Exam paper The making of the Modern Middle East 2022-23

Answer QUESTION 1 and TWO others. (Question 1 represents 40% of the total
marks; the other two questions represent 30% each.)

1. Comment on ONE of the following:

a) 6.That in area (A) the Baghdad Railway shall not be extended southwards beyond
Mosul, and in area (B) northwards beyond Samarra, until a railway connecting Baghdad
with Aleppo via the Euphrates Valley has been completed, and then only with the
concurrence of the two Governments. 7.That Great Britain has the right to build,
administer, and be sole owner of a railway connecting Haifa with area (B), and shall
have a perpetual right to always transport troops along such a line. It is to be
understood by both Governments that this railway is to facilitate the connexion of
Baghdad with Haifa by rail, and it is further understood that, if the engineering
difficulties and expense entailed by keeping this connecting line in the brown area only
make the project unfeasible, that the French Government shall be prepared to consider
that the line in question may also traverse the polygon Banias-Keis Marib-Salkhab Tell
Otsda - Mesmie before reaching area (B). 8. For a period of twenty years the existing
Turkish customs tariff shall remain in force throughout the whole of the blue and red
areas, as well as in areas (A) and (B), and no increase in the rates of duty or
conversion from ad valorem to specific rates shall be made except by agreement
between the two Powers. There shall be no interior customs barriers between any of
the above-mentioned areas. The customs duties leviable on goods destined for the
interior shall be collected at the port of entry and handed over to the administration of
the area of destination. 9. It shall be agreed that the French Government will at no time
enter into any negotiations for the cession of their rights and will not cede such rights in
the blue area to any third Power, except the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States
without the previous agreement of His Majesty's Government, who, on their part, will
give a similar undertaking to the French Government regarding the red area.10 The
British and French Governments, as the protectors of the Arab State, shall agree that
they will not themselves acquire and will not consent to a third Power acquiring
territorial possessions in the Arabian peninsula, nor consent to a third Power installing a
naval base either on the east coast, or on the islands, of the Red Sea. This, however,
shall not prevent such adjustment of the Aden frontier as may be necessary in
consequence of recent Turkish aggression.11. The negotiations with the Arabs as to
the boundaries of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States shall be continued
through the same channel as heretofore on behalf of the two Powers.12. It is agreed
that measures to control the importation of arms into the Arab territories will be
considered by the two Governments. I have further the honour to state that, in order to
make the agreement complete, His Majesty's Government are proposing to the
Russian Government to exchange notes analogous to those exchanged by the latter
and your Excellency's Government on the 26th April last. Copies of these notes will be
communicated to your Excellency as soon as exchanged. I would also venture to
remind your Excellency that the conclusion of the present agreement raises, for
practical consideration, the question of the claims of Italy to a share in any partition or
rearrangement of Turkey in Asia, as formulated in article 9 of the agreement of the 26th
of April 1915, between Italy and the Allies. His Majesty's Government further considers
that the Japanese Government should be informed of the arrangement now concluded.
Sykes-Picot Agreement (May 1916)
b) During the past six months, development in Iran indicates a trend toward an
authoritarian, reformist government. Political power has been further consolidated in the
hands of Prime Minister Mosadeq. The power of the Majles has steadily declined, and
Mosadeq has launched a nationwide popular referendum to give him authority to
dissolve the Chamber. The Shah has been reduced to a symbolic representative of the
institution of the Throne and defender of the Muslim Shia faith. Mosadeq’s principal
political opponents among the traditional governing groups have been routed. The
government has gained more effective control of the army which constitutes the most
important single deterrent to the communist. The Tudeh Party has re-emerged after a
period of quiescence as a strengthened contestant from political party. COMMENT:
Prime Minister Mosadeq is presently in complete control of the political situation in Iran.
The referendum regarding the dissolution of the Majles, which commenced in Teheran
on August 3, resulted in a 99.93% vote in favour of dissolution. It will be continued in
the rest of Iran on August 10 and will probably be equally decisive. Mosadeq will
thereafter be able to set the date for elections for a new Majles which, when held, will
probably further consolidate Mosadeq’s power. If for some reason such as death or
normal parliamentary procedure, Mosadeq should be replaced as Prime Minister, it is
more than likely a successor would be selected who would be in sympathy with
Mosadeq’s basic objectives. It is unlikely that a coup d’etat by Mosadeq’s opponents
among the former governing groups or by the Tudeh Party would be attempted
because neither is sufficiently strong or well-organized to attempt a coup. The danger in
Iran at the present time is that Mosadeq, having partially alienated the former governing
groups and many of his own colleagues such as Kashani, may rely to an increasing
extent on the Tudeh Party for political support. During this process, the Tudeh Party will
have greater opportunities to infiltrate the various organs of government and may,
during some future political crisis while Mosadeq is Prime Minister, be in a position to
demand representation in his government. Meanwhile, in any event, Mosadeq’s
toleration of Tudeh activities and acquiescence in Tudeh political support increases the
scope and prestige of the communists in Iran. Memorandum R.1: Proposed course
of Action with respect to Iran (8/10/1953) ( Authority NNV 917 368- By M. Nara
Date 7/7/199)

c) The Jewish Company is partly modeled on the lines of a great land-acquisition

company. It might be called a Jewish Chartered Company, though it cannot exercise
sovereign power, and has other than purely colonial tasks. The Jewish Company will
be founded as a joint stock company subject to English jurisdiction, framed according
to English laws, and under the protection of England. Its principal center will be
London. I cannot tell yet how large the Company's capital should be; I shall leave that
calculation to our numerous financiers. But to avoid ambiguity, I shall put it at a
thousand million marks (about £50,000,000 or $200,000,000); it may be either more or
less than that sum. The form of subscription, which will be further elucidated, will
determine what fraction of the whole amount must be paid in at once. The Jewish
Company is an organization with a transitional character. It is strictly a business
undertaking and must be carefully distinguished from the Society of Jews. The Jewish
Company will first of all convert into cash all vested interests left by departing Jews.
The method adopted will prevent the occurrences of crises, secure every man's
property, and facilitate the immigration of Christian citizens which has already been
indicated. NON-TRANSFERABLE GOODS The non-transferable goods which come
under consideration are buildings, land, and local business connections. The Jewish
Company will at first take upon itself no more than the necessary negotiations for
effecting the sale of these goods. These Jewish sales will take place freely and without
any serious fall in prices. The Company's branch establishments in various towns will
become the central offices for the sale of Jewish estates and will charge only so much
commission on transactions as will ensure their financial stability. The development of
this movement may cause a considerable fall in the prices of landed property and may
eventually make it impossible to find a market for it. At this juncture, the Company will
enter upon another branch of its functions. It will take over the management of
abandoned estates till such time as it can dispose of them to the greatest advantage. It
will collect house rents, let out land on lease, and install business managers -- these,
on account of the required supervision, being, if possible, tenants also. The Company
will endeavor everywhere to facilitate the acquisition of land by its tenants, who are
Christians. It wins, indeed, gradually replacing its own officials in the European
branches with Christian substitutes (lawyers, etc.); and these are not by any means to
become servants of the Jews; they are intended to be free agents to the Christian
population, so that everything may be carried through in equity, fairness and justice,
and without imperiling the internal welfare of the people.
Theodor Herzl, the Jewish State (1896) p.15.

2. How did the modern Middle East state system come about?

3. Why did pan-Arab nationalist ideology gain such influence in the 1950s
and 1960s and what explains its decline?

4. Why did Muhammad Ali agitate for an Egypt independent of direct

Ottoman rule?

5. What are the core issues in the conflict between Israel and the
Palestinians?

6. What were the key patterns in post-colonial political development in the

Middle East region? Discuss with reference to at least ONE Arab state.

7. To what extent was the overthrow of Mosaddeq in 1953 a defeat for the
monarch as well as for democracy in Iran?

8. To what extent can the Tanzimat be thought of as a response to

European Expansionism?

9. To what extent did Egypt’s loss of regional dominance after 1967 leave a
vacuum in the power politics of the Arabic-speaking Middle East?

10. To what extent did Egypt’s

loss of regional dominance
after 1967
leave a vacuum in the power
politics of the Arabic-speaking
Middle East?
To what extent did Egypt’s loss of regional dominance after 1967 leave a vacuum in the
power politics of the Arabic-speaking Middle Ea
PTO

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