Public Choice

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-020-00805-6

BOOK REVIEW

Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson: the narrow

corridor: states, societies, and the fate of liberty
Penguin Press, New York, NY, 2019. xvii+558 pp., USD 32.00 (cloth)

Randall G. Holcombe1

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2020

The first sentence of the preface in Acemoglu and Robinson’s very impressive book says,
“This book is about liberty, and how and why human societies have achieved or failed to
achieve it.” They argue that a strong government is necessary to preserve liberty, referenc-
ing Hobbes to say that when government is too weak, life becomes a war of all against
all. Recognizing that without a check on government’s power it can become an oppressive
Leviathan, they make the case that a strong civil society is necessary to balance and control
the power of government. To preserve liberty, societies must develop through a narrow
corridor in which the development of government power is matched by the development of
civil society. A strong civil society is needed to keep the power of government in check—
to keep it from becoming a Despotic Leviathan. A balance between a strong civil society
and a strong government produces a Shackled Leviathan that preserves liberty.
Acemoglu and Robinson support their thesis with case studies from many different soci-
eties and different periods in history. The evidence they offer is descriptive and qualitative,
so some readers might argue that they have cherry-picked their facts and rewritten his-
tory to fit their model, but I found their supporting evidence very convincing. However,
key concepts (such as liberty, civil society, and strong government) are defined imprecisely
enough that they would be difficult to quantify based on the book’s analysis. How might
we quantify whether one country has a stronger government, or more liberty, than another?
But criticisms of the book along these lines would be unfair. Surely readers will agree that
China has a stronger government than Somalia, and that the citizens of Sweden have more
liberty than those of Venezuela. They present detailed historical evidence that provides
persuasive support for their framework.
Even so, ambiguities in these key concepts leave an opening for dissenters. For exam-
ple, they want to balance the “power of the state” against the “power of society,” but these
terms are not precisely defined. Their examples sometimes seem to identify more state
power with the ability of the state to enforce order among its citizens—consistent with
the Hobbesian foundation on which they build—and at other times with the scope of gov-
ernment—its production of public goods and income redistribution. Their examples depict

* Randall G. Holcombe
holcombe@fsu.edu
1
Department of Economics, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306, USA

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state power as multidimensional, but their analytic framework depicts “power of the state”
on a single-dimensioned continuum.
Acemoglu and Robinson say “Liberty and ultimately state capacity depend on the bal-
ance of power between state and society. If the state and the elites become too power-
ful, we end up with the Despotic Leviathan. If they fall behind, we get the Absent Levia-
than. So we need state and society running together and neither getting the upper hand”
(p.40). They say that a society without a strong government will be “plagued by militias
and armed groups” (p. 99). They quote Hobbes who says that “in such condition there is no
place for industry because the fruit thereof is uncertain.” They make the case that liberty
requires a strong state, but a state that is shackled by a strong civil society.
One example they draw on early in the volume is the Tiv, a Nigerian ethnic group with
strong social institutions that govern people’s interactions, but with weak government
to maintain order, which puts them outside the narrow corridor, with Absent Leviathan.
China, in contrast, has strong government but a weak society, placing them on the other
side of the narrow corridor, with a Despotic Leviathan. Societies with Absent Leviathan
fail to develop offsetting government institutions because of “norms guarding against the
emergence of political hierarchy” (p.57). A common characteristic of “an Absent Levia-
than: a society divided against itself, unable to act collectively, and in fact deeply suspi-
cious of anybody and any group attempting to influence politics” (p. 62). They continue,
“the state is weak by design because the communities fear the slippery slope” (p. 63) that
leads to a Despotic Leviathan.
There are many ways that societies can enter the narrow corridor, and Acemoglu and
Robinson provide many historical examples of societies that have done so, societies that
never made it in, and societies that entered and subsequently left. I did a rough count and
identified more than 70 different examples they used—different countries, and different
historical time periods—with extensive historical and institutional detail to support their
framework.
Acemoglu and Robinson characterize some states as Paper Leviathans. A Paper Levia-
than “combines some of the defining characteristics of the Despotic Leviathan, in being
unaccountable to and unchecked by society, with the weaknesses of the Absent Leviathan.
It cannot resolve conflicts, enforce laws, or provide public services. It is repressive but not
powerful. It is weak itself and it weakens society” (p. 341). Argentina, along with other
Latin American and African countries provide examples. Paper Leviathans compromise
liberty both because they are violent themselves, and they have limited capacity to enforce
laws that might protect the liberty of their citizens.
Acemoglu and Robinson say that Leviathan in the United States is too weak, “and as
a result many things have fallen by the wayside. Some public services, such as healthcare
and infrastructure, not to mention redistribution of income via taxation…” (p. 307) are
examples they give. Their examples illustrate the ambiguities that arise from imprecise
definitions of key terms. Their basic framework measures government from weak to strong,
But here they are talking about the scope of government rather than its strength or its abil-
ity to protect liberty. Buchanan (1975) divides the activities of government into the protec-
tive state and the productive state, and Acemoglu and Robinson do too, saying “Powerful
states can provide not only protection against violence and dominance but also public ser-
vices” (p. 133). Without disagreeing with that statement, their analysis steps outside their
framework in which “the power of the state” is measured in one dimension.
Favoring centralization of government power, they lament the fact that “it was the
cities that started providing free school lunches to children from poor families. The
federal government came in only later to subsidize and spread these programs… we

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are witnessing a highly shackled U.S. Leviathan, forced to develop new and creative
methods to expand its capacity in the face of novel and sometimes urgent challenges”
(p. 320). But they see the shackles as “a source of strength too. … It has also con-
stantly reassured actors to cede power to the federal state, safe in the belief that it would
remain constrained.” They say, “a multipronged expansion in the responsibilities and
the capacity of the state is necessary” (p. 485). Theirs is clearly not a Reaganesque view
of American government, and they are no fans of federalism.
One reform they suggest “is to increase the autonomy of the civil service… reducing
the ability of new administrations to make political appointments for all high positions
in government agencies…” (p. 487). This would appear to unshackle a major part of
Leviathan by reducing its accountability to voters, perhaps enough to exit the narrow
corridor. Andrew Jackson favored political appointees, using the argument that civil
servants whose jobs are dependent on the success of the current administration have an
incentive to do good work to retain those jobs.
Acemoglu and Robinson say “it is perhaps understandable that the shackles and com-
promises imposed on the American Leviathan from its founding have kept it weak and
forced it to come up with innovative, sometimes unusual solutions to deal with new
problems and expand its capacity” (p. 332). In the twenty-first century the United States
is viewed as the world’s only superpower, so it is surprising to see the American Levia-
than referred to as weak. I assume they are referring to a weak productive state rather
than protective state, but here again, ambiguities arise because of imprecise definitions
of key concepts. They are critical of the unshackled powers of the FBI, CIA and NSA,
organizations that appear to have the autonomy that elsewhere they argue is desirable.
Consistent with their thesis, they note that constraints on the American Leviathan
“were triggered by the mobilization of society and sometimes its more discriminated-
against, disadvantaged parts” (p. 336). They cite the abolition of slavery, the civil rights
movement a century later, and the expansion of women’s rights as examples. While they
are supportive of the shackles that civil society has placed on the American Leviathan,
they still argue that it is too shackled.
Readers of Public Choice will recognize that the starting point and motivation for
this book is very similar to James Buchanan’s The Limits of Liberty: Between Anar-
chy and Leviathan (1975). Both begin with the dismal Hobbesian premise that without
government, life will be a war of all against all, both explicitly reference Hobbes, and
both use the word liberty in their titles. They both argue that government is necessary
to protect liberty, and search for institutions that can preserve liberty by constraining
government power. Both depict liberty as lying in a narrow corridor between Hobbesian
anarchy and Despotic Leviathan. And as noted above, both divide the activities of gov-
ernment into the protective state and the productive state. The similarities are striking
enough that it is worth remarking that Buchanan is not referenced in this book.
Both explore ways that Leviathan can be constrained to preserve liberty. There is
a similarity in the institutional mechanisms they explore as well, in that both recog-
nize the importance of social constraints on government power. But their emphasis is
decidedly different. Buchanan takes a contractarian approach to consider procedures
to develop rules to which members of society would agree, Acemoglu and Robinson
see strong social institutions as the key to balancing the power of government. They
describe the preservation of liberty as a process in which the power of civil society
grows along with the power of government, and the narrow corridor is that development
path for institutions that balances the power of government with the offsetting power of

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civil society. If civil society dominates government, society becomes based on a tribal-
ism that threatens liberty, just as surely as does an unshackled Leviathan government.
Many readers of Public Choice see advantages in limited and constitutionally con-
strained government based on well-established public choice analysis. Big government
brings with it rent-seeking, regulatory capture, special interest politics, and corruption.
While big government and strong government are not necessarily the same things, Acemo-
glu and Robinson see advantages in big government for the benefits it can provide to its
citizens. They do not discuss any advantages to limiting the scope and power of govern-
ment; and liberty is consistent with ever-stronger government, as long as it is shackled by
the offsetting power of civil society. This is one aspect of the book that is likely to engender
criticism and accusations that they have cherry-picked their facts to support their thesis.
This is all-the-more true because those who champion liberty tend to be supporters of lim-
ited government.
While the book emphasizes the importance of strong government and strong civil soci-
ety, it does not explain how these strong institutions can be produced. The many cases
they discuss make it appear that it is a matter of luck rather than something that can be
designed. For example, the development of liberty in Europe “lies in a unique series of
historical events 1.500 years ago that created a fortuitous balance between the powers of
central authority and those of common men (not women, unfortunately)” (p. 153). They
tell us what we need for liberty, but not how to get it.
While I have pointed out a few areas where the book might be criticized, it is a very
high-quality piece of scholarship. The book’s thesis is simple and intuitively appealing, and
the substantial historical evidence Acemoglu and Robinson compile to support their thesis
makes a very convincing case. The book supports the idea that strong government, far from
being a threat to liberty, is necessary to preserve liberty. The book is sure to be widely
cited, making it a must-read for anyone interested in the relationship between liberty and
government.

References
Buchanan, J. M. (1975). The limits of liberty: Between anarchy and leviathan. Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press.

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institutional affiliations.

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