U.S.

war effort -linked to eecret bombln&

campa1&JIS over Cambodia, almidy clitcussed,and many bridaes and rallroads. Interdiction reduced
owr Laos. over lllld Imports form 160,000 to 30,000 tons a
TM> different air wms were fouabt OYtr Laos month. Mlnlna the Halpbona Hll'bor cut seaborne
lq>011S from 250,000 tons a month lo nearly zero.
from 1968 tbrouah 1972. The nr.,c.11ec1
Al; power alone took 120,000 North Vietnamese
s.n.1 Rou,•- over a Dortb pa.tuu realoft called lives. Trouna Nhu Tana of the Vletcon1's
lbe Plain of J.,., It wu directed u OllCU..,mtllts of Provisional Revolutionary Govemmtnt explained
the NVA and Patbtt Lao, aauen\1la force o( &bola that u tbt su111- mer went on, II wu obvious that
35,000 mtft who were the LlotWIequivalent of lht
the loues were more tMn could be sustained end
Vletcona. Some vlUoaes also wen bombed. The
thal the tmitorial advances could not be held.
second bomblna campalan was
Neaotlallons to aet tbe Americans
carried out In soUlhem Laos ailut the Ho Cbl
out o( the war were lq>erallve.
Mlnh Trail used by the Norlh Vietnamese to move
men &lld supplies ln•o South Vlelllt.m. Over the
course of this e&rqlllgn U.S.forces dropped a total of
2.2 millionloN of bombs.
On Mardi 31, 1972, North Vletruun launched the
lar&ut offensive since Tet 1968, 1conventional
U.S. Disengagement:
lnva· lion across .iie DMZ by 120,000 NVA troops 1972-1973
led by Soviet tanks ond 111lllery. The U.S bad only
I 00,000 mlUwy personnel, lncludlna 6,000 combet
troops, left ln Vietnam. Nlxon responded with the By October 1972, the neaotlatlna teams In
laraest bombln& campalan of the war (code named Paris produced a peace treaty .,...eable to the
Linebacker). the mlnina of Halphona Hatbor, and a U.S.and North Vietnam. South Vltlllarnese
naval blockade of North Vietnam. President Thieu char&ed the U.S.with be& his
Almost all oil storoae facllltla and 70 percent aovemment and opposed lht
of electricaJ power aenera11n& Clj*ity inthe north .,reement. Mer bls re-election, Nlxon lnstJUcted
IWre destro)'f'd. The new 1-r-guided smart bornbl Klulnaer toaddress Thlou's ms. On November
smashed 20th, Klsslnaer presented Honol's Le Due Tho
with slxty-nine amendments to the ..,...ment
demanded by Tblou.

141
. .l · !I
 The peace Lalks resumed, but broke down Inand the ARVN could not expect to maintain the suno
com pletely on Dectmbtr 13th. Two Iller lawl of firepower u when the U.S.,.... involved.
NixOl• llM By the bqinnilia of 1915,over 300,000 North
Hanoi 1n uld!Mlum to mum to the table wlthln Viet namne troops with 700 llllW were pollled to
72 taJce over the south. Aided by 11ra1e1ic laples
boun. When It peuod, be unJeubed the- by Thieu, North Vietnam'•ai:rina otTenslve
lntenalw bombina of the entire-.known triWtll'lwd on 1, 1975. Some a!tlclzed tho U.S.for
uUntbcbr D. In eleven .740 8-2 MCI 1,000 abuldoning ita ally. How
ocher a1rcnft oorties dropped over 20,000 tons ever, few would claim Iha! lll)'thlna 1hon or U.S.
of bombs on the Hanol Halpbona area. re enuy Into tho war would have forettalled the
Hllnol'1air defe11se, bolster.cl by an estimated final outcome.
850 Sovlet-imde SAMS (swfoce-t04lr miullel).
hidbeen much 1be U.S.Air Force eclmowlqed
15
8-521and 11..Iha' altcnft shot down, 33m-
killed
and 33 .-ptUAd. 1be North Vlelnamtle claimed
Conclusion
over 1,600 or their people killed and thousands
wounded .
This brouaht forth a SIOrm of protest from world
leaden, includlna thePope. Oiina 11111 the Soviet In the wake of thls defeat, m111y Americans have
been tempted to look fur scapeaoats In Congress, the
Union
media, the universities,a:id the anti-w.r movement. A
threatened to withdraw support fNlll the
poll by Louis Hlnis in 1979found lhll 73pon:ent of tho
neaociations unless the bombing raids were
public Ind 89 percent of VletnuJHn Vetenns qreed:
stopped. Members of Congress m..ie It clur they
"The trouble inVietnam -Iha! our troops were ulced
would lepl con
to f.,hl ina wor which our political leaders InWubinJ
straints upon retum from Cliristmu recess.
too would nollet them win.•
N"txon's popularity flllina fe9 to 39 perc•nt
One Mil-known conserv•ive critic of the U.S. war
ovemlaht .
plan in Vietnam is Colonel Hany Summon (retired).
Hanoi's air defenses now were crippled, but so
For him "the moat frustrating Upecl or the Vietnam
wu die Nixon Fftsldency. l!oin nations were war conflict"is Iha! the U.S.lmled forces won "tvel)' major
wtal)' and world leaders demanded a settlement. On
battle ol the war, yet North Vietnam, rather than the
Decem ber 30, 1972, by mutual aaieemmt, Nixon
United Ststes, triumphed 11t the end.•
stopped the bombilljl Ind the North Vletname1t
Summers believt1 the problem wu Iha!
deleplion retumed to the ne1otiatln1table. Nixon
America's basic IY wu flawed. Inhis view, the U.S.
quickly sumndered most or the cbanJes
>hould have been mud! le• concm'ltd with the
demanded by Thieu. On January 27, 1973, the
Vietcong 1nd
Paris Accords were si&ned, ending America's
longest W.lr. !*ificalion. lnsteed, It should have defiM<I the -
as a convenrional confrontation between North
Vietnam
North Deftats Sou1h: 197J-J 975
.,.I the United Staesand its ally Inthe south.
The ordeal wu just beginning for South
Having done this.Presicknt Johnson should have
Vietnamese leaders, however. 1be treaty ..!lowed
rallied public support for a full declaratlon of war.
North Vietnam to maintain almost I S0,000 troopt
This would have enabled Johnson to raioe taxes,
in the south. It also placed restrictions upon the
amount or aid that South Vietnam could receive, call up the reserves, place a cordon eaoa Laos
althouah no restrictions were placed upon aid for and Invade Nolllh Viellwn. wid1 no restriction Oii
Nonb Vietnam. The American public wu relieved bomblna. Summers claims Iha! Ch:na and the Soviet
to see this 101111 nightmare come to anend. Union would have sta,yed out of the fight and the
1beThieu administtallon Inthe SOUlh wu angry and
U.S.wo ";! have won the ·
Other experts contend that Summer's proposals
apprehensive.
would have been impoaible to implement politically
The U.S.turned over immense amounts or equi!
or rnilitarilf . Moreover, Summtrs' conjecture
> mmt and moteriel to the South Vietnamese prior to
•bout the respc.nltl of O.ina and the Sov'et UniOI•
the treaty, and promised more. lltltu had an •1'111)' of
cannot be prl)Wn. Suchactions carried the potendal
over orie million and the third largest air foroe in
riskoramich
the world. Nixon pledaed continued support and
guaranteed that U.S.troops would return if the lre8!y
were violated by North Vietnam. Still, the Nonh
Vietrwnesc were dug l!i tJ

142
gruler and more devaN!lnl -·
the di1tusalon orpubllc opinion poUs In blah r8le or desertion (more than 20 'Ml). It also
Chapter ahan· doned or IOlcl a 11reat l1WI)' U.S.manufactured
7 makes clur, from the ltllt, most Americans did weapons tothe lnairpnta. Fewer than one In ten
not &enerall Intbt
Wllll IO risk Americml boya hi a llndMr In la, - survey by Gen.Kinnard saw the ARVN u•an accepC·
wry c:oocemed ollout China comlna Into tbe
able flabtlna force.•
·and did not think Ibo SoUlh
could
v- aovemment
llle U.S. military didn't have nub support In
be saved. Viet· nam either. In an lnteJVlew with the New
".:''llllNry to Summers, others have said that the Rtpublic mqazlne, President Thieu hlmlelf
f\lndamental flaw Inthe U.S. war plan wu thal awed:"The main reuon the Vletcona nmaln so
U.S. le.eders c1erinec1 the .:onfllct too nanowly stronaly entrenched Is lhll people...stlll believe there
In mlliwy terms. n1ron1 reminds 111, "Buie Is little dirhmlce be tween tbt French ..tiomthey calJtd
stra1e1Y coursa teach that war Is more than a coloniallstl and the Americans v.bom Ibey calJ
contest between armed forces. ItIs a 11n1&1le bt'- iq>lriallsts."
1llllionlthal lncorponl• economic, culturol, aoclal, To wln the crucial bellle for beorta and minds
and political, u well u milllaly, dimensions." In neces sary to aovern South Vietnam, the U.S.aid its
Vietnam, tbere WU far lno little 1"llOWMdae or the allies bad to winthe loyaltyortho people with eoclal,
local political sltuallon, rar too little eppnclatlon poUtlcal and economic reforms. At the very leut,
ortho clotennln1llon and IPl'tal orthe enemy, and rar they needed to broadenthe popularhue of the
too little lllM!lion to counterlnluraency and aovemment by brlnain& Inthe Buddhista and the
peclflcalion . "Third Force" advocatu for democr91ic reforms.
In 1984,journali1t Wllllarn Broyles Jr.returned to They also llHdecl to implement propams to
Vietnam where he had served u a Marine redl11n'bute llndso as to reduce hunaer and
lleute:wlt m&lnutrltion. Perblps the above would noc have
been
durln& the war. Broyles lnteJVl......S •vm.i Vietnam· sufficient; but there 11 no question thal Ibey were
ese aenerals and soldiers about their 1tn1el)'. ked necessary.
wby they persisted despite the enormous Orepower Inll'IUunder their control, the communists won the
qalllll them, many responded In per1phrues or the support or many ptlAllls by alvin& them llndto
lilq>le but powerful slopn or Ho 0.1 farm. Also, u John F. Kennedy's edv;-. wnecl
Minh:"Nothina him, the communists '""" Ihle to eppeal to tbe
I• more lmponant than Independence and freedom.• force of nation· alism In moblllzlna people qalnst
Americans viewed the war throuab the prism or Cold the "white races• with auns.
War ldeolol)' u between communllm and The Mr In Vietnam ahowed clearly thal
capltall1m. For most VletnameM, however, nice and technolo&Y '!Ould be overcomo by human lnaenuity
nation were ll'IJCb more Important forces. and determina tion. The communist1 peralsttd despite
Still, Broyles persisted, American hellcopcers were twice the per
extremely mobile Ind artillery encl B-521 capita bonle clealli nu•Japon InWorld War D. Infac1,
awesomely dutructJve. How could the Vietnamese only a handful of countries In tbe past I 00 years
win qalnst all thal? The Vletnamete answer wu thal have acceplorl such tremendous loueL 111ford
they prevailed propota tbll perhaps tht most lfr4X)rtant factor
by turnlna America'• superior military strenath qainlt Inthe -wu •en emy determlnallon":
her. One soldier replied, "We learned to bullcl
special shelters, to decoy your artillery and planes The North Vittnamew. bed cleclded that they
with sham positions, to tie )OU toyour firebues and were not aoin& to be cleft41ed. If U.S.air strikes
helicopters so thll they worked ogainst you." lcnocbd down abrldae, hordes of pouants mobi•
Military technolo11, by l11elr, cannot prevail lized to repair the destruction caused by the
bombs, to bullcl fords, or to put In an underwMer
Win· nlna or loslna depends primarily on the bridae. The bomblna n-.y even have strength·
motivation or the troops, nourished by the support entd the r110lve or a people ..tie> were
or the people. culturally inured to edveraity.
When people believe In a cause, they are capeble
or extraordinary sacriOces; encl, soldiers are Many In the military understood this U.S. forel171
capable or exir.orclinaiy courqe. In South
policy disaster all too well. Durtna the war, playwright
Vietnam, however, that wu not the case. The
ARVN bed linle public suppbrt, especially In the
counllylide, and suffered a
143

o
.......

151
 Arthur Miller -Invited to ipeak IIWest Point Aller
hl1 talk, be wont to a .-pelon IIa youna colonel'•
hou.. Mltw repotta: "Somo etalit or tin officm, all of
them VielnAnl wtenn1and lbeir wi-,lalal'Olmd unlit
Ihm 1b81 momina unburdtnln1 themtehoe1, lryina
to ltUe it clear to me not tbM they were lolins the
Wit because they hadone Mnd tied behind their
backs, but because Ibey were tryina to fish!
apoli"cal and moral
conflict with explosives. The ww, despite all tho
tnvay of their men, had somehow abaimd the ....,,.
Ice."
When it -all o-.KiMard uked the
1enenls who had commonded in Vietnam ...tietber
the w wu wonh the effort in Y:ew of the
cuualtlu and the dlwpdon of American politics
and IOCie()r. More thin half (53%) said the ww
either had nol been itor
should not have propued beyond an advisory effort.
AJ -aball -In Cl!apter 12, radlcal, liberal,
and conservllive penpoctivea llill co,,.,ete with
eKb other
In U.S. foret1n Ind military t>Olicy deb.I... They
all
..,.., hoer, that political leeders must inform
the public of tbe UblY colla of a foreisn Mr btfON
makins
Dlacunton QuHtlon•
I. In wbll did industrial leaders influence U.S.
mllilat)I policy?
2. "Rulu of Ena111men1•are the rulel that 1owm
the condition• under which l·S. forcu could flre
on a 1u1pected enelTI)'. Do such Niu make
aenM In a guerrilla co:illlct?
3. After 1968, mAllY American soldiers In
Vietnam resisted the war effort. How did they do
this and wbll is your opinion of their actions?
4. Why wtN many Vletnamete hostile toward the
government of South Vietnam? Whal role did ARVN
(Army, Republic ol Vietnam) pt.y in Ibis
relationship?
S. Whit were '.he goals of the Slralegic Hamlet
Pro gram? How did work? Why did the program
fall?
6. Dlring wm1ime, should wt permit the military to lie
to political leaders and the public Inthe name ol
national
144 l.
f'ICh a commltmenl. Public support Is eaential.
Few ""'" .,. chup and, uthe Sovltt Union
teamed In AfJhanlltan, .....Y, can be Iona and
f'lustnlins. No nllion should 10 ID war uni- it Is
wllllna and able to
be8r ill com.
BecallM w i1not just •conflict between
soldlen, but involves entire llllliona, an effective
war plan mutt hove social, political, Ind economic
u -11 u military
upects. This that wt need to undentMd the
cultures Ind political enviroounenb of Ibo counlries
In which we are involved.
Lffders should not deceive the public ond ill repre
-lallvea In Older ID manipullle co1111nt ID-·
Even tually the truth wiU come out, InddiJengqement
is far more coatly and dlfficuh than Initial avoidance
. The publle needs a c:aute It can believe In for its
sons to march olf to war, IndthM cauw must be
solidly bued In clearly 1taled national principle and
Interest.
American power la noc lnllnlte. It nwst be
exercised with areat care and onlY wbele our vital
national Inter estsclearly-al slake. Few IOd8,Y
btllave that Vielllam ever qualified by the•
standards.
aecurity? If noc, v.ill! can we do to prevent it?
Whst miaht be the conMquences?
7. In tne spring of 1967, General William
Westmore· land announced that the •crou-ove:
point" had been reached. WbAIdid ho ? Wu
thisusertion """"? Wl\y?
8. What is meant by the statement "the alrwar could
destroy the land, but it could not defeal th- people"?
If this statement is !Ne, why do you think that wt
contin ued the bombing for so tons?
9. In v.ill! ways were U.S. efforU to •w;n• the war in
Southeast Asia councerproductive ? noyou thlnlc that
U .S. civiiian and mllltary leaders have teamed
any lessons from the experience In Southeast
Asia? Ifso, what -those tesaons?
)
...
r: • )
Chapter 8 Jerold M. Starr and Christopher W. Wilkens

WHEN WAR BECOMES A CRIME:

THE CASE OF MY LAI

What Happened at My Lai?

The men of Charlie eo...,_,.y beam to llir 11first U.bt. Their sl«p lilld nl&ht h8d been filful beclllle t\
ltry 11\1111 wu th1nldnc about the111ack the next day. It wu a chlmce,11last, to brine 10me hurt to lhelr
entn\Y·The men colJt(:led their -.pons, a triple load of 111M1unillon ond pmadn, eXlra-er, ond
medical packs. Some 'MOie last wlUs ond testamer«s before boardin& the heUcopcen. The first Jin rose Into
the sky II0655 hows(6:55
a.m.) towwds the ban: Jct or My lai-4.The men wtre quiet• the ch:>ppm churned thNu&h the eArly mornina sky.
Inthe distance Ibey could -the flnl fall of the artillery on the ed&e of the vlllqe.
The momin& or March 16, 1968,dawned hot ond bwnid,es it usllllly does inQu.wia Na ·Province. The
villeae or Son My simmered inthe eArly momin& hat. Suddenly, the sbellin& beam . The people toe
.refuge intheir homemade abehers. The shellin& stopped, ond Ibey bnrdthe approacbinJ helicopters. They
knew lhll American
soldiers would soon enter the e,•bodhlpptned on mall)I o4her occuions. A rew bepn to leave their shelters
to wall
Thirteen·yur-old Tron Huym, like many boys inthe hamlet thll mominJ, wu out walking the waler buffaloes.
He usually Swith them for five lo seven days before retl.ming to the vilJaae. He hidbeen <>It WO daysv.t1en

l :J J 145
be uw tMl'lly·five htllcopten fiyl.na towud1 the him· father beaan running toward the rice l*lclies. They bad
let. He -not alarmed btcauao It -common to olrno1t ndo It to the fields when they were
- confronted bythree Amtricmi soldl1r1, ipeld out
AmeriCM bellcoptm Inthe lr9L
Infront of tbem about left --l!plrt. She recall•
Ueutellllll Willlmn J.Calley Jr. and his Flnt
painfully:
Plaloon

o-
"When wt saw the aoldlen, wt stopped runnin&·
_.. Inthe flnt lift of !belltKk. Their orders were
M,y flllber knelt dolWI on bis and put b1a
to
bands bl11-d. hlood lnfrom ofhim. I
MCUre the ludln& zone mid mab certain there wore
no ledto lllnd
betw.n tbe solcllen and Ill)' falber. They did not
enell\)' troo..left In the ..... to fin on the MCODd
"')'lhinl. 11itnthey looked • fadMr and -.
un Thay shot him and -1ked awo,y •
twenly minutes la!er. "A bullet went lhrouah father'schest md blood
Touch down -1110722hours (7:22 Lm.). Tha thlps
came out. He was llill brealblna ·Icried and held
flared out o- a rice peddy about ISO meters
him ln II\)' arms. He looked Illme but could no:lalk.
from the edae of the villa&e· rU'St plaloon Then be stopped brtathin& ."
juq>ed out and bepn settln& up a defense perimtter. "I cried and sta.Yed a '"1111e with my father. Then I
lnltial confusion arose
wont to look for a place to hide Inthe fields.•
when one sunshlp pllot called In a "bot lZ" (landina
Mal's whole family wu killed that rnornJna.
zone under enem,y fire). Howtver, company com·
PFCMichael Bernhardt remembers comLna Into the
mandcr Qptain Emu. Medina rwiioed that the
hamlet and seeLna his fellow soldiers "clolna a whole
landln& bad been smooth and thlll his men bad come
lot ofshoo11.n&....Bii none of It was lncomlna. I'd
Wider no fire. PFC Owles Hall confirmed, "I did not
been around enouah to tell that. Ifi&ured that wt
bear any bulletscnck by II\)'ears likeyou normally
were advancln& on the Yillaae with fire po-r."
htar...nothing
The rqi.n& fever In the other memben of bis
-happening....• platoon shocked-
Inthe vill11e all -qulet. Nauy.n Thi Doc-Just Bernhardt. He rw
one soldier clip after clip
be&innlna a rnomin& meal with thirteen memben of 111 everythlna be uw, t.uabin& allthe time.
her family, inc:ludi.n& nine arandchlldren. She heard
the Bernhardt feh alck about wt>ll be wu seeLna,but
also felt helpless to do anythl.na hat stand and
Americans "come clown from the sky" but thouaht
Mich. All tbroll&h that bloody bour his rifle wu
nothing of It:"they bad \eon in the vill111 before and
aluna nmle down. He felt
alWl,YI brouiht us medicine or candy for the
hthad no realOl1 toshoot. He told areporltr durlna
c:hlldrtn. It
wo bad known wU! they came for this time, wt
the invut11allon later...."I found out that an act like
would have fled.• that, you know, murder tor no reason, could be
clone by just about anybody.w
The acond ;!fl of troops landed on 1ehedule and
Lieutenant Calley set some of the men to work
the thiny odd men of Ueutenant Calley's rU'St
1a1berin& people toaether In aroupa In a central
Platoon lined up and h.:.•.:.: into the viUaae. They
loca· lion. PFC Meadlo describes '"1>al happened
wore tense and prepared for heavy enell\)' fire. Al
next....
they moved throuah the Yillqe, they followec! the
"Calley iuued orders topush the people Into aditch.
physical terrain, broakin& Into smaller and smaller
'Three or four Gls complied. Calley struck a woman
poups. PFC Poul Meadlo rememben someone
with his rifle as he forced her into the ditch.
callin& out that there -a "aook" over there.
Seraeant Mitchell said to shoot him and somtbody U.CAlley be1an to shoot Into the ditch and ordered
did. The muucre -on. Seraeant Owles West the othen to join ln....We pushed seven or el1ht
recalled later: more people Into the ditch and beaan to fire into
"When the attack started, It couldn't have been the people there....!
stopped by anyone. We wore mad and wt had been
told that only the enell\)' would be there when wt
lllllded .... We wore aolna in for a fiaht and for
our dead
buddles ....We started shootlna everythina and every· aueu I shot twen\)' to twenty.five people In the
body wo uw....lt -like our ammunition would ditch...men, women, kids, babiu....Motheu were
never arabbina their kids and kids wore grabbi.n& their
l"\D\ out...."
rnothen....I didn't know '"1>al to do...."
Nguyen Thi Mal, thirteen, wu In her but with her Pham Phonand bis family hid in their shelter
family when she beard the Americans enter the vill11e when the shellin& bepn. WMn it stopped,
and be&ln shooting. She rememben eveeyone rulhlna Phontold his wife and three children tocome out and
out and IClll!eri.n& in different clinc:1ions. Mal and "'1k slowly towwd
her

1411
;·1
 SOUTH VIETNAM

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

SOUTH VIETNAM
QUANG NGAI PROVINCE SON MY VILLAGE

147
the Americans. They knew they abouldn't si.y band like thal and then be shoo: his &wt andthen all
lruride the bouae or bunker. And they knew It was Gls aboot their &WIS."
Imperative not to run. The three children amlled Robert Moples, a rnochlne aunner, was ordered by
and shouted, "Hellol Hellol Oka,yl Oka,yl" C.alley tu fire Into the ditch,but he refllled. He
The Americans pointed their rlOe111the funily watched as othen fired rowtd &lier round and even
tossed are·
and sternly ordered them to walk to the canal
about a bmetera away. When they reoched nades into the ditch until everyone was believed
dead. Wamnt Officer Huah C.Thompson was
the canal, Phon saw •a lot or people who were
piloting oneor the cilcllng hella>ptera. He ond
grouping there,. many orwhom -cryin&. Senalna
bisaunner, LllTy Colbum, noticed the large
diauler, hi• quick
tbinkin& saved bis runlly's life: numbtrt or dead and wowtded Vietnamese civilians.
llllrted to mark the
"I tell my wife and 11\Y kids, 1Up into the canal
location or the wounded with smoke so they could
when GI not looking. We WlllCb for our chance and
be found and treated. One or the first wounded
we do Iha!. Sothen the GI begin to shoot II the
thal be marked was a little girl. A group or 10ldlen
standing people and
then waJkid over and riddled her body with
at the sltUng people on the honks or the canal. They
automatic weopons while she lay onthe aruwtd.
fall
Thompson later identified the man that did the
Into the canal and cover us wllb their bodies. So
shootln& as Captain &nest Med
they were not wowtded, myself, 11\Y wife and my
lna.
two sons. My little dau&hter, only seven years
Thompson was furiOU$. He radioed the lroopl
old, she was wounded In the arm when the Gls
onthe ground to flnd out what was going on. lie
shoot into the canal whe..they heard the people
reported to headquartera about the wtneceuary
groaning and making much noise."
shootings talcln& ploce in the village. His message
During the subsequent investigation, Phon was
was recorded on tape. At one point he decided to
asked whether the Gls had octed on their own,
drop down and evocuate some or the wowtded. He
without a l<ader. He ttplied, •No, there was a
and his crew chief spotted a aroup or a dozen to
leader....He was a small man, small like a
flfleen children. He ferried tho
Vietnamese. He waves his

148
BEST COPY AVAILABLE
" :;. 1fl fi

cblldren to the bo1pltal and retwmd to My Lai.
Thon landed qaln, havin& 1pottcd a
1mall chlld Jylna by hlmwlf. As be 1tarted toward
the child, he aw Calley also epproacblna tbe child.
Thompson motioned Calley toward him. They
met nur the helicopter. They excbanaed words.
Calley motioned with bll rlne. Obviously anary.
Thompson llP proached the waist aunner on hia
aircraft. He told the gunner to aim his weapon "at
that officer" Md ir the officer attempted to
interfere,to 1hoot him. lhoq>SOn then went beck,
picked up the child and carried him beck to the
helicopter. He flew the child to the hospital. Calley
walked over to hi1 radio operator and aid, "That
auy isn't very happy ..;th the way we're running thi1
operation. But I don't care. He's not in charge.•
Huah Thompson would later receive the Distinguished
Ayina Cross for his actions th·ll day at My Lai-4.
Ronald Haebtrle, the Ar >3 photoaraPher
assigned to the mission, was at My Lai-4 nurly the
whole day. His pbotoarai>bs were released nearly
two years later and shocked millions of Americans.
As he moved throu&h the villaae, he took pictures of
dead Vietnam ese piled on top ofeachother; pictures
of dtad •hildrcn
BEST COPY AYAILABlt'
cllnalna to their dead mothen; pictures or Gls bwr ina
hooches, buildln&s, and rooc1 Npplles.
The official Army llCCXlWlt of the Brlaade attack
that day claimed a body count orover one hunchd
twenty eiaht Vletcona and listed both individual
and crcw MrVed weapons as capCured. Cllarlle
Company wu credited with fifteen VC dead and the
capure or tJuott Individual WNpOns. The COJ11>111Y
also was credited with the copl\lre or a radio and
document• on the outskltts orthe hamlet of My
Lai-4. The report went on to oddtbll one Amerian
soldier had been killed 11111one wounded durina
the flahtina .
InKIUality,Oiarlie Cort1*1Y had suffered only
one casualty;oneorthe mtn hadlbot himoelr in the
root. He
l•er tntifled that he had done it to&•t out orthe
village btrore any more klllin& took place. As ror
enemy in-nee, PFC Bernhardt "didn't remember
seeina one mllitsyaae male in the entire pl.:e, dead
or alive.• And the three riflesrountt were American.
The "body count• was over three hundred, by
Olpc&in Medina'sestimate. It would Iller be shown
that the count was much hl&her: more than four
hundred al My Lai-4 and another one hundred plus
by Bravo Compony al My Khe-4 to the north or
My Lai. In all, the two companiu bad killed wtll
ov."fiw hundred Wllrmed Vie civilians in
,...than rour hours.
The next day, YOWi& Tran Huyen retumed
from welkin& the -ier bullaloeo. He met some
or the survlvon and, now very alarmed, "ran into the
hamlet." He recalls:
"It smelled very much. I saw that everythina had
been burned. Isaw arms and leas and pieces or
heads Jyina around. I ran to 11\Y house and saw it
was burned down. Ilifted the uhes and round my
arandfather I
could not wlderstand what had happened. Why
Ameri can soldiers wanted to kill everyone In the
vUlaae.•
"My mother and rather and brothers bad almdy
been buried by 11\Y relaliws when I arrived. I
went to their gravu. I cried....! Slill ay when I
think or that day.•
Dlscu11Jon Queatlons
I. Att there times when it is imponant to obty orders
without quellion or hesiwion? Give examples.
2. Is obedience instinctive to human btinas or Is
it socially conditioned? Can people bt tauaht to
disobey orders tbal cause UMCCCSS&r)' sulTerln& to
others?
15
148
7
 , ..

-
·· ·
»,···
.. .
·.: .. .... '"311

·----------------------
For three weeks during the Tel ottenalve of Janu1ry, 11168, communist soldiers occupild the
city of Hue. They 1rrested •nd executed thou11nds of those considered •enemies of the
people," that s luders lllled with the government of South Vlalnlm. Some were buried
lllveIn m111 graves. Edltor11letrtoonlat Tony Auth comments on the dilemma for many
Vietnam-.

actively opposed the Japmese occupailon. When tho

Victims are
wor ended, tho people welcomed Ho Chi Minh'•
People dec:la ralion oC an Independent Vietnam. When the
French retumed In 1946, the Vietminh qaln
First orpnlzed rells tw:e in tho ina. In1955,with lhe
French finally drlwn out, the Vietminh declared
tbemselvu repreMnWivu of the people of the vlllqe.
They organized a new
Who were the people of pey Lal and wtw could people'• council that encompuHCI all four hamlets.
they have done lo pnl\IOke 111th brutality? My Lal wu They took land from IOmt abMntee lancllordl and
more thanjust a""' zone. Itwu a trwlldonal farm gave it to those peuant farmen who had no land.
villqe that traced Its hlatory back to the early 17th The Vietminh a1Jo l...,oted taxn on the wealll\y
century. The beauty of iu land and beaches were land own cn and businessmen Inthe area. Repre-
well known, u -.. its bountiful rlce lwvests and tadves of the aovemment of the Republic of (South)
abundant calches from the aea. Within the hamlets Vietnam occa· lionally visited the area, hut had no
themselves, there arew a handicraft market of wood, innuence over the people. In 1960, however, the
bamboo, ivory and metals. The villqe of Son My U.S.tp0nsorr.I govern ment oC Preliclent Nao Dinh
became an educallonal and Buddhill rellaious center Diem challenaod the lead enhlp and reforms enacted
for that part of Quana Noal l't'ovinoe. From its earliest in the villqe o( Son !'.y' . The wealthy land owners
times it wu atronaJy Nlllon alistlc, opposed to were brouaht t.ck to reclaim the land tak«I from
western missionaries and tradtrs. When nectllal')', thtm and aovemrnent tax coUec:ton were bribed.
thia opposition took the form of armed By thll time, the Vietminh had been replaced t-y
resistance. the National Ubmilion Front (NU'). The Army oC
During World War II, the Vietminh resistance the Republic of Vietnam llarled to orpniu a
forces
in the area cooperated with the United States and

150
J.
 mlllllatolceepthe NU' monnmoutof the vW.e.
To served InV1ttnam also ......, immor.i? If,on the
mAb matten even -nt, Diem llPJIOinled a
other hnl, youthink the wor lnVlclnam WU
rnimJ,doet tbll
Catholic
ArchbiJbop llldbl,1brocbtr u the relJaious llldpolitJc.I -that eveeythlna tbll American IOldlen did -
leaden ol Q111na Npl Pro..U.C.. ion of monl? Can wa toJr.e dilfereat poeitioaa oa tboM qiaes
the tlons?
people pew ...S, with It, -ina oppooltion to the 3. Doyou think It ls possible ror the Vietnanme
·u.s. puwet• a<>WJ'llllllllt of Presideat Diem lllCI bi.I people lo roraive those conunitled alrocities qainll
two bated brotbm. them? Why mi&bt they be Ylillill& to do lhlil?
At tbla time,NU' rrpre..-Jves moved blc:k Would
Inlo cblllqe tbe aofor control. They thal be aJria)il'I
lrfttledtbe aovemment's repreMntatives and 4. Whal does My J..ti teach you, lf lll}'lblna, about
fonned a people's council mid a people'•court lo bow you should conduct your life? About mon1
ainy OUI public trials. Repraentalives mid values? Individual iespomibillty?
suppor1en of tbe Salaon aovem ment-rrmoved
flOlll tbe vm.,e. A caq:ioJp -
launched to educlle villaae11 about the "people's
C&lllt " By 1964,the forca of the Salaon aowrnmont
hod bee! rouled nlVietcona ond NU' forces
moved frrely lhrou&bout the Son My ore&. When
U.S. forces
The Laws of war
arrived In I96S, Quon& Npl Province became one
of the 11111 areu of oponllons. The U.S. Marine
Corpo llllDCbed Openlion Sl8rliabt 111111 soon
communl• ond ."you mi&bt ."My J..ti wu terrible, but
U.S. forces -re ena11ed in open warfwe with didn't o....i Shtnun 'Wu ls Hell'? r..·1all
the civilian populalion cau&bt helplessly in the fair in wu?" Actually, thal ls one of tho1e clicbes
middle. th11
As they hod always been, farrnt11 inthe probably bal newt been true. The civilized -.Id bas
.,... were concerned primarily with the survival of written records of llteft111s ID esc.bllsb laws of worr...
the vil- 1.,.. lbettfore they coopll1lled u much u tba1ao blc:k 2,SOOyurs or mcR. Such lawt pertain
possible with all political ond military forces to both the Issue or ldequate justlflcllion and or
operalinl in the area. Whenever a new force to proper conduct. Codes of coftlb:t ore concerned
the area, the with pre1tn1-
peasant f1m1tr1ar-ted them with asmile. AU ina 11mldatds or moral ity. Amona other tbinp, they
requests seek to moncii. the klllina or others with the pohibi
were conaideftd and, when possible, slllsfltd. The tion ll'W'der common to all human societies.
Yillaaers did nae protest when their food was Wen ... not foupt becaitc ordinlly people
confis caled. They didnae mist when their younc are Instinctively IQl'fSSive. On the contnry, aey
im.a were taken to fiabt inthe wor. Both sides nation
took adYllltap of this situation. Some or the &Oin& to WU ll'&ISt flnt fi&UN 0..how lo recruit
YoUna men or the vUJaae were ln the of and motivale Its lroop' Neither Is wor irltvlllble.
the Republic of (South) Vietnam. 1beelden W&11 are fouahl u.ruult orpolitic81 decisions
midviUqel1pvt out u little information u mode bynlllona1 Jeadm. And they buesuch
possible witbo,. btina lruultina . They tried lo decisions on their calcula tion tbal their nation's
rellllin Interests-whether poww, pru tlae, pofits,
neutral because they would have to answw lo both principles and/or polection or territory
sides. They provided support only v.ten It was .,.."'°"' likely to be advanced by Fin& to WU than by
necessaiy to save the village as a whole. nae aoln& to w.
laws concerning lwmanitarlan trutment for the
defelled mike it possible for ladersto concede
Dlacuulon Ouullona alosina fiaht and, thus, limit unnecesury casualties
on both
I. Ifyou were responsible for the ..rety ond sides. Neither the winner nor the loser bu 1111)'
w.Jrore of the Yill.,.,bow would you "'late to the inkreot in faahtin& to the last man. For _. to
militaiy forces in the-7 make 1111)' sense
II all, the"' must be spoils for the victor lo enjoy. The
2. If,as some people que,the wu in Vietnam - obvious purpMt of la or wor, then, ls ID keep wor u
immonl, does thal mean thal American soldiers who a legitimlle Jut raort for leaden lo cboooe in settlina

. l 151
"
 For AU My Brother• and Slatara

ThiaIs not •HY to write aboutIt Involves the Ignorant peasants shot by the A­merican aolct.rathese peasants -.so Ignorant they hid no namesso primitive
In nlllura they were alllndlatlngulahable from one anothersolike dumb animals
their lar>guage wH bebbUng noraenseand when
they died all you could remember wH their gesturesdinging together Jn the ditch

Dick Lourie

...

152
Ic; II
 LAST TRAIN TO NUREMBERG
worJs a,J 1l1wsic 6y
PETEt SEU.t

.. .
Am

I
,: I
J ,_., !t ; J p. :=
I

......
;
List trUD IO Nu ·rem ·bcrsl- lut IO u • rein .. :>c:1!-

:.• ,. ! . •J f{
,:,,,
'"ii
. z
Fuic

:
' L..t u.uo ID " • rem • bcr&I-
; boald .
.\U
••

.
,--1--, ,--J --.
I . : , ;, • & •
...
; • f7 4ti
......
I I '
'
I
I. Oo II laeu • teo·&at C.I • 1ey"' Oo ' Cp·t.Ufl t .. Ql na ' Do
Do II
rua • ' <Mot N'U • OD" Do let bOth hoU.S • t'Iol C(,,D . "".. Do

r
:>.C. d FLAt

•1 , ' t· r
'l
; E=-!
....
. r I
•II
'
c.ttW .,
I Ceo • 'ral Kot • tcraJld me lu.I lo4
I ..... YO C • 111'1 1
)"UU,

l. 'N'bo bt14 thl n.0• 'Who pvt the order'"'

Who pl.a .aid Cb• campe1p co lay waaca the llod,
Wbo cnu\l.facNz«S u:.. bullet" Who pa.s tb• r.a.u1., Tell me, Lt I.ba t blooel upoa my l\&.Cal l.,
(Cbona)

J . Co tcU &JI rM yowi1 oplc. tell all tbt UtUc ctu14uo

Ooo't, doo ·t )OU pt abO&N tltLI tr&JDI
SH •btrc ''°'wm• trom, 111wctu at 1iOl.AI · Doo't,cJoo "t )'OU r"1e at ever IJa&.DI
(Cllonu)

•. U Uft b\&Ddred thou.a&nl mot.t:.cn weot «o Wu tunpa

.\Dd utd , 'Brllll all at our tau hom e wu:hout del.ay•- Would the ma..o t.A«y came to Ht, •t "l\e vru too :>u..ty' WoWd he HY l\e Nd co walCb .a foot.ball pmc.
(Cbona)

..., h< .... 100 0"'9

-
I
y'

153
dloputel. The development of what ma,y be called
"m:>dom laws of Is bued on tbe worlt of Fl'llllel1
Ueber. Born mid ralJed tn Gemwly, Ueber became
• Ordered To
cltiJJen of tbe Unli.d s-1In 183211the aae of 34.
His
, work, "the Ueber Code,•-publ.lsbed on
April 24, 1863, clurlnt tbe time of the American
Civil War. The bulc arpment of the Ueber Code
Is tbll the violence of Wlr lbould be dUected only
toWlrd ll1llld
..,.m1es and tbll tbe conduct or -abould always
be re1ullled by mon1 -.cems. Certainly tbe
American
Civil War, 111etpedall.y cniel conflict lhll took the
lives of almost abllf-mllllon Amerlc:1n1,maltes the
loJic of limlllna ww's destruction vezy apporent.
Amon& other thinaa. tbe Ueber Code prolu'bits
111acks on disabled
enemla and torture to extort confessions, while nquir
ln& medial trellJmnl for captured wounded
enell\)I.
T'slnlemlllonal lawsof Wlr 1recontained In a
seri•s of truties called tbe Hque IndGeneva Conv•n
tlons. The United States Senate bu ratified these
trellia so Ibey .,.elllablisbed In U.S.law. These
laws set llmlts to what soldlen In war ma,y do.
U.S.Anny Field Manual 27-10 11the basis for
inllnlCtiftl all U.S. soldlen Inthe laws of warf'&N
dur!na basic tralnlnJ. Some of the actlona lhll
.,.outlawwd under lntema tional law are ufollows:
mwder of civilians and prisoners of war
- ill-treatment of civilians Ind prlsonen or war
- llCIJ of 11p<
- deportation of civilian populations for slave
labor
ldllln& of bostaaes or olh r terroriJtic ICll
plunder of public or privlle property
- any des1Juction of cities, towna or villa&es
not justified by miliuuy ..-uhy
154
1fi2
What If You Are
Commit A War
Crime?
Durin& World War D, Nu! military fo11:a and
their agents committed terrible crimestplnst innocent
civil ians. They slauabtered alx million Jews, half
the to181 popullllon of Jews tn the world, u well u
millions of Cllbollca, communilts Ind o1ber
"undeslral>ln.• 1bc honor of thl1holocaust lhocked
the world. After tho war, tbe vlctorlo111 nadonl put
many Nazi luden on trial In Nurembera, Gmnan,y
for war crime•. The common dtfena of these
luden-11111 they were not personally responsible
for their crimes becauae they were only followina
orders-led to the formulation of lhe Nurembera
Principles. Tbese princlplas bold:
"Iba ftcl tbll a penon ICled purallllll to an order of
bl• aovemment or a superior officer does not relieve
blm from the responsibility under lntemadonal law,
provided tbll a motal decision or choice wu In feet
possible for him.•
"A blaher law sometimes requlrel men to alw
their allealance to humlnlty rather than to the state.•
The United Swes Army lncorporlled the1e prin
ciples Into Ill own Uniform Code of Military Justice.
For ox&111'1• , the code specifies that the "orclen of
his superiors"thll a 10ldler "must obey" themselves
imist be "lawful.• The code also states that •every
vlolallon
of the rules of war is a war c:rlmt.•
With -espect lo the ..bjoct of this Chpter, the U.S.
Army hu clearly defined the shootlna or wwmed
civilians u •.,....vlolallonor the Geneva Convention
of Auaust 12, 1949. A 1908 MACV (Military Army
Conunand in Vietnam) directive requires a soldier
to report usoon upossible lo bl• commandina
officer any "incident or act thouaht to be a war
crime....• Moreover, persons discoverina war crimes
1rerequired lo "preserve pbyslcal evidence, to note
the ldenti1y or wilnases prewnt 11the time, Indto
record the cln:um stancts Indsunound'nas.• All
this information Isto be "made known lo official• of
the Sai&on Command Ind forwarded to
headqlllrten uI001I uit is pnicticaJ.•
Hlah rlllldna officen in the American and South
Vietnamese military comnllnd knew if whll people
were sa,yina blppened at My Lai were true, It
would conlltitule 1erioua war crimes for which
.,me soldien would have to be tried. In fllCt, It wu
con1ldered so horriblethat many tried to cover It
upcompler.ly. And they almoat 1ucceeded.
DllCUHlon OuHtlon•
Do)'Oii l&l'M tbal, lf J\llions are goina to have
wms, they need laws or warfare? Ifyou do not,
what would you propose Instead? Ifyou clo, make a
list or laws you would Include.
Now look al the law. you lilted and 1ee if
you
covered the followina:
I. How 1hould civilians be treatod'I What if they
are
1uspected enemy agenll? enemy 1ympathlzen?
2. Whll 1hould be the ruleo or lntenopllon?
Should tomn be allowed? Whll if the 1uspect
refuse• to talk? 3.How 1hould an Wlllmed or
wounded enemy officer be treated? Whal about an
wwmed or woWldcd enemy soIdler?
4. Do prboners of war have any rigbt1? What
abo1•t food? 1helter? medicine? Whal if your
own troops don't have enou1h?
5. Would you allow the use of chemical weapons,
like
Aaent Orange? Why? Wl\Y not?
6. Whal about bombina? Should bomblna of
enemy bue1 be allowed? Whal about factories?
Wha: if there II a danger thal ho1pltal1 and/or
1ehool1 mlaht be accidentally destroyed? Should
anythlna be done If they are?
1. Shoul!i any particular w.apons beouttwed?
Whal about "cluater" bombl that •Pra.Y metal
"...,menll for hunclftcll of yard• or napalm that
1preaclJ a &llSOlinc jelly that eall a al the
nub?
The Cover-up
My Lai was the biagcst action In the America!
Divilion'• area of opentions. So it was no wonder
that the 1ky over My Lai was filled with C&C
nights (command and control nights). All
commanden were tied Into the command net and
coul hear all th• ;adio "traffic" from the a1tacklna
compwlies while :.ie ac1ion developed .
A1 Charlie Comp.ny moved out of the
bamlet, M O..lu Calhoun, Tuk fORe
Barker'•Executive Officer, told c.pa1n Medina
to IO1-ckand recount the
civilian dead. Medina coalned thal It wu 1ate
and he wanted to aet Into a nlabt defe111lve
position before dark. Suddenly,General Kolter came
on the rwlio lll1d
said tocancel the lasl Older becauae it was too late In
tlie day. He then ubd Medina how many civilian
dead were counted durinl the action. Medin•
reported twenty.five to twenty·eilht.
Whit Madina did not know wu that all radio
"traf fic" from the ·s action bad been reconled al
Bripde He.dquartm. In addition,Warrant Officer
Tho had nted a complete report al his
headquarters, the
!23rd Aviation Battalion, deocribln& whal he had-
n and his convenatlon with Calley. Rumon or
what
happened In the hamlet of My w-4 beaan to spread
throuahout the whole Division.
Medina WU advised of Thompson's complaint
and called bis platoon leaders toaether . He •old
them that there probably would be an Investigation
of some kind. He uked them not to talk about what
had happened with anyone ou11ide the compeny.
He promised that he would back them up tothe
flill..t Still, .,me of the nien were worried. One
Wini(':) the VletnameM !nterprettt to "look uual"
and "be cool" or "it could be very dangeroua for
you.•
On March 17,Colonel 1lenderson, the Bri&ade Com
mander, Initiated a routine investiaalion of the
lncldent. Medina's men repo11ed tbere were no
lndlocrlnllnale killlnas durina the a11ack. Thompson
and his &Wlrllr, Larry Colburn,both rep0r1ed whal
they saw, bul Hen· denon 1howed little Interest.
For the reot of the year, Charlie Com!*\)'settled
back into Ill opeRlional rou· tine. Calley wu
relieved or plaloon conuniind. He rt<tlltlted and
received a transfer out or the company. Very fewof
the men talked about the attack 8f\Y more. However
ThomP10n's "official" complaint could not be lane-
red completely. People were talklna . At Otu LAI,
the Americal DiviJlon'smain bese, General Kosttr
began to receive Inquiries frt"m boll1Salaon and
Wash· in&ton about the rumors. He sent the
Inquiries to Hender.in and ordered a formal
investigalion .
The reports all came to Koster'• duk. Clvill111
deaths were acknowlqed,but they were attributed lo
errant artillery and aunship strikes. lbere wu no
mention or unneceswy shootings of civilians.
Koster forWBlded the.. reports to Saiaun and
Wuhington.
155
l f jj

Major General 8amuel W.Koater
Headqlllllm, Y Mli1Red, filed he reports.
No one seemed to notice that none or the llll'Vivors
or My IAl-4, nor 1r1y of the men of Owlie
CompMy bad ever been lntervlewed.
The South Vletnamete military, on th other hand,
had r.lked to auvlvora atld othert In th.! ll't& and
they knew most er what hid hippentd that day.
Thue nports wtre sent to Salaon, but th..y were
suppeued. Pnslclent Thieu'• orroce -concerned
with not 111· taaonizln& the AmeriC1111 ond mt
arowlna 11111-Ameri· can feelinas amona the Snuth
Vietnamew.
It took the persistence of A youna helicopter
door gunner, Ron Ridenhour, to Irina the story or
the nw· ucre to public liaht. Ridenhour 1WOte letten
to at leaot
thil\y conareuional luclers ond Pent.Ron officials
U· sertina his belief that •aomethina rather
dark and bloody did indeed occur aome time In March
1968 In a villa&• called 'Plnkvllle' In the Ref;ibl!c or
Vietnam.• After n;ooths or being i&n0red, he
clecld«I to ao public. HI• Ital)' was picked up uy
journalist Seymour Hersh. In his own hwutiaatlon
Hersh discovered that Ron Haebtrle had ,,,,,.i. up a
slide show frorn his personal collection of pictW'OI
from the My lJll 4 ,nack. The story 111d pictures
opread acrou the nation.
Directed by President Nixon, Secretery of Def•nse
Melvin lJlird ordered Secretary or the Aney
Stanley Resot tu conduct a full ond "total"
inveati&ation of the Incident. It wu discovered that
Army fllci and after· action reports on the incident
had been either destroyed or deliberately m11flled by
high ranklna officers. Army radio logsalao .wre
altered for that da,y to further cover up what had
ned. Eventually, the Arn\Y would charae t.wnty-
Rve men either with partlclpetina ln the kllllna or
Vietnamese clvili111s or In the suboequent cover-up.
Conare11 was briefed ond a repon was made to the
world press. It took t.wnty 1nonths for the
American public to learn about the attack on My
lJli-4.

Olacuealon QueaUon

Ronald L. Ridenhour History offers examples ot' other traaedies, such

as the Holocaust , which were possible because
peapie were indifferent to the suff•rina. Do you
qree or disagree that people who do not speak out
Hi& when they witness wsr crime are accomplices to
those crimes?

.;i . Ifi ·1
BEST COPY AVAILABLE

The Court-Martial
Whtn news of the My Lal lncldtnt became
more wide apread, Calley -pulled hick to Fort
Bennlna.
Aney Inr.elUaeace Mil Aney Oi.mlnal 1n-tlption
aaents bepn to ala-aou the nation to rtnd witndses.
In all, nearly four hundred people were
Interviewed reprdina whal they knew lbout My
Lai-4.
On Sepe.mt« 6, 1969, Calley- fOIT!lllly
cbaraed with vlolllln1 Artlcle 118 of the Unlfonn
Code of Military Juatlce. His a>wt·mmtlal bepn on
November
12. He -cbarpd with one bundled nine counts
of murder of tho .,timalecl moro than four hundred
klllln&s in My Lal.
Every attempt -made to ensure thll Calley
would be triul by ajwyof his peer? Ub Calley, four
of lhe
Cln·acenelnveallgation In the My Lal area.
Calley: "No, sir. I wu never told that I had a choice."
six jury membenhadbeetsndUlledfrom OCSal
Fort BeMlna. Five h..t ..,,,eel in Vietnam for al leut
one full tour. AU were a>mbol velenull who h..t
,..,;vec1 a1Wd1 for valor under fire. The trial
judp, military defenoe laW)"S' and two civilian
lawyen weN c:ombol
VfltnU\I,
The trial brouaht out the 1hortcomins1 of Calley's
preparation prior to beq shipped oveneu. At one
point he WU questioned lbout hl1 inllnlctlon in the
rules of wvf1rt, u outl1ned In the Geneva
Convention of 1949, whkh specifically outlawed
"willful kllllna, torture, or inhuman treatment ....•
•••
Calley: "1 lcnow there .wreclusa. NothJna standsout
in my mind what wu covered in those claues.•
Quntlon: "Did you learn &r\)'lhlng Inthose cl-•of
what the Geneva Convention actually covered u
rar as
rules and re1ulallons of warfare were concemed?"
Calley: "No, sir.•
Qunllon: "Did you ever receive any lnstructloru on
taking prisoners?"
Calley 1 "Ya, sir. Treat them with respect,
bumllhy. Don't burnllllte them. Keep them lilenL
Keep them llflll8l*I and keep them closely
slWded, sir.•
On the other hand, Calley sawobedience to orders as
U.Olute:
Queotlon : "Did you lt'Ctive anyINlnlna Inany of
thole places that had to do with obedience to
orders?"
Colley: "Yes,sir. It was to JSSUmed that all orders
W11e lqal,lhatuoldier '1job-toc:anyout all orders
to the best of bis ..Oilitles. You oouJd be a>wt-
martlaled forrefualns ..order....You could be
sentenced to dealh for refualns an order In the face
of the enemy....•
Qu<1Uon: •...Were you ewr requireo Inany way,
shape or fonn to make a determlnatior, of the
leaality ?r llleaality of .in order?"
157
l f j !j
 QuutlOD: "If you b&d a doubt about an ord<r, wbll
....,. )'OU IUppoMd ll do?"

Calley: "If I tlonod., order, I-to cany 0111

"I)' mission finl and then come back and make
"I)' repon....Jf -atwn a mialon I,...upected 10
cany iiOU! lmmedialel)'..-"

•••
Georae Latimer, Calley's defense lawyer,
appealed 10 Ibo jury 10 CIOllllder the pecull.- honors
of this -of attrition against aumilla forces
inIndochina:

"Ueutenanl Calley and his pl11oon were in.de

qualely balned and insln>o1ed for this eype of
combal. The unit ,... unders1m1&1h and II wu
the first time some of the men badbeen under
fire. They _,., led to believe that lhelr attack
would be bitterly resisted bythe tne"I)'. The
..:cuMdbadknowkd&e of lmil)' lll'Oclties
committed by lht tne"I)' on Amtrican and South Captain Emeat Medina
V1tt- 111JMM lffVl«men and c!Ylllans in the area.
Many of lht toldlers openlina In the Quana Naai
.,.bad betn killod and othen ruinedfor life by
bavlna lhtir arms and leas blown off by mines....•
"Thus ii wu that Cliarlle Co"1'&11)', with
Calley's the lead platoon, stormed Imo My Lal on
M1tc:b 16, 1968, with a feellna of reYClllC and
reprisal."
Durlna tbe course of Calley's trial, r>.lll)'
members of his platoon, now mostly dlsclwJed
veterans.tull fied u to what bad happened In lht
Yi Uoge that
what Calley baddone Indwbll be bad ordered his
men todo. Medina testified that he felt Calley
badexceeded bis Olden durina lht lltac:k on lhe
Yilla&e. Mudlo and Bernhardt aave the most
clamaglna eyewilness ac COWllJ of the ewnlJ. Ron
Haeberle's pbolognpbs were the moll diamallc
physical •Yidence inlroduced. Aflor all testimony
bad been beard and ail ninety-<>ne wit nesses
called,IboJLOY relired to coosider averdict. The
jury took thirteen days to arrive IIa verdict.
While be waited, Calley wu Interviewed for a
book by John Sack. DurinJ lhls Interview,
Calley rentcted on the forces that badcontributed to Lieutenant G-ral Wlllam R.Peers
his frame of mind that day in My Lal:

"•..So that wu us: Oiarlie Company and we

"Mre in
Vietnam now..•.There -med to be no nice
sedions

158

1fi f i
 ere. I felt superior there. I tbouaht, I'm the bla
Nearo. 1uppoMdly, It 'sevil, It 'sbad ...."
Americon from 11erou tho aea. I'll sock it to theM
"Al for me, I like Oiristianlty....A man "ith a
people here....•
little paddy u.ys, 'I llke 10melhinaelM, and I'm
hippy too'. I uk would communism hurt him? It
"After It\)' MCOnd,It\)' third, It\)' fourth, It\)'
wouldn't hurt him a dunned bltl Co.,.,ared to a
fiflh, Ill)' tenth,my i-iftb, my i-ntletb-ambush, I
still hldn't bed a Ve In my killing zone, and I
war, colllllllllllsm would be a aodMnd- The
had bad perfect ambush sites too....Clwlle wu bonol'I of -came toptber Ill My Uion March
combat infanllyl We want to kill!" 16,1968.And 10rned9ytbe Gii who went there
"Not halfu much u our colonel did. Ht kepi will sq, 'Now the world knows wblll war 11.
And now the world really bales it. And
uking
now there is No More War.'"
us,'Any body count?'"
"No, sir.• Alfor bis own sutJt or Innocence, Calley
clearlybad learned much since his arrest:
' No body count?"'
0

"Nobody there to shoot at.• "...I'mdifferent now. I said a Iona while aao.if
"'You better aet on the stick sometime.•• Americans told me 'Go massacre one thousand
com munists,• I will massacre one thousand
"Yes, 11.r."
communists. No lonaer:toda,y ifAmerica said,'Go
"Itbouaht, ob,for&et it, Colonel. Wbat doyou
to My Lai. Kill everyone there,' I would refuse to.
really want of me?...do you kill everyone in South
I'd really say, 'It's illeaaJ, and I can't be a part of
Vietnam? Andse,y, 'We have won ,..., areaolna
It.' Of coune to kill
bome.' I lmogine so: just everything In toda,y's
everyone in My Lal isn 't the only llleaal thina we do.
society 11'How many thousands? How many
To ev11euate them is illeaaJ too-ii 11&ainst the
millions? How many billions ?' And everythlna WU
Geneva Convention. I've leamed. So ii kidnapin&
in Vietnam; WU numben andIbad to furnish them. So
them. To bwntheir h<luses is very llleaal, and I
televblon could sq, 'We killed another thousand
don't know why the Judge didn't say, 'A reasonable
toda,y,' and Americans sq, •our man would realize it.' One shouldn't bwn a
country'• arut."' Vietnamese vill11&e. It ii l&ainst the Uniform
"The body count-darM. I did what every lieuten Code of Military Justice, Artlcle CDC. It doeRt't
ant bad to: I fonaily aot us a body count....• c:arry death, but it dou carry five years at
"If you 're a GI who hu lost eighteen friends Luvenwortb. Hell,tojust be in My Lai wilh an M-
in a mine fleid with a Vietnamese Yillaae a few 16and some ammunltlon 11 llk>aal too....J now think,
hundred meters away-well. You think, Why didn't to go to Vietnam Is Uleaal too.•
the Viet· rwnese signal us? Why didn't the
Vietnamese tell us, 'Hty there's a mine field On March 29, 1970,the jury reached Its verdict
there.'....At lut it dawned on me, these people It found Lieutenant William J. Calley Jr. aulll)' of
they' re all the VC....• the murder of IIleut thirty-three "oriental human
beings, occupants of the Yill11&e of My I.al, whose
"I bad now found the VC. Everyone there wu names and sexes ate unknown, by means of
VC The old men,the women, the children-the shootlna them with a rine."
babies Mre all VC or would be VC Inabout three The jury then sentenced Calley to be dishonorably
yean . And inside of VC women, I guess there di1eiwged from the Arlt\)' with forfeiture of all PIY
were a thousand little VC now. I thought, Damn it, and allowances and conunined to Leawnworth
what do I do?...Chop up all these people?" Prison for life. After the annowicement of his
Reflec:tlna on the reasons for the war,Calley sentence, Calley was taken away to the post
became philosophlcal : stockade.
"We Mren't in My I.Ai to kill human belnas, On April I , 1970, Calley was placed under
really. house amst based on ordeN from the Commander-
We were there to kill ideology...an intangible Idea.• in-Chief, while the case was plllCed Wider review
"To destroy communism. Now, I hale to say it, but and oppeal. In September, President Nixon
most people know a lot more about communism reduced Calley's sen tence to twenty years. The
than I do. Inochool, I newr tbousht about it. Ijust cue wu appuled to various courts for more than
dismissed it:I looked at conununism as a
three years. Inthe end all appeals Mre denied.
soutbemer looks IIa
However, after the final appeal,

l fi 7 159
Lieutenant WIWam J.Calley Jr.

160

BEST COPY AVAILABLE