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A BRIEF TEXT-BOOK
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OC
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MENTAL PHILOSOPHY
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0 LONGER PROPERTYOF
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b 7 clay Copyright, 1892,
by
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PAGE
INTRODUCTION, . ° : . ° . ° a
LOGIC,
BOOK I.—DIALECTICS.
LOGIC.
DIALECTICS.
26. The first and second of these five forms are the most
obvious modes of argumentation and the most constantly
used. The reasoning so familiar in Mathematics, A=B, B=C,
.*. A=C, is an application of the first form. The argument,
‘if expressed in full, would read thus: “ Any two things
equal to a third thing are equal to each other; but A and C
are equal to a third, B; therefore they are equal to each
other.” Similarly, from the second form we have the fol-
lowing reasoning: “Two things, one of which is equal to a
third thing and the other unequal, are not equal to each
other; but A is equal to B, and C is not equal to B;
therefore A is not equal to C.
27. In these two special modes of reasoning the major
propositions are usually suppressed, because they are so
obvious; and the arguments assume an abridged form, so
constantly in ‘use and so practically useful, that we must ex-
plain it with special care. In fact, many logicians reduce all
syllogisms to these two abridged forms, which they call the
affirmative and the negative syllogism.
28. The affirmative syllogism, z.¢.; that in which both
the premises are affirmative, is based on the principle that
two things equal to a third are equal to each other: A=B,
B=C; therefore A=C
The negative syllogism, 7. ¢., that in which one premise is
negative, is based on the principle that ‘wo things, one of
which is equal and the other unequal to a third, are unequal
to cach other: A=B; B is not equaltoC; therefore A is not
equal to C.
29. The purpose of comparing A with B, and B withC,
in the premises is to bring A and C together in the conclu-
sion, as equal or unequal to each other. A and C are to
be brought together; they are therefore called the extreme
terms, and B, which brings them together, is the middle
26 Dralectics.
two universal terms, one for the middle term and one for
the predicate of the conclusion. For that conclusion will
be negative (Rule 8), and therefore must have a universal
predicate (No. 20). We cannot reason thus:
Some Inquisitors were cruel;
Some good men were Inquisitors;
Therefore some good men were cruel.
Rule8. And let conclusions take the weaker side. The
meaning is that, if one of the premises is negative, the con-
clusion is negative; if one is particular, the conclusion is
particular. The first assertion is evident: it regards the
negative syllogism explained above (No. 28). As to the
second, if one premise is particular, two cases may occur:
1. If both are affirmative, they can contain only one dis-
tributed term, since one subject and both predicates are
particular. The distributed term must, of course, be their
middle term, for the middle term must be at least once
distributed ; and therefore the subject of the conclusion must
be particular. 2. If one premise is negative, there may be
two distributed terms in the premises, viz., the subject of the
universal proposition, and the predicate of the negative—one
of these is needed for the middle term, and one for the
predicate of the negative conclusion; thus the subject of
the conclusion will again be particular.*
33. These same rules apply to all syllogisms having
* Exercise. Criticise the following syllogisms :
x, ‘‘ The beings conjured up by spiritists are spirits;
But the souls of the dead are spirits ;
Therefore the beings conjured up by spiritists are the souls of the dead.”
a. ‘* Blessed are the poor in spirit;
The Apostles are blessed;
Therefore the Apostles are poor in spirit.”
3- ‘* Scientists deal with physical laws;
But Huxley and Darwin are scientists;
Therefore they deal with nothing but physical laws.”
30 Dialectics.
3. The minor may deny all the members but one, the con
clusion affirm that one:
‘* But the mother and the child are not;
Therefore the father is.”
37. III. The conjunctive syllogism has a conjunctive
major premise; as: ‘No one can love God and hate his
neighbor.” From this premise we can reason validly by af-
firming oneof the incompatible predicates in the minor, and
denying the other in the conclusion: “ But the Martyrs loved
God ; therefore they did not hate their neighbor,” or ‘‘ But
Nero hated his neighbor, therefore he did not love God.”
ARTICLE III. OTHER SPECIES OF DEMONSTRATIVE
ARGUMENTS.
38. 1. The Enthymeme, as now usually understood,* is an
elliptical syllogism, one of the premises being understood
(év 6vua, in the mind) ; ¢. g., “ The world displays a wonder-
ful adaptation of means to an end; therefore it is the work
of an intelligent Maker.” The major is understood, viz.,
‘“‘ Whatever displays a wonderful adaptation of means to an
end is the work of an intelligent maker.” To criticise the
validity of an enthymeme we have only to supply the omitted
premise, and then apply the ordinary rules of the syllogism.
39. 2. The sorites (swpos, a heap) is an abridged series of
syllogisms ; it is an argument consisting of more than fhree
propositions so connected that the predicate of the first be-
comes the subject of the second, the predicate of the sec-
ond the subject of the third, etc., till the conclusion joins
the subject of the first with the predicate of the last premise.
“Man is accountable; whoever is accountable is free; who-
ever is free is intelligent; whoever is intelligent cannot be
mere matter; therefore man cannot be mere matter.”
* The word was differently derived and explained by Aristotle.
Reasoning. 33
tinguishing the true from the false, we shall now point out
the chief forms which fallacious arguments are apt to assume.
CRITICAL LOGIC.
CHAPTER I.
oS
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TABLE OF CONTENTS.
INTRODUCTION, . . . . . ° . . e ° 5
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
BOOK II.—COSMOLOGY.
BOOK III.—PSYCHOLOGY.
CHAPTER I.
THE NATURE OF BEING.
CHAPTER: I.
THE NATURE OF BEING.
ARTICLE J. SUBSTANCE.
etc., nor could St. John have written in his Gospel, “ The
Word was made flesh and dwelt amongst us.”
57. Persona] identity consists in the permanence of the
intellectual supposit, not in the continuity of his conscious-
ness; for even when we are totally unconscious we are still
the same individual persons. Mankind has never believed
that aman on losing consciousness ceases to be a person or
becomes another person. On this point Locke, like many
other philosophers, has written much that common sense
does not support. He considers person to be merely a
‘forensic term,’ and personal identity to be nothing but con-
sciousness. ‘It (person) is a forensic term appropniating
actions and their merit, . . . This personality extends
itself beyond the present existence to what is past only by
consciousness, whereby it becomes concerned and account-
able,” etc. (Human UOnderst., b. ii. c. 28, § 27). This doc-
trine would make us no longer accountable for acts which
we have forgotten, of which we are no longer conscious.
related, and not real but only logical in the other; thus,a
contingent being implies relation to the necessary being, but
a necessary being can exist without a relation to a contin-
gent being.
The category of relation is confined to the real relation;
for all the categories express special manners in which things
exist. It will be noticed that the mind cannot consider any
relation without abstracting the foundation of that relation.
Now, brutes have no power of abstracting, therefore they
cannot apprehend relations, but only the things related.
COSMOLOGY.
CHAPTER I.
THE ORIGIN OF THE WORLD.
101. The origin of the world is obviously one of the most
Important questions discussed in Philosophy. The ancients
were divided among various opinions on the subject. 1.
Plato maintained that the matter which composes the world
was necessary, and therefore eternal, but that it was properly
arranged by an intelligent Being, who is God. 2. Aristo-
tle supposed that both the matter and the order of the .
55
56 Cosmology.
some matter that was not made out of anything else. The
only way to evade this argument is to suppose an infinite
series of transformations that matter has undergone; but an
infinite series could never have been passed through ; besides,
it would be infinite and still not infinite, but increasing ; there-
fore there was, or is, a first matter made out of nothing.
107. Objections: 1. Scientists object that it is unscientific
to trace natural effects to a supernatural cause. Aswer.
Scientists do say so, but the only scientific way is to
trace effects to their true causes by whatever name you
call these. Now, the only true, the only possible
cause of matter is creation, as we have proved.
2. But creation is impossible, for out of nothing nothing
can be made. Answer. It is true that nothingness
cannot become a material out of which things are
made. But that is not the meaning of creation; it
means simply that God, by His Almighty will, without
using any material, has made that to exist which
would not exist, either in its present state, or in its
elements, or in any way whatever, but for the mere
fact that He wills it to exist.
3. But the cause must contain the effect, and God did
not contain matter. -Azswer. God contained all per-
fection of matter without its imperfections—z. ¢., He
contains matter eminently. For instance, matter is
something that can exercise certain powers. God can
exercise all those powers—z. ¢., He can produce all
those effects; and thus there is nothing in matter that
does not find its prototype in God. He also contains
matter virtually—t. e., He can produce it, for He is
Almighty.
4. The very idea of matter contains extension, but there
62 Cosmology.
* Chemists claim, besides that some of the properties of the simple substances are pre-
served in the compounds, in particular their chemical affinities : so that ina molecule or
atom of water the affinities of hydrogen and oxygen continue in a manner to exist They
add that spectral analysis shows that the ‘spectra ’ of the simples do not altogether van:
ish from the ‘spectra’ of the compounds. (See Pesch, /ustitutiones Philosophia Natw
valis, No. 132.)
82 Cosmology.
when the risen Saviour entered the Upper Room, though the
doors were closed. On the other hand, it is not absolutely
impossible, because not self-contradictory, that one body should,
by reduplication of its relations, be in two or more places at
the same time.
136. III. Figure is an accident of continuous quantity
which results directly from its limitations ; for whatever is limited
must have definite limits; these definite limits to extension
constitute figure. The natural figure of a body is determined
by its substantial form; for the form gives to the body every
determination that belongs to such a species, though its effects
in individual beings are influenced by present circumstances.
Thus, the forms of metals determine the figures of their
crystals; so with plants and animals; still, circumstances may
favor or impede the action of the form in each individual
case, as when a plant is dwarfed in a cold climate.
137- IV. Local motion is the successive transition of a thing
from one place to another. It supposes a sudyect, a term to
which the subject tends, a force impelling it to that term. If
only one body existed, there would be no such a term, and
therefore no motion in the strict meaning of that word,
though an impelling force might exist, and cause in that body
a mode which might analogically be called motion. Local
motion, then, implies a change of place; but spirits are not
in a place, in the same sense that bodies are in a place, and
therefore motion is not predicated of them in the same sense.
Spirits, as such, have no necessary relation to matter, and may
have been created before matter; but place and local motion
are properly accidents of matter only, and therefore cannot
affect spirits except indirectly, inasmuch as spirits may be in
union with a body, either substantially, as the soul of a living
man, or virtually, as when an Angel protects a child. (See St.
Thomas, Summa, i. q. |x. 4, 1) In this latter case he
The General Properties of Bodies. 87
PSYCHOLOGY.
it such powers and actions and not other powers and actions;
in a word, which constitutes the body in its species.
Now, such is the vital principle of any living body. For, 1.
If the vital principle ceases to animate the matter, as it does
in death, all the specific powers and actions of that body cease,
2. The mere matter, as separate from the vital principle, may
become successively the food and the very substance of differ-
ent plants and animals, its specific nature ever changing with
the vital principles that successively inform it. But this sup-
poses that the vital principle constitutes it in its species, or is
its form.
145. Objection. The substantial form of a body is simple,
and therefore indivisible; but the vital principle of some plants
is divisible; ¢. g., a twig may be cut off and continue to live
by its own life, the vital principle of the tree being divided.
Answer. Simplicity has different meanings. We grant
that all forms, as such, are simple; they are simple in two
senses: 1, Inasmuch as they are not composed of matter
and form; 2, inasmuch as they are not aggregates of parts
quantitatively distinct, as bodies are. Just in the same senses
is the vital principle simple, for it cannot be divided into
matter and form, nor into parts quantitatively distinct. As to
the curious question whether the principle of life is ever divided,
we say that it exists whole and entire in the body and in every
part of the body, so, however, that it can neither act, nor even
exist, but in an extended body, excepting only the soul of man.
To animate a body, the life principle requires a complete
organism ; therefore, when the organism is destroyed, the vital
form ceases to be. Now, in many plants, and in a few of the
lower animals, the organism is so simple and uniform through-
out in its structure that, when divided, the several parts may
still be suited to the functions of life. In such a case the prin-
ciple of life may continue to animate the several parts; but it
Specific Nature of Plants and Animals. 95
can only follow the one beaten track to which their specific
nature determines them. Hence, too, a man can improve him-
self by study, by exertions of his own talents; brutes cannot
do this; they maybe taught various actions by man, but they
cannot improve ¢hemselves. |Hence, too, arace of men may
increase in knowledge and civilization; brutes act now as they
were always known to act; and when, by the training of man
or the change of physical surroundings, new ways of acting
are brought about in some brute animals, it is found by experi-
ment that all brutes of the same species would act in about
the same way under those peculiar circumstances. Therefore
the effects can be accounted for by reference to phantasms
and organic modifications, without attributing to the brute
the abstract perception of the relation between means and
ends.
That brutes are irrational is proved scientifically, (4) From
the nature of reasoning. Reasoning is absolutely impossible
without universal concepts; for in all reasoning the middle
term must be at least once distributed or taken universally.
Now, brutes never give signs of having universal ideas: all
their actions can be accounted for by means of sense-percep-
tions, phantasms, and instinctive action, which will be ex-
plained further on (No. 149).
Il. The brute soul ceases to exist when the organism is de-
stroyed. For it would be unwise to keep anything in existence
which can answer no purpose; but the brute soul, when its
organism is destroyed, can answer no purpose; therefore tne
Creator does not keep it in existence.
The minor is clear from the fact that all the functions of the
brute soul—i. ¢., nutrition, growth, reproduction, sensation, and
motion—require bodily organs. Besides, it is an obvious prin-
ciple that the nature of a being is of the same kind as its
actions; now, the actions of the brute soul are all bound up
Specific Nature of Plants and Animals. 97
man, but only in spirits distinct from the souls of all those
visibly present on such occasions.
174. The same test will apply to the phenomena of spiritism;
namely, all clear exhibition of knowledge or intellectual action
must be ascribed to an intellect as its source. If this cannot
be the intellect of living men, then the effects must be
ascribed, both in spiritism and mesmerism, to the agency of
the evil spirits. For neither God, nor His good Angels, nor
the souls in bliss could be supposed to put themselves at
the disposal of spiritists or mesmerists, especially if we consider
the unworthy and often immoral means employed by such
men in their trades. Norcana man claim control over the
souls of the condemned ; and, even if he could, it would be
unholy and unwise for any one to make these his advisers and
helpers. But it is perfectly conformable to the teachings both
of reason and of Revelation to conclude that the evil spirits,
or demons, are the agents of all such effects in spiritism and
mesmerism as cannot be attributed to human power. Spiritism
is explicitly forbidden in Holy Writ: “ Neither let there be
found any one among you that seeketh the truth from the
dead. For the Lord abhorreth all such things.” (Deut.
xvi. 12. See further Jouin’s Lvidences of Religion, pp.
74; etc.)
ARTICLE II. RaTIONAL COGNITION.
Third part. Universals are not mere fictions of the mind, but
they have a foundation in the reality of individual things. It
is here maiatained that universals express some one thing
which is the same in many things; while the Conceptualists
maintain that there is nothing the same, but only something
similar, in all the individuals of a class.
roof 1. Similarity is impossible without something that is
one in the things similar. For similarity is, as Aristotle de-
fines it, ‘unity in some quality”; things are similar inas-
much as, to a certain extent, they agree or are the same.
Therefore, if all things of a class are said to be similar, they
are really one to a certain extent; now, the universal signifies
things by that in which they are the same—~. g., animals,
plants, etc.
froof 2. If there were not some one thing common to all
the individuals of a species, then the concept could not repre-
sent the nature of that species, but only something which is
not the species, but is mistaken for it; and thus all our appre-
hensions of universals would be founded upon mistakes; all
the words of a language would have a meaning, but a false
meaning. Now, this leads to universal Scepticism. Therefore
universals express some one thing which is found in all the
individuals of a species or genus; therefore they have a
foundation in the reality of individual things.
186. The now antiquated mysticism, taught formerly by
Plato, consisted in a very peculiar theory on the origin of ideas.
He supposed that the souls of men, before being united with
their bodies, were in another state of existence in which they
saw truths intuitively ; afterwards, when united with their
bodies, the souls retain the truths formerly perceived, but
they are unconscious of their knowledge till sense-perception
comes to awaken it anew. Plato could give no proof of
his conjectures; his only reason for them was that he
120 Psychology.
could not in any other way account for the origin of our
ideas.
187. Ontologists teach: 1. That the human soul has not
in virtue of its own essence the power of knowing truth;
2. That this power must be supplied by a principle extrinsic
to it; 3. That this extrinsic principle must be immediately
present to the soul and directly intelligible, and must be of
such a nature that in it all other things can be made intelli-
gible to us; 4. That there can be no such being except God;
5. That our ideas, even our universal ideas, are not psycho-
logical, ¢. ¢., formed by our souls, but ontological, 7. ¢., having
objective existence, being the objects known tous. Still,
many Ontologists allow that our mind can, by means of
reflection, form to itself psychological ideas, which it can then
compare with the ontological, thus knowing them to be con-
formable to the objective truth.
188. Thesis X. Ontologism does not properly account for
the origin of our ideas.
Proof. That theory does not properly account for the origin
of our ideas, 1. Which does not give a good explanation of
known facts; 2. Which makes gratuitous and even false sup-
positions ; 3. Which leads to false conclusions. But such is
Ontologism.
1. It fails to give a good explanation of known facts: (a)
It is a certain fact that our knowledge is intimately dependent
on sense-perception ; why is this so, if we see truth in God?
(5) We know all things in connection with phantasms: bodily
things by their own images, and things immaterial by refer-
ence to images borrowed from matter; why is this? The
very terms applied to immaterial things are taken from material
objects, ¢. g., incomprehensible, immaterial ;an acute, sharp,
dull, clear intellect, etc. (¢) We haveno consciousness, even
on reflection, that we see God; why is this, if we see Him?
Sensitive and Rational Cognition. 121
NATURAL THEOLOGY.
THE END.
ALPHABETICAL INDEX.
I. refers to the Logic; II., to the Mental Philosophy; 1, 2, 3, etc., to the paragraphs.
Abstract, ideas, I. 11, 122 to 124, 148; Atomic theory, II. 131, 133.
II, 176, 182; number, 38. Attribute, 1.13; II. 36; of God, 239,
Accident, one of the predicables, I. Authority, I. 152 to 156.
13; Opposed to substance, II. 49,
50, 58, 59. Beauty, II. 46, 47.
Accidental cause, II. 77. Begging the question, I. 58.
Act, pure, I. 237. Being, II. 6; actual, possible, real,
Action, II. 50, 55, 63 to 65, 78, 79, 85. 7,8, 12; logical, physical, rz; not
Actual, being, I1. 6,12; division, 91. a genus, 13; determination of, 14;
Adaptation of means to end, II. 150. possible, 17 to 27; necessary, 97.
Aevum, II. 70. Belief, I. 153.
Agnosticism, I]. 103, 216, 217, 219, Berkeley, I. 144.
234. Boscowich, II. 130.
Ambiguous middle, I. 57. Brute, animals, I. 148; for man, II.
Analogy, 1. 16, 50 to 52; II. ro. 138, 152; soul, 146 to 148.
Analytic, judgments, I. 17, 63, 125
to 127; reasoning, 64 to 66. Categorical, propositions, I, 21; syl-
Anatomy, II. 157. logisms, 23.
Angels, I. 13 to 16;.II. 139, 141 to Categories, II. 48.
143: species fixed, II. 155. Causality, limits to, II. 85; princi-
Anselm, St., II. 118. ple of, 86 to 88.
Answering objections, I. 55, Cause, defined, [I. 74; formally,
Apparent conflict, of reason and Rev- materially, 76; material, formal,
elation, I. 3; of sciences, 68. substantial, accidental, final, 77 to
Appetite, II. 191, 192, 195, 196. 79; efficient, 81; first, second,
Appreciation, power of. II. 167. properly, accidentally, principal,
Apprehension, I. 9, 75 to 77. instrumental, free, necessary, mor-
Argumentation, I. 22. al, physical, 83; contains effect
Argumentum ad hominem, I. 54. formally, eminently, virtually, uni-
Aristotle, II. 48, ror, 127. vocal, 84; has reality, 85.
Atheists, II, 219, 225. Certainty, I. 70, 71, 78, 112, 113;
180
Alphabetical Index. 181
defined, 167; the ultimate criterion of, 250 to 253; will of, 254 to 257;
of certainty, 169, 170. holiness of, 258; goodness of, 259,
Evil, II. 45, 241, 242, 267; spirits, 260 ; omnipotence of, 261 to 263;
123 to 125; I. 147. concurrence of, 264, 265; provi-
Evolution, II. 156 to 158, 208 to 210, dence of,. 266, 267.
226. Goodness, II. 36, 43; kinds of, 44.
Exemplars, II. 20, 21. Growth, II. 140, 143.
Exemplary cause, I1. 80.
Habiliment, II. 50, 73.
Exercise in reasoning, I. 69.
Harper, Rev. Thos., II. 14, 41, 133.
Existence, II. 33; of God, 220, etc.
Highest genus, [. 14.
Extension, of ideas, I. 16; of propo-
sitions, 20; of predicate, 21; of Holiness, II. 258.
bodies, II. 127, 132 to 134. Hume, I. 145; II. 53, 123.
Extreme terms, I. 29.
Huxley, I. ro, 164; II. 123, 155, 199,
201, 209.
Fallacies, I. 56, etc. Hypnotism, JI. 124.
Falsity, I. 73; II. 42. Hypothesis, I. 53.
Fichte, II. 102; I. 144, 145. Hypothetic, proposition, 21; syllo-
Figment of reason, II. 7. gism, 34 to 37; impossibility, II. 96.
Figure, II. 136, 140.
Final cause, II. 77 to 79. Idea, I. 9; abstract, concrete, 11;
First, fact, principle, condition, I. 98; singular, particular, universal, 12;
principles, 60, II. 35; cause, 83. distributed, 16; primary, 119 to
Foreknowledge, [I. 199; 250 to 252. I2r; not innate, II. 178, 180; how
Form, of syllogism, I. 19, 29 ; of liv- acquired, 180 to 183 ; of being not
ing bodies, II. 144, 203 to 206; that of God, 15, 16; ofinfinity, 95.
matter and, see ‘‘ Matter.” Idealism, I. 144; II. ro2.
Formal, cause, II. 77, 84; objects of Identity, IT. 39, 57.
sciences, I. 67; object of meta- Ignorance, I. 78, 82.
physics, II. 3, 8, 133. Imagination, I. ro5; II. 165.
Free, will, the source of error, I. 81; Immanent action, II. 65.
cause, II. 83; will, in man, 194 to Tmmensity of God, II. 247.
199; in God, 255. Immutability, II. 98; of God, 243,
244.
Genus, I. 13 to 55. Impenetrability, II. 135.
Geology, II. 111. Indirect reasoning, I. 54.
Glory, Il. 115, 153. Individuality, IT. 4r.
God, defined, II. 219; exists, 220 to Induction, I. 44 to 48, 170.
227; essence of, 228; perfection of, Inertia, II. 138.
233, 234; simplicity of, 235 to 238; Infinite, II. 92 to 94; idea of, 95;
attributes of, 239; unity of, 240, perfection, 253.
241; immortality of, 243, 244; eter- Inhesion, IT. 58,
nity of, 245, 246; omnipresence, Inner sense, I. 103 to 105, 1x5; reli-
immensity of, 247, 248; knowledge able, 139 to 141,
Alphabetical Index. 183
Quantity, I]. 50, 60, 93, 94; of prop- 166; judgments, 167; appetite, 191
osition, 1. 2a. to 196.
Sensitive, cognition, II. 159 to 167;
Rational, cognition, II. 175, etc. ; ap-
life, 139.
petite, 191, 192.
Simple apprehensions, I.8; truth of,
Real, being, II. 7, 8; relation, 62;
distinction, 4o. 75 to 77.
Realists, I. 124; II. 185. Simplicity, II. 90, 145; of the soul,
200; of God, 235 to 238.
Reality of causes and effects, I1. 85.
Reason, I. 109. Singularideas, I, 12; propositions, 20.
Reasoning, I. 22; rules of syllogis- Sleep, ITI. 168, 169, 172.
tic, 32; demonstrative, probable, Somnambulism, II, 171.
49; indirect, 54; a priori, a pos- Sophisms, I. 56.
teriori, 62, 63; analytic, synthetic, Sorites, [. 39, 40.
64 to 66; gives certainty, 132 to Soul, the form of the body, IT. 144,
134, 170. 204 to 206; the human, is simple,
200, 201; spiritual, 202,203; when
Redemption, II. 56.
created, 211, 212; survives body,
Reduplication, II. 135.
213; immortal, 214,
Reid, I. 160.
Space, II. 67 to 69, 137.
Relation, II. 50, 62.
Species, I. 13 to 15; Eucharistic, II.
Retort, I. 54.
134; of plants and animals are
Revelation, I. 3; II. 111, 118.
fixed, 156, 157; impressed, ex-
Rules of syllogism, I. 31, 32.
pressed, II. 162, 163.
Sameness, II. 39. Specific difference, I, 13 to 15.
Spinoza, II. 52, ror.
Sceptics, I. 93, 94, 97, 99; II. 85.
Schoolmen’s, the, system, of matter Spirits, II. 66, 137; I. 147.
and form, II. 127; of origin of Spiritism, II. 174.
ideas, 182. Spontaneous, II. 193.
Science, I. 5; formal objects of a, Subordinate, genus, species, I. 14.
Substance, II. 49, etc.
67.
Scotus, II. ror. Substantial, cause, II. 77; principle,
Self-contradiction, I. 54. 132, 144, 145.
Self-existence, II. 104, 220, 239. Suffering, II. 241, 267.
Sensation, I, 135,136; perceives con- Sufficient reason, II. 86 to 88.
crete objects, 137; is reliable, 142 Supposit, Il. 55.
to 147; limits of its reliability, 139 Suspicion, 1. 78, 82.
to 141; how effected, II, 16r to Syllogism, I. 23; construction of, 24,
163; where effected, 164. 25; abridged form of, 27; affirma.
Sense, outer, I. 101, 102, 138, 142 to tive, negative, 28; parts of, 29,
151; inner, 103, 104, 138 to 141; valid, 30; rules of, 31, 32; hypo-
common, 103, 163, 164; percep- thetical, 34 to 37.
tion, II. 160; objects of, I. 148. Synthetic, judgment, I. 17; reason-
Sensible. memory, I. 106, 128; II. ing, 64 to 66.
186 Alphabetical Index.
Term, I. 10, 16, 29, 31, 32. Universe, [I. 100; see ‘‘ World.”
Thomas, St., I. 91; II. 41, 108, 110, Univocal terms, I. 16.
118, 127.
Time, II.-50, 70, 71. Valid, syllogism, I. 30; induction,
Traditionalism, II. 179. 48.
Transcendentals, II. 9. Vegetable life, II. 139.
Transient action, II. 65. Virtual cause, IT. 84.
Transubstantiation, II. 99. Vital, principle, II, 127, 129, 139 te
Trinity, the Holy, II. 74, 237. 148; acts, 59.
True, beauty, II. 47; good, 44. Voluntary, II. 193.
Truth, I. 72 to 77; II. 36, 42.
Tyndall, II. 155.
When, II. 63, 70.
Ultimate, criterion of certainty, I. Whole, II. gr.
165 to 170; particles of matter, Will, II. 181, 192; antecedent, com
I]. 127. sequent, 116; of man is free, 198,
Undue assumption, I. 58. 199; of God, 254 to 258.
Unity, II. 36; kinds of, 37; of God, Wisdom of God, II. 253.
240, 241. World, II. too: origin of the, ror to
Universal, ideas, I. 12, 13, 122, 224; 110; age of the, 111; perfection
direct, reflex, II. 183, etc. ; proposi- of the, 117; purpose of the, 112 ta
tion, I. 20; major, 25 ; cause, II. 84. IIs.
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