Theory of mind and ASD (...

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 Well documented (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Peterson and Siegal,1998).
 However, several studies (e.g. Happé, 1993; Ozonoff et al., 1991) have shown that some individuals with HFA
(i.e. IQ within normal range) or AS are capable of succeeding on these tests.
 Thus, in recent years, more advanced theory of mind measures have been developed to detect more subtle
theory of mind deficits in high-functioning individuals with ASD.

Simplistic first-order (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) false belief tasks

Second-order (Baron-Cohen, 1989) false belief tasks

Happé’s (1994) Strange Stories Task

Kaland et al.’s (2002) Stories from Everyday Life
(require participants to explain story characters’ non-literal utterances)

Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a)

Reading the Mind in the Voice Test (Rutherford et al., 2002)
(examine individuals’ abilities to infer mental states from pictures of people’s eyes, or their voice tone)

 Results from these studies suggest that individuals at the more able end of the autistic spectrum also display
mentalizing difficulties.
 However, many of these advanced measures fail to simulate the demands faced by individuals with ASD in
real social situations. For example, the majority of existing theory of mind tests comprise static stimuli that
are presented in only one modality (e.g. Happé, 1994; Kaland et al., 2002). This eliminates the task of cross-
modal integration of information, which is a characteristic feature of genuine social scenarios. In an attempt
to more closely approximate the challenges faced by individuals with ASD in everyday social situations,

Heavey et al. (2000) devised the Awkward Moments Test

(in which participants viewed a series of television commercials and answered a multiple-choice theory of
mind and memory control question subsequent to each. Results showed that, after IQ discrepancies were
statistically removed, adults with HFA or AS performed more poorly on questions concerning characters’
mental states than did age-and gender-matched controls, although both groups performed equivalently on
the memory control questions)

Although the Awkward Moments Test is arguably one of the most successful to date in approximating the demands
of everyday social functioning, it is characterized by two notable limitations. First, it is yet to be validated as a theory
of mind measure:
Heavey et al. (2000) found a nonsignificant correlation between the performance of participants with HFA/AS on this
test and Happé’s (1994) Strange Stories Task.
Second, it is plausible that the poor performance of the individuals with HFA/AS on the mental state questions
reflected generalized difficulties in integrating the information contained in the commercials as opposed to specific
theory of mind deficits. Thus, there is a need to further develop and examine this measure. Notable advantages of
the afore-mentioned theory of mind tests are the speed, objectivity and accuracy with which they can be scored.
However, to achieve these objectives, the tests are presented as explicit problemsolving tasks that fail to reflect the
unstructured nature of true social situations. To address this issue, researchers have developed more open-ended
measures of mental state understanding.These include examining the spontaneous speech and narrative
productions of individuals with ASD. Several investigators (e.g. Capps et al., 1998; 2000) have demonstrated that
children with autism are as likely to use mental state terms in spontaneous speech as control participants matched
on age and language ability. However, Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (1995) found children with autism to be deficient
in providing appropriate mental state explanations for story events in comparison to controls, and Losh and Capps
(2003) demonstrated that high-functioning children with autism or AS provided fewer explanations for characters’
internal states relative to typically developing children. These results suggest that although individuals with ASD may
be aware that people have thoughts and feelings, their understanding of these phenomena is restricted. However, to
date, researchers have predominantly focused on the narrative productions of children with ASD, as opposed to
adults. Thus, there is a need to examine the mentalizing abilities of adults with ASD using open-ended tasks such as
story telling, as these more closely approximate the unstructured nature of real-life social scenarios.

Prejuízo social com extremo egocentrismo, que pode incluir:

 Incapacidade e falta de desejo de interagir com os pares
 Pobre apreciação de pistas sociais e não-verbais (como linguagem corporal)
 Respostas social e emocionalmente inadequadas
Interesses e preocupações limitados, incluindo:
 Mais rotina do que significado
 Relativamente exclusivo de outros interesses
 Aderência repetitiva
 Pode estar preocupado com um determinado assunto de interesse (por exemplo, mapas, trens, cobras)
Rotinas ou rituais repetitivos. Prefira a mesmice (rotinas e estrutura); e tem dificuldades com transições e mudanças.
Peculiaridades de fala e linguagem, como:
 Desenvolvimento inicial atrasado possível, mas nem sempre visto – Linguagem expressiva superficialmente
perfeita
 Prosódia estranha, características de voz peculiares
 Compreensão prejudicada, incluindo má interpretação de significados literais e implícitos.
Problemas de comunicação não verbal, como:
 Uso limitado de gestos
 Linguagem corporal desajeitada
 Expressão facial limitada ou inadequada
 Olhar “rígido” peculiar
 Dificuldade em ajustar a proximidade física
Desajeitamento motor
 pode não ser parte necessária da imagem em todos os casos
Muitas vezes muito sensível ao som, luz, sabor, cheiro.