c Pleiades Publishing, Ltd., 2019.

ISSN 0010-5082, Combustion, Explosion, and Shock Waves, 2019, Vol. 55, No. 4, pp. 500–506. 
c T.V. Goffart, A.A. Vasil’ev.
Original Russian Text 

Practical Issues of Safety in Coal Mines

T. V. Goffarta and A. A. Vasil’evb UDC 622.817.9,622.412.1,654.026

Published in Fizika Goreniya i Vzryva, Vol. 55, No. 4, pp. 138–145, July–August, 2019.
Original article submitted October 2, 2018; revision submitted January 15, 2019; accepted for publication
February 20, 2019.

Abstract: A number of modern scientific and practical problems in design of multifunctional safety
systems for coal mines and requirements to such systems are discussed. The reasons and the dy-
namics of accidents in mines are analyzed; examples of approaches to preventing such accidents
are given. Available and promising directions of the development of engineering tools and systems
for ensuring miners’ safety are considered. The efficiency of using the scanning gas monitoring
technology is demonstrated. Combining this technology with the automatic system of fire extin-
guishing allows the fire to be suppressed at the initial stage of ignition of the methane–air mixture.
Keywords: accident prevention, explosion, multifunctional safety system, safety triangle, posi-
tioning, underground communication, scanning gas analysis.
DOI: 10.1134/S001050821904018X

Long ago, since the time when people only started
to produce coal from mines, there arose a problem of ex-
plosions of methane mixtures induced by light sources
brought into mines. The problem of fighting against
mine explosions is still urgent: unplanned explosions
lead to human and material losses, as well as tremen-
dous devastation.
According to modern normative documentation,
coal mines must have a multifunctional safety sys-
tem (MFSS), which must ensure monitoring and pre-
vention of conditions for the emergence of geodynamic,
aerological, and technogenic danger, real-time mon-
itoring of correspondence of technological processes
to specified parameters, and application of systems
of emergency protection of people, equipment, and
buildings [1]. However, local administration often
treats the normative requirements formally; moreover,
the requirements are often unclearly defined, whereas
decision-making officers focus their attention on rescu-
ing workers and searching for injured people. The most
important issue is missed: the main task is not elim-
ination of accidents and their consequences; the main
a tematic risk induced by violations of safety requirements
Granch Company, Novosibirsk, 630015 Russia;
goffart@granch.ru.
b
Lavrentyev Institute of Hydrodynamics, Siberian Branch,
Russian Academy of Sciences, Novosibirsk, 630090 Russia;
gasdet@hydro.nsc.ru.
500 0010-5082/19/5504-0500 
c 2019 by Pleiades Publishing, Ltd.
goal is to prevent accidents or ensure the minimum pos-
sible level of their severity. The main role in this pro-
cess should belong to automatic control systems (ACS),
which can significantly reduce human mistakes.
Coal mining enterprises permanently increase the
production rate using more and more perfect equip-
ment for solving various production tasks. The cur-
rently available statistics on the dynamics of accident
and injury rates in the coal industry in 2005–2016 (see,
e.g., [2–8]) reveals a clearly visible trend to injury risk
minimization in mine activities. This is confirmed, e.g.,
by the Rostekhnadzor diagram for 2016 [2] (Fig. 1) illus-
trating the relationship between the number of fatally
injured people and the amount of coal production in
Russia through the years. According to Rostekhnadzor
studies (based on the risk-oriented analysis), the injure
risk at mining enterprises consists of three components:
background risk induced by the deposit properties and
by the current level of development of the industry field
and society as a whole; added individual risk induced by
violations of safety requirements because of insufficient
qualification and low discipline of personnel; added sys-
because of the low level of production organization.
Practical Issues of Safety in Coal Mines
Fig. 1. Dynamics of injuries and accidents in the
mining industry in projection to the coal production
amount in 2005–2016.
Fig. 2. Triangular of miner’s personal safety.
Despite the efforts applied to reduce the level
of industrial injuries, people still die in mining acci-
dents. The most severe recent accidents were those
at the Ul’anovskaya and Yubileinaya (2007), Raspad-
skaya (2010), and Severnaya (2016) mines.
In practice, the main reason for accidents is the
human factor in the most general meaning; therefore,
the use of the MFSS is primarily meant to solve prob-
lems associated with engineering mistakes (mistakes in
design, exploitation, equipment errors), lack of respon-
sibility (violation of safety rules), and violations of the
technology.
As an explosion does not start instantaneously, an
important issue is provision of the technical possibility
of ensuring a real-time response to the emergence of
ignition sites and other pre-accidental events in a mine.
501
Fig. 3. Alerting device SBGPS Light produced
by the Granch company.
Already today the domestic market offers MFSS
that are able not only to satisfy normative requirements,
but really predict emergency situations and take mea-
sures to prevent accidents. An example of such a system
is the complex called Umnaya Shakhta (Smart Mine
system) produced by the Granch company in Novosi-
birsk. To prevent an accident, the system has to pro-
vide real-time (once in a second) determination where
the miner is located, whether he can communicate with
others, and in what state he is. As an example, Fig. 2
shows the miner’s personal safety triangle formed by
line 4 connecting the maximum values at all axes. The
axes are chosen to show the level of providing the corre-
sponding functions by the MFSS, and normalized scales
are used. The unity at the scale “Position” means
that the MFSS ensures continuous determination of the
position of each miner within ±2 m, while the zero
value means that the positioning function is absent alto-
gether. The unity at the scale “Communication” char-
acterizes provision of permanent two-sided communica-
tion, as well as individual and group alerting of miners
with a possibility of alert signal receipt confirmation,
while the zero value means the absence of this function.
The unity at the scale “State” means that real-time in-
formation on the physical state of the miner and the
medium around him is available, while the zero value
means that there are no technical tools for acquisition
of such information. Other lines in Fig. 2 show several
examples how these functions can be provided fully or
partially in various MFSS. Line 1 illustrates a situation
where the MFSS has no data on the physical state of
the miner and has a limited functional in terms of com-
munication and determination of coordinates. Line 2
is an example of the case where all three functions are
implemented in the MFSS only by one half. Recommen-
dations on choosing the criteria of objective estimation
of the MFSS functional can be found in [9]. The devel-
oped Smart Mine system not only allows the miner to
stay within his personal safety triangle, but also ensures
a number of additional functions.
502
Implementation of the modern MFSS at an enter-
prise implies the development of an advanced unified re-
liable infrastructure of communication and data trans-
fer for all subsystems. One of the main elements of
the Smart Mine system is the alerting device SBGPS
Light (Fig. 3). Owing to the electron system built into
the headlight, this device ensures real-time observations
of the position of each miner with a resolution within
±2 m, real-time communication with each miner, emer-
gency alerting of the personnel and confirmation that
the alert signal is received, evaluation of the miner’s
state (able/unable to move) and the state of the medium
in the mine. In contrast to access control systems, the
system of continuous determination of the miner’s po-
sition makes it possible to evaluate the real state of the
miner. When a miner enters a dangerous zone, he au-
tomatically receives a voice announcement; to confirm
the receipt of this alert signal, the miner has to push
a button on the headlight. Based on the positioning
system, the system for preventing transport collisions
is formed. The supervisor can also transfer arbitrary
voice announcements concerning emergency situations
and production process control. In problematic situa-
tions, the miner can also transfer an emergency signal
upward by pushing the button three times. It is impor-
tant that there is only one button on the headlight, so
that to avoid confusion in a stress emergency situation.
For coal mines, which are dangerous in terms
of methane and coal dust explosions, it is necessary to
use a system of air and gas monitoring, which includes
stationary gas sensors. Moreover, this part of the Smart
Mine system can receive data not only from stationary
built-in sensors, but also from mobile gas analyzers built
into the alerting device SBGPS Light. The idea is to
include the positioning module, accelerometer, and gas
sensors (CH4 , CO, and other gases) into the alerting
device. The gas concentration measurement and coor-
dinate determination are performed once in a second or
more often without human participation; the measured
data are automatically transferred to the server of the
safety system and then to the control room (if the mea-
sured values exceed specified thresholds, to supervisory
authorities). In this way, a more detailed pattern of air
and gas situation in the mine is obtained. Monitoring
of the air and gas situation allows the threshold level of
the explosion-hazardous concentration of methane and
its location to be detected in due time.
Such a modification of the Smart Mine system al-
lowed us to develop a unique technology of scanning gas
analysis, which ensures data acquisition for predicting
possible fire, explosion, or detonation at dangerous in-
dustrial places and also for advance alerting of the mine
personnel. The technology has been successfully used
Goffart and Vasil’ev
Fig. 4. Example of statistical information about the
methane concentration collected during one shift in
a particular region: the horizontal axis shows the
numbers of mine roadways visited by the miner; the
vertical axis shows the number of measurements in
which the alert threshold of the methane concentra-
tion and excess of this threshold were registered.
since 2010. Owing to this technology, a tremendous
amount of statistical data on the methane distribution
in mines was gained at six coal mines in Kuzbass for
the last eight years. Figure 4 shows the information
about the methane concentration, which was collected
by one device during one shift. The advantage of the
scanning gas monitoring technology can be formulated
as follows: none of other portable gas analyzers trans-
fers the measured results in the real-time mode with
clear indications of the measurement point coordinates.
As there are many miners in the mine, the error risk
is minimized owing to large statistical sampling.
The current scientific problem of using the collected
statistical information is the absence of the methodol-
ogy, hardware, and software tools for a comprehensive
analysis of data and for predicting the emergence and
subsequent evolution of gas-dynamic flows in mines, in-
cluding the most hazardous scenario. A clear idea on
possible scenarios of the emergence and development of
the combustion site under mining conditions can help
to ensure the maximum possible safety of people and
equipment against the action of hot products.
The metastability of the combustible mixture is
caused by the presence of a potential barrier with the
height equal to the activation energy Eact ; if this bar-
rier is overcome with the use of an external initiator,
a chemical reaction occurs in the initial mixture, and
reaction products pass into a new, more stable state.
The difference between the total energies of formation
of initial substances and reaction products determines
the energy release in the mixture Q. The main task of
the external source is to generate such conditions that
the action of the initiator will trigger the mechanism of
a self-sustained regime of the process owing to energy
release in the mixture Q.
Practical Issues of Safety in Coal Mines
This energy release can ensure propagation
of a subsonic deflagration front and a supersonic det-
onation front over the combustible mixture. Deflagra-
tion combustion is characterized by the fact that the
entropy of the reaction products reaches the maximum
value, which is consistent with the second law of ther-
modynamics. In addition to deflagration combustion,
there is another regime of flame propagation with the
minimum velocity: laminar (normal) burning, though
the condition of the extreme value of the entropy is not
satisfied in this case. It is assumed that the main mech-
anism responsible for flame propagation with the mini-
mum velocity is heat transfer and diffusion of particles
from the hot reaction products upstream to the cold
initial mixture. The laminar burning regime is usu-
ally unstable, and the flame transforms to the turbu-
lent regime corresponding to the deflagration combus-
tion wave. For example, for the methane–air mixture,
the maximum velocity of the laminar flame is 0.48 m/s,
and the deflagration velocity is 60 m/s, which is greater
almost by two orders of magnitude. A typical detona-
tion velocity is even higher: 1800 m/s.
According to the modern classification, the com-
bustible mixture can be excited by one of the three main
methods:
—weak initiation (ignition) where only laminar burning
is excited, and the flame propagation velocity is several
tens of centimeters per second;
—strong (direct) initiation, where a self-sustained det-
onation wave is formed in an immediate vicinity
of the initiator and then propagates over the mix-
ture with a velocity of the order of several kilometers
per second;
—intermediate situation where the mixture is only ig-
nited at the initial stage, and then the flame front be-
comes accelerated due to natural or artificial reasons to
(visible) velocities up to hundreds of meters per second.
Under certain conditions, a deflagration-to-detonation
transition may occur (the photographic records of this
process are shown in Fig. 5). The traditional mea-
sure of successful realization of the process is the en-
ergy transferred from the initiator to the combustible
mixture, i.e., the critical energy E∗ . Thus, ignition
of the methane–air mixture (laminar burning) requires
the energy E∗ = 0.28 mJ, while detonation initiation re-
quires E∗ = 108 J, which is approximately equivalent to
the energy of a 17-kg TNT charge. These values clearly
indicate that the emergency situation in the mine at
the initial time is associated with accidental ignition of
the mixture by a certain source (e.g., short-circuiting of
electric wires, breakdown at high static voltage, or sig-
nificant heating of rubbing elements of mining equip-
ment).
503
As only ignition of the methane–air mixture al-
ways occurs at the initial stage, the flame first prop-
agates from the starting point in the regime of lami-
nar burning with a velocity of 0.34 m/s. If the mine
roadway diameter is 6 m, then the laminar flame will
completely cover the mine cross section approximately
in 17 s (in the case of ignition near the wall). In reality,
however, the laminar flame front loses its stability, and
the process of flame propagation transforms to turbu-
lent combustion with an increasing velocity. The upper
estimate of the turbulent flame velocity is the deflagra-
tion combustion velocity, which is approximately 60 m/s
for the methane–air mixture. If the mixture is signifi-
cantly nonuniform, it will take approximately 0.1 s for
the turbulent flame front to cover the mine cross sec-
tion, i.e., the time is smaller almost by two orders of
magnitude.
After the mine cross section is covered, the flame
propagates over the mine roadway similar to a “piston”
accelerating due to both self-turbulization and artificial
turbulization. The accelerated motion of such a “pis-
ton” will set the initial mixture into motion, and the
flame will propagate with respect to the mine roadway
with the total velocity of the flow of the mixture and
turbulent combustion in this flow. If the combustible
mixture is extended to a significant distance along the
mine roadway, then the compression wave may form
a shock wave under certain conditions, and the mix-
ture may transform to a much more dangerous state:
deflagration-to-detonation transition. If the length of
the region occupied by the mixture is bounded, then
one of the classical types of the Riemann problem will
arise at the interface between the combustible mixture
and air depending on the explosive process propaga-
tion mode (from laminar subsonic burning to hyper-
sonic detonation), followed by unsteady propagation of
an air shock wave over the mine roadway and a rar-
efaction wave directed toward the ignition point. For
correct modeling, it is important to know whether the
mixture was formed gradually or due to sudden ejection
of methane from a coal reservoir: the scenarios will be
different. Some other parameters should be also taken
into account: place of initiation, branching of coal mine
roadways, roughness of the roadway walls, etc.
At the moment, there are several computer codes
for determining the combustion front acceleration based
on Navier–Stokes equations and turbulence models
of different degrees of complexity. There are also
codes for computing combustion of the mixture within
the framework of detailed kinetics including approxi-
mately 2000 reactions for fuels from the class of heavy
hydrocarbons. In principle, it is possible to calculate
the flame acceleration dynamics in a combustible mix-
504 Goffart and Vasil’ev

Fig. 5. Photographic records of the deflagration-to-detonation transition: (1) ignition; (2) acoustic
compression wave; (3) flame front; (4) spontaneous reaction sites and deflagration-to-detonation
transition; (5) detonation wave.

ture by combining the gas-dynamic and kinetic aspects,

but the time needed for that even on computers with
parallel computations is much longer than the time of
mine explosion evolution. The main task is to develop
a physically correct model of flame acceleration that
can ensure “instantaneous” engineering calculations of
the flame dynamics under mine conditions and subse-
quent transfer of control to actuators for flame attenua-
tion and suppression. The problem of flame acceleration
and deflagration-to-detonation transition is one of the
fundamental problems in the theory of combustion and
explosion, which has not been solved up to now.
There are several methods for attenuation and
quenching of combustion and detonation waves: cre-
ation of a cloud of chemically inert solid particles ahead
of the wave front, creation of a gas–water–droplet sheet,
spraying of inhibitors, etc. One of the physically under-
standable criteria of wave suppression is reduction of
the wave velocity due to energy and momentum losses
induced by acceleration and heating of particles to such Fig. 6. Molar concentrations of the basic combustion
products of methane–air mixtures.
a level at which self-ignition of the gas behind the wave
front becomes impossible.
Thus, it is obvious that the development of an
emergency situation can be attenuated and prevented fractions of more than 0.1%) as functions of the mo-
in practice only by a fast-response automatic system, lar fraction of methane in the initial fuel–air mixtures.
which should detect ignition of the mixture in due It should be noted that the peaks of the concentra-
time and actuate appropriate suppression systems at tions of individual components are shifted with respect
a needed time and needed place. The system developed to each other. In the entire range of methane concen-
by the Granch company is able already now to trans- trations, the combustion products contain nitrogen N2 ,
fer any telemetry and control signals in the real-time water vapor H2 O, and carbon dioxide CO2 . Sensors
mode. The next tasks are to determine the character- of luminescence (detecting the flash instant) and ion-
istics of sensors used for detecting pre-accident events, ization sensors (indicators of combustion products) are
to choose and develop methods for accident prevention, preferable tools for detecting the instant of ignition and
to develop methods of attenuation and suppression of propagation of the combustion front. Sensors detecting
combustion and explosion waves in the case of unautho- ignition of the mixture and luminescence of the prod-
rized ignition of the methane–air mixture, and to unite ucts should be “tied” to these components.
all these technologies into one control system. Particular attention in Fig. 6 should be paid to the
Figure 6 shows the logarithmic curves of the mo- fact that an increase in the methane concentration (from
lar compositions of the basic reaction products (with the lower limit) leads to an increase in the fractions of
Practical Issues of Safety in Coal Mines
hydrogen, carbon monoxide (their mixture is known as
the combustible synthesis gas or syngas), and also OH
radicals in combustion products. As heat transfer and
diffusion are the basic physical mechanisms that ensure
flame propagation, the heated molecules of light hydro-
gen (and also OH) diffusing from the region of com-
bustion products to the initial mixture can significantly
accelerate chemical reactions and, thus, provide flame
acceleration (e.g., the well-known chain propagation re-
action H +O2 → OH + O)!
When the flame front becomes accelerated to a suf-
ficient extent and the bow shock wave starts to form,
pressure sensors may play the major role: together with
ionization sensors, they will provide information about
the shock wave (pressure) and position of the chemical
reaction zone (conducting combustion products). The
time shift of these signals will give an idea about the
reaction zone size.
Today’s requirements to fire extinguishing systems
can be logically formulated as follows: rapid detection—
optical system; analysis of the situation and choice of
the solution (ACS); transfer of control to appropriate
elements of the fire extinguishing system (ACS), rapid
actuation of the system (e.g., explosive dispersion of
some powder or water); homogeneity of the extinguish-
ing substance over the cross section and length; opti-
mization of physical properties (allowance for physical
properties of the extinguishing material: heat capacity,
mass, surface, aggregate state, etc.).
It is important to take into account the charac-
teristic temporal and spatial relations because effective
suppression requires that the scales and time of phys-
ical processes [particle acceleration (Ekin ) and heat-
ing (Eheat )] should be smaller than the characteristic
chemical times!
The following extinguishing tools can be used: inert
gas (making the mixture move outside the flammability
limits), inert particles (reduction of kinetic and ther-
mal energy), spraying of an inert fluid (reduction of the
energy of phase transitions), “safety bags,” quenching
gaps, etc.
Already now the system developed at the Granch
company allows one to use all advantages of fire fighting
at the early stage: low velocity of flame propagation,
small size of the ignition region, maximum available
time for decision making and initiating fire extinguish-
ing tools, and maximum time available for generating a
homogeneous extinguishing cloud.
The Smart Mine system includes a multifunctional
system of communication, observation, alerting, and
search for people affected by the accident (SBGPS).
It is successfully used and not only ensures communi-
cation between an arbitrary point in the mines with an
505
arbitrary point on the surface, but offers many other
possibilities owing to numerous applications: monitor-
ing of satisfying instructions, photo and video recording
of detected violations of instructions and pre-accident
events, thermal monitoring of units and mechanisms of
mining equipment, transportation tools inside the mines
(monitoring of operation parameters of diesel and hy-
draulic locomotives) and other mining equipment. Ad-
ditional information is also collected and transferred up-
ward, where it will be used for advanced planning of
maintenance and repair activities, organization of mon-
itoring, and optimal control of transportation logistics.
All these factors will increase the information reliabil-
ity and, as a consequence, reliability of equipment used;
moreover, human errors will be minimized.
Undoubtedly, the MFSS must satisfy the require-
ment of high reliability. The system must continue its
operation despite any single damage event (i.e., in the
case of malfunction of any individual element) and must
be easily recoverable. For this purpose, it is necessary
to analyze not only the operation parameters of min-
ing equipment, but also the operation parameters of the
MFSS itself. In our system, the equipment operation re-
liability is ensured by several levels of redundancy. Such
an MFSS remains workable in the case of complete loss
of power in a certain region or in the entire object if the
cable structure is damaged. The power redundancy is
ensured by built-in lithium–iron–phosphate accumula-
tors; the casing of stationary equipment can withstand
the action of a shock wave with a momentum up to
10 kPa · s. The redundancy of communication lines is
ensured by the network topology (ring) and a wire-
less communication channel satisfying the IEEE 802.11
standard (Wi-Fi). In regions where the operation of
communication lines is interrupted, the communication
can be recovered by using a set of mobile base stations,
which can be rapidly mounted. Such equipment can be
used by rescue workers even at objects where the Smart
Mine system is not installed at all.
The system can work before, during, and after the
accident. Such an approach ensures reliable commu-
nication for rescue workers and their effective efforts
aimed at searching for injured people and elimination of
accident consequences. Moreover, owing to integration
with the Ventilyatsiya software system developed by the
Shakhtekspert-sistemy company (Kemerovo, Russia),
voice navigation of people in accordance with the ac-
cident elimination plan is provided, in particular: real-
time calculation of routes in accordance with the plan,
tracing people’s motion and giving voice navigation in-
structions, organization of people’s outgoing in manual
and automatic regimes, and correcting the route in the
case of deviation from it.
506
Thus, summarizing all the discussion above, it can
be noted that the existing MFSS provides a number
of preventive measures aimed at accident development
prevention:
—remote monitoring of the positions of miners and
transportation systems, as well as rescue workers (anal-
ysis of their motion in the working regime and in an
emergency situation, organization of people’s outgoing
from the mine in accordance with the accident elimina-
tion plan;
—remote monitoring of the gas situation (fractions
of methane, carbon monoxide, oxygen, hydrogen, etc.);
—remote monitoring of safety of production pro-
cesses (riding a conveyor, dangerous closeness to various
mechanisms);
—remote monitoring of satisfying the instructions
(analysis of the most frequent reasons for accidents);
—remote monitoring of the parameters of equip-
ment (including the equipment within the MFSS itself)
and transportation systems.
The Smart Mine system is extendable; its architec-
ture allows easy adding of functions for solving a large
number of problems of accident prevention, including
the analysis of statistics for several gases and predic-
tion of gas-dynamic phenomena, detection of the flash
position, real-time actuation and control of explosion
quenching systems, detection of heated mechanisms and
tracing the equipment wear level for replacement of its
components in due time.
At the moment there are all necessary requisites for
creating an automatic system for prevention and sup-
pression of unauthorized ignition of methane–air mix-
tures under mine conditions, which would be able to
ensure effective quenching of even supersonic detona-
tion, which is the most dangerous process. The most
suitable time for all suppression operations is the initial
stage of mixture ignition.
Challenging urgent tasks are the development of
appropriate legislation for national application of the
system for predicting the onset of fire, explosion, and
detonation on the basis of the scanning gas analysis
technology and also improvement of currently existing
normative requirements to the MFSS and its subsys-
tems.
It is important to solve these problems in practice
in order to prevent real accidents at dangerous indus-
trial enterprises; the principles and technologies can be
applied not only in coal mining.
Goffart and Vasil’ev
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