The document summarizes and compares the safety goals and approaches to probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) used in the nuclear regulatory frameworks of the US, France, UK, Finland, and Japan. The US was the first to establish quantitative safety goals in 1986 to evaluate new regulations following the Three Mile Island accident. While approaches differ among countries, common themes include establishing qualitative goals to limit public risk and quantitative targets for acceptable frequencies of accidents. Reference values or case-by-case assessments are also used. Finland and Japan have incorporated probabilistic design goals.
The document summarizes and compares the safety goals and approaches to probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) used in the nuclear regulatory frameworks of the US, France, UK, Finland, and Japan. The US was the first to establish quantitative safety goals in 1986 to evaluate new regulations following the Three Mile Island accident. While approaches differ among countries, common themes include establishing qualitative goals to limit public risk and quantitative targets for acceptable frequencies of accidents. Reference values or case-by-case assessments are also used. Finland and Japan have incorporated probabilistic design goals.
The document summarizes and compares the safety goals and approaches to probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) used in the nuclear regulatory frameworks of the US, France, UK, Finland, and Japan. The US was the first to establish quantitative safety goals in 1986 to evaluate new regulations following the Three Mile Island accident. While approaches differ among countries, common themes include establishing qualitative goals to limit public risk and quantitative targets for acceptable frequencies of accidents. Reference values or case-by-case assessments are also used. Finland and Japan have incorporated probabilistic design goals.
Reference: Safety Goals and Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Nuclear Regulation in Various Countries
U.S. France U.K. Finland Japan
Safety Goals: Usage Safety goals provide standards to evaluate the appropriateness of There are no safety goals Basic Safety Limit (BSL), : A level Probabilistic design goals, -Safety goals are established as standards for risk control that could regulations. New power plants are required to confirm compliance with that use absolute values. which should be met by licensing which prescribe the standards be achieved through the country's nuclear safety regulations. They are the safety goals. However, they are not applicable to individual, existing (NEA/CSNI/R(2012)11, activities. that must be met during the established using approaches to probabilistic risks, and are referenced power plants. There are two types of safety goals: qualitative safety goals Use and Development of Basic Safety Objective (BSO): A level at design phase of a new reactor, in making decisions on safety regulations, etc. (Interim Study and and quantitative objectives. General performance guidelines are used PSA, June 2013) which further risk reduction is not have been established. Deliberation of Safety Goals, December 2003) supplementary. (Safety Goal for the Operations of Nuclear Power Plants; required by regulation. (YVL 2.8, PSA in safety -It was confirmed that the results of investigation by the former Policy Statement, 51FR28044, August 4, 1986) Reference values are (Safety Assessment Principles) management of nuclear power Nuclear Safety Commission provide sufficient basis for the Nuclear sometimes determined on a plants, May 2003) Regulatory Commission to discuss safety goals. (Nuclear Regulatory case-by-case basis. Commission, April 10, 2013) *For example, the accident *Existing reactors must also sequences with CDF>10- meet the standards to the best 8/year are evaluated in PSRs extent possible. Safety Goals: -In response to the TMI accident in 1979, the Nuclear Regulatory There is no safety goal that -Following the draft version in 1988, the -The Radiation and Nuclear -In 2002, the Nuclear Safety Commission established the Special Background Commission (NRC) began an investigation. use absolute values. Health and Safety Executive (HSE) Safety Authority (STUK) Committee on Safety Goals based on the ongoing trend to exploit risk -In 1986, the NRC released the [Policy Statement on Safety Goals]. There created a framework for the Tolerability demanded Level 2 PSA for information in the U.S., etc. are two types of safety goals: qualitative and quantitative goals Of Risk (ToR) and announced its individual plants. -In 2003, an interim summary on establishing the safety goals was (performance goals are supplementary). Safety goals provide a barometer approach to the Basic Safety Limit (BSL) -Established probabilistic released, which were based on individual risks of the public at large. to evaluate the appropriateness of regulations. However, safety goals are and the Basic Safety Objective (BSO). design goals in the regulatory-In 2006, performance goals were announced, which were based on not applicable to individual, existing power plants. -BSL: A standard that must be met for guideline issued in 1987. the degree of core damage and the frequency of containment vessel authorization failures. -BSO:A standard that limits regulations *Finland's regulations were -It was confirmed that the results of investigation by the former from demanding further risk reduction created for new reactors. Nuclear Safety Commission provide sufficient basis for the Nuclear In 1992, the [Nuclear Inspection] (NI) Existing reactors are asked to Regulatory Commission to discuss safety goals. revised the Safety Assessment Principles meet these standards to the -Safety goals are established as standards for risk control that could (SAP) in response to the above, and best extent possible. be achieved through the country's nuclear safety regulations. They are established more specific BSL and BSO. established using approaches to probabilistic risks, and are referenced -The frameworks for the BSL and BSO in making decisions on safety regulations, etc. The Details of Safety <Qualitative Safety Goals> -- <Probablistic design goals> <Qualitative goals> Goals -Individual members of the public should be provided a level of protection -The average frequency of core -The potential that the public at large suffers from health hazards as a from the consequences of nuclear power plant operation such that damage does not exceed 1×10- result of the emission of radiation and radioactive substances by individuals bear no significant additional risk to life and health. 5/year. nucelar reactors must be controlled at a level that will not -Societal risks to life and health from nuclear power plant operation -The average frequency of significantly increase the everyday health risk of the public. should be comparable to or less than the risks of generating electricity by large-scale emissions does not <Quantitative goals> viable competing technologies and shold not be a significant addition to exceed 5×10-7/year. -The average death risk of individuals of the public at large within a other societal risks. certain distance from the facilities that arise from radioactive <Quantitative Objectives> exposure due to accidents at a nuclear plant must be controlled so that -The risk to an avarage individual in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant the risk does not exceed roughly one in 1 million per year. of prompt fatality that might result from reactor accidents should not <Performance goals (guidelines on evaluating the conformance with exceed one-tenth of one percent (0.1 percent) of the sum of prompt safety goals)> fatality risks resulting from other accidents to which members of the U. S. -Frequency of core damage: roughly <10-4/reactor years population are generally exposed. -Frequency of containment vessel failures: roughly <10-5/reactor -The risk to the population in the area near a nuclear power plant of years cancer fatalities that might result from nuclear power plant operation should not exceed one-tenth of one percent (0.1 percent ) of the sum of cancer fatality risks resulting from all other causes. <General performance guidelines (supplementary goals)> The overall mean frequency of a large release of radioactive materials to U.S. France U.K. Finland Japan The Use and -In [Policy Statement on PRA] (official gazette 60FR42622 -In 2002, the Nuclear To comply with the ALARP -PRA and deterministic -To increase the safety of power plants, an operator may Significance of dated August 16, 1995), PRA is considered to supplement Safety Authority regulations, a risk assessment that evaluations are conduct an evaluation of their safety on its own and PRA Under the decision-making processes. (ASN), which evaluates quantitative and considered to supplement disclose the results according to a schedule determined by Law -For new reactors, the NRC Regulations (10CFR52.79(46)) recognized the greater qualitative requirements, as well as one another. the regulations (The Law for the Regulations of Nuclear require the submission of PRA. role PRA would play in numerical safety standards, is -[An Ordinance on Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors, to -The regulations do not require verification of conformance the regulatory process, required. Nuclear Energy] be enacted in December 2013) with the safety goals for the existing reactors, even if PRA is announced the Basic (NEA/CSNI/R(2012)11, Use and (161/1988) requires the -PRA is being proposed as a part of voluntary assessment. conducted. Safety Rules (RFS) in Development of PSA, June 2013) submission of PRA to (Source: Guide on Implementing [Probabilistic Risk January 2002, which STUK at the time of Assessment (PRA) of Safety Improvement (Outline)] stipulates the applying for authorization (August 2, 2013)) regulations requiring to operate a new reactor. operators to develop -The cabinet decision on the standard PRA for the safety of nuclear all reactors, etc. power plants (733.2008) -A ministerial called for an ordinance (February 7, improvement and renewal 2012) stipulated PRA of PRA as necessary. as a supplement to The Scope of PRA <New reactors> There is no law that -To demonstrate conformance with -YVL 2.8 requires Level- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is proposing the Required by the -NRC's Standard Review Plan (SRP) requires verification of stipulates the scope. the above safety goals, Level-3 2 PRA on a full scope following PRA to be covered by voluntary assessments. Law conformance with the safety goals and comparison with the The regulatory bodies PRA is required. (internal and external -Levels 1, 2, and 3: PRA (internal and external events) performance goals. However, the performance goals are not decide through -Sizewell-B requires high-safety events, full operation -The document says that these will expand in stages regulatory requirements. As such, the performance goals and discussions with an PRA. The scope includes internal mode). depending on how much the PRA methods have been the results and observations of PRA must not be compared to operator. and external events, and full developed. discuss the numbers alone. Rather, the Plan included a operation mode. -Internal events: Internal overflows, internal fires footnote that calls for a balanced consideration of preventing -External events: Simultaneous events such as the severe accidents and implementing deregulatory measures. combination of an earthquake and tsunami, and external (NUREG-0800, p. 19.0-3 footnote) events other than earthquakes and tsunamis -In a standard guidance for authorizing Combined License -Events that occur in used fuel tanks (COL) applications, the PRA's scope must fulfill the -Events that occur simultaneously in multiple reactors following requirements: Level 2, internal and external events, (Source: Guide on Implementing [Probabilistic Risk and full operation mode. Assessment (PRA) of Safety Improvement (Outline)] <Existing reactors> (August 2, 2013)) -The Plan does not require verification of conformance with the safety goals for the existing reactors, even if PRA is conducted. -The Plan calls for Level-2 PRA for internal events by IPE and external events by IPEEE. However, for external events, the Plan accepts simplified methods such as Fire-Induced Vulnerability Evaluation (FIVE) by EPRI, earthquake- resistance allowance assessment on a limited scope, and Submission dates <New reactors> <New reactors> <New reactors> <New reactors> An assessment is made in intervals that do not exceed five -At the time of applying for a Design Certification (DC) -At the time of -At the time of applying for an-At the time of applying years. The assessment is submitted six months or less -At the time of applying for a Combined License (COL) applying for an authorization for an authorization after the completion of a regular facility inspection. -At the time of applying to make changes to the authorization authorization <Existing reactors> <Existing reactors> -The period for submitting the first assessment will be using risk information (frequency of core damage, changes in <Existing reactors> -As supporting information when-STUK screens the determined in light of future considerations. the volume of early large emissions) -As supporting applying to make changes to theassessment when PRS is (Source: Guide on Implementing [Probabilistic Risk <Existing reactors> information when authorization revised or when the scale Assessment (PRA) of Safety Improvement (Outline)] -Internal events (IPE): 1988-1991 applying to make -At the time of Periodic Safetyof the operation is (August 2, 2013)) -External events (IPEEE): 1991-1997 changes to the Reviews (PSR) (every ten years)expanded -At the time of applying to make changes to the authorization authorization -As supporting using risk information (frequency of core damage, changes in -At the time of Periodic information when the volume of early large emissions) Safety Reviews (PSR) applying to make changes (every ten years) to the authorization -At the time of Periodic Safety Reviews (PSR) (every ten years) The Scope of -Backfitting assessment at the time of preparing the -Verification of the -In analyzing failures, both -Verification of the -Verification of the effects of safety improvements made Leveraging PRA in regulations effects of safety deterministic evaluations and PRA effects of safety by the provider the Regulatory -The scope of the inspection is determined upon assessing the improvements made by are always conducted improvements made by -Verification of the facility's vulnerabilities Process performance of power plants through the Reactor Oversight the provider the provider Process (ROP) -Verification of the -Verification of the -Assessment of the seriousness of violations facility's vulnerability facility's vulnerability The Handling of -Used for reference in forming teams to investigate events -In making decisions, it is important to systematically study Consider the Include the impact of uncertainties Include an analysis of The uncertainty of assessment results provides important Uncertainties the uncertainties of the "recognizability" of the parameters uncertainties and and data inconsistencies in uncertainties. information that show the risk characteristics. To grasp in and models used (NUREG-1855, Rev.1, March 2013) quantitatively assess conducting detailed (YVL 2.8; PSA in the detail the contributing factors in the assessment results their impact on the analysis.(HSE's SAP, 2006) safety control of plants) and the impact of the uncertainty, a sensitivity analysis -It is thought that consistency can be significantly improved results. must be conducted along with an analysis of the through a stronger awareness of matters related to (Basic Safety Rules uncertainty. ([Quality Guideline (Trial) of Probabilistic uncertainties arising from a limited knowledge of (RFS) 2002-01; the Safety Assessment (PSA) at Nuclear Power Plants], April deterministic evaluations (e.g., NUREG/CR-6813) expansion and use of 2005, Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and Japan Probabilistic Safety Nuclear Energy Safety Organization,) Research (PSA)) -Assessments must reference the quality guidelines and ensure the safety of PRA. (Source: Guide on Implementing [Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of Safety Improvement (Outline)] (August 2, 2013))