving to remodel mental health care along feminist lines. To close
this chapter, we will briefly examine their work.
Feminist therapy is part of the broader feminist health care move¬
ment. As Ballou and Gabalac (1985) point out, no consensual definition
of feminist therapy has been developed. Instead, we can identify several
principles that form the foundation of this approach to mental health
care (see also Burstow 1992). • u u ■
First, feminist therapists establish egalitarian relationships with their
clients. Rather than being someone to whom something is done by an
expert, the client takes an active part in therapy, and the therapist en-
\
484 Chapter 12
gages in self-disclosure widi the client. The therapy, then, is viewed as a

shared learning process. A corollary to this is that the feminist therapist
accepts the client’s knowledge and personal experiences as valid, rather
than interpreting them as defensive strategies. In other words, to the
feminist therapist the client may be the best authority on her or his
problem.
A second related principle is that feminist therapy assumes that
external conditions, not individual interpersonal ones, generate most
psychological difficulties, particularly those experienced by women. “The
therapist facilitates the client’s ability to understand, both generally and
personally, the existence and impact of cultural conditioning and biased
social/economic/cultural structures. . . . The goal is to build skills for
coping and creating, to develop astute social analysis, and sophisticated
consideration of the potential consequences of change” (Ballou and
Gabalac 1985:31,33). A fundamental part of this process is the analysis of
gender relations (Burstow 1992).
Finally, feminist therapists are committed to working for broader
social changes that benefit not only their individual clients, but all women
and oppressed groups. For instance, they may lobby for adequate and
affordable day care; for safe, sanitary and low-cost housing; and for
shelters for battered women and the sexually abused. In short, feminist
therapists are advocates for social change that will empower the disadvan¬
taged and provide them with social and economic autonomy—factors
these therapists recognize as essential for mental health (Burstow 1992;
Ballou and Gabalac 1985).
Although a goal of feminist therapy clearly is to assist members of
oppressed groups, especially women, there is little empirical evidence
attesting to its success in this regard. Future research should address this
issue by determining to what extent feminist therapy is available to those
most disadvantaged by the current'social structure: poor, minority women
and their children (for a first step in this direction, see Burstow 1992). To
date, however, the impact of feminist therapy remains largely unassessed.
GENDER, HEALTH, AND ILLNESS; A SUMMARY
The data discussed in this chapter are alarming. Taken together, they
indicate, to paraphrase Harrison (1984), that traditional constructions of
gender are hazardous to our health.
With regard to physical health, traditional masculinity appears to
put men at greater risk for a variety of physical conditions, such as heart
disease and stroke, various forms of cancer, and chronic liver disease.
Their greater likelihood to smoke, drink alcohol, and engage in violence
renders them more susceptible not only to these diseases, but also to
accidents, homicide, successful svticide, and alcohol and illicit drug abuse.
In fact, it seems that the more a man conforms to traditional masculinity,
the greater is the risk to his health.
The same appears to be true with regard to women who firmly
adhere to traditional femininity. For them, however, the greatest threat
appears to be to their mental health. Those who embrace the traditional
feminine role are more prone to depression and other psychological
disorders, such as histrionic personality, agoraphobia, bulimia, and ano¬
rexia. In addition, though women tend to live longer than men, their
quality of life appears to be poorer. This is evidenced by mental health
statistics as well as their higher morbidity, their higher number of re¬
stricted activity days, and their greater likelihood of institutionalization.
With few exceptions, minorities and the economically disadvantaged
have poorer health than white, middle- and upper-class men and women.
They also receive the poorest quality of health care from a system that is
sexist, racist, heterosexist, ageist, and class-biased. As we learned in this
chapter, this system of physical and mental health care has frequently
done more harm than good, particularly to women, both historically and
currently.
In response to the inadequacies and abuses of traditional health
care, feminists have begun to offer alternative services. These have as
their basic premises: a nonhierarchical structure; an egalitarian and mu¬
tually educational relationship between patient and provider; a recogni¬
tion of external (i.e., societal rather than personal) causes for individuals’
physical and psychological troubles; and a commitment to advocacy and
action to bring about social change. Although the feminist model of
physical and mental health care is not without problems of its own, it does
hold the promise of transforming our traditional medical services into
“forces committed to undoing damage [and] achieving and maintaining
health” (Ballou and Gabalac 1985:169).
KEY TERMS
acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) a virus that attacks a person s
immune system, destroying his or her ability to fight off other diseases
anorexia an eating disorder in which an individual, because of an obsessive
fear of becoming overweight, literally starves; characterized by a distorted
body image, a 25 percent loss of body weight, and refusal to eat; 90 to 95
percent of anorectics are females
bulimia an abnormal and constant craving for food, also known as binge-
purge syndrome, in which the individual consumes large quantities of
food in short periods of time followed by fasting, use of laxatives, or in¬
duced vomiting to purge the food; afflicts primarily young women fearful
of gaining weight
486 Chapter 12
life expectancy the average number of years of life remaining to an individual

at a given age
morbidity rate the illness rate of a given population
mortality rate the number of deaths in proportion to a given population
SUGGESTED READINGS
Burstow, B. 1992. Radical Feminist Therapy: Working in the Context of Violence. New¬
bury Park, CA; Sage.
Cohen, G. L. (Ed.) 1993. Women in Sport: Issues and Controversies. Newbury Park,
CA: Sage.
Fox, S. 1991. Toxic Work. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Messner, M. A., and D. F. Sabo 1994. Sex, Violence and Power in Sports. Freedom,
CA: The Crossing Press.
Nechas, E., and D. Foley 1994. Unequal Treatment. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Weitz, R. 1991. Life with AIDS. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Chapter 13
Reetructuring
Sex/Gender Syeteme
488 Chapter 13
At this point we anticipate a few pangs of depression among some of our

readers who were perhaps hopeful at the outset that sexism was, for the
most part, a social problem of an earlier age. Unfortunately, the data we
have examined here make it abundantly clear that gender inequality
continues to be a pervasive and powerfully oppressive feature of both our
society and most other societies throughout the world. Nevertheless,
there is cause for optimism: many of the findings also attest to the
significant dents that have been made in our patriarchal sex/gender
system, particularly during the last quarter century. Although an inher¬
ently unequal infrastructure remains largely intact, it is safe to say that no
major social institution—not the family, the school, the workplace, or the
government—has been left untouched by collective efforts to eradicate
gender-based inequities. What is more, surveys and public opinion polls
indicate that in the United States the majority support greater equality of
the sexes in most areas of social life.
Most of the collective activity to eliminate sexism has been organized
and carried out by women for the benefit of women. To conclude the text,
then, we will first turn our attention to the women’s movement. Although
typically discussed as a single, unified entity, feminism or the women’s
movement as we learned in chapter 1 is actually quite diverse, comprising
heterogeneous factions with different interests, perspectives, and tactics
or strategies to achieve various objectives. Importantly, this diversity has
contributed to feminism’s strength and resiliency in the face of backlash,
but it has also generated some problems—an issue that we will explore in
greater detail later in the chapter. We will briefly explore the history of
feminism in the United States and then turn our attention to contempo¬
rary feminism. We will also discuss other social movements—the men’s
movement and the homosexual rights movement—that are also seeking
to revise our social constructions of gender and to redefine cultural
norms regarding appropriate relations between women and men. To
begin, however, let’s first examine the role of social movements in general
in bringing about social change.
SOCIAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
In each of the chapters of this text we have seen that gender inequality,
along with other social inequalities, such as racism, classism, ageism,
ableism, and heterosexism, are built-in features of our social structure.
We may then feel that these are social problems beyond our control, that
there is nothing we can do about them. Certainly there are no simple
solutions, but as we emphasized in chapter 1, what sets humans apart
from other species is our ability to make rational choices and to transform
our environment to better meet our needs. Two other social commenta-
Restructuring Sex/Gender Systems 489
tors describe that faculty in this way: our “highest freedom is not simply
[our] ability to take [a] place on the social ladder, but the opportunity to
assume control over and constantly reshape the basic institutions of soci¬
ety” (Buell and DeLuca 1977:26).
Social change is frequently initiated by those who perceive their
needs as being left unmet under existing social arrangements and public
policies. Wdien a group of similar individuals shares this perception, a
social movement may develop. A social movement is a group that has
organized to promote a particular cause through collective action. Social
movements form around specific issues, with movement members and
supporters taking a stand for or against something and working together
to get their position integrated into official public policy.
We find in our definition of a social movement, then, two important
implied conditions for its emergence: (1) that individuals come to see the
problems they are experiencing as shared by others like themselves; and
(2) that they identify the social structure or a social institution as the
source of the problem rather than blaming themselves. Of course, mem¬
bers of movements seeking social change typically encounter resistance
to their efforts and goals. Those who benefit from the status quo and who
see the objectives of a social movement as threatening their social posi¬
tion will likely resist change. Nevertheless, despite such resistance, history
provides us with countless examples of how the direct collective actions
of various social movements have brought about significant changes in
our society. Feminism is one of these movements, and so we will turn our
attention to it now.
THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
As we pointed out in chapter 5, most of us have grown up uneducated

with regard to women’s history. If, in fact, we rely only on the information
in standard history texts, we are left with the impression that the sole
preoccupation and accomplishment of nineteenth and early twentieth
century women was the right to vote. Not surprisingly, then, to some people,
the word feminist is still synonymous with suffragist. However, feminist histo¬
rians who have studied the woman movement, as it was called in the nine¬
teenth and early twentieth centuries, emphasize that the singular focus on
suffrage emerged only after a decades-long campaign that addressed num¬
erous dimensions of gender inequality. Even then, many feminists objected
to making suffrage the primary goal of the movement and continued to
draw attention to other aspects of women’s oppression (Cott 1987; Delmar
1986). Early feminism, it now appears, was far more diverse than has been
depicted in traditional historical accounts (see Box 13.1 on pages 490-491).
490 Chapter 13
30X 13.1 Early feminists

Although the first wave of feminism in the United States is often depicted as a
single-minded social movement aimed at securing suffrage for women, the activi¬
ties of nineteenth and early twentieth century feminists in this country demon¬
strate otherwise. They were involved in a wide range of political and social
reforms, including public health and hygiene, “moral uplift, abolition, and public
education. We offer a small sampling of brief biographies of some of these
women to illustrate the rich diversity in their backgrounds, ideas, and aims.
Elizabeth Blackwell (1821-1910) The first female physician in the United

States, Blackwell rejected marriage in favor of a career in medicine. She was a
practicing physician, though, for only a short time before she moved into hospi¬
tal administration and from there into public health. She was instrumental in
the enactment and implementation of a number of public sanitation reforms
that substantially improved the health and living conditions of the poor, the
working class, minority Americans, and immigrants.
Charlotte Perkins Gilman (1860-1935) As a professional writer, social critic,

journalist, and public speaker, Gilman was one of the intellectual leaders of the
first wave of feminism in the United States. She wrote and lectured on such top¬
ics as sex differences, social evolution, women and work, and child develop¬
ment. Although she preferred to be called a “sociologist” and not a “feminist,”
the influence of her work is evident in contemporary socialist feminist theory.
At the turn of the century she advocated changes in traditional practices of
child care and housework to relieve the double burden of women who worked
outside the home. But as feminist scholar Alice Rossi (1973:570) points out, Gil¬
man’s ideas “were not centered on a narrow conception of ‘women’s rights’;
they swept broadly across human history, social process, and institutional
change.”
Margaret Sanger (1879-1969) It is perhaps inappropriate to include Sanger

here, since her work on behalf of women’s right to control their own bodies
spans more than five decades of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, her pio¬
neering efforts during the early 1900s are especially significant because she car¬
ried them out at a time when contraceptive devices and even the dissemination
of information about birth control had been outlawed and deemed immoral;
Sanger was arrested and prosecuted several times for her activities. Neverthe¬
less, she remained committed to this cause throughout her life because she rec¬
ognized that “without the means to prevent, and to control the timing of,
conception, economic and political rights have little meaning for women”
(Rossi 1973:517). While she is best known for her advocacy of reproductive
freedom, Sanger also labored to improve employment and living conditions
for the working class, and was politically active for many socialist causes.
Maria W. Stewart (1803-1879) Orphaned at the age of five, this black woman
was bound out as a servant to the home of a white clergyman and his family,
where she stayed until she was fifteen. In 1832, she became the first woman
born in the United States to deliver a public lecture. In a series of four lectures
30X 13.1 Continued
that she gave that year in Boston, she encouraged women domestics and labor¬
ers to educate themselves and to strengthen their talents, which she saw as be¬
ing dulled by women’s servitude and subordination. She also defended
women’s right to speak in public. Later, she became a teacher and in 1863 she
opened her own school in Washington, D.C.
Sojourner Truth (1797-1883) Born a slave in New York, Sojourner Truth was
sold several times during her childhood and suffered many indignities at the
hands of her masters, including rape. When slavery was outlawed in New York,
she began traveling as an itinerant preacher, and in her homilies she advo¬
cated abolition, protection and assistance for the poor, and equal rights for
women. During the Civil War, she visited Union troops, and following the war,
she worked for freedmen’s resettlement and relief.
Frances Willard (1839-1898) Founder and early president of the Women’s

Christian Temperance Society (WCTU), Willard was active in a number of civic
and moral reform movements, but is perhaps best known for her campaigning
for strict laws regulating the sale and consumption of alcohol. As we noted in
chapter 10, many women, like Willard, joined the temperance movement moti¬
vated to protect women and children who were often abused by intoxicated
husbands and fathers.
Sources: Compiled from Hill 1980; Gray 1979; Rossi 1973; Lerner 1972.
Feminist historian Gerda Lerner (1993) also has discovered that

feminist ideas pre-date the period that is typically identified as the “first
wave” of feminism, that is, 1830 to 1920. In her analysis of historical
documents dating back to the Middle Ages, Lerner uncovered a tradition
of women’s protest against patriarchal oppression, although it is fragmen¬
tary largely because, as she points out, women’s actions and writings were
not systematically included in the historical record. Indeed, women were
systematically excluded from history making because men have had the
power to define what is history, what is important. Consequently, most
women who resisted gender inequality were unaware of similar efforts by
other women who came before them. This, in turn, inhibited the devel¬
opment of what Lerner caWs feminist consciousness: a recognition by women
not only of the fact that they are treated unequally as a group, but also
that their subordination is socially created and maintained by a system
that can be replaced, through collective action, with a more equitable
social structure. Thus, although examples of feminist resistance can be
found throughout history, a feminist social movement did not emerge
until near the turn of the nineteenth century.
\
492 Chapter 13
During the late 1700s, a number of women began publicly calling

for equal rights with men, especially equal educational opportunities.
These women, such as Judith Sargent Murray and Mary Wollstonecraft,
were from the middle and upper classes. The men of their social station
were espousing a political philosophy of individualism and democracy
asserting that “all human beings had equal rights by nature; that inan
[sic] must never be used as a means to anything else but is considered ‘an
end in himself; and that everyone should have an equal chance of free
development as an individual” (Klein 1984:530). But none of this seemed
to apply to women nor, for that matter, to anyone other than white men.
Even as middle-class women acquired more education during the 1800s,
they found most professions legally closed to them. Their alternative to
filling hours at home with knitting and needlework was philanthropy and,
as historian Lois Banner (1986) has observed, there were plenty of chari¬
table voluntary organizations for them to join, particularly in the north¬
ern states.
Of course, to the targets of these social reform groups, that is,
African Americans and European immigrants, the poor and the working
class, the goal of equal rights for women must have seemed irrelevant at
best. Black women were enslaved with black men, both equal in a sense
in their oppression, exploitation, and lack of any rights of citizenship. At
the same time, while “the women of the upper and middle class claimed
political freedom, the right to work, and improved educational facilities,
working women wanted protection; while middle-class women were fight¬
ing for equality, working-class women demanded differential treatment”
(Klein 1984:524). As we learned in chapter 8, poor women were already
working for wages outside the home—typically for $1 to $3 a week in
unsafe, unsanitary, and overcrowded factories (Banner 1986). It is not
difficult to understand, then, why the early feminists failed to attract
broad-based support for their demands. (As we shall soon see, racism and
elitism still plague some segments of the women’s movement.)
Ironically, it was their experiences in antislavery organizations that
converted many white, middle- and upper-class women to feminism. Work
in other social reform groups equipped these women with valuable organ¬
izational and administrative skills, but their focus tended to be local and
their interests diverse. Abolitionism brought geographically dispersed
women together and united them for a common cause. In addition, it has
been argued that the ideology of abolitionism provided these women with
a framework for understanding their own inequality relative to men.
However, it is also likely that the way they were treated by supposedly
liberal male abolitionists helped greatly to politicize them. In 1840, for
example, at the first international antislavery conference in London,
women delegates were prohibited from speaking publicly and were segre-
gated from the men in a curtained-off section of the convention hall.

Understandably, the women were outraged, and many, such as Lucretia
Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, resolved to hold their own conferences
in the United States—on women’s rights as well as abolitionism (Simon
and Danziger 1991; Banner 1986; O’Neill 1969).
Over the next twenty years, many such conferences were held, the
most famous one being at Seneca Falls, New York, on July 19 and 20, 1848.
There, led by Mott and Stanton, about 300 women and some sympathetic
rticri men originally were not to be admitted, but they ended up chair¬
ing the meeting—adopted a Declaration of Sentiments, deliberately
modeled on the Declaration of Independence, along with twelve reso¬
lutions. The latter were mostly general statements in support of the
principle of equality between the sexes and in opposition to laws and
customs that preserved women’s inferior status. All except one—specifi¬
cally, “Resolved, That it is the duty of the women of this country to secure
to themselves their sacred right to the elective franchise”—were
adopted unanimously. Those who opposed the call for women’s enfran¬
chisement expressed concern that such a radical demand would weaken
public support for the more reasonable proposals and would possibly
discredit the entire movement. Nevertheless, the resolution was finally
accepted by the majority, and the Seneca Falls Convention became known
as the official launch of the campaign for women’s suffrage (Hole and
Levine 1984; O’Neill 1969).
Still, it was not until after the Civil War that the drive for women’s
enfranchisement became paramount. In the pre-war period, at women’s
rights conferences, before state legislatures, and in their own newspapers,
feminists addressed a variety of issues: dress reform, changes in divorce
and child custody laws, property rights, and the right to control their
earnings. However, once the Civil War broke out in 1861, many feminists
began to neglect the women’s movement and instead devoted their time
and energy to the war effort. Although some, such as Susan B. Anthony,
were openly pessimistic about this strategy, the majority assumed that the
Republican administration would reward them for their wartime support
by granting women the right to vote. They were wrong. In the aftermath
of the war. Congress not only failed to grant women equal rights, but it
also added a sex distinction to the Constitution by using the word “male”
in the second section of the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, the
Fifteenth Amendment was passed specifying only that suffrage could not
be denied on the basis of race, color, or previous condition of servitude;
the word “sex” was excluded (Banner 1986; Hole and Levine 1984;
O’Neill 1969).
Disappointed and angry, feminists took up the fight for women’s
rights on a state by state basis, their first site being Kansas. In 1867, Kansas
\
494 Chapter 13
voters were called upon to decide two referendums, one to enfranchise

blacks and one to enfranchise women. State Republicans supported the
former, but openly opposed the latter. The Democrats, hardly friends of
feminism, allowed their racism to get the better of them and campaigned
for women’s suffrage with the hope of defeating the referendum for
blacks. Even though both measures lost at the polls, the Kansas campaign
had serious repercussions within the women’s movement. Feminists, such
as Stanton and Anthony, who had sided with the Democrats, alienated
other feminists who were appalled by the blatant hypocrisy and racism.
Because of this as well as other disagreements over strategies and goals,
some of these women formed an organization called the American
Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA), which set as its sole objective the
enfranchisement of women and blacks. At the same time, Stanton and her
supporters organized themselves into the rival National Woman Suffrage
Association (NWSA) which, despite its name, continued to lobby for a
variety of causes, including marriage and divorce reforms. Neither group
attracted a very large following, but it was the more radical NWSA that
had the most difficulty winning favor \yith the general public. The advo¬
cacy by some of its members of such unpopular ideas as “free love” and
Marxism helped give it an anti-American and anti-family image (Cott
1987). Eventually, a sizable portion of its membership concluded that
women’s suffrage was more important than any “side issues,” at least for
the time being. By 1890, NWSA and AWSA merged to form the National
American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA), whose sole objective
was winning women the right to vote (O’Neill 1986). (Black men were
enfranchised in 1870.)
Expediency characterized the movement by the turn of the century,
and some feminists appeared willing to exploit virtually every prejudice
and stereotype, no matter how harmful, if it helped garner support for
their cause. They argued, for instance, that women deserved the right to
vote because, like men, they are people and, in a democratic society, the
people should rule themselves. At the same time, however, they main¬
tained that women should vote because they would bring to the political
process the experience garnered from carrying out their womanly duties,
such as caring for the sick and nurturing children. From this perspective,
women would purify politics because they possessed natural talents that
made them not men’s equals, but their moral superiors. Although these
two lines of reasoning appear contradictory, they were offered together;
enfranchisement would “give women the same capacity as men so they
could express their differences” (Cott 1987:30).
In a similar vein, the suffragists capitalized on the growing anti-im¬
migrant sentiment of middle-class, native-born whites, as well as their
long-standing racism against blacks (Caraway 1991). In 1893, for exam¬
ple, NAWSA adopted the following resolution:
Resolved, that without expressing any opinion on the proper

qualifications for voting, we call attention to the significant facts that in
every State there are more white women who can read and write than all
Negro voters; more American women who can read and write than all
foreign voters; so that the enfranchisement of such women would settle
the vexed question of rule by illiteracy, whether of homegrown or
foreign-born production (quoted in Simon and Danziger 1991:16).
There were socialist feminists, such as Charlotte Perkins Gilman,

who successfully mobilized working-class women and men and new immi¬
grants into suffrage organizations at the grass roots. According to histo¬
rian Nancy Cott (1986:53), “As never before, men and women in discreet
ethnic or racial or ideological groups saw the advantage of doubling their
voting numbers if women obtained suffrage” (see also Cott 1987). Black
women’s organizations, such as the National Association of Colored
Women’s Clubs, the National Federation of Afro-American Women, and
the Northeastern Federation of Colored Women’s Clubs, established suf¬
frage departments or committees and conducted classes on civics and the
Constitution to prepare women for enfranchisement (Lerner 1972). For
black women, suffrage was more than a women’s rights issue; it was a
means to address the often violent subversion of black men’s voting rights
in the South (Yee 1992; Cott 1987). “[T]hey mobilized not only as a
matter of gender justice but of race progress, despite [or perhaps because
of] their awareness that white racist arguments were simultaneously being
raised on behalf of woman’s suffrage” (Cott 1986:53). Black women were
systematically excluded from most white suffrage organizations (Caraway
1991). NAWSA, for example, discouraged black membership and typically
segregated black women in its suffrage parades. Similarly, when NAWSA
turned down the membership application of a black women’s organiza¬
tion in 1919 it justified the decision by arguing that the admission of black
women might result in the loss of Southern Democratic Congressional
support for suffrage (Simon and Danziger 1991). Certainly, by the early
1900s, it was clear that “mainstream feminism” was not every woman’s
movement, but rather an explicitly white, middle-class women’s move¬
ment. As a writer in one suffrage journal described it with approval in
1917, the women’s movement at the time was “bourgeois” (quoted in
Simon and Danziger 1991:16).
During the 1890s, several Western states enfranchised women, for
example, Wyoming in 1890, Colorado in 1893, and Utah and Idaho in
1896, but no other states were won until 1910, owing largely to the efforts
of anti-suffragists coupled with public apathy. NAWSA and other groups,
such as Alice Paul’s National Women’s Party (NWP), continued to stage
petition drives, demonstrations, and other media events, but ironically it
took another war. World War I, to turn the political tide for women s
enfranchisement.
\
496 Chapter 13
Most feminists supported President Wilson’s position on the war and

called for women’s suffrage as a “war measure.” There was a presidentially
appointed women’s defense committee and women contributed to the
war effort in many ways, leading feminists once again to demand the vote
as their just reward. In addition, suffrage organizations remained active
during the war and targeted for defeat in the 1918 election those senators
who opposed suffrage. Finally, in a special legislative session held in the
spring of 1919, both the House and the Senate approved the Nineteenth
Amendment, sending it to the states for the two-thirds ratification pro¬
cess. Ratification took little more than a year; on August 26, 1920, 26
million American women won the right to vote (Simon and Danziger
1991; O’Neill 1986).
What followed can best be described as anticlimactic. For one thing,
suffrage did not have the impact that feminists had promised, which is
not surprising given that they had sold it as a panacea for virtually all of
society’s ills. Once the vote was won, women did not go to the polls as
often as men and, when they did go, they voted similarly to men (see
chapter 10). More importantly, the vote cost feminism much of its active
support since many women withdrew from the movement in the belief
that equality had been achieved. Young women in particular ignored the
women’s movement or rejected it outright, depicting feminists as lonely,
unmarried women who needlessly antagonized men. In the politically
conservative postwar era, social activism fell into disfavor and the “cult of
domesticity” was resurrected with a slightly new twist; the modern “eman¬
cipated” middle-class housewife was “to regard child-rearing and home¬
making as complicated, lofty enterprises demanding a skilled mixture of
exact science and aesthetic inspiration. . . . The housewife was no longer
a mere drudge, but a ‘woman administrator’ or household manager,
mobilizing the resources of her family and her community in the interests
of an efficient, democratic domestic life” (O’Neill 1969:309-310). As
O’Neill (1969:313) concludes, “femininity, not feminism, was increasingly
the watchword.”
This does not mean that feminism disappeared completely. For
example, Alice Paul, who has been described as “a dedicated, iron-willed
‘superfeminist,”’ led a small following in the National Women’s Party,
which continued to lobby for women’s rights in a number of arenas, but
focused primarily on the Equal Rights Amendment (Taylor 1990:287; see
also Box 13.2). Other organizations, such as the National Federation
of Business and Professional Women’s Clubs, the National Association
of Women Lawyers, and the American Medical Woman’s Associa¬
tion, worked to get women elected to political office and appointed to
policy-making positions in government (Taylor 1990). Thus, as Taylor
(1990:284) puts it, the period following the ratification of the Nineteenth
Amendment into the early 1960s was not a time of “mass mobilization”
for the women’s movement, but the movement was by no means com-
What Happened to the Equal Rights Amendment? 30X 13.2
The text of the ERA is short and simple:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legisla¬
tion, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. The amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.
In contrast, the struggle over ratification of this amendment has been long and
complex.
WTien Alice Paul and the National Women’s Party succeeded in getting
the ERA introduced in Congress in 1923, they saw it as the next logical move af¬
ter winning suffrage and as a means to rally women around a single cause the
way they thought suffrage had done. The effect, however, was just the opposite.
Eeminist reformers opposed the amendment because it would invalidate laws
regulating wages and hours and other legislation that they felt gave women spe¬
cial protections (Cott 1990). “Women ended up fighting each other over the
value of protection rather than uniting to challenge the social and economic
conditions that made protection so valuable” (Rhode 1986:157).
The amendment was less divisive in Congress—few legislators supported
it. In 1946, the Senate did approve the amendment with a close vote, 38-35,
but a two-thirds majority was needed for adoption. In 1950 and again in 1953,
riders were added to the amendment stating that the ERA could not overturn
protective legislation. These won it some support in the Senate, but exacer¬
bated divisions among other proponents, further delaying consideration of the
measure (Berry 1986).
In the 1960s, a second wave of feminism was building on several fronts, and
pollsters were reporting increasing public support for women’s rights. By 1970,
the ERA was endorsed by both Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, as well as
a variety of prominent national organizations and federal committees. That same
year. Rep. Martha Griffiths of Michigan got the amendment out of the House
Judiciary Committee and onto the House floor where it passed 350-15 after only
an hour’s debate on August 10. The Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments held hearings on the amendment in 1970, but the Senate did not
vote on it until March 22, 1972. It passed the Senate by a vote of 84-8 (Berry
1986).
Before adopting the ERA, Congress set a seven-year limit on the ratifica¬
tion process. Given the overwhelming support for the amendment in Congress,
however, ERA backers assumed that it would be relatively easy to secure the nec¬
essary thirty-eight state adoptions. Early on, it appeared that they were right.
Within three months, twenty-two states ratified the ERA and by 1973, the state
total was thirty. With only eight more states needed within the six remaining years
before expiration, ratification prospects were bright. However, in 1974, only three
states ratified; in 1977, only one; and in 1979, one more. Meanwhile, fifteen states
voted against the amendment, some more than once, and other states that had
ratified, tried to rescind (Hewlett 1986). ERA proponents did manage to con-
498 Chapter 13
30X13.2 Continued
Vince Congress to extend the ratification deadline to June 30, 1982, but ulti¬
mately the desperate battle to get legislators in unratified states to change their
minds failed, only three states short of ratification. What went wrong?
Analysts point to a number of factors as central in the ERA’s demise. One
of the most important is that the amendment’s supporters grossly underesti¬
mated the power of their opposition and they failed to act accordingly until it
was too late. Anti-ERA groups, such as Phyllis Schlafly’s STOP-ERA, wisely tar¬
geted the southern and midwestern states in their campaign, whereas ERA pro¬
ponents focused on national trends and ignored regional differences until
relatively late in the ratification process (Berry 1986). Often, though, ERA back¬
ers misread even the national polls which indicated some significant contradic¬
tions in public attitudes. For instance, even though it appeared that at least 60
percent of women and men favored the ERA in the late VOs, 49 percent of
these also said they would not vote for a qualified woman for president and 67
percent disapproved of married women’s employment during periods of job
scarcity. In short, the public was giving a socially expected response, that is, it
opposed discrimination—but a large segment did not support real equality be¬
tween women and men (Mansbridge 1986). ERA backers also overlooked the
opposition of those Klatch (1988:686) has labeled laissez-faire conservatives.
Laissez-faire conservatives viewed the ERA as a way to eliminate gender dis¬
crimination that was misguided because it implied the growth of big govern¬
ment. In other words, laissez-faire conservatives did not favor gender-based
discrimination, but neither did they support the ERA since they saw it as the en¬
croachment by government upon the liberty of individual citizens.
At the same time, although the anti-ERA groups frequently used scare tac¬
tics—for example, claiming that public toilets would become unisex and that
the ERA would force full-time homemakers into the labor force to earn half
their families’ income—they did successfully persuade many Americans in un¬
ratified states to oppose the amendment. “These in turn convinced many legis¬
lators that they had nothing to lose politically by voting against ERA and much
to gain. In other words, enough voters in their districts were against ERA or luke¬
warm so that they did not risk retribution in voting against it” (Berry 1986:83).
In December 1993, on the 73rd anniversary of the introduction of the
Equal Rights Amendment, a number of women’s groups began lobbying Con¬
gress for nullification of the ERA ratification time limit and announced a re¬
newed campaign for ratification in three more states (Burk 1993). It remains
to be seen whether this attempt at ratification will succeed, but many former
ERA supporters have also begun to express mixed feelings about passage of the
amendment. Some feminists have grown less optimistic about the benefits of se¬
curing formal legal rights, of gaining equality on paper. As Rhode (1986:158)
points out, “Given the process and principal agents of constitutional adjudica¬
tion, an abstract legal mandate is of itself unlikely to work major social transfor¬
mation.” Perhaps, then, what has been most valuable about the struggle to
ratify the Equal Rights Amendment is that the process itself educated many
feminists, teaching them important lessons about political organizing that have
helped to strengthen movement strategies in other areas, such as the struggle
to protect reproductive freedom.
pletely dormant (see also Cott 1987). The early 1960s, however, became a
period of mass mobilization for the movement; feminism was revitalized.
The Second Wave of Feminism

Several factors contributed to the resurgence of feminism in the early
1960s. One important impetus was the publication in 1963 of Betty
Friedan’s book. The Feminine Mystique. Friedan voiced the unhappiness
and boredom of white, educated, middle-class housewives. Isolated in
suburban homes, which Friedan referred to as “comfortable concentra¬
tion camps,” these women found their personal growth stunted. After
subordinating gratification of their own needs to those of their husbands
and children, they were left with a profound sense of emptiness rather
than fulfillment. This Friedan dubbed “the problem that has no name,”
but the real significance of The Feminine Mystique was Friedan’s labeling
this not an individual problem, but a social problem. The book quickly
became a best-seller, but more importantly, it served as a springboard for
developing analyses of sexual politics, that is, the examination of gender
inequality as rooted not only in the public sphere, but also “in the
‘privacy’ of our kitchens and bedrooms,” in the intimate relationships
between women and men (Stacey 1986:210). From such analyses has
come the much-quoted feminist slogan, “The personal is political.”
However, even before the publication of The Feminine Mystique, the
federal government took action that drew attention to the problem of sex
discrimination. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy appointed a Presiden¬
tial Commission on the Status of Women at the urging of Esther Peterson,
whom he later named as an assistant secretary of labor. Interestingly,
Kramer (1986) reports that Peterson advocated the establishment of the
commission to placate members of the National Women’s Party and the
Federation of Business and Professional Women’s Clubs, who were intensi¬
fying their lobbying for the Equal Rights Amendment. In its final report, the
Commission focused primarily on the persistent and severe discrimination
experienced by women in the labor force. It subsequently provided the basis
for the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (see chapter 8), led to the appointment of two
permanent federal committees on women’s issues, and served as a model
for the numerous state-level commissions that were established in its wake. The
state commissions, in turn, became vehicles for gathering and disseminating
information on women’s issues (Kramer 1986; Ereeman 1973).
The state commissions also helped give rise in a sense to the Na¬
tional Organization for Women (NOW), which was founded in 1966 by
Betty Eriedan and twenty-seven others who were representing state
women’s commissions at a national assembly in Washington. The actual
impetus for establishing NOW was provided by the executive director of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the agency charged
with enforcing Title VII, when he openly admitted that he did not con-
\
500 Chapter 13
sider sex discrimination a serious matter. Given that the word “sex” had
been added to Title VII in the hope of defeating the measure altogether,
it is not surprising that the EEOC did not vigilantly enforce the law
(Deitch 1993). NOW took up the task of pressuring President Lyndon
Johnson to strengthen the EEOC and of lobbying for a number of addi¬
tional legal and economic reforms in women’s interests (Kramer 1986).
Importantly, NOW also became a model for a variety of other reform-
oriented feminist groups, such as the National Women’s Political Caucus,
the Women’s Equity Action League, the Congressional Caucus for
Women’s Issues, and the National Abortion Rights Action League.
Today, NOW counts 280,000 members, and it probably represents
what a substantial segment of the general public considers to be the
women’s movement. However, as was the case with the first wave of
feminism, the contemporary women’s movement is hardly homogeneous.
In fact, as we emphasized in chapter 1, it “makes more sense to speak of
a plurality of feminisms than of one” (Delmar 1986:9). Eor example, at
about the same time that NOW was being formed, a second, more mili¬
tant branch of feminism was emerging from different sources. More
specifically, this feminism had its origins in the political Left, centered
largely on college campuses, and developed among women who were
active in other social movements during the 1960s, such as the civil rights
movement and the anti-Vietnam War movement. These latter social
movements were male-dominated, but large numbers of women partici¬
pated, voting, as O’Neill (1969:342) has phrased it, “with their feet”—that
is, “demonstrating that they were prepared to run the same risks and fight
for the same ends as men.” Yet these women often found themselves
relegated to traditional female roles, for instance as cooks, typists, and
sexual partners. Indeed, what struck them was the glaring contradiction
between the ideology of equality and freedom espoused by radical men
and the men’s sexist treatment of women (Shulman 1980; Evans 1979;
Ereeman 1973). By the late 1960s, these women had formed their own
feminist organizations, less formally structured and more radical than
NOW and similar groups. The focus of leftist feminism has been on
developing a theoretical analysis of women’s subordinate status as well as
engaging in political activism to combat gender oppression.
Even within leftist feminism, different perspectives have developed.
Socialist feminists, for example, reject the liberal reform orientation of
NOW and its sister organizations. Whereas liberals press for formal legal
rights and equal opportunities for women, socialist feminists seek “a
transformation of production, reproduction, socialization, and sexuality.
. . . Without a fundamental reordering of societal institutions and values,
women cannot begin to achieve true parity in vocational opportunities,
economic security, and social status” (Rhode 1986:158). Socialist femi¬
nists, then, see capitalism and gender inequality as reciprocally related
and call for the elimination of both to achieve women’s liberation (Hart¬
mann 1984; Jaggar and Rothenberg 1984).
In contrast, radical feminists point out that women are oppressed in
other types of societies besides capitalist ones, and therefore women’s
oppression by men is deeper and more harmful than any other form of
oppression, including social class inequality. It is radical feminists who
perhaps most strongly identify with the slogan, “The personal is political,”
for they point out that male domination of women permeates every
aspect of life, including the home and interpersonal relationships.
Women can be liberated only if they sever their ties with men, including
their sexual ties. As one radical feminist explains, “Love can only exist
between equals, not between the oppressed and the oppressor. . . .
[Thus], lesbianism is not an oddity of a few women to be hidden in the
background of the Movement. In a way, it is the heart of the Women’s
Liberation Movement” (quoted in Shulman 1980:599).
For still other women, none of these feminisms is relevant or appro¬
priate. Working class women, for example, find it difficult to identify with
groups like NOW whose liberal feminist agenda they quite accurately
perceive as benefiting primarily educated middle-class housewives and
professionals. At the same time, they have shown strong resistance and
even hostility toward calls for lesbian separatism by some radical femi¬
nists. Socialist feminists, especially those in the labor movement, have
forged strong ties with working-class women by actively supporting work¬
ing women’s struggles in factories and offices (Bookman and Morgen
1988; Briggs 1987). But the alliance has sometimes been strained by
disagreements over political issues such as abortion rights, disputes over
effective courses of action, and the not unfounded image of many social¬
ist feminists as intellectuals rather than “real workers.” Thus, working-class
feminism, or grass-roots feminism as some observers have called it, has grown
largely out of working women’s involvement in trade unionism, as well as
women’s activities at the grass-roots level of their own neighborhoods and
communities. In contrast to university-based feminism, this brand of femi¬
nism is rooted in blue-collar and pink-collar workplaces and in the neigh¬
borhoods and communities in which such workers live. It is oriented
toward achieving practical goals, such as the right to work, the right to
unionize, equal pay and benefits, affordable child care, neighborhood
health centers, and the like. It coalesces in groups such as consumer
organizations, strike support groups, and mothers’ organizations (Snitow
1990; Bookman and Morgen 1988; Maroney 1986).
Many grass-roots feminists are women of color. Women of color, as
we have seen throughout this text, confront a double oppression in the
forms of sexism and racism, an oppression that frequently generates a
third burden: poverty. Yet many minority women have approached the
women’s movement with suspicion and hostility—and with good reasons
I
\
502 Chapter 13
(King 1988). Historically, as we have seen, mainstream feminism has

largely ignored the concerns of nonwhite women unless its own ends were
also served by addressing them, and white feminists have not infrequently
been racist. With the resurgence of feminism in the 1960s, for example,
there was ample opportunity for white and black women to form alli¬
ances. Black women active in the civil rights and black power movements
often found that despite their historical resistance to white domination,
black male leaders expected them to assume a supportive, but subordi¬
nate position relative to black men (Barnett 1993; Simon and Danziger
1991; Hood 1984; Terrelonge 1984). Yet white women, whom we noted
had similar experiences with radical white men, typically failed to con¬
sider, let alone identify with, the difficulties of black women (Caraway
1991). Women of color confronted such problems as forced sterilization,
inadequate and unaffordable housing, and the degradation of welfare,
and they struggled to raise their children, often alone and in poverty.
They perceived white feminists pursuing liberation defined as “access to
those thrones traditionally occupied by white men—positions in king¬
doms which support racism” (Hood 19^4:192; hooks 1990; King 1988).
In addition, some minority women see feminism as divisive, that is,
as pitting women against men. Their objective life experiences as non¬
whites frequently lead them to conclude that they have more in common
with nonwhite men, who also have been victimized by racism, than white
women who, despite sexism, enjoy numerous privileges because of their
race (King 1988). Still, many minority women identify themselves as
feminists and, in recent opinion polls, they have expressed stronger
support for the women’s movement than white women. In a 1989 survey,
for example, 85 percent of African-Anterican women and 76 percent of
Hispanic women said that the United States continues to need a strong
women’s movement to press for changes that benefit women. In contrast,
64 percent of white women expressed this opinion (Dione 1989). More
importantly, many women of color are actively working to expand the
focus of feminism to include not only the fight against sexism, but also
the battle against heterosexism, social class inequality, ageism, ableism,
and racism—both in society and in the movement itself (Collins 1990;
Allan 1986; Hohri 1986; Smith 1986; Quintanales, 1983).
Within each of these branches or categories of feminism, there are
still other divisions. The one that has gotten the most attention, as we
noted in chapter 1, is typically labeled the equality versus difference debate,
but it has been referred to variously as the debate between the minimizers
and the maximizers, between social constructionists and essentialists, and
between cultural feminists and radical feminists (Snitow 1990). As we
discussed in chapter 1 and other chapters in this text, the debate revolves
around the question of whether women and men are equal in virtually all
respects (except their reproductive functions, which are minimized by
these feminists) and, therefore, should be treated the same or similarly.
or whether, because of biology and/or culture, women are fundamentally

different from men—that is, they have special qualities as women, al¬
though there is disagreement over what these special qualities are—and,
therefore, have interests as women that deserve special treatment. The
arguments around these issues are often so intense that Snitow (1990) has
labeled the debate the “great divide” within feminism.
Of course, these positions need not be mutually exclusive. Our
discussion of the divisions within feminism is, by necessity, overly simplis¬
tic—a presentation of ideal types or characterizations of the essential ele¬
ments of each category, which does not do justice to the multifaceted
nature of a movement in which differences are rarely so clear cut and
factions often overlap. Our intent, however, is merely to give our readers
a sense of the rich diversity of feminism, a diversity that we pointed out
earlier has given the movement strength and resiliency and has promoted
what Hirsch and Keller (1990) call “a discourse of difference.”
However, diversity also has generated problems for feminism. One
of the most serious problems is what one analyst calls “a sclerosis of the
movement” in which segments “have become separated from and hard¬
ened against each other. Instead of internal dialogue there is a naming
of the parts: there are radical feminists, socialist feminists, Marxist femi¬
nists, lesbian separatists, women of color, and so on, each group with its
own carefully preserved sense of identity. Each for itself is the only worth¬
while feminism; others are ignored except to be criticized” (Delmar
1986:9). The discourse of difference, in other words, has not been accom¬
panied by an “ethic of conflict or criticism” (Hirsch and Keller 1990). The
criticism and conflict that erupt around differences of perspectives and
strategy have sometimes disintegrated into censorship or trashing of com¬
peting feminist viewpoints. There exists, then, a tension within feminism
between the felt urgency to present concerns and grievances as a single,
unified group of women, and the need to give voice to the variations in
concerns and grievances that exist among feminists on the basis of race,
social class, sexual orientation, age, physical ability/disability, and a host
of other factors. Consequently, what feminists must recognize, as Childers
(1990:70) points out, is that “practicing conflict is also practicing femi¬
nism.” Or, to paraphrase Hirsch and Keller (1990:380), although femi¬
nists may be invested in the possibility of speaking with a common voice,
they must also give equal value to the integrity of diverse voices. This
attention to the plurality of voices within feminism is becoming increas¬
ingly important as young women Join the movement, but bring to it their
own concerns and strategies.
Feminism’s Third Wave

During the 1980s, media reports began to proclaim that feminism was
dead. Certainly, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, feminism came under
\
504 Chapter 13
assault from various politically conservative groups—for example, Phyllis

Schlafly’s Eagle Forum, Concerned Women for America, and the Na¬
tional Right to Life Committee—which formed an antifeminist coalition.
The antifeminists loudly proclaimed that by seeking equality, feminists
were not only “opposing Mother Nature herself,” but also threatening to
deprive women of important “protections” (e.g., economic support from
men and exemption from the military draft). Feminists, from this per¬
spective were antimarriage, antinatalist, antifamily, and even antidemo¬
cratic (Klatch 1988; Marshall 1984).
Although research indicates that these claims were rarely based on
direct contact with feminists (Rowland 1986; Pohli 1983)—and many are
so inaccurate or exaggerated that they appear not to warrant a serious
response—antifeminists did manage to attract considerable support and
organized themselves in a social movement with a substantial resource
base (see also chapter 11). They were instrumental in getting conserva¬
tive political candidates, including Ronald Reagan and George Bush,
elected to office, and these politicians, in turn, reinforced the antifemin¬
ists’ position by enacting or endorsing antifeminist public policies.
The fact that many antifeminists are women has led some to ques¬
tion what motivates them to “agitate for their own subordination”
(Dworkin 1983b:xiii). Analyses of antifeminism indicate that it has re¬
ceived its greatest support from working-class, nonemployed women; for
these women, being full-time homemakers is a luxury in itself and a
symbol of upward mobility. Antifeminists successfully portrayed feminist
programs, such as affirmative action, as threats to this lifestyle and to
men’s jobs (Klatch 1988). Feminists were depicted as “‘smooth-talking
college women who have never seen a production line’ and are thus far
removed from and little concerned with the economic problems of work¬
ing class women” (Marshall 1984:577). Moreover, in a period of economic
recession, when single-income, working-class families are especially inse¬
cure about their financial futures and their ability to maintain their
present standard of living, “it is easier to see the cause as a women’s
movement that insisted on ‘changing things,’ than as the social and
economic structures operating in society” (Rowland 1986:681). In short,
antifeminism has been an organized effort to preserve a particular life¬
style or cultural status which some groups, including many women, per¬
ceive as being threatened by the women’s movement (Klatch 1988;
Himmelstein 1986; Luker 1984; for a discussion of competing explana¬
tions of antifeminism see Marshall 1991).
At the same time that antifeminist groups were waging their war
against feminism, the media were also reporting a dramatic decline in
support for feminism among young women. According to the popular
press, among eighteen- to twenty-nine-year-olds, feminists were seen as
whining, humorless man-haters who practice the “politics of victimiza-
tion and who are out of touch with the concerns of the younger genera¬
tion. These reports claimed that most young women saw the women’s
movement as an anachronism, no longer necessary because women now
had the greater freedom they had been seeking. Consequently, the 1980s
was dubbed the “post-feminist era” (Wallis 1989; Hornaday 1983; Bolotin
1982).
Importantly, empirical research conducted during the 1980s sub¬
stantially qualified this negativism. In studies of college students’ attitudes
toward feminists and the women’s movement, for example, researchers
reported that most young women did not hold negative views of feminists,
and most recognized that gender-based discrimination is still a major
problem in our society. In addition, they were supportive of feminist
ideals, although a majority were reluctant to identify themselves as femi¬
nists (Miller-Bernal 1992; Renzetti 1987; Komarovsky 1985). In short,
while they tended to reject the label “feminist,” these young women did
not reject feminism. Indeed, public opinion polls indicated young
women, aged eighteen to twenty-nine, were among those most likely to
agree that the United States continues to need a strong women’s move¬
ment (Dione 1989).
Since 1991, the involvement of young women in the feminist move¬
ment has increased dramatically. Analysts tie this renewed feminist
ground swell to a number of events: Supreme Court decisions—especially
the Webster decision (see chapter 7)—that threatened the continued avail¬
ability of abortion; the rape trials of William Kennedy Smith and Mike
Tyson; the sexist treatment of Anita Hill by members of the Senate and
the media during Clarence Thomas’s confirmation hearing; the increas¬
ing difficulty of getting a decent-paying job; skyrocketing tuition; and the
explosion of the AIDS epidemic (Powers 1993; Schrof 1993; Manegold
1993; 1992). Significantly, the result has been not only an increased
individual commitment to feminism among many young women, but also
a growing willingness to take collective action to bring about change,
leading some observers to argue that these young women constitute a
distinct “third wave” of feminist activism.
Numerous organizations, founded and led by young women, have
sprung up across the country. These include Women’s Health Action and
Mobilization (WHAM) and Students Organizing Students (SOS), which
address health issues, including abortion rights, AIDS, freedom from
violence, and affordable health care for poor women, as well as the
National Women’s Student Coalition and the Third Wave Direct Action
Corp, which are networks of high school and college students with a
broader focus on the intersection of gender inequality with other forms
of inequality. These groups tend to be loosely organized and nonhierar-
chical in their leadership. Their action strategies are often quite radical,
modeled after those of organizations like Act Up, expressing outrage over
506 Chapter 13
identified injustices and demanding change in dramatic ways. Not sur¬

prisingly, such radical action has led to some criticism from older, more
mainstream feminists who favor working within the system. But many
young feminists argue that both the white male system and the “feminist
system” have excluded them (Schrof 1993; Manegold 1993; 1992).
An important dimension of most third-wave feminist groups is their
concern with inclusion. Although the majority of members are white and
middle-class, most groups have a multicultural emphasis and attempt to
address problems resulting from racism, social class inequality, and homo¬
phobia as well as sexism. The inclusiveness of these groups may prove to
be the key to their continued viability—and the continued viability of the
feminist movement in general. If the movement is to remain strong and
to make up ground lost as a result of the conservative backlash of the
1980s, then the needs and experiences of diverse groups of women must
not just be taken into account by the powers that be within feminism, they
must reshape the focus and course of the movement itself (King 1988).
Such a reshaping appears to be a primary goal of third-wave feminists.
The Women’s Movement Internationally

Although we have given considerable attention to feminism in the United
States, the women’s movement is virtually global. According to Staudt and
Jaquette (1988:263), since 1975, “official programs for women’s advance¬
ment have been established in 90 percent of national governments; pro¬
gressive laws and policies are in place for women; and women’s
organizational growth has flourished.” Not surprisingly, given the history
of American feminism that we discussed earlier, the women’s movement
in Europe is both similar to and different from the women’s movement
in the United States, but Third World feminism is, in many ways, distinct
from each of these.
Feminism in Great Britain and Western Europe' Western European

feminism, like its counterpart in the United States, emerged out of par¬
ticular social, political, and economic circumstances. The Enlighten¬
ment—with its emphasis on reason, progress, education, the fulfillment
of the individual, and freedom from restrictions—has been identified as
'Our focus on Western European feminism in this section is not meant to diminish
feminist activism in other industrialized countries in other parts of the world, such as
Eastern Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. (Eor a comparison of feminist
movements in some of these countries, see Funk and Mueller 1993; Chafetz and
Dworkin 1986. See also Drakulic 1991; Eisenstein 1991.) Our goal here simply is to
emphasize the international character of feminism; a complete cross-cultural exami¬
nation of feminist movements is beyond the scope of this book.
an important antecedent, although the major Enlightenment philoso¬

phers, such as Rousseau, were openly opposed to equal rights for women.
Nevertheless, we can see the influence of Enlightenment ideals in the
writings of early Western European feminists, such as Mary Wollstone-
craft. In her 1792 treatise, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, Wollstone-
craft denounced traditional male authority and female subservience and
called for equal educational opportunities for women as the means for
their liberation and full development as individuals.
The Erench Revolution and the rise of liberalism also contributed to
the emergence of nineteenth century Western European feminism.
Women were actively involved in the Erench Revolution, leading protests
and forming political clubs, and writers like Olympe de Georges argued
vehemently for full economic and political rights for women under the
new government. (Unfortunately, de Georges was beheaded by Robes¬
pierre, and the Revolutionary Assembly outlawed all women’s organiza¬
tions.) The writing of John Stuart Mill in The Subjugation of Women
illustrates liberalism’s emphasis on removing legal barriers to equal
rights, although Mill was one of the few liberal male philosophers who
took up the cause of women’s rights. At the same time, socialists such as
August Rebel and Erederich Engels developed their critiques of the sub¬
ordination of women in the family under capitalism and exhorted women
to join the socialist movement to secure their emancipation.
With these diverse origins, it is not surprising that early Western
European feminists tackled a range of issues, including the protection of
women and children from battery and sexual abuse, prevention of the
exploitation of women through prostitution, divorce reform, revisions in
property laws, employment opportunities, equal access to education, and,
of course, the right to vote, but their concerns were broader than formal
legal rights. “Europeans focused as much or more on elaborations of
womanliness; they celebrated sexual difference rather than similarity
within a framework of male/female complementarity; and instead of
seeking unqualified admission to male-dominated society, they mounted
a widespread critique of the society and its institutions” (Offen 1988:124).
Still, Western European feminists exchanged ideas and experiences
with their American sisters through participation in international femi¬
nist organizations, such as the International Council of Women, the
International Women’s Suffrage Alliance, and the Socialist Women s
International (Cott 1987; Lovenduski 1986). Indeed, the ideas and strate¬
gies of the women’s movement in the United States were clearly influ¬
enced by the views of European feminists just as U.S. feminists made their
mark on the development of feminism throughout much of Europe.
The success of European feminists’ struggles depended to a large
extent on specific conditions in the country in which they were waged
(Chafetz et al. 1990). In most European countries, for instance, divorce
508 Chapter 13
laws were gradually liberalized during the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, but in strongly Catholic-identified countries, divorce was pro¬
hibited until very recently. (For example, it was prohibited until 1985 in
Ireland, and many restrictions still remain.) In addition, most European
nations enfranchised women during or shortly after World War I, al¬
though some had granted women full suffrage rights much earlier (e.g.,
Finland in 1906) and others much later (e.g., France in 1944) (Loven-
duski 1986).
The upheaval of war in Europe and increasing political conservatism
in its aftermath helped to suppress feminism in many countries and to
drive it underground in others. During the 1960s and 1970s, however.
Western Europe, like the United States, experienced a resurgence of
feminism. Although a variety of factors undoubtedly contributed to this,
it was due at least in part to widespread dissatisfaction among women
regarding how little genuine equality they enjoyed despite several de¬
cades of formal legal rights that had been secured largely through the
efforts of nineteenth century feminists (Lovenduski 1986). This dissatis¬
faction has given rise to a multiplicity of feminist groups and organiza¬
tions, which, like those in the United States, have diverse philosophies,
strategies, and goals.
In Europe, there are liberal feminists, radical feminists, and socialist
feminists just as there are in the United States. But some observers argue
that, in general, contemporary Western European feminism can be dis¬
tinguished from its American counterpart on the basis of the general
focus or emphasis of the two movements. Many Western European femi¬
nists are critical of U.S. feminism because of the latter’s broad, liberal
approach, as well as for its white, middle-class character (Margolis 1993).
As we have noted in this chapter, much of mainstream liberal feminism
in the United States is committed to securing legal rights for women, an
agenda that has benefited primarily white, middle-class women. In con¬
trast, consistent with its history, rqainstream feminism in Europe for the
most part has focused instead on securing social benefits and support
structures, particularly for families, and has attempted to be more inclu¬
sive of diverse groups of women, especially along social class lines. It has
been argued that it is these differences in agenda and focus that largely
account for the success of Western European feminists in securing impor¬
tant social welfare policies and programs, such as paid parental leaves,
nationally mandated and subsidized child care, and a narrower gender
gap in wages (Hewlett 1986; see also chapters 7 and 8). The social
programs and policies instituted in Western Europe cut across social class
lines and benefit women and men in diverse groups.
While we have seen that throughout much of its history the women’s
movement in the United States has been largely a white, middle-class
women’s movement, the differences between contemporary U.S. femi-
nism and Western European feminism may be far fewer than they were
two or three decades ago. Certainly, U.S. feminists, like their Western
European sisters, have lobbied aggressively for federally mandated family
leave policies, governmental support and regulation of child care, more
flexibly structured workplaces, and so on. The strong influence of demo¬
cratic socialism in many Western European nations, especially in the
Scandinavian countries, has meant that governments there have been
politically more receptive to such programs and policies. In the more
politically conservative United States, with its greater emphasis on indi¬
vidualism, programs and policies such as these have met with significantly
more resistance in the halls of government. It is also the case that most
Western European governments, except during times of war, have spent
more on social welfare programs than on the military or defense. In
contrast, in the United States, government financing of military and
defense programs has far outdistanced federal spending on social welfare
programs and, during the 1980s, the military/defense budget was in¬
creased while the budgets of social welfare programs were gutted (Curran
and Renzetti 1993).
With more feminists now holding federal offices and working in the
federal government (see chapter 10), and with a more sympathetic presi¬
dential administration in place, many programs on the feminist agenda
have a significantly better chance of political success. Nevertheless, this is
not to say that U.S. feminists have nothing to learn from their Western
European sisters. By studying the ideas and strategies, as well as the
successes and failures, of Western European feminists, U.S. feminists can
undoubtedly gain some useful insights and fresh perspectives for our own
movement just as our foremothers did in the nineteenth century.
Feminism in the Third World Histories of feminist activism in the Third

World are relatively scarce.^ As Mohanty (1991) points out, although
there is now a considerable body of scholarship on Third World women’s
involvement in liberation movements, this work usually does not focus on
feminist activism per se. Although it is the case that for many people in
^The term Third World is a contentious one. We are using it as an umbiella term to
refer to countries in particular geographic locales that are economically undeveloped
or underdeveloped) many of the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America where
the people have a per capita annual income of less than $1,400 U.S. dollars. This is a
standard use of the concept, but it should be kept in mind that nations identified as
Third World are extremely diverse—a fact that is obscured by the use of this general
category. In addition, as Mohanty (1991) notes, the concept Third World is defined
not only by geographic location, but also by sociohistorical conditions. Consequently,
although we are not using the term this way, it is also often applied to racial minority
groups and minority communities in the United States and other economically
developed countries.
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510 Chapter 13
the Third World, the struggle for the liberation of women has been
inseparable from the struggle for national liberation from Western impe¬
rialism or the struggle for liberation from political dictatorships, recent
writers have begun to document the history of Third World women’s
activism on behalf of women as women (see, for example, Lobao 1990;
Jayawardena 1986). Nevertheless, much more is known about feminism
in the contemporary Third World than historically.
In the impoverished Third World, daily economic survival usually
takes precedence over any attempts to win formal legal rights for women.
Third World men also are oppressed by imperialism, racism, and social
class inequality, so that many Third World women view the goals of
Western feminism as separatist and ethnocentric. As Johnson-Odim
(1991:320) writes, “In ‘underdeveloped’ societies it is not just a question
of internal redistribution of resources, but of their generation and con¬
trol; not Just equal opportunity between men and women, but the crea¬
tion of opportunity itself; not only the position of women in society, but
the position of the societies in which Third World women find them¬
selves” (see also Margolis 1993). Nevertheless, women in these societies
experience oppression not only because they are citizens of the Third
World oppressed by economic exploitation and racism, but also because
they are women oppressed by patriarchy.
Consider, for example, economic development policies. Training
and support programs, technology transfers, and agricultural extension
programs typically benefit Third World men, rather than women, even
though the women are responsible for much of the economic production
(Rowbotham 1989; Curran and Renzetti 1987). Similarly, Asian women
constitute a large percentage of the exploited labor force on the “global
assembly line” (Brah, 1991; Ehrenreich and Fuentes 1981). In fact, in the
international division of labor, “yqung women comprise 85-90 percent of
workers in the Third World’s Export Processing Zones of U.S. based
multinationals” (Burris 1989:175). These women are unskilled and
grossly underpaid. And it is Third World women who are the victims of
sex tourism, the mail-order bride business, and the international prosti¬
tution trade (U.S. Department of State 1994; Matsui 1989).
In the Western world, as we have noted, one of the central feminist
goals has been reproductive freedom. This largely has taken the form of
freedom from childbearing. However, in the Third World, the issue of
reproductive freedom sometimes has a different meaning. In some coun¬
tries, where women are exhorted to bear many children to populate a
small labor force or to staff revolutionary armies, reproductive freedom
does often mean access to contraception and abortion. But in other
countries where women gain status and material security through child¬
bearing, they also often encounter pressures from Western agencies such
as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as well as from
their own governments, to use contraceptives (some forms of which have

not been approved for use in the West) or to undergo sterilization
(Chesler 1994). In these countries reproductive freedom is the right to
have children. In addition, in countries where women are weakened by
pregnancies and births spaced too close together and where malnutrition
and disease make it unlikely that most of their children will live into
adolescence, reproductive freedom may simply mean the right to give
birth to healthy babies whose lives may be sustained through adulthood
(Bulbeck 1988).
These, then, are some of the central concerns raised by Third World
feminists in their writings and public speeches, through their organiza¬
tions and at international conferences (Johnson-Odim 1991). However,
Mohanty (1991:6) cautions that to locate Third World women solely in
the contexts of underdevelopment, oppressive traditions, poverty, over¬
population, and similar problems is to mask the diversity that exists
among Third World women and to collapse the fluid and dynamic nature
of these women’s everyday lives into “a few frozen ‘indicators’ of their
well-being.” Brah (1991) gives us some sense of this problem when she
writes about being an Asian woman living in Great Britain and being the
recipient of considerable racism. However, she notes that her member¬
ship in a dominant caste also affords her a position of power relative to
lower-caste Asian women living in Britain. Consequently, she argues that
a feminist politics necessarily requires women, both “First World” and
Third World, to “examine the ways in which their ‘womanhoods’ are both
similarly and differently constructed within patriarchal, racial and class
relations of power” (Brah 1991:173).
In the early 1980s, a prominent U.S. feminist boldly coined the
slogan, “Sisterhood is global” (Morgan 1984). However, during that de¬
cade and throughout the 1980s, many Third World feminists began to
express anger over the ethnocentrism of mainstream liberal First World
feminists, which typically took the form of the latter attempting patroniz¬
ingly to define for Third World women the needs, aims and priorities of
their liberation movements (Johnson-Odim 1991). Consequently, many
observers have come to question whether a global feminism is possible.
We cannot hope to offer an answer to this sweeping question here, but
we do think that a useful starting point, as others have argued, is for
Western feminists to do their homework; that is, to learn about Third
World women’s experiences, to use these experiences to call into ques¬
tion the ethnocentrism and privilege inherent in their own positions, and
to accept Third World women’s analyses of their own oppression as valid
rather than imposing Western analyses on them. As Bulbeck (1988.154)
maintains, “The strength of feminism lies not in its ability to ape the
unitary categories and Archimedean points of male theory, philosophy
and politics; not to search for one position from which the truth of all
\
512 Chapter 13
women can be seen, nor the one lever that will transform the whole
female world, but to abandon the privileges of hierarchies for the multi¬
ple connections of the web and the quilt.
MEN AND LIBERATION
To some readers, the term men’s liberation may seem a bit ironic. After all,
much of the material covered in this text has documented male privilege,
gained usually at the expense of women. It certainly would not be justifi¬
able to argue that men are in need of liberation in the same sense that
women are; yet, we have also seen that adherence to traditional prescrip¬
tions of masculinity is harmful to men. For example, their higher rates of
ulcers, hypertension, and heart attacks, and their lower life expectancy
have been linked to traditional masculinity (see chapter 12). In addition,
we have learned that the category “man” is as diverse as the category
“woman.” Although all men benefit to some extent from male privilege,
the distribution of societal resources—most importantly, wealth, prestige,
and power—varies among men according to their race and ethnicity,
social class background, age, physical ability, and sexual orientation.
In the early 1970s, some men, mostly white, educated professionals,
began to meet in small informal groups to discuss their experiences as
men, their interpersonal relationships, and their notions of masculinity
and how these impinge, for better or worse, on their lives. As one writer
observed, the men’s consciousness raising groups were “more introspec¬
tive than political” (Katz 1974:153). Most became involved because of
personal crises: their relationships with the women in their lives seemed
Jeopardized as the women themselves developed a feminist consciousness
and grew increasingly dissatisfied with sexist gender relations (Segal
1990). By the mid-1970s, there was an estimated three hundred men’s
groups in the United States meeting regularly to discuss primarily how
gender norms and stereotypes limited or harmed them (Katz 1974).
Interestingly, however, these groups did not coalesce into a full-fledged
social movement akin to the women’s movement. Today, there are several
national organizations (e.g.. The National Organization for Men Against
Sexism, formerly The National Organization for Changing Men, and the
North American Federation of Men’s Councils, which even has a chapter
in a men’s prison). There are also local and regional men’s centers, men’s
studies programs in universities (see chapter 5), and a number of news¬
letters and journals (e.g.. Changing Men, The Journal of Men’s Studies). But
the men’s movement has not been politically active in the same sense as
the women’s movement; most groups concentrate on personal growth,
although some, as we will see, have adopted a liberal “equal rights for
men agenda (Segal 1990; Astrachan 1986). The men’s movement also
has not been successful in attracting a broad-based following of either

men or women. In fact, some analysts have argued that it is more appro¬
priate to categorize it as a social or political network rather than a move¬
ment (Carrigan et al. 1987; Filene 1987).
Like the women’s movement, though, the men’s movement contains
not one, but several diverse perspectives. Harry Brod (1987), a leader in
the field of men’s studies, has identified at least two strains of thought.
The first he labels male-identified, and sees it as a corollary of mainstream
liberal feminism. This perspective emphasizes that male privilege is really
a double-edged sword that for most men bestows as many, if not more,
disadvantages as advantages. The major goal of this camp is male enlight¬
enment to bring about personal development as an individual. Exempli¬
fied in Robert Ely’s (1990) best-selling book. Iron John, this approach
celebrates traditional masculine qualities such as bravery and inde¬
pendence, but also encourages men to develop close friendships with one
another, freely express their emotions, explore “feminine” aspects of their
personalities, and develop closer relationships with their children. Al¬
though claiming to be supportive of feminism, some analysts of this
segment of the men’s movement maintain that it often blames women—
usually mothers—for men’s problems and depends heavily on women
playing traditional roles in order for men to be free to explore alterna¬
tives (Hagan 1992; Johnston 1992). Related to these points is the criticism
that this perspective fails to undertake a serious analysis of the issue of
power and of how power impinges on men’s relations with women and
with other men (Hagan 1992; Astrachan 1986).
A second branch of the men’s movement has been labeled by Brod
as female-identified. This approach is best illustrated in Victor Seidler’s
(1991) book. Recreating Sexual Politics. Members of this segment essentially
agree that traditional masculinity is debilitating, especially for particular
groups of men (e.g., minority men and the working class). Although it
acknowledges that some men might be motivated to relinquish their male
privileges because of this, most will not unless they are forced. It is this
branch of the men’s movement that takes up the issue of power, and
proponents of this perspective advocate:
revolution against, rather than a redistribution of, power. They aim to

dismantle the power structures that damage male psyches, structures that
liberal feminism leaves on the whole intact, generally seeking only
greater access to them for women. Consequently, they hold out the
greater possibility of men gaining from radical social reconstruction to
alleviate or eliminate male and female role restrictions and debilities
(Brod 1987:56).
For obvious reasons, this second perspective is seen as a corollary of more

radical or leftist feminisms (Seidler 1991; Brod 1987).
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514 Chapter 13
In addition to these two approaches, considerable attention has also

recently been given to “men’s rights” groups, such as the Domestic Rights
Coalition and Free Men, a Maryland-based organization with chapters
throughout the United States. Astrachan (1986) divides this branch of the
men’s movement into two segments. One segment is composed of divorce
reformers who view most divorce and child custody laws as unfair to men.
Groups such as Fathers United for Equal Rights have formed to provide
divorcing men with an emotional support network and with legal assis¬
tance, but few of these groups have taken up political lobbying as a
primary activity.
The second segment of the “men’s rights” branch of the men’s
movement is called “the no-guilt wing” by Astrachan. No-guilt men’s
liberationists denounce traditional masculine stereotypes as harmful and
destructive to men, but they also maintain that men should not feel guilty
about gender privilege and domination. In their eyes, these are largely
illusions given the advantages women enjoy in our society. Men’s rights
groups, therefore, concentrate their efforts on eliminating what they see
as favoritism toward women in U.S. public policy—for instance in military
exemptions, lower automobile insurance premiums, and “happy hours”
or “ladies’ nights” at bars and restaurants where women are offered
drinks at reduced prices. Not surprisingly, such groups have staunchly
supported the Equal Rights Amendment, but significantly, many of those
involved in other branches of the men’s movement disavow men’s rights
groups, viewing them as opposing rather than complementing feminism
(Brannon 1981-82). This conclusion is not unfounded, for much of the
men’s rights literature is both reactionary and sexist, depicting men as
the innocent victims of conniving and selfish women (see, for example,
Farrell 1993; Thomas 1993; for a critique of this branch of the men’s
movement, see Hagan 1992).
Of course, it comes as no surprise that some, particularly women in
the feminist movement, regard the men’s movement in general with
suspicion and skepticism. There is the very real concern, fueled by the
actions of men’s rights groups, that the men’s movement or network is
simply a strategy “for repairing men’s authority in the face of the damage
done by feminism . . .” (Carrigan et al. 1987:100). Others share Barbara
Ehrenreich’s (1983) reservation that the net result of “men’s liberation”
will be to further encourage men to renege on their commitments—es¬
pecially the financial ones—to women and children. And some question
men’s commitment to genuine social change in gender relations (Hagan
1992). As Astrachan (1986:290) points out:
It’s easy to see why the women’s movement is so large and the men’s
movement is small. Women respond to their movement because they
know first hand the injustices it wants to erase. They feel a passion to
change the system that denies them true equality with men in access to
power, economic opportunity, family life, personal autonomy. . . . Most
[men] are the beneficiaries of existing political, social, and economic
systems—in fact or in our own mythology. We are privileged compared to
women, whom we often treat as an underclass.
Implicit in Astrachan’s analysis is a question. Just as we asked with regard

to antifeminist women, how they could not support the women’s move¬
ment, we may ask of men’s liberationists, why they should want to support
a movement for equality. The challenge that confronts many men’s lib¬
erationists, then, is how to mobilize men for social change when such a
change may result in gains for women—but at the cost of some loss of
privilege for themselves.
Still, despite these legitimate concerns, the female-identified seg¬
ment of the men’s movement has provided reason for optimism. One of
the most significant components of this branch of the men’s movement
is its antiviolence emphasis. In both the United States and abroad, men’s
groups have formed cooperative alliances with feminist rape crisis centers
and battered women’s agencies, providing counseling and other pro¬
grams to change the behavior of violent men (Segal 1990; Stoltenberg
1989; Brod 1987). On an individual level, the men’s movement has also
generated “3. good deal of quiet experimentation with masculinity
among men who wish to develop nonoppressive relationships with
women and other men (Carrigan et al. 1987:100).
One aspect of the men’s movement that has drawn considerable
criticism is the failure—some would say refusal of some men in the
movement to actively support the struggle for gay rights (Carrigan et al.
1987). Although some argue that the men’s movement has become more
“gay affirmative” (Seidler 1991), there has been a persistent conflict in
the movement between those who have focused on men s liberation
analogous to women’s liberation and those whose concern is opposing
sexism and therefore being more supportive of women s and gays rights
(Segal 1990). Consequently, the gay liberation movement has been to a
large extent separate and distinct from the men s liberation movement.
We turn our attention next to gay and lesbian activism.
GAY AND LESBIAN RIGHTS
Much of the information available about homosexual men and women

has been produced by nonhomosexuals, and most, we know now, is
heterosexist and grounded in myths and negative stereotypes (see chap¬
ter 7). Because of the stigma attached to homosexuality, gays and lesbians
themselves historically have been forced to remain silent and closeted, or
\
516 Chapter 13
suffer severe consequences, including imprisonment, violence, and the

loss of their jobs.
This does not mean that there have been only recent efforts to
secure equal rights and freedom from discrimination for homosexuals.
According to Carrigan and his colleagues (1987), for example, accompa¬
nying the first wave of feminism in Europe was a simultaneous move to
emancipate homosexuals. Cruikshank (1992), Faderman (1991) and oth¬
ers have documented the histories of numerous organizations established
in the United States as early as the 1920s to combat prejudice and dis¬
crimination against gays and lesbians, although their memberships were
small and they did not identify homosexuals as an oppressed minority
group. Such an identity began emerging during the 1950s when new
groups, such as the Mattachine Society for gay men and Daughters of
Bilitis for lesbians, formed. The goals of these groups were modest by
today’s standards, but radical for their time: to provide support for homo¬
sexuals, to correct widespread inaccuracies about homosexuals and ho¬
mosexual relationships, and to promote tolerance of homosexuals by
heterosexuals (Cruikshank 1992; Katz 1976).
Like the women’s and men’s movements, the gay rights movement
was also influenced by the civil rights struggle and anti-war activism of the
1960s (Cruikshank 1992). However, the Stonewall riots of 1969 are con¬
sidered by most to be the political spark that galvanized the gay liberation
movement. On June 27, 1969, New York police raided the Stonewall Inn,
a Greenwich Village bar whose patrons were mostly lesbians and gay men.
Tired of harassment and brutality at the hands of the police and the
heterosexual public, the bar’s patrons, joined by a crowd of about 2,000
others, fought back with two nights of street rioting. As Cruikshank
(1992:69) writes, “Stonewall was a symbolic end to victim status.”
Following Stonewall, a number of new, highly political and activist
groups emerged, including the Gay Liberation Front and the Gay Activist
Alliance. Gay liberationists began to emphasize that:
the institutionalization of heterosexuality as in the family, was achieved

only by considerable effort, and at considerable cost not only to
homosexual people but also to women and children. . . . The gay
movement’s theoretical work, by comparison with the “sex-role” literature
and “men’s movement” writings, had a much clearer understanding of
the reality of men’s power over women, and it had direct implications for
any consideration of the hierarchy of power among men (Carriean et al
1987:86). & V 5
Coming out as homosexual was a highly personal act of self-disclosure,

but it was also a radical political act. This was a time of gay pride, but it
was also a time of heightened activism that included demonstrations,
fundraising, the publication of newsletters and journals, lobbying for the
passage of equal rights laws and'the rescinding of discriminatory ones, as

well as myriad other activities.
We have noted throughout this book the numerous successes of gay
rights activism. At the same time, we have documented setbacks and
opposition to gay rights, including the Bowers v. Hardwick decision (see
chapter 7), the continued denial of parenting opportunities and rights to
gay men and lesbians, a rise in hate crimes, the crusade against homo¬
sexuals and homosexuality being pursued by the religious New Right, the
underfunding of AIDS research, and the continuing controversy over
gays and lesbians in the military. Significantly, these problems have not
served to re-silence the gay and lesbian communities, but rather have
politicized them further. Consider, for instance, that gay and lesbian
voters were instrumental in the 1992 election of President Clinton and
other liberal politicians. Consider, too, the 1993 gay rights march in
Washington, D.C., at which more than 300,000 women and men, virtually
all homosexual, demonstrated for equal rights. Most important perhaps,
consider that an increasing number of lesbian and gay teens are willing
to be out about their sexual orientation and are attempting to educate
their peers, heterosexual and homosexual, through public speaking en¬
gagements and school workshops (Green 1993).
This is not to say that there are no conflicts within the gay rights
movement. As Cruikshank (1992) notes, black, Hispanic, Asian, and Na¬
tive American lesbians and gay men often feel torn between their alle¬
giance to the gay rights movement and to movements for the liberation
of racial minorities. The movement has also been criticized from within
by lesbians who see it as male dominated. Some lesbians in fact believe
that lesbianism cannot be understood alongside of male homosexuality
because the two are entirely different phenomena, partly because women
are oppressed and men are part of the dominant culture (Cruikshank
1992:4).
Although the struggle for gay men’s rights owes a debt to feminism
for constructing a framework for analyzing sexual oppression (Carrigan
et al. 1987), feminism has special significance for lesbians. According to
Pearlman (1987:317), the feminist movement was central to lesbians’
politicization as a group. “Feminism gave lesbianism a female-oriented
political movement and a political understanding of the basis of their
persecution. . . . Feminist political activity gave lesbians places to^ meet
outside of the bars through consciousness raising groups, women s cen¬
ters, and services such as rape crisis and women’s health centers. A more
open and supportive environment meant that lesbians could be visible
and active. However, as lesbian feminists increased their participation m
the women’s movement and began to contribute their own critical analy¬
ses of heterosexual relations, straight feminists grew more defensive and
argued that a visible and vocal lesbian presence would hurt the movement
\
518 Chapter 13
by delegitimating it. This eventually led to a lesbian/straight split in the

women’s movement, with lesbian feminists forming their own organiza¬
tions, such as Radicalesbians (Cruikshank 1992; Faderman 1991; Pearl-
man 1987). Although in recent years this split has been mended
somewhat, there remains an uneasy alliance between lesbian and straight
feminists within some segments of the women’s movement.
The tensions that continue to exist within the gay rights movement,
as well as between the gay rights movement and the feminist movement,
are unfortunate because they draw attention away from the substantial
contributions that lesbian and gay activists have made in restructuring
our inequitable sex/gender system. The greater tragedy, however, is that
while we could continue to list the successes of lesbian and gay activism,
it has become clear through our discussions in this text that so much
more remains to be done before lesbians and gay men enjoy the same
rights and privileges accorded to heterosexuals and are free from dis¬
crimination in our society.
CARRYING ON
We conclude this text much as we began: with the observation that

sex/gender systems are social constructs. What has been socially con¬
structed can be socially reconstructed to better meet human needs (Lor-
ber 1986). The social movements we discussed in this chapter are efforts
toward that reconstruction. They are an expression of the shared griev¬
ances of disadvantaged and dissatisfied segments of the population who
are working to change the status quo, and to remedy their grievances
through direct collective action.
In this chapter and throughout the text, we have highlighted some
of the successful challenges that these movements have posed to the
present sex/pnder system. Yet, we also know that existing institutions
and most social relations remain fundamentally unequal. Although many
overtly sexist policies and practices have been combated through legal
reforms, other more subtle, more insidious forms of sexism flourish, and
heterosexism is as blatant as ever. Even the formal legal rights that have
been won are subject to interpretation by a predominantly white, elite
male judiciary which frequently produces less than desirable outcomes.
Thus, for example, “the list of constitutional entitlements has been inter¬
preted to include the right to bear arms or sell ‘artistically redeeming’
pornographic magazines, but not, if one is indigent, the right to obtain
an abortion, child care, health services, or equal educational opportuni¬
ties. Women are, at least in theory, protected from discrimination on
account of sex in employment but not from discrimination on account of
Restructuring Sex/Gende^^ Systems 519
sexual preference or non-marital sexual activity” (Rhode 1986:154-155).

These examples make clear that legal reform is at best a short-term
solution to inequality. What must be changed is the inherently unequal
social structure of which law itself is one part.
As we approach the twenty-first century, the issue of social change
raises questions about the future. Can masculinity and femininity, homo¬
sexuality and heterosexuality, age, ability/disability, race, and social class
ever disappear as hierarchical organizing categories in our society? Will
the social movements we have discussed here overcome their individual
differences and collaborate to achieve this goal? We share the sentiments
of one group that wrote, “We feel that all liberation movements are
equally important; there is no hierarchy of oppression. Every group must
speak its own language, assume its own form, take its own action ...” Our
hope for the future, however, lies with the realization that “when each of
these groups learns to express itself in harmony with the rest, this will
create the basis for an all embracing social change” (Berkeley Men’s
Center 1974:174).
KEY TERMS
sexual politics analysis of gender inequality as rooted not only in the public
sphere, but also in the supposedly private sphere of the family and inti¬
mate male/female relationships
social movement a group that has organized to promote a particular cause
through collective action
women’s movement (feminism) a social movement that spans more than a
century of U.S. and European history and which is represented today in
most countries of the Third World; composed of many diverse segments,
each committed to eliminating gender oppression as well as other oppres¬
sions
SUGGESTED READINGS
Cruikshank, M. 1992. The Gay and Lesbian Liberation Movement. New York: Rout-
ledge, Chapman and Hall.
Eisenstein, H. 1991. Gender Shock. Boston: Beacon Press.
Faderman, L. 1991. Odd Girls and Twilight Lovers. New York: Columbia University
Press.
Hagan, K. L. 1992. Women Respond to the Men’s Movement. San Francisco: Pandora.
Hirsch’, M., and E. F. Keller (Eds.) 1990. Gonflicts in Feminism. New York: Rout-
ledge, Chapman and Hall.
Mohanty, C. T., A. Russo, and L. Torres (Eds.) 1991. Third World Women and the
Politics of Feminism. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Glossary
acquaintance rape an incident of sexual assault in which the victim knows or is

familiar with the assailant
acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) a virus that attacks a person’s
immune system, destroying his or her ability to fight off other diseases
Affirmative Action see Executive Order 11246
AIDS see acquired immune deficiency syndrome
androcentrism male-centered; the view that men are superior to animals and to
women
anorexia an eating disorder in which an individual, because of an obsessive fear
of becoming overweight, literally starves her/himself; characterized by a
distorted body image, and a 25 percent loss of body weight with a concom¬
itant refusal to eat; 90 to 95 percent of anorectics are female
biological essentialism a cultural lens that rationalizes and legitimates both
androcentrism and gender polarization by portraying them as the natural
and inevitable products of the inherent biological differences between the
sexes
bipedalism walking upright on two feet
bulimia also known as binge-purge syndrome because the individual consumes
large quantities of food in a short period, and then, fearful of gaining
weight, purges the food through fasting, laxatives, or induced vomiting;
afflicts primarily young women
chivalry hypothesis the belief that female offenders are afforded greater leni¬
ency before the law than their^male counterparts
comparable worth the policy of paying workers equally when they perform
different jobs that have similar value
dissimilarity index (segregation index) a measure of occupational sex segrega¬
tion, reported as a percent, that indicates the proportion of workers of one
sex that would have to change to Jobs in which members of their sex are
underrepresented in order for the occupational distribution between the
sexes to be equal
domestic partnership couples who are cohabiting or living together without
being married
double work load a problem faced by women who are in the paid labor force
but who also maintain primary responsibility for housework and child care
dual labor market a labor market characterized by one set of jobs employing
almost exclusively men and another set of jobs, typically lower paying and
with lower prestige, employing almost exclusively women
economy the system for the management and development of a society’s human
and material resources
520
Glossary 521
emancipation theory posits that female crime is increasing and/or is becoming

more masculine in character as a result of the women’s liberation move¬
ment
Equal Pay Act of 1963 forbids employers from paying employees of one sex
more than employees of the opposite sex when these employees are en¬
gaged in work that requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility and is
performed under similar working conditions, although exceptions, such as
unequal pay based on seniority, merit, the quality or quantity of production,
or any other factor besides sex, are allowed
ethnocentrism the view that one set of cultural beliefs and practices is superior
to all others
Executive Order 11246 (Affirmative Action) forbids federal contractors from
discrimination in personnel decisions on the basis of sex, as well as race,
color, national origin, and religion, and requires employers to take affirm¬
ative measures to recruit, train, and hire women and minorities; since 1978,
implemented and enforced by the OFFCP
feminism (women’s movement) a social movement that spans more than a
century of American and European history, composed today of many di¬
verse segments, each committed to eliminating gender oppression
feminist paradigm explains gender in terms of the political and socioeconomic
structure in which it is constructed; emphasizes the importance of taking
collective action to eradicate sexism in sociology as well as the larger society
and to reconstruct gender so that it is neither a harmful nor an oppressive
social category
feminist spirituality a religious movement composed of diverse segments with
differing beliefs and strategies for change, but unified in their rejection of
the dualism characteristic of traditional patriarchal religions; dualism is
replaced with the theme of unification of spirit and nature, and the princi¬
ple that human experience is the source of spirituality
feminization of poverty the position that poverty is increasingly becoming a
problem affecting primarily women and their dependent children
foraging societies (hunting and gathering societies) small, technologically unde¬
veloped societies whose members meet their survival needs by hunting and
trapping animals, by fishing if possible, and by gathering vegetation and
other types of food in their surrounding environment; characterized by
highly egalitarian gender relations
formal curriculum the set of subjects officially and explicitly taught to students
in school
gender socially generated attitudes and behaviors, the contents of which are
usually organized dichotomously as masculinity and femininity
gender attrihution the process of linking archeological data with males and females
gender gap differences in the voting patterns and political opinions of men and
women
gender polarization the assumption that males and females are fundamental y
different from one another, and the practice of using these differences as a
central organizing principle for the social life of a society
gender stereotypes oversimplified summary descriptions of masculinity and
femininity
\
522 Glossary
gladiator activities the highest level of political activism in Millbrath’s typology;

include working on a political campaign, taking an active role in a political
party, or running for public office
gynecentrism female-centered; the view that females are superior to other ani¬
mals and to men
hidden curriculum the value preferences children are taught in school that are
not an explicit part of the formal curriculum, but rather are hidden or
implicit in it
homophobia an unreasonable fear of and hostility toward homosexuals
human capital theory explains occupational sex segregation in terms of
women’s “free choice” to work in jobs that make few demands on workers
and require low personal investment in training or skills acquisition be¬
cause women’s primary responsibilities are in the home
hunting and gathering societies see foraging societies
identification a central concept of the Freudian-based theory of gender sociali¬
zation; the process by which boys and girls begin to unconsciously model
their behavior after that of their same-sex parent in their effort to resolve
their respective gender-identity complexes
isolated nuclear family a family form in which the husband/father, wife/mother,
and their dependent children establi'Sh a household separate from other
kin and private in the sense that production no longer takes place there
life expectancy the average number of years of life remaining to an individual
at a given age
linguistic sexism ways in which language devalues members of one sex
mentor an older, established member of a profession who serves as a kind of
sponsor for a younger, new member by providing advice and valuable
contacts with others in the field
micro-inequities subtle, everyday forms of discrimination that single out, ignore,
or in some way discount individuals and their work or ideas simply on the
basis of an ascribed trait, such as sex
modeling a central concept of the social learning theory of gender socialization;
the process by which children imitate the behavior of their same-sex parent,
especially if the parent rewards their imitation or is perceived by them to
be warm, friendly, or powerful
morbidity rate the illness rate of a given population
mortality rate the number of deaths in proportion to a given population
new reproductive technologies a variety of laboratory techniques, including in
vitro fertilization, that allow those who are infertile, who are physically
unable to conceive or sustain a pregnancy, or who are able to get pregnant
but do not have a male partner or do not wish to enter into a committed
relationship with a man, to become parents
no-fault divorce a form of marital dissolution which allows either spouse to
divorce the other on the ground of “irreconcilable differences” without
fixing blame for the marital breakdown
occupational sex segregation the degree to which men and women are concen¬
trated in occupations that employ workers of predominantly one sex
patriarchy a sex/gender system in which men dominate women and what is
considered masculine is more highly valued than that which is considered
feminine
Glossary 523
PMS see premenstrual syndrome -

premenstrual syndrome (PMS) a menstrual disorder, the exact causes of which
are unknown, but for which there are up to 150 disparate physical, psycho¬
logical, and behavioral symptoms
public/private split the notion that the world of the family is private and,
therefore, separate from and uninfluenced by the public world of work and
other social institutions
Qur’an the compilation of the revelations that the prophet Mohamad is said to
have received from Allah and which is understood by Muslims to be literally
the word of God
reflection hypothesis the belief that media content mirrors the behaviors and
relationships, and values and norms most prevalent or dominant in a
society
reinforcement a central principle of the social learning theory of gender sociali¬
zation w'hich states that a behavior that is consistently followed by a reward
wall likely occur again, while a behavior followed by a punishment will rarely
re-occur
religiosity an individual’s or group’s intensity of commitment to a religious
belief system
second shift see double work load
segregation index see dissimilarity index
semantic derogation the process by which the meanings or connotations of
words are debased over time
sentencing disparity the imposition of different sentences on offenders con¬
victed of similar crimes usually resulting in unfair or inappropriate sen¬
tences (i.e., sentences disproportionate to the severity of the crime or the
offender’s criminal history, and based instead on irrelevant factors, such as
the offender’s sex or race)
separation anxiety the level of distress exhibited by a child if left alone by a
parent, and the extent to which the child clings to its parent or seeks the
parent’s help when placed in novel situations; used as a measure of depen¬
dency in infants
sex the biologically determined physical distinctions between males and fe¬
males
sex/gender system the institutionalized traits, behaviors, and patterns of social
interaction that are prescribed for a society’s members on the basis of their
sex; composed of three interrelated components: the social construction of
two dichotomous genders on the basis of biological sex, a sexual division of
labor, and the social regulation of sexuality
sexism the differential valuing of one sex over the other
sexual double standard the tradition of permitting young men to engage in
sexual activity while simultaneously condemning and punishing the same
behavior by young women
sexual harassment involves any unwanted leers, comments, suggestions, or
physical contact of a sexual nature, as well as unwelcome requests for sexual
favors
sexual politics the analysis of gender inequality as rooted not only in the public
sphere, but also in the supposedly private sphere of the family and intimate
male/female relationships
\
524 Glossary
socialization the process by which a society’s values and norms, including those
pertaining to gender, are taught and learned
social movement a group that has organized to promote a particular cause
through collective action
spectator activities the lowest level of political activism in Millbrath’s typology;
include voting, wearing a campaign button or putting a political bumper
sticker on one’s car
status offenses behavior considered illegal if engaged in by a juvenile that would
not be illegal if engaged in by an adult
structural functionalist paradigm explains gender as being derived from the
biological differences between the sexes, especially differences in their
reproductive functions
symbolic annihilation symbolically ignoring, trivializing, or condemning indi¬
viduals or groups through the media
Talmud thought to have been compiled around C.E. 200; records the oral inter¬
pretations of scripture by the ancient Rabbis and constitutes the foundation
of religious authority for traditional Judaism
Tide IX the provisions of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 that forbid
sex discrimination in any education programs or activities that receive
federal funding
Tide VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act forbids discrimination in employment on
the basis of sex, as well as race, color, national origin, and religion by
employers of fifteen or more employees, although exceptions such as the
BFOQ are allowed; implemented and enforced by the EEOC
transformative account of gender development a theory of gender development
that recognizes the truly interactive nature of biology and environment as
well as individual agency in the creation of gender by examining how
culture and individual behavior may impact on biology and vice versa
transitional activities the mid-range of political activism in Millbrath’s typology;
include writing to public officials, making campaign contributions, or at¬
tending rallies or political meetings
witchcraft naturalistic practices with religious significance usually engaged in by
women; includes folk magic and medicine as well as knowledge of farming,
ceramics, metallurgy, and astrology
women’s movement see feminism
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\
Name Index
Abbott, R, 8, 9 Arnold, R. A., 314 Beatty, J. R., 288

Abel, G., 344 Aronson, E., 119 Beatty, R. W., 288
Abplanalp, Dr. J., 53 Asch, A., 198 Bebel, A., 507
Abzug, B., 362 Aspin, L., 386 Becker, M., 218
Adams, A., 359 Astrachan, A., 512, 513, 514 Bedard, M. E., 224, 225, 228, 229,
Adams, J., 359 Attie, L., 476, 477, 478 230
Adams, K .L., 151 Aulette,J. R., 183, 191 Bedell, K. B., 413, 423
Adelson, A., 96 Ayres, B. D., 236 Beecher, R., 115
Adler, R, 308, 309, 313 Beer, W., 209
Adler, M., 424 Babbie, E., 192 Belkin, L., 199
Afshar, H., 419 Baca Zinn, M., 8, 223 Bell, R. Q., 34
Ageton, S., 345 Bacchi, C. L., 15 Beilin, J. S., 439, 440
Agus, A., 426 Bacon, M. H., 402 Belsky, J., 49
Ahmed, L., 417, 418, 419 Baehr, H., 154 Bern, S. L., 12, 80, 82, 85, 86,
Aiken, S. H., 141 Baird, Z., 379 87-90, 98, 102, 103
Albright, M., 156 Baker, S. W., 24, 26 Benedetto, R., 367
Alder, C. 314, 328 Ballou, M, 482, 483, 484, 485 Bennet, J., 236
Allan, G., 185, 205, 206, 207 Bandura, A., 83, 84 Benson, D.J., 135
Allan, P. G., 502 Bane, M.J., 222 Benson, K. A., 138
Allen, K.R., 219 Banner, L., 492, 493 Benston, M., 207
Allen, L. S., 43, 44, 45 Bannerji, H. L., 141 Berardo, D. H., 210
Allgood-Merton, B., 466, 479 Baran, S.J., 179 Bergen, C., 174
Altman, L. K., 443 BardwelhJ. R., 101 Berger, R. J., 348
Ames, A., 50, 446 Barker-Benfield, G. J., 450 Bergman, B. R., 258
Amott, T. L., 255 Barnes, A. S., 210 Berk, R. A., 242, 328
Andersen, M. L., 144 Barnett, B. M., 502 Berliner, A. K., 231, 411
Anderson, B., 128 Barnett, R. C., 211, 216, 437, 468 Berman, Dr. E., 47
Anderson, S.R., 424 Barnhouse, R. T., 231 Berman, S., 404
Andors, R, 301 Baron, D., 149, 151 Bernard,]., 211, 212
Andrews, L. B., 198, 200 Baron, J, N., 266 Bernat, R R, 321
Angier, N., 36, 44 Barr, K. E. M., 472 Bernstein, R., 137
Anthony, S. B., 493 Barrett, N., 282 Berrill, K. T., 336
Applebome, R, 331 Barringer, R, 192 Berry, C., 115
Archer, C., 86 Barry, K., 347 Berry, M., 497, 498
Ardrey, R., 59, 63 Barstow, A. L., 401 Berry, V., 164
Aries, N., 455 Baruch, G. K., 211, 216, 437, 468 Best, R., 117
Armstead, C. A., 438 Baskin, D. R., 312 Betz, N. E., 477
Armstrong, G., 324 Baunach, D. R., 330, 333 Biden,J., 337
Arnold, C. L., 266 Baxter, S., 362 Biehl,J., 425
Arnold, M., 350 Bearden, J., 446 Bielby, D. D., 287
586
Name Index 587
Bielby, W. T., 266, 287 Briggs, S., 407, 413, 423, 426, 501 Campbell, J. B., 415
Biener, L., 438, 471 Brinkley, D., 169 Campbell, K., 171
Birke, L., 54 Brinton, M., 124 Cann, A., 86
Bishop, K., 140 Brod, H., 142, 513, 515 Cannon, R. O., 437
Bjorqvist, K., 65 Bronstein, R, 84, 91, 92, 101 Cantor, M. G., 159
Bjorn, L., 270 Brooks-Gunn, J., 24, 33, 34, 39, Caraway, N., 494, 502
Black, L. E., 230 101, 464, 476, 477, 478 Carey, S., 87
Blackmun, H., 380 Brooten, B. J., 426 Carlen, R, 315
Blackwell, E., 490 Broude, G., 344 Carlson, S. M., 260, 261, 264
Blake, C. R, 352 Broverman, 1. K., 464-465 Carmody, D. L., 398, 400, 401, 403,
Blakeslee, S., 40, 41, 46, 439 Brown, J, D., I7l 404, 408, 409, 410, 416
Blanc, A. K., 229, 230 Brown, S., 217, 218 Carney, L. S., 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 74
Blankenship, K. M., 200, 293, 295 Browne, A., 238, 241 Carr, R G., 101
Blasko, V.J., 179 Brownmiller, S., 351 Carrigan, T. B., 513, 514, 515, 516,
Blaubergs, M. S., 151 Brozan, N., 426 517
Bleier, R., 45, 57, 58, 60, 61, 63, 65, Brubaker, T., 210 Carroll, C. M., 136
69, 70, 74 Brumberg, J. J., 478 Carroll, S.J., 370, 371, 373
Blinde, E. M., 459, 460 Buell, T., 489 Carter, D. B., 86, 99
Blood, R., 204 Bulbeck, G., 511 Carter, Pres. J., 361, 384
Bloom, A., 141 Bumiller, E., 354 Carty, L., 133
Bloom, R. L., 341, 342 Bumpass, L. L., 230 Castelli, J., 195, 395, 396, 397
Blum, L., 263, 268 Buresh, B. S., 158 Cells, W., 117
Blume, E., 50 Burgess, E., 183 Cepko, C. L., 45
Blumstein, R, 189, 204, 205, 206, Burk, M., 498 Cernkovich, S. A., 313
230, 232 Burke, B. M., 77, 78, 90 Chafetz,J. S., 8, 13,506, 507
Bly, R., 513 Burns, A. L., 91, 101 Chalfant, H. R, 463
Bohlander, E., 323 Burr, E., 247 Chambless, D. L., 468, 469, 470
Bolotin, S., 505 Burris, B. H., 267, 510 Chapman, J. R., 351, 352, 354
Boneparth, E., 380 Burstow, B., 483, 484 Chatters, L. H., 185
Bookman, A., 366, 501 Busfield, J., 465 Chavkin, W., 440, 474
Booth, A., 37 Bush, D. M., 120, 123 Cheska, A. T., 459
Boskind-White, M., 478 Bush, Pres. G., 196, 360, 361, 364, Chesler, E., 511
Bouchard, C., 476 365, 378, 379-380, 380, 504 Chesney-Lind, M., 309, 310, 314,
Bourque, L. B., 339, 340, 341, 342 Bussey, K., 84, 85 323, 327, 328, 331, 333, 337
Boxer, B., 376 Butler, A., 324 Chesterman, C., 126
Bozett, F. W., 236 Butler, M., 179 Childers, M., 503
Bradbard, M. R., 95 Buzawa, G. G., 241, 242 Chira, S., 212, 214, 284
Bradley, Justice, 293 Buzawa, E. S., 241, 242 Chodorow, N., 83
Bradwell, M., 6 Byrne, J. M., 315 Chopp, R. S., 424
Brah, A., 510, 511 Byrne, L., 426 Chretien, J. K., 342
Braiman, S., 479 Chrisler,J. C., 47, 49, 52
Brand, R A., 243 Cahill, S. V., 239, 240 Christ, C. R, 400, 401, 424
Brannon, R., 514 Caldera, V. M., 95 Christensen, A. S., 293, 294, 295,
Braun, C. M., 376 Calderwood, D., 448 298, 299
Bray, L., 386 Caldwell, M. A., 233 Christensen, C. L., 461
Breglio, V. S., 360, 361, 362, 363, Callahan, J.J., 249, 250 Chrysostom, John, 410
365 Calvert, C., 200 Chung, C., 169
Brennan, T., 82 Calvert, M., 200 Clancy, C. M., 457
Brennan, W., 380 Calvin, J., 410 Clark, J., 370, 371, 372
Brewer, L., 381 Cameron, E., 95 Clark, R. R., 97
Brewster, K. L., 190 Campbell, A., 313 Cleary, P. D., 431, 438, 447, 466, 467
Briggs, N., 289 Campbell, B. N., 376 Clewell, B. C., 128
588 Name Index \
Culpepper, E. E., 50, 52 Doucette, S., 319

Clinton, H. R., 156
Cummings, J., 407 Douglas, Justice, 346
Clinton, Pres. W., 196, 198, 285,
361, 363, 364, 365, 378-379, 380, Curie, M., 125 Douglass, F, 106
388-391, 517 Curran, D. J., 224, 274, 328, 355, Dowd, M., 362, 378
Cobble, D. S., 286 356, 509, 510 Downs, A. C., 99
Cochran, S. D., 445 Downs, H., 169
Cohen, T., 213, 216 Dacri, T., 48 Doyal, L., 207, 214, 267, 434, 437,
Colasanto, D., 421 Dalton, Dr. K., 49, 50 440, 447, 455, 468, 469
Cole, D., 202 Daly, K., 314, 324, 325, 328 Drake, D. C., 443
Colletta, N. D., 100 Daly, M., 353, 354, 424 Drakulic, S., 506
Collins, P. H., 143, 214, 223, 265, Danner, M. J. E., 14 Draper, R, 68
502 Danziger, N., 359, 493, 495, 502 Dukakis, M., 360
Collins, R., 11 Darling, C., 188, 189 Dunkle, M., 460
Coltrane, S., 209, 210, 213, 216 Darrow, W. R., 418, 419 Dunphy, J. S., 282, 285
Comer, J. R, 100 Datwyler, M. M., 215 Dupre, J., 58, 62
Comstock, G., 163, 164, 176 Davidson, J., 25 Durkheim, E., 394
Condry, J., 35, 164, 166, 167, 179 Davies, B., 87, 98, 102 Duviant, N., 101
Confucius, 6 Davies, M., 479 Dweck, C. S., 113
Conkey, M. W., 57, 60, 61, 62 Davis, A., 452 Dworkin, A. G., 352, 353, 504, 506
Conover, P. J., 421 Davis, A. J., 98 Dzeich, B. W., 135, 138
Cook, A., 299 Davis, K., 228, 276, 277, 447
Cook, J., 93, 94, 96 Davis, M., 433 Eagly, A. H., 35, 37
Cook, K. V., 141 Davis, N.J., 327 Easteal, P. W., 241
Cooke, M., 382 Davis-Floyd, R. E., 450 Easteal, S., 241
Coombs, L. C., 77 Deaux, K., 32, 41, 123 Ebaugh, H. R., 413
Cooper, S. E., 297 DeFour, D. C., 135 Ebomoyi, E., 355, 356
Cooperstock, R., 475 de Georges, O., 507 Edelsky, C., 152
Corcoran, M., 271, 272, 286, 287 Deitch, C., 293, 500 Edelson,J. L., 239, 240, 241
Cornell, C. R, 236, 238, 247, 248 DeKeseredy, W. S., 241, 338, 341, 345 Eder, D., 85, 86, 99
Corsaro, W. A., 85, 86, 99 Delmar, R., 8, 489, 500, 503 Edwards, H., 462
Cott, N. R, 255, 256, 489, 494, 495, DeLoache, J. S., 98 Ehrenberg, S., 426
497, 499, 507 DeLuca, T., 489 Ehrenreich, B., 401, 436, 448, 449,
Couric, E., 268, 321 de Mause, L., 247 452, 457, 458, 463, 469, 510, 514
Courtney, A. E., 155, 172, 173, 174, Dennehy, K., 120, 122, 210, 285 Ehrhardt, A. A., 26, 29
175, 176, 179, 180 DePalma, A., 132, 140 Eicher, E. M., 21
Cowan, A. L., 201 DeStefano, L., 421 Eiduson, B. T., 213
Cowan, C. P, 212 DeWitt, K., 191 ' Eisenhart, M. A., 131
Cowan, G., 80, 86 Diamond, D. L., 29, 198, 202, 471 Eisenhower, D., 361
Cowan, P. A., 212 Diamond, I., 425 Eisenstein, H., 506
Cowan, R. S., 201, 207-208, 212 Dibble, J., 241, 247 Eitzen, D. S., 67
Cox, M.J., 212, 213 Diedrick, R, 226 Elder, G. H., 186
Craft, C., 168 di Leonardo, M., 59, 214 Elder, J., 379
Cramer, R, 141, 142, 143 Dione, E. J., 502, 505 El-Or, T., 404, 419
Crawford, K., 125, 126 Dobash, R. E., 240, 241 Enarson, E., 270
Crawford, M., 29 Dobash, R. R, 240, 241 Engel, M., 369
Creighton, S. J., 248 Dodson, D. L., 369, 372, 380 Engels, F, 300, 507
Cron, T., 248 Doell, R., 30, 61 Engineer, A. A., 416, 417
Crosby, F. J., 215 Dole, E., 378 England, R, 298, 299
Crossette, B., 438 Dolinsky, A., 479 English, D., 401, 448, 449, 452,
Crouter, A. C,, 212 Dominick, J. R., 170, 171 463, 469
Crowley, H., 13, 14 Donnerstein, E., 347 Enloe, C. H., 384, 385, 389, 390
Cruikshank, M., 516, 517, 518 Donovan, R, 197 Epelboin, A., 355
Name Index 589
Epelboin, S., 355 Flexner, E., 108 Gilligan, C., 119, 122, 316, 462
Epstein., C. E, 367 Flowers, R. B., 315, 328, 343 Gilman, C. R, 490, 495
Erhardt, A. A., 22, 23, 24 Flynn, C. R, 241 Gilmore, D. O., 67, 72
Erikson, E., 82 Foley, D., 437, 453, 454, 455, 463, Gilroy, F, 77, 464
Erikson, J. A., 297 467, 475 Gimbutas, M., 399, 400
Erikson, R. J., 214, 216 Fox, R., 59 Ginsburg, R. B., 318, 380
Escoffier, J., 142 Fox, S., 440 Ginzburg, C., 400
Esdoko-Griffin, A., 65, 69 Frable, D. E. S., 90 Giordano, R, 313
Estrich, S., 339, 341 Frank, F. W., 150, 151 Giovannini, M. J., 48
Etienne, M., 65 Frank, Dr. R. T., 47 Gitlin, M. J., 48, 463
Ettema,J. S., 176, 179 Franklin, D. W., 268 Glaberson, W., 157, 158
Ettorre, E., 473, 475, 477, 478 Franks, R, 457 Glass.,;., 291
Evans, S., 299 Fraser, N., 275 Glass, R., 47
Evans, S. M., 256, 257, 258, 500 Freedman, R., 476, 477, 478, 479, Glazer, N., 159
481 Glenn, E. N., 185, 216, 255, 256,
Eaderman, L., 516, 518 Freeman, J., 499, 500 258, 261, 268, 290, 455
Eagot, B. L, 84, 91, 99 Freeza, H., 473 Gluck, S. B., 258
Eaine, J. R., 323 Freud, S., 71, 80-82 Gold, A. R., 324
Ealudi, S., 156 Friedan, B., 499 Gold, M., 475
Farrell, S. R., 415, 416 Friedman, R. C., 51 Goldberg, S., 6, 33
Farrell, W., 514 Frieze, 1. H., 24, 30, 34, 36, 37, 49, Golden, S., 278, 279, 280
Fausto-Sterling, A., 20, 21, 30, 36, 81, 82, 85, 125 Goldenberg, E. N., 371
40, 42, 45, 49, 53 Fuentes, A., 510 Goldhaber, M. K., 440
Fee, E., 454, 457 Fulani, L., 465 Golding,;. M., 468
Feinman, C., 327, 328 Funk, N., 506 Goldman, A. F., 407, 408, 415
Feinman, S., 84 Furstenberg, F. F, 191 Goldman,;. D. G., 87
Feinstein, D., 376 Goldman, N., 433
Feiring, C., 99 Gabalac, N. N., 482, 483, 484, 485 Goldman, R.;., 87
Fejes, F.J., 164, 166, 168, 173 Gabin, N. F, 255, 286 Goldstein, A.;., 468, 469, 470
Feldberg, R. L., 289 Gadon, E. M., 398 Goldstein, L. F, 6
Fennema, E., 125, 126 Gailey, C. W., 61, 64, 70, 71, 72, 73, Goleman, D., 92, 336
Ferguson, M., 159, 162 74 Golub, S., 49, 50, 51, 52, 53
Ferguson, T., 282, 285 Gallup, G., 195, 395, 396, 397, 415 Gonzalez, A., 101, 119
Ferraro, B., 195 Gammon, C., 143 Goodchilds,;., 345
Ferraro, G., 369 Gargan, E. A., 77 Goodenough, R. G., 99
Ferraro., K. J., 242 Gamier, H., 98 Goodstein, F., 140
Ferree, M. M., 10, 209 Garrison, C. G., 141 Goodwin,;., 418, 419
Fidell, L. S., 473 Garrow, D. J., 379 Gorbachev, M., 301
Figert, A. E., 49, 50 Gecas, V., 214, 216 Gordon, L., 193, 275
Figueira-McDonough, J., 323, 324 Geis, F. F., 176, 179 Gordon, M., 248
Filene, R, 513 Gelles, R. J., 236, 237, 238, 240, Gordon, M. R., 386, 387
Fillmore, K. M., 471 247, 248 Gordon, M. T., 334, 338, 341
Fine, L., 266 Gelman, D., 44 Gorman, C., 39, 40, 46, 52
Finklehor, D., 249, 250, 342 Gendler, M., 426 Gornick, V., 42, 45
Fiore, M., 123 Gerber, J., 334 Gorski, R. A., 43, 44, 45
Firebaugh, F. M., 209 Gerbner, G., 164, 167, 169 Gortmaker, S. L., 476
Fisch, M., 464 Gero,J. M., 57, 59, 60, 61 Gough, K., 58, 74
Fisher, S., 451 Gerson, M., 215 Gould, M. B. W., 199-200
Fitzgerald, L. F., 465 Gertzog, I. N., 377 Gould, S.;., 8, 42, 44
Fivush, R., 92 Gettleman, T. E., 478 Gradison, H., 378
Fleishman, J., 437 Giddings, R, 109, 111, 112 Graham, E., 355, 356
Flerx, V. C., 179 Gilkes, C. T., 397, 422 Graham, R A., 107, 111
590 Name Index . \
Grant, J., 397, 422, 423 Harrison, J. B., 442, 484 Homel, R., 101
Gray, F. D., 301 Hart, M. M., 460 Homer, C., 378
Gray, M. P., 491 Hartjen, G., 322 Hood, E. F., 502
Gray, W., 421, 422 Hartmann, H. 1., 14, 124, 208, 210, Hood,]., 272
Greeley, A. M., 195, 402, 415 255, 257, 259, 261, 263, 264, 265, hooks, b., 502
Green, J., 122, 474, 517 266, 267, 268, 280, 282, 288, 290, Hopkins, R, 424
Green, S., 344 291, 292, 294, 295, 296, 298, 299, Hornaday, A., 505
Greene, K. W., 295 501 Horner, M., 122
Greenhouse, S., 286 Hatch, M., 439 Homey, K., 82
Greer, W. R., 236, 451 Haynes, S. G., 437 Horwitz, A. V., 468
Greif, G. L., 216, 217, 218 Hedges, C., 419 Hosken, F., 356
Gresham, J. H., 223 Height, D., 185, 223 Hossain, Z., 100, 210
Griffiths, M., 497 Heitler, S. K., 49 House,]. S., 436
Grigsby, J. S., 175 Hekma, G., 143 Hout, M., 415
Gross, J., 136, 137, 154, 226, 227, Helgeson, V. S., 435, 437 Howe, R, 106, 107, 108, 109
228, 270, 340, 365, 373, 389 Hemmings, A., 139 Howe, K, 142
Gross, L., 164, 168 Henig, R, M., 437, 453 Hoyenga, K. B., 21, 23, 25, 26, 29, 32
Gruber, J. E., 270 Henley, N., 150, 151, 152, 153 Hoyenga, K. T., 21, 23, 25, 26, 29, 32
Guinier, L., 379 Henshaw, S. K., 197 Hu, Y, 433
Gunter, B., 179 Herdt, G. H., 25 Hubbard, R., 44, 57, 62, 63
Gutis, P. S., 188 Herek, G. M., 43, 336 Hugon, D, 28
Guy, P., 157 Herman, C. R, 477 Huie, V. A., 333
Herman, J. L., 240, 340, 344 Hunt, M. E., 415, 416, 422
Haas, L., 283, 285 Hess, B. B., 10, 125 Hurtig, A. L., 24
Hacker, S., 150 Hesse-Biber, S., 477 Husni, S., 158
Haddad, Y. Y, 416, 418, 419, 427 Hewlett, S. A., 283, 508 Hussey, R, 195
Hafner, R. J., 470 Heyward, C., 411 Huston, A. C., 86, 179
Hagan, K. L., 513, 514 Higginbotham, E. B., 422 Hyde,]. S., 37, 39
Hagin, R., 115 Higgins, P.J., 417, 418, 419 Hyman, R, 403, 405
Haignere, L., 288 Hilkert, M. C., 412
Hale-Benson, J., 100, 101 Hill, A., 270, 271, 380, 505 Immarigeon, R., 328, 333
Halemba, G. J., 321 Hill, M. A., 491 Imperato-McGinley,]., 25
Hall, L., 225 Hilts, P. J., 430, 446 Indardi,]., 309, 312, 313, 322, 444,
Hall, R. M., 128, 130, 132, 133, 134, Himmelstein, J. L., 504 473, 474, 475
135 Himmelweit, S., 13, 14 Innes, C. A., 312
Hamill, D., 156 Hinds, M. D., 475 ^ Isaaks, L., 101
Hampson, E., 42 Hine, D. C., 255 Isasi-Diaz, A. M., 426
Handsman, R. G., 62 Hirsch, E. D., 141 Island, D., 243, 245, 246
Hansen, E. J., 464, 465 Hirsch, M., 503 Israel, A. C., 84
Hanson, S. M. H., 218 Hochschild, A., 209, 210
Hansot, E., 109 Hodson, D., 248 ]acklin, C. N., 32, 33, 34, 36, 38, 39,
Haraway, D., 62, 63 Hoffman, C. D., 80, 86 40, 85, 91, 99
Harbeck, K. M., 121, 122 Hoffman, E. L., 137 ]ackson. Rev.]., 422
Harding, S. G., 7 Hoffman,]., 342, 343 ]acobs,]. A., 260, 290, 292
Harlan, S., 266 Hoff-Wilson, J., 307 ]acquet, C. H., 413, 414
Harmatz, M. G., 39, 40, 45 Hohri, S., 502 ]acqtiette,]., 506
Harrington, A., 42 Holden, C., 433 ]aggar, A. M., 13, 501
Harrington, M., 7 Holden, K. C., 219, 222, 226, 227, ]ames,]., 324
Harris, B., 469 228, 229, 277 ]app, P. M., 166
Harris, B. C., 413 Hole,]., 493 ]arratt, E. H., 459, 462
Harris, J., 332 Holland, B., 301 ]ayawardena, K., 510
Harris, M., 65, 68, 74 Holland, D. C., 131 ]effery, R, 77
Harris, M. B., 478 Holloman,]. L. S., 443, 447 ]ehl, D., 378
Name Index 591
Jenness, V., 336 Kerber, L. K., 316 Lacan, J., 82

Jensen, C., 154 Kerr, K. L., 347 Lackey, P. N., 101
Jensen, G., 321, 322 Kerrigan, N., 461 LaCroix, A. Z., 437
Jensen, M., 116 Kesselman, A., 258, 282 Ladner, J., 223
Jessel, D., 25, 42 Kessler, S., 28 LaFree, G., 328, 343
Jewell, K. S., 223 Kessler-Harris, A., 255, 256, 297 Lake, A., 91
John, D., 208, 211, 230 Kidd, A. H., 243 Lake, C. C., 360, 361, 362, 363, 365
John Chrysostom, 410 Kielwasser, A. R, 180 Lakeoff, R., 149, 151, 152, 153
John Paul II, Pope, 409-410 Kim,J. C., 376 Lamar, J. V., 385, 386
Johnson, A., 200 Kimball, R., 141 Lamb, T. A., 37
Johnson, A. G., 343 Kimmel, M. S., 17 Lambert, B., 443
Johnson, C. M., 430 Kimura, D., 41, 42 Lambert, H. H., 45
Johnson, D., 196, 321 King, D. R., 12, 13, 14, 502, 506 Lambert, S., 324
Johnson,J., 176, 179 King, Rev. M. L. Jr., 422 Landford, A. G., 108
Johnson, J., 479 Kinsey, A., 192 Landis, J., 310, 313, 323, 330, 332,
Johnson, L., 497 Kirsch, N., 67 333
Johnson, L. B., 100, 101 Kite, M. E., 32, 41 Landry, P. H., 328
Johnson, Pres. L. B., 500 Klag, M.J., 438 Langolis, J. H., 99
Johnson, P. J., 209 Klass, R, 454 Lansing, M., 362
Johnson-Odim, C., 510, 511 Klatch, R., 421, 427, 504 Larson, J. H., 212
Johnston, D., 320, 334, 342 Klein, D., 326 Lawnham, R, 352
Johnston, J., 513 Klein, E., 12, 492 Lawrence, R., 321
Jones, E. R, 189 Klein, V., 492 Lawrence, W., 459
Jones, E. H., 379-380 Klitsch, M., 196 Lawson, C., 96, 285
Jones, J. H., 452 Kmetz,J., 478 Lazier-Smith, C., 173, 174
Jones, T., 147, 167 Koehler, M. S., 126 Leach, W., 108
Joseph, G., 83 Koeske, R., 50, 51 Leacock, E., 65
Jurgens, J.J., 51 Kohlberg, L., 85 Leder, G. C., 126
Jurik, N. C., 314, 321 Kolata, G., 197, 201 Lee, F. R., 442
Kolker, A., 78, 90 Lee, G. R., 215
Kahn, A.J., 219, 221, 222 Komarovsky, M., 505 Lees, S., 327
Kahn, K. E, 371 Konner, M., 65 Leibowitz, L., 62, 63
Kahn, S. S., 453 Kosberg,J. I., 249, 250 Leinen, S., 319
Kain, E.. 188 Koser Wilson, N., 140 Leland, J., 470
Kalikow, K., 479 Koss, M., 138, 341, 345 Lemle, R., 471
Kalleberg, A. L., 280, 287 Kowalski, S., 235 Lenney, E., 90
Kamerman, S. B., 219, 221, 222 KozokJ., 278 Lenskyj, H., 459, 460, 462
Kammeyer, K. C. W., 229, 247 Krafft, S., 161 Lepowsky, M., 65, 69, 74, 344
Kane, E. W., 209, 210 Kramarae, C., 8, 15 Leppard, W., 453
Kanter, R. M., 10, 268 Kramer, H., 401 Lerner, G., 491, 495
Karlen, A., 115 Kramer, R., 499 Letellier, R, 243, 245, 246
Katz,J., 512, 516 Kranichfeld, M. L., 214 Leung,J.J., 126
Kaufman, D. R., 404, 406, 407, 419 Krieger, S., 231 Levant, R. E, 208
Kay, H. H., 204, 220, 241, 294 Kristoff, N. D., 77, 350 LeVay, S., 43, 44
Kaye, E., 480 Kruttschnitt, C., 324 Levine, E., 493
Keller, E. E, 503 Kuhn, D., 80, 86 Levinson, R. M., 95
Kelly, R. M., 241, 380 Kuhn, T., 7 Levy, K. B., 47, 49
Kempe, C. H., 237 Kulp, K., 341 Lewin, T., 237, 410, 474
Kemper, T. D., 37, 38, 41, 45 Kumar, R., 49 Lewis, D. K., 101
Kennedy, L., 455 Kurz, D., 238, 241 Lewis, L. A., 171
Kennedy, Pres. J. R, 361, 499 Kurtz, R. A., 463 Lewis, M., 33, 91, 99, 130
Kennedy Bergen, R., 342, 343 Kushner, H. I., 442 Lewis, N.A., 178
Kennedy, B., 377 Kutner, N. G., 95 Liebert, R.J., 176
\
592 Name Index
Lightfoot-Klein, H., 354, 355, 356 Margolin, G., 84 Meigs, A., 72

Lincoln, C. E., 422, 423 Margolis, D. R., 508, 510 Meredig, C., 96n.
Lindgren, J. R., 203, 204, 217, 219, Margolis, M. L., 350 Meredith, N., 232
221, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298 Marieskind, H. L> 457, 458 Mernissi, R, 418
Lindsey, R., 368 Marini, M. M., 124 Messner, M. A., 120, 459, 461
Linn, M. C., 39, 40. 41 Markham, W. T., 95 Metzger, G., 164, 165, 166, 173
Lipsedge, M., 465 Marolla, J., 344, 345, 347 Meyer-Bahlburg, H. R L., 23, 24
Lissyutkina, L., 303 Maroney, H. J., 501 Miethe, T. D., 328
Litde, C. B., 464 Marshall, E., 44 Milbrath, L., 365, 366
Liulewood, R., 465 Marshall, S. E., 504 Milkman, R., 258, 286, 297
Lobao, L., 510 Martin, C. L., 84 Milkuski, B., 377
Lobel, K., 243, 246 Martin, D., 379 Mill,;. S., 507
Lockhart, L. L., 240 Martin, E., 451 Miller, B. D., 70
Lockheed, M. E., 118, 125, 126 Martin, M. K., 71 Miller, C., 149, 150
Lockwood, B. A., 307 Martin, S. E., 319 Miller, C. L., 95
Lofland, L., 9 Martyna, W., 150, 151 Miller, D. C., 275
London, K., 435 Marx, K., 300 Miller,;., 419
London, R, 230 Marzolf, M. T., 157, 158 Miller,;. E., 28
Longino, H., 30, 61 Maslach, C., 86 Miller, N., 217
Lorber,J., 9, 31, 83, 103, 518 Masse, M. A., 173, 175 Miller, S. L., 336, 337
Loring, M., 465, 467 Mathews, D., 24 Miller, S. M., 467
Loseke, D. R., 239, 240 Matsui, Y, 510 Miller, T., 375
Lott, B., 120, 468 Matthaei, J. A., 255 Miller, T. M., 476
Lovejoy, O., 59, 63 Matthews, D., 24 Miller-Bernal, L., 505
Lovenduski, J., 368, 369, 381, 507, Matthews, W. S., 24, 33, 34, 39 Millman, M., 10
508 Mauldin, T., 226 Minge, P.;., 470
Luckenbill, D. R, 324 May, K. A., 480 Minton, H. L., 143
Luker, K., 193, 504 Mayall, A., 346 Mintz, L. B., 477
Lundstrom, W. J., 174 Maynard, R E., 237 Mirande, A., 100, 209, 223
Lunneborg, R W., 291 Mays, V. M., 445 Mischel, W., 84
Lunney, G. S., 35 Mazur, A., 37 Mitchell,;., 82
Lurie, N., 457 McAdoo, H. P, 223 Miura, 1. T., 125, 126
Luther, M., 410 McAdoo,J. L., 71 Mohanty, C. T., 509, 511
Lyall, S., 139 McCaulay, M., 477 Mohr,;., 193
Lynn, N. B., 365, 366, 367, 369, McClary, S., 171 Moir, A., 25, 42
376, 377 McClosky, L. A., 86, 99 > Mollenkott, V. R., 426
McConaghy, M. J., 82 Money,;., 22, 23, 24, 26, 29
Maccoby, E., 32, 33, 34, 38, 39, 40, McConnell-Ginet, S., 152, 153 Montague, M. F. A., 27
91,99 McCormack, A., 138, 139 Montgomery, R.;. V., 215
MacCorquodale, R, 321, 322 McCracken, E., 159, 161, 173 Moore, C. A., 328
MacDonald, E., 381 McCrea, F. B., 451 Moos, R. H., 28
MacDonald, K., 91 McGrath, E., 466 Morello, K. B., 321
MacKinnon, C., 346, 349 McGregor, R., 352 Morgan, D. H., 183
Madden, J., 297 McGuinness, D., 34, 38, 40, 115 Morgan, M., 176
Makowsky, M., 11 McIlwee,J. W., 263, 287 Morgan, R., 350, 356, 511
Mamanova, T., 301 McIntosh, R, 140 Morgen, S., 366, 501
Mamiya, L. H., 422, 423 McKinney, R, 455 Morris,;. T., 95
Mandel, R. B., 369, 372, 380 McLaren, A., 20 Morrissey, E. R., 470, 471
Manegold, C. S., 505, 506 McLean, S., 354, 355 Mortimer,;. T., 120, 122, 210, 285
Mann, C. R., 315, 323, 326 McQuillan, J., 209 Mosedale, L., 174
Mansbridge, J. J., 498 Mead, M., 64 Moseley Braun, C., 376
Mapplethorpe, R., 348 Mednick, M. T., 101 Mosher, D. L., 452, 471
Maquieira, V., 327 Meier, B., 451 Mott, L., 493
Name Index 593
Moyer, I. L., 330, 331, 332 Palmer, L., 383 Powers, A., 172, 505
Mueller, C., 362, 363 Palmer, S., 86 Powers, B. A., 51
Mueller, M., 506 Paradise, L. V., 119 Prather, J. E., 473
Mullings, L., 440 Parisi, N., 324 Pratt, N. R, 403, 404, 407
Murdoch, G. P., 67 Parke, R. D., 91 Press, A. L., 164, 165, 166
Murray, J. S., 492 Parlee, M. B., 47, 51, 52 Prestage, J, L., 363, 366, 372, 422
Mydans, S., 200, 320, 421, 442 Parmar, R, 355 Price, B. R., 320
Myers, M. A., 324, 328 Parsons, T., 5, 183, 184, 186 Price-Bonham, S., 101
Myers, P. L., 232 Passnau, R. O.j 48, 463 Provost, C., 67
Myers, R. A., 31, 356 Patterson, C. J., 236 Purcell, R, 117
Patterson, G. R., 84 Putnam, B. A., 124
Nagel, 1. H., 324 Paul, A., 495, 496 Pyke, K. D., 205, 211
Nagel, S., 323 Paul, M., 439, 440
Nanda, S., 72 Paul, St., 408-409, 412, 426 Quester, G. H., 382
Natividad, L, 370, 372, 422 Pavalko, E. K., 186 Quinn, R, 219
Nechas, E., 437, 453, 454, 455, 463, Pear, R., 284, 378 Quintanales, M., 502
467, 475 Pearlman, S. R, 517, 518
Nelson, B., 299 Peck, S., 6 Rada, R., 344
Nelson, M., 284, 401 Pedersen, F. A., 34 Rafferty, J., 464
Nelson, M. B., 459. 462 Peplau, L. A, 232, 233 Raiborn, M. H., 460
Nelson, S. M., 74 Peretti, P. O., 95 Rankin, D., 231
Nemy, E., 228 Perlez,J., 351 Rankin, J., 376
Neuberger, J., 404, 405, 407 Perloff, R. M., 176 Rapoport, J. L., 479
Nevels, L., 134 Perot, R., 361, 364 Raskin, P. A., 84
Ng, S. H., 150 Perrett, D. I., 480 Rather, D., 169
Nichols, P. C., 152 Perry, D. G., 85 Raymond, J. G., 202
Nicoloff, L. K., 471, 472 Petersen, A. C., 40, 41 Reagan, Pres. R., 196, 279, 360,
Nilsen, A. R, 149, 150 Peterson, E., 499 361, 362, 378, 379, 384, 504
Nixon, R., 361, 497 Petro, C. S., 124 Reekie, L., 464, 465
Norris, J., 347 Pfost, K. S., 123 Reid, P. T., 101, 116
Norton, E. H., 375 Philips, F. B., 159 Reid, R. L., 50
Novak, M. A., 39, 40, 45 Philips, R. D., 464 Reid, S. T., 316, 321, 342
Novello, A., 378 Philliber, W. W., 211 Reilly, M. E., 135, 136, 137, 138
Phillips, S. R, 270 Reinharz, S., 10, 11
Oakley, A., 49 Phipps, R, 115 Reinisch, J. M., 36
O’Brien, M., 86 Piaget, J., 85 Reiss, I. L., 344
0’Connor,J.J., 167, 168 Pierce, J. L., 101, 185 Reno, J., 160, 177, 379
O’Connor, S. D., 318, 379, 380 Pierce, M., 461 Renoize,J., 217
O’Earrell, B., 266 Pike, D. L., 317, 318 Rent, C. S., 77
Offen, K., 10, 13, 507 Pillemer, K., 249, 250 Rent, G. S., 77
Ogden, A. S., 207 Plaskow, J., 424 Renzetti, C. M., 224, 233, 244, 245,
O’Kelley, C. G., 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, Pleck,J. H., 209 246, 274, 295, 355, 356, 505, 509,
74 Pogrebin, L. C., 215, 408, 426 510
O’Leary, K. D., 240, 241 Pohli, C. V., 420, 421, 504 Reskin, B., 124, 255, 257, 259, 260,
O’Neill, W. L., 493, 494, 496, Polivy, J., 477 261, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 273,
500 Pollock-Byrne, J. M., 331 280, 282, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290,
Osmond, M. W., 444, 446 Poole, K. T., 363 291, 292, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298
Pope, K. S., 483 Rheingold, H. L., 93, 94, 96
Padevic, 1. A., 282 Pope John Paul II, 409-410 Rhoads, H., 233, 366, 422
Page, D. C., 20 Posadskaya, A., 301, 302, 303 Rhode, D. L., 497, 498, 500, 519
Pagelow, M. D., 239 Poussaint, A. F., 100 Rhodes, J., 167
Pagels, E., 400 Powell, B., 465, 467 Rice,J. K., 139
Paisley, W., 179 Power, T., 91 Rich, A., 232
594 Name Index \
Richardson, L. W., 37, 120, 164 Rubenstein, R., 439, 440 Schwartz, R, 285
Richmond, R, 479 Rubin, G., 3 Schwartz, L. A., 95, 345
Riding, A., 351, 412 Rubin, J. Z,, 91 Schwartz, R, 189, 204, 205, 206,
Riger, S., 282, 290, 334, 338, 341 Rubin, L., 189, 350 230, 232
Rimer, S., 122, 197 Rubin, R. T., 25, 36 Sciolino, E., 386
Ripper, M., 52 Ruble, D., 51 Scott, K., 124
Ritzer, G., 4 Ruether, R. R., 415, 416, 424 Scott, H., 297, 301
Rizzo, D., 116 Runfola, R., 459, 462 Scott, J. A., 440
Robertson, C., 136, 137, 138 Russell, D. E. H., 248, 342, 346, Scully, D., 344, 345, 347
Robertson, 1., 394, 416, 418 347, 348, 349, 356 Sears, J. T., 121
Robertson, J., 465 Russo, A., 141, 142, 143, 349 Seegmiller, B. R., 101
Robertson, R, 365, 421 Rustad, M., 381, 382, 383, 387, 390, Segal, L., 512, 515
Robinson, C. C., 95 391 Segura, D. A., 101, 185
Robinson, J., 440 Ruzek, S, 452, 457, 458 Seidler,V., 513, 515
Robinson, J. G., 263, 287 Ryan, L. T., 461 Seles, M., 461
Robinson, L. S., 142, 460 Selik, R. M., 443, 444, 446
Robson, K. M., 49 Sabo, D. E, 459 Senn, C. Y, 350
Robson, R., 192, 234, 235, 236, 390 Sachs, A., 307 Serbin, L. A., 113
Rock, M., 169 Sacks, K., 65, 68, 70, 381 Shaffer, D., 479
Rogers, L., 30 Sadker, D., 112-113, 116, 117, 118, Shakin, M., 92-93
Rogers, S. C., 64 119 Shanley, M. L., 200, 202
Rohter, L., 389 Sadker, M., 112-113, 116, 117, 118, Shapiro, L., 92, 95
Roiphe, K., 341 119 Shaywitz, S., 115
Roland, H. A., 171 Safir, M. R, 39 Shelden, R. G., 327, 328, 331
Romero, M., 256 Sampson, R. J., 315 Shelton, B. A., 209, 210, 211, 213,
Roof, J. L., 397 Sanchez, L., 209, 210 230, 284, 286
Roof, W. C., 397 Sanchez-Ayendez, M., 215 Sherman, B. L., 170, 171
Roopnarine, J. L., 95, 99, 100, 210 Sanday, R R., 344, 345 Sherman, J. A., 38, 82, 123, 125, 126
Rods, R, 260, 265, 266, 286, 287 Sanders, M., 168 Sherman, L. W., 241, 242
Root, M. R R, 478 Sandler, B. R. 128, 130, 132, 133, Shilts, L. R., 388, 389, 390
Roscoe, W., 71, 72 134, 135 Shostak, M., 68
Rosen, L. W., 478 Sandler, K., 481 Shulman, A. K., 500, 501
Rosenberg, H. G., 437, 440 Sandmair, M., 471 SichekJ., 320
Rosenberg, J., 321 Sanger, M., 490 Sidel, R., 256, 262, 263
Rosenberg, R., 297 Sapiro, V., 369, 402 Sidorowicz, L., 35
Rosenblum, C., 173, 175 Sarbin, T. R., 28 Silveira,J., 150
Rosenfeld, L. B., 116 Sarri, R. C., 313, 324, 326 Silverstein, B., 164, 476, 477-478
Rosenfeld, R. A., 266, 280, 282, 287 Saunders, D. G., 238 Simon, R. 1., 130
Rosenhan, D. L., 464 Saussy, C., 398 Simon, R. J., 308, 309, 310, 313,
Rosenthal, E., 201 Sayers, J., 54 323, 330, 332, 333, 359, 495, 502
Rosenthal, I. M., 24 Schau, C., 124 Simons, M., 303, 355, 356
Rosenwasser, S. M., 179 Schlafly, R, 498, 504 Sims, J. M., 451
Rosser, R, 125 Schmalz, J., 234, 236, 365 Sinclair, A. H., 20
Rossi, A. S., 52, 213, 490, 491 Schmitt, E., 278, 385, 387 Sirkin, M., 471
Rossi, R, 278 Schneider, J., 150, 270 Skeen,R, 248
Rossi, R E., 52 Schollaert, R T., 77 Skelly, G. U., 174
Rothblum, E. D., 466, 467 Schroeder, R, 377 Skitka, L. J., 86
Rothenberg, A. M., 13, 501 Schrof, J. M, 505, 506 Slocum, S., 60, 61
Rothman, B. K., 202, 448, 449, 450, Schur, E., 268, 316, 324, 339, 341, Small, M. A., 343
451 344, 345, 350 Smart, C., 309
Rothschild, E., 261 Schussler Eiorenza, E., 409, 412, Smith, B., 502
Rowbotham, S., 510 416 Smith, C., 248
Rowland, R., 504 Schwager, S., 107, 109 Smith, D., 183
Name Index 595
Smith, D. E., 223 Steil, J. M., 468 Tavris, C., 31, 465, 468, 473, 476,
Smith, E., 123 Stein, D. K., 353, 354 479
Smith, J., 258 Steinbacher, R., 77 Taylor, V., 496
Smith, P. M., 148, 150 Steinberg, R. J., 288, 290, 292, 299 Teachman,J. D., 77
Smith, V., 263 Steinem, G., 153, 346, 356 Teilmann, K. S., 328
Smith, W. K., 505 Steinfels, R, 411, 412 Teleki, G., 63
Smock, P. J., 219, 222, 226, 227, Steinmetz, S. K., 237, 249, 250 Teltsch, K., 218
228, 229, 277 Stern, E., 199-200 Temkin,J., 341
Smothers, R., 200 Stern, W., 199-200 Terrelonge, R, 502
Snarey,J., 212, 213, 216, 285 Sterngold, J., 389 Terry, R. M., 309
Snell, W. E.Jr., 471 Stewart, L., 117 Tetreault, P. A., 343
Snitow, A., 501, 502, 503 Stewart, M. W., 490-491 Thatcher, M., 380
Snow,J. T., 338,478 Stiehm, J. H., 383, 384 Therberge, N., 460
Snow, M., 117 Stiglitz, E. A., 471, 472 Thoits, P. A., 468
Snow, M. E., 91 Stimpson, C. R., 142 Thomas, C., 270, 380, 505
Snyder, E, 406 Stoddart, T., 86 Thomas, D., 514
Sokoloff, N. J., 260, 264, 266 Stoltenberg, J., 515 Thompson, C., 82
Sommer, B., 50 Stone, M., 398 Thompson, C. S., 136
Sommers, I., 312 Stone, V. A., 169, 170 Thompson, J. K., 478
Song, Y. 1., 227 Stoneman, E., 94 Thompson, K., 235
Sonne, J. L., 483 St. Peter, S., 97 Thompson, K M., 471
Sontag, D., 351 Strate, L., 173 Thompson, L., 205, 207, 209, 210,
Souter, D., 380 Straus, M. A., 237, 238, 241, 247, 211,213,216
Sparkman, K., 477-478 248 Thompson, S., 189
Speck, R., 28 Strauss-Noll, M., 148 Thorne, B., 3, 6, 8, 118, 215
Specter, A., 156 Striegel-Moore, R. H., 478 Tidball, M. E., 109, 139
Spector, J. D., 62 Strober, M. H., 108, 266 Tiger, L., 59
Speizer, J. J., 134 Stroper, E., 380 Tobias, S., 123
Spender, D., 8, 10, 15 Stuck, M. E, 173, 174 Tong, R., 13
Spenner, K. I., 282 Stunkard, A. J., 476 Treadwell, R, 45
Sperry, R., 42, 44 Sugawara, L., 235 Treichler, P. A., 150, 151
Spielberger, C., 435 Sullivan, Rev. L., 422 Tresemer, D. W., 123
Spohn, C., 323 Sullivan, R., 421, 422 Trocki, K., 347, 348
Sprenger, J., 401 Suter, B., 101 Truth, S., 491
Sprenkle, D. H., 230 Sutker, P. B., 473 Tuchman, G., 155, 158
Stacey, J., 6, 8, 188, 210, 214, 499 Sutlive, V. H., 69, 74, 344 Turetsky, B. A., 468
Stack, C., 185 Sweeney, J. L., 268 Turiel, E., 86
Stallings, Rev. G. A., 412 Sweet, J. E., 230 Tyack, D., 108, 109
Stanback, M. H., 152 Swift, K., 149, 150 Tyson, M., 505
Stanko, E. A., 135, 138, 337 Sydell, L. L., 195, 196, 422
Stanley, E., 8, 9 Sydney, T. M., 95 Umansky, E. M., 404, 407
Stanley, L., 99 Szasz, T., 463 Ungar, S. B., 95
Stansell, C., 255 Szinovacz, M., 210 Unger, R. K., 29
Stanton, E. C., 493 Uribe, V., 121, 122
Staples, R., 101, 147, 167 Taeuber, C. M., 185, 257, 261, 264, Ussher, J., 480
Starhawk, 400, 401, 424 272, 288
Statham, A., 134, 135 Talarico, S. M., 324, 328 Valdisera, V., 257, 261, 264, 272, 288
Staudt, K., 506 Tannen, D., 152 Van Buskirk, S. S., 482
Stearns, P. N., 217 Tanner, N., 58, 59, 60, 63, 64 van der Meer, T, 143
Steenland, S., 168, 174 Tartre, L. A., 125 Vanderstaay, S., 278, 279
Steffan, V. J., 35, 37 Taub, D. E., 459, 460 Van de Ven, N., 356
Steffensmeier, D. J., 310, 314, 323, Taub, N., 203, 204, 217, 220, 221, Vannoy-Hiller, D., 211
324, 325 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298 Van Voohries, R, 321
596 Name Index \
Van Vort, J., 197 Weissman, M. M., 467 Witelson, S. E, 45

Velasquez, L., 381 Weitz, R., 447 Withorn, A., 457, 458
Velasquez, N., 376 Weitzman, L., 92, 96, 97, 116, 220, Witkin, H. A., 29
Verbrugge, L. M., 433 221, 323 Witt, L., 370, 371, 372, 373
Vivian, J., 177, 178 Welch, S., 415, 424 Wober, M., 179
Vogel, L., 297 Wells-Petry, M., 389 Wolf, M. A., 180
Vogel, S. A., 115 Werthheimer, B. M., 255 Wolf, N. W., 480
Vollmer, R, 123 Wertz, D. C., 449, 450 Wolfe, D., 204
Voohries, B., 71 Wertz, R. W., 449, 450 Wollacott, A., 382
Vrazo,E, 49 Westley, L. A., 270 Wollstonecraft, M., 492, 507
Weston, K., 233 Wolowitz, H. M., 469
Waite, Justice, 379 Whipp, B.J., 461 Wood, K. M., 379
Waite, T. L., 192 Whipple, T. W., 156, 172, 173, 174, Woods, N. E, 51
Wald, E., 44 175, 176, 179, 180 Woody, B., 264
Waldron, 1. W., 433, 435, 438, 439, White, B., 380 Wooley, O. W., 475, 476, 477, 478
441, 442, 447, 448 Whitehead, H., 71 Wooley, S. C., 475, 476, 477, 478
Walker, A., 355 Whitehead, M. B., 199-200 Woollett, A., 91
Walker, L., 205, 207, 209, 210, 211, Whitaker, A., 479 Worden, A. R, 316, 319, 320
213, 216 Widom, C. S., 50 Wright, R C., 62, 63, 64
Walker, L. E., 239, 240 Wikan, U., 72 Wroblewski, R., 179
Wall, S. M., 119 Wilbanks, W., 315 Wylie, A., 59, 60, 61
Wallace, R. A., 413 Wilkerson, I., 139, 384
Wallis, C., 505 Wilkie, J. R., 209, 210 Yeakel, L., 156
Walsh, B. T., 479 Willard, E, 491 Yee, S.J., 495
Walsh, C., 30, 45 Willentz,J. A., 383 Yen, M., 50
Walters, B., 169 Williams, B., 231, 411 Y116, K., 342
Ward, S. A., 461 Williams, C. L., 269, 270 Yoshikawa, S., 480
Ware, M. C., 173, 174 Williams, C. W., 190, 191
Ware, N. C., 151 Williams, J. A., Jr., 97 Zavella, R, 256, 264
Warr, M., 338 Williams, J. E., 339 Zeigler, L. H., 363
Warren, M.A., 77 Williams, L., 481 Zeitz, D., 314
Washburn, L. L., 21 Williams, L. A., 439, 440 Zellman, G., 345
Waters, E., 301 Williams, M., 167 Zicklin, G., 43, 44
Watt, S., 141 Williams, W. L., 71, 72 Zihlman, A., 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63,
Weathers, B., 471 Williamson, N. E., 77 64
Weaver, M. J., 413 Wilsnack, S. C., 471 Zimmer, L. E., 268, 321
Webber, J., 403, 404, 405 Wilson, E., 150 ' Zuckerman, M., 232
Weeks, S. I., 334 Wilson, J. H., , 307 Zuckoff, A. C., 426
Weidman, J. L., 424 Wilson, M. N., 100, 210 Zupan, L. L., 320
Weiner, T., 135, 138, 385 Wilson, W., 496 Zuravin, S. J., 248
Weisner, T. S., 98, 213 Wines, M., 195
Weissbrod, C., 123 Wise, E., 464
6ubject Index
Abolitionists, 491, 492-493 sports-related products, 462 nineteenth century medical

Abortion, medical, 193-198 in women’s magazines, 160-161 establishment and, 451-452
{see also Contraception and Affirmative Action, 294, 295, 504 obesity, 475-476
abortion) corrections system employment, occupational injuries, 440
Catholic Church teachings, 411 320 reproductive freedom, 197
fundamentalist Christians and, political party policies, 367-368 Tuskegee Study, 452n.
421, 422 Supreme Court rulings, 379, 380 political participation, 363
gender selection, 78-79 African American churches, enfranchisement of men, 494
political attitudes, 363 422-423 television images, 167, 169, 170,
sterilization abuse, 452 African Americans {see also Race 171
Supreme Court rulings, 379, 380 and ethnicity) women’s movement, 490-491,
Abortion, spontaneous, 432 economic issues 492, 495, 501-502
Abstinence, sexual, 160, 188, 446, child poverty, 22 Age (see also Adolescents; Elderly)
195 female-headed households, body image, 481
Abuse {see also Physical abuse; net worth, 222 crime/justice issues
Violence, domestic) education criminal victimization statistics,
of children {see Child abuse) Afrocentric academies or ele¬ 335
medical, 334, 451, 452, 463 mentary schools, 139 sentencing, 326—327
Accidental death, 435, 441-442 college and university facul¬ economic issues
Accordion households, 188 ties, 134 employment, 263-264
Achievement tests, 119 curriculum materials, 124 poverty, 275
Acquaintance rape, 341-342 elementary school, 116 health issues
Actometers, 34 post-secondary level, 111-112, aging research, 453
Adolescents 127 eating disorders, 479
advertising strategies for, 175 employment, nineteenth cen¬ morbidity, 447-448
crime/justice issues tury, 255-256 mortality rates, 437
crime statistics, 308 family structure pregnancy, IVF, 198
status offenses, 327-328 marriage, 225 media and
drug use, 473 multiple mothers, 83 magazine articles, 160
pregnancy, 189, 190-191, 195, politics of housework, 210-211 television news anchors,
196 single-parent families, 216, 222 168-169
secondary education, 119-126 health issues television programming, 164
single-parent families, 216 athletics and sport, 461-462 and political participation
Adoption, 236 cancer, 438-439 attitudes, 363, 364
Adrenogenital syndrome (AGS), cardiovascular disease, voting behavior, 364
23-24, 30 436-437, 438 and relationships
Advertising, 172-175 cosmetic surgery, 481 domestic partnerships, 229-230
in men’s magazines, 162 homicide rates, 442 politics of housework, 210
and pornography, 350 life expectancy, 431-432, 433 sexual activity, 188
smoking, 438-439 mortality by sex and race, 436 and religiosity, 397
597
598 Subject Index. V
Ageism, 12 about homosexual rights, 236 beauty norms, 480—482

Aggression versus passivity, 33-38 political, 361-368 eating disorders and, 475-479
Agoraphobia, 469-470 about sexuality female circumcision and, 355-356
AIDS, 245, 443-447, 505, 517 homosexual rights, 236 foot binding and, 350, 352-353
Catholic Church on safe sex cam¬ male versus female, 189 television images, 164, 165
paigns, 412 Attorneys, female, 262, 316, 321- Boundary heightening, 268
mortality rates by sex and race, 322 Brain, 42-46
436 hemispheric lateralization, 45-46
as political issue, election of Beauty norms, 480-482 visual-spatial ability, 39-42
1992, 365 Behavioral problems versus learn¬ Bulimia, 477-478
prevention of, 445-446 ing disabilities, 114
rape and, 338n. Behaviorism, 83-85 Cancer, 436
television programming, 168 Bern model, 87-90 Cardiology, 452-453
AIDS-related complex (ARC), 444 Berdache, 71-72 Cardiovascular disease, 435-438
Aid to Families with Dependent Best interests of the child standard, Caregiving, 300
Children, 190 218 changing trends, 258
Alcohol, 441, 470-473 (ree also Sub¬ Bias double work load, 259
stance abuse) androcentrism, 59, 73, 88 elder abuse, 249-250
Alimony, 219 feminist versus traditional sociol¬ in marriage, 212-216
5-Alpha-reductase deficiency, 24-25 ogy, 10-11 Castration, female, 463
Alyha, 71 gynecentrism, 61, 73-74 Catholic Church, 194-195, 395,
Androcentrism, 59, 73, 88 injudicial decision making, 324 402, 409-410, 415
Androgen-insensitive syndrome, 24- visual-spatial abilities, 40 Central Intelligence Agency, 385n.
25 Bias, observer, 82 Cerebrovascular disease, 435-438
Androgens, 20 {see also Testoster¬ Bias crimes, 336-337 Cesarean deliveries, 450-451
one) Binge-purge cycle, 477-478 Child abuse, 247-249
Anorexia, 478-479 Biological essentialism, 88 joint custody arrangements and,
Anthropology Biological factors 217
aboriginal religions, 401 alcohol metabolism, 472-473 runaway juveniles, status of¬
feminist, 59-62 brain development, 42-46 fenses, 327-328
gynecentrism, 61-62 culture-biology interactions, 53- Childbirth {see Pregnancy and
rape-free societies, 344 54 childbirth)
And-Vietnam War movement, 500 fetal development Child care, 300
Anxiety hysteria, 469-470 normal, 19-21, 22 cross-cultural perspectives, 70, 83
Archeological record, 57-62 prenatal mishaps, 21, 23-31 and employment, 281-282
Arrest rates, sex-specific, 310, 311 postpartum depression, 48-49 European policies, 509
Artificial insemination, 411 premenstrual syndrome, 46-47, as political issue, 362, 379n.
Asian Americans {see also Race and 49-53 in Russia, 302
ethnicity) sex differences, 31-42 in Third World, 434
college and university faculties, aggression versus passivity, 33- wage gap and, 283-286
134 38 during World War II, 258
education, post-secondary, 127 independence versus depend¬ Child custody
television images, 167, 169, 170 ence, 32-33 homosexual couples, 236
Assembly-line hysteria, 469 verbal versus visual-spatial abil¬ incarcerated mothers, 332
Attitudes ity, 38-42 in Islam, 417
about abortion, 195 sexual differentiation, biological, men’s rights groups and, 513
about crime, 333-334 19-31 single-parent families, 217-218
about female corrections offi¬ Bipedalism, 58, 60 surrogacy conflicts, 199-200
cers, 321 Blacks (see African Americans; Race Children {see also Early childhood
about female-headed house¬ and ethnicity) socialization)
holds, 223 Bobbit trial, 237 cross-cultural perspectives, 70, 83
about female police officers, 320 Body image and division of household labor,
about feminism, 504-505 advertising and, 160-161 211-212
Subject Index 599
Children (continued) date rape, 341 emancipation theory of female

education {see Education) feminist organizations, 505 crime, 308-309
health issues Commonwealth of Independent substance abuse, 312-313, 474
pediatric AIDS, 446 States, 301-303 sentencing, 322-329
uninsured and underinsured, Communication styles, 152-154 and spduse abuse, 242-243
430 Community victimization, 333-356
homelessness, 278 multiple mothering figures, 83 hate crimes, 336-337
and housework, 211 primate studies, 63 institutionalized violence
incarcerated mothers, 332-333 Comparable worth, 289, 298-299 against women, 350-356
political views of, 369 Competitiveness, 6 pornography, 345-350
television viewing, 163 Congress, election to, 375-377 rape, 338-345
Child support, 221 Conservatism, political, 508 statistics, 333-335
Chimpanzee studies, 62-64 anti-abortion activism, 195-196, Criminal victimization
China 197 (see Violence, criminal
foot binding in, 350, 352-353 antifeminist policies, 504 victimization)
work in, 300 and E.R.A., 498 Cross-addictions, 475
Chivalry hypothesis, 315 evangelical Christians, 420-422 Cross-cultural research
Chorionic villus sampling (CVS), 78 and gay rights, 517 verbal versus visual-spatial ability,
Christianity, 408-416, 420-422 Constitutional amendments 38-39
Chromosomes, 19-31, 432 Equal Rights, 497-498 Cross-cultural studies, 57-74
Chronic dieting, 477 Fifteenth, 493 anthropological studies, 64—74
Circumcision, female, 354—356 Nineteenth, 496 contemporary foraging socie¬
Cirrhosis, 435, 441 Contraception, 191, 193-198 ties, 65-71
Civil rights Catholic Church teachings, 411 multiple genders, 71-73
legislation. Civil Rights Act of early feminists, 490 archeological record, 57-62
1964, 293-294, 295, 296, as legal issue, 193-194 institutionalized violence against
298, 299 religion and, 193-194 women, 350-356
Supreme Court rulings, 380 and singlehood, 224 female circumcision, 354—356
women’s movement and, 500 Third World women, 510-511 foot binding, 350, 352-356
Classicism, 12 Contrapower sexual harassment, as human rights violations,
Clergy 138 351-352
Christian Convergence hypothesis, 471 suttee, 353-354
African American churches, Conversion reaction, 468-469 multiple mothering figures, 83
423 Cooperative learning, 118-119 primate studies, 62-64
Anglican, 412n. Coronary Prone Behavior Patterns, rape-free societies, 344
Catholic, 411, 412-413 435-436 verbal versus visual-spatial ability,
Christian, 409 Corporate crime, 314, 334 38-39
by denomination, 414 Corpus callosum, 45 Cross-dressing, berdaches, 71
Episcopal, 412, 413 Corrections system Cult of femininity, 159
Jewish, 407-408 employment in, 316, 318 Cult of masculinity {see Masculinity
Clothes sentencing practices, 322-329 stereotypes)
children’s, 92-93 status offenders in, 327-328 Culture {see also Cross-cultural
Islamic tradition, 418, 419 Cosmetic surgery, 480-481 Studies; Early-childhood
in men’s magazines, 162 Counterfeiting, 310, 311, 312 socialization)
news reporting, 156 sentencing practices, 322-329 and body weight, 476
nineteenth century, 449 Covert advertising, 161 biology interactions with, 53-54
women’s magazines and, 159 Crack cocaine, 473 and domestic violence, 241
Cognitive-developmental theory, Crime (see Criminal justice system) enculturated lens theory of gen¬
85-87, 102 Criminal justice system der formation, 87
Cohabitation, 229-231 administration, staff composi¬ multiple mothering figures, 83
Colleges and graduate schools, 110- tion, 316-322 Curricula, 106, 117
111, 127-142 corrections system, 329-333 Curriculum materials
black women in, 111-112 offenders, 308-315 elementary schools, 116-117
600 Subject Index \
Curriculum materials (continued) Dual labor market, 261-263 new reproductive technologies,
fundamentalist Christians and, Dyadic attachment, 231-232 201-202
421 political campaign financing,
secondary-school, 124 Early-childhood socialization, 372-373
Curriculum reform, 117 77-103 as political issue, 362
Curriculum revision, 141-142 development, 90-102 political participation, 366
Custody (iee Child custody) early peer group socialization, single-parent families, 219-221
99-100 surrogacy, 200
Daily hormonal cycle, 52 gender-specific nature of Education, 370 (see also Schools)
Date rape, 341-342 children’s environment, adolescent pregnancy and, 191
Dependence versus independence, 92-99 athletic participation, 459-460
32-33 race and social class, 100-102 and employment
Depression, 214-215, 466-468, 482 sex selection, 78-79 occupational sex segregation,
Development (see also Biological theoretical perspectives, 80-90 264
factors; Early-childhood cognitive-developmental wage gap, 286, 287-288
socialization) theory, 85-87 fundamentalist Christians and,
Diabetes mellitus, 435, 441 enculturated lens theory of 421
Dieting, chronic, 477 gender formation, 87-90 medical school, 454
Dihydrotestosterone (DHT), identification theory, 80-83 as political issue, 362
20-21, 24 social learning theory, 83-85 prison programs, 330-331
Disahilides, 141, 225 Earnings gap television and, 179
Disparate treatment, 296 child care, 283-286 and voting behavior, 364
Dissimilarity (segregation) index, comparable worth, 289 Education Amendments Act of
259-260 comparison of median incomes, 1972, 112, 128
Division of labor by sex, 3 274 Education gap, 110
anthropological perspectives, homelessness, 278-280 Education levels
64-71 human capital theory, 281-282, and father participation in child
archaeological perspectives, 286-289 care, 214
58-59, 60 legislation, 298-299 of female offenders, 314
child care, 212-216 male- versus female-dominated and political participation
housework, 206-212 occupations, 281 and attitudes, 363, 364
Divorce, 219, 507-508 in nineteenth century, 255 office holders, 370
in Islam, 417 poverty and welfare policy, and voting behavior, 364
in Judaism, 405 273-280 Elderly, 300
men’s rights groups and, 513 race and, 272-273 abuse of, 249-250
no-fault divorce laws, 219-221 remediation approaches, 292-293 caregiving to, 215
prediction of well being after, Eating disorders, 475-479 health issues, 447-448
226-227 anorexia, 478-479 poverty, 275-277
and single-parent families, bulimia, 477-478 Elementary schools, 107-108
217-218 obesity, 475-476 (see also Early childhood
Domestic partnerships, 187, Ecofeminism, 425-426 socialization)
223-236 Economic factors (see Social class) Emancipation theory of female
heterosexual, 229-231 Economic issues (see also Earnings crime, 308-309
homosexual, 192, 231-236 gap; Employment; Income Embezzlement (see Occupational
Dominance, 37, 41 and wages; Poverty) crime)
defined, 37 abortion funding, 197 Eminence, 37, 41
primate studies, 63 battered women, 239 Employment, 186
Double standard, sexual, 189 birth control as, 194 assembly-line hysteria, 469
Double work load, 209, 211, 259 magazine articles, 160 careers in justice system and law
Dowry abuse, 354n. and marriage enforcement, 316-322
Drugs, illegal (see Substance abuse) adjustment to divorce, 226-227 domestic, 205, 211
Drugs, prescription (see Medica¬ delaying of, 224 earnings gap, 271-289
tions) marriage contract, 203, 204 child care, 283-286
Subject Index 601
Employment (continued) Establishment sex segregation, single and domestic partner¬

human capital theory, 280-289 266-267 ships, 233-236
poverty and welfare policy, Estrogen, 21, 35 single-parent families, 216-223
273-280 Ethnicity (see Race and ethnicity) sexuality, 188-202
European policies, 509 Ethnocentrism, defined, 59 adolescent pregnancy, 190-191
family leave, 214, 283, 284, 509 Europe contraception and abortion,
health insurance benefits, 430 child care in, 285-286 193-198
historical perspective, 254-259 domestic partnerships in, 229, new reproductive technolo¬
homosexual rights, 235, 236 230 gies, 198-202
ideology and role of law, international women’s move¬ reproductive freedom, 192-202
289-300 ment, 506-509 sociology and family, 183-188
gender stereotypes, 289-293 life expectancy in selected coun¬ violence, 237-250
legislation, 293-200 tries, 432 Family leave, 214, 283, 284, 509
of married mothers, 187 parental leave policy, 283, 509 Family of affinity, 235
and marital power, 204-205 political officeholding by Fear of success theory, 122-123
nuclear family model, 186-187 women, 368 Federal government {see also Legis¬
occupational crimes, 309, 310, women in military, 381 lation; Public policy)
311, 312, 313-314 women in public office, 368 Congress, 375-377
as political issue, 362, 379n. Evangelical Christians, 420-422, 517 political roles, 375-381
and post-divorce adjustment, 226 Evolution of gender roles presidential appointments,
in post-socialist societies, 300-303 archaeological perspectives, ^77-379
prison vocational training pro¬ 57-62 Supreme Court, 379-380
grams, 330-331 primate studies, 62-64 Female castration, 463
sex segregation in workplace, Executive Order 11246 (see Affirm¬ Female circumcision, 354-356
259-271 ative Action) Female-headed households
consequences of, 266-271 Expressive role, 184 economic differences, race and,
intervening variables, 263-264 Extended family 222-223
minorities, 264—265 caregiving, 215 poverty, 273-280
shifts in occupations, 265-266 structural functionalist model, Femininity, 159, 448-449 {see also
structural functionalist perspec¬ 185 Gender stereotypes)
tive, 5 Extended kin networks, 83, 101, Feminism
television images, 165, 166 185, 188 attitudes of female offenders, 313
Third World women in global as¬ and employment patterns,
sembly line, 510 Faculty, college and university em¬ 258-259
tokenism, 268—269 ployment statistics, 262 equality versus difference debate,
unpaid labor in home {see House¬ Familial-based justice, 324 297n., 502-503
work and homemaking) Family (see also Child care) gay and lesbian rights, 515-518
work and home, 208-209, 303— abortion consent requirements, historical perspective
304 195,196 abolitionists, 492-493
workplace exposures, 439—441 cross-cultural perspectives, 83 early feminists, 490-491
Employment crimes, 309, 310, 311, double work load, 259 Equal Rights Amendment,
312, 313-314 imprisoned women, 331, 332-333 497-498
Employment status mommy track, 285 international, 506-512
and criminal Justice system, multiple mothering figures, 83, second wave (1960s), 499-503
327-328 101, 185, 188 suffrage campaign, 493-496
and political attitudes, 363 socialization patterns and career third wave, 503-506
Enculturated lens theory of gender decisions, 131 lesbian/straight split in, 518
formation, 87-90, 102 Family and intimate relationships, liberal, 13, 508
Equality versus difference debate, 183-251 Marxist, 13-14
502-503 magazine articles, 160 men and liberation, 512-515
Equal Rights Amendment, 421, power, 202-236 and military, 390-391
497-498, 513 heterosexual marriages, minority women and, 501-502
Erotica, 346 203-216 radical, 14
602 Subject Index
Feminism (continued) Gender polarization, 87-90 cause of death by sex and race,
social change, 488-489 Gender roles, 5, 159 436
socialist, 14 evolution of, 57-64 corporate crimes, 334
television programming ages, kinkeeping, 214-215 health care systems, 448-458
164-166 risk rule, 384—386 feminist, 457-458
television portrayal of, 166 socialization and {see Early child¬ traditional, 454-457
Feminist health care, 457-458 hood socialization; Media; heart disease and stroke, 435-438
Feminist sociology of gender, 8-15 Schools) homelessness and, 279-280
Feminist spirituality, 423-427 sociological theories in vitro fertilization, 201-202
Feminist therapy, mental health, {see Sociology) life expectancy and mortality
483-484 workplace, 255, 289-293 rates, 431—435
Feminization of poverty, 221, 222, Gender stereotypes, 5, 159 {see also mental health, 462-484 {see also
434 {see also Poverty) Masculinity stereotypes) Mental health and illness)
Fetal development, 19-21, 22 defined,32 morbidity rates, 447-448
Fetal monitoring, 451 dependence versus inde¬ occupational exposures, 439-440
Field independence versus depend¬ pendence, 32-33 parental leave policies, 214, 283,
ence, 40 nonfunctional/sick role and, 284, 509
Fitness, 458-462 448-449 as political issue, 362, 365
Flextime/flexplace policies, passivity versus aggression, 33-38 in prisons, 331-332
284-285 verbal versus visual-spatial ability, sport and fitness, 458-462
Foot binding, 350, 352-353 38-42 in Third World, 434—435
Foraging societies, 65-71 Genetic disorders, 432 welfare benefits, 274
Foreign policy, 370 Genital tubercule, 20-21 women’s magazines and, 160
Forgery, 310, 311, 312 Gestational mother, 199-200 Heart disease, 435-438
Formal curriculum, 106 Gladiator activities, 365-366 Hemispheric asymmetry, 45-46
Fraud (ree Occupational crime) Glass ceiling, 269 Heterosexism, 12
Freudian theory, 80-82 Glass Ceiling Commission, 296n. Heterosexual domestic partner¬
Functionalist perspective, 4-7, Glass escalator, 269 ships, 229-231
183-186 Goddesses, 398-401 partner abuse, 237-243
Functional model of health, Government (êeEederal govern¬ Hidden curriculum, 106, 116
448-449 ment; Legislation; Political High school, 119-126
roles; Public policy) feminist organizations, 505
Gay men {see also Lesbians and gay Graduate schools (5ee Colleges and sexual harassment in, 136n.
men) graduate schools) Hispanic Americans {see also Race
anorexia, 478 Grass-roots feminism, 501 and ethnicity)
health issues (ieeAlDS) Great Depression, 256-25i7 child poverty, 220
magazine features, 162 Group consciousness, 12 education
rape of, 339, 352 Guevedoces, 25 college and university facul¬
Gay rights, fundamentalist Chris¬ Guns, 442 ties, 134
tians and,421 Gynecentrism, 61, 73-74 post-secondary, 127
Gender, and sex, 2 family structure, multiple
Gender attribution, 60-61 Hate crimes, 336-337 mothers, 83
Gendercide, 78 against homosexuals, 517 single-parent families, 216
Gender crossing, 71-73 in military, 386 television images, 167, 169, 170
Gender equity Health Histrionic personality, 468-469
legislation. Gender Equity in Edu¬ magazine articles, 160 Homelessness, 278-280, 362, 370
cation Act, 128 sexual harassment and, 270-271 Homemaking (ieg Housework and
Supreme Court rulings, 380 Health and health care, 430-485 homemaking)
Gender Equity in Education Act, {see also Reproductive Homicide, 442
128 freedom) anti-abortion activism and,
Gender gap, in political life, abortion, 193 195-196, 197
360-368 AIDS,443-447 child abuse, 247-248
Genderlects, 152 cancer, 438-439 domestic violence
Subject Index 603
Homicide, (continued) Infertility, new reproductive tech- Learned helplessness hypothesis,

dowry abuse, 354n. ' nologies, 198-202 467
spouse abuse, 238 Infibulation, 354-355 Learning disabilities, special educa¬
hate crimes, 336-337 Influenza, 435, 441 tion, 114—115
institutionalized, suttee, 353 Informal social networks, work¬ Leftist feminism, 13-14, 500-501,
mortality rates by sex and race, place, 268 513
436 Informed consent, 452 Legal issues (see also Criminal jus-
on-the-job deaths, 334, 337 Instrumental family role, 184 dee system)
suttee, 353-354 International women’s movements, abortion, 193, 194, 196
workplace, 441 506-512 child custody, 217-218
Homophobia, 121, 245-246 Great Britain and Western contraception as, 193-194
Homosexuality, 189, 191-192 (see Europe (w 506-509) domestic partnerships
also Gay men; Lesbians and Third World, 509-512 heterosexual, 230-231
gay men; Sexual orientation) Intimate relationships (see Eamily homosexual, 235-236
Christian teachings, 410-411 and intimate relationships) homosexual rights, 233-234
demedicalization of, 465 Invisible ceiling, 123 marriage contract, 203-204
fundamentalist Christians and, In vitro (test tube) fertilization, pornography, 348-350
421, 422 198, 411 spouse abuse, 241-243
Hormones Biological factors) Islam, 416-420, 427 surrogacy, 199-200
Housework and homemaking Israel, 427 Third World women’s rights, 510
cult of domesticity, 496 Legal profession, 262, 316, 321-322
double work load, 259 Jewish women, 141 (see a&ojudaism) Legislation
hazardous chemicals, 440 Joint custody awards, 217-218 antipornography, 348
human capital theory, 288 Journalism, 270 (see also Media) criminal sentencing reforms, 328
politics of, 206-212 Judaism, 395, 402, 403-408, 424 Education Amendments Act of
structural functionalist model, 186 Jury trial penalty, 323n. 1972, 112, 128, 460
television images, 166 Justice system (see also Criminal jus¬ Equal Pay Act of 1963, 298-299,
Human capital theory, 281-282, tice system; Litigation; Su¬ 499
286-289 preme Court decisions) Eamily Support Act, 221
Human rights violations, victimiza¬ Juvenile in need of supervision, fertility clinics, 201
tion as, 351-352 327-328 no-fault divorce, 219
Hunting-gathering society, 65-71 parental leave, 283
H-Y antigen, 20 Kinkeeping role, 214-215 Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
Hypothalamus, 45 Kin and friendship networks, 83, 1981, 439
101, 185, 188 reproductive rights, 196
Identification theory, 80-83, 102 Klinefelter’s syndrome, 26 Violence Against Women Act,
Ideology Koran, 416, 419 243, 337
religions, traditional, 402-420 !Kung people, 68-69 Voting Rights Act, 372n.
work roles, 255, 289-293 women in military, 383
Incest, 248 Labor unions, 255, 286 workplace equity, 293-300
Income and wages (see also Earn¬ Language, 10, 147-154 (see also Lesbians
ings gap) Media, language and) pregnancy, artificial insemina¬
and depression, 468 Judeo-Christian, 424 tion, 199
and housework, 210-211 linguistic sexism, 150-152 radical feminism, 501, 503, 508
and marital power, 204—205 mental health characteristics, single-parent families, 216
types of families, 219 464-465 Lesbians and gay men, 189,
Incumbents, 371-372 religious concepts, 397-398 191-192, 515-518
Independence versus dependence, secondary school curriculum ma¬ domestic partnerships, 231-236
32-33 terial, 124 partner abuse, 243-247
Indifferent gonad, 20 semantic derogation, 148-150 education
Industry sex segregation, 266-267 Language abilities (iee Verbal ability) colleges and universities,
Infant mortality, 450 Law enforcement, employment in, 142-143
Infants, drug-addicted, 474 316, 317 curriculum materials, 117
604 Subject Index
weight, 477 Marxist feminists, 13-14, 503, 508

Lesbians (continued)
infertility, 199 Masculinity stereotypes, 442 {see
high school experience,
liberation movements, 512-515 also Gender stereotypes)
121-122
meiosis, 26-27 alcohol consumption and, 471
employment
in journalism, 157, 158 sexuality {see also Family and media coverage of sport, 460-461
in law enforcement, 319n. intimate relationships; military and, 386
in military, 388-390 Sexuality) sports ethics, 462
workplace discrimination, 269 prostitutes, 324 Maternal and infant mortality
hate crimes, 336 rape of, 339 rates, 450
health issues sexual development, 20-21 Mathematics (iee Science, engineer¬
alcohol use, 471-472 sexual harassment of, 137 ing, and mathematics)
mental health services, 482 sexual orientation {see Gay Mbuti society, 69
political activity men; Lesbians and gay men) Media, 147-180, 477
ActUp, 505 traditional sociological studies, 9 beauty norms, 480
coalitions, 373 Man the Hunter model, 58-59, 63, crime issues, 308-309, 310
election of 1992, 365 69, 73 drugs and,312-313
organizations, 363, 365 Marital power, 202-236 emancipation theory of female
state and local, 374-375 income and, 204-205 crime, 308-309
religion and spirituality and psychological well-being, 468 and female athletics, 460-461
clergy, Christian, 411 Marital rape, 342-343, 347 and feminism, 503-504
feminist spirituality and, 426 Marital status fundamentalist Christians and,
Judaism, 407, 408 and criminal sentencing, 421
television images, 167-168, 172 327-328 language, 147-154
Lesbian separatists, 503 and employment, 282 lifestyle and health issues,
Lhamana, 71 and life expectancy, 433, 435 438-439
Liberal feminism, 13, 508 and mental health issues newspapers and magazines,
Life expectancy, 431-435 agoraphobia, 470 155-163
Linguistic sexism, 150-152 depression, 466-467 and political candidates, 371
Literature, children’s, 97-98 and psychological well-being, 468 pornography, 349-350
Litigation and sentencing in criminal sports-related product advertise¬
athletic participation, 459 courts, 324 ments, 462
comparable worth, 299 Marriage, 203-216 television, 163-176
employment discrimination, alternatives to, 216-217 advertisement, 172-^175
294-297 caregiving, 212-216 effects, 176-179
reverse discrimination suits, 295 Catholic Church teachings, 411 shaping of gender, 179-180
Liver disease, 435, 441 divorce (ice Divorce) > violence, 170-171, 177-178
domestic partnerships and, 230 Medicaid, 197, 474
Machihembra, 25 dowry abuse, 354n. Medication (s)
Magazines, 155-163, 477 female circumcision and, 356 addiction to prescription drugs,
men’s, 161-163 foot binding and, 352 475
sports, 461 housework, politics of, 206-212 during pregnancy, 450
women’s, 158-161 Islamic tradition, 417 of prisoners, 331-332
Male-headed single-parent families, in Judaism, 404—405 RU 486, 196
218-219 mail-order bride business, 510 Meiosis, 25, 27
Male power, 12 {see also Power) marital power, 202-236 Menendez trial, 248
Males {see also Masculinity stereo¬ decision making in, 204-206 Menopause, 451, 463
types) delegating authority in, Men’s liberation, 512-515
attitudes about rape, 344 205-206 Menstruation
cosmetic surgery, 481-482 marital rape, 342-343, 347 medicalization of, 449
health care issues {see also AIDS) marriage contract, 203-204 niddah,405
characteristics of mental remarriage after divorce, and personality disorders, 463
health, 464—465 227-228 premenstrual syndrome, 46-47,
Tuskegee Study, 452n. Marriage, homosexual, 234—235 49-53
Subject Index 605
Mental health and illness, 462-484 berdaches, 71-72 of prisoners, 331

addictions and substance abuse, education Physical disabilities, television im¬
470-475 college and university facul¬ ages, 167
agoraphobia, 469-470 ties, 134 Physician-patient relationship, 455,
beauty norms, 480-482 post-secondary, 127 457
depression, 466-468 Nature-environment interactions Physicians
eating disorders, 475-479 {see Biological factors) anti-abortion activism and,
feminist therapy, 483-484 New reproductive technologies, 195-196, 197
histrionic personality, 468-469 198-202, 411-412 and childbirth, 449-451
incarcerated mothers, 333 Newspapers, 155-163 male-female ratio, 454-457
ovariectomy, "therapeutic," 463 News programs, 168-170 medical school training, 454
rapists, 343-344 No-fault divorce laws, 219 sexual harassment by patients, 270
service delivery, 479, 482-483 Nondisjunction, chromosomal, 26, Piaget model, 85-87
Mental rotation tasks, 41 27 Play, 93-97
Mentors, 130, 133-134 Nonsexist counseling, 483-484 Plea bargaining/negotiation,
Mexican Americans (ree Hispanic Normal schools, 108 322-323
Americans; Race and Norplant, 191 Pneumonia, 435, 441
ethnicity) Nuclear family, 184—186 Polarization, gender, 87, 88
Micro-inequities, 128, 130 Nutrition Political issues
Midwives, 193, 449 and obesity, 476 abortion as, 193
Military, 381-391 in Third World, 434 eating disorders as, 479
anti-Vietnam War movement, 500 mental health/illness as, 463
combat role, risk rule, 384—386 Obesity, 475-476 pornography, 348-350
feminist values and, 390-391 Observer bias, 82 religion and, 427
gays and lesbians in, 388-390, 517 Occupational crime, 309, 311, 312 fundamentalist Christians and,
history, 381-383 Occupational shifts, 265-267 420-422
legislation, 383 Occupational stereotyping in ads, religious beliefs and, 397
military academies, 383-384 173 reproductive freedom, 195-196
political attitudes, 362-363 Offenders, 308-315 Political roles, 359-391
sexual harassment in, 387 Our Bodies, Our Selves, 457 gender gap, 360-368
Supreme Court rulings, 383-384 Ovariectomy, 463 military service, 381-391
U. S. government spending on, Ovaries, 21 public office, 368-381 {see also
509 Public office)
Military colleges, 140n. Palimony, 230 federal government, 375-381
Minorities {see also Race and Paradigm, 4 state and local government,
ethnicity) Paradigm revolution, 7-8 373-375
Modeling, 84—85 {see also Gender Parental leave, 214, 283, 284, 509 Political sociology, feminist sociol¬
roles) Parenting {see also Child Care) ogy and, 9n.
curriculum materials and, 124 caregiving, 212-216 Politics, sexual, 499
mentors, 133-134 new reproductive technology Politics of housework, 206-212
television and, 177, 178 and, 199-201 Politics of victimization, 504-505
Mommy track, 285 single parenthood, 216-217 Population, 194
Mortality rates, 435, 350 Passivity versus aggression, 33-38 Pornography, 345-350
Mullerian inhibiting substance Patient role, 448 Postpartum depression syndrome,
(MIS), 20 Patriarchy, defined, 3 48-49
Multiple-birth babies, 201-202 Peer culture Post-socialist societies, work in,
Music video, 170-172 and career decisions, 131 300-303
and drug use, 473 Poverty {see also Earnings gap; In¬
National health plan, 198 Penis envy, 81, 82-83 come and wages)
National organizations, 494, 495, Physical abuse {see also Violence, abortion funding, 197
499, 505 domestic) and adolescent pregnancy, 191
Native Americans {see also Race and of children (tee Child abuse) children, by family type and race,
ethnicity) and depression, 467 220
606 Subject Index \
and military service, 384 Public/private split, 185-186

Poverty (continued)
women’s movement issues, Public television, 168
and chromosomal abnormalities,
28 510-511
crime/justice issues, plea bargain¬ Premarital sex, 188 Quakers, 402
Premenstrual syndrome, 46-47, Qur’an, 416, 419
ing, 323
earnings gap, 273-280 49-53
event-driven, 222 Prescription drugs (s«e Medications) Race and ethnicity (see a/so African
female-headed households, Prescriptions, gender, 179 Americans, Asian Ameri¬
222-223 Presidential appointments, 377-379 cans, Hispanic Americans,
feminization of, 221, 222 Primate studies, 62-67 Native Americans)
health issues Prison system Corrections crime/justice issues
depression, 468 system) arrest rates, 315
morbidity, 447-448 Privacy issues female offenders, 314
nineteenth century medical abortion as, 193 plea bargaining, 323
establishment and, 451-452 and spouse abuse, 241 rape cases, 343
obesity, 475-476 Progesterone, 35, 52-53 sentencing practices, 323, 325,
violence, 442-443 Promiscuity, 232 326, 329
new poor, 221-222 Prostitution criminal victimization, 333-334
as political issue, 362 criminal justice system and, 311, hate crimes, 336, 337
widowhood and, 228-229 324n., 325, 340 rape cases, 343
Power drug abuse and, 313 statistics, 335
in hunting and gathering socie¬ male, 324 early-childhood gender socializa¬
ties, 67-68 Third World, 510 tion, 100-102
male (white, heterosexual), 12 Pseudohermaphroditism, 29-30 economic issues (see Earnings gap;
structural functionalist analysis, 7 Psychoanalytic theory, 80-83 Income and wages; Poverty))
Power, marital (see Marriage, Psychosomatic illness, 462-463 education
heterosexual) Puberty, 25 children’s literature, 97
Pregnancy and childbirth (see also Public office (see also Political roles) in colleges and universities, 141
Reproduction) federal, 375-381 curriculum materials, 116-117,
adolescent, 189, 190-191 fundraising, 372-373 141, 124
cross-cultural studies, 72-73 incumbents, 371-372 special education, 115
employment issues media and, 371 university faculties, 133-134
family leave, 214, 283, 284, 509 qualifications, 370-371 employment
Pregnancy Discrimination Act state and local, 373-375 earnings gap, 272-273, 274
of 1981,440 Public opinion (see Attitudes) elderly poor, 275-277
statistical discrimination, 291 Public policy (see also Criminal jus¬ in health care system, 455,
women in military, 383 tice system; Legisladon) 456
workplace exposures to hazard¬ AIDS, 446-447 in law enforcement, 319
ous materials, 439-441 antifeminist, 504 military personnel by, 385
equality versus difference debate, child care, 284, 285-286 nineteenth century, 255-256
297n. family size in China, 194 occupational sex segregation,
fetal development health research, 453-454 264-265
of brain, 42-46 human rights violations, 352 stereotypes and, 290, 321-322
of gonads, 19-31 parental leave and child care, susceptibility to unemploy¬
health issues 283-284 ment, 267-268
cesarean deliveries, 450-451 political attitudes, 362-365 wage gap, 287-288
medical intervention in, pornography, 345-346 family issues
449-451 war-on-drugs, 313 adjustment to divorce, 227
mortality rates, 450 welfare, 273-280 adolescent pregnancy, 190
postpartum depression, 48-49 women’s movement and child poverty, 220
sports parUcipation and, 461 early feminists and, 490-496 divorce settlements, 221
substance abuse, 461, 474 in Europe, 509 female-headed households,
in Third World, 434 workplace equity, 293-200 222-223
Subject Index 607
Race and ethnicity (continued) television images, 166, 167, 169, new reproductive technologies,
kin and friendship networks, 170, 171 198-202
83, 101, 185, 188 women’s movement issues, political attitudes, 363
politics of housework, 210 501-502 Third World women, 510-511
single-parent families, 216 Racism, 12 Reproductive system, fetal develop¬
health issues abortion controversies, 193 ment, 19-31
AIDS, 444, 445, 446 early feminists, 494-495 Right-to-Life Movement, 421
alcohol use/abuse, 472 feminist movements, 501-502 Risk rule, 384—385
cardiovascular disease, Radicalesbians, 518 Role models, 130
436-437, 438 Radical feminism, 14, 501, 503 mentors, 133-134
cosmetic surgery, 481 in Europe, 508 workplace, 282
depression, 466, 467, 468 male corollary of, 513 Roles (w Gender roles; Gender
eating disorders, 477 Rape, 338-345 {see also Sexual stereotypes; Masculinity
employment in health care sys¬ assault) stereotypes; Socialization)
tem, 455, 456 acquaintance, 341-342 Rosenhan experiment, 464
homicide rates, 442 arrest and conviction rates, 311, RU 486, 196
life expectancy, 431-432, 433 338-339
mental health, 465 of males, 339, 352 Schools, 106-144
morbidity, 447-448 marital, 342-343, 347 colleges and graduate schools,
mortality rates by sex and race, as political weapon, 351-352 127-143
436 victim precipitation myth, 340 sexual harassment, 135-139
nineteenth century health Violence Against Women Act, 337 structuring learning environ¬
care models, 448-449 Reflection hypothesis, 154 ment, 139-143,
nineteenth century medical Reinforcement, 84 women faculty and administra¬
establishment and, 451-452 Relationships (see Family and inti¬ tion, 131-135
obesity, 475-476 mate relationships) elementary schools, 112-119
occupational injuries, 440 Religion (see also Spirituality) historical overview, 106-112
pediatric AIDS, 446 abortion issue, 193 lesbian and gay youth,
homelessness, 278-280 and female circumcision, 355 121-122
in journalism, 157, 158 and reproductive freedom, mathematics and science,
and new reproductive technolo¬ 194-195 125-126
gies, 202 and suttee, 354 secondary schools, 119-126
and political attitudes, 363, Reproduction (see also Pregnancy special education, 114—115
364 and childbirth) Science, engineering, and
political coalitions, 373 cross-cultural studies, 72-73 mathematics
political offices, 370, 372n. fetal development of reproduc¬ education in, 124—126, 127
Congress, 376-377 tive system, 19-31 employment statistics, 262
presidential appointments, new technologies, 198-202, Science, feminist perspective, 10
378-379 411-412 Secondary schools, 119-126, 136n.,
state and local, 374-375 and role, functionalist perspec¬ 505
poverty tive, 5 Second shift, 209
elderly poor, 275-277 sex selection, 78-79 Segregation (dissimilarity) index,
female-headed households, workplace exposures and, 259-260
222-223 439-441 Self-fulfilling prophecy, 41
reproductive freedom, 197 Reproductive freedom, 192-202, 370 Semantic derogation, 148-150
spirituality Catholic Church teachings and, Sentencing practices, criminal of¬
African American Catholic 411-412 fenses, 322-329
Congregation, 412n. contraception and abortion, Separation anxiety, 32-33
Islam, 416-420 193-198 Sex chromosomes, 19-31 {see also
Judaism, 403-408 early feminists, 490 Chromosomes)
minority churches, 422-423 Equal Rights Amendment and, Sex/gender system components,
religious identification by, 395, 498 2-3
396-397 medical establishment and, 452 Sex hormones, 21
608 Subject Index \
Sexuality, 25, 188-202 Smoking, health issues, 438

Sexism
biological development, 19-31 Social change (see also Feminism)
linguistics, 150
and crime/justice issues gay and lesbian rights, 515-518
in sociology, 9
prostitution, 311, 324n., 325, men and liberation, 512-515
Sex-neutral custody awards,
340 Social class (see also Earnings gap;
217-218
sentencing practices, 326-327 Income and wages)
Sex segregation
in education female circumcision and, crime/justice issues
classrooms, 118 354-355 female offenders, 314
graduate, 128 fluidity of, 189, 191-192 sentencing practices, 325
Japanese labor force, 260 footbinding and, 353 white-collar crime, 314
religious customs health issues and early-childhood gender so¬
Islamic, 418 adolescent pregnancy, 190-191 cialization, 100-102
in Judaism, 404, 406 AIDS, 444, 445, 446 and education, 106-107
in workplace, 259-271 magazine articles, 160, 161-162 elementary-level, 116
age and, 263-264 religions and special education, 115
consequences of, 267-271 Christian dogma, 410 family issues
dissimilarity index, 259-260 Islamic tradition, 418 child abuse, 247
dual labor market, 259-263 reproductive freedom, 192-202 divorce settlements, 221
industry/establishment, (sec a/so Abortion; incest, 248
266-267 Contraception) violence, 242
Japanese labor force, 260 contraception and abortion, and feminist movement, 501
occupational shifts, 265-267 193-198 and antifeminism, 504
occupations, comparison of new reproductive technolo- ' in Europe, 508-509
men versus women, 260-261, gies, 198-202 feminist sociology and, 9n.
262 television images, 165, 166 feminization of poverty, 222
race and, 264-265 women’s magazines and, 159, health issues
remediation approaches, 160, 161 depression, 466
292-293 Sexually bipotential development, eating disorders, 477
Sex selection, 78-79 20 heart disease, 435-436, 438
Sex tourism, 510 Sexual minorities, 12 nineteenth century health
Sexual abuse Sexual orientation, 12, 189 (see also care models, 448-449
of children, 248 Gay men; Lesbians; Lesbians nineteenth century medical es¬
and depression, 467 and gay men) tablishment and, 451-452
of patients by therapists, 482-483 and alcohol use, 471-472 obesity, 476
of prisoners, 331 and brain, 43-44 and new reproductive technolo¬
runaway juveniles, status of¬ demedicalization of homosexual¬ gies, 202
fenses, 327-328 ity, 465 and political attitudes, 363
Sexual assault, 338-345 (see also hate crimes, 336 and politics of housework, 210,
Rape) Sexual politics, 499 211
on homeless persons, 279 Sick role, 448 and social development model,
incidence of, 334 Single-parent families, 187, 216-223 83
Sexual division of labor (see Divi¬ child poverty, 220 Social factors, and biology, 37
sion of labor by sex) poverty, 273-280 Social issues
Sexual double standard, 189 Singles, 223-226 ecofeminism, 425-426
Sexual harassment, 130 divorced and separated individu¬ feminist therapists and, 484
in colleges and universities, als, 224,226-227 fundamentalist Christians and,
135-139 heterosexual domestic partner¬ 420-422
as employment discrimination, ships, 229-231 new reproductive technologies,
295 homelessness, 279 198-202
homeless women, 280 homosexual domestic partner¬ political candidate qualifications,
in law enforcement agencies, ships, 231-236 370
319-320 never-married individuals, political participation, 366
in military, 386, 387 224-227 religious beliefs and, 397
in workplace, 269-271 widows, 228-229 women’s movement and
Subject Index 609
Social issues (continued) Christianity, 408-416 arrest rates, 311

early feminists, 490-493 ' Islam, 416-420 drug-related crimes, 310, 311,
in Third World, 510-512 Judaism, 402, 403-408 312-314
Socialist feminism, 13-14, 500-501, Spouse abuse (iee Violence, female inmates, 331-332
503,508 domestic) and rape, 340, 344
Socialization, 77 (see also Early-child- SRY (sex-determining region of the sentencing practices, 324-325
hood socializadon; Educa¬ Ychromosome), 20 health issues
tion; Media; Schools) Stained glass ceiling, 415 accidental death rate, 441-442
and career decisions, 131 Standard North American family AIDS, 444, 445, 446
learned helplessness hypothesis, (SNAF), 183 social issues
467 Standard of maternal deference, family violence, 240
Social learning theory, 6, 83-85, 218 homelessness, 278
102 State and local government, politi¬ Suffrage, 490, 493-496
Social networks cal roles, 373-375 Suicide, 436, 442
kin, 83, 101, 185, 188 Statistical discrimination, 291 Supreme Court appointments and
workplace, 268 Status nominations, 270, 379-380
Social organization, primate behav¬ alcohol consumption and, 470 Supreme Court decisions
ior and,64 body weight and, 476 abortion, 193, 194, 196
Social regulation of sexuality, 3 cross-cultural perspectives, 72 employment issues
Social Security, 277 eminence, 37, 41 corrections system employ¬
Social status (see Social class; Status) and employment experiences, ment, 320n.
Social status hypothesis, 467 269 employment discrimination,
Social stratification, 3 language, 148, 149 295-296
Social welfare programs (see nineteenth century roles for homosexuality, 233
Welfare) women, 448-449 military policy, 383-384
Societal consensus, structural func¬ and political attitudes, 363 occupational exposures to repro¬
tionalist paradigm, 4-6 and psychological well-being, ductive toxins, 440-441
Sociology 467, 468 personhood of women (1894),
defined, 3-4 Status givers, husbands as, 184 307
family, 183-188 Status offenses, 327-328 sexual harassment, 271
redefining, 186-188 Stereotypes (see also Gender surrogacy, 199-200
structural functional theory, stereotypes; Masculinity Surgery, 334
183-186 stereotypes) cosmetic, 334, 480-481
feminist, 8—15 defined, 31 for emotional disorders, 463
male study of male society, 10 occupational, in advertising, experimental, 451
paradigm revolution, 7-8 173 Surrogacy, 199-200
sexism in, 9 secondary school curriculum Suttee, 353-354
structural functionalism, 4-7, material, 124 Symbolic annihilation, 155-163,
183-186 workplace issues, 289-293 179
Soviet Union/ClS, work in, Sterilizations, medical, 452, 511 Syndrome X, 437
300-303 Stigmatization
Spatial visualization tasks, 41 alcoholism, 473 Talmud, 403
Special education, 114—115 drug addiction, 313 Tax policies, child care allowance,
Spectator activities, 365-366 homeless women, 280 285
Speech,10 of homosexuality, 515-516 Teaching (see Education; Schools)
Spirituality mental health/illness issues, 463 Television, 163-180 (iee aiso Media)
ecofeminism, 425—426 sexuality, 192 advertisements, 172-175
feminist spirituality, 423-427 Stress, 435-436 as agent of socialization, 163-164
goddesses and witches, 398-401 Stroke, 435-438 effects of, 175-180
minority churches, 422-423 Structural determinism, 15-16 gays and lesbians, 167-168
new evangelicals, 420-422 Structural functionalism, 4—7, gender roles, 164-167
religiosity, 395-398 183-186 minorities, 167
traditional teachings, 402-420 Substance abuse, 470-475 music videos, 170-172
(see also Religion) crime/justice issues, 312-313 news programming, 167-170
Subject Index \
610
Vanatinai people, 69 as human rights violations,

physical disabilities, 167
Verbal ability 351-352
as shapers of gender, 179-180
brain structure and, 45-46 suttee, 353-354
violence, 170-171, 177—178
stereotypes, 38-42 Visual-spatial ability, 38—42, 45-46
Tender years presumption, 217
Victimization (iee aiso Violence, Vitamin Be, 53
Testosterone, 6, 20, 24, 25, 28, 45,
criminal victimization) Voting (see Politics)
52
and aggression, 36-38 of patients by therapists, 482-483
politics of, 504-505 Wages {see Earnings gap; Income
and visual-spatial test perform¬
television portrayals, 166 and wages)
ance, 41
Victim precipitation myth, 340 War, rape as political weapon,
Test tube fertilization, 198
Third World Violence, criminal victimization, 351-352
institutionalized violence against 333-345 War and peace issues
women, 350-356 abortion activists and, 195-196 feminist philosophy, 390-391
international women’s move¬ justice system and gender gap, 362
ment, 509-512 arrest rates, 311 War-on-drugs policy, 313
Three-generation family, 185 female police officers and, 32 Welfare, 370
Title IX of Education Amendments hate crimes, 336-337 and adolescent pregnancy, 190
Act, 112, 460 pornography, 345-350 earnings gap and, 273-280
Title VII (Civil Rights Act of 1964), rape, 338-345 income and benefits, 274
293-294, 295, 296, 298, 299, statistics, 333-335 U. S. government spending on,
317, 499-500 homelessness and, 279 509
Tokenism, 268-269 human rights violations, Welfare reform, 221, 275, 285
Toys, 77, 93-97 351-352 White-collar crime, 309, 311, 312,
Trade unions, 255, 286 media and, 166, 170, 171-172, 313-314
Transformative account of gender 177-178 Widowhood, 228-229
development, 54 Violence, domestic, 237-250 and poverty, 277
Transitional activities, 365-366 arrest rates, 311 Social Security benefits, 277
Turner’s syndrome, 26 child abuse, 247-249 Widows, 217
Type A personality, 435-438 and depression, 467 Witches, 398-401
elder abuse, 249-250 Wolffian duct system, 20
Unions, labor, 255, 286 and homelessness, 279 Women-Church movement,
Unrelated persons living together, joint custody arrangements and, 415-416
187 217 Women’s Health Initiative, 453-454
Urban sociology, feminist critiques, marital rape, 342-343 Women’s movement (s«e Feminism)
9n. partner abuse Work (see Employment)
in heterosexual relationships, Working-class feminism, 501
Values (we a/fo Religion; Spirituality) 237-243 Workplace (see a/so Employment)
feminist {see also Feminism) in lesbian and gay relation¬ assembly-line hysteria, 469
and military, 390-391 ships, 243-247 European policies, 509
versus traditional sociology, Violence Against Women Act, 337 occupational exposures, 439-441
10-11 Violence, institutionalized, 350-356
sociological research, 11 female circumcision, 354-356 X and Y (sex) chromosomes, 20,
visual-spatial abilities, 40 foot binding, 350, 352-356 24-26, 28, 432
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Women, Men, and Society - Renzetti, Claire M Curran, Daniel J - 1995 - Boston - Allyn and Bacon - 9780205156191 - Anna's Archive

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Susan Basow, Ph.D.

Allyn and Bacon

Copyright © 1995, 1992, 1989 by Allyn & Bacon

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Printed in the United States of America

Chapter 1 Studying Gender: An Overview 1

The Perspective of This Text 15

PART I MEN AND WOMEN: WHATS THE DIFFERENCE?

Chapter 2 Sex Differences: The Interaction of Nature

The Case for His and Hers Brains 42

“My Hormones Made Me Do It”: Premenstrual Syndrome 46

The Interaction of Biology and Culture 53

Chapter 3 Ancestors and Neighbors: Social Constructions of

Our Relatives, the Chimps 62

Gender, Evolution, and Culture 73

PART II TEACHING U6 TO KNOW OUR RE6PECTIVE PLACES

Chapter 4 Early Childhood Gender Socialization 70

Growing Up Feminine or Masculine' 90

By the Time a Child Is Five 102

Key Terms 103

Chapter 5 Schools and Gender 105

Educating Girls and Boys: The Elementary Schools 112

Educating Teenage Girls and Boys: The Secondary Schools 119

Educating Women and Men: Golleges and Graduate Schools 127

Sexual Harassment 135

Gender, Education, and Power 143

Key Terms 144

Chapter 6 The Great Communicators: Language and

Gender and the Media 154

Images of Gender in the Media: What Are Their Effects? 176

Language and Media as Shapers of Gender 179

Key Terms 180

PART ill KEEPING US IN OUR RESPECTIVE PLACES:

Chapter 7 Gender and Intimate Relationships 152

Sexuality and Reproductive Ereedom 188

Gender, Intimacy, and Power 202

The Dark Side of Intimacy: Domestic Violence 237

Child Abuse 247

Key Terms 251

Chapter & Gender, Employment, and the Economy 253

Sex Segregation in the Workplace 259

The Male/Female Earnings Gap 271

The Work World: Ideology and the Role of Law 289

Gender and Work in Post-Socialist Societies 300

The Intersection of Home and the Work World 303

Key Terms 304

Chapter 9 Gender, Crime, and Justice 306

With Justice for All? 316

Criminal Victimization: Gender, Power, and Violence 333

Power, Crime, and Justice 356

Key Terms 357

Chapter 10 Gender, Politics, Government, and

Gender and Public Office 368

Women and Men in the Military 381

The Politics of Gender 391

Key Terms 392

Chapter 11 Gender and Spirituality 393

Of Goddesses and Witches 398

Traditional Religious Teachings on Gender 402

Religion, Politics, and Social Change 420

Challenges to Patriarchal Religions: Feminist Spirituality 423

Key Terms 427

Chapter 12 Gender and Health 429