Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries xxx (2014) 1e6

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jlp

Application of FeN curves in API RP 752 building siting studies

Jeffrey D. Marx*,1, Kendall M. Werts 1
Quest Consultants Inc.Ò, Norman, OK, USA

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: An explosion overpressure analysis is a routine part of compliance with the American Petroleum Institute
Received 6 June 2013 (API) Recommended Practice (RP) 752 and 753. A basic consequence analysis often attempts to
Received in revised form demonstrate a few scenarios that may appear to have the most extreme consequences; however, these
16 April 2014
scenarios may also have extremely low likelihoods of occurrence. To have a better understanding of how
Accepted 21 April 2014
likely as well as how extreme a consequence may be, risk-based analysis is often required. One method
used for this is an overpressure exceedance analysis which uses overpressure results from many po-
Keywords:
tential explosion scenarios coupled with the probability of each scenario. Pressureeimpulse curves can
API RP 752
Building siting
make better use of the explosion model’s outputs (pressure and impulse) in order to predict building
Quantitative risk analysis damage and possible impacts to personnel. Using this type of analysis with a building damageefatality
QRA relationship, an FeN style curve can be created which shows the cumulative frequency vs. the number of
FeN curve potential fatalities. Generation of FeN curves can help to better define the risks to building occupants,
Overpressure exceedance provide an additional means of evaluating a building’s acceptability, and can serve as a part of a quan-
titative risk analysis (QRA) for facility personnel. This paper will discuss the method used to predict the
probabilities of building occupant fatalities for use in an FeN curve, as well as the benefits and potential
problems with this type of analysis.
Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction itself, this paper extends that type of evaluation to a probabilistic

In a series of papers by the authors, the topic of building siting
studies has been evaluated with the use of overpressure exceed-
ance curves (Marx & Werts, 2013) and also with an extended
analysis using pressureeimpulse (PeI) curves (Marx & Werts,
2012). These methodologies were presented to offer means for
analysis beyond that of a simple worst-case consequence analysis
when evaluating the effects of vapor cloud explosions on occupied
buildings in or near a petrochemical process facility. These meth-
odologies provide a risk-based method to comply with API RP 752
and/or 753.
In some situations, the risk-based evaluation of a building may
show that a building can sustain significant damage due to over-
pressures that are predicted to occur at frequencies which may be
considered acceptable (e.g., 1.0
104 per year). Although the
damage sustained by buildings is always a concern, the greater
concern is the potential impact on building occupants. While many
evaluation techniques have focused on the damage to the building
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: jdm@questconsult.com (J.D. Marx), kmw@questconsult.com
(K.M. Werts).
1
www.questconsult.com.
prediction of building occupant fatalities. The chosen measure of
risk for these results is the FeN curve, a measure of societal risk,
which requires the analysis to develop a relationship between
building damage and occupant fatalities. A particular challenge in
generating an FeN curve of this nature is the probability of fatality
for a given number of building occupants; a methodology for this
calculation is explained in this paper.
2. Risk-based explosion modeling
The first step in producing a measure of building occupant fa-
talities is to model the explosion events. The model employed in
this work is the Quest model for estimating flame speeds (QMEFS)
(Melton & Marx, March 2009), an adaptation and extension of the
Baker-Strehlow-Tang (BST) model. The model provides modeling
flexibility by allowing the user to specify the defining parameters in
more detail than the BST model, avoiding the step changes inherent
in the typical low/medium/high categories. With the QMEFS model,
the potential impacts of specific explosion scenarios are predicted
in the form of overpressure and impulse as a function of distance
from the explosion center. This is often the first step in a siting
analysis, i.e., using this type of model (QMEFS, BST, TNO multi-
energy, or other similar models) to estimate the maximum

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2014.04.008
0950-4230/Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Please cite this article in press as: Marx, J. D., & Werts, K. M., Application of FeN curves in API RP 752 building siting studies, Journal of Loss
Prevention in the Process Industries (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2014.04.008
2 J.D. Marx, K.M. Werts / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries xxx (2014) 1e6
impacts on a building from various explosion scenarios. Maximum
impacts, because they are derived from worst case scenarios, usu-
ally occur at low frequencies, making their application limited in a
building siting analysis.
To provide more useful explosion impact data, the analysis can
proceed to a fully quantitative approach. This process uses a much
more expansive set of explosion events to quantitatively describe the
hazards (explosion impacts) coupled with quantitative methods to
describe the probability of each event. Event probabilities are
developed using tools such as equipment failure rate databases,
ignition probability models, and local weather data. Quantitative
approaches for determining occupied building explosion impacts
follow the methodology of a quantitative risk analysis (QRA), but do
not include potential toxic and fire impacts to the building. Because of
this, these approaches cannot be referred to as full measures of risk
since they do not fully describe the total risk to building occupants. A
QRA methodology follows these steps:
 Accident scenario selection
 Multiple release locations and release sizes
 Defined set of potential explosion sites (PESs)
 Dispersion analysis
 Multiple atmospheric stabilities, wind speeds, and wind
directions
 Explosion modeling
 Comparison of flammable cloud volume to PES volume
 Calculation of source strength (energy) to predict over-
pressures and impulses
 Probability analysis
 Release event frequencies based on equipment failure rates
 Ignition probabilities and weather condition probabilities
 Combination of consequences and probabilities for use in risk
measures
This methodology is consistent with that published by CCPS
(CCPS, 2000) for chemical process QRAs. It begins with accident
scenario selection and, in the context of vapor cloud explosions,
Fig. 1. Example facility layout.
Please cite this article in press as: Marx, J. D., & Werts, K. M., Application of FeN curves in API RP 752 building siting studies, Journal of Loss
Prevention in the Process Industries (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2014.04.008
must consider all potential release sources and each potential ex-
plosion site. Release and dispersion modeling is conducted for each
potential flammable fluid release selected. The dispersion behavior
of flammable vapors is calculated using the lower flammable limit
(LFL) as the endpoint.
Each explosion event will be characterized by the fuel reactivity
(specific to the released material), the volume involved, and the
confinement/congestion parameters. Due to the many combina-
tions of release events, hole sizes, weather conditions, and available
confinement/congestion locations in a typical petrochemical pro-
cess plant, a complete list of explosion events will often number in
the tens (or sometimes hundreds) of thousands.
In order to produce an FeN curve, a quantitative explosion
analysis must first produce results in one of two forms: over-
pressure exceedance curves or building damage curves. These
curves describe, probabilistically, the potential for a building to
experience varying levels of overpressure or varying levels of
damage. From this information, a relationship between building
damage and occupant fatalities is required in order to predict
building occupant fatalities for each explosion event. However,
when a building is occupied by more than one person, a simple
relationship between building damage and probability of fatality
does not clearly define the number of fatalities (N, in the FeN
curve) in any explosion event. Thus, an extension of the simple
approach is required to properly construct an FeN curve.
3. Example analysis
Consider a small hydrocarbon processing facility with eight
small equipment groups. The layout of this fictional facility is
shown in Fig. 1. In the figure, the facility’s four occupied buildings
are labeled and the PESs (regions of congestion due to process
equipment) are shown as dashed-outline polygons. The PESs have
various properties of confinement and congestion due to the
obstacle density and restriction of flame expansion that is present
in each particular area. All the flammable materials evaluated in
this example can be characterized as medium reactivity.
 J.D. Marx, K.M. Werts / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries xxx (2014) 1e6
When the potential release scenarios are identified and evalu-
ated with the PESs chosen for this facility, a set of potential ex-
plosion scenarios is developed. Using the risk-based methodology
described above, the required data is generated so that over-
pressure exceedance curves (OECs) and probability of building
damage curves can be constructed.
4. Overpressure exceedance curves
To construct an OEC, the list of potential explosion events is
evaluated in reference to one specific location (typically the closest
point on the building to the process areas). The explosion model is
run for each event, and the resulting overpressure at that point is
calculated. For any building, multiple points may need to be evalu-
ated in order to account for shorter distances between the different
sides of the building and the various PESs that exist around it.
The construction of an OEC involves creating a data set of predicted
overpressure (for the specified location of concern) and probability
pairs for the entire range of explosion events considered in the
analysis. Each data point represents a unique explosion event and its
specific probability of occurrence. The data set is then sorted by peak
overpressure from high to low. An exceedance curve is generated by
creating a cumulative sum of the probability values, beginning with
the probability of the highest overpressure value. Thus, for any over-
pressure value represented by the exceedance curve, the probability is
the summation of the probability of that particular overpressure plus
the probabilities of all events resulting in higher overpressures at the
specified location. The exceedance curve then represents the proba-
bility of experiencing or exceeding a particular overpressure value for
the location specified. Exceedance curves for the buildings in the
example facility are shown in Fig. 2.
5. Building damage estimates from PeI curves
Overpressure exceedance curves demonstrate the overpressure
impacts following vapor cloud explosions, without taking into ac-
count the corresponding impulse. While overpressure-only
methods may provide the characteristic measure of potential
building damage, a more complete description of the explosion’s
blast wave effects involves both the peak overpressure and the
corresponding impulse.
Fig. 2. Overpressure exceedance curves for the buildings in the example facility.
Please cite this article in press as: Marx, J. D., & Werts, K. M., Application of FeN curves in API RP 752 building siting studies, Journal of Loss
Prevention in the Process Industries (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2014.04.008
3
The next potential step in blast wave evaluation is to also
include the impulse corresponding to each incident overpressure. A
relationship between pressure and impulse pairs and a range of
expected damage levels can be determined by using PeI curves
developed for specific building construction types (or specific
buildings). For this work, PeI curves from a U.S. Department of
Defense (DOD) report (DOD, 2009) were used. The DOD report
describes the methodology and algorithms implemented in their
SAFER software, which is used to perform risk-based explosion
analyses. Of the PeI curves presented by the DOD report, the subset
of curves presented in Fig. 3 were selected as the most represen-
tative of the buildings in the example problem. The curves are
labeled as representative of a “small un-reinforced brick structure,”
and are assumed to represent all buildings in the analysis. (NOTE:
PeI curves are very specific to building construction, and even to
specific structural members; care should be taken when selecting
PeI curves for use in an explosion analysis.)
The PeI curves presented by DOD represent percent damage
levels (0.1%e100%) that a building may sustain in an explosion. It is
important to note that within the DOD methodology, building
damage is not a measure of building collapse, but rather, the level of
damage that necessitates repair or replacement of the building.
100% damage is equated to a complete financial and functional loss
and is the point where the building is no longer inhabitable. This
does not mean that the building has completely collapsed or is
grossly displaced, although partial collapse is possible.
Also shown in Fig. 3 are the PeI pairs predicted in this analysis.
Each data point on the plot represents the potential impacts of one
explosion event on a wall of one building; the entire data set
contains approximately 25,000 pressureeimpulse pairs per build-
ing. Based on the selected PeI curves in the figure, the impacts from
most of the explosion events are well below the 1% damage level
(no/negligible damage). As suggested in the OECs in Fig. 2, the
potential explosion scenarios will not have a measurable impact on
the office and security buildings. These buildings are removed from
further analysis.
The predicted damage levels for the remaining two buildings
extends to about 50% for the control room and slightly more than
80% building damage for the lab building at the upper end. The PeI
data was compared to the PeI curves to determine the percent
building damage for each explosion event. Because each PeI pair
has a corresponding probability, a new data set of event probability
versus building damage, or the probability of building damage
curve can be constructed:
Fig. 3. Pressureeimpulse curves for a small un-reinforced brick structure. With
overpressureeimpulse impacts for each building.
4 J.D. Marx, K.M. Werts / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries xxx (2014) 1e6
 Data are sorted based on the level of building damage (0%e
100%).
 Beginning with the highest value of building damage, a cumu-
lative sum of probability is generated, moving from high to low
values of building damage.
 A plot is constructed which shows level of building damage
versus cumulative probability.
Where an OEC represents a cumulative summary of the over-
pressure and probability of a full range of events that could affect a
building, the probability of building damage curve represents a
cumulative summary of building damage for that range of events.
Both methods can help to identify which buildings need further
analysis or mitigation measures. The result of performing the cu-
mulative sum on the building damage data is shown in Fig. 4 for the
lab and control buildings. This graph shows that for either building,
the probability of doing more than about 20% damage is less than
1.0
104 per year. While this information can be useful in
determining risk to buildings, further work is required to estimate
the risk posed on building occupants.
6. Determining fatality probabilities
The first factor to be considered when constructing an FeN
curve is the amount of time a certain worker population spends
inside a building. Because the same number of people are not inside
the building 24 hours per day (various shifts, worker groups, and
working patterns), a conditional probability is assigned to each
population to account for occupancy. The frequency of each ex-
plosion event that a worker shift may be exposed to is based on
annual equipment failure rates which are further modified by
conditional probabilities (weather conditions, ignition, etc.). For
each explosion event and worker shift that is considered in the
analysis, the following equation is applied:
fG ¼ Pshift $fe
where: fG ¼ frequency of a worker group experiencing an event
Pshift ¼ conditional probability of that shift
fe ¼ frequency of event that affects the building
Fig. 4. Probability of building damage for lab and control buildings.
Please cite this article in press as: Marx, J. D., & Werts, K. M., Application of FeN curves in API RP 752 building siting studies, Journal of Loss
Prevention in the Process Industries (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2014.04.008
Table 1
Occupied building populations.
Building evaluated Worker population by shift
Day Night
Control room 12 3
Lab 5 2
To determine Pshift, the worker populations in each building are
required. Table 1 presents an assumed set of population values for
application in this study. In this case, a conditional probability of
Pshift ¼ 0.5 was used for both day and night shift. Building occu-
pancies were assumed to be constant for either shift every day of
the year.
When the impact of an explosion on a building is evaluated with
respect to the number of building occupants fatally affected, a
relationship between the level of impact and percent fatality is
applied. This calculation is straightforward if there is only one
worker in a given building. If a specific probability of fatality within
a building is 0.1 for a given explosion event, the single worker in
that building has a probability of fatality of 0.1 for that event.
However, if there are two people in a building, a single fatality
probability is harder to determine since there is a probability of
killing one worker, a probability of killing the other, the probability
that both persons will be fatalities, as well as the potential of no
fatalities. To determine the probability of each of these outcomes
for a given building population, the following equation was
applied:
 N  ðKNÞ
K!
PN ¼ $ Pf $ 1  Pf (2)
N!ðK  NÞ!
where: K ¼ number of persons in the building
N ¼ number of fatalities
(1) Pf ¼ probability of fatality for a given explosion event
PN ¼ probability of fatality for N persons
Application of Equation (2) results in Kþ1 probability values. For
example, if there are four building occupants, there are distinct
possibilities of fatality of 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 of those persons in an ex-
plosion event. Table 2 demonstrates the probabilities associated
with each of these possibilities when there are four building oc-
cupants and a probability of fatality due to the explosion of 15%.
The Kþ1 probability values from Equation (2) are applied to the
value calculated by Equation (1) to determine a set of f/N pairs for
each explosion event.
fN ¼ PN $fG (3)
where: fN ¼ frequency of N fatalities, for N ¼ 0 to N ¼ K
The one factor in the above equations that has not yet been
discussed is the Pf term e the probability of fatality within a
building for a given explosion event. There have been a few
Table 2
Probabilities of N fatalities (K ¼ 4, Pf ¼ 0.15).
Number of fatalities Probability of N fatalities (PN)
(N) due to explosion event
4 0.000506
3 0.011475
2 0.097538
1 0.368475
0 0.522006
 J.D. Marx, K.M. Werts / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries xxx (2014) 1e6 5

6 35%

Percent Fataliy for Personnel

Peak Side-on Overpressure, psi

30%
5
25%

Inside Building
4 20%

15%
3
10%

2 5%

0%
1 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Predicted Building Damage (from P-I Curves)
0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 Fig. 7. DOD curve for relationship between building damage and probability of fatality.
Probability of Seroius Injury/Fatality

Fig. 5. CCPS Relationship between overpressure and probability of fatality. For building overpressure as well as impulse to determine a percent building
type “D”.
damage, which is then used to determine a percent fatality for
building occupants. The building damage versus percent fatality
relationship for a “small un-reinforced brick structure” is presented
published methods to determine this probability. Three methods
in Fig. 7. Using the same methodology discussed above, a level of
are outlined in this paper.
fatality is determined for each instance of building damage (or each
The first method was published by the Center for Chemical
PeI pair).
Process Safety (CCPS, 1996) in the book Evaluating Process Plant
With building damage versus fatality relationships (Figs. 5e7),
Buildings for External Explosions and Fires. A graphical relationship
the impacts of each explosion event can be related to occupant
was presented between peak side-on overpressure and probability
fatality. Each explosion event then can be represented by its
of serious injury/fatality for several general building types. The
probability of occurrence (f) and the resulting number of fatalities
curve chosen for use in this analysis was for building type “D” and is
(N) that are predicted to occur within a given building. The cu-
shown in Fig. 5. Building type D is described as one with a “steel or
mulative sum of these values results in an FeN curve. An FeN curve
concrete frame with unreinforced masonry infill or cladding.” With
is created in much the same way as OECs and building damage
this relationship, each overpressure predicted for a building can be
curves:
associated with a probability of fatality. Using Equations (1) and (2),
the probability that each number of fatalities for that building
 Frequencyefatality pairs (f/N data points) are sorted based on
population may occur can be determined.
the number of fatalities.
The second relationship chosen for consideration appears in
 A cumulative sum (F) of event frequencies is generated, begin-
Guidance for the Location and Design of Occupied Buildings on
ning with the frequency (f) associated with the highest value of
Chemical Manufacturing Sites, published by the UK’s Chemical In-
N, moving to the lowest N.
dustries Association (CIA) (CIA, 1998). It is similar to the CCPS
 A plot is constructed which shows fatalities (N) versus cumu-
method in that it presents a relationship between overpressure and
lative probability (F).
percent fatality (as vulnerability). The building type chosen from
the CIA work is type #3, “Typical domestic building: two-storey,
Using this methodology, FeN curves were created for the
brick walls, timber floors.” The overpressureevulnerability rela-
example control room and laboratory building occupants based on
tionship for this type of building is presented in Fig. 6.
the CCPS, CIA, and DOD building damage or overpressure versus
The final relationship chosen was the method presented in the
occupant fatality (vulnerability) relationships. The results of this
DOD report, from which the PeI curves were taken. This method
effort are shown in Fig. 8.
differs from the CCPS and CIA relationships in that it uses

7. Evaluation

14 The three methods of determining fatalities due to explosion

13
overpressure for building occupants presented in this paper each
12
11 have a set of assumptions or conditions built into them. For this
Overpressure, psi

10 reason, it is worth evaluating the differences between the three

9 methods.
8 One of the issues with the relationship from the CCPS book is
7
that the data for serious injury or fatality versus overpressure is
6
5 based on building damage data from earthquakes. While this
4 may seem like a straight-forward comparison, it may not be very
3 useful since there are differences in the way an earthquake
2 causes damage compared to how a blast wave damages build-
1
ings. The CCPS book also states that its predictions for fatality
0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 above about 3.0 psi (approximately 60% vulnerability for build-
ing type D) are questionable and should be used with caution. In
Vulnerability
addition, the building type chosen as most appropriate for this
Fig. 6. CIA relationship between overpressure and probability of fatality. For building analysis was type D e “steel or concrete frame with unreinforced
type “3”. masonry infill or cladding.” For an example analysis such as this,

Please cite this article in press as: Marx, J. D., & Werts, K. M., Application of FeN curves in API RP 752 building siting studies, Journal of Loss
Prevention in the Process Industries (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2014.04.008
6 J.D. Marx, K.M. Werts / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries xxx (2014) 1e6
Fig. 8. FeN Curves comparison for all three damageefatality relationships.
the choice is appropriate. For a real building, however, this
choice may or may not correctly represent the true building
response.
The CIA overpressureevulnerability curves are based on work
done to gather data and develop a method specifically for assessing
the vulnerability of people in buildings to external overpressure
impacts. The CIA commissioned WS Atkins to do this work. The
intent was for application in vapor cloud explosion events,
although much of the available data was from munitions or nuclear
blast waves. As with the CCPS relationship, one building type
(typical domestic building) was chosen as the most appropriate for
this analysis, but may not always appropriately represent a real
building.
The DOD method would seem to be more appropriate because it
incorporates impulse into the analysis, an important factor in
designing buildings to withstand explosions that often gets over-
looked in favor of overpressure. However, as with the other two
relationships, the user must select the most appropriate building
type from the DOD report. The DOD model does present a larger
number of building types from which to choose. The presentation is
in the form of PeI curves and corresponding building damage vs.
fatality curves. As stated above, the selection of PeI curves is more
scientific than presented here and should be done with care. One
downside to the DOD analysis is that for most building types it is
not possible to have more than about a 30% probability of fatality as
building damage reaches 100%. Part of the reason for this is that,
according to the DOD report, 100% building damage is simply a
100% financial loss. Within this example analysis, this was not
problematic because the explosion events never reached 100%
building damage for the set of PeI curves chosen to represent the
buildings in the example.
The FeN comparison plot presented in Fig. 8 demonstrates the
differences in these three methods.
Please cite this article in press as: Marx, J. D., & Werts, K. M., Application of FeN curves in API RP 752 building siting studies, Journal of Loss
Prevention in the Process Industries (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2014.04.008
8. Conclusions
The methodology presented in this paper provides a means to
apply vapor cloud explosion predictions to a building, accounting
for its specific population. In order to produce an FeN curve for
building occupants, two things are needed:
 A set of predictions relating explosion impacts to building
damage; and,
 Some measure of the building response in the form of occupant
fatalities.
The prediction of building impacts following explosion over-
pressure can be accomplished with the use of published infor-
mation (see Figs. 5e7). The relationship between building
response and occupant fatalities may be part of the building
response (Figs. 5 and 6) or may be more detailed (Figs. 3 and 7).
The probabilistic nature of the analysis is handled through Equa-
tions (1) and (2). This approach provides for the probability of the
event, the probability of persons being in the building, and the
multiple probabilities associated with differing numbers of fatal-
ities given a predicted building response to the blast wave. In this
way, the FeN curve can be generated properly, considering the
various potential outcomes of a single explosion event (see
Table 2) and the range of occupant impacts given a range of ex-
plosion events.
As can be seen in Fig. 8, the results of the analysis can vary
widely based on the approach that is chosen for predicting building
occupant impacts. The choice of building type is a key factor in any
analysis. As seen with each of the three sources evaluated in this
paper, there are several building types to choose from. It is
important to pick the PeI curves that best match the building to be
evaluated. Even within this example analysis, the choice of a
building vulnerability curve is not always clear, and not consistent
between the sources of building damage (overpressure) versus
occupant fatality relationships. With the many potential types of
buildings at a petrochemical facility, choosing the wrong fatality
relationships can easily result in an over- or under-prediction of
risk.
References
CCPS. (1996). Guidelines for evaluating process plant buildings for external explosions
and fire. 345 East 47th Street, New York, New York 10017: Center for Chemical
Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers.
CCPS. (2000). Guidelines for chemical process quantitative risk analysis (2nd ed.). 2
Park Avenue, New York, New York: Center for Chemical Process Safety of the
American Institute of Chemical Engineers.
CIA. (February 1998). Guidance for the location and design of occupied buildings on
chemical manufacturing sites. London: Chemical Industries Association, ISBN
1858970776.
DOD. (21 July 2009). Approved methods and algorithms for DOD risk-based explosives
siting (Revision 4). In Technical Paper No. 14. Alexandria, VA: Department of
Defense Explosives Safety Board.
Marx, J. D., & Werts, K. M. (May 2013). The application of pressureeimpulse curves
in a blast exceedance analysis. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries,
26(3), 478e482.
Marx, J. D., & Werts, K. M. (2012b). The application of pressureeimpulse curves in a
blast exceedance analysis. Presented at the Mary K. O’Connor Process Safety
Center’s 2011 Symposium, College Station, TX, October 2012.
Melton, T. A., & Marx, J. D. (March 2009). Estimating flame speeds for use with the
BST blast curves. Process Safety Progress, 28(1), 5.