FACTS:

THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was dismissed because
of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company. He is now before this Court
via a petition for review on certiorari claiming that he was illegally dismissed.

Armando Yrasuegui, a former international flight steward of Philippine Airlines, was dismissed after
repeatedly failing to meet the weight requirements mandated by the company. Despite multiple
warnings and leaves of absence to address his weight issues, Yrasuegui continued to be overweight
and did not comply with the company's weight check directives. After almost five years of leniency,
he was terminated due to his inability to attain his ideal weight. Yrasuegui claimed that his
termination was illegal and that the company had discriminated against him. The Labor Arbiter
initially ruled in his favor, but the Court of Appeals later reversed the decision.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT PETITIONER’S OBESITY CAN BE A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL UNDER PARAGRAPH (e)
OF ARTICLE 282 OF THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES;

RULING:

I. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e) 44

of the Labor Code.

A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they constitute
a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. Tersely put, an employee may be
dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight
standards. The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. As
explained by the CA:

x x x [T]he standards violated in this case were not mere "orders" of the employer; they were the
"prescribed weights" that a cabin crew must maintain in order to qualify for and keep his or her
position in the company. In other words, they were standards that establish continuing
qualifications for an employee’s position. In this sense, the failure to maintain these standards does
not fall under Article 282(a) whose express terms require the element of willfulness in order to be a
ground for dismissal. The failure to meet the employer’s qualifying standards is in fact a ground
that does not squarely fall under grounds (a) to (d) and is therefore one that falls under Article 282(e)
– the "other causes analogous to the foregoing."

By its nature, these "qualifying standards" are norms that apply prior to and after an employee is
hired. They apply prior to employment because these are the standards a job applicant must
initially meet in order to be hired. They apply after hiring because an employee must continue to
meet these standards while on the job in order to keep his job. Under this perspective, a violation is
not one of the faults for which an employee can be dismissed pursuant to pars. (a) to (d) of Article
282; the employee can be dismissed simply because he no longer "qualifies" for his job irrespective
of whether or not the failure to qualify was willful or intentional. x x x 45
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight
attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his
dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the
CA correctly puts it, "[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the
employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through
all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission.
Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the
element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).

FACTS:
The text describes a legal case involving petitioner Charlito Peñaranda, who was hired as an
employee of Baganga Plywood Corporation (BPC) in June 1999 to manage its steam plant boiler.
However, in May 2001, Peñaranda filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against
BPC and its general manager, Hudson Chua, before the NLRC (National Labor Relations
Commission).

After the parties failed to settle amicably, the labor arbiter directed them to file their position papers
and submit supporting documents. Peñaranda alleged that he was employed by BPC on March 15,
1999, with a monthly salary of P5,000.00 as Foreman/Boiler Head/Shift Engineer until he was
illegally terminated on December 19, 2000. He claimed that his services were terminated without the
benefit of due process and valid grounds in accordance with the law. Peñaranda also alleged that he
was not paid his overtime pay, premium pay for working during holidays/rest days, night shift
differentials, and finally claimed for payment of damages and attorney’s fees having been forced to
litigate the present complaint.

On the other hand, BPC alleged that Peñaranda’s separation from service was done pursuant to Art.
283 of the Labor Code, as BPC was on temporary closure due to repair and general maintenance
and had applied for clearance with the Department of Labor and Employment to shut down and
dismiss employees. Due to the insistence of Peñaranda, he was paid his separation benefits.
Consequently, when BPC partially reopened in January 2001, Peñaranda failed to reapply, and he
was not terminated from employment, much less illegally. BPC also argued that Peñaranda, being a
managerial employee, was not entitled to overtime pay. Finally, respondents alleged that the claim
for damages had no legal and factual basis, and the instant complaint must necessarily fail for lack
of merit.

The labor arbiter ruled that there was no illegal dismissal, and Peñaranda's complaint was premature
because he was still employed by BPC. The temporary closure of BPC’s plant did not terminate his
employment; hence, he need not reapply when the plant reopened. According to the labor arbiter,
Peñaranda's money claims for illegal dismissal were also weakened by his quitclaim and admission
during the clarificatory conference that he accepted separation benefits, sick and vacation leave
conversions, and thirteenth-month pay. However, the labor arbiter found Peñaranda entitled to
overtime pay, premium pay for working on rest days, and attorney’s fees in the total amount of
P21,257.98.

The respondents filed an appeal to the NLRC, which deleted the award of overtime pay and
premium pay for working on rest days, as the Commission held that Peñaranda was a managerial
employee and not entitled to these awards.

Peñaranda then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), seeking the reversal of
the NLRC's decision. However, in its Resolution dated January 27, 2003, the CA dismissed
Peñaranda’s Petition for Certiorari, holding that he failed to attach copies of the pleadings submitted
before the labor arbiter and NLRC, and did not explain why the filing and service of the Petition was
not done by personal service. In its later Resolution dated July 4, 2003, the CA denied
reconsideration on the ground that Peñaranda still failed to submit the pleadings filed before the
NLRC.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT PETITIONER’S OBESITY CAN BE A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL UNDER PARAGRAPH (e)
OF ARTICLE 282 OF THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES;

RULING:

I. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e) 44

of the Labor Code.

A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they constitute
a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. Tersely put, an employee may be
dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight
standards. The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. As
explained by the CA:

x x x [T]he standards violated in this case were not mere "orders" of the employer; they were the
"prescribed weights" that a cabin crew must maintain in order to qualify for and keep his or her
position in the company. In other words, they were standards that establish continuing
qualifications for an employee’s position. In this sense, the failure to maintain these standards does
not fall under Article 282(a) whose express terms require the element of willfulness in order to be a
ground for dismissal. The failure to meet the employer’s qualifying standards is in fact a ground
that does not squarely fall under grounds (a) to (d) and is therefore one that falls under Article 282(e)
– the "other causes analogous to the foregoing."

By its nature, these "qualifying standards" are norms that apply prior to and after an employee is
hired. They apply prior to employment because these are the standards a job applicant must
initially meet in order to be hired. They apply after hiring because an employee must continue to
meet these standards while on the job in order to keep his job. Under this perspective, a violation is
not one of the faults for which an employee can be dismissed pursuant to pars. (a) to (d) of Article
282; the employee can be dismissed simply because he no longer "qualifies" for his job irrespective
of whether or not the failure to qualify was willful or intentional. x x x 45

In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight
attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his
dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the
CA correctly puts it, "[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the
employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through
all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission.
Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the
element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).

FACTS:

The case is about a petition for certification election filed by the PICOP-Bislig Supervisory and
Technical Staff Employees Union (PBSTSEU) to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining agent
of the supervisory and technical staff employees of PICOP, a paper and timber products
manufacturer in the Philippines. Private respondents, the Federation of Free Workers (FFW) and
Associated Labor Union (ALU), filed their respective petitions for intervention. The Med-Arbiter
granted the petitions for interventions and set the holding of a certification election with four choices,
including PBSTSEU, FFW, ALU, and no union.

PICOP appealed the order, arguing that the Med-Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion in
deciding the case without giving PICOP the opportunity to file its comments/answer, and that
PBSTSEU had no personality to file the petition for certification election. The Secretary of Labor
upheld the Med-Arbiter's order with modification, allowing the supervising and staff employees in
Cebu, Davao, and Iligan City to participate in the certification election.

During the pre-election conference, PICOP objected to the inclusion of some section heads and
supervisors in the list of voters, claiming that their positions were reclassified as managerial
employees and thus ineligible to form or join any labor organization. The Med-Arbiter held that
supervisors and section heads of the petitioner are managerial employees and therefore excluded
them from the list of voters. PBSTSEU appealed the order to the Office of the Secretary, DOLE. ALU
also appealed, and the Undersecretary of Labor declared that the subject supervisors and section
heads are supervisory employees eligible to vote in the certification election.

PICOP sought reconsideration, but it was denied. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court,
which upheld the DOLE's ruling, concluding that the subject employees are supervisory and not
managerial employees, and therefore eligible to vote in the certification election.
ISSUE: W/N the positions Section Heads and Supervisors, who have been designated as Section
Managers and Unit Managers, were converted to managerial employees under the decentralization
and reorganization program

RULING:

No, they are not.

In the petition before us, a thorough dissection of the job description of the concerned supervisory
34

employees and section heads indisputably show that they are not actually managerial but only
supervisory employees since they do not lay down company policies. PICOP's contention that the
subject section heads and unit managers exercise the authority to hire and fire is ambiguous and
35

quite misleading for the reason that any authority they exercise is not supreme but merely advisory
in character. Theirs is not a final determination of the company policies inasmuch as any action
taken by them on matters relative to hiring, promotion, transfer, suspension and termination of
employees is still subject to confirmation and approval by their respective superior. Thus, where
36

such power, which is in effect recommendatory in character, is subject to evaluation, review and final
action by the department heads and other higher executives of the company, the same, although
present, is not effective and not an exercise of independent judgment as required by law.