MODELLING OF IGNITION SOURCES

ON OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS

FACILITIES

Ingar Fossan
Lloyd’s Register Consulting

E: Ingar.Fossan@lr.org

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 Modelling of Ignition Sources on Offshore Oil and Gas
Facilities
Ingar Fossan, Senior Principal Consultant
FABIG, London/Aberdeen, June 23rd / June 24th 2015

Working together
for a safer world

Content

• Overview recent work carried in the industry in Norway on recommended practice

for modelling of the ignition control barrier in risk analysis
• The model is briefly described and examples are presented for demonstration of
the capability to reflect important aspects of the ignition control barrier.
• The model’s capability to reflect the historical fire frequency in North Sea is shown
and compared with another commonly used model in industry – the UKOOA
ignition model

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 Motivation – effective barrier management

Normal
Failure Hazard Consequence
operation

Barrier Barrier Barrier

Increased focus in QRA on reflecting barriers that reduce occurrence of events!

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We need understand the complex relationship between the physical

phenomena and the barriers as the initial event unfolds

Fire Damage

Leak Dispersion Ignition Explosion Damage

Toxic
effect

Time

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 We need understand the complex relationship between the physical
phenomena and the barriers as the initial event unfolds

How can we optimize the safety design

such that the event does not ignite!
Fire Damage

Leak Dispersion Ignition Explosion Damage

Toxic
effect

Time

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The rational

• The likelihood of exposing potential sources of ignition in the module to combustible mixture of gas is
very different in the two cases!
• Appreciating that the ignition probability should be different for these two cases forms the basic
rational for the approach.

Exact same leak scenario - 5 kg/s

Open module Combustible gas cloud shown at steady Enclosed module
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 Ignition modelling - general principle

• Ignition probability is the product of two probabilities; the probability for exposure of a
live ignition source to a flammable fluid, ܲሺ‫ܧ‬ሻ, and the ignition probability given such
exposure, ܲ ‫ܧ ܫ‬ሻ

PIgnition = ܲ ‫ ܫ‬ൌ ܲሺ‫ܧ‬ሻ ȉ ܲ ‫ܧ ܫ‬ሻ

• Both ሺሻ and ሺ ȁሻ possess a time dependent behavior resulting from the
properties of the process system and safety functions
• We have to reflect the transient relationship between the various safety functions to
enable effective analysis of the barriers
• Guidelines for establishing a model according this principle can be found in NORSOK
Z-13 and in guidance notes under the LR rules. The latter also cover important
additional aspects related to LNG.

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Modelling of ignition sources

• A detailed understanding of various objects potentially possessing a mode as a source of

ignition, i.e. ܲ ‫ܧ ܫ‬ሻ , is required
• In the mid 1990’s a joint industry project (JIP) was created to develop a model on ignition
mechanism on offshore platforms (often referred to as the JIP ignition model).
• Almost a decade later a new model (model often referred to as OLF model) was created
by a JIP headed by Scandpower Risk Management (rebranded to Lloyd’s Register
Consulting in 2012).
• Another 5 year period later, the ignition model was updated in 2014 to reflect improved
knowledge and methods to model the ignition control barrier in QRAs.
• This project was executed by Lloyd’s Register and Lilleaker Consulting AS on behalf of
the Norwegian Oil and Gas Association. All the operators at NCS plus DNV GL, Safetec
and Gexcon reviewed the model development and report.
• Resulting report denoted MISOF (Modelling of Ignition Sources on Offshore oil and gas
Facilities).

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 Model basis

• The model is based on hydrocarbon leak statistics collected for the UK Continental Shelf
(UKCS) from 1992-2012, from the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) from 1996-2009
and the Danish Continental Shelf (DCS) from 2004 to 2010.
• Hence the model is tuned to North Sea offshore facilities with regard to industry practice
• It is judged that the model is applicable to other domains with equivalent industry
practice in terms of safety design
• 3 relevant ignited event identified; two at UK sector and one at Danish sector
• 1,665 corresponding relevant leaks
• The historical ignition probability should be around 0.2%
• Currently report is not open for distribution. The project is awaiting ongoing project
updating the leak frequency model for NCS (headed by LR Consulting on behalf of
Statoil)
• On behalf of Statoil, LR Consulting has developed an adjusted model, based on the
same principles, for land based facilities

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Model structure

The exposure
model, ܲሺ‫ܧ‬ሻ,
The exposure
must reflect the
model, ܲሺ‫ܧ‬ሻ,
location of these
should reflect the
special sources
location of the
of ignition.
rotating
equipment
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 Benefits

• MISOF enables detailed Assessment of

• type of Ex equipment, Ex zone 1 vs. Ex zone 2
• fraction of equipment being isolated upon detection
• layout with respect to
• Rotating equipment (pumps and compressors)
• Equipment not intended for use in explosive atmosphere, such as diesel engines and
gas turbines
• the safety functions affecting loss of containment
• Gas detection
• ESD
• Blow down
• Geometrical layout affecting the ventilation conditions
• The effect of deluge, where the time to initiation is crucial to reflect justify the mitigating
effect on the explosion load
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Case example – exposure to gas turbine air intake

• The gas turbine is a known significant potential source of ignition; however the
actual behavior of a gas turbine when the intake air includes combustible fluid is
still not adequately understood.
• Two out of the three relevant events found in the historical data for the North Sea
in the period 1992-2012 were possibly ignited by combustible gas included in the
intake air, which suggest that the likelihood of ignition is very high. Potential
ignition mechanisms have been found both under normal operation and during the
shutdown sequence
• To understand the mechanisms of ignition and the likelihood that ingested
flammable gas will ignite a JIP for investing the behavior of gas turbines in such a
scenario are currently being established by Lloyd’s Register.
• A preliminary ignition model for ignition due exposure of gas turbine air intakes
has been established which will result in a very high likelihood of ignition

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 Case example – exposure to gas turbine air intake

Intake

Gas clouds surrounding the gas turbine intake

Gas Turbine in the utility area exposed to gas cloud

Even small leaks may expose air intakes of

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turbines driving compressors

Case example – exposure to gas turbine air intake

Prominent effect of
gas turbine located
in process area,
which is crucial to
highlight in risk
analysis to justify
high cost measures
according to ALARP
principle

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 Comparison UKOOA Ignition model

• The absolute value of the estimated frequency for explosions and frequency is the
crucial for whether the suggested improvements are financially viable or not. The
review of the statistics suggests that the historical likelihood of ignition for the
installations in the North Sea should be around 0.20%. The underlying ignition
probability for the various installations in the North Sea should hence be around
that average figure, some above and some below.
• Various ignition models are available in the market. A recognized model in
industry is the UKOOA ignition model
• The following slide shows the result using the UKOOA look up functions and using
the exact same probabilistic gas dispersion model as basis as for the model based
on the new MISOF model

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Basis for application of UKOOA model in example

• The installation used is the same installation as applied as basis for the benchmarking model
of the MISOF model.
• The installation is a conventional jacket with typical module sizes and layout found on both
UKCS and NCS. The platform produce mostly gas and condensate. The platform consists of
5 modules included in the probabilistic model; 1 wellhead module and 4 process modules

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 UKOOA Look-up functions

• Curve 17 (Offshore Process Liquid) and Curve 20 (Offshore Process Gas Typical)
is used for all liquid and gas leaks respectively

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Comparison UKOOA Ignition model

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 Comparison UKOOA Ignition model

• Significant difference in
resulting overall ignition
probability (average for all
5 modules)

• However, models can be

considered to be aligned
for this particular case.
UKOOA methodology is
coarser and to account for
uncertainty it is reasonable
that the model produce
higher probabilities.

• The important aspect is

however the difference in
ability to reflect the ignition
control barrier
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UKOOA – generic distribution of ignition time applied

• Generic distribution of ignition time taken from UKOOA model (see Table 2.15 in Section 2.8.5.1 in
UKOOA report)

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 Comparison UKOOA Ignition model

Significant difference in overall

resulting explosion pressure
distribution for the entire installation
(sum of 5 modules including
wellhead). NB! Difference is more
prominent per module (which is not
shown).
It is expected that difference is more
prominent for other concepts (e.g.
FPSO, enclosures and land based
facilities), but this has not been
investigated. This is expected bacue
result will be dependent on time
distribution, which varies for different
concepts, layouts and safety designs

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UKOOA vs. MISOF – some observations

• MISOF based on transient cloud model and transient response of safety functions:
• MISOF enable a detailed assessment of safety functions such as
• Location of ignition sources (rotating equipment, electrical equipment, instruments, air intakes)
• Properties of F&G system (number of detectors, type of detectors, voting, set point)
• Response of F&G system, ESD system, BD system
• Type of Ex equipment
• Efficiency of isolation of ignition sources
• A detailed calculation of the distribution of ignition outcomes (fire vs. explosion ) as the point in time when
ignition occur is calculated transiently in the model.
• MISOF is more complex, and requires more analysis work to be undertaken (i.e. build exposure model), hence
• UKOOA more efficient for coarse analysis, screening studies and when is detailed approach based on CFD
simulations is not required for the problem at hand. In general, it can be expected that the UKOOA model result
in more conservative result, which is aligned with sound risk management principles.
• Different trends with respect to release rate
• MISOF reflect ignition time in more detail, and there is not necessarily a continuous increase of likelihood of
ignition with release rate (large release rates may have less likelihood than intermediate releases due to short
duration (e.g. enclosures)

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 Summary

• The added value of transient modelling of ignition probability based on the MISOF model
has been demonstrated – it enables the operator to understand the performance the
ignition control barrier in detail
• The MISOF report will be released by the Norwegian Oil and Gas Association following
the update of the leak frequency model for Norwegian Continental Shelf developed in an
on-going project headed by LR Consulting on behalf of Statoil
• We need more partners in our JIP project on investigation on how to control risk
associated with gas ingested in gas turbine air intakes – please consider the invitation to
join the JIP that is about to the kick off. Find out more at
http://www.lr.org/en/energy/technology-and-innovation/joint-industry-projects/

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Ingar Fossan M.Sc.

Senior Principal Consultant
LR Consulting, Trondheim
T +47 934 38 201 E ingar.fossan@lr.org

Lloyd’s Register Consulting

Havnegata 9, Trondheim

Working together
for a safer world

Lloyd’s Register and variants of it are trading names of Lloyd’s Register Group Limited, its subsidiaries and affiliates.
Copyright © Lloyd’s Register [Entity]. 2013. A member of the Lloyd’s Register group.

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