Intelligence and National Forces

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The ‘usual source’: Signals

intelligence and planning
for the eighth army
‘Crusader’ offensive, 1941
a
John Ferris
a
Department of History , University of
Calgary , Canada
Published online: 02 Jan 2008.
To cite this article: John Ferris (1999) The ‘usual source’: Signals intelligence
and planning for the eighth army ‘Crusader’ offensive, 1941, Intelligence and
National Security, 14:1, 84-118, DOI: 10.1080/02684529908432525
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529908432525
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The 'Usual Source': Signals Intelligence and
Planning for the Eighth Army 'Crusader'
Offensive, 1941
JOHN FERRIS
On 17 November 1941, 180,000 Commonwealth soldiers attacked Axis

forces in the eastern province of Libya, Cyrenaica. Operation 'Crusader'
began with surprise and turned to disaster and then to a near run victory.
Intelligence produced before these events shaped them, but this influence is
misunderstood, because the literature focuses on just part of the topic - on
how intelligence was collected and interpreted and used in London.
'Crusader' was an Eighth Army operation planned by authorities in Cairo,
but this literature, focused on Bletchley Park and Winston Churchill, does
not explain how intelligence affected this process. It also overlooks ample
evidence on the topic. Older accounts written without full knowledge of
Ultra are, despite this handicap, in some ways better.1 This study will fill
that lacuna by examining how intelligence, especially signals intelligence
(Sigint), affected the strategy of Army authorities in Cairo during 1941, and
their planning for 'Crusader'. It will demonstrate that intelligence was
fundamental to these matters. This essay will also explain how good
intelligence produced bad planning and address the limits to the classical
value of Sigint.
The Army's intelligence system in the Middle East during 1939-41 is
often viewed as a failure, and because its organization differed from that in
Britain. This view is mistaken in some ways, oversimplified in others. Local
Army leaders, especially General Sir Archibald Wavell, the Commander-in-
Chief, disagreed with Whitehall about the organization of intelligence. As a
staff officer during 1917, Wavell had witnessed General Allenby's use of
irregular warfare, signals intelligence and deception, and often referred to
them in later years.2 In 1939 he wished to model his intelligence services on
that organization.3 This system was never allowed to work as he intended,
which complicates any judgement about its performance, but simply
because it differed from models in Britain does not mean that it was poor.
SIGINT AND PLANNING FOR 'CRUSADER' 85
On the contrary, Army authorities in Cairo were unusually interested in

intelligence. That, Wavell held, 'we neglect completely during peace, but
are, I think, rather good at when we get into our stride in war. But it takes
us a long time to make up for the neglect in peace.'4 They pursued their
needs by creating interservice agencies, efforts, they believed, which
Whitehall was sabotaging.5 They also advocated a sophisticated mixture of
intelligence, deception and manoeuvre warfare.
Wavell moved quickly towards Allenby's stride, developing irregular
warfare and a grander version of the 'haversack ruse'. He established 'A'
Force and wrote its first order, aimed to make Italians regard preparations for
a real attack on Ethiopia as cover for one on Somaliland. 'The advantage of it

seems to me to be that the greater part of it is true, the enemy will see for
himself that the greater part of it is actually being done. What we want is for
him to place the wrong interpretation on what he sees.' This remarkable order
emphasised standard Great War tactics, exemplified in the classic
Meinertzhagen memorandum (wireless deception, documents 'lost' to the
enemy, the spreading of rumours among one's own troops), but also the use
of controlled agents. It pointed the way from haversacks to 'Fortitude'.6
Lt-General Alan Cunningham, commander of Eighth Army between
August and November 1941, also knew the intelligence-deception lessons
of 1917-18. He held up planning for his Ethiopian offensive until his staff
assessed a mass of captured documents. He believed that he won it partly
through intelligence, deception and security and derived lessons on those
topics which he applied to 'Crusader'.7 WavelFs successor, General Sir
Claude Auchinleck , ranked 'strictest secrecy', surprise, deception and
security as central to 'Crusader' .8
Between 1939 and 1941, Army signals intelligence (Sigint) in the
Middle East reflected this context of small resources, disputes between
Cairo and London, and the influence of models from 1918. It rested on a
marriage between the Great War and the Government Code and Cypher
School (GC& CS) models, and the union bore fruit. Failures there were, but
often just from lack of resources, and the successes were significant.
Compared to the Bletchley Park model, high-level Army codebreaking was
linked less well to those of the RAF and RN, but better to its own 'Y'
Service. It had an organic intelligence section to 'prepare the Intelligence to
be given to the General Staff. This section was 'the key position in this
arrangement: this senior officer must know the country and receive all the
information and orders available to the General Staff itself'.9 This approach
suited the Army's command system in the theatre, where staffs were small
and intelligence officers worked through close relationships with generals.
It placed signals intelligence in context and in decisions as well as the
Bletchley model.
86 ALLIED AND AXIS SIGINT IN WORLD WAR II
Until late 1940, intelligence in London offered little to Cairo, save

advice. In February 1940 the 'Y' Committee recommended that a 'central
cryptographic bureau in CAIRO' be organised on the Bletchley basis. The
services intelligence personnel in Cairo rejected this proposal, and
countered by requesting greater influence over the interception schedules of
local signals intelligence units.10 They generated virtually all of their own
signals intelligence and wanted local resources to meet local needs, not
surprisingly, in 1939-40 these resources were desperately small. RAF
signals intelligence in Egypt had only two or three translators, and air
authorities warned that the system must 'inevitably collapse'." Army 'Y'
consisted of No.2 Special Wireless Company, the radio intelligence unit of

the interwar years, augmented by reinforcements from India. Its 80 men
were organized in four 'mobile sections', so-called because each had a
motorcycle and three radio receivers. They were expected to meet signals
intelligence needs on three continents against three powers, Germany, the
USSR and Italy, with fewer men than a corps in the field theoretically
needed to cover a front of 20 miles.
Despite its weakness, No.2 Special Wireless Company met the needs of
the first campaigns against Italy, giving Cairo some central strength and
dispatching 'mobile sections' to Cyrenaica and Khartoum, but by March
1941 it could not meet all its responsibilities.12 This had serious
consequences during Rommel's first offensive. Though intelligence
authorities recognized that 'the forward section covering Libya may have to
be strengthened and organized to deal with Italian and German', they lacked
the means to do so. All newly-formed signals intelligence units were posted
to Greece. Only one 'mobile section' covered Libya, intermittently assisted
by another two in Cairo which had three other responsibilities.13 With too
few bodies to scan all the frequencies in use, they missed the first wireless
indications of Rommel's offensive - the initial warning came from
Australian Sigint personnel turning their dials in Greece.14
The situation improved slowly from the summer of 1940, when, aided
by a few reinforcements from Bletchley, including the head of its Italian
military section, a joint Army and RAF centre for cryptanalysis and
interpretation was established at the Museum of Flora and Fauna in
Heliopolis. By March-April 1941, 27 Army officers and 52 other ranks and
18 RAF officers and 198 enlisted men worked there in interception and
cryptanalysis.15 This arrangement favoured the Army, providing easy access
to material from air sources, at a time when Bletchley was more successful
against the Luftwaffe than the German Army. Bletchley also trained
Heliopolis against the tactical cryptographic systems of the German Army
and began to send Ultra to the theatre, initially distributed through a slow
and clumsy system, replaced by Special Liasion Units in July. Further
reinforcements came from Britain and Australia. By December 1941,

Middle East 'Y' had created an empire. Its four centres ran 64 eight hour
watches, about 10 focused on Axis messages in Libya, and 25 on German
and Italian traffic between Libya and Italy.16
All this was a blessing, but not without cost. Just as Germany joined
Italy in Libya, British Sigint was radically reorganized. Commanders and
some intelligence officers already were experienced with its use, but new
collectors had to be trained and procedures proven. Army and RAF Sigint
had to be co-ordinated, as did two distinct cryptanalytic problems:
Bletchley's attacks on Axis cipher machines, and Heliopolis's work against
Italian codebooks and German tactical systems. For the Army, much
material became available but with major gaps. Bletchley had mastered the
systems of the Luftwaffe, which cast a useful if uncertain light on General
Erwin Rommel, but not of the German Army (excepting a few flashes of
insight in autumn 1941). Heliopolis rectified some of this problem through
traffic analysis, solution of low-grade German Army traffic, and command
of virtually all Italian army and air force codes used in Libya, all of which
were more useful than the Bletchley focused literature indicates.17 Sigint
directly illuminated everything about the enemy except the main things -
Rommel's intentions and the Afrika Korps' capabilities.
Fundamental to Army intelligence in the Middle East during 1941 was
the head of General Staff Intelligence (GSI) at GHQ Middle East. Brigadier
Eric John Shearer had many excellent characteristics for an intelligence
officer and some poor ones. Shearer, an energetic, able, creative and
confident man - too confident - with a powerful if overly schematic mind,
made intelligence matter to his masters. Wavell trusted him, Auchlinleck
even more so. As Shearer's replacement noted, Auchinleck 'was rather in
favour of the "Brains Trust" principle, and would like to gather around him
various members of his staff and argue out the merits or otherwise of a
certain plan'.18 Shearer became influential in this circle. By August 1941
Auchinleck accepted Shearer's assessments and sent him to London to sell
his strategy to Whitehall and Churchill. Shearer did so with effect. Before
'Crusader', referring specifically to Shearer, Auchinleck held that
intelligence officers were trained to develop their 'powers of analysis and
deduction to a considerable degree', and thus were particularly useful for
planning operations. When Auchinleck went to Eighth Army during the
crisis of 'Crusader', he immediately called Shearer to the front 'to act
"Rommel" for us'.19
Against this, by January 1942 the War Office viewed Shearer as a
failure, while front line commanders blamed him for their defeats. Some of
these complaints were justified, others not. Shearer's assessments of enemy
intentions and capabilities in the Mediterranean theatre were flawed, but no
worse than those of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and sometimes
better. Though he often misunderstood Rommel's logic, he developed a
knack for predicting, sometimes for the wrong reasons, what the enemy
would do next. Rommel's first offensive surprised Shearer. A staff officer
captured in April 1941 correctly complained that GSI's assessments were
'a fortnight, and in some cases a month behind'.20 Less accurately, Major-
General Michael 'Dicky' O'Moore Creagh, commander of Western Desert
Force (WDF) during the 'Battleaxe' operation (14-17 June 1941), claimed
that Shearer misled him and led Wavell to believe that 7th Armoured
Division 'was not doing what it might'.21 According to Creagh, before the
battle Shearer stated that 70 Panzers were near Sollum. 'I, who deal in units
as opposed to tanks 'by numbers", asked if this meant a battalion and 'he
replied 'yes" - but two tank regiments were forward when the battle
began'.
Creagh's criticisms were misguided. Before the battle Shearer did report
that only 70 odd tanks were on the frontier, which was also literally accurate
at that moment; he also reported that two regiments might intervene in the
battle, many of their tanks were far away before it began and they
intervened primarily because poor signals security by Creagh's forces
betrayed the attack. Shearer was innocent as charged, but the reputation
stuck - several months later Wavell's Australian Deputy Commander-in-
Chief, Lt-General Thomas Blarney, publically blamed GSI for the failure of
"Battleaxe".22 Still, Shearer's record was imperfect: "Battleaxe" failed,
Wavell agreed, because 'enemy disclosed much greater tank strength in
forward area than we had expected' and 'was obviously ready for our attack
and had prepared counter-attack'.23 The Prime Minister's Office (PMO)
soon knew that GSI had been criticized 'from time to time' and asked
whether its personnel should be changed.24
Cunningham read Creagh's criticism, but his attitude toward Shearer
before 'Crusader' is unclear. He accepted Shearer's assessments of enemy
strength, but he may have mistrusted GSI's views on other issues, and
friction certainly remained. When Shearer criticized him for letting some
units break wireless silence, endangering security and deception,
Cunningham sharply and rightly retorted that this was essential for training.
Auchinleck's chief of staff apologised: 'I sense that you feel that the I
branch here are apt to go beyond the range of their intelligence function',
which incidentally shows GSI's significance when 'Crusader' was
planned.25 In the first days of that battle, confusing and optimistic reports
flowed from lower levels. Cunningham reported inflated German losses, so
did Shearer, and so both fell. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff,
General Sir Alan Brooke, warned Auchinleck in February 1942
' to impress on Shearer that highly coloured optimistic reports which

are not borne out by subsequent facts have been too frequent lately.
There has been a continual tendency to over-estimate the destruction
of the enemy's armoured forces and to convey a picture of completely
surrounded hostile forces. These reports are apt to create a spirit of
unwarranted optimism amongst politicians, which is followed by one
of doubt as to the veracity of our statements.26
Some 18 months later Cunningham criticized Shearer's 'most optimistic'
and 'highly exaggerated' reports, and noted, 'Shearer has now been proved
as what I always knew he was, a wishful thinker. All his intelligence,

sometimes from the most doubtful sources, e.g. Rommel's chauffeur was
interpreted as to how he would like it to appear. This can be confirmed by
several commanders on the scene in the Western Desert before I was.' This
criticism was wrong. Shearer's assessments before 'Crusader' were good
and some of Cunningham's posterior claims were not. In particular, he held
that Shearer had misled forces on a key issue, indicating that Germans tanks
only had 37mm guns when Pzkw Mk Ills had 50mm guns and Pzkw Mk IVs
carried 75mm cannon. In fact, Shearer provided accurate information on
these points and others.27
However, the operational disaster of 21 January-4 February 1942 did
stem from failures by Shearer. This, combined with past mistakes and
rumours of them, doomed him, as did the need for scapegoats. Thus, the
PMO's file on Shearer begins with an anonymous denunciation of GHQ
Middle East, which Churchill and his secretariat took seriously.28 Brooke
blamed these disasters on 'bad' generalship and intelligence - Auchinleck
'has been overconfident and has believed everything his overoptimistic
Shearer has told him'.29 After meeting Cunningham on his return to London,
Brooke pressed Auchinleck to sack Shearer: 'all quarters' believed that 'it
is in [Shearer's] nature to always under-estimate his opponent's strength, a
dangerous failing'. Auchinleck countered that Shearer was a 'first class'
organizer with outstanding 'originality, energy and drive', an officer whose
'estimates of the enemy strength and intentions [were] consistently good
and with a high degree of accuracy'.
However, Cunningham's replacement, Major-General Neil Ritchie,
Commander of Eighth Army from 25 November 1941, and some formation
commanders held different views. They blamed their recent defeats on
Shearer. Ritchie had 'not the least doubt that people's confidence in John
has been shaken.. .1 have on occasions felt that John was far more concerned
with trying to prove his information correct than in what in fact is the real
effect of the information on operations in general.' With regret, Auchinleck
sacked Shearer in February 1942 because 'he had lost the confidence of the
Army, and especially of certain formation commanders in the Eighth Army.

This is due largely to his lack of psychological sense, and because he finds
it most difficult to admit that he can be wrong' - serious criticisms from a
friendly source.30
Between 'Battleaxe' and 'Crusader', there were doubts about Shearer,
but confidence remained. He dominated assessment and influenced his
superiors and he was competent — his successor made worse errors despite
having better sources. It was not Shearer's personal failings or the
bureaucratic position of GSI within GHQ Middle East that created
intelligence failures in Libya, but more systematic problems - an initial lack
of resources, followed by massive expansion and the need to train personnel

and develop systems while fighting a dangerous foe..
Until mid-1941 GSI, as GHQ's intelligence branch, focused on the
issues which most concerned the C-in-C at any moment. Generally these
were strategic matters. Field commanders, assisted by a handful of
specialists, were left to organize their own intelligence, in return often
receiving control over much of GSI's resources. This approach had mixed
results, working well in Ethiopia but reaching absurdity in Crete. Following
Rommel's landing in February 1941, GSI came to dominate operational
intelligence in Libya. Its initial performance was poor, partly because its
attention was focused on strategic issues in the Balkans. Though GSI traced
the German build-up in Libya and warned that Rommel might attack, still
that action caught it by surprise, being, Wavell noted, 'launched at least
fortnight before we had calculated on a time and space basis it was possible
but in approximately the strength we had expected'.31
The quality of intelligence rose in April and May, as Ultra provided
excellent material about the siege of Tobruk and enemy supplies and
reinforcements, while Shearer began to assess Rommel's intentions and
capabilities with skill.32 When Wavell ordered WDF 'to drive the enemy out
of EGYPT, and eventually back beyond TOBRUK', intelligence was vague
but influential. Enemy forces on the front 'are little stronger at present than
those which we have available'. Another Panzer Division 'may reach the
forward area before we have a comparative force available', but it would
have 'considerable AFV [Armoured Fighting Vehicle] casualties from the
long distances covered' while British reinforcements should also have
arrived by that time. Hence, 'there is no reason why we should accept that
the enemy will be in greatly superior strength at any time'. British forces
could not face a long drive, 'but I wish him met as far forward and as soon
as is possible without exposing ourselves to defeat in detail of our armoured
force'. Though Churchill, impressed by Ultra on Rommel's weakness,
demanded the annihilation of the enemy in Cyrenaica, Wavell pursued a
limited action to push the Germans back across the escarpment (the coastal
plateau of Cyrenaica).33 Operation 'Brevity', on 15 May, aimed to seize the

two main east-west passages onto the escarpment before 15th Panzer
Division reached the front. It failed largely, Shearer admitted, because GSI
missed the fact that this formation had already arrived.34
Over the next six weeks, up to the WDF's second offensive, 'Battleaxe',
GSI became efficient at operational intelligence. Its material also affected
decisions. GSI developed a good picture of enemy deployments, but warned
that 'it would be unwise to count on its dispositions remaining the same
from one day to the next'. GSI's picture of enemy strength was less good. It
held that the Afrika Korps had 255 tanks (the actual strength was 190) and
probably would have 775 tanks by August, with up to eight mechanized and
armoured divisions in the theatre by 1 September. In particular, by 29 May
GSI expected another German armoured regiment with 162 tanks to reach
Cyrenaica by 15 June. Until that time, Rommel would adopt 'an opportunist
offensive-defensive attitude' but then he might undertake major operations.
This reading of intentions was accurate, but not of capabilities - no such
reinforcements were on the way. That serious mistake probably occurred
because Shearer interpreted information that some new tanks had reached
Tripoli to mean that the enemy was sending a regiment to bring 5th Light
Division or 15th Panzer Division to what the British thought was its true
establishment. In any case, Wavell accepted Shearer's view that 'enemy
reinforcements in tanks not likely before 15 June'.35 Hence 'Battleaxe'
which aimed to exploit a perceived superiority in strength before enemy
reinforcements turned the tables, in order to seize the two main passes onto
the escarpment. GSI's error, however, was of minor significance. Wavell
launched 'Battleaxe' only because of irresistible pressure from Churchill.
Plans faithfully reflected GSI's tactical assessment, which proved good in
quality. After planning began, GSI realized that no more enemy armour was
on the way, while imagery on enemy defences overcame the only major
error in GSI's tactical appreciation. It worked well enough; but the British
lost badly.36
Between March to June 1941, GSI's performance in operational
intelligence was mediocre, and Sigint was a source of limited value. After
'Battleaxe', Cyrenaica became GSI's first priority and it focused as much on
operational as strategic intelligence. GSI played a fundamental role in
planning for 'Crusader', while Sigint - soon nicknamed the 'usual source'
and later the 'best source' - rose steadily in power and quality. It became
central to GSI's assessments and to the operations of the British Army for
the first time since 1918.
Shearer's basic task was to monitor the Axis order of battle. This was not
easy in Libya, where small forces roamed large areas. Simply because a
company was in one area indicated nothing about the location of battalions,
let alone divisions. On 19 May 1941, for example, Shearer mistakenly

thought 6th or 7th Bersaglieri (Italian Rifle) Regiments were near the
frontier, simply because some of their platoons were.37 The scale of this
problem was doubled because Axis formations did not follow their tables of
establishment - thus, to reconstruct a division required specific information
on all of its units38 - and redoubled because main Axis and British forces
rarely contacted each other. Between 19 June and 11 August, British forces
encountered elements of 5th Light Division only three times, and then not
at all for several weeks more, leading GSI to conclude that it might have left
the theatre.39
Several technical problems hampered assessment of enemy armoured

strength. Between February and November 1941, about 350 German and
150 Italian tanks entered Libya at irregular intervals, while in September
Pzkw Mk Is, 25 per cent of the Afrika Korp's initial strength, came off
establishment, though remaining in the theatre. Mechanical problems
always produced a sizeable but variable discrepancy between
establishments and actual 'runners'. Authorities differ over GSFs
performance in solving these problems: the Official History of British
Intelligence indicates that it was good while Ralph Bennett argues that
'British intelligence consistently overestimated [Rommel]'s tank strength'.
Both comments are right in part, neither in whole.40 GSI's success in
determining enemy armour was paradoxical: excellent by numbers, poor
about organization.
Before 'Battleaxe', GSI overestimated German armoured strength by 34
per cent (65 tanks). Then, an error improved accuracy. British forces
thought they had destroyed 90 tanks at 'Battleaxe', not surprisingly - they
had disabled about 70 Panzers. About 70 per cent of them were repaired -
'runners' rose from 115 on 20 June to 169 ten days later.41 Shearer, however,
concluded that the Afrika Korps had lost 90 tanks but repaired 40 of them,
overestimating losses by 100 per cent, and that it had 200 tanks left against
170 in reality. This error halved GSI's overestimate of German tank
strength.42
Between 20 and 28 July, GSI moved to perfection about enemy tank
strength. Captured but outdated German establishment tables from January
1941 led Shearer to believe that the Afrika Korps' armoured regiments
should each have 150 tanks. Despite the temptation to overestimate enemy
strength, Shearer reduced these estimates. He concluded that the Afrika
Korps had only 180 tanks. In fact, it had 178. From this excellent base,
Shearer's estimates fluctuated in accuracy between August and November.
Most notably, in September, the Afrika Korps took Pzkw Mk Is off
establishment. GSI did not accept this change as definite for several weeks,
during which it overestimated German strength by 55 tanks, including 43
Mk Is. Otherwise, GSI's assessments were rarely 10 per cent wrong and
usually better. It also accurately distinguished obsolete Pzkw Mk Is or
obsolescent Pzkw Mk Us from their deadlier brethren. Shearer determined
these figures through an elaborate process of cross checking. Sigint was
useful in this process, but no more so than imagery or captured documents,
which twice precisely defined the establishment of both 15th and 21st
Panzer Divisions.43 Shearer had a good grip on enemy strength before Ultra
entered the fray. However, by September this grip slipped and GSI drifted
toward overestimate of enemy tank strength. Material from a 'sure source'
in October and from Ultra in November stopped this drift. Together, these
sources provided enough hard data to define Axis tanks by numbers at a

time when, as 21 January 1942 proved, to lose track of just 68 tanks could
be costly.
Determining strength by establishments posed greater problems, doubly
significant since Shearer treated them as a key to enemy reinforcements.
These establishments changed in 1940—41 and did not become stable until
1942. Those in Libya and Russia (on which Britain had good intelligence)
differed widely, as did formal and actual strengths. In theory, on 18
November 1941, 15th and 21st Panzer Division each should have had one
armoured regiment, of two battalions, each of two light and one heavy
companies, or 60 Pzkw Mk Us, 68 Pzkw Mk Ills and 56 Pzkw Mk IVs, for
a total of 184 tanks on establishment. In reality, they had 255 Mk II-Mk IV
tanks: 40 per cent above armoured strength, but with just half the normal
infantry complement.44 Even more, each tank battalion was intended to
receive a third light company, which did not arrive until mid-December
(providing the forces which surprised Eighth Army on 21 January 1942).
Until October 1941, 21st Panzer was not even formally termed a Panzer
Division but 5th Light Division, which caused Shearer to spill much ink, as
did its initial designation of 'Colonial Division'.
In early 1941 the Military Intelligence Division (MID) held that each
Panzer division had one tank brigade, each with two regiments of two
battalions of 'approximately 100 tanks' - or 400 tanks, twice the true
strength (though close to British armoured establishments). In September
1941, it concluded that each Panzer division had one armoured regiment of
three battalions with 201 tanks,45 still grossly wrong though improving.
Shearer followed these views, distorting the strength of every German
armoured unit. In 1941, when he or the MID predicted that Germany could
deploy any number of Panzer divisions to Libya, they often referred to
forces with 200 to 400 per cent more tanks than they actually had; and
Auchinleck and Wavell relied on these inflated figures when guessing at
enemy strength in the near future. On 12 November 1941 the Afrika Korps
had 264 tanks: in May 1941 Shearer and the MID would have expected two
armoured divisions to have 800 tanks, or 1,120 had they known it to be 40

per cent over strength.46
These and other assumptions crippled Shearer's efforts to assess Axis
strength. In May 1941,5th Light Division and 15th Panzer Division had one
armoured regiment, but at their supposed establishment should have had
two. Shearer was uncertain whether any new tanks entering Libya would
bring an existing division to its 'establishment' or create another
understrength one. His predictions of reinforcements assumed that Germans
must wish to bring divisions to their 'establishment' as soon as possible, and
that a German 'Colonial Division' must have a composition something like
what he thought a British one with that name would have. When added to
these errors, even accurate information provoked confusion. Confronting
data not easily correlated with British ideas of German establishments,
Shearer sometimes thought that every Panzer Division would have two
armoured regiments each of 150 tanks, or one of 300.47 His concern with
establishments sometimes seems to have been almost a hobby, but still it
reflected uncertainty about enemy reinforcements. This, and concern about
a German thrust into Turkey, fed Auchinleck's concern with enemy
capabilities in the summer of 1941 and hence his caution.
By September-October, the planning phase for 'Crusader', all of this
uncertainty vanished. Shearer understood that Mk Is were no longer rated as
combat worthy, though about 40 of them remained in the theatre, that 15th
and 21st Panzer Divisions each had one armoured regiment of two
battalions and 120 to 130 tanks, and together had received 100 armoured
reinforcements since landing.48 Sigint was central to this precision and
certainty. In late October 'a sure source' defined German tank strength on
31 August and that of 15th Panzer Division on 21 September. On 31 August,
15th and 21st Panzer Divisions had 222 serviceable Pzkw Mk II-Mk IV
tanks. Shearer recalibrated enemy armoured strength: he compared old
assessments with new material to determine the number of reinforcements
which must have arrived, compared to those known to have done so. This
produced a remarkably accurate assessment of German tank strength on 23
October (234, excluding Mk Is and captured Matildas; against a real
establishment of 241) and strengthened the base for cross checking. This
calculation, unlike others, went to Cunningham.49 'The full text of the
message from usual source' also ended the uncertainty about enemy
armoured establishments. It showed that 5th and 8th Panzer Regiment had
a unique war establishment: each was intended to have three battalions, but
presently had only two. They had no tank reserves but did have more crew
than vehicles. Meanwhile the Italian Ariete Armoured Division had 138
M.13s (the real strength was 146).50 When 'Crusader' began, GSI was 99
per cent accurate about enemy tank strength in the theatre.
In broader terms, between 'Battleaxe' and 'Crusader', Shearer traced the

location and strength of most enemy formations with accuracy but made
astonishing errors about replacements and reinforcements. On 24 June he
defined Axis strength as 15th Panzer and 5th Light (a weak armoured
division), five Italian infantry divisions (each 'at best' equalling tv/o British
brigade groups, with far less mobility and firepower), the mechanized
infantry division Trento ('about the equivalent of two motorized brigade
groups') and the armoured division Ariete. Prisoners and '"M" source' ('a
most secret and reliable source', that is, Heliopolis's solutions of Italian
traffic and low-level German codes) indicated that armoured division
Littorio was moving to Libya; analysis of shipping schedules shov/ed that it

could already have landed, though wireless and prisoners did not confirm its
presence. This would increase the enemy's strength in M.13 tanks but not in
armoured formations, since Littorio and Ariete would probably be merged
into one division.51 These assessments were accurate, though Littorio
remained in Italy, with two of its tank battalions fed to Ariete. Then
uncertainty entered the picture. Shearer expected another Panzer division
(or 300 tanks) to be the next Axis reinforcement. Where he had earlier
predicted that such a force could be ready for operations in Cyrenaica by 15
August, he pushed that date back. Given experience with German troop
movements and Axis shipping, a full division could not be at the frontier
until 26 September. Yet its units would advance as soon as they arrived. A
tank regiment might be at the front by 16 July and 'a very formidable
fighting unit by mid-August'.
On 7 July Shearer offered a similar assessment, with amendments:
Ariete would eat Littorio rather than being eaten itself, while prisoners and
Ultra indicated that another German infantry unit might have arrived. He
expected the dispatch of 8,000 riflemen to bring Italian infantry divisions to
strength while two German infantry regiments and other replacements
would take 15th Panzer to establishment and make 5th Light a full-strength
Panzer division. The most likely German reinforcement would be another
tank regiment for 15th Panzer (150 tanks): since nothing suggested its
arrival, no such regiment could be in the forward area before 1 September,
most likely not until 1 October.52 These predictions were mixed in quality.
They were roughly right about Italian reinforcements but mixed on the
central points. Germany did not send any armoured units to Libya, but soon
wished to ship four companies with 68 tanks. It did transport roughly the
strength in infantry he expected, but Rommel used them in August to form
an understrength infantry division, z.b. V. Afrika [designated 90th Light
Division from March 1942], rather than to flesh out existing formations.
Again, Shearer's predictions of enemy reinforcements by number were
good while those about formations were not.
From late July, Shearer took a crucial analytical step. For the first time
since April 1941, he ceased to believe that Germany would ship another
armoured formation to Libya within any three month period, which in turn
made an early British offensive more feasible. His instincts were excellent
- Rommel continually demanded major reinforcements, and in mid-July
Adolf Hitler briefly wished to ship four more Panzer divisions to Libya; but
developments in the USSR ended this prospect, precisely when Shearer
concluded that it was impossible. He noted that no information indicated
substantial German replacements or reinforcements, while some showed
that Germans were leaving the frontier and perhaps the theatre. Sigint
indicated that Italians were taking over defence of the frontier, backed by
German supporting arms. 'Y' 'have come to the guarded conclusion' that
German wireless stations had fallen back, while 'Italian operators may be
replacing German and trying to camouflage themselves as German.' 'M'
mentioned that German divisions would leave, or 5th Light Division might
be relieved; a German prisoner stated that 5th Light was in the rear while a
'21 Division' had arrived, which Shearer thought might be replacing either
the 15th or 5th Divisions. Still, 'there is good reason to believe that this
particular prisoner is either lying or even endeavouring to plant false
information'. Shearer refused to draw any conclusion other than 'German
evacuation of LIBYA is improbable but relief of personnel logical.'53
Soon he concluded that a formation had been relieved. His information
came entirely from prisoners with three exceptions - traffic analysis showed
that German wireless operators had left the frontier, 'M' indicated that 5th
Light Division might be relieved, while imagery showed large and
unexplained convoys reaching Tripoli and great movements of motorized
transport in the rear. Two prisoners claimed that 21st Panzer Division was
in Libya. This seemed probable and consistent with the imagery, but
photographs also indicated that Germany could not have shipped another
armoured division to Libya - 50 tanks, perhaps, but not the 200 Shearer
believed were in a Panzer division; and such a deployment seemed unlikely
since 'German strategy preaches "one front one time'". Meanwhile, nothing
positive had been heard of 5th Light since 'Battleaxe'. Hence, Shearer
concluded, over the past six weeks the personnel of one Panzer division had
reached Libya from Italy and that of another had left Tripoli for Naples
without either movement being detected. Fifth Light's personnel had
withdrawn, leaving their equipment behind, replaced by 21st Panzer
Division with 50 new tanks.54 In fact, 5th Light Division had simply been
renamed, and reinforced in minor ways. Ultra was of no help on this issue:
it proved 21st Panzer Division's presence in Libya without explaining 5th
Light Division's fate. This problem was only solved when prisoners from
21st Panzer Division were taken on 14/15 September.55
This error is revealing but in the long run it was insignificant. GSI
always knew the number of German divisions in the theatre and their
numerical strength and what reinforcements actually had arrived. From
September, Ultra provided good information on reinforcements, the
formation of Division z.b.V. Afrika and the location of Panzer divisions, and
reduced uncertainty. Thus, when Ultra first detected the existence of Panzer
Gruppe Afrika, GSI did not (as it might have done three months before)
think that it indicated imminent and major German reinforcements, but
simply that it provided a command structure for all Axis mechanized
forces.56
Meanwhile, Heliopolis offered excellent material on Italian dispositions.

Though the records are fragmentary. Shearer's assessments frequently refer
to 'M' source while in GSI's 'Weekly Reviews of the Military Situation',
the marginal notation 'Y' sometimes indicates the source for a statement,
and sections labelled 'information sidelined in the margin is NOT to be
reproduced' often refer to Sigint, for example, to 'a general relief of German
W/T operators...between 21 and 28 July', or to a relationship between
increased enemy wireless traffic and Italian redeployments.57 These
references contain a mass of detail about the dispositions, deployments,
intentions and command of Italian formations on and far behind the front
and offered powerful indications about those of the Afrika Korps.-
Heliopolis and other sources traced the deployment to Cyrenaica of two
Italian infantry divisions from Tripolitania and of a mechanized division,
Trieste, from Italy. Before 'Crusader', traffic analysis and a captured letter
showed that Ariete and Trieste had formed a Mobile Corps, which GSI
accurately predicted would work with the Afrika Korps, and traced their
movements toward the intended British axis of attack.58 On 18 November
GSI's assessments of the location and command of Axis forces were wrong
in only one respect, in believing Trento was also in the Mobile Corps.
Together, 'Y' and Ultra were Britain's main source of intelligence on
enemy divisional deployments and locations, and their value increased
steadily. For much of the summer of 1941, uncertainty reigned over enemy
establishments and strength. GSI lost track of 5th Light and the armour of
15th Panzer Division, and its predictions of likely enemy reinforcements were
alarmist and inaccurate, at a time when GHQ was sensitive to that issue. By
August-September, however, GSI understood enemy command and the
disposition of every enemy division in the field, tracing movements within a
few days after they were made. It regularly and accurately informed its
consumers of the location and strength in men, and every category of weapon
of all Italian and German formations.59 Its grip on the enemy reinforcement
schedule was much better, and it provided precise and accurate information
precisely when this was required for planning an offensive.
Numbers and locations were only part of the matter - logistics were the
heart of Shearer's assessments of enemy capabilities. His recurrent cry was
'BENGHAZI is the key to the maintenance problem of enemy forces in
CYRENAICA' - hammer that port, and the Axis could not operate in eastern
Libya.60 The assessment of logistics involved schematic analyses of hard
intelligence about enemy strength, supply requirements and capacity,
combined with crude guesses. Thus, in May 1941, relying on captured
Italian documents, recent British experiences and some 'guesswork, based
on the needs of a British Armoured Division', the MID held that a Panzer
division needed 234 tons of supplies per day for maintenance. This was
distorted, largely because the MID exaggerated the strength of Panzer

divisions by 400 per cent.61 Again, in February 1942, from captured
documents and prisoners' statements, Shearer estimated the Afrika Korps'
supply requirements at 70 tons in a static role and 135 during operations,
those of the Italian Mobile Corps 'at the exact strength derived from "Y"
sources' at 50 and 120 tons, while (according to the War Office) German
and Italian air forces in Libya needed 200 tons during active operations.
Hence, Axis forces needed 320 tons of supplies per day for maintenance,
and 475 for operations. 'From best source, air photographs and evidence of
shipping tonnage figure', forward Axis ports could cover this deficit, barely,
so long as they could use Benghazi.62
Such calculations were useless without hard data, and that was hard to
find. In July 1941, Shearer noted that air reconnaissance and imagery had
been 'our most reliable source of information' on Axis reinforcements to
Libya. Naval losses and Axis airpower, however, handicapped
reconnaissance and eased enemy transport. The RAF was not tracking the
movement of supplies to Libya or of enemy forces at the front, which was
degrading the value of Shearer's estimates of shipping. These 'are as
accurate as possible in difficult circumstances. But I feel it necessary to add
at least 10 per cent, or possibly even 15 per cent, to estimated
reinforcements which may have arrived.'63
For over a year we have precariously existed upon information
provided by spasmodic air reconnaissance. At no time have we been
certain that shipping and convoys have not been missed altogether.
But the net result has justified the means in that our estimates and
calculations have proved substantially correct.
Yet 'the slender grip on this side of the Intelligence problem which we have
precariously held during the past year' would vanish without 'the
establishment of a definite cycle of strategical reconnaissance' of enemy
maritime and land transport routes.64
This was too tall an order for the RAF, but then Ultra entered the picture.
Before July 1941 it provided much material about enemy supply with little
influence.65 Between 'Battleaxe' and 'Crusader', it tracked that matter with
extraordinary detail and effect. This was essential for Britain's attack on
Axis maritime transport, and it also illuminated enemy shipments to Libya
and its logistical difficulties. Between 22 July and 1 August, for example,
Ultra showed that various German authorities believed 'the problem of
supplies to G[erman].A[ir].F[orce]. units between Benghazi and Derna is
acute' or 'supply position German Africa Corps very serious', or 'fuel crisis
of Africa Corps likely to be extremely grave should British attacks continue
successful', and referred to the Luftwaffe"s 'critical supply position' and
'desperate lack of aircraft fuel'.66

Such material gradually gave GSI a precise and accurate grasp of enemy
logistics. By 1 September, when planning for Crusader began,
recent research into the enemy situation in CYRENAICA has produced
figures of considerable value...Our present conclusions are that the
enemy's accumulated supplies are enough to permit one armoured and
one motorised division to operate on full operational scale for a period
of about 3 weeks, the remainder of the Axis forces in CYRENAICA
carrying on a hand-to-mouth basis or little more. These figures are, of
course, under continual review and the conclusion above must NOT be
taken as absolutely final.
Rommel could at most launch a spoiling attack on the forward area
under British control, at Sidi Barrani, followed by a quick assault on
Tobruk. 'Should the enemy fail to capture TOBRUK within 14 days, his
reserve of supplies would then have dwindled practically to nil' - a
comforting conclusion.67 Again, on 15 October Shearer calculated that the
enemy was well supplied in Libya, but half its reserves were in Tripoli and
25 per cent around Benghazi. Forward dumps between Derna and Bardia
held 20 to 30 days of food and most munitions, but only ten days' reserves
of fuel and flak ammunition; dumps between El Agheila and Derna held just
five days' worth of fuel, with another 20 or so around Tripoli. Thus, the
enemy could fight a prolonged struggle in Tripolitania but just a short
intensive battle in Cyrenaica.68
These conclusions underrated enemy logistical power and operational
endurance, but not by much, and here, ironically, the intelligence failure
encouraged Britain to take the correct move. On these issues, Sigint was the
fundamental source, with imagery a distant second. It allowed GSI a
remarkable insight into a key aspect of enemy capabilities, that which
caused its defeat in Crusader. Sigint also prevented uncertainty about enemy
logistical capabilities from hampering British planning; and it helped GHQ
to gauge nicely the latest feasible time to launch 'Crusader'.
Between 'Battleaxe' and 'Crusader', Sigint was the best source on

enemy capabilities - prisoners were infrequent and their information
mistrusted, agents even more so, the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) not
fully developed. Imagery and captured documents provided some crucial
and otherwise unavailable information, but Sigint provided more material of
that sort. Ultra and 'Y' were fundamental to the issue of enemy logistics and
order of battle, though secondary on tank numbers and organization. Backed
by imagery, Ultra also monitored enemy reinforcements well, tracing many
units which did arrive and providing some confidence that no formation (or
large number of units) could cross the Mediterranean without quick
detection. Ultra and 'Y' could not answer all questions or falsify all errors,
but they did so far more than other sources and when they did, the lesson
was learned immediately. They were fundamental to keeping GSI on track
and came close to eliminating uncertainty in the period just before
'Crusader'.
Given the centrality of these topics and the nature of the evidence,
assessment became politicized. In particular, Ultra spurred a dispute
between Churchill and Auchinleck, in a classic instance of how good and
well interpreted intelligence can support opposite policies. Knowledge of
enemy weakness caused Churchill to demand immediate action. By 1
August, he noted 'the serious supply situation which all our information
tended to show existed on the German side in Cyrenaica ... it was a frightful
prospect that nothing should be done for four and a half months at a time
when a small German army was having the greatest difficulty in so much as
existing'.69 'Battleaxe', conversely, convinced Wavell that further offensives
were impossible for several months. Auchinleck shared this view when he
came to command.
It is not sound to take unreasonable risk. I am quite ready to take a
reasonable risk...but to attack with patently inadequate means is to
take an unreasonable risk in the present circumstances, and is almost
certain to result in a much greater delay eventually than if we wait
until the odds are reasonable...As to what constitutes a reasonable
risk, I think that I alone can be the judge.™
He judged a German drive into Turkey unlikely but possible; thus, major
forces must be ready to defend that region. So long as Tobruk was held, a
major German drive on Egypt was unlikely, though if one were launched
before September 'land defences and force available will be on weak side'.
Any British offensive would require air and armoured reinforcements; and
the enemy's 'strength in A.F.V.s and potential rate of reinforcement leave us
much leeway to make up before we are in position to launch offensive'.
Hence, 'unless enemy strength develops more slowly than anticipated an
offensive into CYRENAICA cannot be undertaken for several months'." By

September the enemy might have two Panzer divisions (or about 600 tanks,
on GSI's contemporary idea of German establishments) while Britain 'will
not repeat not have one complete armoured division available to meet this
threat'. Though 'our object is to resume offensive actions against the enemy
as early as possible...at least two armoured divisions' were needed to
recover Cyrenaica 'even if enemy armoured strength does not greatly
increase. On present forecast these two will not repeat not be fully equipped
and trained until early 1942.'
Auchinleck, however, pledged to attack on 15 November in the best case
- if no substantial enemy reinforcements arrived and if he received the

strength needed to attack with an armoured division and two armoured
brigades.72 Knowing enemy strength and his own but uncertain about Axis
reinforcements, Auchinleck saw information about enemy weakness as
offering not the chance for immediate attack but the time to prepare a
successful one. Initially, intelligence drove Churchill and Auchinleck apart,
but then it pushed them together. It showed Auchinleck that enemy strength
had developed 'more slowly than anticipated' and his best case scenario had
materialised; and, finally, it demonstrated that he must attack before he
really wished to, in order to prevent a possible disaster at Tobruk.
If knowledge of enemy capabilities shaped the nature of 'Crusader',
material on intentions dictated its timing. Intelligence on intentions was
problematical, as the General Paulus message of May 1941 had shown.
British sources rarely provided clear statements of enemy intentions but
often these could be inferred from material on capabilities, primarily
derived from Sigint. That illumination was uncertain. It consisted of
educated guesses, some being self-evident conclusions from material on
enemy reinforcements and requests, others derived from fragments: as Hut
3, the assessment section at Bletchley Park, informed Heliopolis on 26
October 1941, 'Everything bearing on the subject has been signalled to you,
but you will realise that it is impossible to convey the subtler shades of
meanings, and it is on these that our appreciation is based, apart from the
concrete facts reported.'73 Fortunately, Shearer understood Rommel and that
he was the key to enemy intentions. He derived a clear idea of ths threat, of
when and where the enemy would strike; and Auchinleck listened to his
views.
Throughout July 1941, Shearer noted the development of Axis fortified
regions on the frontier and around Tobruk, while 'most secret sources
indicate definite belief in impending large scale British operation on the
TOBRUK and SOLLUM fronts. This has originated from our cover activities.'
Shearer presumably referred to Hut 3's note 'that Fliegerkorps Ten was
expecting new British offensive in Libya to start on July 23rd', and
Heliopolis's report that '55 SAVONA Division, which now has elements
forward on the FRONTIER, is sending out frequent situation reports which
tend to indicate apprehension of attack rather than an intention to make
one'.74 Immediate German intentions were cautious, 'to ensure defence of
frontier by using chiefly Italian infantry in fortified line and German
armoured units in mobile reserve'. Even Tobruk would be attacked by
aircraft and guns rather than assaulted.75 This assessment was accurate and,
combined with the material on German supply problems, showed
Auchinleck that he had time to strengthen his forces. During
August-September, he resisted all pressure for a premature offensive, but
also began planning for 'Crusader'.

Meanwhile, Shearer focused on reading Rommel's mind, which was far
from easy, given the contradictions between the latter's aims and means.
From early September, Rommel always wished to attack Tobruk
immediately, but lack of resources forced one postponement after another.
Given these circumstances, Shearer achieved some success. In mid-August,
he held that Rommel must expect an attack on Cyrenaica sooner or later,
and take precautions against one. 'Whatever may be our strength in the
Western Desert, it is probable, from what we know of the Italo-German
Intelligence Service, that it is exaggerated by the enemy.' Later, Hut 3 noted
that GAF dispositions and reconnaissances 'indicate(d) no immediate
British intention to attack'; but that Panzer Gruppe Afrika was picking up
material from the British cover plan about a buildup in the Jarabub Oasis,
on the centre of the Libyan-Egyptian frontier. These assumptions centred
around the truth. On 29 August Rommel noted, 'There's a lot of blather
about an imminent attack by the British, but it's probably pure gossip.'76
Again, in early September, as GSI helped to refine the planning for
'Crusader', Shearer noted 'definite, though imprecise, indications that the
enemy is preparing to attack TOBRUK'. Still, he held that for Rommel 'an
essential preliminary to an attack on TOBRUK' was an assault on Sidi
Barrani,77 to end uncertainty about British capabilities on the frontier.
Precisely this uncertainty sparked 'Moonlight Sonata', a reconnaissance in
force by 21st Panzer Division towards Sidi Barrani on 14 September. Days
before this occurred, Ultra warned that Rommel would launch some sort of
special operation near the frontier,78 but 'Moonlight Sonata' apparently
surprised GHQ and certainly did British forces at the front, though they
were deployed so as to withdraw immediately and safely.
At the end of the movement, Shearer tried to determine why it had been
launched and what it meant. WDF had taken no prisoners since mid-August:
'mainly for this reason we have been very much in the dark as regard
detailed enemy dispositions. It is very probable that the enemy is equally in
the dark and that his move was to test our reactions and gain intelligence'
on whether British forces or dumps were in the forward area. This they
would realize was not so. 'If he was looking to see whether he had sufficient
elbow room...to attack TOBRUK', he would know that he did. Against this,
the enemy still would not know the location of British armour, its
reconnaissance flights indicated concern with Jarabub, and 'we have reason
to believe that the enemy reacted to our Cover Plan', that Britain was ready
to attack on the frontier on 15 September. 'This is the third time the
Germans have formed up to meet expected attack. They may now suspect
this information.'79
Shearer's assessment was correct: British signals security and dummy
tanks had masked the withdrawal of 7th Armoured Division from the front,
while Rommel had acted to check the cover story that British forces at
Sollum were strong. The reconnaissance had shown that British armour was
not at Sollum, which was weakly held.80 From these facts the enemy drew
precisely the wrong conclusions - that if no British forces were on the
frontier and covering forces withdrew before superior numbers, this
situation would continue for several months. Shearer, meanwhile, correctly
appreciated that the enemy would no longer feel the need to attack Sidi
Barrani before Tobruk, and would strike Tobruk whenever it felt it had the
required strength - but would still be unclear whether British armour was at
Jarabub. 'Moonlight Sonata' was extraordinarily counterproductive - it led
the Germans to make erroneous conclusions and the British to draw
accurate ones, and also let them acquire a detailed breakdown of 21st
Panzer Division's units which helped to end uncertainty about German
armoured establishments.81
By 22 September Shearer noted that an Axis drive on Egypt v/as 'for the
time being' unlikely. 'Our main preoccupation, at the moment, is to try and
gauge whether enemy activities in CYRENAICA portent [sic] offensive
action with the primary object of reducing TOBRUK, or offensive/
defensive, or purely defensive.' Shearer was overoptimistic - Axis
commanders must know that Auchinleck would build up forces for an
attack. Unless their reinforcements matched the British, at some stage
it will no longer be safe for the present Axis forces in LIBYA to risk
battle in their present positions because they will be hopelessly
outnumbered. By the nature of the country, and because of their
present composition, a serious defeat in the forward area of the main
Axis forces would involve not only the loss of CYRENAICA but,
almost inevitably, the loss of all the non-mobile Axis forces and
accumulated stores between SOLLUM and JEDABYA.
This was true, and a prophecy of events after 'Crusader' but it did not reflect
Rommel's logic! Instead, Shearer held that Rommel's 'attitude must be
carefully determined by his estimate of our strength and by his knowledge

of the time and rate of suitable air and armoured reinforcements for
himself; he would 'contemplate' withdrawal from Cyrenaica if he did not
believe that 'a reasonable balance is preserved between his strength and
ours'. Hence, Rommel had three choices; a stalling attack on British
forward dumps well behind Sidi Barrani, which he likely would view as
ineffective; 'to 'accept or invite a set battle on the frontier, hoping to inflict
sufficient losses to set back British effort some months', perhaps more; or
to withdraw from Cyrenaica, so as to buy time. Shearer predicted that
Rommel would first strike to capture Tobruk, withdraw all non-motorized
forces towards Tripolitania, keep his armour in Cyrenaica and wait. If

reinforcements were large, he would attack Egypt; if not, his forces would
wait for an attack and then fall back, fighting 'every inch of the way
westwards from the Frontier to BENGHAZI' towards a decisive battle in
Tripolitania. Shearer correctly predicted Rommel's next step - an attack on
Tobruk, combined with a willingness to gamble for a decisive victory on the
frontier - but for the wrong reasons.Though he defined what might have
been Rommel's best line of operations, he misconstrued Rommel's real
intentions, which would have been to attack Egypt as soon as Tobruk fell,
regardless of the comparative reinforcement schedule.82
Shearer's last full dress estimate before 'Crusader', of 27 September, the
day after WDF became Eighth Army, offered an accurate picture of enemy
deployments and strength in Cyrenaica and its reinforcements: z.b.V. Afrika
was forming but no further reinforcements would arrive until late
December. Even if Germany decided to send another Panzer division, this
could not reach the front until 15 to 29 December.83 Only 20 days of supplies
stood past Benghazi, and not well balanced. Without radical improvements
in logistics, the enemy could fight in Cyrenaica for only 30 days. All this
was good, but Shearer was less accurate regarding enemy intentions.
We know that the enemy has obtained, and is continuing to obtain,
items of correct information from intercepts. But we also have
evidence that he does not always put the right interpretation on the
results. Taken all round enemy intelligence in LIBYA, even under
German control, appears to be patchy.
Shearer assumed that Rommel knew the strength of the Tobruk garrison
('except, it is hoped, in regard to recent reinforcement') and of British
deployments to Egypt. 'In default of better evidence it must be assumed that
he has a good general picture of our present strength, although he may be
without detailed information.' 'Moonlight Sonata' indicated that the
Germans did not know British strength on the frontiers but 'other sources'
(i.e. Sigint) showed that they knew that in Jarabub. Rommel would expect
Auchinleck to attack as soon as possible, but not until he overcame the key
weakness of 'Battleaxe', and gained clear numerical superiority in tanks.
'If, as is possible, he is aware that our tank strength has already exceeded
his own, he may still go wrong in his timing if he draws upon past history'
- thinking it 'logical' that Britain would not dare attack with untrained
armour. Rommel could no longer conduct a deep withdrawal or a spoiling
attack, while a Panzer division would be required to assault Tobruk and
would be crippled in the process. Hence, the threat to Tobruk had declined.
Most likely, Rommel would prefer 'to stay on the frontier and to fight it
out', hoping to so wreck British forces that he could take Tobruk. While
Rommel might not like the 'disadvantage' that defeat in such a battle would
mean - that 'his game is finally up' - it had an advantage: 'he will be able
to conserve and to concentrate his available tank strength for the decisive
moment using well prepared defensive positions with minefields and
numerous anti-tank guns as a pivot of manoeuvre. Further, he will be
fighting a battle on a ground of his own choosing.' This account was odd: it
was wrong about Rommel's intentions in general and about Tobruk in
particular, but understood his belief that a British attack was not looming
and predicted exactly what he would do when 'Crusader' began.81
Shearer's assessments were protean as 'Crusader' was formulated, an
odd mixture of insight and error, usually right on the main points but wrong
on secondary ones. Yet he always remained willing to change his, views in
accordance with the evidence, and from late September a flood of self-
evident Ultra betrayed enemy intentions. By 27 September, such Ultra led
the Joint Intelligence Committee to warn that an attack on Tobruk was
imminent, and would be successful.85 For the next seven weeks, Ultra
monitored the development of the danger, day by day; by 5 November, for
example, it noted that the date of 20 November was crucial to Luftwaffe
offensive preparations, by 9 November, that Panzer Gruppe Afrika wanted
a reserve of commanders 'because of the "impending attack'" and on 17
November traced a major shift in GAF strength from Greece to Africa for
imminent operations.
For its part, by 10 November GSI held that 'the enemy is preparing for
some major development' and by 17 November noted 'strong indications
that the enemy intends a major attack on Tobruk in the not so distant
future'. British commanders took these warnings with calm. They timed
'Crusader' just to preempt the assault on Tobruk. They were sufficiently
confident to postpone it three times - from 1 to 11 to 18 November - so as
to maximize training time for forces. By coincidence 'Crusader' was
launched at the perfect time - with the enemy distracted by its own
preparations against Tobruk but just before 21st Panzer Division moved
south to reconnoitre an area including the intended British axis of advance.
Even more this information was too imprecise to let the British try to strike
just as the enemy began a costly assault on Tobruk. That option,
Auchinleck noted later, was tempting but impossible unless he knew the
exact time of the attack.86 In fact, it probably would have failed - air or
ground reconnaissance would have detected its initial deployments, or else
the enemy might well have seized Tobruk before Eighth Army could
intervene.
Ultra and 'Y' also illuminated enemy perceptions of British intentions
and resolved a debate within British intelligence. In October-November
Ultra showed that German imagery demonstrated 'that railway stations
between Alexandria and Mersa Matruh were particularly full of traffic'.

Intelligence authorities in London held that the enemy expected a British
offensive and was focused on preparing for one. Hut 3 did not detect 'any
imminence in German apprehensions', but argued:
Although, in general, the serious concern shown by G.A.F. authorities
over the supply position in Cyrenaica has lacked that character of
urgency which one would associate with the anticipation of an
immediately imminent offensive on our part, our appreciation is that
they do expect an offensive by us in the comparatively near
future...The impression here is that the Germans anticipate an
offensive by us in November and are straining every nerve to be
prepared when it comes...You are of course aware of Italian ideas on
the subject and of their defensive preparations. They have obviously
given the Germans their appreciation of the position.87
GSI's assessments of this issue were better than those in London and of a
high quality. There were many Axis perceptions of British intentions, which
were easy to conflate. The Italians and many German officers understood
that a British attack was looming: only Rommel and his intelligence staff
were gulled - but they were the people who most mattered. GSI correctly
read all of these disparate views and their effects, noting that Italian forces
were readying against an attack but German ones were not.
British intelligence on Axis intentions was excellent. Virtually every day
between 'Battleaxe' and 'Crusader', GSI knew what the Axis would do
over the next month, and what they thought that the British would do. This
material demonstrably influenced Auchinleck, particularly over the timing
of 'Crusader'. Auchinleck had no burning desire to fight in November 1941,
but he believed that his forces could at last do so with some chance of
success. Certain knowledge of the danger to Tobruk forced his hand, but it
also let him delay his attack until the last moment, just in time to preempt
Rommel's assault. Knowledge of enemy strength, weaknesses and
intentions allowed Auchinleck to attack virtually on the day he had
SIGINT AND PLANNING FOR 'CRUSADER1 107
promised to do in the best case five months earlier. This entirely negated the
deleterious effects of Churchill's impetuosity and maximized the time
available to train units. 'Crusader' became that rarity, an intelligence driven
operation. As Auchinleck put it,
should the enemy make any radical change in his dispositions, the
plan will almost certainly require reconsideration, as the essence of it
is the bringing of the enemy's armoured forces to battle in the
circumstances most favourable to ourselves. This entails threatening
something which he considers is essential to fight to retain; and
should he, by changing his position, show that he has changed his
ideas of what is essential to him, we too may have to change our plan.
He carefully monitored intelligence and was ready to act on it, while
planners accepted Shearer's views on enemy strengths, locations and
intentions.88 The changes GSI noted after planning began, like the advance
of Trieste and Ariete, did not change the basic approach. Planners assumed
that the enemy had observed some British forces but, focused on Tobruk,
believed that it could handle any British attack, and these views were close
to the truth. This information was well distributed before the battle and
assisted formations after command collapsed in its early stages.89
One central aspect of GSI's material did not affect planning for
'Crusader'. Though staff officers and GSI emphasized Axis logistical
weaknesses, Cunningham doubted Britain's ability to interdict supplies.
Given its 'continuous dumping', he assumed that 'the enemy in the forward
area will be in a position to carry on land operations for a period of 3
months, and air operations for at least one month'.90 This distorted the
enemy's capacity, but it also had no practical impact on planning - no matter
what they thought about this issue, all senior officers aimed for immediate
decision rather than attrition. Moreover, GSI's knowledge of enemy
logistics became central when it was most needed, after the first disasters of
'Crusader', when Auchinleck turned to attrition and chose to fight where his
forces stood. He thought victory to be 'a question as to who can stick it out
longest' and knew the enemy could not stick it for long."
Intelligence has rarely given planners so precise a knowledge of the
enemy before a battle; yet few plans have produced disasters like that which
befell Eighth Army when 'Crusader' began. Why did good intelligence
produce such a poor result?
The main reason was Axis superiority in armoured warfare and British
failure to appreciate it. This error is well known but badly explained: the
Official History of British Intelligence, for example, implies that it stemmed
primarily from failures of technical intelligence on German weapons. In
fact, this error stemmed fundamentally from the combination of high morale
and overconfidence which marked the Eighth Army in November 1941.

During the Greek campaign, Commonwealth forces did not do well, but
their commander, Lt-General Henry Maitland 'Jumbo' Wilson, claimed
'When we fought the bosh [sic] on even terms there was no doubt which
were the better troops, and many of the Brigadiers who were COs. in the
last war said that the German Army was nothing like what they had faced
then, either in morale or enterprise.' Cunningham replied, 'What you say
about the Bosh [sic] was the opinion of everyone who came back from
France. Very comforting and now that the provision of equipment must be
on the up grade, I am sure he will soon take the knock which he is asking
for.'92 Eighth Army carried such confidence into 'Crusader', producing

initial disaster and the endurance to overcome it.
Tactical misconceptions magnified this problem of temperament. Main
British and German forces did not clash between 17 June and 18 November
and British ideas of battle were drawn from 'Battleaxe'. That engagement
was a failure, but British officers thought it almost a victory, which had
'very decidedly shaken' the enemy. They also read its lessons in the light of
experience with Italians. In the autumn of 1941, when discussing tactics
versus the Afrika Korps, officers of 7th Armoured Division drew on their
experience at 'the decisive Tank. vs. Tank battle of BEDA FOMM' (5-7
February 1941), assuming that Germans would be lured into similar
engagements, charging British tanks with inferior armour. Again, after
'Battleaxe', 7th Armoured Division noted that
The enemy tactics are rigid and rather stereotyped. Envelopment is the
main theme and his effort is normally developed on three main axis.
In the defensive battle his policy is to draw our tanks on to his guns
and to then counter-attack with his own tanks after we had disclosed
our intentions. He set himself a point and goes for it in strength but is
slow to adjust himself to altered circumstances. It is this weakness that
we must exploit by manoeuvre and this implies good information
(especially as to what is going on behind our front).93
British commanders knew everything about enemy tactics except the fact
that these worked - how many tanks the enemy had, but not how much
better in their use. In conceptual terms, they assumed that a quick and
decisive armoured clash would settle the battle, both sides charging each
other and other arms irrelevant. After the event, GHQ noted that 'Crusader'
proved 'that the tank alone cannot win battles'; only combined arms.
Indeed, 'we are decidedly at a disadvantage in any purely tank versus tank
engagement...any operation of unsupported tanks is to be avoided by
us...tanks must never move, once contact has been made, unless adequately
protected by artillery'. German armour could be destroyed only if it could
SIGINT AND PLANNING FOR 'CRUSADER1 109
be forced to attack and yet, 7th Armoured Division noted, 'The German will
not commit himself to tank v [sic] tank battle as such. In every phase of
battle he co-ordinates the action of his anti-tank guns, field artillery and
infantry with his tanks and he will not be drawn from that policy'.94 Every
major British assumption about enemy tactics had been wrong.
British officers also misunderstood the complex technical balance
between British and German armour. Though they noted how 88 mm anti-
tank guns 'had a devastating effect on our attacking tanks' at 'Battleaxe',
they derived no lessons about the danger. Cunningham, Auchinleck and 30
(Armoured) Corps agreed that armour should not charge 'fixed anti-tank
defences', but the crucial word was 'fixed'. They knew that 88mm guns
would wreck cruiser tanks, but not that the 50mm anti-tank guns carried in
strength by every German division could do the same. They still believed
Matilda Mark II infantry tanks invulnerable even to 88mm guns except at
close range. Australian officers touring the front during 'Crusader' were
'amazed' at the enemy's strength in anti-tank guns. Mark II tanks had
simply 'crawled up to the enemy posns [sic]' to be destroyed by 88mm
guns. Their tactics 'were not based on the knowledge that the enemy
possessed a hard hitting A Tk [sic] gun. It would be interesting to know
whether the characteristics of the 88 mm GERMAN A Tk [sic] gun had been
circulated among our tank units; and, if so, whether the tactics of attack had
been modified accordingly.' The answer is no.95
These were failures of the intelligence system but not strictly speaking
of GSI. Before the battle, GSI did not address these issues, though it
provided accurate information on numbers and characteristics of enemy
weapons. Defining enemy tactics and British counters were matters 'beyond
the range of their intelligence function', on which neither it nor Ultra could
have changed the deeply rooted views of fighting formations. In fact GSI
probably shared those views. GSI, however, must be condemned for
reinforcing GHQ's gross underestimate of Italian capacity. During
'Crusader', the two best Italian formations, Ariete and Trieste, matched the
worst trained third of Commonwealth forces, 1st South African Division
and the 22nd Armoured Brigade, while six Italian infantry divisions (backed
by Division z.b.V. Afrika) tied down another third (two infantry divisions
and 1st Army Tank Brigade) around Tobruk, Sidi Omar and Bardia-Sollum.
These technical and tactical errors were the main British intelligence
failure before 'Crusader', and a significant one - the British counted
everything which could be counted but misunderstood their value. This
shows the limits to one classic strength of Sigint. Its technical success in
providing quantitative material on Axis forces could not achieve the greater
aim, to define hostile strength, because British commanders also grossly
misunderstood enemy quality. In a meaningful sense, the source of
intelligence which Britain most lacked before 'Crusader' was recent combat
experience against the Axis.
Even more: 'Crusader' was damaged precisely because it relied so much
on intelligence and deception. It was covered by Britain's most thorough
and sophisticated effort at deception since 1939. As Auchinleck put it, 'we
are trying by every means in our power to mislead the enemy as to our
intention to attack and as to the date on which we may attack'.96
Cunningham 'did not think it possible to conceal the fact that an offensive
was toward...I therefore concentrated on trying to conceal the time and
direction of the attack'. He did so by seeking to convince the enemy that
Eighth Army's main force would operate from Jarabub into central
Cyrenaica rather than at the escarpment. To this cover Shearer glued
another. He feared that the enemy might doubt a deception carried through
sources to which it had reacted unnecessarily three times before, he
possessed a new channel of disinformation to the Axis, 'Cheese', and he
held that some Axis authorities but not Rommel thought attack was
imminent. Hence, Shearer pursued the complex technique of the 'double
bluff. Older sources spread the story of an imminent offensive (though the
Jarabub deception distorted time and place). Meanwhile 'Cheese' told his
masters that these preparations were part of a campaign of lies, and no
offensive could occur until the end of 1941. Cunningham and Auchinleck
believed that their 'cover story' had confused the enemy up to the
onslaught.97 They were half right.
Throughout October and November Panzer Gruppe Afrika noted the
deployment behind Sidi Barrani of many forces, but missed the movement
to the front of two key formations, the New Zealand Division and 7th
Armoured Division, and failed to realize that an attack was looming.
Despite this gross failure of intelligence, its forces were well placed against
that threat; and 21st Panzer Division was preparing for movements which
would have detected 'Crusader' almost as soon as it began. The Italians
missed details of British efforts but appreciated that an attack was
imminent, and deployed their mechanized forces effectively against it.
Rommel was surprised: the Italians not; the enemy misunderstood the exact
time and place of the British attack but it was well positioned against any
such attack, surprise or not. The deception hampered enemy assessments
but not their actions.
Deception had mixed success and this at a cost. GHQ directed
Cunningham to 'deploy his forces on as wide a front as possible in order to
deceive the enemy'.98 They were widely distributed, yet too weak to win
without concentration. Only excellent C3I could square this circle.
Cunningham believed this to be possible because it had occurred in Ethiopia
and because of his trust in intelligence. As he noted about the campaign in
Ethiopia, 'There can seldom in the history of war have been a campaign in
which the Commander was so continuously served with accurate
information of the enemy's movements and dispositions. The bulk of this
information was received from "Y" sources.'99 He assumed that the quality
of intelligence in 'Crusader' would match that in Ethiopia and that he could
use it and retain the initiative through a sophisticated approach to command.
He wished to avoid 'detailed operational orders. Circumstances change with
time. Enemy dispositions in particular are liable to alter and necessitate
frequent amendments to orders. Any plan made should, he considered, be
elastic."00 Unfortunately, his plan stretched elasticity to the breaking point,
because it assumed that an approach which defeated a poor foe in Ethiopia

must necessarily beat a better one in Libya.
When 'Crusader' began 30 Corps, controlling two thirds of British
armour and 1st South African Division, were to advance deep into the desert
- and wait 18 hours until the British learned the German reaction.
Cunningham doubted that 30 Corps
could take on the enemy armoured forces on its own and should
therefore make for Tobruk. We should not go for Tobruk, unless we
knew we could hold it. Our armoured forces must take up a central
battle position. If the enemy observed what was happening and
decided to make a stand, he must either concentrate his armour to
defend Bardia or Tobruk, or divide his forces. If he split his forces, we
could split ours. If he made no move, we could hem him in. If he tried
to get away, we could not cut him off even by making straight for
Tobruk. The approach march was unlikely to pass unobserved by the
enemy, and from his reactions we should know what he meant to do.
By the first evening his intentions would be known, and the decision
could be taken.
Meanwhile, forces in Tobruk would wait until 30 Corps approached and
then break out: 13 Corps would surround and contain Axis forces on the
coast with 4th Indian Division, while the New Zealand Division crossed the
escarpment toward Tobruk. Its flank would be covered by 22nd Armoured
Brigade, ordered to attack inferior Axis armour but to fall back on 7th
Armoured Division if the Afrika Korps appeared, and so provoke a decisive
clash between British and Axis forces.
This complex plan assumed that intelligence could track the enemy
precisely, commanders receive this information and units act on it.
Cunningham took pains to make this possible, placing tactical 'Y' teams
with formations, especially 7th Armoured Division, and the LRDG south of
Benghazi, to warn if the enemy ran.101 Still, this plan was designed on a large
scale map and the assumption of perfect C3I. The commander of 30 Corps,
doubting that these conditions could exist, argued that the plan would
dissipate strength and cause confusion.102 He was overruled but right.
In the first phase of the battle, British forces became isolated into five
groups while their command and communication collapsed. As
Cunningham's aide de camp noted 30 hours into 'Crusader', 'Army Comdr
was much concerned throughout this day at lack of information, indecisive
nature of operation, apparent slowness of Armd Div in getting on and his
own inability to force the pace."03 The failure to determine enemy actions
sparked disastrous tactical decisions. It occurred, ironically, because the
Germans were so surprised that they did not know they were being attacked
and therefore did not act! Exaggerated faith in intelligence and deception
was a fundamental flaw in the plan for 'Crusader'; ironically, the success of
deception increased the problem with intelligence.
This article has shown that the British Army developed an effective
system for operational intelligence at a different time and place than is often
assumed, by late 1941 in the Middle East. During 'Crusader', for the first
time since 1939, intelligence was a 'force multiplier' for the British Army.
GSI was a main root for British military intelligence during World War II.
Wavell and Shearer created the system which carried the Army through
Libya, Tunisia, Italy, Normandy and Germany. GSI was fundamental to
planning in Cairo during 1941 - so much so that the strategy of Wavell and
Auchinleck and the plans for 'Crusader' cannot be understood without
examining the intelligence record.
This examination overturns conventional views, particularly the idea
that constant pressure from Churchill (in part inspired by hasty readings of
Ultra) forced reluctant commanders to launch premature offensives in the
desert. Parts of this argument are correct - Churchill's pressure was constant
and often ill-informed, Ultra fed this tendency and his doubts about
generals, British forces were unready for offensives, even when these were
unavoidable - but not the whole. This argument fits all the facts of
'Battleaxe" but none about 'Brevity'. As regards 'Crusader', Churchill did
initially press for unrealistic action, in part because of Ultra. Soon, however,
intelligence convinced Auchinleck that 'Crusader' was a 'reasonable' risk
and a better one than leaving Tobruk alone against the Afrika Korps. Far
from dividing Churchill and Auchinleck, intelligence helped to create a
consensus between them, embodied in 'Crusader' and to make it effective
in strategic terms, though not operational ones.
This examination also demonstrates the need to distinguish the technical
success of intelligence from its practical effect. The value of a 'force
multiplier' depends on the force to be multiplied. By November 1941, the
British Army was good at intelligence but not operations. GSI might have
guided another army to easy victory in 'Crusader'; Eighth Army learnt the
hard way. All that it really gained from intelligence was the ability to
intervene before the enemy struck Tobruk, and the knowledge that the enemy
could not fight a prolonged battle of attrition. These were significant gains.
None the less, on 18 November 1941 Britain's success in intelligence
and deception failed to do something equally significant - to deny Rommel
an excellent chance to smash his foe. British intelligence superiority and the
enemy's surprise demonstrated weaknesses in German intelligence and
generalship, but the practical effect was minuscule. Axis forces were well
deployed against any attack, Eighth Army failed to exploit its acquisition of
surprise, Cunningham's plan exposed every British weakness to every
German strength. Eighth Army almost lost 'Crusader' despite better

intelligence and greater strength than the enemy.
It won not through intelligence, but numbers, courage, the skill of
Commonwealth infantry and Rommel's stupidity. Not until the British
Army became competent in the field could intelligence provide victory in
battle.
NOTES
All files from the AIR, CAB, PREM and WO series are held at the Public Record Office, London,
and appear by permission of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office. All files from the
AWM 54 series are held at the Australian War Memorial, Canberra, and appear by permission of
that institution. The Lord Alanbrooke, George Aston, Basil Liddell Hart and Richard O'Connor
Papers are held by the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (LHCMA), King's College,
London; the Claude Auchinleck Papers by the John Ryland Library, the University of
Manchester, the Alan Cunningham Papers by the National Army Museum; and the Thomas
Blarney Papers by the Australian War Memorial, Canberra. All citations from these private
collections appear by permission of the copyright holders.
1. For treatments by the best studies of British intelligence during World War II, cf. Ralph
Bennett, Ultra in Mediterranean Strategy, (London: Hamish Hamilton 1989) pp.79-80,
and F.H. Hinsley, E.E. Thomas, C.F.G. Ransom and R.C. Knight, British Intelligence in the
Second World War, Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, Volume Two, (London:
HMSO 1981) pp.289-304. For the older literature, cf. John Connell, Wavell, Soldier and
Scholar, To June 1941 (London: Collins 1964) and idem, Auchinleck, A Critical Biography
(London: Cassell 1959). Connell knew that Britain had some access to German codes, but
not the whole story.
2. Wavell to Aston, 29 Jan. 1930, George Aston papers, LHCMA, 5/3; Archibald Wavell,
Allenby, A Study in Greatness (London: OUP 1940) pp.220-2.
3. Smith to Willis, 23 Dec. 1939, Smith to Beaumont-Nesbitt, 28 Sept. 1939, passim, WO
201/2796.
4. Wavell to Liddell Hart, 4 Feb. 1935, 20 Feb. 1935, Liddell Hart Papers, LHCMA, LH
1/733; same to same, 11 Sept. 1942, LH 1/733.
5. Wavell to Massey, 23 Nov. 1939, WO 201/2119.
6. Wavell, 'Note for DDMI (I)', 15 Dec. 1940, Alan Cunningham Papers, National Army
Museum, 8303-104/7; for the Meinertzhagen memorandum, cf. John Ferris (ed.), The
British Army and Signals Intelligence During the First World War (London: Army Records
Society 1992) pp.185-94. For other instances of Wavell's direction of deception, cf. 'A'
Force Diary, entries 30 March 1941, 6 April 1941, CAB 154/1 and 'Operations in Western
Desert October to December 1940', by Wavell, 15 Dec. 1940, WO 169/16.

7. Memoranda by Cunningham, 6 June 1941, 'East Africa Force, Report on Operations from
1st November, 1940, to 5th April, 1941', 'Notes on Operations in East Africa, 11th
February, 1941, to 3rd July, 1941', Cunningham papers, 8303-104-12-1 and 8303-104/14 .
8. 'Crusader, Note by C-in-C, M.E.F.', 30 Oct. 1941, Cunningham Papers, 8303-104/18;
Auchinleck to Churchill, 11 Oct. 1941, Claude Auchinleck Papers, The John Ryland
Library, The University of Manchester, No.374.
9. 'Sabine, Notes Handed to Lt. Col. Home on 3/4/41', 'Mideast "Y"', by GSI (S), 28 Oct.
1941, passim, WO 208/5021.
10. 'Minutes of the Meeting Held at General Headquarters, Middle East, on 29th February,
1940', WO 208/5079.
11. HQME to Buss, 12 Aug. 1939, AIR 23/729; Mitchell to Boyle, 21 March 1940, AIR
23/760.
12. GSI (s) to DDMI (I), 14 Feb. 1941, 'Sabine, Notes Handed to Lt. Col. Home on 3/4/41',
passim, WO 208/5021; cf. WO 208/5077.
13. 'Military "Y" Mideast', GSI (s), 2 March 1941, WO 208/5021.
14. Geoffrey Ballard, On Ultra Secret Service, The Story of Australia's Signals Intelligence
Operations During World War 11 (Richmond, Victoria: Spectrum 1991) p.49;
Memorandum By Hill, No. 4 Wireless Company, Second Australian Imperial Force, to
GSI, 5 May 1941, WO 208/5021.
15. 'Sabine, Notes Handed to Lt.-Col. Home on 3/4/41', WO 208/5021; Air Ministry Wireless
Station, Cairo, Senior Intelligence Officer, HQ, RAF. M.E, 3 Feb. 1941, AIR 29/152;
Henry Dryden, 'Recollections of Bletchley Park, France and Cairo', in F.H. Hinsley and
Alan Stripp (eds.), Codebreakers, The Inside Story of Bletchley Park (Oxford: OUP 1993),
pp.202-6; Bennett, Ultra (note 1) p.43.
16. Appendix A to War Office MI8 to Air Commodore Blandy, 1 Dec. 1941, WO 208/5129.
17. 'Mideast "Y", by GSI (S), 28 Oct. 1941, 'Military "Y" Mideast Memo', 11 Feb. 1942, WO
208/5021; Hinsley et. al., British Intelligence, Volume 2 (note 1) pp.289-90, 293-5.
18. Francis De Guingand, Operation Victory (London: Hodder 1947) p.90.
19. Auchinleck to Amery, 10 Nov. 1941, Auchinleck to Arthur Smith, Auchinleck Papers,
No.429, 516; Eighth Army Signals Log, entries 1930, 2Dec. 1941, 1950,3Dec. 1941, WO
169/996.
20. Brig. J. Embe, 'Western Desert-February 1941-7th April 1941', undated, Richard
O'Connor papers, 4/3/1, LHCMA.
21. 'Extract from H.Q. 7th Armd. Div. letter 136/G, of 30 July 1941', Cunningham Papers,
8303-104/18.
22. Wavell to Auchinleck, 14 Nov. 1941, Auchinleck Papers, No. 435; Weekly Review of the
Military Situation, No. 54, 9 June 1941, WO 208/1559; John Ferris, 'The British Army,
Signals and Security in the Desert Campaign, 1940-42', in Michael Handel, Intelligence
and Military Operations, (London: Frank Cass 1990) pp.274-6.
23. Wavell to Dill, telegram 0/74021, 18 June 1941, WO 169/920.
24. Ismay, 'Points for Discussion with General Auchinleck', 2 Aug. 1941, PREM 3/286.
25. Cunningham to Shearer, Oct. 1941, Smith to Cunningham, 30 Oct. 1941, Cunningham
Papers, 8303-104/18.
26. Alanbrooke to Auchinleck, 21 Feb. 1942, Auchinleck Papers, No.649.
27. Comments by Gen. Sir Alan Cunningham, GCMG, KCB, DSO, MC, on draft Chapters 40
and 41 of Vol.III, dated Dec. 1955, Playfair to Cunningham, 16 Dec. 1955, 'A note for
record', Nov. 1943, Cunningham Papers, 8303-104/18.
28. PREM 3/290/18B.
29. Alanbrooke Papers, LHCMA, Alanbrooke diary, entry 30 Jan. 1942.
30. Alanbrooke to Auchinleck, 6 Feb. 1942, Auchinleck to Alanbrooke, 14 Feb. 1942, Ritchie
to Auchinleck, 17 Feb. 1942, Auchinleck Papers, Nos.688, 706, 720, 740-1. The issue is
most accurately treated in Connell, Auchinleck (note 1) pp.450-1, 478-80; the Official
History's account of GSI during Shearer's tenure is of little value, Hinsley et al. (note 1)
p.333, passim.
31. Wavell to Dill, telegram 09024, 26 April 1941, WO 216/14.
SIGINT AND PLANNING FOR ' C R U S A D E R ' 115
32. Ultra Reel 74, OL 141, OL 192, OL 211, OL 331, OL 332, OL 338, OL 352, OL 356, OL
366; Memorandum by GSI, 2 May 1941, DDMI (I)/VI/2, 'Appreciation of the Situation by
General Rommel...', passim, Blarney Papers, Australian War Memorial, DRL 3 6643/1/2
(B) 18.
33. Gen. Wavell, 'Note for GOC Western Desert, 1 May 1941, Blarney Papers, DRL 3
6643/1/2 (B) 1.
34. DDMI (I) to CGS, 19 May 1941, Blarney Papers, 3 DRL/6643/1/2 (B) 18; Bennett, Ultra
(note 1) pp.38-41, overestimates the influence of Churchill and Ultra on 'Brevity' though
not 'Battleaxe'.
35. Wavell to Dill, tele O./69213, 31 May 1941, WO 216/9; DDMI (I)/VI/2, 'German
Intentions in Libya', 26 May 1941, Blarney Papers, 3 DRL 6643/1 2B 18; General Staff,
WDF, to 7th Armoured Division, 29 May 1941, passim, WO 201/357; 'Weekly Review of
the Military Situation', Nos.53, 54, 2 June 1941, 9 June 1941, WO 208/1559. The MID's
views of Rommel's armoured strength were similar to those of GSI, cf. Memo by General
Davidson, 'Axis Strength in Libya', 10 June 1941, WO 216/9.
36. General Staff, Western Desert Force to 7th Armoured Division, 29 May 1941, passim, WO
201/357; Western Desert Force Operation Instruction No. 11, 12 June 1941, WO 201/2482;
'Report by Commander 4 Ind Div on Operations in the Western Desert, 15-18 June 1941
[sic]', WO 201/372.
37. DDMI (I) to CGS, 19 May 1941, DDMI (I) to CGS, 21 May 1941, Blarney Papers, 3
DRL/6643/1/2 (B) 18.
38. Weekly Review of the Military Situation, No. 55, 16 June 1941, WO 208/1559.
39. Ibid., No 63, 11 Aug. 1941, WO 208/1559.
40. Bennett, Ultra (note 1) p.46; Hinsley et al. (note 1) p.296.
41. German Tank Strength Returns', Appendix to EDS/Misc/2, CAB 146/356.
42. 'German Tank Strength in Libya", DMI/LIBYA, 20 July 1941, 23 Oct. 1941 Blamey
Papers, 3 DRL 6643/1/2B 5; 'Weekly Review of the Military Situation', No.57, 30 June
1941, WO 208/1559.
43. DMI/VI/2, 'German Tank Strength in Cyrenaica', 20 July 1941; DMI/LIBYA, 'Italo-
German Tank Strength in Libya', 2 Oct. 1941, DMI to CGS, 20 Oct. 1941, DMI/LIBYA,
Blarney Papers, 3 DRL 6643/1 2B 5 and 1 2B 6; Ultra Reel 75, OL 1931; 'Italian Tank
Strength in Libya', undated, circa Nov. 1941, WO 208/40.
44. Figures on German armoured strength throughout 1941 are derived from several different
analyses of surviving German records by postwar British official historians, found in the
Liddell Hart papers (LH 4/31)) and in 'German Tank Strength returns', Appendix to
EDS/Misc/2, CAB 146/356; Mellan to 'Brian', 22 Feb. 1953, CAB 146/357; CAB
106/1218, passim.
45. 'Notes on the German Army-War', 12.40, WO 208/2962; 'New Notes on the German
Army', April 1942, WO 208/2963.
46. DDMI (I)/VI/2, Blarney Papers, 3 DRL/6643/1/2B 18.
47. DMI/VI/2, 'Enemy Reinforcements to Libya Since 3 June 1941', DMI/VI/2, 'German Tank
Strength in Cyrenaica', 20 July 1941, Blarney Papers, 3 DRL 6643/ 1 2B 5 and 1 2B 18.
48. DMI/LIBYA, 21 Sept. 1941, DMI/LIBYA, 'Italo-German Tank Strength in Libya', 2 Oct.
1941, Blarney Papers, 3 DRL 6643/1/2B 5 .
49. 'German Tank Strength in Libya', DMI/LIBYA, 23 Oct. 1941, Blarney Papers, 3 DRL
6643/1/ 2B 6. The 'sure source' is not absolutely certain, but was probably solutions from
Heliopolis. Its material was entirely accurate; the phrase 'usual source' was the local
British euphemism for signals intelligence at that time; no such message exists in the Ultra
records; the only other source likely to have provided material of such accuracy, captured
documents, were openly described as such.
50. McNab to Latham, 18 Feb. 1949, CAB 146/356.
51. DDMI (I) /1V/2, 24 June 1941, 'Arrival of Reinforcement in Libya', DMI/VI/2, 'Enemy
Reinforcements to Libya Since 3 June 1941', Blarney Papers, 2 DRL 6643/1/2B 18.
52. German Tank Strength in Cyrenaica, DMI/VI/2, 20 July 1941, 26 July 1941, Blarney
Papers, 3 DRL 6643/ 1/ 2B 5.
53. DMI/VI/2, 'Relief or Withdrawal of German Africa Corps', 30 July 1941, German Tank
Reinforcements in Libya, DMI/VI/2, 29 July 1941, Blarney Papers, 3 DRL 6643/1/2B 18

and 1/2B 5; Ultra Reel 76, OL 777.
54. 'The Case of 21 Armoured Division Being in Libya', 12 Aug. 1941, DMI/VI/2, Blarney
Papers, 3 DRL/6643/1/2B 5.
55. Ultra Reel 76, OL 1089, OL 1164.
56. Ibid. OL 1089, OL 1175, OL 1318, OL 1390; DMI to DDO, 23 Sept. 1941, DMI/LIBYA,
Blarney Papers, 3 DRL 6643/1/2B 5; 'Weekly Review of the Military Situation', No.67, 8
Sept. 1941, WO 208/1559. Hinsley et al. (note 1) pp.293-6 offers a judicious assessment
of the relative value of sources of intelligence, though it underrates GSI's success.
57. Weekly Reviews of the Military Situation, Nos.63, 64, 66, 67, 70, 73, 74, 76, 11 Aug. 1941,
18 Aug. 1941, 1 Sept. 1941, 8 Sept. 1941, 29 Sept. 1941, 20 Oct. 1941, 27 Oct. 1941, 10
Nov. 1941, WO 208/1559; Ultra Reel 75, OL 1931.
58. DMI/LIBYA, 'Italo-German Tank Strength in Libya', 2 Oct. 1941, Blarney Papers, 3 DRL
6643/2B 5.
59. Enemy Fighting Strengths in CYRENAICA on 23 August', Appendix A to GSI, GHQ MEF,
Daily Intelligence Summary, 27 Aug. 1941, 3 DRL 6643 l/2b (ii) Pt. 1, Blarney Papers.
60. DMI/VI/2, 'Benghazi Harbour', 7 July 1941; 'Enemy Reinforcements to Libya Since 3
June 1941', DMI/VI/2; DDMI (I) /1V/2, 24 June 1941, 'Arrival of Reinforcement in
Libya', DMI/VI/2, Blarney Papers, 3 DRL 6643/1/2B 18.
61. Memo by MI 14, 20 May 1941, to DDMI (I), passim, WO 208/39.
62. 'Note on Present Axis Maintenance Situation in Cyrenaica', DMI/VI/2, 19 Feb. 1942,
Blarney Papers, 3 DRL 6643/1/2 B (1).
63. DDMI (I) to CGS, 19 May 1941, DDMI (I)/VI/2, 'Benghazi Harbour, 7 July 1941,
DMI/VI/2, 3 July 1941, DMI/VI/2, 'Enemy Reinforcements to Libya Since 3 June 1941',
Blarney Papers, 3 DRL 6643/1/2B 18.
64. DMI/VI/2, German Tank Strength in Cyrenaica, 20 July 1941, Blarney Papers, 3 DRL
6643/1/2B 5.
65. Ultra Reel 74, OL 26, OL 74, OL 79, OL 88, OL 89, OL 126, OL 269, passim.
66. Ultra Reel 76, OL 769, OL 787, OL 805, OL 835, OL 861, OL 881, OL 937.
67. Weekly Review of the Military Situation, No 66, 1 Sept. 1941, WO 208/1559.
68. Mideast to Trooper, 18 Oct. 1941, 1/15698, Blarney Papers, 3 DRL 6643/l/2b 5.
69. Defence Committee meeting, 1 Aug. 1941, PREM 3/286.
70. Mideast to Desforce, 19 June 1941, Blarney Papers; 3 DRL 6643/1/2B 18; Auchinleck to
Churchill, 4 July 1941, Auchinleck to Dill, 21 July 1941, Auchinleck Papers, Nos. 280-2,
289.
71. Mideast to Troopers, 0/78318, 2 July 1941 and 0/79668, 7/7.41, Blarney Papers, 3 DRL
6643/1/2B 6.
72. Mideast to Troopers, 0/83384, Blarney Papers, 3 DRL 6348/1/2B 6; Mideast to Troopers,
0/84700, 23 July 1941, WO 201/2357.
73. Ultra Reel 75, OL 1698,.
74. Weekly Review of the Military Situation, No.66, 1 Sept. 1941, WO 208/1559; Ultra Reel
76, OL 795.
75. Mideast to Troopers, 7 July 1941, 1/79781, Blarney Papers, 3 DRL 6643/1/2B 6; Weekly
Review of the Military Situation, Nos.57, 58, 30 June 1941, 7 July 1941, WO 208/1559.
76. Weekly Review of the Military Situation, No.64, 18 Aug. 1941, WO 208/1559; Ultra, Reel
76, OL 999, OL 1179; Reel 75, OL 1513, OL 1646; B.H. Liddell Hart (ed.), The Rommel
Papers (London: Collins 1953) p.150.
77. 'Notes on Offensive Operation', 6 Sept. 1941, Cunningham Papers, 8303-104/18.
78. Ultra Reel 76, OL 1098, 1106. Hinsley et al. (note 1) p.294; Bennett, Ultra (note 1)
pp.82-3.
79. DMI/CYRENE, 'The Enemy Reconnaissance in Force, Frontier Area, 14/15 Sept. 1941',
17 Sept. 1941, Blarney Papers, 3 DRL 6643/1/2B 18.
80. Captured Report of the Reconnaissance in Force Carried out by 21 Armoured Division on
14 September 1941', Blamey Papers, 3 DRL 6643/ l/2b (ii) Pt.1; Liddell Hart (note 76)
pp.154-5.
81. 'Composition of the Recent German Reconnaisance Columns', DMI/LIBYA, 23 Sept.
1941, Blarney Papers, 3 DRL 6643/1/2B/ 5; 'Weekly Review of the Military Situation',
No.68, 15 Sept. 1941, WO 208/1559.
82. 'Possibility of an Axis Withdrawal from Cyrenaica', 22 Sept. 1941, DMI/LIBYA, Blarney
Papers, 3 DRL 6643/1/2B 5.
83. DMI to DDO, 23 Sept. 1941, DMI/LIBYA, Blarney Papers, 3 DRL 6643/1/2B 5; C-in-C
Middle East to War Office, Telegrams 1/14303 and 1/08756, 14 Oct. 1941, 30 Sept. 1941,
WO 208/39.
84. 'Enemy Intentions in Libya', DMI/LIBYA, Blamey Papers, 3 DRL 6643/1/2B 5.
85. JIC (41) 388 (0), 27 Sept. 1941, CAB 81/164' 'Appreciation of the Situation at Tobruk',
Gen. Davidson, 24 Sept. 1941, WO 216/15; Ultra Reel 76, OL 1092, OL 1203.
86. Ultra Reel 76, OL 1379; Ultra Reel 75, OL 1795 OL 1832, OL 1834, OL 1865, OL 1935,
OL 1994, OL 1996, OL 1998; 'Weekly Review of the Military Situation'. Nos.76-77, 10
Nov. 1941, 17 Nov. 1941, WO 208/1559; Bennett, Ultra (note 1) pp.83-6; Memo by Gen.
von Ravenstein, 21st Panzer Division, 12 Nov. 1941, in 13 Corps Intelligence Summary,
No.58, WO 169/1107.
87. Ultra Reel 75, OL 1650, OL 1661, OL 1698, OL 1902; Hinsley et al. (note 1) pp.302-3.
88. 'CRUSADER, Note by C-in-C, MEF', 30 Oct. 1941, Cunningham Papers, 8303-104/18;
'Middle East Joint Planning Staff Paper No.64, Cyrenaica September 1941', 'Appreciation
of the Situation by Commander Eighth Army in the Field', 28 Sept. 1941, Cunningham
Papers, 8303-104/18; WO 201/358, passim.
89. Cunningham to Norrie, HQ/8A/12/G/(O), undated but circa 13 Nov. 1941, Cunningham
Papers, 8303-104/18, cf. WO 201/518; WO 201/361.
90. Memoranda by Cunningham, 'Appreciation of the Situation', 28 Sept. 1941, and 'Some
Factors in Connection with an Offensive in the Western Desert for the Consideration of the
C-in-C, 16 Aug. 1941, and marginal notes, WO 201/2357.
91. 'Notes for C.G.S. and M. of S.', by Auchinleck, 28 Nov. 1941, WO 169/921.
92. Wilson to Cunningham, 30 May 1941, Cunningham to Wilson, 12 June 1941, Cunningham
Papers, 8303-104/6.
93. Appendix C., Notes on Action 7 Armd Div 14-17 June 1941', 'Jim' to 'John', 'An Account
of the Frontier Battle', n/d, WO 201/357; 7 Armd Div Int Summary No.8, 17 June 1941,
WO 169/1173; 'Tactical Questions and Answers for 7th Armoured Division', AWM
54/44/4/1; WO 201/357, passim.
94. C-in-C MEF to Comd Eighth Army, formations and unit commanders, 8 Feb. 1942, WO
201/538; 'Lessons of the Operations in CYRENAICA-No. 3', WO 201/479; Lesson from
Operations - Cyrenaica No. 10', 13 Jan. 1942, WO 201/479; 'Role of Armoured
Formations and Tactical Handling of Armoured Forces', GHQ MEF to brigades, 17 Jan.
1942, WO 201/527; Lessons from Operations - CYRENAICA No.11, 19 Jan. 1942, and
No.13, 18 Feb. 1942, WO 201/479; 'Seventh Armoured Division, An Account of the
Operations in Libya, 18th November to 27th December 1941', CAB 106/582, partly
published as 'Studies of Enemy Methods and Tactics', 7th Armoured Division, Appendix
A to GSI GHQ MEF Daily Intelligence Summary No.626, 5 Feb. 1942, Blamey Papers, 3
DRL 6643 l/2b (ii) Part 2; undated lecture by Gott, 'Operation 7 Armd Div Nov'-Dec 1941
sic', WO 201/516.
95. 'Report on Battle of Capuzzo, 14 to 17 June 1941', passim, WO 201/357, 'Report by
Commander 4 Ind Div on Operations in the Western Desert, 15-18 June 1941 (sic)', WO
201/372; Wavell to Dill, telegram 0/74021, 18 June 1941, WO 169/920, Auchinleck,
'Notes on Exploitation in the Event of Enemy Attack', 4 Oct. 1941, Cunningham Papers,
8303-104/18; 30 Corps, General Intelligence Summary No.1, 10 Nov. 1941, WO 169/1123;
13 Corps Intelligence Summary No.43, 15 Nov. 1941, WO 169/1107; Lessons from
Operations - Cyrenaica No.8', GHQ MEF, 27 Dec. 1941, WO 201/479; 'Notes on
Employment of "I" tanks, Based on Conversation with Brig. Watkins, 27 Dec 41', WO
201/527; Lessons from Operations - Cyrenaica No.6, WO 201/479 Memo by J.D. Rogers
and S.H. Porter, 26 Dec. 1941, AWM 54/519/7/26.
96. Auchinleck to Churchill, 18 Oct. 1941, Auchinleck papers, No.391.
97. Auchinleck to Alanbrooke, tele 0012, 18 Nov. 1941, WO 106/2174; Auchinleck to
Cunningham, 10 Oct. 1941, memorandum by Cunningham for CIGS, circa Feb. 1942,
Cunningham papers, 8803-104/18; CRME/1998/G (CAM)', 21 Feb. 1942, Middle East

GHQ to War Office, 'Camouflage-Visual Deception. Lessons of 'Crusader' Operation-
CYRENAICA', WO 106/2186; 'Broad Outline of Jarabub Oasis Deception Scheme for
Operation Crusader', GSI (a), 14 Feb. 1942, passim, WO 201/369; Liddell Hart, Rommel
Papers (note 76) pp.156-7; undated and unsigned memo for CIGS from Cunningham,
circa Feb. 1942, 8303-104/18; Eighth Army Conference, 6 Oct. 1941, Cunningham Papers,
8303-104/18; A Force Diary, entries, 17 July 1941, 29 Aug. 1941, 25 Sept. 1941, CAB
154/1.
98. 'Eighth Army, Report on Operations', WO 201/358; GHQ, Middle East, to Eighth Army,
2 Sept. 1941, 'Crusader, Note by C-in-C, MEF', 30 Oct. 1941, 8303/104-18.
99. Memoranda by Cunningham, 6 June 1941, 'East Africa Force, Report on Operations from
1st November 1940, to 5th April, 1941', 'Notes on Operations in East Africa, 11th
February, 1941, to 3rd July, 1941', Cunningham Papers, 8303-104-12-1 and 8303-104/14.
100. 'Eighth Army, Report on Operations', WO 201/358.

101. John W. Gordon, The Other Desert War, British Special Forces in North Africa, 1940-1943
(NY: Greenwood 1987) pp.78, 84.
102. Norrie to Cunningham, 1 Nov. 1941, WO 201/513; Corps Commanders Conference No.3,
29 Oct. 1941, Cunningham Papers, 8303-104/1; Corps Commanders Conference No.4, 14
Nov. 1941, 8303-104/18.
103. Eighth Army War Diary, Supplementary Sheets, entry 0945, 19 Nov. 1941, WO 169/996.

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This article was downloaded by: [Universidad de Sevilla]

On: 12 December 2014, At: 03:01

Intelligence and National

The ‘usual source’: Signals

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529908432525

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On 17 November 1941, 180,000 Commonwealth soldiers attacked Axis

On the contrary, Army authorities in Cairo were unusually interested in

a real attack on Ethiopia as cover for one on Somaliland. 'The advantage of it

Until late 1940, intelligence in London offered little to Cairo, save

consisted of No.2 Special Wireless Company, the radio intelligence unit of

reinforcements came from Britain and Australia. By December 1941,

' to impress on Shearer that highly coloured optimistic reports which

as what I always knew he was, a wishful thinker. All his intelligence,

Army, and especially of certain formation commanders in the Eighth Army.

of resources, followed by massive expansion and the need to train personnel

plateau of Cyrenaica).33 Operation 'Brevity', on 15 May, aimed to seize the

let alone divisions. On 19 May 1941, for example, Shearer mistakenly

Several technical problems hampered assessment of enemy armoured

sources provided enough hard data to define Axis tanks by numbers at a

armoured divisions to have 800 tanks, or 1,120 had they known it to be 40

In broader terms, between 'Battleaxe' and 'Crusader', Shearer traced the

Littorio was moving to Libya; analysis of shipping schedules shov/ed that it

Meanwhile, Heliopolis offered excellent material on Italian dispositions.

distorted, largely because the MID exaggerated the strength of Panzer

'desperate lack of aircraft fuel'.66

Between 'Battleaxe' and 'Crusader', Sigint was the best source on

offensive into CYRENAICA cannot be undertaken for several months'." By

- if no substantial enemy reinforcements arrived and if he received the

also began planning for 'Crusader'.

carefully determined by his estimate of our strength and by his knowledge

forces towards Tripolitania, keep his armour in Cyrenaica and wait. If

between Alexandria and Mersa Matruh were particularly full of traffic'.

and overconfidence which marked the Eighth Army in November 1941.

for.'92 Eighth Army carried such confidence into 'Crusader', producing

because it assumed that an approach which defeated a poor foe in Ethiopia

German strength. Eighth Army almost lost 'Crusader' despite better

Desert October to December 1940', by Wavell, 15 Dec. 1940, WO 169/16.

Reinforcements in Libya, DMI/VI/2, 29 July 1941, Blarney Papers, 3 DRL 6643/1/2B 18

Cunningham papers, 8803-104/18; CRME/1998/G (CAM)', 21 Feb. 1942, Middle East

100. 'Eighth Army, Report on Operations', WO 201/358.

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