Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 (2004) 437–447

www.elsevier.com/locate/jlp

Threshold values for domino effects caused by blast wave interaction

with process equipment
Valerio Cozzani a,
, Ernesto Salzano b
a
Dipartimento di Ingegneria Chimica, Mineraria e delle Tecnologie Ambientali, Università degli Studi di Bologna, viale Risorgimento no. 2,
40136 Bologna, Italy
b
Istituto di Ricerche sulla Combustione, CNR, via Diocleziano 328, 80125 Napoli, Italy

Abstract

The present study focuses on the definition and assessment of overpressure threshold values for the damage to equipment
caused by blast waves originated by primary accidental scenarios. A revision of literature data and of the available damage prob-
ability models was carried out. Threshold values were proposed for different categories of process equipment, taking into account
either damage levels or release intensities following the loss of containment. Specific threshold values for domino effect were also
proposed.
# 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Domino effects; Threshold values; Blast wave; Probit analysis; Quantitative risk analysis; Explosion

1. Introduction ment studies, because in alternative damage evaluations

The assessment of damage to process equipment
caused by blast waves may be carried out at different
levels of detail, depending on the final aim of the
analysis. The analysis may be addressed to different
perspectives as for instance economical losses, which
are mainly related to structural damage of equipment
or to loss of containment from equipment, which may
possibly trigger domino effects. This may require the
use of rather different methodologies, as discussed in
the following. When evaluating the risk of domino
effects, the starting point is the identification of equip-
ment that may be ‘‘damaged’’ by blast waves origi-
nated from primary accidental scenarios. In this
framework, the straightforward identification of poss-
ible damage following a blast wave is greatly enhanced
by the availability of so-called damage threshold
values, that is minimum overpressure values at which a
damage is expected at a given ‘‘target equipment’’. It is
also worth remarking that the availability of threshold
values is of utmost importance to simplify risk assess-

that the different characteristics of equipment cate-
Corresponding author. Tel.: +39-0512093141; fax: +39-
051581200.
E-mail address: valerio.cozzani@mail.ing.unibo.it (V. Cozzani).
0950-4230/$ - see front matter # 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2004.08.003
should be carried out for all the equipment present on
site. Moreover, several simplified models for the assess-
ment of damage caused by blast waves in quantitative
risk analysis (e.g., see Bagster & Pitblado, 1991; Lees,
1996), as well as many ‘‘safety distance’’ criteria adop-
ted in technical standards (Gledhill & Lines, 1988;
TNO, 1979) and even in the legislation (DM 151/
2001), are based on threshold values.
Several authors have reported different and appar-
ently contradictory threshold values for equipment
‘‘damage’’ caused by overpressure. Among the factors
which may have caused these apparent inconsistencies
in literature data, two seem the more important: (i) the
complete lack of indications on the specific character-
istics of process equipment; (ii) the ambiguities in the
definition of ‘‘damage’’ and/or ‘‘loss’’.
In a previous paper, an extended study on blast wave
interactions with industrial equipment was presented,
together with the probit coefficients for damage prob-
ability to process equipment involved in an explosion
(Salzano & Cozzani, 2003). The results pointed out
gories should be taken into account for the reliable
assessment of blast wave damage.
438 V. Cozzani, E. Salzano / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 (2004) 437–447
The present study focuses on the definition of thresh-
old values for ‘‘damage’’ and ‘‘loss’’ from process
equipment. A threshold was defined as the value of the
maximum peak static overpressure, Pt, above which the
reference damage is possible. The concept of ‘‘loss’’
was defined with respect to the specific aim of the
analysis. Damage levels were identified and threshold
values were proposed for different categories of process
equipment. The values obtained were compared to
literature data and to the available damage probability
models. The analysis was limited to the damage caused
by blast waves in the ‘‘far field’’, provided an ‘‘idealiza-
tion’’ of the blast wave produced by any kind of
explosion (Baker, Cox, Westine, Kulesz, & Strehlow,
1983; Salzano & Cozzani, 2003).
2. The damage of process equipment caused by blast
waves
In the field of quantitative risk analysis (QRA),
threshold values for damage caused by blast waves to
process equipment may be identified with respect to
several different effects. In particular, the term ‘‘loss’’
may have several meanings: structural damage to
equipment (‘‘loss’’ of equipment), loss of containment,
loss of energy, economic losses, and loss of lives due to
secondary scenarios (domino effect). Although econ-
omic losses are the more comprehensive category of
losses, having the potential to express the final con-
sequences of all the other losses, each of the above
potential loss categories should be considered in a
QRA. The present study is focused on the thresholds
for damage to equipment and for the loss of contain-
ment, which result as the more relevant with respect to
the assessment of possible domino events following a
primary blast wave.
As discussed above, the identification of reliable
threshold values for losses caused by blast waves
requires the definition of what is intended as ‘‘losses’’,
and of the characteristics of the target equipment. In a
former study, four different equipment categories were
identified to assess the potential damage caused by
blast waves: atmospheric vessels, pressurized equip-
ment, vertical elongated vessels and small equipment
(Salzano & Cozzani, 2003). On the other hand, the fol-
lowing definitions of ‘‘losses’’ were considered in the
present approach.
2.1. Structural damage of equipment
Damage states (DS) are often defined, in the litera-
ture, to give an economical evaluation for the resto-
ration of the equipment damaged by explosions (Tam
& Corr, 2000) and even by natural events (Hazus,
1997). Damage costs are not discussed here. However,
the definition of damage states can be assumed as the
entry point to evaluate the loss of containment, as dis-
cussed in the following. Thus, the damage of a struc-
ture may be roughly evaluated defining two damage
classes:
. DS1: light damage to the structure or to the auxili-
ary equipment;
. DS2: intense, or catastrophic damage, or even total
collapse of structure, which is certainly followed by
an intense loss of containment.
Almost all the experimental observations presented
in the literature and the models developed for the dam-
age to equipment are devoted to the evaluation of
equipment structural damage. Therefore, a first aim of
the present study was the identification of overpressure
threshold values for the two damage states of interest,
Pt,DS1 and Pt,DS2, respectively. However, the knowl-
edge of damage states is not sufficient to evaluate the
secondary scenarios that may be triggered by equip-
ment damage.
2.2. Loss of containment from equipment
Different types of loss of containment may follow the
damage of process equipment (defined as damage state,
DS) caused by a blast wave. The main factor affecting
the severity of the loss of containment and the possible
consequences is the release flow. Obviously, a higher
flow results in a lower release time, thus in a lower
probability of mitigation and in a higher severity of the
secondary scenario. The release flow is, in turn, mainly
influenced by two factors: the section available for the
outflow (that is related to equipment damage state),
and the physical properties and process conditions of
the fluid in the vessel (e.g., temperature above boiling
point at ambient pressure). Thus, it is useful to define
different categories for the loss intensity (LI). Follow-
ing the approach proposed in the well-known ‘‘purple
book’’ (TNO, 1979), three classes of loss intensities
were defined:
(i) LI1: ‘‘minor loss’’, defined as the partial loss of
inventory or total loss of inventory in a time inter-
val of more than 10 min from the impact of the
blast wave.
(ii) LI2: ‘‘intense loss’’, defined as the total loss of
inventory in a time interval between 1 and 10 min.
(iii) LI3: ‘‘catastrophic loss’’, defined as the ‘‘instan-
taneous’’ complete loss of inventory (complete loss
in a time interval of less than 1 min).
In the case of LI1, the dispersion of highly toxic pro-
ducts, rather than flammable materials, should be con-
sidered as the source of major consequences. However,
domino effects and local fires can still take place, e.g. in
 V. Cozzani, E. Salzano / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 (2004) 437–447
the case of sprinkler systems failure. It is here worth
remembering that Ness and Chavarria (1995) proposed
a total time of about 30 min for the recognition of
‘‘leakages’’ and for the intervention. It is also impor-
tant to note that minor losses due to blast wave inter-
action with storage tanks can be accompanied by
damage of either manual or automatic mitigation devi-
ces, thus producing strong malfunctioning of water-
foam sprinkler, automatic safety valves and interlock
systems. Therefore, the threshold value for LI1 should
be considered as a reference and conservative value in
the estimation of damage to process equipment.
With respect to LI2, mitigation actions due to oper-
ator and automatic intervention ‘‘on the leakage’’ are
still possible. However, the probability of a successful
mitigation against fires, explosion and toxic release fol-
lowing a LI2 loss of containment is low. It should be
remarked that blast waves are in this case very intense
and mitigation devices may often result at least par-
tially damaged. Moreover, the contemporary presence
of several fires or dispersion phenomena (toxic or
flammable gases or vapors) is also very likely. As a
conclusion, the threshold value for LI2 represents a
‘‘non-return’’ value for the cascade effects that may fol-
low the blast wave interaction with equipment, unless
specific mitigation devices (e.g. water curtains) are
installed to prevent the triggered secondary accidental
scenarios.
In the case of LI3, no intervention is possible due to
the rapid release of target vessel content. Possibly, the
threshold value for LI3 corresponds to the certainty of
cascade effects. Thus, three threshold values seem sig-
nificant in the assessment of loss intensity following
damage caused by a blast wave: Pt,LI1, Pt,LI2, and
Pt,LI3.
For the sake of simplicity, on the basis of the defi-
nition of DS and LI states which still retain unavoid-
able uncertainties, a step forward can be obtained by
considering that the overpressure threshold value for
damage state DS1 may be assumed coincident with
that for LI1, while that for DS2 may be associated to
LI2 or LI3. Therefore, from the above analysis, three
different overpressure values seem significant in the
assessment of possible equipment damage due to over-
pressure: (i) Pt,DS1–LI1, for damage state 1 associated to
loss intensity 1; (ii) Pt,DS2–LI2, for damage state 2 asso-
ciated to loss intensity 2; (iii) Pt,DS2–LI3, for damage
state 2 associated to loss intensity 3. The present study
was aimed at the identification of these three threshold
values for different categories of process equipment.
439
3. Threshold values for industrial equipment
3.1. Threshold values reported in the literature
Table 1 shows the data reported in the open litera-
ture for threshold values used in the assessment of
equipment damage and of possible domino effects
caused by blast waves. As shown in the table, a differ-
ence of about an order of magnitude is present between
the value of 7 kPa given by several sources for the
damage to atmospheric vessels and the value of 70 kPa
suggested by HSE (1981) and by Khan and Abbasi
(2001). Some of the proposed threshold values are
often generic and do not take into account the specific
features of different equipment categories.
A previous study has evidenced that differences in
process equipment result in strong differences for the
intensity of damage caused by blast waves (Salzano &
Cozzani, 2003). In particular, as expected, atmospheric
equipment evidenced a damage probability at low
values of overpressure more than twice of that for pres-
surized equipment. As a matter of fact, most of the
data in Table 1 are concerned with the assessment of
the structural integrity of process equipment following
an accidental explosion. Thus, it is likely that the lower
values in Table 1 should correspond to threshold
values for damage state DS1. On the other hand, some
values in the table were possibly related to domino
effect. The loss intensity required to trigger a secondary
accident should obviously be relevant in this case,
usually requiring DS2 to occur (unless the emission of
toxic gases is of concern). All these factors may explain
the dispersion and apparent disagreement of the data
observed in Table 1. Therefore, a correct definition of
threshold values for overpressure damage should
include at least the equipment category, the damage
state and the release intensity to which these values are
correspondent.
3.2. Literature data for blast damage to process
equipment
In order to identify the threshold values for different
equipment categories, literature data for blast damage
to process equipment were revised. Tables 2–5 show
the retrieved data for blast damage to different cate-
gories of process equipment. Overpressure damage data
were associated to the different damage states and to
the different loss intensities on the basis of available
information.
On the basis of the criteria discussed above, DS1–LI1
state was assumed to correspond to all damages defined
as ‘‘minor losses’’ (e.g., minor damage, cracks, defor-
mation, or failure of connections). DS2–LI3 was
assumed to correspond to damage described as the
destruction or complete loss of the equipment. DS2–LI2
was assumed to correspond to all the intermediate cases.
440 V. Cozzani, E. Salzano / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 (2004) 437–447

Table 1
Threshold values for damage to process equipment caused by blast waves as reported in the literature

Equipment category Threshold (kPa) Source Notes

Atmospheric 7.00 Gledhill and Lines (1998) Partial damage
10.00 Barton (1995)
10.00 Bottleberghs and Ale (1996)
10.00 Kletz (1980) Minor leaks, fixed roof tanks
10.00 Ramsey, Sylvester-Evans, and English (1982)
14.00 Cremer and Warner (1978) Low pressure item damage
14.00 Gugan (1979)
20.31 Brasie and Simpson (1968)
20.00 Kletz (1980)
20.70 Clancey (1972)
21.00 Gledhill and Lines (1998) Total damage
23.80 Glasstone and Dolan (1977)
35.00 Wells (1980)
45.00 Gledhill and Lines (1998) Floating roof storage tank destruction
Pressurized 30.00 Bottleberghs and Ale (1996)
35.00 Wells (1980)
35.00 Cremer and Warner (1978)
38.00 Gledhill and Lines (1998) Partial damage
42.00 Gugan (1979)
48.00 Gledhill and Lines (1998) Total damage
55.00 Brasie and Simpson (1968)
65.00 Glasstone and Dolan (1977)
70.00 HSE (1981) Failure of pressurized storage sphere
Elongated 14.00 Gugan (1979)
17.00 Schneider (1997)
Small 14.00 Cremer and Warner (1978) Low pressure item damage
All 35.00 Bagster and Pitblado (1991)
70.00 Khan and Abbasi (2001)

The tables clearly show that the same damage state
or loss intensity seemed to occur as a consequence of a
wide interval of overpressures. The possible causes of
the scatter in overpressure damage data were discussed
elsewhere (Salzano & Cozzani, 2003). However, the
data in the tables are useful to define and validate
threshold values for the different categories of equip-
ment.
3.3. Threshold values derived from ‘‘probit’’ models
Few attempts were made in the literature to model
the probability of equipment failure as a consequence
of overpressure (Bagster & Pitblado, 1991; Eisenberg,
Lynch, & Breeding, 1975; Khan & Abbasi, 2001;
Schneider, 1997). In a previous study, literature data
were analyzed in order to estimate probit functions for
the overpressure damage probability of different cate-
gories of process equipment (Salzano & Cozzani,
2003). Since probit functions are obtained from a stat-
istical analysis of the available information on blast
damage to equipment, it would be of utmost impor-
tance to derive threshold values from this approach.
As a matter of fact, probit functions for over-
pressure-related damage may be also associated to
damage states and expected release intensities. Indeed,
a value of Y ¼ 2:71, can be assumed as the character-
istic limit value for the probability of damage occur-
rence, and the corresponding overpressure values were
thus defined as the probit-derived overpressure limit
for DS1–LS1, indicated as pt,DS1–LI1 in the following.
This characteristic overpressure value well corresponds
to the threshold value of blast pressure for very light
damage (DS1) and light loss of containment (LI1), pre-
viously defined as Pt,DS1–LI1.
It is more difficult to find a correspondence between
probit values and the DS2–LI2 or DS2–LI3 states.
Indeed, the value of Y is associated only to the prob-
ability of having damage, without reference to the
‘‘intensity’’ of damage. However, it is possible to
assume that DS2–LI3 occurs for higher values of over-
pressure, which are possibly close to the ‘‘certainty’’ of
damage, that is a probit value of Y ¼ 7:10. This
assumption is acceptable since in the statistical pro-
cedure used for the construction of probit functions, a
probability of occurrence equal to 1 was assigned if
catastrophic damage was observed for a given value of
overpressure. Damage and loss of containment are cer-
tain if total destruction occurs, and an instantaneous
loss of containment is only certain after the total
 V. Cozzani, E. Salzano / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 (2004) 437–447 441

Table 2
Literature data for damage to atmospheric equipment caused by peak static overpressure (DP). Evaluated damage state (DS) and loss intensity
(LI) are also reported
v
DP (kPa) Damage DS LI References
5.17 Minor damage, cone roof tank (100% filled) 1 1 Nelson (1977)
5.17 Minor damage, cone roof tank (50% filled) 1 1 Nelson (1977)
6.10 1% Structural damage of equipment 1 1 Eisenberg et al. (1975)
7.00 Failure of connection 1 1 Henrych (1979)
7.00 Collapse of atmospheric tank roof 1 1 TNO (1979)
7.00 Partial damage to atmospheric tank 1 1 Mecklenburgh (1985)
10.00 Failure of atmospheric equipment 2 2 Bottelberghs and Ale (1996)
10.00 Fixed roof tank damage 1 1 Kletz (1980)
10.00 50% Damage of atmospheric tank 2 2 Barton (1995)
14.00 Minor damage of atmospheric tank 1 1 Gugan (1979)
18.70 Minor damage, floating roof tank (50% filled) 1 1 Nelson (1977)
18.70 Catastrophic failure, cone roof tank (50% filled) 2 3 Nelson (1977)
20.00 Displacement of steel supports 1 1 Clancey (1972)
20.00 Deformation of atmospheric tank 1 1 Gugan (1979)
20.00 100% damage, atmospheric tank 2 3 Barton (1995)
21.00 Destruction of fixed roof atmospheric tank 2 3 Mecklenburgh (1985)
24.00 20% Of structural damage of steel floating roof
2 2 Brasie and Simpson (1968)
petroleum tank
25.00 Atmospheric tank destruction 2 3 Gugan (1979)
35.00 80% Damage of process plant 2 3 Barton (1995)
42.51 Minor damage, floating roof tank (100% filled) 1 1 Nelson (1977)
42.51 Catastrophic failure, cone roof tank (100% filled) 2 3 Nelson (1977)
45.00 Catastrophic failure, floating roof tank 2 3 Mecklenburgh (1985)
136.05 Catastrophic failure, floating roof tank (50% filled) 2 3 Nelson (1977)
136.05 Catastrophic failure, floating roof tank (100% filled) 2 3 Nelson (1977)
136.10 99% Structural damage of floating roof tank 2 3 Pickering and Bockholt (1971)
137.00 99% Damage (destruction) of floating roof petroleum
2 3 Brasie and Simpson (1968)
tank

destruction of equipment. Thus, the probit approach
allows the definition of an overpressure limit value,
pt,DS2–LI3, corresponding to the peak static over-
pressure resulting in a unitary probability of having
DS2 damage state followed by loss of containment
LI3. This value may be used as the higher limit of
Pt,DS2–LI3 (that is the minimum pressure value needed
to have DS2 followed by LI3).
With respect to DS2–LI2 state, a probit-derived
overpressure limit should be assumed between the pro-
bit values of 2.71 and 7.10. A reference probit value,
pt,DS2–LI2, was arbitrarily assumed to be of Y ¼ 4:74,
which approximately corresponds to a 0.4 value of the
occurrence probability. This arbitrary reference value
was useful to allow a comparison of the thresholds
obtained for the different categories of process equip-
ment.
Table 6 shows the available probit functions for
overpressure damage to process equipment.
4. Threshold values for specific equipment categories
In the following, the threshold values given in the
literature and the probit-derived overpressure limits
were compared to the overpressure damage data for
the four types of equipment categories previously
defined. Fig. 1 summarizes the data collected for the
different categories of process equipment. The ranges
of the reported threshold values and of the probit-
derived overpressure limits pt,DS1–LI1, pt,DS2–LI2 and
pt,DS2–LI3 are also shown in the figure.
4.1. Atmospheric tanks
A first observation that comes from Fig. 1(a) is that
some of the threshold values reported in the literature
for damage caused by overpressure (TV) are not neces-
sarily conservative. In particular, some of the proposed
threshold values are above 20.00 kPa, while over-
pressures as low as 18.70 kPa were reported to have
caused the destruction (DS2–LI3) of atmospheric ves-
sels (see Table 2). On the other hand, the data collected
in the literature show that overpressure damage related
to damage state DS1–LI1 range between 5.17 (Nelson,
1977, cone roof storage tank) and 42.51 kPa
(Nelson,1977, floating roof tank). The probit-derived
overpressure value is 7.17 kPa using our probit func-
tion and 8.77 kPa using the probit function given by
Eisenberg et al. (1975). These values are close to that
given by Gledhill and Lines (1998) for the failure of
442 V. Cozzani, E. Salzano / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 (2004) 437–447

Table 3
Literature data for damage to pressurized vessels caused by peak static overpressure (DP). Evaluated damage state (DS) and loss intensity (LI) are
also reported
v
DP (kPa) Damage DS LI References
20.00 Displacement of steel supports 1 1 Clancey (1972)
20.00 Tubes deformation 1 1 Gugan (1979)
30.00 Failure of pressure vessel 1 1 Bottelberghs and Ale (1996)
38.00 Partial damage of pressure vessel 2 2 Mecklenburgh (1985)
39.00 Structural damage to pressure vessel 2 2 Wells (1980)
39.12 Minor damage, pressure vessel horizontal 1 1 Nelson (1997)
42.00 Pressure vessel deformation 1 1 Gugan (1979)
52.72 Minor damage, tank sphere 1 1 Nelson (1977)
53.00 Pressure vessel failure 2 2 Gugan (1979)
53.00 Failure of spherical pressure vessel 2 2 Gugan (1979)
55.00 20% Of structural damage of spherical steel 2 2 Brasie and Simpson (1968)
petroleum tank
61.22 Catastrophic failure, pressure vessel horizontal 2 3 Nelson (1977)
70.00 Failure of pressurized storage sphere 2 2 HSE (1981)
81.63 Minor damage, pressure vessel vertical 1 1 Nelson (1977)
83.00 20% Structural damage of vertical cylindrical 2 2 Brasie and Simpson (1968)
steel pressure vessel
88.44 Catastrophic failure, pressure vessel vertical 2 3 Nelson (1977)
95.30 99% Structural damage of vertical, steel pressure 2 3 Pickering and Bockholt (1971)
vessel
97.00 99% Damage of vertical cylindrical steel pressure 2 3 Brasie and Simpson (1968)
vessel
108.84 Catastrophic failure, tank sphere 2 3 Nelson (1977)
108.90 99% Structural damage of spherical, pressure 2 3 Pickering and Bockholt (1971)
steel vessel
110.00 99% Damage (destruction) of spherical steel 2 3 Brasie and Simpson (1968)
petroleum tank

atmospheric connections. This suggests that a con-
servative threshold value to be assumed for DS1–LI1
of atmospheric storage vessels is of 5 kPa, while a more
realistic value is of 7 kPa.
With respect to DS2–LI2, the damage data collected
show that this specific damage state is likely to be
caused by overpressure values which lay between 10
and 24 kPa. With reference to statistical analysis, the
overpressure values corresponding to a damage prob-
ability of 0.4 is 17.55 kPa for the probit given by
Eisenberg et al. (1975), whereas a value of 16.15 kPa is
obtained by our probit function. Both the values are
slightly lower than 18 kPa, which was reported as the
overpressure corresponding to the catastrophic failure

Table 4
Literature data for damage to elongated vessels caused by peak static overpressure (DP). Evaluated damage state (DS) and loss intensity (LI) are
also reported
v
DP (kPa) Damage DS LI References
7.00 Failure of connection 1 1 Henrych (1979)
10.00 Failure of atmospheric equipment 1 1 Bottelberghs and Ale (1996)
14.00 Minor damage of cooling tower 1 1 Gugan (1979)
17.00 Minor damage, distillation tower and cylindrical steel vertical 1 1 Schneider (1997)
structure
20.00 Displacement of steel supports 1 1 Clancey (1972)
20.00 Tubes deformation 1 1 Gugan (1979)
29.00 Distillation tower and cylindrical steel vertical structure failure 1 1 Schneider (1997)
35.00 Damage to fractionating column 1 1 TNO (1979)
35.71 Minor damage, fractionation column 1 1 Nelson (1977)
37.42 Catastrophic failure, pipe supports 2 2 Nelson (1977)
38.00 Deformation of non-pressure equipment 1 1 Gugan (1979)
42.00 Tubes failure 2 2 Gugan (1979)
42.52 Minor damage, extraction column 1 1 Nelson (1977)
45.92 Catastrophic failure, fractionation column 2 3 Nelson (1977)
47.00 Failure of non-pressure equipment 2 2 Nelson (1977)
69.73 Catastrophic failure, extraction column 2 3 Nelson (1977)
 V. Cozzani, E. Salzano / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 (2004) 437–447 443

Table 5
Literature data for damage to small equipment caused by peak static overpressure (DP). Evaluated damage state (DS) and loss intensity (LI) are
also reported
v
DP (kPa) Damage DS LI References
7.00 Failure of connection 1 1 Henrych (1979)
18.70 Minor damage, reactor: cracking 1 1 Nelson (1977)
20.00 Displacement of steel supports 1 1 Clancey (1972)
20.00 Tubes deformation 1 1 Gugan (1979)
25.30 Minor damage, reactor chemical 1 1 Nelson (1977)
37.42 Catastrophic failure, pipe supports 2 2 Nelson (1977)
42.00 Tubes failure 2 2 Gugan (1979)
49.32 Minor damage, heat exchanger 1 1 Nelson (1977)
59.52 Catastrophic failure, reactor chemical 2 3 Nelson (1977)
59.52 Catastrophic failure, heat exchanger 2 3 Nelson (1977)
76.53 Catastrophic failure, reactor: cracking 2 3 Nelson (1977)
81.63 Minor damage, pump 1 1 Nelson (1977)
108.84 Catastrophic failure, pump 2 3 Nelson (1977)

of a cone roof tank (50% filled). This suggests that a
minimum value of 10 kPa should be adopted for DS2–
LI2 of atmospheric vessels, a less conservative value
being of 16 kPa.
The lower peak static overpressure that resulted in
DS2–LI3 is 20.00 kPa for atmospheric equipment. As
expected, this value is reasonably lower than the pro-
bit-derived limit pt,DS2–LI3, that is of 39.45 kPa for the
probit given by Eisenberg et al. (1975), and of 43.5 kPa
for our probit.
Table 7 summarizes the suggested, minimum and
probit-derived overpressure threshold values for this
and the following categories of process equipment.
4.2. Pressurised tanks
As shown in Fig. 1(b), the threshold values proposed
in the literature for pressurized vessels range between
30 and 70 kPa. The lower specific overpressure value
resulting in DS–LI1 for this equipment category is of
30 kPa. However, displacement of steel supports and
deformation of tubes have been reported for over-
pressure values as low as 20.00 kPa (see Table 3). The
probit value of 2.71 is reached at 33.69 kPa, which is in
good agreement with the specific equipment damage
data reported in Table 4. A threshold value of 30 kPa
is thus suggested for the DS1–LI1 damage state in the
case of pressurized vessels, whereas a more conserva-
tive value of 20 kPa could be assumed on the basis of
data for connection and support deformation.
With respect to state DS2–LI2, reported over-
pressure values range between 38.00 and 83.00 kPa.
The probit-derived overpressure limit for DS2–LI2 is
of 54.32 kPa. As for atmospheric vessels, this value is
above the lower value quoted in the literature for this
damage state. Moreover, overpressure values of 48 kPa
were reported for the destruction of pressure vessel
(Mecklenburgh, 1985). Thus, a conservative threshold
value for this damage state should be of 38 kPa.
With respect to the release intensity LI3, reported
overpressure data range between 61 and 110.00 kPa.
The probit value of 7.1 is reached for an overpressure
of 93.07 kPa, which, as expected, is reasonably above
the lower values of damage data for LI3. The value of
61 kPa should thus be assumed as the DS2–LI3 thresh-
old for pressurized equipment.
4.3. Elongated vessels
Fig. 1(c) shows the range of overpressure values that
were reported to have caused the different damage
states and release intensities for atmospheric long, ver-
tical elongated vessels. The lower specific value for
DS1–LI1 is 14.00 kPa, which is not far from the value
of 16.94 kPa obtained by assuming a probit value of
2.71. Hence, the suggested threshold value is of 14 kPa,
while a more conservative threshold value is of 7 kPa,

Table 6
v
Probit coefficients for overpressure damage probabilities for different equipment categories. Y ¼ a þ blnðDP Þ, with overpressure in Pa

Equipment a b References
Atmospheric vessels 23.8 2.92 Eisenberg et al. (1975)
Atmospheric vessels 18.96 2.44 Salzano and Cozzani (2003)
Pressurized vessels 42.44 4.33 Salzano and Cozzani (2003)
Elongated equipment 28.07 3.16 Salzano and Cozzani (2003)
Small equipment 17.79 2.18 Salzano and Cozzani (2003)
444 V. Cozzani, E. Salzano / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 (2004) 437–447

Fig. 1. Overpressure damage data ranges for atmospheric vessels (a), pressurized equipment (b), vertical elongated vessels (c), and small equip-
ment (d), for the three loss intensities of concern (LI). Suggested probit-derived overpressure limit values for damage as obtained from probit
analysis (PTV1: pt,DS1–LI1; PTV2: pt,DS2–LI2; PTV3: pt,DS2–LI3) and as suggested in the literature (TV) are also reported.

which corresponds to the overpressure resulting in the
failure of connection in atmospheric equipment (see
Table 4). The use of this lower threshold value should
be considered particularly in the case of atmospheric
columns with unprotected large diameter piping (e.g.,
unsupported head condenser piping), which may be
easily damaged by blast waves.
Overpressure values between 37.00 and 42.00 kPa
were reported to cause damage and release intensity
corresponding to state DS2–LI2. These values are
higher than the probit-derived overpressure limit for a
damage occurrence probability of 0.4, which results of
be 32.20 kPa.
With respect to release intensity LI3 (DS2–LI3),
reported damage data range between 45.92 and 69.73
kPa. Also in this case, as expected, the pressure value
of 68.17, obtained for a probit value of 7.1, is near to
the higher bound of the overpressure range that resul-
ted for this damage state. A threshold value of 45 kPa
should thus be assumed.
4.4. Small equipment
The overpressure damage data collected for ‘‘small’’
process equipment, reported in Fig. 1(d), show a wider
interval of values. ‘‘Small’’ process equipment repre-
sents the less homogeneous equipment category, which
ranges from pumps to heat exchangers, to small vol-
ume reactors. The minimum specific overpressure dam-
age data resulting in DS1–LI1 is 18.70 kPa, although
lower values (7.00 kPa) should be again considered as
the thresholds for the damage of atmospheric piping
 V. Cozzani, E. Salzano / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 (2004) 437–447 445

Table 7
Peak static overpressure threshold values (kPa) for the different damage states and equipment categories. The reported pt values are from the pro-
bit functions given by from Salzano and Cozzani (2003)

Threshold value Equipment

Atmospheric Pressurized Elongated Small
Suggested
Pt,DS1–LI1 7 30 14 12
Pt,DS2–LI2 16 38 37 37
Pt,DS2–LI3 20 61 45 59
Minimum
Pt,DS1–LI1 5 20 7 7
Pt,DS2–LI2 10 38 37 37
Pt,DS2–LI3 20 61 45 59
Probit-derived
pt,DS1–LI1 7 34 17 12
pt,DS2–LI2 16 54 32 31
pt,DS2–LI3 44 93 68 91

and connections. The overpressure value corresponding
to a probit Y ¼ 2:71 is of 12.08 kPa. Hence, a con-
servative threshold of 7 kPa should be adopted, while a
reasonably less conservative value of 12 kPa may be
suggested by the present analysis.
With respect to the DS2–LI2 state, 37.42 kPa is the
lower reported value, which is consistently higher than
the 30.62 kPa value coming from a damage occurrence
probability of 0.4. The value of 59.52 kPa is the lower
reported value of overpressure that resulted in DS3–
LI3, while a value of 90.89 kPa comes from the analy-
sis of the probit function.
5. Threshold values for domino effect
5.1. Escalation of secondary scenarios
Although any damage to process equipment may
result in a domino effect, the likelihood of the escala-
tion of the secondary scenario is strongly dependent on
the intensity of damage and on the release intensity.
Indeed, as a matter of fact, the release intensity
strongly influences the severity of the secondary scen-
ario and/or the time required for the escalation of the
secondary scenario (e.g., pool fire diameter, time
required for the formation of a flammable cloud).
Moreover, following a primary accident emergency
plans usually result in the activation of all the possible
on-site mitigation and protection actions. Thus, the
probability of a successful mitigation taking place is
increased as the release intensity at the secondary tar-
get vessel decreases.
In this framework, it is clear that definition of
thresholds values for domino effects caused by blast
waves are influenced by several factors: (i) the category
of equipment; (ii) the inventory; (iii) the secondary sce-
narios that may take place following the release.
Although the possible secondary scenario may be
strongly influenced by the characteristics of the sub-
stance released and by on-site factors, some general-
izations are possible, also based on standard QRA
scenarios (TNO, 1979).
Table 8 reports the secondary scenarios that are
more likely to follow a release caused by blast wave
damage. The possibility of runaway reactions related to

Table 8
Expected secondary scenarios with respect to damage states for different equipment categories

Structural damage Loss of containment Secondary events for flammable materials

Equipment
Atmospheric Pressurized Elongated Small
Minor pool fire Minor jet fire Minor pool fire Minor pool fire
DS1 LS1
Minor flash fire Minor flash fire
Pool fire Jet fire Pool fire Minor pool fire
DS2 LS2 Flash fire Flash fire Flash fire Minor flash fire
UVCE UVCE UVCE
Pool fire BLEVE/fireball Pool fire Minor pool fire
DS2 LS3 Flash fire Flash fire Flash fire Minor flash fire
UVCE UVCE UVCE
446 V. Cozzani, E. Salzano / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 (2004) 437–447
the loss of control of the process following the blast
wave was not considered in this framework.
The scenarios following the dispersion of toxic
liquids, vapors or gases were not included in the table.
The effects of a toxic dispersion are strongly dependent
on the relative toxicity of the substances, thus no gen-
eralization is possible for atmospheric releases without
taking into account the characteristics of the substance
released. In the case of pressurized equipment, an
intense escape of gas or vapour can be produced even
for small equipment failure. In this case, a conservative
approach requires that potential secondary effects
should always be considered as severe. Also on the
basis of these considerations, a specific analysis of sec-
ondary events that are likely to involve the different
equipment categories was performed, aiming to the
identification of specific thresholds for domino effects
caused by blast waves.
5.2. Atmospheric equipment
Unless mitigation actions are not undertaken, a
slight loss of containment (LI1) from atmospheric
equipment is likely to be followed only by liquid dis-
persion or small pool fires, rather than by vapor cloud
explosions. In the case of toxic dispersion, LI1 again
results in small amounts of liquid released in the catch
basin, and it is likely that the severity of the secondary
scenario is effectively mitigated. Therefore, the escala-
tion of the secondary scenario associated to DS1 and
LI1 seems to be rather unlikely, thus suggesting that
threshold values for DS2–LI2 should be considered as
more appropriate for domino effect. Table 8 sum-
marizes the proposed threshold values for all the cate-
gories of process equipment.
5.3. Pressurized vessels
As shown in Table 7, severe scenarios may arise
from the loss of containment in pressurized vessels.
Moreover, in the case of pressurized vessels, even small
damages as a LI1 release of toxic materials may result
in severe consequences. The minimum threshold value
for DS1–LI1 (20 kPa), that corresponds to the mini-
mum pressure for the failure of connection rather than
for the failure of the pressure vessel, should thus be
considered as the domino threshold value for pressur-
ized equipment.
5.4. Elongated vessels
In the case of elongated vertical vessels, damage state
DS1 is unlikely to result in severe secondary scenarios,
unless toxic materials are concerned, e.g. in distillation
columns. Hence, as in atmospheric equipment, the
threshold values corresponding to DS2 and LI2 seem
to be the more appropriate for secondary scenarios
involving flammable materials. However, a comparison
to the corresponding occurrence probability suggests
that the more conservative value corresponding to
pt,DS2–LI2 is used, instead of the Pt,DS2–LI2 value result-
ing from data analysis. Moreover, the DS1 suggested
threshold value (14 kPa) should be considered if toxic
materials are present, due to the higher process tem-
peratures that are likely in most of these process
vessels.
5.5. Small vessels
The analysis of threshold data for atmospheric or
low pressure small vessels subjected to blast waves has
evidenced that, unless a toxic material is contained in
the vessel, it is very unlikely that the secondary acci-
dental scenarios are able to produce a relevant damage
to people and/or to other equipment, due to the low
amount of substance that is likely to be released. How-
ever, the presence of toxic material may be hazardous
in the case of a rapid loss of containment (LI2), corre-
sponding to DS2. The threshold value obtained for
DS2–LI2 of this equipment category may thus be
assumed as the ‘‘domino’’ threshold if toxic materials
are considered.
6. Conclusions
Threshold values for the damage to process equip-
ment caused by blast waves were revised and analyzed
in the framework of domino effect assessment. The
analysis was limited to damages caused in the
‘‘far field’’, provided an idealization of the blast wave
produced by any kind of explosion. Damage states and
release intensities caused by blast waves were defined.
On the basis of available data for blast wave damage
to process equipment, overpressure threshold values
were defined for different equipment categories. The
results are summarized in Table 7.
The analysis of possible secondary scenarios for dif-
ferent categories of process equipment allowed the defi-
nition of a further set of threshold values for the
assessment of domino effects caused by blast waves.
This second set of data, summarized in Table 9, can be
Table 9
Overpressure (kPa) threshold values for domino effects caused by
blast waves
Substance Equipment
Atmospheric Pressurized Elongated Small
Flammable 16 20 32 Unlikely
Toxic 16 20 14 37
 V. Cozzani, E. Salzano / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 (2004) 437–447
useful for a preliminary identification of process
equipment that could be a likely secondary target of
domino effect caused by blast waves.
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