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Sargam Gupta
IGIDR
K
k=
L
(δ = 1 capital depreciates fully after use)
R(t + 1) = 1 + r (t + 1)
Definition of equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium can be represented by sequences of aggregate
capital stocks, household consumption, and factor prices
{K (t), C1 (t), C2 (t), R(t), w (t)}∞t=0 , such that the factor price sequence
{R(t), w (t)}∞ t=0 is given by (1) and (2), individual consumption decisions
∞
{C1 (t), C2 (t)}t=0 are given by Euler equation and saving per person above
and the aggregate capital stock {K (t)}∞ t=0 evolves according to LOM
above.
L(t + 1) = (1 + n)L(t)
s(f (k ∗ ) − k ∗ f 0 (k ∗ ), f 0 (k ∗ ))
k∗ =
(1 + n)
Sargam Gupta (IGIDR) Macroeconomics 1 Fall Semester, 2023 11 / 22
Steady State in OLG
C1 (t)1−θ − 1 C2 (t + 1)1−θ − 1
Ut (C1 (t), C2 (t + 1)) = + β( )
1−θ 1−θ
where θ > 0 and β ∈ (0, 1).
Assume technology is Cobb-Douglas
f (k) = k α
C2 (t + 1) 1
= (βR(t + 1)) θ
C1 (t)
Alternately,
s(t)−θ βR(t + 1))1−θ = (w (t) − s(t))−θ
w (t)
s(t) =
ψ(t + 1)
where
−1 −(1−θ)
ψ(t + 1) = [1 + β θ R(t + 1)) θ ]>1
which ensures savings are less than earnings.
s(t) w (t)
k(t + 1) = =
(1 + n) (1 + n)ψ(t + 1)
Note that 0 < sw < 0. But sR < 0 if θ > 1, sR > 0, if θ < 1 and
sR = 0 if θ = 1
θ > 1 income effect of R dominates but when θ < 1 substitution
effect dominates
θ = 1 Log preferences + Cobb Douglas production function is called
canonical OLG model
Substitution effect
(+): As r increases, the return to saving increases, and this leads
individuals to substitute current consumption for future consumption so
that saving increases.
Income effect
(-): As r increases, individuals prefer more current consumption to future
consumption and this will lead to less saving today and more consumption.
f (k ∗ ) − k ∗ f 0 (k ∗ )
k∗ = −1 −(1−θ)
(1 + n)[1 + β θ f 0 (k ∗ ) θ ]
Define R∗ = α(k ∗ )α−1
(1 − α)k ∗ α
k∗ = −1 −(1−θ)
(3)
(1 + n)[1 + β θ (αk ∗ α−1 ) θ ]
Solve for k ∗ .
The income and substitution effect exactly cancel out, such that
changes in interest rate (or changes in capital-labor ratio) have no
effect on the saving rate. This makes the model identical to the basic
Solow model
Ut (C1 (t), C2 (t + 1)) = logC1 (t) + βlogC2 (t + 1)
C2 (t + 1)
= βR(t + 1)
C1 (t)
β
⇒ s(t) = w (t)
1+β
s(t) βw (t) β(1 − α)k(t)α
⇒ k(t + 1) = = =
(1 + n) (1 + n)(1 + β) (1 + n)(1 + β)
It is assumed that,
∞
X
ξt < ∞
t=0
such that the planner’s problem is well behaved. The social planner
maximizes the following wrt {C1 (t), C2 (t + 1), k(t + 1)},
∞
X
ξt (U(C1 (t)) + βU(C2 (t + 1)))
t=0
C2 (t)
f (k(t)) = (1 + n)(k(t + 1)) + C1 (t) +
1+n
Social planner’s maximization problem implies
= C∗
thus
∂C ∗
= f 0 (k ∗ ) − (1 + n)
∂k ∗
f 0 (kgold ) = 1 + n
In the baseline OLG economy, the competitive equilibrium is not necessarily
Pareto optimal. When r ∗ < n, the economy is dynamically inefficient.