Yates - THE TRADITION OF THE HELLENIC LEAGUE AGAINST XERXES

THE TRADITION OF THE HELLENIC LEAGUE AGAINST XERXES
Author(s): David Yates

Source: Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte , 2015, Bd. 64, H. 1 (2015), pp. 1-25
Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24433806
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Historia
Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte
Revue d'Histoire Ancienne
Journal of Ancient History Historia Band 64 · Heft 1 · 2015
Rivista di Storia Antica © Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart
THE TRADITION OF THE HELLENIC LEAGUE

AGAINST XERXES*
Abstrack In this paper the author demonstrates that the earlier and later sources for th
League understood that alliance quite differently. The later authorities depict a cohesive and
Organization managed by a powerful common Council, while Herodotus and Thucydides
more tenuous and temporary alliance that was largely dépendent on Sparta. These versions a
combined in historical reconstructions, but the significant différence between the two sug
they are not compatible. The later version is likely an invention of the fourth Century and
sheds considérable light on the tradition of the League, but not the historical League itself.
Introduction
In 479 Β. C. the grand Persian invasion of Greece was defeated by the so-called Hellenic
League.1 The strength, cohésion, and duration of this league are debatable.2 Recent work
on Persian-War memory and a renewed interest in the history of interstate coopération
in Greece have raised the stakes of that debate still further.3 Given the importance of
the Hellenic League to these burgeoning fields of inquiry, it seems Atting to revisit the
evidence for this early alliance. Scholarly consensus has recently emerged in favor of a
strong and cohesive Hellenic League that continued to be a powerful force in Greece at
least down to 462/1.4 Only Adrian Tronson has recently argued for a weak and ephem
eral League, but his conclusions have been largely ignored, in no small part because of
his insistence that the Hellenic League was nothing more than a temporary expansion
* An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the meeting of the Classical Association of the
Middle, West, and South in March 2012, and I am grateful for the comments of the audience on that
occasion. I also wish to give special thanks to Deborah Boedeker, Kurt Raaflaub, John Marincola,
Holly Sypniewski, Jennifer Lewton-Yates, and the anonymous readers of this paper for their many
helpful suggestions and criticisms. All remaining errors are my own.
1 All dates are Β. C. unless otherwise noted.
2 See, for example, Larsen 1944: 151-54, Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor 1950: 183-93, Brunt
1953/4, Tronson 1991, Baltrusch 1994: 30-51, Kienast 2003, and Jung 2006: 271-81.
3 For recent work on Persian-War memory, see nn. 102 and 107 below; for interstate coopération, see
Beck 2001 and 2003, Buraselis and Zoumboulakis 2003 generally, and Beck and Funke, forthcoming
2014.
4 Kienast 2003, now followed by Jung 2006: 271-81 and Beck 2010: 61.

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David Yates
of the Peloponnesian League.5 While the Hellenic League was certainly a sepa
Organization,6 Tronson's broader point about the overall weakness of the League warr
more attention than it has received. Arguments in favor of a strenger League draw
ily on later accounts adduced to supplément our fifth-century sources. Underlying
practice is the assumption that our earlier and later accounts, when properly evaluate
the basis of their "intrinsic plausibility," can be combined to reconstruct a more pr
picture of the League as it was.7 By contrast, I argue that this practice has obscured
significant différence in how our sources thought the Hellenic League operated. For
later authorities the League was indeed a cohesive, independent, and durable Organi
tion managed by a powerful common Council.8 Herodotus and Thucydides, how
depict a rather more tenuous and temporary alliance that was largely dépendent on
hegemon, Sparta.9 Both versions are plausible, but not necessarily compatible. A bet
understanding of the historical League, its political impact, and subséquent traditio
achieved once we recognize that our sources are in effect describing two différent
lenic Leagues, each one a product of unique contemporary expectations.
The Hellenic League at War
Düring the period of active résistance to Persia (481-478) the différences between o
early and later sources for the Hellenic League center on the role played by the com
Council of the League.10 Both feature a Council, but in Herodotus that Council fonc
Tronson 1991. Kienast 2003 shows no apparent knowledge of this article. Jung 2006: 272-76
it, but quickly rejects its conclusions with arguments focused largely on the identification o
Hellenic League with the Peloponnesian League.
The possibility that the Hellenic League was a temporarily expanded Peloponnesian Leagu
soundly refuted long ago by Brunt 1953/4: 141 —49.
Green succinctly expresses the principle (and the phrase quoted above) in his commentary t
odorus Siculus (2006: 36), but it has long informed studies of the Persian War (see, for exam
Hammond 1956 [= Hammond 1973: 251-310], Burn 1962, Roux 1974, Bradford 1980, Hamm
1973: 311-45 and 1988: 518-91, Green 1996a, Flower 1998, and Marincola 2007: 106). Hig
1963: 6-25 famously rejected the later sources for the Persian War as mere elaborations of Hero
(see also Pritchett 1959: 260-61 and Lazenby 1993: 7-10). Brunt 1953/4 is similarly wary of
later tradition of the Hellenic League, but in practice applies the rule of plausibility on a cas
case basis (see also Baltrusch 1994: 30-51).
The later version is largely represented by Diodorus Siculus and to a lesser extent Plutarch, both
whom may ultimately look back to Ephorus (see n. 90 below). There are other continuous narrat
of the Persian War, but none touches on the opération of the Hellenic League in any detail (se
sias, FGrHist 688 F 13.25-32; Justin 2.10-15; Nepos, Them. 2-8 Ar ist. and Paus.·, and Aristode
FGrHist 104 FI.1-11). When relevant, these and other minor sources are noted below.
For a similar reading of Sparta's position within the League, see also Meritt, Wade-Gery, and
Gregor 1950: 95-105 and 183-93 and Baltrusch 1994: 31-35.
The term owes much to Diodorus, who refers to the League council as "the common Counci
the Greeks" (ή κοινή σύνοδος τών 'Ελλήνων / τό κοινόν συνέδριον τών 'Ελλήνων: 11.

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The Tradition of the Hellenic League Against Xerxes
for barely a year, is dissolved before the first battle, and subsequently yields much of
the war's management to Sparta. When Thucydides briefly narrâtes the actions of the
League in 478, he assumes a similar State of affairs. In Diodorus and Plutarch, however,
the League Council continues to direct the war effort throughout the conflict.
It cannot be denied that the mood of Herodotus' opening description of the Hellenic
League is distinctly Panhellenic. Major décisions are made by an international body of
councilors, who assemble in 481 and again in early 480.11 Herodotus omits the setting
for the first meeting,12 but spécifiés that the second occurred on the Isthmus of Corinth
(7.172.1). At these meetings the councilors took bold action, resolving ail outstanding
conflicts among member states (7.145.1) and imposing a tithe on any Greek state that
willingly defected to the Persians (7.132.2). They also took the initial stratégie steps
for a coordinated résistance against Persia, dispatching spies to Asia Minor, sending
ambassadors throughout free Greece (7.145.2), and later debating the best location
for a united defense (7.172-175).13 But in the mid-summer of 480 Herodotus' League
undergoes a significant structural change. He states that "when they (the councilors)
learned that the Persians were in Pieria, they were dismissed (διαλυθέντες) from the
Isthmus and went on campaign, some of them on foot to Thermopylae and others by
and 11.55.4) or "the common Council" for short (τό κοινόν συνεδριον: 11.3.4 and 11.55.5) and
its members as "the councilors of the Greeks" (ol σύνεδροι τών 'Ελλήνων: 11.4.1, 11.16.3, and
11.29.1) or simply "the councilors" (oi σύνεδροι) when context makes their précisé identity clear
(11.3.5 and 11.55.7). I use the term here for the sake of convenience, but pace Kienast 2003: 49, it
is by no means certain that such terminology was used in the fifth Century to designate the League's
deliberative body. Thucydides never has occasion to refer to the Council by name. Herodotus uses
the term probouloi, but only once in reference to the League (7.172.1), and so it is difficult to treat
it as a terminus technicus, especially in light of his varied terminology for the League overall. It is
generally referred to as "the Hellenes", but can also go by "the Greeks who took up the war against
the barbarians" (7.132.2), "the Greeks who thought better of Greece" (7.145.1; see also 7.172.1,
and 9.19.1), "the sworn confederates against the Persians among the Greeks" (7.148.1), and on two
occasions "the Spartans and their allies" (7.157.1 and 8.142.4). See Brunt 1953/4:145-46 and Meritt,
Wade-Gery, and McGregor 1950: 96-98 for more detailed discussions of Herodotus' terminology
for the League.
See Brunt 1953/4: 136-40 for arguments in support of two separate meetings before the 480 cam
paign season.
Pausanias, the travel writer, thought that this first meeting was called in Laconia (3.12.6). This
position has found support from Hammond 1988: 543, Tronson 1991: 97-98, Baltrusch 1994: 34
n.163, Kienast 2003: 44-45, and perhaps most surprisingly from Brunt 1953/4: 148, who normally
eschews the later traditions. Others have assumed that this earlier meeting must have taken place
at the Isthmus (How and Wells 1928: 187, Hignett 1963: 98, and Jung 2006: 275 n.170; see also
Bradford 1980: 80, Green 1996a: 69, and Cartledge 2006: 99-104). The possibility that the League
in fact met initially in Laconia strongly advances my overall view that Sparta dominated the League,
but since it can only be inferred from Herodotus' silence, I leave it aside.
Diodorus records the council's resolution about tithing Willing medizers (11.3.3) and the initial
stratégie décisions (11.2.5 and 11.4.1) in the opening chapters of Book 11, but the institution of the
League and its other early actions are lost along with the bulk of Book 10. For a discussion of what
remains of Book 10, see Cohen-Skalli 2012: 165-85.

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David Yates
sea to Artemisium" (7.177).14 This brief notice leaves little room to imagine a stand
League Council in session at Corinth during the subséquent campaign season.15 More
ver, neither Herodotus nor Thucydides mentions any further meetings of a Panhel
deliberative body except the war Councils in the field. The common Council, despit
manifest importance in 481 and the early months of 480, does not remain a perman
feature of the League in the early tradition.
Even before the breakup of the League Council, Herodotus reserves an impor
place for the hegemon in his account of the League. In two lengthy descriptions of
embassies dispatched to Argos and Syracuse, Herodotus emphasizes the power wielde
by Sparta. Both the Argives and the Syracusan tyrant, Gelon, demand some share i
leadership as the price of their support. In each case the Spartan delegates take it u
themselves to respond. At Argos this is not entirely surprising since the Argives h
also requested a separate treaty with Sparta,16 but what is striking is how Herodotu
phrases the Spartan response to the further question of hegemony. The Spartan am
sadors say that they have already received instructions to offer the Argives a third of
command along with the two Spartan kings (7.149.2). Herodotus does not immediate
clarify who gave them the instructions, but when he later reports an alternate int
tation of the negotiations, he states that the Argives "knew that the Spartans woul
give them a share of the command (ού μεταδώσουσι της αρχής Λακεδαιμόνι
and so asked for it" (7.150.3). The Argive ploy is based on the assumption that S
could dispose of the League's leadership as it wished without further reference to t
common Council. However historically improbable we may find this assumption, th
is no good reason to doubt that it is Herodotus' all the same.17 Indeed, when Herodo
subsequently describes the embassy to Gelon, his characters présumé a similar State
affairs. When Gelon demands füll command, the Spartan ambassador again replies f
the entire délégation and rejects it summarily on the grounds that hegemony is a Spa
birthright (7.159).18 Both Gelon and the Athenian ambassador accept that comm
is a Spartan matter in subséquent negotiations. Gelon's counterproposal - that h
All translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

See Macan 1908a: 264, Brunt 1953/4: 140 and 157, Baltrusch 1994: 42-43, Kienast 2003: 50
and Jung 2006: 275; contra Hammond 1973: 322-26 and 1988: 568 and Green 1996a: 157-58, w
maintain that the common Council was still in session after the defeat at Thermopylae. In Herod
the Isthmus did continue to serve as a locus for League activity (7.195, 8.40.2, 8.123, and 9.88
commémoration (9.81.1), but not, as in Diodorus, a seat of League délibération.
How and Wells 1928: 188.
Macan 1908a: 203 (see also 1908c: 224—25) is at a loss to explain how questions of hegemony
could now be raised when they must have been dealt with in the first meeting of the Hellenic League
Council. His solution is to impugn the historicity of the episode by noting that the détails are related
within an Argive tale (7.148.2-150.1), but Herodotus' story about the hegemony claim occurs in
another version of this event (7.150), which makes it unlikely that he intended it to be read as a
biased prévarication.
For more on the Spartan claim to authority through the Pelopid rulers of Argos, Agamemnon and
Orestes, see Grethlein 2006: 493-94 on this speech and Boedeker 1993 more generally.

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the Spartans share command - is directed at the Spartan ambassador alone (7.160). No
mention is made of the League's deliberative body or even the other ambassadors. The
Athenian ambassador takes a broader view, but at no point does he suggest that this is
a question properly decided by the allies. He insists only that command over the fleet
belongs to the Athenians if the Spartans do not want it (7.161.2).
The implication of the embassies in Herodotus should not be pressed too far. Hero
dotus was fully aware that Sparta could not have held hegemony without the approval
of the allies.19 Moreover, he does not confirm whether Sparta similarly dominated the
meetings of the common Council, though it is suggestive that when his Council disbands
in 480, the councilors do not dismiss themselves, but rather are dismissed with a passive
participle (διαλυθέντες) that implies clear subordination (7.177). Regardless, Herodotus'
estimation of Spartan power down to the dissolution of the Council in 480 dramatically
exceeds that of Diodorus. From the surviving fragments of Diodorus' Book 10 and
the opening chapters of Book 11, we can reconstruct his account of the negotiations
with Argos and Gelon. In each case, the common Council plays a pivotai rôle. Gelon's
proposai is not rejected at Syracuse, as it is in Herodotus.20 Rather, the ambassadors
return to Corinth where the question is debated and decided by the Council (ll.l.l).21
This was not a small point for Diodorus who seems to have related the debate in oratio
recta.22 His account of the Argive embassy follows the same pattern. Here too ambas
sadors from a prospective ally travel to Corinth where a request for leadership is again
debated and rejected by the councilors of the League (11.3.4-5). No specific mention
is made of Sparta or its claim to hegemony.23
When Herodotus turns his focus from Thermopylae to Artemisium, he states that in the initial meeting
of the Hellenic League Council there had been talk of giving command of the fleet to the Athenians,
but that "the allies resisted (άντιβάντων δέ τών συμμάχων), and the Athenians yielded" (8.3.1).
This passage indicates that hegemony was discussed by the allies and formally conferred on Sparta
(see Macan 1908b: 360 and 1908c: 221, Brunt 1953/4: 138-39, Hignett 1963: 98, and Kienast 2003:
46), but we should not imagine a serious or heated debate. Opposition to the idea of split hegemony
was widespread. This was not, as often happens in Herodotus, the product of Peloponnesian in
transigence (see Brunt 1953/4: 138 n.4 and Lotze 1970: 257-58; contra Demir 2009: 60 n.7). The
allies (unqualilîed) opposed the idea. The bid for Athenian command over the fleet is presented as
a spectacular failure.
See fr. 10.33 in Oldfather's Loeb (1946:102-103) and fr. 10.66 in Cohen-Skalli's Budé (2012: 214).
Diodorus' account of the debate is lost, but he refers to it in the introduction to Book 11, where he
notes that the previous book had ended "with the Speeches delivered in the common Council of the
Greeks in Corinth about Gelon's alliance with the Greeks" (εις τάς γενομένας δημηγορ(ας έν τή
κοινή συνόδψ τών 'Ελλήνων έν Κορίνθψ περί τής Γέλωνος συμμαχίας τοις Έλλησιν).
See Diod. 10.33-34 in Oldfather's Loeb (1946: 102-107) and frr. 10.67-79 in Cohen-Skalli's
Budé (2012: 214-16). For more on the likely context of these fragments in Diodorus' work, see
Cohen-Skalli 2012: 403-404. Polybius attributes a similar version of events as well as speeches to
Timaeus (12.26b = FGrHist 566 F 94), who is the likely source for Diodorus' narrative of Sicilian
affairs (see Haillet 2001: x-xiii).
It is, however, quite likely that Sparta's claim to hegemony was mentioned explicitly in Diodorus'
now highly fragmentary account of the embassy to Gelon and the subséquent debate. See fr. 10.34.8

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David Yates
Diodorus' conception of a strong and independent Panhellenic Council direct

overall war effort remains consistent throughout his narrative of Xerxes' inva
Obviously his councilors do not disband in 480, but rather dispatch forces to t
positions at Thermopylae and Artemisium (τοις δέ συνέδροις των Ελλήνω
ταχέως άποστέλλειν: 11.4.1). Later, the common Council résolves to build a wa
the Isthmus while the générais at Salamis make préparations for the upcom
battle (11.16.3).25 Afterward the Council votes on the prize of valor.26 When i
year Athens demands that a League army advance into Boeotia to protect A
Council responds ( 11.29.1 ). At the same time, the councilors vote to institute the
Games at Plataea and presumably administer the famous Oath of Plataea,27 bin
members to refrain from sacking allied cities or rebuilding temples destroyed
Persians (11.29.1—3).28 Sparta is not wholly absent. When fears are raised about A
loyalties in the winter of 480/79, the Spartans dispatch an embassy to Athens
(11.28).29 Moreover, the Spartans seem to wield considérable influence over
in Oldfather's Loeb (1946: 104-05) and fr. 10.74 in Cohen-Skalli's Budé (2012: 215), wher
tan?) speaker says that the Spartans received as their inheritance, not money, but a zeal fo
on behalf of freedom.
Plutarch's biographical format naturally results in a more sélective view on the common Council.
His basic agreement with Diodorus' treatment can be inferred from the presence of councilors
(σύνεδροι), as distinct from the générais (ηγεμόνες), on the field of Plataea (Arist. 12.4), a meet
ing of the common Council after the battle (21), and the continued opération of the Council in his
Themistocles even after the war's end (23.4—6).
In Herodotus the Isthmus fortification is an exclusively Peloponnesian affair and is constructed in
apparent contradiction to the understood plan of the League (8.40.2), but in Diodorus the décision
takes on a significantly more Panhellenic character (see Nikolaou 1982: 148). Hammond 1988: 568
and Green 1996a: 157-58 accept (without comment) Diodorus' basic historicity here.
Diodorus does not clarify what body voted the prizes after the battle of Salamis (11.27.2-3), but
later when he explains why Themistocles feared the pro-Spartan bias of the Council, he notes as
evidence that body's décision to rob the Athenians of the prize of val or after Salamis at the behest
of the Spartans (11.55.5-7).
This final point must be inferred. Diodorus expressly states that the Council resolved to fight at Plataea
and to celebrate games after the victory. He then goes on to say that "when the Greeks were assembled
at the Isthmus, all resolved to swear an oath about the war" (συναχθέντων ôè τών Ελλήνων εις
τον Ίσθμόν, έδόκει τοις πάσιν ορκον όμόσαι περί τού πολέμου: 11.29.2). It is difficult to say
with confidence whether Diodorus understood this to be a spontaneous outburst on the part of the
newly assembled army or an officiai resolution either of the war Council or the common Council.
The Oath and its possible veracity have long inspired scholarly controversy. Siewert 1972 remains
the most detailed treatment, but see now the recent monograph by Cartledge 2013 with a sélection
of more recent bibliography surveyed on pp. 170-71.
Diodorus' account is confused or at least imprécise with regard to the diplomatie negotiations that
took place between the 480 and 479 campaign seasons. He initially states that ambassadors from the
Greeks (παρά τών Ελλήνων) arrived in Athens (11.28.1), but for the rest of the episode he refers
to these ambassadors as Spartans. A subséquent embassy from Athens goes to Sparta to request
military aid (11.28.5), before the common Council décidés to dispatch an army to Boeotia (11.29.1).
For more on the problems related to this passage, see Kienast 2003: 50 n.49.

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be awarded the prize of valor after Salamis (11.55.5-7). Nevertheless, the authority of
Sparta is largely overshadowed by the collective délibération of the allies.
Herodotus' estimation of Sparta's influence, already higher than that of Diodorus,
jumps considerably after the dissolution of the Council at Corinth. Most conclude that the
power of the common Council then devolved solely onto the (equally?) Panhellenic war
Councils.30 There can be no doubt that these bodies made important stratégie décisions
during the 480 and 479 campaign seasons, but they do not represent the only source of
authority over the League after 480. It is clear from his account that Herodotus believed
the Spartan government also helped to All the vaeuum left by the common Council of
the League. Herodotus' characters consistently act on the assumption that décisions not
made on the field would be made at Sparta by Spartans. Chian ambassadors, dispatched
to win Greek support for an lonian expédition in early 479, travelled to Sparta before
bringing their request directly to King Leotychidas, who was then in command of the
fleet (8.132). When Spartan ambassadors arrive in Athens to speak against Mardonius'
proposai of a separate peace, neither they nor the Athenians refer to or otherwise ac
knowledge the existence of a body coordinating the actions of the allies (8.141-144).
Later when the Athenians, Plataeans, and Megarians demand a League campaign into
central Greece, they go directly to Sparta. Their complaints are lodged with the Ephors
(9.6-8), and it is the Ephors who have the final say on the actions of the League army
(9.9-11).31 In Herodotus' mind the Spartan State assumes what in Diodorus' account
will remain the responsibility of the common Council.
Thucydides paints a similar picture of Spartan authority over League policy in the
opening chapters of the Pentecontaetia.32 In 478 the allies object to Athenian efforts to
reconstruct their walls. The Athenians dispatch Themistocles to address those objec
tions. Whatever the historical truth of the incident,33 Thucydides clearly présents it as
a League matter. The alliance and its common interests are front and center throughout
Themistocles' speech (1.91.4-7),34 but it is important to note that in Thucydides the
entire episode is handled at Sparta and by the Spartans. Complaints may come from
30 Brunt 1953/4: 140 and 157, Tronson 1991: 102, Baltrusch 1994: 42^13, and Kienast 2003: 50-51
(see also Jung 2006: 275). Of course, not everyone accepts that the common Council was dissolved
in 480 (see n. 15 above). Since we know almost nothing about the internal dynamics of the common
Council at Corinth, we can only guess whether it mirrored the much better attested war Councils.
31 Herodotus' assertion that the Ephors decided the issue has been criticized by Macan 1908b: 603
and 606, who maintains that the final décision must have been made by the common Council of the
League, as in Diodorus.
32 For the basic agreement between Herodotus and Thucydides on the events of the Persian War, see
also Hignett 1963: 7-8.
33 See Fornara and Samons 1991: 118-121 against the historicity of the épisode as related by Thucy
dides.
34 See Larsen 1940: 205 and Kienast 2003: 52-53. That Themistocles would focus so much on the
League should come as no surprise. The dramatic date of the speech is within months of both the
earlier victories at Plataea and Mycale (Thuc. 1.89.2-3) and the subséquent League campaigns to
Cyprus and Byzantium under Pausanias' command (1.94).

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David Yates
the allies, but it is the Spartan government that formally requests that the Atheni
stop work on their walls (1.90.1-2). Themistocles is immediately dispatched to S
where he delays a meeting with "the authorities" (τάς άρχάς: 1.90.5), which m
naturally refers to the officiais of the Spartan government, not an otherwise unkn
magistracy of the Hellenic League. When he finally delivers his speech, he doe
address the common Council, but rather the Spartans (ό Θεμιστοκλής έπελθών
Λακεδαιμονίοις ένταΰθα δή φανερώς είπεν: 1.91.4). Thucydides' League resp
exactly as Herodotus' does before Plataea - exclusively through the Spartan go
ment. This fact has never received sufficient attention in historical reconstructions
the League.35
The dissolution of the common Council did not, of course, mark the end of coll
tive délibération in the early tradition. At most, the Spartan government shared p
with the war Councils. Herodotus' estimation of Spartan authority in these Council
difficult to détermine, since his references to them do not yield a simple or consis
set of procédures. At one end of the spectrum, the Spartan suprême Commanders s
to act with little or no concern for the wishes of the allies.36 At the other end, all
générais can show considérable independence.37 It is beyond the scope of the pr
project to define the power dynamics of the war Councils in fact.381 restrict myself
Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor 1950: 102 n.31 do make passing reference to the fact that "Sp
appears to be military headquarters until they are shifted to Delos" (by which they mean the
tution of the Delian League in 478/7).
For example, Leonidas' vote to remain at Thermopylae overrules a Peloponnesian majority i
war Council for flight (Hdt. 7.207; for the number of Peloponnesian states contributing to Leon
army, see 7.202). After the battle of Plataea Pausanias can forbid anyone from appropriating the
and orders his Helots to collect the profits for later distribution (9.80). Before Mycale Leotyc
unilaterally Orders the allied fleet into the eastern Aegean on the strength of his own extempora
interprétation of an omen (9.91). A similarly high estimation of the supreme commander's powe
be gleaned from Thucydides. In a Plataean speech he refers to an oath that bound the Hellenic-L
allies to restore and defend the independence of Plataea (2.71.2). If (as the Plataean speaker im
Pausanias was the driving force behind the oath, it would constitute one of the most important p
décisions taken at the insistence of a Spartan supreme commander.
Strategie décisions are very often attributed to the war Council as a whole (for example, 7.173,
8.108, 8.132, 9.25, 9.51, and 9.86). Open debates are not uncommon (7.207, 7.219, 8.9, 8.40
8.59-64, 8.74-83, 8.108,8.123, and 9.106), even if the opinion ultimately supported by the Spa
supreme commander almost always prevails. On occasion Spartan Commanders can seem distin
powerless as does Leotychidas at Artemisium (see 8.5 and 8.19) or Pausanias before Plataea (9
For a detailed discussion of Salamis, see below. Thucydides also recognized the potential weak
of the Spartan supreme Commanders. Pausanias was recalled from his command in the Aegea
complaints from the allies (1.95.3), and his replacement, Dorcis, was subsequently rejected by
League fleet (1.95.6).
Brunt 1953/4: 140—41 provides the standard treatment of Spartan authority within the war Coun
Although he recognizes Sparta's formai leadership, he concludes that their position "was on
considérable delicacy," a state of affairs that arose from the simple fact that "in the new confede
Sparta did not necessarily possess an overwhelming prépondérance of power" (see also Larsen
152). His estimation is not, however, unanimous. Macan 1908b: 434 and 453, commenting on Salam

138.44.9.77 on Tue, 27 Feb 2024 00:56:53 +00:00
to demonstrating that Herodotus' conception diverges sharply from those of our later
sources. Salamis is a perfect case in point since Herodotus, Diodorus, and Plutarch
devote significant attention to the debates that preceded the battle. Eurybiades is, of
course, overshadowed by Themistocles in all three, but Herodotus nevertheless at
tributes significantly more authority to the Spartan suprême commander than do either
Diodorus or Plutarch.
Eurybiades' authority in Herodotus is immediately apparent. He sets the question for

the first meeting (8.49.1) and later must be persuaded to call a second (8.58). Herodotus'
characters consistently assume that the final décision over whether the fleet will remain
or départ rests solely with Eurybiades. When Mnesiphilus advises Themistocles to do
more to keep the fleet at Salamis, he speaks as though Themistocles needed to persuade
Eurybiades alone: "but if there is some way, go and try to undo what has been decided to
see whether you are somehow able to persuade Eurybiades to change his mind (ήν κως
δύνη άναγνώσαι Εύρυβιάδην μεταβουλεύσασθαι) so that he remain here" (8.57.2).
Themistocles subsequently présumés a similar State of affairs when he addresses Eury
biades before the allies in the war Council: "it is now on you to save Greece" (έν σοΙ νϋν
έστι σώσαι την 'Ελλάδα: 8.60a).39 Düring this meeting, his antagonist, Adeimantus
of Corinth, also addresses Eurybiades, not the Council at large (8.61.1). This was not
meaningless flattery. Despite Themistocles' threat to abandon the League, debate does
not end until Eurybiades makes his décision: "he opted for this opinion: that they remain
there and fight it out by sea. So those skirmishing in words about Salamis were, after
Eurybiades made his décision (έπείτε Ευρυβιάδη εδοξε), preparing to fight a naval
battle there" (Hdt. 8.63-64.1).40 Eurybiades' position of authority is not unassailable,41
but it remains estimable in Herodotus' opinion.
The war Council in Diodorus opérâtes quite differently. When the grave situation
at Salamis prompts a meeting, Diodorus' Council seems almost to summon itself: "so
they decided (εδοξεν ούν αύτοίς) that all those assigned to command should meet and
détermine in what sorts of places it was best to fight a naval battle" (11.15.2). Düring
reserves significantly more power for Eurybiades, noting that "if he puts the question to the vote, it
is merely for his own guidance; the resuit is not obligatory" (see also Hignett 1963: 204).
After stating his arguments in favor of remaining at Salamis and rebutting Adeimantus' objection,
Themistocles again directs his attention exclusively to Eurybiades to the same effect: "If you remain
here and are courageous while here, (well and good); but if you do not, you will destroy Greece" (où
εί μενέεις αύτοΰ καΐ μένων έσεαι άνήρ άγαθός- εί δέ μή, ανατρέψεις τήν 'Ελλάδα: 8.62.1).
See Bowie 2007: 149 for comment on the omitted apodosis as well as the translation (with modifi
cations).
See Macan 1908b: 453. Bowie 2007:150 suggests that Herodotus permits Eurybiades to décidé here
only for dramatic effect and that normally such décisions were in the hands of the Commanders, but
see n. 36 above for other instances when Spartan suprême Commanders act on their own authority.
Even after Eurybiades' final décision to stay, Herodotus reports that open complaints ffom the
Peloponnesians soon prompt another debate (8.74.2), which is ultimately interrupted by news that
Xerxes had eut off the intended escape route and ends, of necessity, by confirming implicitly the
earlier décision (8.83.1).

138.44.9.77 on Tue, 27 Feb 2024 00:56:53 +00:00
10 David Yates
the subséquent debate Them

commander, but the coun
11.15.4). Their vote settles
by sea off Salamis (τέλος δ
the Greeks began to make p
appears only briefly to off
(11.16.1). Plutarch's Eurybi
Herodotus'. Here, the meet
a notable change of venue
ship to request a new me
over the délibérations, but
that the debate almost resu
not Eurybiades' to make.43
owl landed on the mast of
with his opinion and prep
καιπαρεσκευάζοντο ναυ
does not in practice leave m
nominally in command (1
obtuse equal.46 In the later
tion of the League, is held
The Afterlife of t
The gulf between the early

sion. The early tradition, n
that the League ceased to
Plutarch draws heavily on Hero

of attributing one of Adeima
Frost 1980: 128-29 and Pellin
Pace Frost 1980: 129, there is
er he falls silent as a resuit o
Αθηναίων: Them. 11.5), and i
An episode from the prelimina
veals a similar assumption unde
judges in a dispute between the
line (9.28.1). In Plutarch's versi
12.4). The more Panhellenic ton
Diodorus also explicitly recog
Nepos may have a similar view
less than he wished" (quem cu
his account we can only confi
did Diodorus.

138.44.9.77 on Tue, 27 Feb 2024 00:56:53 +00:00
The Tradition of the Hellenic League Against Xerxes 11
the fleet in 478/7. Diodorus and Plutarch, however, thought that the League continued
to thrive for at least a decade more, possibly longer. Both Kienast and Michael Jung
accept this basic assumption and argue that the League remained an influential body
down to the mid-fifth Century.47
There can be no doubt that the Hellenic League outlived the 479 campaign year,
which is where Herodotus' account ends 48 According to Thucydides the Hellenic League
continued to function in the next year much as it had in the previous two. Sparta set
League policy49 and held supreme command in the field with Pausanias in the eastern
Mediterranean (Thuc. 1.94) and perhaps Leotychidas in Thessaly.50 But later that year
Thucydides maintains that a perfect storm of Spartan mismanagement and Athenian
ambition put an end to this arrangement. Pausanias was recalled from his command on
charges of violence against the allies and medism (Thuc. 1.95.3-5). His replacement,
Dorcis, was subsequently rejected by the League fleet (1.95.6). Sparta sent no more gén
érais, the Peloponnesians withdrew, and the Athenians secured their new-found primacy
in the Aegean by establishing the Delian League (1.96). It was perhaps at roughly the
same time that Leotychidas was accused of taking bribes in Thessaly (Hdt. 6.72).51 He
too was recalled.52 There are no further indications of any Hellenic-League opérations
by land or sea. The joint military campaigns that had most defined the League's activities
since 480 disappear a year after the Persian invasion force was defeated. Thucydides
never states that the League was formally dissolved, but he does not recognize that it
took any further action after 478/7.53
47 Kienast 2003:51-64 and Jung 2006: 276-81 (see also Brunt 1953/4:153-58 withno claim for contin
ued influence). Despite Jung's broader contention (see especially p. 280), he expresses doubts about
two of the épisodes that Kienast uses to demonstrate the continued activity of the League between
478 and 462/1, the triai of Pausanias and the intended triai of Themistocles (see nn. 58 and 64 below).
48 There is no reason, however, to conclude that Herodotus thought the Hellenic League ceased to
function in that year. In the debate over the new Ionian allies after Mycale his characters certainly
act on the assumption that further League opérations were still envisioned (Hdt. 9.106.2-4; see also
Jung 2006: 276). Moreover, Herodotus elsewhere notes in passing Athens' eventual seizure of he
gemony from Sparta (8.3.2), which points to the same events that marked the end of League activity
in Thucydides (see Bowie 2007: 93).
49 See the debate over the reconstruction of Athens' walls above (pp. 7-8).
50 The actions of Leotychidas are not mentioned by Thucydides, but by Herodotus in passing. He
tells us that King Leotychidas was recalled from Thessaly, convicted of taking bribes, and exiled to
Tegea (Hdt. 6.72) at some point after his great victory at Mycale (see also Paus. 3.7.9-10 and Plut.
Mor. 859d). No further détails are provided. It seems likely (but by no means certain) that he was
assigned command of a League army in or soon after 478 for the purposes of punishing the medizing
Thessalians (see Burn 1962: 556-58, Lotze 1970: 263-66, Davies 1992: 35, Lewis 1992a: 97-98,
and Rhodes 2007: 34).
51 Herodotus gives no hint about the date of Leotychidas' recall. See Schieber 1982, Connor 1985:
99-102, and Lewis 1992b: 499 for a discussion of the issue.
52 For the possibility that he, like Pausanias, was charged with medism, see Wolski 1973: 7-8.
53 See below for a discussion of those passages in Thucydides that have been inteipreted as indicating
further League activity.

138.44.9.77 on Tue, 27 Feb 2024 00:56:53 +00:00
12 David Yates
The impression left by D

fully accept the authentici
help to illustrate the high
sole source is Plutarch, and
common Council of the L
Delegates and sacred envo
the Freedom Games ever
against Persia were set on
infantry, 1000 cavalry, an
a sacred city and charged w
(21.2-6). That Diodorus fa
seeing the later tradition a
thought the Hellenic Leag
for at least a decade more.
brought charges of medis
the Council of the Hellen
Diodorus adds, "was accusto
συνεδρεύειν έν τη Σπάρ
protest, but willingly aid i
international court (Diod. 1
version are wide-reaching.
lär meetings, but it also p
recognized to supersede th
For recent discussions of the

66-67, and Cartledge 2013: 1
Vitruvius records an épisode a
direct the ongoing war effort
makes passing reference to an
on charges of medism in the y
at the behest of the common
consilio Cariatibus bellum ind
The spurious collection of lette
Century A.D. also makes men
δικαστήριον τών Ελλήνων: 1
111-112 and Podlecki 1975: 12
The phrase έν τή Σπάρτη does
Loeb (1946). Haillet 2001: 159,
regularly met in Sparta (see a
meetings are not of concern
that later meetings of the co
Diodorus almost immediately
Council precisely because this
Kienast 2003: 59-64. Jung 200
sible due to the indirect natur

138.44.9.77 on Tue, 27 Feb 2024 00:56:53 +00:00
Kienast interprets Thucydides' account of the proceedings against Themistocles in

light of the later tradition, arguing that here too Themistocles was to be tried before a
Panhellenic court.59 Thucydides does confirm that there was an international component
to the proceedings. Spartan envoys come to Athens, bring charges, and demand punish
ment, but he says nothing about where the trial might be held (1.135.2—3).60 Kienast
tries to extract some indication of League involvement from the fact that both Atheni
ans and Spartans pursue Themistocles, but coopération between Sparta and Themisto
cles' domestic enemies need not indicate the presence of a larger League mechanism
at work. In fact, an episode from Themistocles' subséquent flight throws the contrast
between Thucydides and Diodorus' understanding of the trial into sharp relief. When
Themistocles Hees the Peloponnese, he first travels to Corcyra (1.136.1), then the court
of Admetus (1.136.2). Thucydides includes an exchange between the Corcyreans and
Themistocles' pursuers; Diodorus, a similar exchange featuring Admetus. Both parties
are pressured to hand Themistocles over, but whereas Diodorus' Admetus is threatened
with a füll League army (11.56.2), Thucydides' Corcyreans fear alienating Athens and
Sparta alone (Thuc. 1.136.1).61 When Thucydides later relates the contents of a letter
Themistocles wrote to Artaxerxes, he does have his Themistocles claim that he was
being pursued by the Greeks (διωκόμενος ύπό των 'Ελλήνων: 1.137.4),62 but we are
right to question whether Thucydides intends us to read this comment as a reflection of
reality or the rhetorical exaggerations of a secondary narrator who is keen to elicit the
Great King's favor. It cannot be doubted that medism was by définition a Panhellenic
affair since the charge implies the betrayal of all Greece, not just a single polity.63 But
the evidence is simply not there to say that Thucydides thought the actual trial was to
be conducted by the common council of the Hellenic League.
Kienast also finds indications of League involvement in Thucydides' account of
Pausanias' earlier trial on charges of medism.64 Here Thucydides is remarkably clear;
however. Pausanias was recalled from his command by the Spartans (1.95.3-5) and
then tried by them at Sparta (1.128.3).65 Two problems give Kienast room for doubt.
Thucydides states that other Greeks arrived in Sparta to bring charges against Pausanias
Kienast 2003: 63. Others have been receptive to the historicity of the episode (Larsen 1933: 264 and
1940: 205-206, Podlecki 1975: 98, Barrett 1977, and Green 2006: 117 n.208), but none have tried
to read the later version into Thucydides' account.
Green 2006: 117 n.208 rightly notes Thucydides' silence on this point (see also Rhodes 1970: 392
n.32 and Frost 1980: 197), but then adds parenthetically, "logical though this request would have
been in the case of Medism."
See also Nepos (Them. 8.3) who here follows Thucydides quite closely.
Kienast 2003: 63 cites this phrase as proof that Thucydides thought the trial of Themistocles was to
be before a Panhellenic court.
For more on medism generally, see Wolski 1973, Gillis 1979, and Graf 1984.
Kienast 2003: 56-58. Here Jung 2006: 277 n.180 expresses serious réservations.
In this case the later tradition follows Thucydides in seeing the trial of Pausanias as a Spartan matter
(see Plut. Cim. 6.3, Diod. 11.44—45, and Nepos, Paus. 2.6).

138.44.9.77 on Tue, 27 Feb 2024 00:56:53 +00:00
14 David Yates
(1.95.3).66 Kienast maintai

officiais and so concludes
would normally carry litt
was put on trial by the Sp
sanias (1.128-134), and th
Themistocles feature sev
style.68 Westlake sugges
sloppy account Thucydide
considérations allow us t
derstanding of the incide
believed. Whatever the d
was a Spartan affair.
Two further épisodes in
influence of the Hellenic
epigram Pausanias the reg
replaced with a list of 31
conflict between a single
While Badian 1993: 131 right

no indication that they were
time, as Kienast 2003: 58 fu
by the Spartan court."
Kienast 2003: 57, citing Kah
The problems associated with
scholarly attention: see Westl
Lazenby 1975, and Podlecki
1989, and Hornblower 1991: 211-212.
Although Westlake comes to no firm conclusion about the identity of the source, he does suggest
Charon of Lampsacus as the most likely possibility (1977: 106-110; see also Parker 2005).
It is not entirely clear, however, that Kienast's historical conclusions can be supported by the text.
Pausanias was recalled by the Spartans to stand trial at Sparta. That much is confirmed outside the
digression (1.95.3-5). Moreover, the fact that charges were brought by the allies does not require
a Panhellenic court. Kienast's source for such a rule, Kahrstedt, recognizes that we are not dealing
with "an invariable legal obligation" in this case (1922: 324). Allies could and did bring complaints
against Spartan officiais (Kahrstedt cites Thuc. 8.85.2, Xen. Hell. 3.1.8, and Plut. Cim. 6.3 on p.
156; and Plut. Ages. 24.6 on p. 324 n.3). Throughout, Kahrstedt seems rather more concerned to
show that Helots and private persons from other states were not on the same legal footing to bring
charges against officeholders, but even here Kahrstedt allows some latitude (p. 324). If there were a
hard and fast rule against prosecutions involving foreigners, however, allied complaints could have
easily been mediated through their Spartan proxenoi or Pausanias' domestic enemies.
For the likely date at which the Serpent Column was completed, see Gauer 1968: 93. Thucydides
implies that the original epigram was removed soon thereafter: "at the time the Spartans immedi
ately erased the elegy from the tripod" (1.132.3). Fornara 1967: 291-94 has argued that the erasure
of Pausanias' inscription occurred far later than is usually thought, in 468 after the regent's second
recall, but see Trevett 1990: 410-411 for a persuasive rebuttal.

138.44.9.77 on Tue, 27 Feb 2024 00:56:53 +00:00
sented by the League.72 Pausanias attempts to hijack the victory at Plataea on behalf
of his home State. The allies object and bring suit before the Delphic Amphictyony.73
I address this fascinating episode in more detail elsewhere.74 Here I restrict myself to
demonstrating that this interprétation finds no support in Thucydides. Jung's reconstruc
tion is based rather on the mid-fourth-century account of Apollodorus, the likely author
of Against Neaera (Ps. Dem. 59.96-98).75 Thucydides' version, however, makes no
mention of the Amphictyony or even the allies:76
They (the Spartans) began to review whether he had in his other actions departed
in any way from established custom. Of particular note was the fact that he had, on
his own authority (Ιδία), once presumed to have this elegy inscribed on the tripod
that the Greeks dedicated at Delphi as the first fruits from the Persians:
"When the leader of the Greeks destroyed the army of the Medes,
He, Pausanias, dedicated this monument to Phoebus,"
At the time the Spartans immediately (εύθύς) erased the elegy from the tripod and
inscribed by name the cities that had joined together to put down the barbarians and
erected the dedication (1.132.2-3).
In Thucydides Pausanias oversteps his authority by arrogating to himself the privilège

of placing a self-serving inscription on a monument dedicated by the Greeks. The Spar
tan government responds immediately to rectify his transgression. They and they alone
have the elegy erased and replaced with the list of allied states. In fact, Thucydides'
account of the Serpent Column affair hints at the great power Sparta continued to wield
over the League's identity. Not only does the Spartan regent start with the authority to
Jung 2006: 278 cites the épisode briefly in his discussion of the League, but deals with the Serpent
Column in detail earlier (pp. 241-56). See also Beck 2010: 64-65.
Although Jung 2006: 241-56 maintains that the members of the Hellenic League, as allies, were very
much involved in the suit, it is important to note that he cites the Serpent Column in his discussion
of League cohésion merely as proof that the Hellenic League was one of several Panhellenic bodies
that played an active rôle in the years after Plataea (p. 278). Along with the alleged actions of the
Amphictyony here, he also cites an inscription from Olympia, almost certainly dated to the first
quarter of the fifth Century, which refers to fines imposed on the Thebans and Thessalians by the
Eleans for breaking the sacred trace in 480 B.C. (Siewert 1981). It goes well beyond the scope of
the présent paper to consider the possible impact of existing Panhellenic institutions on the émer
gence or maintenance of a Panhellenic mémorial Community in the years after the Persian War (to
which Jung himself gives little attention). For our rather more limited purposes here, I say only that
neither the décisions of the Hellenodikai in Olympia nor the putative ralings of the Amphictyony in
the Serpent-Column affair speak to the Hellenic League's real or perceived cohésion and durability.
See Yates 2010, which I am currently revising and expanding into a book.
Apollodoras wrote [Demosthenes] 59 between 343 and 339 (see Macurdy 1942: 257-59 andTrevett
1990: 407).
Jung 2006: 246 n.72 is fully aware that Thucydides' version is on its face quite différent, but argues
thatThucydides has simply omitted pertinent facts that Apollodoras includes. See Plut. Mor. 873c-d
for another late treatment of this épisode that reserves a place for allied complaints.

138.44.9.77 on Tue, 27 Feb 2024 00:56:53 +00:00
16 DavidYates
characterize the Greek vic

to remove an inscription f
devising. This new inscrip
(ML 27), but Thucydides at
consultation with the allies themselves.
Much has also been made of Thucydides' brief notice that the Athenians formally left
the alliance against Persia (in 462/1) after an Athenian army, sent to help the Spartans at
Ithome, was dismissed without cause (1.102).78 The passage confirms that Thucydides
thought the League continued to exist after the rejection of Dorcis in 478/7,79 but lit
tle more. It is just possible that the Spartans made their original request for aid on the
basis of the old alliance against Persia,80 but that inference does not guarantee the con
tinued power or influence of the League down to 462/1 either in fact or in Thucydides'
estimation. Indeed, Sparta's request for aid seems to have gone unheeded by most of
her présent Peloponnesian and former Hellenic-League allies,81 which suggests that,
The dedicatee (Apollo) as well as the basic location (Delphi) and form (column of serpents) had, of
course, been determined by the allies after the battle of Plataea (Hdt. 9.81.1), but it is notable that
Pausanias seems to have been in a position to have his inscription added to the monument before
any complaint could be made (Thucydides speaks here of physical erasure, έξεκόλαψαν: 1.132.3).
Pausanias' apparent authority over the monument's final form raises the possibility that he had in fact
been assigned the task of overseeing its construction. For a possible parallel, see the tithes entrusted
to Xenophon and his fellow générais after the March of the 10,000 (Xen. Anab. 5.3.4-13).
Larsen 1940: 204, Brunt 1953/4: 158, Kienast 2003: 64, and Jung 2006: 276-77. For Kienast and
Jung the departure of Athens in 462/1 marks the end of the League's period of high influence.
Thucydides makes a similar assumption in the Archaeology (1.18.2-3). Baltrusch 1994: 51 argues
that the League ended in 478/7 with the withdrawal of the Peloponnesians from the fleet, but he
does not take Thucydides' contrary implication in these two passages into considération (see Kienast
2003: 51 n.53 for a similar criticism).
See Larsen 1940: 205 and Brunt 1953/4: 153 for this possibility (contra Gomme 1945: 300 and
Baltrusch 1994: 51 n.279). Jung 2006: 277 leaves the matter open.
Only four states are known to have supplied aid to Sparta during the Ithome crisis: Athens, Pla
taea, Aegina, and Mantinea - that is, two allies within and two beyond the so-called Peloponnesian
League. The argument against broader participation turns on special considérations later given to
Mantinea (Yates 2005: 70-71). Eighty years after the fact, King Agesilaus refused to lead an attack
on the Mantineans, citing their service during the Ithome crisis (Xen. Hell. 5.2.3). But when Xeno
phon explains precisely why the Phliasians expected Agesilaus not to lead an attack against them,
he fails to mention the very reason that had stopped Agesilaus from attacking Mantinea just four
years before (5.3.10). This is an odd omission on Xenophon's part if the Phliasians had also aided
Sparta in the Helot uprising. In this light, it is also notable that Plataea expected (Thuc. 3.54.5) and
Aegina actually received (2.27.2 and 4.56.2) special considération for their part in the Ithome crisis
as well. These cases are, of course, less telling than that of Mantinea, but they are suggestive since
such requests and grants make less sense if overall participation had been ubiquitous and thus unre
markable. A final indication of limited participation cornes from Plutarch, who records an anecdote
in which the Corinthians object to Cimon moving his troops through their territory during the siege
of Ithome (Cim. 17.1) - a curious épisode if the Corinthians too were supplying aid at the time. For
Ion of Chios as Plutarch's source here, see Jacoby 1947: 9.

138.44.9.77 on Tue, 27 Feb 2024 00:56:53 +00:00
if the obligations or (more likely) the memory of the League were explicitly invoked,
it did not carry much weight. Furthermore, the subséquent Athenian décision to leave
the League does not in itself imply that the League remained particularly powerful or
even politically active. Here too we have reason to suspect the contrary. Ion of Chios
records the argument that had convinced the Athenians to support Sparta in the first
place. Cimon, the leading proponent of the expédition, won his fellow Citizens over by
"urging them not to allow Greece to become lame, nor the city to have an ill-matched
yoke-mate" (παρακαλούν μήτε την 'Ελλάδα χωλήν μήτε τήν πόλιν έτερόζυγα
περιιδείν γεγενημένην: Plut. Cim. 16.10).82 The quotation hints at a larger line of
argumentation that drew strongly on a positive memory of coopération with Sparta
against Persia.83 When the expédition returned in disgrâce, Cimon's enemies may have
taken this opportunity to renounce publicly the long defunct League that had inspired
the expédition in the first place. The fact that Thucydides' League lies dormant for the
sixteen years between 478/7 and 462/1 adds weight to the possibility that he too under
stood the Athenian departure as a largely symbolic act.
Thucydides does not State that the League was dissolved as a resuit of the Athenian
departure in 462/1, and there is no good reason to imagine such a step was ever formally
taken. Without an immédiate Persian threat, without Sparta, it seems that the Hellenic
League simply faded out of relevance as a political Organization soon after 478/7.84 It
was certainly not forgotten, and its memory could be activated, but the agent was invari
ably a single state hoping to advance its own agenda. Kienast discusses the later uses
of the League in some detail.85 As we have seen above, the Spartans and their friends
in Athens almost certainly exploited the memory of the old League to create sympathy
during the Ithome crisis. Later, the Peloponnesian War was in part framed as a continu
ation of the League's larger mission of freeing the Greeks.86 A few years into that war
the Plataeans cited an oath taken under the auspices of the League that guaranteed their
autonomy (Thuc. 2.71).87 While each case confions that the League continued to be
remembered, they fall well short of proving that such a League maintained any political
See Pelling 2007b: 94-96 for his illuminating comments on "ill-matched" (έτερόζυγα). His trans
lation is provided here with slight modification.
For more on this épisode and its Panhellenic résonance, see Flower 2000b: 77-80 and Pelling 2007b:
96 n.73.
Brunt 1953/4: 149-153 is quite right that the Hellenic League did not act as though it were strictly
limited in scope "to the repuise of the Persian invasion" (p. 149). Yet, it is manifestly clear that the
alliance was formed because of a Persian threat and ceased to function very soon thereafter.
Kienast 2003:64-77 (see also Larsen 1940: 204-205 and Brunt 1953/4:152-56 and 158). Jung 2006:
280 allows the possibility that the League continued to exist after 462/1, but does not insist upon it
(see also p. 279 n.183). I mention below only those cases that can be supported from Thucydides.
Kienast also cites the Congress Decree (2003: 65) and a later meeting of the Hellenic League to
discuss the implications of the Megarian Decree (p. 68). Both, however, are products of the later
tradition and so naturally (in my opinion) continue to overestimate the importance of the League.
Kienast 2003: 67-68; see also Raaflaub 2004: 195.
Kienast 2003: 68-75.

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18 David Yates
cohésion or even a memory

recalling it on each occasio
Conclusions
If we read our later sources as supplementing the earlier tradition, it is hard to escape
Kienast's conclusion that the Hellenic League was a powerful and relatively longstand
ing Organization. It is, of course, a well accepted method to Supplement earlier sources
in this way. But we should always exercise caution when doing so materially alters the
basic assumptions of those sources. And this is the dilemma presented by the tradition of
the Hellenic League. Our later sources do not simply add information or fill in blanks left
by Herodotus and Thucydides. Rather, they présent a notably différent Hellenic League.
Our fifth-century sources, who were of course closer in time and in a position to inter
view witnesses, understood the League to be an evolving political compromise that was
largely dépendent on its hegemon and abandoned barely a year after the initial threat was
turned back. In its place our later sources crafted a much stronger and more confident
Organization with a clear sense of itself as a collective. By distinguishing between the
two traditions of the League, we can sharpen our knowledge of the historical League, its
immédiate political impact, and the rôle it played in the broader Persian War tradition.
Kienast's contention that the League was in fact a strong and durable Organization
cannot stand. The evidence is simply not there in our best sources to suggest that the
alliance against Persia was anything more than a temporary expédient predicated on
Spartan supremacy. Kienast argues that the later tradition can be traced to the fourth
century historian Ephorus, and that he in turn made extensive and conscientious use of
fifth-century source material.89 The first proposition is, for better or worse, axiomatic.90
The second, however, cannot be maintained with any confidence.91 Ephorus survives
only in fragments, and very few of those treat the Persian War.92 His possible fifth
century sources are even more poorly represented.93 We should not support an historical
Kienast 2003: 64 concédés that the League hardly retained much influence after the Athenians left
the Organization in 462/1 and later became a mere tool of Sparta Propaganda (p. 74).
Kienast 2003: 51-52.
For Diodorus' use of Ephorus, see Schwartz 1903: 679-81, Macan 1908c: 66-77, Jacoby 1926:
33-34, Hammond 1973: 314, Schepens 1977: 101-102, Pearson 1984, Andrewes 1985: 189, Sacks
1994, Flower 1998: 365, Stylianou 1998: 49-50, Haillet 2001: x-xiii, and Parker 2004: 29. Plutarch
regularly consulte a broader range of sources (Macan 1908c: 84-87, Gomme 1945: 81-84, and Frost
1980: 40-59), but Ephorus is surely an influential voice among them in his Persian-War Lives (Her
bert 1954). Even in the case of Diodorus, however, the hard evidence Connecting specific passages
to Ephorus does not justify any categorical pronouncements (see Green 2006: 23-34).
See Green 2006: 31 and 40-42 for a succinct summary of the issue (see also Frost 1980: 13-19).
See FGrHist 70 F 63, 64, 186, 187, and 188. See also F 189-191 for the subséquent flight of The
mistocles.
In addition to Herodotus himself, Charon of Lampsacus, Demastes of Sigeum, Dionysius of Miletus,

Hellanicus of Lesbos, and Ctesias of Cnidus have been cited among others as possible sources (see,

138.44.9.77 on Tue, 27 Feb 2024 00:56:53 +00:00
reconstruction of the League on the authority of the fragmentary historiés a fragmentary

historian may have used. The streng League of the later tradition is in all probability an
invention of the fourth Century.94 None of this is to imply that our fifth-century historians
offer an unfiltered or unbiased account of the League.95 There remains room for debate
about the historical accuracy and basic plausibility of Herodotus or Thucydides' version.
I suggest here only that our later sources add little to that discussion.
The likely fact that the Hellenic League was weaker, shorter-lived, and more dé
pendent on Sparta than is generally supposed has obvious relevance for the history of
interstate political coopération in Greece.96 This is particularly true for the leagues and
alliances of the fifth Century, when the memory of the Hellenic League was still fresh.
Any direct impact on later leagues and fédéral states, however, would have naturally
diminished as the later tradition was gradually accepted as fact. A weaker League also
has clear implications for our understanding of the early Persian War tradition. In his
recent study of Marathon and Plataea as places of memory, Jung has argued that the
Hellenic League sponsored and maintained a Panhellenic memory of the Persian War
that for decades competed with the parochial Claims of the individual city-states, Sparta
in particular.97 Without the streng and durable League of the later tradition, however,
his case for an influential Panhellenic mémorial Community centered on the Hellenic
League becomes difficult to maintain. Memory theory tells us that one-time participation
in an event, no matter how momentous, is never enough.98 Collective memories require
mémorial communities capable of sustaining them." Paul Connerton speaks perfectly
to our présent point when he considers the modern European memory of World War I:
It is possible to imagine that the members of two quite différent groups may par
ticipate in the same event, even so catastrophic and all-engulfing an event as a great
war, but still these two groups may be to such a degree incommensurable that their
subséquent memories of that event, the memories they pass on to their children, can
scarcely be said to refer to the 'same' event.100
for example, Schwartz 1907: 13-14, Barber 1935: 119-122, Hammond 1973: 314, Schepens 1977:
103, Flower 1998: 368, and Parker 2004: 33-35).
94 See below for more discussion of the fourth-century context for this invention.
95 Tronson 1991 argues that Herodotus himself vastly overstated the Panhellenic aspects of the League.
Speaking more generally, Marincola 2007:106 reminds us that Herodotus' account has been affected
by the concerne of his own day (see also Fornara 1971).
96 For some recent bibliography, see n. 3 above.
97 Jung 2006:225-97, now followed by Beck 2010:61-68. For Jung the clearest case of tension between
a Panhellenic and state-centered view of the war occurs between Sparta and the rest of the alliance
when the Spartan regent Pausanias attempts to dehne the Serpent Column as a Spartan monument
(pp. 241-59).
98 Halbwachs 1980 (=1950): 32. For more général discussion of the relationship between memory and
Community, see Fentress and Wickham 1992: 87-91 and Cubitt 2007: 118-74.
99 Jung 2006: 271 makes the point himself explicitly.
100 Connerton 1989: 20.

138.44.9.77 on Tue, 27 Feb 2024 00:56:53 +00:00
20 David Yates
In the context of classical G

able obstacle to a shared Pa
states like Athens to mor
been mounting grandiose
a
unlikely that the Hellenic
possessed the cohésion, in
theme of Panhellenism was
of the présent study we sh
stituted a viable alternativ
above, even the premier Pa
Column at Delphi, was not
Finally, a dramatic shift
attention again to the com
cess. Rather, the past must
Ephorus embedded the Per
he did so with assumptions
interstate organizations lik
possessed more formalized
Ephorus' reading of his fif
logical component at play.
growing impact of Panhelle
on.106 He finds that both D
peals to unity and coopérat
of scholarship that has ide
inventions.107 The présent
Panhellenism also changed
101 For the influence of the p

1995, Manville 1997, and, wit
102 For the emergence of diverg
1962, West 1970, Vannicelli
103 For Panhellenism as a tool
104 See Halbwachs 1992 (=195
Fentress and Wickham 1992:
105 Tronson 1991: 96.
106 Marincola 2007 and 2010.
107 See Habicht 1961 generally, Bosworth 1971 on the Congress Decree, Johansson 2001 ontheThemis
tocles Decree, Etienne and Piérart 1975 and West 1977 on the Eleutheria, n. 54 above on the Covenant
of Plataea, and n. 28 above on the Oath of Plataea. For a contemporary perspective on the issue, see
Theopompus' famous comments on the Athenian tendency to inflate their own Persian War exploits
(FGrHist 115 F 153). For more on the évolution of the Persian-War tradition generally, see Flashar
1996, Hölkeskamp 2001, Gehrke 2001 and 2003 (= 2007), Jung 2006, Cartledge 2006: 153-95 and
2013: 145-61, Bridges, Hall, and Rhodes 2007, Beck 2010, and Yates 2010.

138.44.9.77 on Tue, 27 Feb 2024 00:56:53 +00:00
understood.108 In either case, the ad hoc alliance against Persia was reshaped into a more
effective, longstanding, and cohesive Organization that better matched the expectations
of a fourth-century audience.
There is, however, no reason to conclude that the development of this particular
historical invention ended with the fourth Century. The Propaganda surrounding Philip of
Macedon's Corinthian League expressly recalled the old Hellenic League.109 This new
League was variously restored and recalled throughout the Hellenistic period.110 Each
occasion offered ample opportunity for subséquent générations to rethink the Hellenic
League long before Diodorus reworked Ephorus' version.111 Nor is there any reason
to doubt that he did so in light of his own présent.112 Even in the second Century A.D.
Plutarch had his own reasons for emphasizing coopération between the Greek allies.113
Although we cannot use our later sources to arrive at a more historically accurate Hel
lenic League, it is for that very reason that they can shed considérable light on how it
was recalled and repurposed over time.
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Yates - THE TRADITION OF THE HELLENIC LEAGUE AGAINST XERXES

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THE TRADITION OF THE HELLENIC LEAGUE AGAINST XERXES

Author(s): David Yates

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24433806

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THE TRADITION OF THE HELLENIC LEAGUE

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The Hellenic League at War

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All translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

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Diodorus' conception of a strong and independent Panhellenic Council direct

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Eurybiades' authority in Herodotus is immediately apparent. He sets the question for

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the subséquent debate Them

The gulf between the early

Plutarch draws heavily on Hero

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The impression left by D

For recent discussions of the

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Kienast interprets Thucydides' account of the proceedings against Themistocles in

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(1.95.3).66 Kienast maintai

While Badian 1993: 131 right

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In Thucydides Pausanias oversteps his authority by arrogating to himself the privilège

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characterize the Greek vic

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cohésion or even a memory

In addition to Herodotus himself, Charon of Lampsacus, Demastes of Sigeum, Dionysius of Miletus,

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reconstruction of the League on the authority of the fragmentary historiés a fragmentary

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In the context of classical G

101 For the influence of the p

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2010. "Ephebie - Ritual - Gesc

Brunt, P. 1953/4. "The Hellenic League against Persia," Historia 2: 135-63.

Fornara, C. 1967. "Two Notes on Thucydides," Philologus 111: 291-95.

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Gauer, W. 1968. Weihgeschenke aus den Perserkriegen. Tübingen.

Haillet, J. 2001. Diodore de Sicile: Bibliothèque Historique, Livre XI. Paris.

Hornblower, S. 1991. A Commentary on Thucydides, Volume I: Books 1-3. Oxford.

-. 1947. "Some Remarks on Ion of Chios," CQ 41: 1-17.

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Lazenby, J. 1975. "Pausanias, S

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Sakellariou, M. 1980. "Panhellenism: From Concept to Policy," in M. Hatzopoulos and L. Loukopoulos

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