Historical Roots of AKP's EU Stance

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The Historical and Discoursive Roots of the Justice and
Development Party's EU Stance
Erhan Doğan a
a
Department of Political Science and International Relations, Marmara University,
Istanbul, Turkey
Online Publication Date: 01 September 2005

To cite this Article: Doğan, Erhan (2005) 'The Historical and Discoursive Roots of the
Justice and Development Party's EU Stance', Turkish Studies, 6:3, 421 - 437
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The Historical and Discoursive Roots of

the Justice and Development Party’s
EU Stance
ERHAN DO ĞAN G
[ebvre]
Department of Political Science and International Relations, Marmara University, Istanbul, Turkey
ErhanDogan
630Taylor
edogan@marmara.edu.tr
00000September
Turkish&
10.1080/14683840500235498
FTUR123532.sgm
1468-3849
Original
2005 andFrancis
Francisgroup
Studies
Article 2005
Ltd Ltd (online)
(print)/1743-9663
ABSTRACT A structural transformation has occurred in the attitude of political Islam in

Turkey regarding EU affairs since the 1970s. This essay will show the main steps in this
transformation, through an examination of the political discourses and actions of those
parties with strong Islamic references. The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve
Kalkınma Partisi—AKP), in taking a pro-European stand and in utilizing the accession
process for the benefit of the party’s program and its execution, represents an important step
in this transformation. In fact, the party leaders consistently claim today that their party is
not Islamist. Since coming to power, the party leadership has tried to establish a bridge
between its past political profile and its current EU accession-based program and actions,
amid questions concerning the party’s sincerity, which frequently arise among the secular
establishment and opposition. This essay tries to show the problems and prospects that the
EU accession process imposes on this party.
Following the general elections of November 2002 in which it garnered the majority
of votes, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—AKP),
although a newcomer on the Turkish political scene, was in a position to establish a
single party government. Knowing the Islamist background of the leaders in AKP,
Turkey’s secular elites expressed feelings of anxiety and skepticism as to what this
party’s attitude and/or reaction would be to Turkey’s 200-year modernization history.
Within a short time, however, it became clear that the AKP was in fact a byproduct
and an agent of the secular modernization project. Its program is an example of
conservative modernity,1 which aims at compromise between the masses, forced into
speedy and sharp transformation. The leader of the AKP, Tayyip Erdoğan, in his first
geb[vre]
message to Turkey and the international community, made clear his party’s commit-
ment to Turkey’s EU cause. This declaration and the party’s performance in devel-
oping Turkey–EU relations in the period since then have surprised many of the
skeptics, their opinions having been based on the past performances of the party’s
elite, many of whom had previously served in parliament in parties such as the
National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi—MSP), the Welfare Party
(Refah Partisi—RP) and the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi—FP). Given the Islamist
Correspondence Address: Erhan Do ğan, Department of Political Science and International Relations,
g[bevre]
Marmara University, Göztepe Campus, 34722 Kadıköy, Istanbul, Turkey. Email: edogan@marmara.edu.tr
ISSN 1468-3849 Print/1743-9663 Online/05/030421-17 © 2005 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/14683840500235498
422 E. Doǧan
and anti-EU stance of these parties, it is necessary to consider their EU history in

order to shed some light on the EU policy of AKP. A study of these parties would tell
us a great deal about AKP itself and its reference to Islam, its relations with the secular
elite, its attitudes to capitalism and globalism and its place in neoliberalism.
By looking at recent history—the period from the 1970s onwards—this essay will
attempt to understand and clarify the main policy and stance of those parties with
strong Islamic references regarding Turkey’s EU membership application.
A New Era in Turkey’s Multiparty Democracy

The results of the November 3, 2002 elections represented a major landslide in Turkish
party politics. Due to the ten percent national threshold, only two parties succeeded
in getting into parliament, namely the AKP and the Republican People’s Party
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi—CHP). With 34.3 percent of the votes, the AKP acquired
363 seats (which later rose to 365 following repeated elections in the province of Siirt).
This represented 66 percent control in a parliament of 550 seats. The CHP, with 19.4
percent of the votes, represented 32.4 percent of seats. These percentages clearly mean
that only 53.7 percent of the valid votes had parliamentary representation. This may
seem quite undemocratic, but its legitimacy could not be criticized by those parties
who now found themselves excluded from parliament, such as the True Path Party
(Do ğruyol Partisi—DYP) and the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi—ANAP). The
g[bevr]
ten percent threshold rule had come into existence in 1983 and had in the past been
of great benefit to these other parties in their quest for parliamentary power.2
As has already been stated, immediately following the election Tayyip Erdoğan, geb[vre]
the leader of the AKP, quickly confirmed his party’s loyalty to Turkey’s EU cause.
As proof of this and in the hope of obtaining a starting date for accession negotia-
tions from the upcoming EU Council summit in Copenhagen (December 11–12,
2002), Erdoğan, prior to obtaining a vote of confidence from the newly formed
geb[vre]
parliament, began a series of visits to European leaders. Furthermore, even while in

opposition, prior to the November general elections, the AKP was acting in support
of the EU accession process, and in fact, it was only with the support of the AKP
that the previous government, led by Bülent Ecevit, had been able to introduce
changes to the Turkish Constitution, many of which were essential prerequisites for
the beginning of the accession negotiations.
For those aware of the Islamist background of the AKP leadership and the attitude
of political Islam towards the western world and the EU in particular, this stance
would be quite surprising. One might easily argue that there is no doubting the fact
that a structural transformation has occurred in the attitude of political Islam regard-
ing EU affairs. This essay will show the main steps in this transformation.
An Historical Account of Political Islam in Turkey

Although there existed an Islamist-traditionalist opposition to Turkey’s modernity
project since the times of the reforms of Sultan Selim III, opposition manifested
Roots of the Justice and Development Party’s EU Stance 423
itself mainly as popular reactions and uprisings centered on the personal charisma of
specific leaders.
These uprisings were limited in their achievements and harshly suppressed by the
modernizing governing elites. It must be said that Islam was the key reference point
for opposition in Ottoman times. This opposition originally defined itself as a bulwark
against the modernizing elites inspired by the western world, and therefore had an
anti-western attitude. However, throughout the modernization history of Turkey, this
opposition has nevertheless sought a compromise with modernity in order to cope
with their main rivals. Tunaya claims that this search for compromise has created a
westernized Islamist political line.3 This provides us with some historical links in our
efforts to understand the pro-western stance of the AKP.
The establishment of the Republic represents an important turning-point for polit-
ical Islam. The founders of the Republic rejected almost totally the role of tradition
and religion within society and began a radical and speedy superstructure revolution.
In this process, any opposition, including Islamist, was outlawed and marginalized,
and thus remained almost completely underground until the late 1940s, when the
transition to multiparty democracy began.
This transition, in 1946, enabled political movements which could be called
“Islamist” to become organized as political parties and to flourish. The first Islamist
political party to emerge onto the scene during the multiparty period in 1951 was the
Islam Democracy Party (İ slami Demokrasi Partisi), the first such party to use an
]d[Iot
Islamist slogan.4 In the main, however, Islamist circles supported and played active
roles in the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti—DP) during its time in power
(1950–60). The banning of the DP following the 1961 military coup led its follow-
ers to transfer their allegiance to the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi—AP), the succes-
sor to the DP. Later, that support shifted to the National Order Party (Milli Nizam
Partisi—MNP) which was founded in 1970.
This party was the result of an uncompromising struggle between the greater indus-
trial and commercial bourgeoisie of the big cities and the petit bourgeoisie of small
Anatolian towns.5 With the increasing speed of industrialization, capitalization and
modernization, the traditional classes of rural areas, small traders, craftsmen and small
farmers had lost their traditional economic and political position to the large metro-
politan-based (Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara) rising industrialist and commercial bourgeoi-
sie. It is not surprising that the leader of the MNP, Necmettin Erbakan, was a former
chairman of the Union of Chambers and Stock Exchanges in Turkey (UCSET), to
which he had been elected in 1968 with the support of the Anatolian petit bourgeoisie.
Subsequently, however, he was removed from office by the AP government of the
time as a response to the reactions of the Istanbul and Izmir Chambers.6
The government’s bias towards modernization and urbanization was operating
against the rural coalition of small traders, craftsmen, and small farmers. Members of
this coalition, disadvantaged economically, politically and socially, thus began
laying the blame for the deterioration in their situation on westernization and the
capitalist system, and felt they could find representation through the MNP. Thus, in
its nature, this was not a rebellious act, but a protective and conservative movement.7
424 E. Doǧan
The MNP had a dominant Islamist discourse and considered national and spiritual
development to be of great importance. The concepts of “morality” and “virtue”
were underlined in the party program, according to which the party was against the
market economy and interest system. The program suggested that “order” in the
economy could be attained only via state intervention. The MNP was against
Turkey’s close relations with the EEC and thus its candidacy process.8 All these
ideas were proposed in the MNP program known as the “National View” (Milli
Görüş) and created a framework for future parties to be founded by Erbakan and his
]cs[eldi
friends. Before the 1991 general election, these ideas were reformulated by Erbakan
under the title of Just Economic Order (Adil Ekonomik Düzen) and used in the
Welfare Party’s election campaign.
In 1970, the ruling Demirel government decided to move on to the second stage of
Turkey’s candidacy process and began negotiations on the terms of the Additional
Protocol with the EEC. The MNP reacted to this government action by initiating a
parliamentary inquiry presented by the leader of the party. According to Erbakan:
Turkey’s social structure, world view, historical consciousness and experiences

are inconsistent with Turkey’s membership of a political entity of western
states. There is a disproportion in material possibilities and population numbers.
Such unification will result in Turkey being subsumed by the community of
western states … A common market between Turkey and western states would
result in Turkey’s colonization and would make Turks laborers of the west.9
In place of a common market with the EEC, Erbakan suggested the establishment of
a common market between Muslim states and Turkey.
The Constitutional Court banned the MNP on the basis that it was aiming to
remove Article 163 of the Turkish Penal Code, which concerns the banning of
activities aimed at changing the established order to a religious one. However, the
MNP was succeeded by the MSP in 1972. The MSP was a “neo-Islamist” party,
defending the “retraditionalization of the social and cultural life on the basis of
Islamic principles.” It was quite effective in delivering its message to the electorate
and garnered 11.8 percent of the total vote in the 1973 elections, to become the third
largest party. The MSP gained its votes mostly from the underdeveloped rural areas
and also the fast-developing industrialized regions, the former probably supporting
the party due to its emphasis on traditional Islamic feelings, the latter probably feeling
that it could halt the decline in their economic position.10
After the elections, the MSP established a coalition government with the CHP.
The CHP, despite having some reservations about the conditions and timing of the
Additional Protocol, was a pro-EEC party. Therefore, there existed an incompatibil-
ity between these two parties in their EEC policies. The CHP and the MSP, instead
of adding some anti-EEC clauses (such as freezing relations with the EEC) to the
coalition protocol, agreed on a policy of “revising the additional protocols which
regulated the conditions of the transition stage,”11 an attitude change which was a
compromise on the part of the MSP.
In the politically fractured atmosphere of the 1970s, the MSP, with its vote rate
varying between 8 and 12 percent, became a critical party in coalition formations and
took part in two more coalition governments, this time with the AP and the Nation-
alist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi—MHP). These coalitions are known as
the Nationalist Front governments. The leading partner of these nationalist front
governments, the AP, was supportive of “the EEC cause.” Therefore, the MSP, yet
again, reached another compromise on EEC affairs with the AP. According to the
compromise, the MSP would accept only the economic aspects of relations with the
EEC on condition that it did not damage the Turkish economy. Other aspects, espe-
cially the target of attaining political integration, were not acceptable to the MSP.12
In 1980, the AP established a minority government. This government decided to
inform the EEC it was waiving the previous Ecevit government’s decision to cease
Turkey’s obligations to the EEC, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hayrettin
Erkmen, declared that his government was planning to apply for full membership.
Soon after Erkmen’s speech, the leader of the MSP, Necmettin Erbakan, proposed a
motion of general inquiry into Erkmen’s act. In the motion, Erbakan claimed that
Erkmen’s attempts to gain entry to the Common Market for Turkey would eventu-
ally render Turkey a province of the EEC, leading to its isolation from the Muslim
world and its political unification with the West.13 His motion was accepted with the
support of the CHP and Erkmen was removed from his ministerial position on
August 28, 1980. Only 15 days later, a military coup d’état brought parliamentary
democracy in Turkey to a halt.14
To sum up the EEC policies of the MSP during the 1970s, it may be said that the
pro-EEC political stance of its coalition partners, the CHP and later the AP, forced it
to compromise in order to be able to share governmental power. Although the MSP
never wavered in its opposition to political union with European countries, it did
begin to accept the idea of economic cooperation or even a customs union, to be
carefully designed in Turkey’s interests.
The military coup brought with it the closure of all parties and the banning of all
political activities for approximately three years. At the end of this period, in 1983,
the generals decided to hold elections and restart democracy. Before the elections,
all the leaders of pre-coup parties were prohibited from engaging in politics. The
National Security Council forbade the participation of any of the old parties and any
new parties that appeared to be in any way connected with them. This political ban
remained in force until a 1987 referendum.
Within this period, “political Islam” was organized under the umbrella of the
Welfare Party, one of those forbidden to participate in the 1983 elections. Support-
ers of political Islam most probably voted for the newly founded Motherland Party
of Turgut Özal, whose past personal affiliation with the MSP was well known. The
Welfare Party participated in the 1987 election and received 7.2 percent of the vote,
but because of the ten percent national threshold it was not represented in parlia-
ment. In the 1991 national elections the Welfare Party established a party bloc,15
made very good progress, and received 16.9 percent of the valid vote, thus finally
getting into parliament.
426 E. Doǧan
The Welfare Party was totally opposed to the signing in 1995 of the Turkey–EU
Customs Union Decision of the Turkey–EU Association Council, signed by the
True Path Party–Social Democrat Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti—
SODEP) coalition. The Welfare Party proposed a motion of general inquiry into the
Çiller government regarding the Customs Union process in parliament. It accused
the government of paving the way for economic destruction and loss of political
independence in taking Turkey into the Customs Union on the basis of one-sided
concessions. In the motion, the Welfare Party criticized the EU for its failure to
bring into operation the Financial Protocols, and denying Turkish workers the right
of free movement.16
In the 1995 elections another important shift in the Welfare Party vote rate
occurred when it received 21.4 percent of the total valid votes. Despite this being the
greatest vote share, it was not enough to establish a majority government, so it went
into coalition with the True Path Party, one of the parties to the signature of the
Customs Union Agreement earlier that year. The government program of these two
parties, in conflict regarding EU affairs, was a balanced document. The program
stated that the government would play an important role in empowering relations
between the EU and Turkey by considering cost–benefit balances within the frame-
work of relations among equal states, without sacrificing the principles of national
sovereignty, state integrity and Turkey’s national interests. The program also stated
that the new government would do its utmost to put into action the principle of free
movement of people referred to in the Ankara Agreement of 1963 and the Additional
Protocol of 1971. The coalition protocol also recalled the need to develop the finan-
cial cooperation which had been one of the founding elements of the Turkey–EU
Association regime.
The clauses contained in the program were, in a way, trying to balance the old
anti-EU stance of the Welfare Party with the necessity of establishing a coalition
with the architect of the Customs Union Agreement, Tansu Çiller. The Welfare
Party, instead of directly opposing the EU, was warning it to honor its obligations.17
The Erbakan-led Welfare Party–DYP coalition collapsed under pressure from the
Turkish military and some media groups. The campaign started with a declaration of
the National Security Council on February 28, 1997, undersigned, ironically, by
Prime Minister Erbakan. This process, which led to the overthrow of the coalition, is
called, by some columnists, a “postmodern coup.” The process resulted in Erbakan
having to resign as prime minister in order to ease tension and release pressure.
Meanwhile, the Welfare Party was banned by the Constitutional Court. The reason
given by the Court was that the Welfare Party, by way of its statutes, programs and
actions, challenged the independence of the state and the principles of the democratic
and secular republic. As a result of this, Erbakan and his five friends were denied MP
status and prohibited from politics for a period of five years.18
Prior to the closure of the Welfare Party, the European Council, at its Luxembourg
summit, had refused to offer Turkey candidate status. The evaluation of the Luxem-
bourg summit by Abdullah Gül19 is worth mentioning here. For Gül, the decision of
the Council only confirmed his party’s suspicions concerning the EU. According to
Gül, the decision showed that the EU was not seriously contemplating the acceptance
of Turkey as a full member. A Customs Union decision, the negotiation phase of
which was not thought out in detail and which was signed in a hurry, could not be in
the interests of the country. According to Gül, the government’s palpable desire to
get into the EU in the face of what seemed clear reluctance on the part of the EU was
negative foreign policy behavior. Alternatives to the EU (such as developing relations
with the Muslim world) were not properly appraised due to this desire on Turkey’s
part and opportunities were therefore missed. Gül also stated that the EU’s refusal to
offer Turkey candidate status was not surprising as Turkey did not meet the Copen-
hagen criteria, namely being a well functioning market economy, a real civilian
democracy with its institutions (not a militarist one), and being a country with a better
record of human rights and freedom.20
Upon closure of the Welfare Party, its MPs transferred to the newly established
Virtue Party. The Virtue Party’s policies on EU affairs were, in general, close to
the Welfare Party’s, but there was a transformation in their policies and attitudes
concerning the Customs Union. Their attitudes towards the Copenhagen criteria
were shaped, in great part, by the February 28 process which had brought down
the Welfare Party, and which led the members and followers of the Virtue Party to
the realization that democracy and human rights were basic needs that also applied
to themselves. It may be said that coalitions and crises such as that of February 28
and consecutive closures of parties by the Constitutional Court were all learning
and maturing experiences for the “National View” movement. The Virtue Party’s
vulnerability in this sense was demonstrated by the fact that an appeal by the Chief
Public Prosecutor to the Constitutional Court for the closure of the party was made
merely on the basis that the party was the continuation of a previously banned
party.
Another reason for the changing stance of the Virtue Party towards the Customs
Union was that a very important group of their supporters, the growing class of
middle-sized Anatolian businessmen (organized under the umbrella of MÜSİAD), ]dI[ot
was happy with the Customs Union as it opened up many new business opportuni-
ties for them.21 However, when one examines the discourse of the Virtue Party MPs
in this period, it becomes clear that any change was mainly rhetorical. They were
still skeptical about close relations with the EU.22
Within this atmosphere, the Virtue Party gradually moved to a more open and
supportive stance on the issue of EU membership. It was their assumption that the
secular elites, including the military, would not allow their movement to be in
government in the prevailing political conditions, so democratization was a must for
the sake of their future rule. The EU’s criticisms of the institutionalized dominant
role of the military within the political system via the National Security Council
reflected, in a way, one of the major concerns of the Virtue Party. The Virtue Party
leadership viewed the prohibition from politics of Erbakan and his friends as part of
the human rights issue. They felt that the standard of values espoused by the EU and
briefly formulized as the Copenhagen criteria would, in this respect, represent a
solution to their long-lasting political problems and insecurities.
428 E. Doǧan
The Virtue Party observed the Helsinki summit within this atmosphere and
welcomed the EU Council’s decision to declare Turkey’s candidate status. Oğuzhan
geb[vre]
Asiltürk, a senior Virtue Party MP, made a congratulatory speech in parliament in

which he also drew attention to Turkey’s shortcomings in democracy, human rights,

rule of law, and development. As progress on these issues was demanded of Turkey
by the EU as a prerequisite to accession, his party presented a positive evaluation of
the progress made by Turkey so far. Nevertheless, Asiltürk, in addition, recalled the
old suspicious attitude of the National View movement regarding European integra-
tion, and stated that in the process of the achievement of these targets, “national and
strategic” targets should not be neglected, nor should the government be in a state of
total surrender.23
The Virtue Party leader Recai Kutan also made an evaluation of the Helsinki
summit and the accession process. He stated that they were hoping for democracy,
human rights, and freedom at the end of this process and that they were ready to
make any necessary contribution to this. Kutan also criticized the articles of the
Helsinki summit declaration on the Cyprus and Aegean Sea problems, maintaining
that these articles had brought issues which concerned Turkey and Greece only onto
the EU political stage.24 Traditional Turkish foreign policy had always maintained
that the issue of the Aegean was a bilateral matter, and the issue of Cyprus would be
solved through UN mediation.
The Virtue Party’s new attitude and policies regarding the EU represented a
dramatic change in the National View movement’s history. The Customs Union
agreement forced the movement to review their EU policy discourse and make it
somehow compatible with their previous anti-EU stance. The February 28 crisis
was an important step in this policy change, with the leaders of the Welfare Party
discovering that the Copenhagen criteria demands of the EU would be beneficial
to the National View movement in ruling the country when the party secured a
sufficient majority in future elections. The end of the Welfare Party–DYP coali-
tion government taught them much about the difficulties of staying in power with-
out having a working democracy with proper institutions. Another important
factor was the emergence of dynamic young reformists from among the upper-
middle level cadres within the movement. These reformists were aware of “the
realities of government” and the “real” world; they were well educated and more
open to the world. The traditional discourse of Erbakan, the party and its “Just
Order” manifesto were no longer enough for these groups who, in addition to
being more pragmatic, had learned the refined methods and craft of government
while serving as mayors of a large number of municipalities following the 1994
local elections.25
It seems that following 30 years of political struggle, the National View
movement’s cadres organized under the umbrella of the Virtue Party had finally
understood that the only peaceful method of limiting the role of the military in
Turkish democracy lay in being in accord with EU norms and thus attaining full
membership. The EU accession process was “a natural source of protection” for
them.26
The Rise of the AKP: “A Moderate Party?”
However, the Virtue Party was also closed down by the Constitutional Court. This
closure of the party led to a division in the National View movement. The tradi-
tional, grey-haired cadre of the Virtue Party following Erbakan founded a new party
called the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi—SP) under the leadership of Recai Kutan,
whereas the young reformers headed by Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül
geb[vre]
established the Justice and Development Party. Just before the closure of the Virtue
Party, the first signals of this breakup were seen at the annual party congress. Abdul-
lah Gül, one of the reformers, was declared a nominee for the leadership of the party
during the process of electing the new leaders following Erbakan’s prohibition from
politics. However, Erbakan and older, traditionalist members supported Recai
Kutan, a man totally loyal to Erbakan and the National View movement. The
tension at that party congress and the opposition of conservatives against young
reformers was an important step on the way to the division.27
From the beginning, the AKP tried to make it clear that it was not an Islamist
party,28 although its leadership cadre’s affiliation with the National View movement
was quite well known to the public.29 The AKP defined itself as “Conservative
Democrat,” this identity allowing them leeway in declaring their pro-EU position
easily and without creating too much suspicion. The AKP’s conservatism lies in its
attitude to cultural affairs and their—arguably—narrow concept of democracy, as
they define their democratic affiliation on the basis of liberal economic policies that
they plan to implement.30
As stated at the beginning of the essay, one of the first statements made by the AKP
leadership right after the announcement of the first election results confirmed their
affiliation to Turkey’s EU cause. The government program of the first AKP cabinet
included many references to the EU accession process. The program stated that full
membership of the EU, in order to realise economic and democratic progress, was
their priority target. The program also stated that the economic and democratic stan-
dards, legal and institutional regulations of the EU would be supported even without
seeking the condition of full membership. It was also added that full membership to
the EU was among the first targets of the government and attempts would be made
to start the accession negotiations as soon as possible, for which purpose the govern-
ment was determined to fully comply with the Copenhagen criteria.31
It may be concluded from the government program that the AKP government
seemed determined to make Turkey a full member of the EU. Why would full EU
membership be the AKP’s number one priority target? When one considers their
Islamist past, several reasons may be listed:
First of all, Tayyip Erdoğan and his friends claim they have changed. It seems that
geb[vre]
they have come to believe in the virtues of democracy and human rights. Although
admitting their opposition to EU membership in the past,32 the declaration in their
government program that the economic and democratic standards, and legal and insti-
tutional regulations of the EU would be supported independent of the condition of
full membership, reflects their belief in the value of those goals for their own sake.33
430 E. Doǧan
The Utopian, Just Order program of the National View movement had become
too narrow for the needs of the leadership of the AKP;34 nor did it meet the new
demands of an electorate which, according to the AKP, was in search of a culturally
and socially conservative but economically liberal political movement.

We must admit that the AKP has been very successful, mainly due to the incapac-
ity of the old parties in meeting the demands of the electorate.35 The old parties, on
getting into government, applied policies dictated by the secular establishment, the
IMF and the status quo.36 The AKP’s ability to distance itself from the ongoing
corruption allegations concerning previous governments, in power since 1983, and
its ability to present a fresh image, reminiscent of that of the Menderes government
of the 1950s,37 have also played their part in AKP’s success.
In order to be successful and remain as a permanent party of the center-right—the
gap they claim to fill—the AKP movement must avoid early conflict with the secular
elite, which seems reluctant to see major changes in the system despite clear signals
to the contrary from the electorate.
The AKP seems to find the values required by the EU closer to the values that they
themselves are trying to impose on the political agenda in Turkey. Thus, these values
and norms which the establishment (at least those supporting the westernization
cause) rhetorically shares serve, along with their electoral support, as a secondary
source of legitimacy for their reformist policies.
The AKP has pragmatic roots and a problem-solving approach which have grown
out of the local government experiences of the leadership cadre. In this respect, it is
willing to make do with the norms imposed on Turkey by the EU, instead of engag-
ing in a struggle to impose a unique program of its own on Turkish politics. For the
pragmatic AKP leadership, the quest for EU membership is a useful way of avoiding
conflict, staying in power and executing their declared political program, which is
not in conflict with the EU cause. For its own cause, it would also find the financial
resources and know-how that EU institutions would supply during the accession
process as well as the expected capital inflow necessary and helpful.
It may also be added that the Erbakan-led Welfare Party–DYP coalition govern-
ment’s foreign policy experiences38 showed this cadre that there was no program, unity
or power among Muslim states to change their fates. It seems that Erbakan’s Just Order
Program to save the Muslim world under the leadership of the National View Move-
ment of Turkey did not find a serious echo in other Muslim countries. On the contrary,
the attitude towards Erbakan displayed by the leadership in some Muslim countries,
especially Libya and Iran, on his visits while Prime Minister, was quite a discouraging
and embarrassing experience.39 These facts also discouraged the AKP cadres from
focusing on the Muslim world, although they still pay much attention to relations with
the Muslim world and have strong personal connections with Muslim countries.
Policy Stance of the AKP

Sincerity was one of the most prominent issues for the skeptical critics of the AKP.
However, when one considers all the above elements, it may be said that the AKP
leadership has shown sincerity in its efforts to politically transform itself40 and its
EU policies.41 For the AKP the EU accession process serves as the basis for
compromise with the secular establishment, as it represents and dictates democracy,
the market economy and human rights in a multicultural atmosphere.

The AKP target of EU accession is in accordance with Turkey’s traditional foreign
policy orientation which, since the times of the Tanzimat reforms in the nineteenth
century, has been towards the West. Until recently, this pro-western foreign policy
orientation was a source of conflict between pro-western elites and extreme nation-
alist and Islamist political parties due to the distant attitude and orientalist discourse
of the western world regarding Turkey, and also the collective national memory of
the contribution of western powers to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. It also
formed the basis of an identity crisis, and so for the AKP it has become an opportu-
nity to release tensions and close gaps that had formed. It is a useful ideological tool
in avoiding conflict between different parties in the country caused by religious and
ethnic differences and the secular–anti-secular axis. The EU quest is also compatible
with the political targets of the party. It would supply the necessary financial
resources and know-how to transform the Turkish state and Turkish society into a
more open, democratic and developed place. The expected inflow of foreign capital
after the start of accession negotiations is expected to increase government income
from tax, and as a result of the expected increase in real investment, the rate of unem-
ployment would decrease, a factor the AKP considers to be of great importance.
The AKP has a pragmatic core, which strives to combine a problem-solving,
rational approach with a political approach.42 An illustrative point in case is Tayyip
Erdoğan’s keen interest in solving the Cyprus issue. The AKP government’s stance
geb[vre]
on UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s initiatives for the solution of the Cyprus

problem was reformist and constructive. It played an active role in the tailoring
stage of the Annan plan, and applied political pressure on an unwilling President
Denktaş of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) to negotiate and
sc[e]dli
ultimately accept the Secretary-General’s plan. As a result of this constructive,

determined action by the AKP government, a referendum was held on the plan in
Cyprus, which garnered 65 percent approval of the TRNC citizens. However, the
plan was rejected by the Greek Cypriots.
Does this policy stance by the AKP represent a total digression from Turkey’s
traditional Cyprus policies? Actually no. If one examines the official policies of
Turkey regarding Cyprus, the AKP’s maneuvers would be considered a political
adjustment developed in reaction to political pressure from the EU, directly related
as it was to Turkey’s accession process. One should remember that Turkey was,
de jure, defending the existence of a federal and united Cyprus republic consisting
of Turkish and Greek states. The details have varied since 1974, but the diplomatic
efforts of previous Turkish governments had not been sufficient for world accep-
tance of the existence of an independent Turkish state in Cyprus.
Prime Minister Erdoğan’s determination and persistence in trying to get a
geb[vre]
negotiation date prior to the 2002 Copenhagen European Council was criticized by
President Chirac of France as impolite. The image of Erdoğan as impatient was part
geb[vre]
432 E. Doǧan
of his personal political campaign profile. He would be the prime minister who
would solve all long-lasting problems by using logic, rationale and a problem-
solving approach acquired and developed during his time as mayor of Istanbul. For
him, all problems with the EU may be solved by negotiation abroad and domestic
reform through parliament, a prerequisite for accession. For Erdoğan, the accession
geb[vre]
process is meaningful only if he can see light at the end of the tunnel.
The AKP government seems capable of solving Turkey’s long-term problems not
only because of its majority in parliament but also because of the political stance it
has chosen to take. For instance, it could provide a solution to the long-lasting and
costly Kurdish question. The AKP is removed from nationalism since one of its
main points of reference is religion, and in the last two elections this combination
was echoed in the votes of the electorate in resounding results in Northeast, Mideast
and Southeast Anatolia.43 In general, due to its Islamic references, the AKP would
make the necessary regulations in order to improve Turkey’s human rights record,
with its “zero tolerance of torture” policy being a promising beginning.
The AKP leader cadres have important local government experience which could
bring relief to a highly centralized and inefficient Turkish public administration,
which is also an EU requirement. To this end, the AKP started public administration
reform, giving more power to local governments.
Turkish society has experienced radical transformation, especially since the 1980
coup. This transformation has been painful and irrevocably altered the checks and
balances within society. Alienation was one of the main results of this ongoing change.
People had difficulty in creating and protecting the necessary social norms and values
that make life more secure and predictable. The political system could provide neither
an umbrella nor an anchor for the masses. The AKP program places a special emphasis
on social policies and AKP’s discourse stresses the importance of norms and values.
“Conservative Democracy” is the political motto the AKP has formed and given shape
to since the beginning of its government. According to Erdoğan, his government is
geb[vre]
an important opportunity for the “conservative idea, which emphasizes tradition,

history and social culture, gives religion a place of importance and (re)constructs itself
in a democratic form.”44 This is the panacea for alienation the AKP offers to society.
The party’s program is quite weak in providing sufficient solutions for this compli-
cated problem of humankind in the globalization age, but it seems that, given the
results of the March 28, 2004 local elections, recognition of the problem and efforts
towards solving it are, for the moment, sufficient for the masses.
In order to stay in power and provide pragmatic solutions for its supporters, the
AKP has no choice other than standing by the EU cause. Without the accession process
it is quite difficult for any party in Turkey to provide social consensus and undertake
the reforms that Turkish society, public administration and the market require.
Conclusion
For the moment, it would seem that the AKP, aided by the structural weaknesses
and shortsightedness of its political rivals, is being credited by the electorate in
finding solutions for the main problems of the Turkish state and society. But it is too
early yet to anticipate anything or make general comments on the long-term
performance of the AKP in government. The AKP faces many external and internal
problems and self-imposed restraints which could neutralize and/or block the party
in their efforts to carry forward their program.
For instance, the AKPs’ advocacy of neoliberal economic policies is in direct
conflict with its norms, tradition and morality-based social policy understanding. The
AKP’s intellectuals are in search of ways to close the gap between the two. For the
time being, considering global neoliberal trends, this seems rather a futile effort.
Furthermore, the AKP government is engaged in great efforts to link Turkey to global
capitalism by making the necessary structural changes, thus proving that they them-
selves are among the ranks of the executive committee for globalization. The AKP
government continues to follow the policies imposed by the IMF on the previous
government despite having criticized these policies when in opposition as being too
difficult a financial burden for the public to bear and as insensitive to social needs,
and there are as yet no signs of a development policy as implied in the party’s title.45
Another problem is related to the party’s interpretation of secularism. If one
attempts to compare the AKP’s understanding of secularism with that of previous
governments, it may be said that the AKP views the issue from a reverse angle.
Traditional secular understanding emphasizes separation of state affairs (political
affairs) from religious affairs; meaning that traditionally what had been done was
cleansing the state of any religious institutions and references. On the societal level,
this had some implications which led to the cleansing of daily interpersonal relations
from religious references. AKP claims that in the history of the Republic attempts at
secularism went too far, and created unjust pressure on believers. For Erdoğan, the
geb[vre]
state may, and indeed should, be secular, but not the people. From this discourse it
can be concluded that the AKP does not attach importance to secular references in
daily life. Religions, religious people and institutions, in referring to the divine,
intentionally or unintentionally coerce people to behave in accordance with reli-
gious rules. This automatically limits the freedom of people, so therefore an empha-
sis on secular references in social relations is crucial in the creation of democratic
freedoms. This reference would limit the place of the religion to the individual’s
personal sphere. Sensitivity in this field would also be important in the struggle to
determine the place of religion in public spaces. The AKP does not view this issue
as a problem and it may be said that it underestimates the influence and pressure and
power of religion and radical religious people over moderates.
Because of the Islamist background of the leadership cadre and the party’s refer-
ence to Islam, moderate and within constitutional limits though that reference may
be, the AKP has been supported by Islamist voters, the estimated ratio of whom
does not exceed eight percent on a nationwide level. The most radical of Islamist
voters continue to support the Felicity Party, which garnered 2.5 percent of the votes
in the 2002 elections. So, less than three-quarters of pre-2002 election Islamist
voters supported the AKP. Some of these voters failed to support the AKP in the
2004 local elections and instead supported the Felicity Party, which left the
434 E. Doǧan
Islamists equally distributed between the AKP and the Felicity Party. The Islamist
remnants within the AKP are quite influential in the party organization, and there
are two issues they consider highly important. These are the headscarf issue among
female university students, and the barriers faced by graduates of religious schools
in their attempts to enter university faculties other than theology. Both are issues on
which the AKP has failed to reach compromise with the traditional governing elites
within the framework of the existing Constitution, and therefore has failed to meet
the expectations of these young groups and their families. This creates pressure
from within the party on the cabinet. The existence and opposition of the Felicity
Party, constructed around religious sensitivities, is another source of tension for the
AKP. If/when things go amiss and the AKP starts to lose its wide electoral support,
this issue would become more critical.
For the time being it may be said that the AKP government has been successful in
mobilizing domestic and international support. It has a majority in parliament and with
the help of these structural opportunities it has seemed capable of altering or control-
ling the traditional opposition of the army and elites to Islamist parties. The EU acces-
sion process has been successfully utilized to this end. The AKP has also been
successful in limiting and controlling the demands of its Islamist supporters in this
context. However, it must also be remembered that the AKP is a conglomerate which
mobilized the support of different segments of the society. This coalition is quite
vulnerable to crises, especially on the issue of secularism, and its success or collapse
is closely connected to international developments and the political talents of the AKP
leadership. Concerns regarding the sincerity of the AKP resurface periodically, for
example in the aftermath of the French referendum on the EU Constitution.
Following Turkey being given a starting date for accession negotiations—
October 3, 2005—some signs of weakness emerged in the government’s “deci-
sive” attitude towards the EU accession process. This was in some measure due to
the EU’s reneging on its promises to Turkey regarding the Cyprus issue, which led
to disappointment within the government. Another factor involved is said to be the
expectation on the EU side that, given the controversy surrounding Turkey’s entry,
Turkey would maintain a low profile during the critical French vote on the EU
Constitution in order for the desired “yes” vote to be attained. The result in both
France and the Netherlands was a definite and resounding “no” to the implementa-
tion of the Constitution, and this has made it difficult for European leaders to
continue giving positive, encouraging feedback to Turkey. Thus, we can say that
just as the AKP was in a position to consolidate its domestic political power by
utilizing the EU accession process, the momentum it gained seems somewhat lost.
In turn, the Kemalist republican elite is making use of this loss of momentum and
has been constructing a coalition with nationalists across the political spectrum,
including elements of the left, with which they now find themselves sharing concerns
about the sincerity of the AKP regarding secularism, and concerns about the EU with
respect to national integrity, and especially EU policies on national minorities.
The situation has thus become complicated, and as a result it has become more
difficult for the AKP leadership to maintain control over or to accommodate the
restless National View and other Islamist elements within the party organization,
and to maintain its preferential place among its Islamist voters. The polemics
surrounding the petition of the government attorney to the European Court of
Human Rights in defense of the headscarf ban in Turkish universities in a court case
brought by a student who insisted on wearing the turban,46 and the headscarf
demonstrations in Diyarbakır and Konya are reflections of the concerns of the
AKP’s Islamist electoral base. Another example of the unrest among AKP’s Islam-
ist supporters, which was brought into parliament by MPs of National View and
Islamist origin was the easing of penalties against those providing unlicensed
courses in Koran reading—some of whom are accused by the Republican People’s
Party of training fanatic Islamists—as a part of recent changes to Turkish penal law
for compliance with the EU. When taken into consideration alongside some cases
mentioned earlier, such as the adultery clause, these events are evidence in the hands
of those who doubt the sincerity of the AKP, despite the leadership’s continuous
underlining of its non-Islamist nature.
In the absence of any influential political opposition, all these tensions have
served to create a mechanism for self-imposed control for the government without
which the loose coalition of which it is in fact made up would be in danger of falling
apart. And of course it must be remembered that the maintenance of the fragile unity
that is this party is dependent not only on the fine balance of internal tensions, but
also on the EU accession process, European public opinion and EU governments
and institutions.
Acknowledgments
The author is grateful to Catherine Campion for her careful reading and corrections.
He also thanks İ. Emre Işık, Yüksel Taşkın, Ahmet Demirel, Ayhan Kaya and Burak
]dIo[t ]cse[ldi s[ce]dli
Ulman for their contribution to earlier drafts.
Notes
1. For a detailed analysis of conservative modernity see Tanel Demirel, “Cumhuriyet Döneminde
Alternatif Batılılaşma Arayışları” [The Quest for Alternative Westernization in the Republican
]cse[ldi ]csel[di
Period], in T. Bora and M. Gültekingil (eds.), Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Modernleşme ve ]cs[eldi ]cs[eldi
Batıcılık [Political Thought in Modern Turkey: Modernity and Westernization], Vol.3 (İ stanbul: ] dIo[t dIo[t
İ letişim, 2002), pp.218–38.

] ]csel[di
2. Ahmet Demirel, “Türkiye’de Seçimler: 1983–2002, Barajla Yaşamaya Mecburmuyuz?” [Elections ]cse[ldi
in Turkey: 1983–2002, Must We Live with the Threshold?], İ ktisat Dergisi, No.43 (November ] dI[ot
2002), p.51.
3. Tarık Zafer Tunaya, İ slamcılık Akımı [Islamism Movement] ( İ stanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları,
]dI[ot [Ido]t
2003), pp.67–69.
4. “The sun of welfare and happiness will rise when [we] take the Koran into our hands. Believers unite
for your own regime.” It is not a coincidence that Mr Erbakan and his friends chose the names
“welfare” and “felicity” for their future parties. These have been the main promises of Islamist
parties to the masses over the last 54 years. See Birol A. Yeşilada, “The Virtue Party,” in Barry
]cse[ldi
Rubin and Metin Heper (eds.), Political Parties in Turkey (London: Frank Cass, 2002), p.63.
436 E. Doǧan
5. Haldun Gülalp, “Globalization and Political Islam: The Social Bases of Turkey’s Welfare Party,”
International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.33, No.3 (2001), pp.435–36.
6. Doğan Duman, Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye’de İ sIlamcılık [Islamism in the Process of Democrati-
geb[vre] ]dI[ot
zation in Turkey] ( İ zmir: Dokuz Eylül Yayınları, 1997), p.73. [Ido]t
7. Ibid., pp.69–70.
8. İ lhan Tekeli and Selim İ lkin, Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu [Turkey and the European Union]
] dIo[t ] dIo[t g[bevr]
(Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993), pp.115–16.

9. Esra Çayhan, Dünden Bugüne Türkiye Avrupa Birliği İ liş kileri ve Partilerin Konuya Bakış ı g[bevr] ] dI[ot ]cs[eldi ]cs[eldi
[Turkey–EU Relations in the Past and Present and Parties’ Approaches to the Issue] (İ stanbul: Boyut ]dIo[t
Kitapları, 1997), pp.70–73.

10. Binnaz Toprak, “Dinci Sağ” [Religious Right], in I.C. Schick and E.A. Tonak (eds.), Geçiş geb[vre] ]cs[eldi
Sürecinde Türkiye [Turkey in Transition] ( İ stanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1990), pp.249–50. [Ido]t
11. Coalition Protocol, 1974.

12. Çayhan (1997), pp.191–92.
13. It seems that Mr Erbakan was fully aware of the ramifications of full integration with the EEC.
14. Çayhan (1997), pp.211–39.
15. The party bloc consisted of the Welfare Party coming from the Islamist tradition, the Nationalist
Working Party (NWP) coming from the Nationalist Movement Party (NMP) tradition, and the
Reformist Democracy Party representing a small sect.
16. Çayhan (1997), pp.401–4.
17. Government Program, 1996.
18. For the decision of the Constitutional Court on closing the Welfare Party, see Constitutional Court,
Anayasa Mahkemesi’nin RP Hakkındaki Gerekçeli Kararı [The Memorandum of the Constitutional
Court Decision on RP] ( İ stanbul: Alkım, 1998). [Ido]t
19. Prime Minister of the first AKP government, who later became the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
20. Abdullah Gül, Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA)—General Assembly Meetings Log
(GAML), Term (T).20, Legislation Year (LY).3, Session (S).32, date (d.) 20.12.1997, pp.53–54.
21. For a similar evaluation see İ hsan Dağı, Kimlik Söylem ve Siyaset: Doğu-Batı Ayrımında Refah ] dIo[t geb[vre] g[bevr]
Partisi Geleneği [Identity, Discourse and Politics: RP Tradition at the Crossroads of East and West]
g[bevr]
(Ankara: İ mge Kitabevi, 1998), pp.97–98.

]dIo[t
22. For some sample speeches of Virtue Party parlamentarians which contain the traditional skepticism
of political Islam about the EU, see speech of MP Avni Doğan, “Speech on Public Sector Workers geb[vre]
Labour Union Law,” TGNA, GAML, T.20, LY.3, S.72, d.26.03.1998; and responding speech of MP
Azmi Ateş to Foreign Minister Ş.Sina Gürel’s informative speech about the latest developments in
]cse[ldi S[]celdi
Cyprus, TGNA, GAML, T.20, LY.79, S.79, d.21.04.1998.

23. Oğuzhan Asiltürk, “Welcoming Speech on the Helsinki Summit,” TGNA, GAML, T.21, Y.2, S.33,
geb[vre]
d.14.12.1999, p.14.
24. Recai Kutan, “Congratulatory Speech on the Helsinki Summit,” TGNA, GAML, T.21, LY.2, S.33,
d.19.12.1999, p.13.
25. For a detailed account of the Welfare Party mayors’ performances in local governments see U.
Akıncı, “Welfare Party’s Municipal Track Record: Evaluating Islamist Municipal Activism in
Turkey,” Middle East Journal, Vol.53, No.1 (Winter 1999), pp.75–94.
26. Ziya Öniş, “Political Islam at the Crossroads: From Hegemony to Co-existence,” Contemporary
]cse[ldi
Politics, Vol.7, No.4 (2004), p.292.

27. For a brief comparison of the AKP and Felicity Party programs before the November 2002 elections
see Fulya Atacan, “Yaramaz Muhalefet-Uslu İ ktidar: SP–AKP Parti Programları” [Disobedient ] dIo[t
Opposition-Obedient Government: SP–AKP Party Programs], İ ktisat Dergisi, No.431 (November ]dI[ot
2002), pp.60–66.
28. Menderes Çınar, “Milli Görüş Hareketi: Gidenler ve Kalanlar” [The National View Movement: ]cse[ldi
Those Who Have Left and Those Who Have Remained], Birikim, No.162 (October 2002), p.98.
29. Based on research done by Pollmark in 2003 which encompassed 212 AKP MPs and excluded
members of the cabinet, 24% of the AKP MPs relate most closely to the Welfare Party; 11% to the
pre-1980 era’s National Salvation Party; 11% of the MPs are ANAP sympathizers; 7% connect
themselves to the banned Virtue Party and 73.5% claim to have voted for the Virtue Party in the
1999 general elections; 6% relate most closely to the National Movement Party; Justice Party and
True Path Party supporters number around 12%; only 5% claim that they voted for ANAP. The
percentage of the MPs who give Kurdish as their mother tongue is 14. The percentage of MPs who
give their mother tongue as other than Turkish is higher, at 25.7. Hurriyet, November 20, 2004.
30. Çınar (2002), pp.100–101.
31. “Abdullah Gül government (58th government) program,” 2002, http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/ambar/
HP58.htm.
32. Tayyip Erdoğan, “In an interview with Nuri Çolakoğlu at CNN Türk on 24.07.2002,” http://
geb[vre] geb[vre]
www.akparti.org.tr/haber.asp?haber_id=600&kategori=8.
33. “Abdullah Gül government (58th government) program,” 2002, http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/ambar/
HP58.htm.
34. E.Yıldırım, “AKP: Bir Politik Tasarının Sosyolojik Temsiliyeti” [AKP: A Sociological Representa-
tion of a Political Design], Birikim, No.163–64 (November–December 2002), pp.68, 69.
35. According to Ziya Öni[scş],
edli “the Welfare Party’s success (in 1994 and 1995) was based, to a large
extent, on the failure of social democracy in Turkey.” For the November 3, 2002 general elections,
the failure of the center-right parties may also be added to this list. Ziya Öniş, “The Political Econ- ]cse[ldi
omy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective,” Third World
Quarterly, Vol.18, No.4, (1997), p.757.
36. Menderes Çınar, “Seçimlerin Ardından Siyaset Yeniden” [Politics after the Elections] Birikim,
No.163–64 (November–December 2002), p.41.
37. Ibid., p.42.
38. For a detailed account of the foreign policy of the Erbakan government see Philip Robins, “Turkish
Foreign Policy Under Erbakan,” Survival, Vol.39, No.2 (Summer 1997), pp.82–100.
39. W. Mason, “The Future of Political Islam in Turkey,” World Policy Journal (Summer 2000), pp.61–62.
40. Kemal Karpat, “In an Interview Conducted by Nuriye Akman,” Zaman, December 8, 2002.
41. Mümtazer Türköne, “3 Kasım: Bizans Düştü!” [November 3: Byzantium Fallen!], Türkiye Günlüğü,
]cse[ldi g[bevr]
No.70 (2002), p.8.

42. Tanıl Bora, “2002 Seçimi ve Siyasal Güzergah Problemleri” [2002 Elections and Problems in a
Political Direction], Birikim, Issue 163-164 (November–December 2002), p.32.
43. The votes of the AKP in the general election of 2002 and following local elections of 2004 in the
abovementioned regions are as follows:
November 2002 March 2004
Northeast 34 40.5
Mideast 32.3 37.7
Southeast 26 40.3
Ahmet Demirel, “28 Mart’ta ne oldu?” [What Happened on March 28?], Birikim, No.181 (May
2004), p.64.
44. Tayyip Erdoğan, “Opening Speech of Prime Minister Erdoğan,” Symposium on Conservatism and
geb[vre] geb[vre]
Democracy, İ stanbul, January 10, 2004, http://www.akparti.org.tr/haber.asp?haber_id=6532.

]dIo[t
45. F.Yaşlı, “AKP, Muhafazakar Demokrasi ve Yeni Sa ğ” [AKP, Conservative Democracy and the New
]cse[ldi g[bevre]
Right], Birikim, No.180 (April 2004), p.40.

46. Doğu Ergil, Turkish Daily News, May 23, 2005, http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=13901.
geb[vre]

Historical Roots of AKP's EU Stance

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The Historical and Discoursive Roots of

ABSTRACT A structural transformation has occurred in the attitude of political Islam in

ISSN 1468-3849 Print/1743-9663 Online/05/030421-17 © 2005 Taylor & Francis

and anti-EU stance of these parties, it is necessary to consider their EU history in

A New Era in Turkey’s Multiparty Democracy

parliament, began a series of visits to European leaders. Furthermore, even while in

An Historical Account of Political Islam in Turkey

Turkey’s social structure, world view, historical consciousness and experiences

Asiltürk, a senior Virtue Party MP, made a congratulatory speech in parliament in

which he also drew attention to Turkey’s shortcomings in democracy, human rights,

The Rise of the AKP: “A Moderate Party?”

and socially conservative but economically liberal political movement.

Policy Stance of the AKP

the market economy and human rights in a multicultural atmosphere.

on UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s initiatives for the solution of the Cyprus

ultimately accept the Secretary-General’s plan. As a result of this constructive,

an important opportunity for the “conservative idea, which emphasizes tradition,

Ulman for their contribution to earlier drafts.

İ letişim, 2002), pp.218–38.

zation in Turkey] ( İ zmir: Dokuz Eylül Yayınları, 1997), p.73. [Ido]t

(Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993), pp.115–16.

Kitapları, 1997), pp.70–73.

11. Coalition Protocol, 1974.

(Ankara: İ mge Kitabevi, 1998), pp.97–98.

Cyprus, TGNA, GAML, T.20, LY.79, S.79, d.21.04.1998.

Politics, Vol.7, No.4 (2004), p.292.

No.70 (2002), p.8.

November 2002 March 2004

Democracy, İ stanbul, January 10, 2004, http://www.akparti.org.tr/haber.asp?haber_id=6532.

Right], Birikim, No.180 (April 2004), p.40.

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