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it came to his knowledge, and then, on the 6th of March, 1897,
went back over the record of his complaints and summed them
up, as follows: "It will be convenient if I recapitulate
briefly the occasions for such complaint, beginning with the
cases relating to Article IV. of the Convention. …

"1.—Netherlands Treaty.
On the 9th November 1895, an Extradition Treaty between the
South African Republic and the Netherlands was signed at the
Hague, and the ratifications were exchanged on the 19th June
last, without the Treaty being submitted for the approval of
Her Majesty. The case was therefore one of a clear infraction
of the Convention, inasmuch as the Treaty had not been
submitted to Her Majesty's Government on its completion, and
had been concluded by the exchange of ratifications without
obtaining the previous approval of the Queen. The Government
of the South African Republic, on their attention being called
to the infraction, did not deny that there had been a
departure from the general practice, but urged that they had
made no publication of the Treaty in anticipation of the
approval of Her Majesty. The Treaty had, however, been
published in the 'Netherlands Gazette' of the 3rd July, and I
observed that when the Treaty was published in the 'Staats
Courant' of the South African Republic after Her Majesty's
approval had been given, the official notice merely stated
that the Treaty was signed and ratified on certain dates, no
reference being made to that approval.

"2.-The Accession of the South African Republic to the

Geneva Convention.
After Dr. Jameson's raid, owing to a report made by the St.
John's Ambulance Association, Her Majesty's Government
determined to invite the South African Republic to accede to
the Geneva Convention, and the necessary instructions were
sent to Sir J. de Wet, who, however, omitted to carry them
out. The South African Republic, on the 30th September,
formally communicated to the Swiss Government, through their
Representative at the Hague, their act of accession to the
Geneva Convention. Her Majesty's Government, in the
circumstances, did not hesitate to convey the Queen's
approval, but the action of the Government of the Republic
none the less constituted a breach of the London Convention.

"3.—Portuguese Treaty.
An Extradition Treaty between the South African Republic and
Portugal was signed on the 3rd November 1893, but, contrary to
the usual practice, has not yet been submitted for the Queen's
approval, although two years have elapsed since Lord Ripon, in
his Despatch of the 25th February 1895, requested your
predecessor to call the attention of the President to the
omission to communicate this Convention to Her Majesty's
Government under the provisions of Article IV. of the London
Convention. … I now pass to the consideration of some of the
recent legislation of the Volksraad in its relation to Article
XIV. It will be found that it involves in more than one case
actual or possible breaches of the Convention. Article XIV.
runs as follows:—'All persons, other than natives, conforming
themselves to the laws of the South African Republic
(a) will have full liberty, with their families, to enter,
travel, or reside in any part of the South African
Republic;
(b) they will be entitled to hire or possess houses,
manufactories, warehouses, shops, and premises;
(c) they may carry on their commerce either in person or by
any agents whom they may think fit to employ;
(d) they will not be subject, in respect of their persons
or property, or in respect of their commerce or industry,
to any taxes, whether general or local, other than those
which are or may be imposed upon citizens of the said
Republic.'

"4.—The Aliens Immigration Law.

This law imposes upon aliens conditions of a new and
burthensome character in excess of the simple requirement that
 they must conform themselves to the laws of the Republic. … 2.
The Aliens Expulsion Law. This law empowers the President,
with the advice and consent of the Executive Council, after
consulting the State Attorney, to expel, without an appeal to
the Court, any foreigner who, by word or writing, excites to
disobedience or transgression of the law, or takes any steps
dangerous to public peace and order. … Her Majesty's
Government … do not admit that the Government of the Republic
have a right to expel foreigners who are not shown to have
failed to conform to the laws of the Republic, and they
reserve the right to object to proceedings under the Act which
may amount to a breach of the Convention.
{473}
3. The Press Law. This law empowers the State President, on
the advice and with the consent of the Executive, to prohibit
entirely or for a time the circulation of printed or published
matter the contents of which are, in his judgment, contrary to
good morals or a danger to the peace and order in the
Republic. The suppression of the 'Critic' newspaper, the
property of a British subject, under this law, is a matter
which may raise a serious question as to whether the action of
the Government of the Republic has been consistent with the
Convention, but as Her Majesty's Government have not yet
received the explanation of the Government of the Republic in
that case, it is only necessary for me to make a passing
allusion to it in this Despatch.

"In several of the cases above cited, the strict letter of the
Convention could apparently have been observed without any
difficulty, while in others the objects which the Government
of the South African Republic had in view could have been
attained without any infringement of the Convention by a
previous understanding with Her Majesty's Government. Her
Majesty's Government therefore cannot conceal from themselves
that the Government of the South African Republic have in
these cases failed to give effect in practice to the
intention, so frequently expressed in public and official
utterances, of upholding the Convention on the part of the
Republic, and of maintaining that good understanding with Her
Majesty's Government which is so necessary in the interests of
South Africa."

Of the laws complained of by Mr. Chamberlain, that relating to

immigrant aliens had raised the most protest, because of its
requirement that all such aliens who were permitted to enter
and remain in the country must carry "travelling and
residential passes," to be shown on demand. The Transvaal
Government had met Mr. Chamberlain's first remonstrance on
this subject, in January, by saying: "It is an evident fact
that, especially during the last time, the immigration of
aliens of the lowest class and without any means of
subsistence has been increasing in a disquieting manner. These
persons are dangerous to the peace of the inhabitants and of
the State itself, and, in the opinion of this Government, no
country whatever can be obliged to admit such undesirable
persons. The regulation of unrestricted entry, as it at
present takes place, is thus, from the point of view of police
requirement, not only necessary but also entirely justified
and constitutes no infringement of Article 14 of the
Convention. This Government does not desire as yet to express
any opinion on the suggestion that under the circumstances
mentioned it should have approached Her Britannic Majesty's
Government with a view to arriving at an understanding. In
case, however, the Government of Her Britannic Majesty has
another practical measure to propose whereby its
above-mentioned subjects, whose presence here is not desired
for the reasons stated, can be prevented from seeking an
outlet on the soil of the South African Republic, and that
measure can be found to be applicable to the subjects of other
Powers as well (since the law makes no distinction in that
respect) it will be ready, with gratitude, to give its full
consideration to such measure."

Great Britain, Papers by Command: 1897, C. 8423.

SOUTH AFRICA: Cape Colony and Natal: A. D. 1897.
Conference of colonial premiers with
the British Colonial] Secretary.

See (in this volume)

ENGLAND: A. D. 1897 (JUNE-JULY).

SOUTH AFRICA: British South Africa Company: A. D. 1897 (January).

Compulsory labor in Rhodesia.

In January, 1897, the Deputy Commissioner of the British

government in Rhodesia made a report to the High Commissioner
on several subjects pertaining to the native administration of
the British South Africa Company which he had been instructed to
investigate. One question to be answered was "whether there
exists a law or practice whereby compulsory labor is exacted
from natives, either by the government of the British South
Africa Company, or by private persons with consent of the
government, or by both?" From his lengthy report on this
subject the High Commissioner deduced the following summary of
conclusions, which he communicated to the colonial secretary:

"(1.) That compulsory labour did undoubtedly exist in

Matabeleland, if not in Mashonaland.

(2.) That labour was procured by the various Native

Commissioners for the various requirements of the Government,
mining companies, and private persons.

(3.) That the Native Commissioners, in the first instance,

endeavoured to obtain labour through the indunas, but, failing
in this, they procured it by force."

Great Britain,
Papers by Command: 1897, C.—8547.
SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1897 (January-March).
Conflict of the Judiciary with the Executive and the Volksraad.
The case of R. E. Brown.

In January, 1897, a decision was rendered by the High Court of

the Republic which brought it into conflict with President
Kruger and the Volksraad. This decision was given in
connection with a suit brought against the government of the
South African Republic by an American engineer, Mr. R. E.
Brown, and the claim of Mr. Brown had arisen out of
circumstances which were subsequently related by a speaker in
the United States Senate, as follows: Mr. R. E. Brown, a young
American mining engineer, living and operating in the Cœur
d'Alene district, in the State of Idaho, about eight years
ago, at the invitation of English capitalists, left this
country to go to the South African Republic for the purpose of
assisting in the development of the gold mines of that
country. It was about that time that Hammond, Clements, and
other American engineers went there, and it is not too much to
say that the genius and the energy of those young Americans
more than anything else made that country a great gold
producer and its mines the most valuable of any in the world.
At that time most of the mines were held by English companies
or Germans. The laws were very simple, but in some respects
appear to have been drawn in the interest of the wealthy
syndicates. Upon the discovery of new mines the President of
the Republic by proclamation opened them to mining locations,
fixing a day and hour at which they would be opened to such
location. Thereafter persons desiring to stake out mines had
to go to the office of the responsible clerk of the district
in which the mines were located to make application for
licenses to locate the mines, and thereafter they were
authorized, either in person or by deputy, to go on the ground
and make mining locations.
{474}
Under this system most of the valuable mines of the country
had been absorbed, as I said, by English and German
syndicates. The mode in which they operated to absorb the
mines was to place their men upon the newly opened ground and
at the earliest possible moment apply for licenses to locate
the mines, and then by means of couriers with swift horses, or
by signals from mountain to mountain where that was possible, to
convey information to their men and cause the mines to be
located before their rivals could get on the ground. Mr. Brown
had not been in the country very long before he learned of this
antiquated system, and he determined on the next opening of
mines to apply to their location some of the snap and go of
American methods.

"In June, 1895, President Kruger by proclamation opened the

mines on the Witfontein farm, district of Potchefstroom, the
responsible clerk for which resided at Doornkop, in that
district. Mr. Brown determined that he would acquire some of
these mines, at least, and as large a number of them as
possible. Witfontein was only 30 miles from Doornkop. The
mines were known to be very valuable, because they had been
prospected on each side and it was found that valuable
gold-bearing reefs ran through them from end to end.
Accordingly he purchased heliographic instruments and employed
expert heliographic operators, and without the knowledge of his
rivals established heliographic communication between Doornkop
and Witfontein. Then he placed his men upon the ground, and on
the 19th day of July, 1895, the earliest period at which he
was permitted to do so, he appeared at the office of the
responsible clerk and sought licenses to locate 1,200 mines
upon this ground. However, on the day before the opening of
the mines his rivals had found out about the heliographic
communication, but they were beaten in the race. In that
extremity they communicated with President Kruger by wire and
induced him on the night of the 18th to issue a second
proclamation, withdrawing the mines of Witfontein from the
privilege of mining locations, and when Mr. Brown appeared at
the office of the responsible clerk and tendered his money he
was met with the information of this action on the part of the
President of the South African Republic, and his application
was refused. But nothing daunted he caused his agents on the
ground to locate the mines the same as if the licenses had
been granted to him, and then he brought suit before the high
court of justice of the South African Republic against the
Republic, alleging the facts substantially as I have stated
them and praying that the authorities be compelled to issue to
him licenses for the mines located, or in lieu thereof that
compensation be made to him in the sum of £372,400, amounting
to about $1,850,000. While this suit was pending it was sought
to re-enforce the action of the President in withdrawing these
lands, and the Volksraad [passed a resolution approving the
withdrawal and declaring that no person should be entitled to
compensation on account of it]."

United States Congressional Record,

January 21, 1901, page 1370.

On Mr. Brown's suit, the High Court of the Republic decided

that the claimant's right to the land was good, and could not
be set aside by ex post facto measures of the Executive or the
Legislature. The President and the Volksraad refused to submit to
this decision, and passed a law to overrule it, on the ground
that, under the Grondwet (constitution), the Volksraad is the
highest power in the state. In a subsequent public statement
of the matter, Justice Kotze, the Chief Justice, explained the
issue that was thus raised between his court and the
President, and also related the circumstances of a compromise
by which it was settled temporarily, as follows:

"This so-called Law Number 1 of 1897 seeks to deprive the

judges of the testing right, authorizes the President to put a
certain question to the members of the bench that they would
not arrogate to themselves the so-called testing power, and
empowers him to instantly dismiss the judge or judges from
whom he receives no answer, or, in his opinion, an
unsatisfactory answer. The judges for the future are also
subjected to a humiliating form of oath. This measure, it
seems almost superfluous to observe, is no law. It alters the
constitution of the country without any previous reference to
the people, and for the reasons given in the Brown case it is
devoid of all legal validity. The five judges, on March 1,
1897, unanimously issued a declaration, stating that by this
so-called Law Number 1 of 1897 a vital violation of the
independence of the bench had taken place, and that the judges
were exposed in future to the suspicion of bribery. In fact,
the nature and tendency of this measure are so immoral that
one of the judges openly said that no honorable man can occupy
a seat on the bench while Law Number 1 of 1897 remains on the
statute book.

"The question above referred to was duly put by the President

to the judges, who had unanimously signed a letter to the
effect that they did not feel themselves at liberty to give
any answer, when the chief justice of the Cape Colony arrived
in Pretoria, and through his mediation a written understanding
was proposed by the judges on March 19, and accepted without
any qualification by the President on March 22, 1897. By the
terms of this compact the judges undertook not to test laws
and resolutions of the Volksraad on the distinct understanding
that the President would as soon as possible submit a draft
Grondwet to the Volksraad providing how alone the Grondwet can
be altered by special legislation in a manner analogous to the
provisions contained in the constitution of the Orange Free
State on the subject, and incorporating the guaranties for the
independence of the judiciary. By these means the judges
intended to protect both the constitution and the bench
against sudden surprises and attacks, such as, for instance,
the oft-quoted measure known as Law Number 1, of 1897. They
did this to avert a crisis, and, in order to help the
Government and Volksraad out of a difficulty of their own
creation, placed themselves under a temporary obligation upon
the faith of the President as speedily as possible complying
with his portion of the understanding."
 United States, 56th Congress, 1st Session,
House Document Number 618.

The promised amendment of the Grondwet was not made, and the
issue concerning it was brought to a crisis in the next year.

See below: A. D. 1898 (JANUARY-FEBRUARY).

SOUTH AFRICA: A. D. 1897 (February):

Appointment of Sir Alfred Milner.

In February, Sir Alfred Milner was appointed High Commissioner

for South Africa and Governor of Cape Colony, to succeed Sir
Hercules Robinson, retired, and raised to the peerage as Lord
Rosmead.

{475}

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1897 (February).

The franchise.

The government of the Transvaal extended the full franchise to

862 Uitlanders who supported it at the time of the Jameson
raid.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1897 (February.)

Indemnity claimed by the South African Republic for
the Jameson Raid.

On the 16th of February, 1877, the State Secretary of the

South African Republic, Dr. W. J. Leyds, presented to the
British High Commissioner the following "specification of the
compensation to which the Government of the South African
Republic lays claim for and in connexion with the incursion
into the Territory of the South African Republic by Dr.
Jameson and the Troops of the Chartered Company at the end of
December 1895 and the beginning of January 1896.

1. Expenditure for military and commando

services In connexion with the incursion,
the sum of. £136,733 s.4 d.3

2. Compensation to the Netherlands South

African Railway Company for making use,
in accordance with the concession granted
to that Company, of the railway worked by
it during the commando on account of the
incursion of Dr. Jameson. £9,500 s.0 d.0

3. Disbursements to surviving relatives

of slain and wounded. £234 s.19 d.6

4. For annuities, pensions, and disbursements

to widows and children of slain burghers and
to relatives of unmarried slain burghers, as
also to wounded burghers, a total sum of. £28,243 s.0 d.0

5. Expenses of the telegraph department,

for more overtime, more telegrams on service
in South African communication, more
cablegrams, &c. £4,692 s.11 d.9

6. Hospital expenses for the care of the

wounded and sick men, &c. of Dr. Jameson. £225 s.0 d.0

7. For support of members of the families of

commandeered burghers during the commando. £177 s.8 d.8

8. Compensation to be paid to the and the

commandeered burghers for their services
troubles and cares brought upon them. £62,120 s.0 d.0

9. Account of expenses of the Orange

 Free State. £36,011 s.19 d.1

Total £677,936 s.3 d.3

"Moral or intellectual compensation to which the Government of

the South African Republic lays claim for and in connexion
with the incursion into the Territory of the South African
Republic by Dr. Jameson and the Troops of the Chartered
Company at the end of December 1895 and the beginning of
January 1896. One million pounds sterling (£1,000,000)."

To this claim the British colonial secretary, Mr. Chamberlain,

replied on the 10th of April, saying, with reference to the
specification under the second head, "for moral or
intellectual damage," that "Her Majesty's Government … regret
that they do not feel justified in presenting it to the
British South Africa Company"; and adding: "Her Majesty's
Government fear that they may be compelled to take similar
exception to certain of the items composing the first head,
especially in view of the very short period which elapsed
between the crossing of the frontier by Dr. Jameson's force
and its surrender; but as it is apparent from the nature of
the figures that the Government of the South African Republic
have proceeded on very precise data in arriving at the various
sums to which they lay claim, Her Majesty's Government, before
offering any observations on this part of the claim, would ask
his Honour to be so good as to furnish them with full
particulars of the way in which the different items comprised
in the first head have been arrived at."

Great Britain,
Papers by Command: C.—8404, 1897; and C.—8721, 1898.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1897 (February-July).

British parliamentary investigation of the Jameson Raid.

A Committee of the British House of Commons, appointed "to

inquire into the origin and circumstances of the incursion
into the South African Republic by an armed force, and into
the administration of the British South Africa Company," began
its sittings on the 16th of February, 1897. Among the members
of the Committee were the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the
Attorney-General, Mr. Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for
the Colonies, Sir William Harcourt, Sir John Lubbock, Sir H.
Campbell-Bannerman, Mr. Labouchere, Mr. John Ellis, Mr.
Buxton, Mr. Blake, and others. Mr. Rhodes, who was first
examined by the Committee, read a statement of the
circumstances leading up to the raid, in which he said that,
as one largely interested in the Transvaal, he felt that the
unfriendly attitude of the Boer Government was the great
obstacle to common action among the various states in South
Africa, and that, therefore, he had assisted the movement in
Johannesburg with his purse and influence. "Further," he said,
"acting within my rights, in the autumn of 1895 I placed a
body of troops under Dr. Jameson, prepared to act in the
Transvaal in certain eventualities." Subsequently Mr. Rhodes
declared: "With reference to the Jameson raid, I may state
that Dr. Jameson went in without my authority." He concluded
his statement by declaring that in what he did he was greatly
influenced by his belief that the policy of the Boer
Government was to "introduce the influence of another foreign
Power into the already complicated system of South Africa."
Mr. Rhodes was kept under examination before the Committee for
four days, and then "almost the next thing heard of him was
that he had started for South Africa on his way back to
Rhodesia." Another witness examined was Sir Graham Bower,
Secretary to the High Commissioner at the Cape. "His evidence
was certainly most startling, and at the same time of great
importance. He stated that late in October, 1895, Mr. Rhodes
came into his office and said: 'I want you to give me your
word of honour that you will not say a word to anyone about
what I am going to tell you.' Sir Graham Bower—who, as he
said, had a great many Cape secrets in his possession—pledged
his word, and soon found he was in possession of a secret
 which it was his official duty to disclose to the High
Commissioner and his private duty not to disclose. Mr. Rhodes
then said that he was negotiating about the Protectorate, that
there was going to be a rising in Johannesburg, and that he
wished to have a police force on the border. He added in
substance: 'If trouble comes I am not going to sit still. You
fellows are infernally slow.' It further transpired that on
the fateful Sunday (December 28) Mr. Rhodes had told him that
Jameson had gone in, but that he hoped that the message he had
sent would stop him."
{476}
When Dr. Jameson was examined he fully acknowledged his
conspiracy with the Johannesburg revolutionists, and stated
that he had given information of it to Mr. Rhodes, adding; "He
agreed, and we arranged that when the rising took place he
should go to Johannesburg or Pretoria with the High
Commissioner and Mr. Hofmeyr to mediate between the Transvaal
Government and the Uitlanders. With these matters settled, I
left Cape Town and joined my camp at Pitsani. I required no
orders or authority from Mr. Rhodes, and desired neither to
receive nor to send any messages from or to Cape Town."

In the course of the inquiry, Mr. Chamberlain, the Colonial

Secretary, desired to give testimony, and related that Dr.
Harris, the Secretary in South Africa to the British South
Africa Company, said to him, "I could tell you something in
confidence," or "I could give you some confidential
information"; but that he (Chamberlain) stopped him at once,
saying, "I do not want to hear any confidential information. I
am here in an official capacity, and I can only hear
information of which I can make official use"; and adding: "I
have Sir Hercules Robinson in South Africa. I have entire
confidence in him, and I am quite convinced he will keep me
informed of everything I ought to know." In concluding his
testimony, Mr. Chamberlain said: "I desire to say, in the most
explicit manner, that I did not then have, and that I never
had, any knowledge or—until, I think it was, the day before
the raid took place—the slightest suspicion of anything in the
nature of a hostile or armed invasion of the Transvaal." The
Committee having called upon Mr. Rhodes' solicitor, a Mr.
Hawksley, to produce telegrams which had passed between Mr.
Rhodes and himself, refused to do so.

"The proceedings which ensued were not to the credit of the

Committee, for instead of reporting the matter to the House at
once in a special report, they decided to refer to it in the
interim report on the raid. Mr. Labouchere and Mr. Blake alone
opposed this course, which was either a confession of
unwillingness to reach the bottom of the business, or the
suggestion that somebody was to be shielded. … Having devoted
two days to hearing counsel on behalf of Mr. Rhodes, Mr. Beit
and Dr. Harris, the Committee adjourned to consider its
report. The general feeling was that the proceedings had been
conducted with singular laxity or want of skill. Those
interested in keeping secret the true history of the raid were
entirely successful, and it was generally by the merest chance
that any fact of importance was elicited from the witnesses.
The representatives of the Opposition, Sir William Harcourt,
Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman and Mr. Buxton, were, after Mr.
Rhodes had been unaccountably permitted to quit England,
willing to allow the breakdown of the proceedings; and what
was even more surprising in so strict a parliamentarian as Sir
William Harcourt, a witness was allowed to treat the Committee
with defiance, and to pass unchecked. To a very great extent the
inquiry had been obviously factitious, but in whose interest
concealment was considered necessary remained undivulged. It
was surmised that reasons of State had been found which
outweighed party considerations, and that the leaders of the
Opposition had been privately convinced that the alleged
grounds were sufficient for the course adopted."

The report of the majority of the Committee, signed by all of

its members except Mr. Labouchere and Mr. Blake (the former of
whom submitted a minority report), was made public on the 13th
of July. The results of its inquiry were summed up under the
following heads:

I. "Great discontent had, for some time previous to the

incursion, existed in Johannesburg, arising from the
grievances of the Uitlanders.

II. Mr. Rhodes occupied a great position in South Africa; he

was Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, and, beyond all other
persons, should have been careful to abstain from such a
course of action as that which he adopted. As managing
director of the British South Africa Company, as director of
the De Beers Consolidated Mines and the Gold Fields of South
Africa, Mr. Rhodes controlled a great combination of
interests; he used his position and those interests to promote
and assist his policy. Whatever justification there might have
been for action on the part of the people of Johannesburg, there
was none for the conduct of a person in Mr. Rhodes' position
in subsidising, organising, and stimulating an armed
insurrection against the Government of the South African
Republic, and employing the forces and resources of the
Chartered Company to support such a revolution. He seriously
embarrassed both the Imperial and Colonial Governments, and
his proceedings resulted in the invasion of the territory of a
State which was in friendly relations with her Majesty, in
breach of the obligation to respect the right to
self-government of the South African Republic under the
conventions between her Majesty and that State. Although Dr.
Jameson 'went in' without Mr. Rhodes' authority, it was always
part of the plan that these forces should be used in the
Transvaal in support of an insurrection. Nothing could justify
such a use of such a force, and Mr. Rhodes' heavy
responsibility remains, although Dr. Jameson at the last
moment invaded the Transvaal without his direct sanction.

III. Such a policy once embarked upon inevitably involved Mr.

Rhodes in grave breaches of duty to those to whom he owed
 allegiance. He deceived the High Commissioner representing the
Imperial Government, he concealed his views from his
colleagues in the Colonial Ministry and from the board of the
British South Africa Company, and led his subordinates to
believe that his plans were approved by his superiors.

IV. Your committee have heard the evidence of all the

directors of the British South Africa Company, with the
exception of Lord Grey. Of those who were examined, Mr. Beit
and Mr. Maguire alone had cognisance of Mr. Rhodes' plans. Mr.
Beit played a prominent part in the negotiations with the
Reform Union; he contributed large sums of money to the
revolutionary movement, and must share full responsibility for
the consequences.

V. There is not the slightest evidence that the late High

Commissioner in South Africa, Lord Rosmead, was made
acquainted with Mr. Rhodes' plans. The evidence, on the
contrary, shows that there was a conspiracy to keep all
information on the subject from him. The committee must,
however, express a strong opinion upon the conduct of Sir
Graham Bower, who was guilty of a grave dereliction of duty in
not communicating to the High Commissioner the information
which had come to his knowledge. Mr. Newton failed in his duty
in a like manner.

VI. Neither the Secretary of State for the Colonies nor any of
the officials of the Colonial Office received any information
which made them, or should have made them or any of them,
aware of the plot during its development.

{477}

VII. Finally, your committee desire to put on record an

absolute and unqualified condemnation of the raid and of the
plans which made it possible."
"The result caused for the time being grave injury to British
influence in South Africa. Public confidence was shaken, race
feeling embittered, and serious difficulties were created with
neighbouring States. The course of action subsequently taken by
the Government increased the suspicions which were aroused by
such an emasculated report. Two days after its publication
(July 15), Mr. Balfour was asked to set apart a day for the
formal discussion of so important a matter. To this request
Mr. Balfour, with the tacit concurrence of the front
Opposition bench, replied that he saw no useful purpose to be
served by such a debate."

Those who were known as the "Forward Radicals," or "Forwards,"

in the House, were not to be silenced in this manner, and
debate was forced upon a motion expressing regret at "the
inconclusive action and report of the select committee on
British South Africa," and summoning Mr. Hawksley to the bar
of the House, to produce "then and there," the telegrams which
he had refused to the committee. In the course of the
discussion which followed, Mr.Chamberlain expressed his
conviction that, "while the fault of Mr. Rhodes was about as
great a fault as a politician or statesman could commit, there
existed nothing which affected his personal character as a man
of honour." When Sir Elliott Lees, a supporter of the
government, rose to protest against such a doctrine, he was
met by cries which silenced his speech. The House then
divided, and the resolution was defeated by 304 to 77. "It was
an open secret that throughout the debate one member,
unconnected with either front bench, sat with the famous
telegrams in his pocket, and with them certain correspondence
relating thereto which he had been instructed to read in the
event of Mr. Rhodes' character being aspersed."

Annual Register, 1897.

"The position … stands thus. The Colonial Office conceals its

own documents. From none of its officials have we had any
detailed or frank statement as to their relations to South
African affairs during the critical period. The High
Commissioner himself has not been examined. Mr. Rhodes has
been allowed to go without any serious inquiry into this
branch of the case. The most important cables are refused by
Mr. Rhodes's order, and the Committee decline to exercise
their power to compel the production of them. The story, in
fact, so far as it concerns this question of the truth or
falsity of the allegation that Mr. Chamberlain was 'in it,' is
being smothered up, with an audacious disregard of the
principles which guide all ordinary tribunals. The last steps
in this proceeding have been taken with the direct assent of
the leader of the Opposition. Everybody, therefore, is
inquiring what reason can have induced Sir William Harcourt to
execute this startling change of front. There is only one
reason that can, with any probability, be assigned-that is,
that some member of the Government has made a 'Front Bench
communication' to the leader of the Opposition, indicating to
him explicitly that there are 'reasons of State' for stopping
the disclosures. There can be little doubt that this is what
has happened, and conjecture, not only in this country but
elsewhere, will naturally be keen to know what the nature of
this momentous disclosure was.

"If Mr. Chamberlain was as absolutely free from knowledge of

the Jameson plan as he has professed to be, it is hard to see
how full disclosure could do any damage to the Empire, or
could do anything but good to the Colonial Secretary himself.
Mr. Chamberlain, of course, professes in words his private
desire that everything should come out. He has not, however,
assisted in the attainment of that result. The consequence is
that a national and international question of very grave
importance has arisen. It is said in circles usually well
informed, that when the Raid occurred, it became necessary to
give assurances to foreign Governments, and in particular to
Germany, that the Queen's Government was in no way
compromised. These assurances, it is said, were given. It is
 even said that they were given expressly in the name of the
Queen. Something of this kind may well have happened; but it
is hard to see how, if it did happen, and if the Colonial
Office was as innocent as it claims to be, the disclosure of
the facts can do anything but confirm the Queen's word. That
documents exist which are supposed to be compromising, and
which the very authors of them allege to be compromising, is a
fact past hiding. It casts, unless it is cleared up, a damning
doubt. Therefore it would appear to be the duty of all honest
men, and, above all, of the Parliament of Great Britain, to
see that an immediate end is put to a policy which may be
aptly described as 'thimble-rigging,' and that the truth,
whether it suits Mr. Rhodes or Mr. Chamberlain, or neither of
them, must be told at fist."

Contemporary Review,
July, 1897.

SOUTH AFRICA: Orange Free State and Transvaal: A. D. 1897 (April).

Treaty of alliance.

In April, the two republics entered into a treaty for mutual

support and defense against attacks on the independence of
either, each opening its political franchises to the citizens
of the other on the taking of an oath of allegiance.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1897 (April).

Military expenditure by British and Boer Governments.

The budget of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer,

submitted to the House of Commons in April, contained an item
of '£200,000 for increased military expenditure in South
Africa. This was promptly attacked by the opposition, who
accused the government of pursuing a war policy in its
dealings with the Transvaal. Sir William Harcourt declared
that Mr. Chamberlain had, "in every utterance of his during
the last few months, been endeavouring to exasperate sentiment