UE CENTRALIZED

20|21
BAR OPERATIONS
JAN ADRIANNE PRADO
Chairman

JOHN PAUL MARIANO

Deputy Vice Chairman

NATHANIEL ALFONSE ALUMNO Vice Chairman for Logistics

CHARMAINE BILGERA Vice Chairman for Recruitment
JAYMIE REYES Vice Chairman for Recruitment
PATRICIA ANDREA TUYAY Vice Chairman for
Creatives and Publicity

ELLA MARIZ MILLARE

Finance Committee Head

JOANNA DIANE MORTEL

Creatives & Publicity Committee Head

DEBORAH PADRIGO
Creatives & Publicity Committee Assistant Head (Publicity)

ATTY. MANUEL DELDIO

Adviser
 ACADEMICS COMMITTEE
VENUS JANE FINULIAR
Head

ALLANA LORRAINE ABLIR

Co-Head

LEJAN PANGILINAN Assistant to the Head

ELAYNE ROSE MARIANO Assistant to the Co-Head

PREPARED BY:

POLITICAL LAW
SOPHIA AUBREY MALLARI GLYDEL CO
Subject Head Subject Head

JUSTIN FRANCIS KURT NEO Assistant Subject Head

EUNICE MARCOS Member

SHERYLYN REYES Member

SPECIAL THANKS TO:

ATTY. PATRICK MAGLINAO Adviser for Political Law

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I. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL LAW

SEPARATION OF POWERS

1. Q: E.O. No. 304 was passed which provides that all departments, bureaus,
and offices of national government in the SOCCSKSARGEN Region shall transfer their
regional seat of operations to Koronadal City. The Department of Agriculture ordered
the OIC of the Department of Agriculture-Regional Field Unit XII (DARFU XII) to transfer
its offices to Koronadal City. However, this was opposed by DARFU XII‟s officials and
employees and filed a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order with the RTC. Can the RTC
decide on the case?

A: No. It is basic in our form of government that the judiciary cannot inquire into
the wisdom or expediency of the acts of the executive or the legislative department, for
each department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is devoid of
authority not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of the
other department, but also to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the
acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the other departments. The
transfer of the regional center of the SOCCSKSARGEN region to Koronadal City is an
executive function. The judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the
acts of the executive. The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the
three great government branches has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in
concerns falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. The judiciary as Justice
Laurel emphatically asserted "will neither direct nor restrain executive or legislative
action." (Republic v. Bayao, G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013)

II. BILL OF RIGHTS

(DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES)

1. Q: Nicasio is a Cash Collecting Officer, with the designation of Cashier III at

National Food Authority-National Capital Region. One day, several armed men
disarmed NFA-NCR, NDO's security guards and took Nicasio's undeposited collections.

Subsequently, the COA found that Nicasio was negligent in safekeeping her
collections. Placement of collections in a "pearless" box instead of in the safety vault,
especially given the volume of collections, constituted gross negligence on her part. Her
20-year service aggravated her negligence. It should have made her more "security-
conscious.”

Petitioner elevated the findings of the COA and argues that her right to due
process was violated when a decision was rendered against her without giving her a
chance to file an appeal memorandum in accordance with Section 5 of Rule V of the
Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Audit.

Is the contention of Petitioner Nicasio, correct?

A: No, the contention of Petitioner Nicasio is not correct.

Petitioner's due process rights were not violated when the Commission on Audit
Director had failed to require her to submit an appeal memorandum before he decided
her appeal of the State Auditor's issuance of a withholding order. There was also no
violation of due process rights when the Commission on Audit issued its decision
denying her request for relief from accountability, without a petition for review of the
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Commission on Audit Director's decision. The right to appeal is not part of due process.
Neither is it a natural right. (Gutierrez v. COA, GR 200628, January 28, 2015)

2. Q: Aly was arrested for illegal sale of shabu. The inventory receipt however
indicates that the police officers seized one piece of small heat-sealed sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing undetermined quantity of alleged dried marijuana
fruiting tops, with JS 20- 09-1 marking, while the chemistry reports refer to one (1) heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet with markings AB 20-09-10 containing 4.35 gms. of
white crystalline substance. Can this clerical error affect the chain of custody rule?

A: Yes. We cannot dismiss as mere "clerical error" the discrepancies between

the inventory receipt and chemistry reports. The inventory receipt labeled the seized
item as marijuana, while the chemistry reports indicate it was shabu. Irregularities are
also glaring in the marking and the weight of the seized item-all of which are utterly
inexcusable and cast serious doubts on the origin of the item supposedly confiscated
from accused-appellant. The discrepancies are blatant irregularities that cast serious
doubts on the seized items' identity. They completely defeat the police officers' self-
serving assertions that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drug were
preserved. Gross irregularities like these cannot be downplayed as mere clerical errors.
Nor can the prosecution find solace in a blanket invocation of the presumption of
regularity in the conduct of the officers' duties. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is
required to support a conviction in criminal cases. The prosecution bears the burden of
proving beyond reasonable doubt that an accused is guilty of the offense charged.
Should it fail, the presumption of innocence prevails and, ultimately, the accused shall
be acquitted. Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt finds basis not only in the due
process clause of the Constitution, but similarly, in the right of an accused to be
"presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. Thus, this discrepancy and the gap in
the chain of custody immediately affect proof of the corpus delicti without which the
accused must be acquitted. (People v. Banding, G.R. No. 233470, August 14, 2019)

3. Q: Thompson filed his Petition for Review before the Department of Justice.
On the same day, he filed a Motion to Defer the Proceedings before the Regional Trial
Court. Secretary Cinco denied Thompson„s Petition for Review and stated that based
on the evidence on record, there was ―no reason to alter, modify, or reverse the
resolution of the City Prosecutor of San Juan City. Aggrieved, Thompson argues that:
(a) Secretary Cinco took into account additional evidence which the City Prosecutor
allegedly had no authority to receive and which Thompson had no opportunity to
address and rebut, thereby denying him due process of law; (b) Secretary Cinco found
probable cause to charge Thompson with the crime of murder when ― the evidence on
record does not support the existence of probable cause to indict [him] with either
homicide or murder[;] and (c) Secretary Cinco found that ― the killing was attended with
the qualifying circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength[,] and cruelty
despite prevailing jurisprudence dictating that the elements of these qualifying
circumstances be established by direct evidence. The question now is whether
respondent Secretary Cinco committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the
finding of probable cause against petitioner Thompson, thereby denying petitioner due
process of law.

A: No. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of
guilt, as the investigating officer acts upon probable cause of reasonable belief.
Probable cause implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but
less than evidence which would justify a conviction. A finding of probable cause needs
only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed
by the suspect. There is no basis to doubt that respondent Secretary Cinco judiciously
scrutinized the evidence on record. Based on respondent De Lima„s assessment, there
was ample evidence submitted to establish probable cause that petitioner murdered the
victim. Foregoing circumstances all taken together leads to the fair and reasonable
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inference that respondent is probably guilty of killing Sofia through treachery, abuse of
superior strength, and cruelty. Absence of direct evidence does not preclude a finding of
probable cause. It has been the consistent pronouncement of the Supreme Court that,
in such cases, the prosecution may resort to circumstantial evidence. Crimes are
usually committed in secret and under conditions where concealment is highly probable.
(Pemberton v. De Lima, GR No. 217508, April 18, 2016)

4. Q: Czarina Cunanan received a court decision declaring her marriage to

Virgilio Cunanan as void ab initio. She was surprised as she did not know that her
husband filed any petition. Consequently, she discovered that no hearing was
conducted on the case at all. This prompted her to file an administrative complaint
against the Judge who nullified their marriage without her knowing about it. While the
case was pending, the Judge died. Should the administrative complaint against the
judge be dismissed?

A: Yes. Respondent‟s death while the case was pending effectively renders the
case moot. Prudence dictates that the case should be rendered moot as respondent
Judge died. She could no longer be in a position to defend herself from these charges in
a motion for reconsideration. She could no longer admit to the charges, express
remorse, or beg for clemency. Proceeding any further would be a gross violation of her
constitutionally guaranteed right to due process. (Flores-Concepcion v. Castaneda,
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2438, September 15, 2020).

5. Q: Accused of having committed a special complex crime of robbery with

homicide, Joselito, accompanied by his mother, voluntarily surrendered before a police
officer. It may appear however that the Miranda rights only apply when one is "taken
into custody by the police," such as during an arrest. Having surrendered voluntarily,
must Joselito be apprised of his Miranda Rights guaranteed under the Constitution?

A: Yes. The Republic Act No. 7438 expanded the definition of custodial
investigation to "include the practice of issuing an „invitation‟ to a person who is
investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without
prejudice to the liability of the „inviting‟ officer for any violation of law." This means that
even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer must be apprised of their
Miranda rights. For one, the same pressures of a custodial setting exist in this scenario.
Joselito is also being questioned by an investigating officer in a police station. As an
additional pressure, he may have been compelled to surrender by his mother who
accompanied him to the police station. (People v. Chavez, G.R. No. 207950, September
22, 2014)

6. Q: The petitioners Diocese of Antipolo et al. posted 2 tarpaulins within a

private compound housing in the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. One tarp
contained the message “Ibasura RH Law” while the other tarp contained the words
“Team Buhay” and “Team Patay,” classifying the electoral candidates according to their
vote on the adoption of the RH Law. The COMELEC issued an order and letter ordering
the immediate removal of the tarpaulin, otherwise it will be constrained to file an election
offense against the petitioners. Petitioners contend that the order to remove the
tarps constitutes an infringement on freedom of speech and violates the separation of
church and state.

a. Did the order violate the separation of church and state?

b. Did the order violate petitioner‟s rights to freedom of expression?

A:

a. NO. The tarpaulin and its message are not religious speech. Art. III, Sec. 5
of the Constitution has two aspects: first, the non-establishment clause; second, the free
 4

exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship. The second aspect is the
issue in this case. Clearly, not all acts done by those who are priests, bishops, ustadz,
imams, or any other religious make such act immune from any secular regulation. The
religious also have a secular existence. They exist within a society that is regulated by
law. The Bishop of Bacolod caused the posting of the tarpaulin. But not all acts of a
bishop amounts to religious expression. This notwithstanding petitioners‟ claim that "the
views and position of the petitioners, the Bishop and the Diocese of Antipolo, on the RH
Bill is inextricably connected to its Catholic dogma, faith, and moral teachings.” The
tarpaulin, on its face, "does not convey any religious doctrine of the Catholic church."
That the position of the Catholic church appears to coincide with the message of the
tarpaulin regarding the RH Law does not, by itself, bring the expression within the ambit
of religious speech. On the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly refers to candidates classified
under "Team Patay" and "Team Buhay" according to their respective votes on the RH
Law. (Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, GR No. 205728, January 21, 2015)

b. YES. The COMELEC is incorrect in assuming that the tarps are election
propaganda. While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named
candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted "in return for consideration" by
any candidate, political party, or party-list group. COMELEC had no legal basis to
regulate expressions made by private citizens. COMELEC cites the Constitution, laws,
and jurisprudence to support their position that they had the power to regulate the
tarpaulin. However, all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties.
Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC
does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom
of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case. Every citizen‟s expression with
political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection. We have also ruled that the
preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what
may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the
equally vital right of suffrage. Speech with political consequences is at the core of the
freedom of expression and must be protected by this court. (Diocese of Bacolod v.
COMELEC, GR No. 205728, January 21, 2015)

7. Q: Carly Rae was charged with violation of illegal sale of marijuana. When he
was arrested and was about to be handcuffed, the police officer marked the plastic
sachet with his initials “CR”. He was then brought to the office for further investigation.
Inside the office, an inventory was allegedly conducted, and photographs of the marked
money and the sachet was taken. The PNP Crime laboratory also issued a report on
Carly Rae‟s urine stating that dangerous drugs were present in his system. With these
allegations, should Carly Rae be convicted of the illegal sale of marijuana?

A: No. Section 21(1) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act was not
faithfully complied with. While an inventory was supposed to have been conducted, this
was done neither in the presence of petitioner, the person from whom the drugs were
supposedly seized, nor in the presence of his counsel or representative. Likewise, not
one of the persons required to be present (an elected public official, and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media) was shown to have
been around during the inventory and photographing. In effect, there is no other
assurance of the integrity of the seized item other than the self-serving claims of the
police officers and its witnesses. These claims cannot sustain a conviction. (Lescano v.
People, G.R. No. 214490, January 13, 2016)
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8. Q: An Information was filed against Juan, Pepe, and Pilar charging them with
violation of Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 or the illegal possession of
dangerous drugs particularly the possession of ten (10) kilos of marijuana leaves.

Only Juan appealed before the Court of Appeals. Juan contended that the two
(2) sacks of marijuana supposedly seized from him, Pepe, and Pilar are inadmissible
evidence since the police officers did not have probable cause to conduct a search on
their vehicle. He noted that the radio message supposedly received by the police
officers was the sole basis for their belief of the alleged transportation of marijuana.

The Office of the Solicitor General countered that probable cause was properly
established since there was verified information that the pickup was being used to
transport illegal drugs. It maintained that an extensive search in checkpoints is allowed
if the officers conducting the search have probable cause to believe, prior to the search,
that either the motorist was a law offender or that they would find evidence pertaining to
the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched. The question now here is
whether or not a valid search and seizure was conducted on the pickup boarded by
accused-appellant and his co-accused, Pepe and Pilar.

A: No. Accused are acquitted. Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution
states that: the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
(People v. Jaime Sison, GR No. 238453, July 31, 2019)

9. Q: Dom was arrested for possession of dangerous drugs. The police officer
marked the seized sachet of illegal drugs by sticking a masking tape on it and there it
was written Dom‟s initials, “DTR”, and the date of his arrest. The police officer did not
place his signature on the masking tape, and he only used a ballpen which can be
easily erased or altered. Is the failure of the police officer to place his signature in the
masking tape affect the chain of custody rule and hence, warrants the acquittal of Dom?

A: Yes. The failure of the police officer creates doubt, because without his
signature, the generic marking of Dom‟s initials and date of arrest may as well have
been replicated by just about anybody on a piece of masking tape placed on any plastic
sachet of shabu. With the substantial gap in the chain of custody caused by the
insufficient marking the police officer was unable to prove with moral certainty that the
sachet supposedly seized from Dom was the same sachet presented in court. Hence,
the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti, warranting Dom's
acquittal. Trial courts should meticulously consider the factual intricacies of cases
involving violations of Republic Act No. 9165. Courts must employ heightened scrutiny,
consistent with the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases
involving miniscule amounts of drugs. These can be readily planted and tampered.
(Palencia v. People, G.R. No. 219560, July 01, 2020)

10. Q: Karina was at a pier of Cebu Domestic Port when she proceeded to the
entrance of the terminal and placed her bag on the x-ray scanning machine for
inspection. Ningning was the x-ray machine operator when the x-ray machine saw
firearms inside Karina's bag. She saw the impression of what appeared to be three (3)
firearms inside the bag. Karina admitted that she was owner of the bag. The bag was
then inspected and the following items were found inside: three (3) revolvers; other
personal items; and four (4) live ammunitions placed inside the cylinder. When asked
whether she had the proper documents for the firearms, Karina answered in the
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negative. Karina was then arrested and informed of her violation of a crime punishable
by law.

Decide whether there was unreasonable search or seizure.

A: No. This court held that there was no unreasonable search or seizure. The
evidence obtained against the accused was not procured by the state acting through its
police officers or authorized government agencies. The Bill of Rights does not govern
relationships between individuals; it cannot be invoked against the acts of private
individuals.

The port personnel's actions proceed from the authority and policy to ensure the
safety of travelers and vehicles within the port. At this point, petitioner already submitted
himself and his belongings to inspection by placing his bag in the x-ray scanning
machine.

Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done

without search warrants, are not unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional
provisions protecting privacy should not be so literally understood so as to deny
reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety of the traveling public. (Erwin Libo-on vs.
People, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016)

11. Q: Michael was among the members of a fraternity, who were all charged
with violating the Anti-Hazing Act for their acts against Novelino. The trial court was
convinced that the injuries and humiliation suffered by Novelino were caused by Michael
and the other accused as part of the initiation rites. It held that they violated the Anti-
Hazing Act when they punched Novelino and inflicted abdominal injury on him.

Michael appealed along with his co-accused, mainly averring that the Information
charged against him was invalid. He argued that the phrase "as a prerequisite for
admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization" was an essential
element of hazing, which should have been alleged in the Information.

Decide whether the information file is considered void for being insufficient.

A: No. Due process dictates that an accused be fully informed of the reason and
basis for their indictment. Petitioner's constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him was not violated. A plain reading of the
Information shows that the allegations stated there sufficiently apprised petitioner that
the crime charged against him was hazing.

Petitioner's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the

accusation against him is upheld as long as the crime, as described, is reasonably
adequate to apprise him of the offense charged. This mandate does not require a
verbatim reiteration of the law. The use of derivatives, synonyms, and allegations of
basic facts constituting the crime will suffice.

Moreover, this Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that petitioner was able to
prepare his defense and evidence based on the Information. There is no showing that
petitioner was caught by surprise during trial or that he was oblivious to the crime
charged. (Villarba vs. CA, G.R. No. 227777, June 15, 2020)
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12. Q: The Office of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding
probable cause to indict Mayor Apollo for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019 and for malversation. Mayor Apollo filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but this was
denied. Thus, Mayor Apollo comes to the Supreme Court through a Petition for
Certiorari seeking, among others, to nullify public respondent Office of the
Ombudsman's Resolution finding probable cause against her. Petitioner also avers that
her right to due process was violated when she was not served with copies of her co-
accused's motions for reconsideration. She claims that she was not informed of the
allegations contained in these pleadings, which effectively deprived her of her right to be
notified and heard.

Decide whether Mayor Apollo‟s right to due process was violated.

A: No. Her failure to receive a copy of the Motions for Reconsideration does not
result in a violation of her right to due process.

This Court explained that a preliminary investigation is not a part of trial.

Consequently, it need not be subjected under the same due process requirements
mandated during trial.

All the same, petitioner cannot insist that she was deprived of due process. It has
been consistently held that "due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or an opportunity to
move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of." Petitioner does not
deny that she moved for reconsideration of the assailed Resolution. She was given the
opportunity to question the decision against her. She was not denied due process.
(Binay vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 213957-58, August 07, 2019)

III. JUDICIAL REVIEW

1. Q: House Bill No. 4690 requiring the court to remit its Judiciary Development
Fund collections to the national treasure, and House Bill No. 4738 entitled “The Act
Creating the Judicial Support Fund” were filed. Consequently, Rolando Olivares, a
Filipino citizen and a concerned taxpayer, filed a petition praying for the issuance of a
writ of mandamus in order to compel the court to exercise its judicial independence and
fiscal autonomy against the perceived hostility of Congress. He also prays that the court
exercise its powers to revoke/abrogate and expunge whatever irreconcilable
contravention of existing laws affecting the judicial independence and fiscal autonomy
as mandated under the Constitution to better serve public interest and general welfare
of the people. Decide on whether Rolando Olivares has sufficiently shown grounds to
grant a petition.

A: No. The power of judicial review, like all powers granted by the Constitution, is
subject to certain limitations. Petitioner must comply with all the requisites for judicial
review before this court may take cognizance of the case. The requisites are:

(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power;

(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement;

(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;

and
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(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Petitioner‟s failure to comply with the first two requisites warrants the outright
dismissal of the petition. One of the requirements for this court to exercise its power of
judicial review is the existence of an actual controversy. This means that there must be
"an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion." Petitioner‟s allegations show that he wants this court to strike down the
proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund. This court, however, must
act only within its powers granted under the Constitution. This court is not empowered
to review proposed bills because a bill is not a law. The filing of bills is within the
legislative power of Congress and is "not subject to judicial restraint. A proposed bill
produces no legal effects until it is passed into law. Under the Constitution, the judiciary
is mandated to interpret laws. It cannot speculate on the constitutionality or
unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress may or may not pass. It cannot rule on mere
speculations or issues that are not ripe for judicial determination. The petition, therefore,
does not present any actual case or controversy that is ripe for this court‟s
determination.

Furthermore, even assuming that there is an actual case or controversy that this
court must resolve, petitioner has no legal standing to question the validity of the
proposed bill. Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a
given question.” The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result." Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or will sustain a direct
injury if the proposed bill is passed into law. While his concern for judicial independence
is laudable, it does not, by itself, clothe him with the requisite standing to question the
constitutionality of a proposed bill that may only affect the judiciary. (In the Matter of:
Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement v.
Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy,
UDK-15143, January 21, 2015).

2. Q: Luisa Santos, May Claro, and Maria Clara Santos applied for the
registration of parcels of land in Alulod, Indang, Cavite. Eventually, applicants sold Lot
Nos. 9715-B and 9715-C, with a total land area of 40,000 square meters, to Molten
Realty, Inc. Applicants were later substituted by Moldex Realty, Inc. in the application
for registration pending before the Regional Trial Court. The sale was evidenced by two
(2) separate deeds of sale executed in 1997.

RTC rendered a Decision granting the application. Once this decision becomes
final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued.The Office of the Solicitor
General, representing the Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC‟s Decision
before the CA. It argued that Molten Realty, Inc. failed to prove its open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the property since June 12, 1945, or for more
than 30 years.

CA rendered a Decision affirming the approval of Molten Realty, Inc.'s application

for registration. However, the court received a Manifestation and Motion from Molten
Realty, Inc. stating that although it had already been issued a favorable decision by the
RTC and the CA, it opted to withdraw its application for registration of the properties in
its name. Hence, the case had become moot and academic.

Is it correct to claim that the withdrawal of Respondent Molten Realty Inc.

application for land registration has rendered this case moot and academic?
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A: YES. Respondent's withdrawal of its application for registration has rendered

this case moot and academic.

A case becomes moot and academic when, by virtue of supervening events, the
conflicting issue that may be resolved by the court ceases to exist. There is no longer
any justiciable controversy that may be resolved by the court.41 This court refuses to
render advisory opinions and resolve issues that would provide no practical use or
value. Thus, courts generally "decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground
of mootness.

Respondent's Manifestation stating its withdrawal of its application for registration

has erased the conflicting interests that used to be present in this case. Respondent's
Manifestation was an expression of its intent not to act on whatever claim or right it has
to the property involved. Thus, the controversy ended when respondent filed that
Manifestation.

A ruling on the issue of respondent's right to registration would be nothing but an

advisory opinion. The power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a "self-
starting capacity." This court cannot, through affirmation or denial, rule on the issue of
respondent's right to registration because respondent no longer asserts this right.
(Republic v. Moldex Realty Inc., GR No. 171041, Feb. 10, 2016)

3. Q: A Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 praying that the Court of
Appeals September 28, 2012 Decision and March 5, 2013 Resolution be modified to
consider the concerns raised by ABC Bank of the Philippines. These concerns pertain
to the rehabilitation of respondents Quatrix Synergy Philippines, Inc.

In its September 28, 2012 Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the
December 9, 2011 Resolution of RTC Makati which dismissed the petition respondents'
Joint

Petition for corporate rehabilitation. In this Decision, the CA approved

respondents' Rehabilitation Plan and remanded the case back to the Rehabilitation
Court.

The Rehabilitation Court dismissed the filed petition.The Quatrix Corporations

elevated the case before the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Review under Rule
43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Court of Appeals issued a Temporary
Restraining Order to prevent the case from being moot and academic considering the
Ex Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession filed by Cuenco Bank over the
properties of the Quatrix Corporations. Court of Appeals issued a Decision, granting the
Quatrix Corporations' Petition for Review, which it found to have "served the purpose of
corporate rehabilitation."

ABC and Cuenco bank separately moved for reconsideration. The Court of
Appeals issued a Resolution denying both motions. Cuenco Bank and its successor-in-
interest, Philippine Asset Growth Two, Inc. (PAGTI), filed a Petition for Review before
this Court. ABC bank also filed a Petition for Review before this Court against the
Quatrix Corporations. The Court then rendered a judgment in the year 2016 making the
present case as moot and academic.

Decide whether the petition for review be granted.

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A: The petition for review should not be granted for the case has been rendered
moot and academic already.

A case is moot and academic if it "ceases to present a justiciable controversy

because of supervening events so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical
use or value." When a case is moot and academic, this court generally declines
jurisdiction over it.

Courts will not render judgment on a moot and academic case unless any of the
following circumstances exists:

(1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a
situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3) the issues
raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and
the public; and (4) the case was capable of repetition yet evading review. (Landbank v.
Fastech GR No. 206150, August 9, 2017)

4. Q: Ella Zarate offered for sale to the government, under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), a parcel of land with an area of approximately 136
hectares. Landbank made a valuation of the land and determined that only 125 hectares
of the property were covered by the CARP. It valued the covered portion at
Php3,986,639.57, and consequently deposited the amount in the name of Ella.
However, Ella rejected the valuation. The Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) conducted a summary administrative proceeding and rendered a
decision fixing just compensation at Php 8,938,757.72. Upon motion, the regional
adjudicator granted the issuance of the writ of execution. Thus, Landbank sought for the
quashal of the writ from the Special Agrarian Court (SAC). Unable to obtain relief from
SAC, Landbank filed a petition for certiorari before the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB). Decide whether DARAB possesses power to issue writs
of certiorari.

A: No. Administrative agencies, such as the Department of Agrarian Reform

Adjudication Board (DARAB), are not courts of law exercising judicial power. The power
to issue writs of certiorari is an incident of judicial review. Thus, administrative agencies
may not issue writs of certiorari to annul acts of officers or state organs even when they
exercise supervisory authority over these officers or organs. (Heirs of Eliza Q. Zoleta v.
Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 205128, August 9, 2017).

5. Q: Bernardin files a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. He claims that Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code deny
the existence of "individuals belonging to religious denominations that believe in same-
sex marriage" and that they have a "right to found a family in accordance with their
religious convictions."

The court then ordered the Civil Registrar General to comment on the Petition.
Civil Registrar claims that Bernardin did not present any statistics or evidence showing
discrimination against the LGBTQI+ community and that Falcis did not show any
specific injury, such as the denial of a marriage license or refusal of a solemnizing
officer to officiate a same-sex marriage.

Bernardin further argues that his Petition complied with the requisites of judicial
review.

Decide whether his petition complied with the requisites of judicial review.

A: NO. The requisites for judicial review has not been complied with. The
requisites of Judicial review are:(1) actual case or controversy; (2) standing; (3) was
 11

raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) that the constitutional question is the very lis
mota of the case.

Petitioner has no legal standing to file his Petition. Legal standing or locus standi
is the "right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." To possess legal
standing, parties must show "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
[they have] sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that
is being challenged."

Petitioner's supposed "personal stake in the outcome of this case" is not the
direct injury contemplated by jurisprudence as that which would endow him with
standing. Petitioner's desire "to find and enter into long-term monogamous same-sex
relationships" and "to settle down and have a companion for life in his beloved country"
does not constitute legally demandable rights that require judicial enforcement. This
Court will not witlessly indulge petitioner in blaming the Family Code for his admitted
inability to find a partner.

If the mere passage of a law does not create an actual case or controversy,
neither can it be a source of direct injury to establish legal standing. This Court is not
duty bound to find facts on petitioner's behalf just so he can support his claims. (Falcis
v. Civil Registrar, GR No. 217910, Sept. 3, 2019)

6. Q: RA 10591 was enacted on May 29, 2013. It regulated the ownership,

possession, carrying, manufacture, dealing in, and importation of firearms and
ammunition in the country. It was enacted with the view with the view of maintaining
peace and order and protecting people from violence. After the its effectivity , the PNP
centralized all firearm licensing and renewals at its HQ in Camp Crame. They also
started issuing pro forma application form for firearm registration requiring consent to
“Voluntary Presentation for Inspection”. Meanwhile, licensed firearm owners FPJ and
Dolphy filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition, assailing the constitutionality of
some of the provisions of the said law. The question herein now is 2. Whether or not
petitioners have legal standing to file their respective Petitions.

A: Yes, the petitioners have legal standing to file the present suit.

An aspect of justiciability, legal standing is the "right of appearance in a court of

justice on a given question." It ensures that the party bringing the case has a "personal
and substantial interest in [its outcome] such that he [or she] has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement". What is essential is direct injury, as
this guarantee a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy" which, in turn,
assures "that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."

The concept of legal standing is similar to the concept of "interest" in private

suits: it refers to "a present substantial interest," not a "mere expectancy or a future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest." Thus, under the Rules of Court,
actions must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.

As individual firearms license holders, petitioners Acosta and Dela Paz are the
ones who stand to suffer direct injury should the inspection of their houses be required
for firearm registration. (Acosta v. Ochoa, GR No. 211599, October 15, 2019)
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7. Q: Enrique Concepcion prays that Leon Medina, then a sitting senator, be

permanently prohibited from conducting a legislative inquiry into their alleged conflict of
interest on government contracts awarded to their security services company.
Concepcion claims that the proposed Senate Resolution No. 7603 does not contain any
intended legislation. Medina contends that the proposed senate resolution underwent
first reading and was formally and officially referred by the Senate President to the
Committee on Civil Service. Medina further contends that the Senate‟s power and
authority to conduct investigations in aid of legislation are provided in the Constitution,
thus, the issue is a political question which is outside the Court‟s jurisdiction. Decide the
case.

A: This Court's power of judicial review is limited to an actual case and

controversy. An actual case and controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal
rights or opposite legal claims capable of judicial resolution and a specific relief. The
controversy must be real and substantial, and must require a specific relief that courts
can grant.

A case becomes moot when it loses its justiciability, as there is no longer a

conflict of legal rights which would entail judicial review. This Court is precluded from
ruling on moot cases where no justiciable controversy exists.

This Court takes judicial notice that Proposed Senate Resolution No. 7603 was
filed on May 30, 2018, during the second regular session of the 17th Congress. The
17th Congress closed on June 4, 2019, while the 18th Congress opened on July 22,
2019 and will close in June 2022.

With the closing of the 17th Congress, the investigation into Proposed Senate
Resolution No. 7603 automatically ceased, rendering this case moot as "the conflicting
issue that may be resolved by the court ceased to exist."

This Court also takes judicial notice that Medina has reached the end of his two-
year term as senator. Thus, Concepcion‟s prayer for this Court to permanently prohibit
him from conducting an investigation into their supposed conflict of interest has likewise
been rendered moot. (Calida v. Trillanes, G.R. No. 240873, September 3, 2019)