Atp3 34x20 PDF

ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.
2D
Countering Explosive Hazards
JANUARY 2016
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protect technical or operational information as required by Title 22 USC, Section 2751 and NSDD 298. This
determination was made on 29 September 2015. Other requests for this document must be referred to
Commandant, U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence, ATTN: ATZT-CDC, 14000 MSCoE Loop, Suite
270, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the
document.
This publication supersedes FM 3-34.210, 27 March 2007.
Headquarters, Department of the Army
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOREWORD
This publication has been prepared under our direction for use by our respective commands and other
commands as appropriate.
ANTHONY C. FUNKHOUSER ROBERT S. WALSH

Brigadier General, USA Lieutenant General, USMC
Commandant Deputy Commandant for
U.S. Army Engineer School Combat Development and Integration
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at Marine Corps Doctrine at <https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil/>.
*ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D
Army Techniques Publication Headquarters

No. 3-34.20 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 21 January 2016
Marine Corps Reference Publication

No. 3-17.2D
Countering Explosive Hazards
Contents
Page
PREFACE.............................................................................................................. iv
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... v
Chapter 1 APPLYING ENGINEER DISCIPLINES/FUNCTIONS TO COUNTERING
EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS..................................................................................... 1-1
Categories of Explosive Hazards (U) ................................................................. 1-1
Engineer Disciplines/Functions (U) .................................................................... 1-2
Engineer Framework for Countering Explosive Hazards (U) ............................. 1-3
Effect of Engineer Disciplines/Functions in Countering Explosive Hazards (U) 1-5
Complementary Capabilities Available to Counter Explosive Obstacles (U) ..... 1-6
Chapter 2 EXPLOSIVE HAZARD CONSIDERATIONS ..................................................... 2-1
Explosive Booby Traps/Improvised Explosive Devices (U) ................................ 2-1
Mines (U) ............................................................................................................ 2-2
Mechanics of Land Mines (U) ............................................................................. 2-3
Chapter 3 MOBILITY ROLES ............................................................................................. 3-1
Mobility Operations for Countering Explosive Obstacles (U) ............................. 3-1
Reducing Explosive obstacles (U) ...................................................................... 3-4
Clearing of Explosive Obstacles (U) ................................................................... 3-4
Chapter 4 ENHANCE PROTECTION ................................................................................. 4-1
General Engineering and Survivability(U) .......................................................... 4-1
Distribution Restriction: Distribution authorized to U.S. government agencies and their contractors only to protect
technical or operational information as required by Title 22 USC, Section 2751 and NSDD 298. This determination
was made on 29 September 2015. Other requests for this document must be referred to Commandant, United
States Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence, ATTN: ATZT-CDC, 14000 MSCoE Loop, Suite 270, Fort
Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929.
Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the
document.
*This publication supersedes FM 3-34.210, 27 March 2007.
21 January 2016 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D i

Contents
Establishing Protective Positions and Hardening of Structures Against Effects

of Mobile IEDs (U) ............................................................................................... 4-2
Construction or Hardening of Structures to Secure Captured Enemy
Ammunition and Bulk Explosives (U) .................................................................. 4-2
Barriers And Obstacles (U) ................................................................................. 4-2
Chapter 5 RECONNAISSANCE .......................................................................................... 5-1
Engineer Roles in Reconnaissance (U) .............................................................. 5-1
Objectives (U) ..................................................................................................... 5-1
Principles (U)....................................................................................................... 5-3
Search Levels (U) ............................................................................................... 5-3
Categories (U) ..................................................................................................... 5-4
Resources (U) ..................................................................................................... 5-4
Chapter 6 EXPLOSIVE HAZARD PLANNING.................................................................... 6-1
Planning Considerations (U) ............................................................................... 6-1
Data Recording and Tracking (U) ....................................................................... 6-3
Appendix A METRIC CONVERSION CHART ...................................................................... A-1
Appendix B COUNTER EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS ENABLING EQUIPMENT ....................... B-1
Appendix C FORMS .............................................................................................................. C-1
Appendix D EXTRACTION FROM MINEFIELDS AND SIMILAR AREAS ........................... D-1
Appendix E EXPLOSIVE HAZARD INDICATORS ............................................................... E-1
GLOSSARY ............................................................................................ Glossary-
............................................................................................................................... 1
REFERENCES.................................................................................... References-
............................................................................................................................... 1
INDEX ........................................................................................................... Index-
............................................................................................................................... 1
Figures
Figure 1-1. (U) Engineer framework for countering explosive hazards ................................. 1-4
Figure 2-1. (U) Mine components .......................................................................................... 2-3
Figure 2-2. (U) Common methods of actuating mines ........................................................... 2-4
Figure 3-1. (U) Engineer terminology for reducing and clearing obstacles in support of
movement and maneuver ................................................................................... 3-2
Figure 3-2. (U) Engineer reduction and clearing tasks in support of mobility ........................ 3-3
Figure C-1. (U) Sample DD Form 3007 ................................................................................. C-2
Figure C-2. (U) Sample DD Form 3008 ................................................................................. C-5
Figure C-3. (U) Sample DD Form 3017 ............................................................................... C-10
ii ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 21 January 2016

Contents
Tables
Table 1-1. (U) Primary capabilities of warfighters, combat engineers, and EOD to
counter explosive obstacles impeding movement and maneuver ...................... 1-7
Table 3-1. (U) Typical engineer unit steps for conducting support to explosive
obstacle breaching .............................................................................................. 3-5
Table 3-2. (U) Typical engineer unit actions in support of route clearing of explosive
obstacles ............................................................................................................. 3-6
Table 4-1. (U) Some techniques to protect positions and harden structures ......................... 4-3
Table 5-1. (U) Engineer reconnaissance tasks relative to EHs .............................................. 5-2
Table 5-2. (U) Characteristics of search incident categories ................................................. 5-4
Table A-1. (U) Metric conversion chart ...................................................................................A-1
Table B-1. (U) Capabilities of metal and nonmetal detectors .................................................B-1
Table B-2. (U) Capabilities of EH component detectors ........................................................B-3
Table B-3. (U) Capabilities of homemade explosive detectors ..............................................B-4
Table B-4. (FOUO) Capabilities of countermine vehicles ......................................................B-4
Table B-5. (U) Capabilities of explosive obstacle breaching equipment ................................B-5
Table B-6. (U) Capabilities of MRAP and mine-protected vehicles ........................................B-6
Table B-7. (FOUO) Capabilities of vehicle attachments and auxiliary equipment .................B-8
Table B-8. (FOUO) Capabilities of robotic systems .............................................................B-10
Table B-9. (FOUO) Capabilities of CREW systems .............................................................B-11
Table B-10. (FOUO) Capabilities of UASs ...........................................................................B-12
Table E-1. (U) Typical EH indicators ......................................................................................E-2
Table E-2. (U) Typical EH locations .......................................................................................E-3
21 January 2016 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D iii

Preface
(U) ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D provides the overarching framework for how combat engineers apply their
disciplines/functions of combat engineering, general engineering, and geospatial engineering to countering
explosive hazards. It clarifies the terms and the language that engineers and the combined arms team use in
countering explosive hazards so that actions taken by combat engineers and units to counter explosive hazards
are communicated clearly and precisely. ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D addresses those topics regarding
countering explosive hazards that are not captured in other engineer doctrinal publications. On explosive hazards
topics covered in other engineer publications, ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D highlights the information and points
the reader to those other publications where applicable.
(U) The principal target audience for ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D is engineer leaders and staffs from platoon
level up to Corps level. However, all leaders will benefit from reading it. Trainers, educators, and capability
developers throughout the Army and Marine Corps will also use this publication.
(U) Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United
States (U.S.), international and, in some cases, host nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure
that Soldiers operate according to the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10 for additional
information.)
(U) Unless stated otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.
Appendix A contains a metric conversion chart for the measurements used in this publication. For a complete
listing of preferred metric units for general use, see Fed-Std-376B.
(U) ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint, Army, or Marine Corps terms
and definitions appear in the glossary and the text. Terms for which ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D is the proponent
publication (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Definitions for which
ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D is the proponent publication are boldfaced in the text. For other definitions shown
in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.
(U) ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the
United States, the U.S. Army Reserve, and United States Marine Corps (USMC) Total Force unless otherwise
stated.
(U) The proponent of ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D is the U.S. Army Engineer School. The preparing agency is
the U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE) Capabilities Development and Integration
Directorate; Concepts, Organizations, and Doctrine Development Division; Doctrine Branch. Send comments and
recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander,
MSCoE, ATTN: ATZT-CDC, 14000 MSCoE Loop, Suite 270, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929; by e-mail
to <usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.cdidcodddengdoc@mail.mil>; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.
(U) Marine Corps readers of this publication are encouraged to submit suggestions and changes through via e-
mail: <doctrine@usmc.mil> or Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, ATTN: C116
3300 Russell Road, Suite 204 Quantico, VA 22134-5021.
iv ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 21 January 2016

Introduction
(U) During the past decade of primarily counterinsurgency operations, insurgents and terrorists effectively
employed improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as one of the primary weapons against U.S. forces. U.S. forces
can expect future enemies to employ IEDs. At the other end of the spectrum, future conflicts may require combat
operations against near peer threats employing scatterable mines and conventional mines. These near peer threats
will also likely employ newer types of mines (such as enhanced top and side attack munitions). Future hybrid
threats will likely combine mines, IEDs, explosive booby traps, and other explosive hazards as part of their plans
to defeat U.S. forces. Combat engineers must be prepared to counter these and any other type of explosive hazard
to enable friendly freedom of action during offense, defense, and stability operations. Army and Marine forces,
besides combat engineers, counter explosive hazards. The combined arms effort of military forces with their
complementary capabilities allows U.S. forces to successfully counter explosive hazards.
(U) The primary purpose of ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D is to describe how combat engineers counter explosive
hazards in support of ground forces during offensive, defensive, and stability operations to provide commanders
with freedom of action. A secondary purpose of ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D is to clarify how engineers should
think about explosive hazards and to refocus engineers on understanding and using precise doctrinal terminology
to ensure that what engineers communicate regarding explosive hazards cannot be misunderstood. For example,
the term explosive hazards consists of five different categories of explosive hazards and hundreds of different
individual explosives and explosive devices. In planning and conducting operations, combat engineers must be
diligent in identifying and describing precisely which categories and types of explosive hazards the combined
arms team is facing. This is necessary because different categories of explosive hazards require different
combined arms and engineer techniques or procedures. In this publication, once the explosive hazard categories
are defined, explosive hazards will be used only when it applies to all five categories. If what is being stated
applies to four or less of the categories, then those categories will be listed.
(U) According to joint terminology, Marine Corps readers should note that combat engineer units and personnel
reduce explosive hazards as obstacles, whereas explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units clear explosive hazards
with render-safe procedures. Marine Corps combat engineer units counter explosive and nonexplosive obstacles
in breaching and clearing operations by detecting, confirming, reporting, recording, reducing, or marking and
bypassing. This distinction highlights the complementary capabilities of EOD team augmentation to combat
engineer units in clearing operations to reduce or clear explosive hazards, based on the threat situation or
commander’s direction.
(U) ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D uses the term explosive ordnance clearance agent (EOCA) as an equivalent
Army and Marine Corps capability in limited unexploded explosive ordnance (UXO) and single UXO-based IED
destruction by detonation. The U.S. Army Engineer School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, provides an
Engineer-EOCA course for Soldiers. The U.S. Army Ordnance School located at Fort Lee, Virginia, provides the
curriculum and instructional support for the EOCA course held at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The Marine
Corps Engineer School located at Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, provides equivalent
instruction for Marines.
(U) This publication does not address humanitarian demining efforts or mine warfare. U.S. armed forces are
prohibited from demining. In international mine action standards and guides, mine and UXO clearance is
considered just one part of the demining process. The international community considers demining as one
component of mine action. Section 401, Title 10, United States Code, Chapter 20 (10 USC 401 Chapter 20)
explicitly restricts members of the armed forces from demining unless it has the concurrent purpose of supporting
a U.S. military operation.
21 January 2016 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D v

Introduction
(U) ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D is a significant revision from its predecessor publication. Transformation of
Army and Marine Corps operating concepts, current operational environment, and lessons learned guided the
modifications. Changes include the—
 (U) Addition of relevant information based on lessons from two theaters of operations and the
emergence and evolution of the threat posed to U.S. forces.
 (U) Deletion of the chapter on assured mobility, because it is covered in ATTP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8.
 (U) Deletion of the chapter on mine warfare principles, because it is covered in ATTP 3-90.4
/MCWP 3-17.8.
(U) ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D consists of six chapters and five appendixes to provide additional details on
selected topics. A brief description of the chapters and appendixes follow:
 (U) Chapter 1 provides the broad framework for how engineers apply their disciplines/functions to
countering the five categories of explosive hazards.
 (U) Chapter 2 describes the five categories of explosive hazards in more detail
 (U) Chapter 3 focuses on application of mobility operations of reducing and clearing to explosive
obstacles including mines, IEDs, explosive booby traps, and UXO.
 (U) Chapter 4 focuses on enhance protection roles for combat engineers in countering explosive
hazards (EHs) by addressing engineer tasks in survivability and security operations.
 (U) Chapter 5 discusses engineer roles in reconnaissance and the search framework.
 (U) Chapter 6 describes engineer planning considerations.
 (U) Appendix A is a metric conversion chart.
 (U) Appendix B describes counter-EH-enabling equipment used by the Army/Marine Corps.
 (U) Appendix C provides samples of forms used.
 (U) Appendix D describes extraction from minefields and similar areas.
 (U) Appendix E provides explosive hazard indicators.
(U) This publication uses the term planning process to indicate the military decisionmaking process/Marine Corps
Planning Process and (Army) troop leading procedures/troop leading steps. Battalion-size and larger units use
either the military decisionmaking process or Marine Corps Planning Process. Company-size and smaller units
typically follow troop leading procedures/troop leading steps.
(U) ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D uses the term mission variables to indicate both the Army and Marine Corps
uses of the term. For the Army, mission variables consist of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and
support available, time available, and civil considerations. For the Marine Corps (and in joint doctrine), mission
variables consist of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, and time available.
(U) When this publication uses two terms separated by a slash (/), the first term is the Army term, and the second
term is the Marine Corps term. Key differences in Army and Marine Corps terms include—
 (U) (Army) Battlefield/(Marine Corps) battlespace (written as battlefield/battlespace).
 (U) (Army) Brigade combat team (BCT)/(Marine Corps) regimental combat team (RCT) (written as
BCT/RCT).
 (U) (Army) Knowledge management/(Marine Corps) knowledge sharing (written as knowledge
management/knowledge sharing).
 (U) (Army) Protection warfighting function/(Marine Corps) force protection warfighting function
(written as protection/force protection).
 (U) (Army) Sustainment warfighting function/(Marine Corps) logistics warfighting function (written
as sustainment/logistics).
 (U) (Army) Human intelligence/(Marine Corps) tactical human intelligence (written as human
intelligence/tactical human intelligence).
(U) The techniques and principles included in this publication represent the most current practices within the
combined arms community. The information in this publication does not replace or limit the ingenuity and
enterprise of military leaders, but serves as the foundation for mission planning and execution of combined arms
countering EHs.
vi ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 21 January 2016

Chapter 1
Applying Engineer Disciplines/Functions to Countering
Explosive Hazards (U)
(U) An explosive hazard is any hazard containing an explosive component to include
UXO (including land mines), booby traps (some booby traps are nonexplosive),
improvised explosive devices (which are an improvised type of booby trap), captured
enemy ammunition (CEA), and bulk explosives (JP 3-15). For engineers, countering
explosive hazards can best be described as the application of the engineer
disciplines/functions of combat engineering, general engineering, and geospatial
engineering in coordination with engineer reconnaissance and following the
commander’s guidance to the categories of explosive hazards, enabling freedom of
action for friendly forces. Combat engineers counter EHs by conducting engineer tasks
as part of combined arms teams to provide maneuver commanders the ability to
accomplish missions more effectively and safely. This chapter presents an overarching
framework for how engineers should think and talk about explosive hazards and about
how to counter them in terms of engineer tasks. This chapter also addresses the
progressive response capabilities available when units encounter mines, IEDs,
explosive booby traps, and UXO during mobility operations.
CATEGORIES OF EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS (U)

1-1. (U) There are five categories of explosive hazards: IEDs, booby traps, UXO (mines), CEA, and bulk
explosives. These categories group the enormous number and type of explosive hazards into a manageable
set of categories that allow engineers to assess and understand their responsibility for each. The following
paragraphs provide the definitions for each category (chapter 2 discusses each category in more detail):
 (U) Unexploded explosive ordnance is explosive ordnance which has been primed, fused, armed
or otherwise prepared for action, and which has been fired, dropped, launched, projected, or placed
in such a manner as to constitute a hazard to operations, installations, personnel, or material and
remains unexploded either by malfunction or design or for any other cause (JP 3-15).
 (U) A mine is an explosive or other material, normally encased, designed to destroy or damage
ground vehicles, boats, or aircraft, or designed to wound, kill, or otherwise incapacitate personnel
and designed to be detonated by the action of its victim, by the passage of time, or by controlled
means (JP 3-15).
 (U) Booby traps are explosive or nonexplosive devices deliberately placed to cause casualties, or
provide warning, when a person disturbs or approaches an apparently harmless object or performs
an apparently safe act. (This publication limits its discussion to explosive booby traps.)
 (U) An improvised explosive device is a weapon that is fabricated or emplaced in an
unconventional manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary
chemicals designed to kill, destroy, incapacitate, harass, deny mobility, or distract (JP 3-15.1).
 (U) CEA is ammunition products and components, including military grade explosives produced
for or used by a hostile foreign force (that is or was engaged in combat against the United States)
that is in the custody of a U.S. military force or under the control of a Department of Defense
(DOD) component.
 (U) Bulk explosives are explosives that do not normally have military applications, but may be
found within the area of operations. Bulk explosives are often used in civilian quarrying or mining;
however, the enemy can use these explosives just like CEA.
21 January 2016 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 1-1

Chapter 1
1-2. (U) Mines, explosive booby traps, and IEDs have several characteristics in common that are important
to engineers. These particular EHs are deliberately built and emplaced for causing casualties and damage.
Enemy forces emplace these categories of explosive hazards in areas where friendly forces will be operating.
When engineers talk about countering mines, IEDs, and explosive booby traps, it is normally in reference to
enemy emplaced explosive devices that intend to target friendly forces.
1-3. (U) While explosive booby traps and IEDs are similar in many aspects, they are defined differently.
However, for the purpose of this publication, these two explosive hazards are referenced together (explosive
booby traps/IEDs) because engineers approach these threats in the same manner. In contrast, this publication
specifically separates mines from UXOs because engineers have a specific role in reducing and clearing
mines that is separate from how they approach UXO.
1-4. (U) Grouped together, engineers consider all types of mines, explosive booby traps/IEDs, and UXO
primarily as explosive obstacles since their presence in the area of operations impedes freedom of movement
or maneuver.
1-5. (U) For engineers, CEA and bulk explosives are addressed differently than mines, explosive booby
traps/ IEDs, and UXO because these two categories of explosive hazards do not pose an imminent threat to
friendly force maneuver or movement. CEA is under friendly control, and bulk explosives are not set to
impede movement and maneuver. Therefore, combat engineers are not required to reduce or clear them, but
may be required to conduct other engineering tasks.
1-6. (U) Explosive hazards can have devastating and negative effects on friendly forces and friendly
operations. A determined and resourceful enemy can employ mines and explosive booby traps/IEDs across
an area of operations to negatively impact:
 (U) Moving supplies and forces.
 (U) Maneuvering against defending enemies.
 (U) Occupying and constructing assembly areas, outposts, and airfields.
 (U) Securing key terrain.
 (U) Maintaining safety, morale, and confidence of friendly forces.
 (U) Achieving civil security and civil control.
ENGINEER DISCIPLINES/FUNCTIONS (U)

1-7. (U) Ground forces conduct operations primarily on or in the natural and man-made features of terrain.
Engineer operations are unique because engineer activities are directly aimed at affecting the terrain or at
improving the understanding of the terrain for aiding ground forces. Because explosive hazards exist on, in,
and above the terrain over which ground forces operate, engineers apply their assigned disciplines/functions
to the categories of explosive hazards to determine their responsibilities in countering negative effects.
1-8. (U) The engineer disciplines/functions of combat, general, and geospatial engineering are those
capabilities that engineer forces must be able to provide to supported ground forces. These engineer
disciplines/functions and their application to explosive hazards will be discussed in more detail in subsequent
chapters. This chapter uses these disciplines/functions to build the overarching framework for how engineers
counter the categories of explosive hazards in any type of operation and terrain.
1-9. (U) Combat engineering is the engineering capabilities and activities that closely support the maneuver
of land combat forces consisting of three types: mobility, countermobility, and survivability (JP 3-34).
Mobility operations are those combined arms activities that mitigate the effects of natural and man-made
obstacles to enable freedom of movement and maneuver (ATTP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8). Countermobility
operations are those combined arms activities that use or enhance the effects of natural and man-made
obstacles to deny adversary freedom of movement and maneuver (ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5). Survivability
operations are those military activities that alter the physical environment to provide or improve cover,
concealment, and camouflage (ATP 3-37.34/MCWP 3-17.6).
1-10. (U) General engineering are those engineering capabilities and activities, other than combat
engineering, that modify, maintain, or protect the physical environment (JP 3-34).
1-2 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 21 January 2016

Applying Engineer Disciplines/Functions to Countering Explosive Hazards (U)
1-11. (U) Geospatial engineering are those engineering capabilities and activities that contribute to a clear
understanding of the physical environment by providing geospatial information and services to commanders
and staffs (JP 3-34).
1-12. (U) Engineer reconnaissance can be described as those operations undertaken by engineers to obtain,
by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy
or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographical, or geographical characteristics
and the local population of a particular area.
ENGINEER FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTERING EXPLOSIVE

HAZARDS (U)
1-13. (U) This section identifies the four conditions that cover every situation in which engineers must
counter the categories of explosive hazards. It then identifies the major engineer tasks, organized by engineer
discipline, that the Army requires engineers to conduct to counter explosive hazards in these conditions. By
identifying the conditions, engineers can apply their unique capabilities in a logical manner without getting
overwhelmed by the complexities of the various explosives materials, initiating systems, triggering
mechanisms, and other attributes of the device. Engineers counter the categories of EHs under the four
specific conditions outlined below. These different conditions drive the extent to which engineers are
involved in countering the different groupings of the categories, govern the type of tasks the engineers will
conduct to counter them, and in large part determine the type of engineer unit that will conduct the tasks to
counter the explosives hazards under these specific conditions. Engineers must understand these conditions
and know how to apply the right engineer effort to counter the effects of each condition on friendly forces
and friendly operations. Each condition groups like categories of explosive hazards, thereby simplifying how
engineers think about and counter such a wide array of explosive hazards. Figure 1-1, page 1-4, depicts the
overarching framework for how engineers counter all categories of explosive hazards by grouping them into
the four conditions and showing the conditions, which engineer disciplines/functions and key tasks engineers
apply to counter them. This figure provides the foundation for the rest of the publication. The conditions are
as follows:
 (U) Condition 1. This condition exists when there are mines, explosive booby traps/IEDs and
UXO already emplaced or in place in the area of operations, and they are impeding the maneuver
or movement of friendly forces. This condition applies only to mines, explosive booby traps/IEDs
and UXO.
 (U) Condition 2. This condition exists when the enemy is moving mines, explosive booby
traps/IEDs into the friendly area of operations or moving them to new locations within the friendly
area of operations to eventually emplace them in the area of operations. The enemy plans to
emplace them where they will impede movement or maneuver. This condition applies only to
mines and explosive booby traps/IEDs and to their component parts.
 (U) Condition 3. This condition exists when the enemy employs IEDs (vehicle-borne IEDs,
personnel-borne IEDs, airborne IEDs, waterborne IEDs) against stationary targets in the area of
operations. This condition applies only to moving or mobile IEDs.
 (U) Condition 4. This condition exists when there are CEA and bulk explosives located in the
area of operations and are under friendly force control. They are not impeding movement or
maneuver but may require protective barriers constructed around them (in case of detonation) or
they require manpower to assist in proper disposal using demolitions. This condition applies only
to CEA and bulk explosives.

Chapter 1
Legend:
ABIED air-borne improvised explosive device
AO area of operations
CEA captured enemy ammunition
IED improvised explosive device
ISO in support of
PBIED person-borne improvised explosive device
VBIED vehicle-borne improvised explosive device
WBIED waterborne improvised explosive device
UXO unexploded explosive ordnance
Figure 1-1. (U) Engineer framework for countering explosive hazards
1-14. (U) Condition 1 is the major focus for combat engineers. Combat engineers must be able to counter
the effects of having mines, explosive booby traps/IEDs, and UXO impeding the movement and maneuver
of friendly forces. Combat engineers achieve this primarily in support to mobility operations, supporting
breaching during maneuver and clearing operations during movement. Countering the explosive hazards
under this condition takes in offensive, defensive and stability operations throughout the phases of a typical
campaign plan. The majority of engineer effort to counter explosive hazards is applied to countering this
condition.
1-15. (U) The engineer role in countering Condition 2 is not intuitively obvious and varies in how it is
accomplished in offensive and defensive versus in stability operations. In stability operations, this condition
can require engineers to install barriers and obstacles to deny the enemy the ability to move mines and
explosive booby traps/IEDs into or around the area of operations. The kilometers of T-walls that engineers
emplaced to compartmentalize the Green Zone in Baghdad during Operation Iraqi Freedom assisted the
combined arms team in preventing insurgents from moving IEDs and IED components into the area of
operations. During the offense and defense, combat engineers work within the targeting process to ensure

mine-laying vehicles and other enemy assets or units are targeted to prevent them from ever emplacing
explosive obstacles that will impede the combined arms team.
1-16. (U) Condition 3 occurs when IEDs are employed against stationary friendly forces or facilities. Combat
engineers counter these IEDs (such as vehicle or personnel-borne) by executing survivability operations and
general engineering to build protective positions and harden structures to mitigate the blast effects.
Additionally, engineers install barriers such as tetrahedrons at checkpoints or serpentine concrete barriers at
entry control points to slow or stop the movement of mobile IEDs.
1-17. (U) Condition 4 differs from the other three in that the CEA and bulk explosives are under the control
of friendly forces and normally do not pose an immediate danger to friendly forces. However, these explosive
hazards often require military effort to protect, move, or destroy them. Engineer support to Condition 4 is
normally limited to providing general engineering support to construct berms or fencing around CEA sites
to secure these explosives from falling into threat hands. Combat engineers may also be tasked to assist EOD
in destroying CEA or bulk explosives.
1-18. (U) Engineers apply disciplines/functions and capabilities to counter the categories of explosive
hazards, but only under the four conditions described above. Each engineer discipline provides different
capabilities to counter the challenges that explosive hazards create on the battlefield under one or more of
the four conditions.
1-19. (U) The key tasks identified in figure 1-1 and listed below represent the primary ways that engineers
counter explosive hazards in coordination with the combined arms team. These tasks are interdependent. The
synergy gained by the coordinated application of these tasks conducted by combined arms teams and
supported by engineer units and staffs across the area of operations ensures freedom of action and protection
for friendly ground forces against any category of explosive hazard. For engineers then, countering explosive
hazards means successfully supporting or conducting the tasks listed below at the right place and time during
offensive, defensive, and stability operations. Chapters 3-6 of this publication discuss the following tasks
applied to the relevant categories of explosive hazards and the conditions requiring engineer action:
 (U) Conduct reduction in support of breaching missions.
 (U) Conduct route clearing.
 (U) Conduct area clearing.
 (U) Conduct countermobility.
 (U) Conduct survivability.
 (U) Provide general engineering support.
 (U) Conduct route, area, and obstacle reconnaissance.
 (U) Conduct engineer search for cached explosive obstacle materials and their components.
 (U) Conduct terrain analysis and provide terrain visualization products.
 (U) Plan, prepare, execute, and assess engineer operations.
EFFECT OF ENGINEER DISCIPLINES/FUNCTIONS IN

COUNTERING EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS (U)
1-20. (U) Countering the four conditions of explosive hazards and their negative effects requires a
coordinated effort of all engineer units across the area of operations in support of and in coordination with
all warfighting functions during offensive, defensive and stability operations. Combined arms operations,
with effective engineer integration, provides the best means to counter the conditions of explosive hazards.
It is critical that this engineer integration occurs during all phases of a campaign plan. During the shaping
and deterrent phases, geospatial engineers and engineer leaders study the terrain, existing obstacle situation
(to include all explosive hazard data), and obstacle capability of the potential enemy, including all sources of
explosive obstacles. This terrain analysis and obstacle information supports the engineer planning for the
combined arms operations to seize the initiative, including opening airfields and seaports. To dominate the
enemy during major combat operations, combat engineers provide mobility to friendly force movement and
maneuver despite the presence of any obstacle type. During stability operations, combined arms teams,
supported by combat engineers, clear routes of explosive obstacles while other engineers emplace obstacles
in coordination with maneuver to deny the threat the ability to emplace explosive booby traps/IEDs or to

Chapter 1
move them into or around the area of operations. Engineers support the maneuver commander by building
base camps with protective structures and hardening other facilities to protect friendly forces against possible
moving IED attacks (vehicle-borne IEDs, person-borne IEDs). These engineers also construct protective and
security barriers around areas containing CEA and bulk explosives. The synergy gained by synchronizing
the engineer disciplines/functions in support of the combined arms team provides the most effective use of
combat engineers to counter explosive hazards across the range of military operations.
ENGINEERS COUNTERING EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS DURING THE OFFENSE AND DEFENSE (U)
1-21. (U) During the offense, engineer leaders participate in the targeting process to ensure that enemy mine-
laying equipment is listed as a high payoff target to prevent minefields from ever being emplaced. Engineer
reconnaissance and geospatial engineers provide intelligence and analysis to recommend the avenues of
approach least likely to be covered with explosive obstacles. Combat engineer units provide support to
breaching to create lanes for maneuver in contact with the enemy while route and area clearance units provide
support to route and area clearing operations in support of follow-on or support forces. During the defense,
engineers clear supply routes and areas for command and logistics sites while building protective structures
to mitigate the effects of moving IEDs.
ENGINEERS COUNTERING EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS DURING STABILITY OPERATIONS (U)

1-22. (U) During stability operations where explosive obstacles such as IEDs are common
(counterinsurgency), a BCT/RCT can most effectively counter explosive hazards by applying its diverse
engineer support across the area of operations, integrated with the other combined arms team members. The
BCT/RCT can employ its construction and combat engineer assets to compartmentalize the terrain to meet
the goal of civil security. Engineer units can install kilometers of barriers, such as T-walls or triple standard
concertina fence around specific locations that effectively deny threat movement into the area of operations
except along specific routes and in/out of limited entry control points. This compartmentalization denies the
enemy access to the routes for emplacing explosive booby traps/IEDs and provides focused effort for
persistent surveillance assets. Engineers install culvert denial systems, and conduct route sanitization to
reduce the insurgent ability to emplace explosive booby traps/IEDs. Route clearance units conduct clearing
operations along these routes to detect and clear IEDs that are emplaced to ensure freedom of movement.
The synergy gained by this coordinated application of engineer capabilities provides the most effective means
for the combat engineers to support the combined arms team in countering explosive booby traps/IEDs and
establishing civil security during counterinsurgency operations.
COMPLEMENTARY CAPABILITIES AVAILABLE TO COUNTER

EXPLOSIVE OBSTACLES (U)
1-23. (U) The warfighter has a basic set of capabilities to react to explosive obstacles when they are impeding
movement and maneuver, while combat engineers and EOD forces have additional capabilities to counter or
respond to them. It is important for leaders to understand the complementary nature of these capabilities to
be able to plan, prepare, and execute operations where there is the likelihood of encountering explosive
obstacles. This section briefly outlines how warfighters, combat engineers, and EOD forces react, counter,
and respond to explosive obstacles. Table 1-1 provides a snapshot of the primary tasks, normal conditions,
and main limitations of warfighters, combat engineers, and EOD in countering explosive obstacles during
movement and maneuver. The synchronization of these arms ensures the most effective countering of
explosive obstacles impeding freedom of action.

Table 1-1. (U) Primary capabilities of warfighters, combat engineers, and EOD to
counter explosive obstacles impeding movement and maneuver
Explosive Ordnance
Warfighter Combat Engineer
Disposal
Primary tasks or • Bypass • Bypass • Route • Render safe
capabilities to • Limited reducing • Reducing in clearing • Exploitation
counter explosive in support of hasty support of • Area • Disposal
obstacles: breach breaching clearing
Conditions • Under enemy fire • For • For clear: • Local security provided
normally required or under reducing: not under by friendly force external
to conduct immediate enemy under enemy fire to explosive ordnance
task(s): threat of fire enemy fire or at low disposal
or immediate threat of
threat of enemy fire
enemy fire
Limitations: • Not equipped or • Not equipped or trained to • Not equipped, organized,
trained to conduct render safe or exploit or trained to reduce in
deliberate support of breaching
reduction,
clearing, or render
safe
WARFIGHTER CAPABILITY TO REACT TO EXPLOSIVE OBSTACLES (U)

1-24. (U) The warfighters (or locating unit) have limited capabilities to counter explosive obstacles that they
encounter while conducting movement and maneuver. Without engineer or EOD support, they primarily react
to explosive obstacles. Combat engineers are normally task-organized with units that expect to encounter
explosive obstacles. EOD forces may be task-organized to support the lead element. If the maneuver
commander (or locating unit commander) does not have engineer or EOD support when they encounter an
explosive obstacle, then the commander will consider mission requirements, acceptable level of risk, and
available resources to determine the best course of action to take. In general, the warfighter reacts to mines,
explosive booby traps/IEDs, and UXO using immediate action battle drills and unit standard operating
procedures. Mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, time available, troops and support
available and civil considerations will dictate the warfighter’s specific response to encountering an explosive
obstacle.
Offensive and Defensive Operations (U)

1-25. (U) Warfighters conducting maneuver against a defending enemy will normally be task-organized with
combat engineers to provide reduction capabilities. Also, EOD may be task-organized. A unit bypassing an
explosive obstacle should record and report the explosive obstacle. If bypass is not an option and to preserve
life, limb, or eyesight, warfighters may attempt (according to unit standard operating procedures) to create a
lane through the explosive obstacle using destruction or removal. Warfighters should avoid unnecessary
attempts to destroy or remove explosive hazards.
Stability Operations (U)

1-26. (U) During stability operations, units without combat engineers or EOD encountering explosive
obstacles during movement or occupation of a new area should normally stop, report the hazard, and ensure
that the hazard is secured until combat engineers or EOD arrives or the unit receives other guidance from
higher command. Depending on the threat situation, there is often more danger to a unit in trying to reduce
the explosive obstacle using organic capabilities than from taking the time to wait for those units trained to
reduce these obstacles. The commander must determine what capabilities are required (engineers, EOD, or a
mix of both) to address the threat. All units report encounters with explosive obstacles to the unit tactical
operations center according to unit standard operating procedures (enemy, friendly, unit minefield, obstacle
report, EOD 9-line). The unit should also populate its digital force tracking devices with the area the explosive

Chapter 1
obstacle is located to assist in building a common operational picture on explosive obstacle locations and
route status (if explosive obstacle was found on a route). Reporting and tracking protection/force protection
measures allows military units and convoys to avoid hazards and predict potential future hazard locations.
(See ATP 4-32 and ATP 4-32.2/MCRP 3-17.2B/NTTP 3-02.4.1/AFTTP 3-2.12 for additional information on
EH reporting.)
ENGINEER CAPABILITY TO COUNTER EXPLOSIVE OBSTACLES (U)

1-27. (U) Engineers proactively plan for reducing or clearing explosive obstacles during offensive, defensive
and stability operations. Engineer leaders employ the full complement of the engineer disciplines/functions
of combat engineering (mobility, countermobility, survivability), general engineering, geospatial
engineering, and engineer reconnaissance to countering explosive obstacles. Engineers first prevent the
enemy from being able to install explosive obstacles in the friendly area of operations and then proactively
reduce and clear explosive obstacles that the enemy manages to install that are impeding movement and
maneuver.

1-28. (U) During offensive operations of major combat operations, combat engineer units are task-organized
with attacking maneuver units to reduce (create lanes through, over, or around) explosive obstacles for the
attacking maneuver unit by the methods of bypass, destruction, or removal. Combat engineers are the only
units fully equipped, trained, and organized to conduct reduction of explosive obstacles in support of
breaching for maneuvering armored, infantry, or armored wheeled vehicle forces. Maneuver commanders
and their supporting combat engineers already know what actions the combat engineers will take to reduce
any explosive obstacles that may be encountered before they cross the line of departure during an attack. This
ensures breaching conducted by maneuver and engineer units occur without hesitation down to the lowest
combined arms level. Combat engineers possess unique equipment to support breaching. For example, the
assault breaching vehicle allows combat engineers to maneuver as part of the combined arms team even when
under enemy direct and indirect fires. The assault breaching vehicle crew creates the initial vehicle width
lane using its two mine clearing line charges through an explosive obstacle, proofs the lane with its mine
plow, and marks the left hand rail of the lane with its marking system. Combat engineers breaching equipment
and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) are designed to rapidly create these lanes to maintain the
momentum of the attack and not allow enemy obstacles to impede maneuver and put friendly forces at risk
of casualties from direct and indirect fires. Combat engineers report locations of all obstacles and created
lanes or bypasses to maneuver and engineer higher headquarters for dissemination across the force.
1-29. (U) Additionally during offensive operations, engineer forces are task-organized with follow-on
maneuver and support forces to clearing explosive obstacles along main supply routes and other routes that
keep support moving forward with the attack and casualties moving safely and quickly back to support areas.
The engineer units that normally support the combined arms route clearing behind the lead maneuver units
are route clearance units. These engineer units support the follow-on movement of forces in opening
additional lanes through the explosive obstacles, clearing supply routes, and clearing tactical assembly areas.
1-30. (U) During defensive operations, combat engineers support the combined arms teams by clearing
routes and areas of explosive obstacles for maneuver and support units to occupy defensive positions and
prepare for the enemy attack.

1-31. (U) During stability operations, the threat from enemy maneuver and fires to combined arms teams
diminishes as friendly forces operate to establish civil security, civil control, restore essential services,
support governance, and support economic and infrastructure development. The threat of irregular elements
conducting attacks against friendly forces or the civil governance also exists. Enemy forces will likely
increase employment of IEDs, as explosive obstacles along key routes. Friendly forces become more
vulnerable to these threats as they establish base camps and use regular routes to move units and supplies.
Combat engineers conduct route and area clearing missions to detect and eliminate explosive obstacles in
support of safe and efficient movement of troops and supplies. Engineers also emplace barriers and obstacles

to deny the enemy scouts or irregular forces from moving explosives into or within the defensive area of
operations.
1-32. (U) During stability operations, engineer leaders receive guidance or authorization from their higher
headquarters in an operation order or in unit standard operating procedures that frame responses to explosive
obstacle incidents during stability operations. Engineers consider the following factors clearing these
explosive obstacles but should ensure that before conducting clearing missions they understand exactly what
is in their authority to accomplish in terms of destruction, removal, and reporting of encountered explosive
obstacles:
 (U) Higher command guidance on explosive obstacles.
 (U) Effect of the delay on the mission.
 (U) Threat from direct and indirect fire. The risk of casualties from direct or indirect fire may be
greater than that from the explosive obstacle.
 (U) Size; location; possibility of multiple devices; and potential chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear contents of the explosive obstacle.
 (U) Terrain and location of the explosive obstacle.
 (U) Alternate routes or positions available.
 (U) The location and security of potential control or check points.
 (U) The degree of protection available.
 (U) The capabilities of the unit and its personnel.
 (U) The danger to follow-on forces and missions.
 (U) The danger to civilian population and infrastructure.
 (U) The availability of EOD support.
 (U) Dedicating security for the explosive hazard.
1-33. (U) Engineers track and report route status and clearing efforts to provide input in the creation of a
common operational picture of the explosive obstacle threat in the area of operations. An updated route status
report with current and past explosive obstacle locations enables leaders to plan and execute combat missions
and avoid or bypass areas traditionally emplaced with explosive obstacles.
1-34. (U) EOCA personnel are combat engineers with additional training to perform limited
battlefield/battlespace disposal of authorized explosive ordnance identified in the EOCA guide or
supplemental EOCA ordnance list. During reduction tasks in support of breaching, the limitations placed on
EOCA-certified combat engineers do not apply. That is, all combat engineers reducing explosive obstacles
in support of breaching are authorized to destroy or remove all mines, explosive booby traps/IEDs, and UXO
that are impeding friendly maneuver. The EOCA guide and UXO supplemental list do not limit them.
1-35. (U) When conducting clearing operations, EOCA-certified combat engineers can remotely identify and
detonate those explosive devices for which they are specifically trained and authorized as detailed in the
EOCA identification guide and supplemental list of EOCA ordnance. The EOCA guide is produced by the
EOD directorate and approved by the EOD technology division. The theater EOD commander normally
publishes a UXO supplemental list. EOCA capabilities include—
 (U) Explosive ordnance reconnaissance. EOCA personnel are trained to perform remote and
manual reconnaissance of suspect explosive ordnance to determine if it is listed in the EOCA
identification guide and supplemental EOCA ordnance list.
 (U) Explosive ordnance identification. While combat engineers are trained in demolitions,
mines, and various explosive obstacles, the EOCA certification adds the capability to identify
explosive ordnance listed in the EOCA identification guide and the supplemental EOCA ordnance
list. Leaders use the EOD 9-Line to report the items the EOCA cannot positively identify.
 (U) Explosive device area marking. EOCA personnel mark the explosive device area according
to the standard explosive hazard marking system.
 (U) Increased survivability support. EOCA personnel can support survivability efforts to isolate
a blast and fragmentation danger area of the identified UXO. EOCAs will advise the on-scene
commander about the recommended personnel and equipment protective measures. If the
explosive ordnance is identified as 89 millimeter and below, the recommended standoff distance

Chapter 1
is 381 meters. For explosive ordnance 90 millimeter and above, the recommended standoff is 600
meters. Commanders should increase survivability efforts to protect personnel and equipment
from the blast effects when they must remain in the hazard area.
 (U) Explosive ordnance disposal. EOCA personnel are authorized to destroy by detonation
explosive ordnance identified in the EOCA identification guide and supplemental list of EOCA
ordnance.
 (U) Explosive ordnance move. EOCA personnel are not trained to move explosive ordnance.
Under certain conditions, EOCA personnel may use remote devices to move explosive devices
where speed is required and the commander’s acceptable risk require the device to be moved.
1-36. (U) The Marine Corps institutionalized EH ordnance identification, and reduction programs of
instruction are the equivalent in training to the Army Engineer-EOCA course. Resident courses meeting
Army EOCA equivalency are the Marine Corps Engineer School combat engineer noncommissioned officers
course, combat engineer platoon sergeant course, and combat engineer officer course. Theater-specific
training may be required for Marines having attended the resident courses before deployment or once
deployed. Destruction by detonation of explosive devices by Marines is based on current theater of operation
standard and supplemental EOCA ordnance list.
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO EXPLOSIVE OBSTACLES

(U)
1-37. (U) EOD forces support maneuver commanders by providing capabilities to identify, render safe,
dispose of, collect, and exploit all explosive ordnance and IEDs. The EOD team is the only organization
authorized to conduct render-safe procedures on these explosive types and in addition, the EOD team has the
ability to collect detailed forensics. They can also provide tactical analysis of enemy use of IEDs and train
and mentor joint, host nation, and multinational forces. EOD capabilities include—
 (U) Providing explosive ordnance battlefield/battlespace technical intelligence and exploitation.
 (U) Directing EOD teams, platoons, and companies and counter-IED task forces.
 (U) Providing technical advice to interrogators and tactical questioners about the subject of
improvised bomb construction. This advice would be limited to a supporting effort for the human
intelligence/tactical human intelligence team or in support of other related detainee operations.
 (U) Providing technical expertise to Explosive Hazard Coordination Cells on explosives and
explosive devices.
 (U) Conducting a postblast assessment.
 (U) Supporting the handling and disposal of UXO and CEA.

1-38. (U) EOD supports the purposes of offensive operations by depriving the enemy of resources. This is
accomplished through the disposal of CEA. EOD also supports the development of intelligence by
performing postblast analysis, fragmentation analysis, and site exploitation and producing weapons technical
intelligence. EOD is the only asset capable of providing rendered-safe weapons in support of the weapons
technical intelligence process and the larger counter-IED process. In addition, EOD supports the creation of
a secure environment for stability operations by negating the enemy ability to effectively use explosive
ordnance and rendering safe and disposing of all UXO (friendly and enemy).
1-39. (U) EOD supports the purposes of defensive operations by protecting the populace, critical assets, and
infrastructure. This is accomplished through the rendering safe and disposal of UXO, IED, homemade
explosives (HME) and precursors, chemical and biological ordnance, nuclear ordnance, and weapons of mass
destruction. Driving factors in the execution of the EOD mission during defensive operations include the
level of security of the operational environment, enemy weapons of choice, and TTPs. EOD units will focus
on protecting joint, multinational, and host nation forces from all explosive hazards. EOD supports the
development of intelligence during defensive operations in the same way that it does during offensive
operations. Additionally, EOD forces provide significant support to vulnerability and threat assessments.


1-40. (U) The support provided by EOD during offensive and defensive operations continues during stability
operations. The first aim is to limit adversary influence and isolate the populace from the enemy by
establishing civil security. If the enemy poses a significant military threat, forces engaged in stability
operations defend themselves and the populace from attacks. EOD units will focus on the safety and security
of the forces, civilian populace, and infrastructure concerning explosive hazards. It is critical that
commanders maximize the use of EOD qualified personnel to minimize the likelihood of collateral damage.
Local security is the foremost condition for consideration of employment of EOD assets; it underpins all
other factors. During stability operations, EOD also focuses on the training, advising, and assisting of host
nation and multinational forces in explosive ordnance recognition and response. (See ATP 4-32,
ATP 4-32.2/MCRP 3-17.2B/NTTP 3-02.4.1/AFTTP 3-2.12, and ATP 4-32.16/MCRP 3-17.2C/NTTP
3-02.5/AFTTP 3-2.32 for additional information on EOD capabilities.)

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Chapter 2
Explosive Hazard Considerations (U)
(U) This chapter expounds on the five categories of explosive hazards identified in the
first chapter. Engineers must understand these categories of explosive hazards since
engineer actions vary by EH category and by various types of explosives within each
category. Chapter 2 also includes discussion of the requirements for Soldier/Marine
awareness and engineer knowledge of explosive hazards and the signs and indicators
of the presence of these hazards.
EXPLOSIVE BOOBY TRAPS/IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

(U)
2-1. (U) Threat groups across the globe use explosive booby traps/IEDs to create or exploit vulnerabilities
and achieve their tactical and strategic aims. Because explosive booby traps/IEDs are effective, inexpensive
to produce, and relatively easy to employ, they are likely to be a weapon of choice in warfare for the
foreseeable future. When used in conjunction with other obstacles or as a close contact weapon, explosive
booby traps/IEDs are employed to ambush military forces; assassinate key military, government, or civilian
figures; or to target a particular group or organization.
2-2. (U) Explosive booby traps/IEDs may incorporate military munitions and hardware, but they are
frequently constructed from components that are nonmilitary in nature. Explosive booby traps/IEDs range in
size from small devices directed at individual targets (such as military personnel or civilians) to large HME
designed to destroy armored vehicles and their occupants or facilities and buildings. Although explosive
booby traps/IEDs vary widely in shape, size, and form, they usually share common components:
 (U) Switch. A switch is a device for making, breaking, or changing an electrical or nonelectrical
connection in an explosive booby trap or IED. The three main categories of switches are command,
time, and victim-operated. In a command switch, the attacker controls the device and activates the
switch. Remote-controlled detonators allow the exact timing of detonations. Often, these are along
a roadside and detonate as a vehicle passes. Time switches function after a set or predetermined
time and are generally used by an attacker on fixed site locations. A timer is common and can be
set hours in advance. Some bomb makers also use safe-arm switches to reduce the risk of
accidental detonation during explosive booby trap or IED emplacement. In a victim-operated
switch, physical actions of an unsuspecting individual activate the switch. A single explosive
booby trap or IED can have more than one switch; for example, it could be command and victim-
operated. Regardless of the type of switch, a device may also have an antihandling device intended
to kill or injure personnel attempting to render safe, clear, or reduce the device.
 (U) Initiator. The initiator is any device that starts a detonation or deflagration. Usually, the
initiator is an electric or nonelectric blasting cap; however, enemies have demonstrated the ability
to make improvised initiators. Examples of nonelectric initiators include, but are not limited to,
flame or spark initiators, friction-initiated devices, stab initiators, chemical initiators, and
percussion initiators.
 (U) Main charge. The main charge constitutes the bulk explosive component of an explosive
booby trap or IED and can be configured for directional effects. Common explosive filler used in
explosive booby traps/IEDs comes from military ordnance and HME. Military ordnance provides
an immediate explosive filler and ready-made fragmentation effect. Explosive booby traps/IEDs
may contain military, commercial, and homemade explosive fillers. Many explosive booby
traps/IEDs include common hardware (ball bearings, bolts, nuts, nails) to enhance shrapnel.

Chapter 2
 (U) Electrical power source. A power source can store and release electrical energy to initiate an
explosive booby trap or IED main charge. The most common power source is a battery, with sizes
ranging from small batteries to car and truck batteries. Enemies have also used alternating current
(such as a local power supply in a home or office) to provide the power source for an IED.
 (U) Container. The container is an item or vessel that commonly houses main explosive
components of an explosive booby trap or IED. Containers serve two basic purposes: confinement
of the main explosive components and protection from the elements. Containers are the source of
primary fragmentation. Containers should not be confused with the materials used to conceal an
explosive booby trap or IED. Soda cans, pipes, crockpots, pressure cookers, backpacks, plastic
bags, jugs, briefcases, vests, or satchels are examples of containers. Explosive booby traps/IEDs
can range in size and have been placed inside animal carcasses, tires, and under trash piles for
concealment purposes. While the materials used in concealing an explosive booby trap or IED can
have secondary fragmentation effects, they are primarily used to conceal the explosive booby trap
or IED from visual detection.
2-3. (U) In addition to these five components, an explosive booby trap or IED may contain enhancements.
An enhancement is any optional component deliberately added to an explosive booby trap or IED as a
secondary hazard. Fuel and shrapnel are examples of enhancements.
2-4. (U) IEDs are generally categorized by their employment methods. The enemy may combine suicide
and nonsuicide tactics during one attack or over the course of an operation. The enemy may use IEDs to
reinforce conventional tactics, presenting a complex threat to U.S. and multinational forces. Some
employment methods are—
 (U) Airborne IED. An IED delivered by or concealed in an air-based vehicle.
 (U) Person-borne IED. An IED worn, carried, or housed by a person, willingly or unwillingly,
in such a way that the person houses the whole IED or principal IED components or serves as the
delivery or concealment means for an explosive with an initiating device. Examples of wear or
carry methods include a vest, belt, backpack, box, or briefcase.
 (U) Projected IED. An IED delivered by aerial means to its target.
 (U) Vehicle-borne IED. An IED delivered by or concealed in a ground-based vehicle.
 (U) Waterborne IED. An IED delivered by or concealed in a water-based vessel.
MINES (U)
2-5. (U) A land mine is a munition on or near the ground or other surface area that is designed to be exploded
by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle (ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5). Land mines can
be employed in quantities within a specific area to form a minefield, or they can be used individually to
reinforce nonexplosive obstacles.
2-6. (U) In land mine warfare, a mine is an explosive or other material (normally encased) designed to
destroy or damage ground vehicles, boats, or aircraft or designed to wound, kill, or otherwise incapacitate
personnel. Mines are designed to be detonated by the action of its victim, by the passage of time, or by
controlled means. Mines can be employed in quantities within a specific area to form a minefield or
individually to reinforce nonexplosive obstacles. (See JP 3-15 and MCWP 3-31.2/NWP 3-15 for additional
information on sea mines.) Land mines fall into the following general categories:
 (U) Persistent. Mines that are not capable of self-destructing or self-deactivating.
 (U) Nonpersistent. Mines that are capable of self-destructing or self-deactivating.
2-7. (U) The mines and munitions within each of these categories can be further defined as an antivehicle
landmine or antipersonnel landmine. Land mines can be hand-emplaced, remote-delivered, ground-delivered,
or air-delivered. Whether buried conventionally in patterns, laid on the surface in seemingly random fashion,
or intentionally scattered, land mines will likely be present in prolific numbers on the battlefield. Potential
adversaries with conventional military capabilities will employ large numbers of land mines to offset U.S.
maneuver advantages. Terrorists will obtain and employ land mines in any manner possible to inflict losses
on friendly forces and noncombatants. The conventional employment of mines will typically be with other
obstacles (such as wire and antivehicle ditches) to create complex obstacles that are normally covered by fire

and observation. A complex obstacle is a combination of different types of individual obstacles that require
more than one reduction technique (explosive, mechanical, or physical) to create a lane through the obstacle.
2-8. (U) Antidisturbance (including antihandling) devices exist for persistent and nonpersistent
(scatterable) mines.
MECHANICS OF LAND MINES (U)

2-9. (U) A land mine detonates by the action of its target, the passage of time (self-destruct), or controlled
means. Mines generally consist of the following parts (see figure 2-1):
 (U) Fuze or firing device (receives the initiating action and initiates the explosive train)
 (U) Detonator or igniter (a primary explosive that usually initiates a booster or supplemental
charge; this component is usually integral to the fuzing system).
 (U) Booster charge (may be attached to the fuse or the igniter or be part of the main charge).
 (U) Main charge (the main explosive component of the mine and usually housed in the mine
casing).
 (U) Casing (contains all the above parts of the mine and may be metallic, plastic or cellulose type
coating; usually contains a section for the main fuze component and an auxiliary fuze well for
secondary systems and firing devices).
Figure 2-1. (U) Mine components
COMPONENTS AND INITIATING ACTIONS (U)

2-10. (U) The fuze is the initial component in the firing chain; it contains primary explosives and is highly
sensitive. The fuze is actuated by an initiating action. A fuze prevents the mine from exploding until it makes
contact with, or is influenced by, its target. Once a mine is armed, the firing mechanism is ready for actuation
by the following methods (trip wires and tilt rods are typically connected to pressure or pressure release
triggers and usually only act as levers). Some examples of current fuzes include―
 (U) Pressure (including tilt rod and can trip wires).
 (U) Pressure release (can also include trip wires)
 (U) Time-delay mechanism (electrical or mechanical).
 (U) Impulses.
 (U) Seismic.
 (U) Magnetic-influence.
 (U) Infrared-sensor (passive or active).
 (U) Acoustic.
2-11. (U) Figure 2-2, page 2-4, shows the methods used to actuate mines. Engineers must be knowledgeable
on all these methods in general terms and must become experts on the specific methods being used by the
enemies that they are facing in a given conflict. History shows that enemies will use different actuation

Chapter 2
methods based on their assessment of U.S. capabilities to combat them. The most challenging situations for
engineers occur when enemy forces employ different actuation methods within a given obstacle or location.
Engineers must be knowledgeable on all these methods in general terms and must become experts on the
specific methods being used by the enemies that they are facing in a given conflict. History shows that
enemies will use different actuation methods based on their assessment of U.S. capabilities to combat them.
The most challenging situations for combat engineers occur when enemy forces employ different actuation
methods within a given obstacle or location.
Figure 2-2. (U) Common methods of actuating mines
UNEXPLODED EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE (U)

2-12. (U) Unexploded explosive ordnance is explosive ordnance which has been primed, fused, armed or
otherwise prepared for action, and which has been fired, dropped, launched, projected, or placed in such a
manner as to constitute a hazard to operations, installations, personnel, or material and remains unexploded
either by malfunction or design or for any other cause (JP 3-15). UXO negatively affects the mobility,
protection, and mission accomplishment of friendly forces.
2-13. (U) All explosive ordnance encountered on the battlefield/battlespace or other areas or that remain in
an area after a direct attack on a position should be considered and treated as UXO. UXO generally found in
the area of operations include—
 (U) Ordnance that failed to function.
 (U) Ordnance designed for area denial use, to include conventional landmines, scatterable mines
and networked munitions, and general munitions.

2-14. (U) UXO has the potential of remaining in the area of operations long after commanders (enemy or
friendly) complete their tactical engagements. Climatic conditions and time can cause UXO to become more
sensitized, and some UXO may contain random self-destruct mechanisms. Other UXO may be chemical
weapons. For these reasons, personnel should not touch or move UXO.
2-15. (U) Chemical munitions or enhanced munitions with chemical additives may be extremely volatile and
constitute a class of hazardous chemical weapons stockpiled by some nations. The most dangerous of these
are nerve agents (GA, GB, and VX) and vesicant (blister) agents, which are formulations of sulfur mustard
(H, HT, HD). All are liquids at normal room temperature, but they create gaseous vapors when released and
become hazards. Chemical munitions can range from mortars 81-millimeter, artillery projectiles, rocket
systems (such as the 122-millimeter) missile warheads, aerial bombs, and submunitions. In many cases,
chemical weapons are dispersed to locations where, because of conflict conditions, they may be mixed with
conventional munitions, abandoned, buried, lost, or damaged. Commanders, leaders, and personnel should
understand whether there is a possibility of chemical weapons in the area of operations, the type of
ammunition generally used, and the specific markings.
2-16. (U) Some UXO shapes are easily identifiable and others are nearly unrecognizable. UXO may look
new or it may look old and rusty. Some will resemble pointed metal pipes, soda cans, or small balls. UXO
may be clearly visible, partially covered, or completely hidden. (See ATP 4-32.16/MCRP 3-17.2C for a
comprehensive description of UXO characteristics and a detailed recognition guide for U.S. and foreign
ordnance.)
CAPTURED ENEMY AMMUNITION (U)

2-17. (U) CEA is ammunition products and components produced for or used by a hostile foreign force that
is in the custody of a U.S. military force or under the control of a DOD component. CEA can also include
North Atlantic Treaty Organization or U.S.-manufactured munitions that may not have been under U.S.
continual custody or control. CEA may range from only a few rounds of ammunition and rifles to an entire
enemy ammunition supply point. Because of this large range of what may encompass CEA, it is important
not to generalize who can handle CEA.
2-18. (U) Capturing enemy ammunition reduces the availability of ammunition product and component
supplies to enemy forces. Unsecured enemy ammunition has proven to be a significant source of explosive
components for explosive booby traps/IEDs, and arms supplies to those forces opposing U.S. interests in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Planning for CEA and its disposition should be a major component of any operation.
Units that discover or capture quantities of stored or cached enemy ammunition are generally responsible for
securing the CEA until relieved of the responsibility to do so. Units capturing or locating unsecured
ammunition should mark and report it to their higher headquarters immediately to ensure that the proper
personnel destroy or handle the munitions and arms.
2-19. (U) Untrained personnel should not touch or attempt to move CEA, which may be sensitized because
of deterioration, the effects of climatic conditions, or improper handling. For these situations, leaders should
seek support from engineer and EOD forces. Certain countries do not maintain the same quality control over
munitions manufacturing, handling, or storing as the United States. Unfamiliarity with foreign ordnance
characteristics potentially results in mishandling or improperly transporting the ordnance, which may lead to
a greater likelihood of a catastrophic incident. Munitions (rockets, bombs, missiles) may contain toxic or
hazardous propellants or fillers. Liquid fuels stored in or near missiles contain strong oxidizers and petroleum
fuels that pose dangerous inhalation and flammability hazards. Chemical munitions without markings or
unconventional markings may be intermixed with conventional munitions.
2-20. (U) Engineer leaders should ensure that their personnel are trained in the characteristics, hazards, and
controls (to include safety policies and standards) of CEA. Operations involving CEA will follow current
DOD, Army, and Marine Corps explosives safety standards and procedures to the maximum extent possible.

Chapter 2
BULK EXPLOSIVES (U)

2-21. (U) Bulk explosives refers to explosives that do not normally have military applications, but may be
found within the area of operations. Bulk explosives are often used in civilian quarrying or mining; however,
the enemy can use these explosives just like CEA. Intelligence gathering can identify and determine the
location of possible supplies of bulk explosives and their disposition before beginning operations.
2-22. (U) HME come in a variety of forms (crystals, liquid, powder, granules). They are typically created
using widely available materials (such as ordinary household chemicals) and conventional equipment (such
as stoves and pressure cookers). Appendix E provides characteristics of prevalent bulk explosives. It is
important to note that the colors of HME can be easily changed, so personnel should not rely on color as a
defining characteristic.

Chapter 3
Mobility Roles (U)
(U) Mobility operations are those combined arms activities that mitigate the effects of
natural and man-made obstacles to enable freedom of movement and maneuver. This
chapter describes the two mobility operations that engineers support to counter the
explosive obstacles of mines, explosive booby traps/IEDs, and UXOs that are
impeding friendly movement and maneuver: breaching and clearing operations. This
chapter clarifies the difference between breaching and clearing operations as applied
to explosive obstacles. It describes the steps an engineer unit takes in reducing an
explosive obstacle (such as a minefield) as a subset of a combined arms breach and
then provides details on route and area clearance, all with a focus on the engineer
actions. (See ATTP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 for additional information on breaching and
clearing operations, with focus on how engineers conduct their tasks as part of the
combined arms team.)
MOBILITY OPERATIONS FOR COUNTERING EXPLOSIVE

OBSTACLES (U)
3-1. (U) Engineer support to maneuver is different from engineer support to movement. Conducting tactical
maneuver requires commanders to mass the effects of combat power to achieve surprise, shock, momentum,
and dominance. On the other hand, conducting tactical troop movements is the relocation or movement of
forces by any means or mode of transportation preparatory to deploying into combat formations to support
commander plans. During tactical maneuver, there is imminent or expected enemy contact; whereas, during
troop movement, there is a low probability of enemy contact. Because of this, engineer operations in support
of maneuver must be conducted as quickly as possible to minimize exposure to enemy direct and indirect
fires. Movement is different from maneuver in perspective of breaching and clearing primarily due to the
urgency of action. Typically, commanders accept less risk during clearing than reduction. These
considerations drive different tasks, organizations, equipment, and TTPs required by combined arms teams
conducting tactical maneuver versus troop movement. Breaching normally supports maneuver; clearing
normally supports movement.
3-2. (U) Breaching is a synchronized combined arms operation under the control of a maneuver
commander, and it is conducted to allow maneuver despite the presence of enemy reinforcing obstacles that
are covered by fire. It is one of the most difficult combined arms tasks that a force can encounter. The
breaching section of this chapter focuses on the engineer breaching fundamental of reduce and the engineer
actions that enable this engineer task. (See ATTP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 for additional information on the
other breaching fundamentals of suppress, obscure, secure, and assault.) During maneuver against a
conventional enemy, the most likely explosive obstacles that friendly forces will encounter are minefields.
Likely explosive obstacles when maneuvering against a hybrid threat or insurgent enemy include minefields,
mines, and explosive booby traps/IEDs,. This threat will employ these explosive obstacles in various
combinations to achieve the largest impact on friendly maneuver, to include individual obstacles employed
as complex obstacles in depth.
3-3. (U) Clearing operations are combined arms operations conducted to eliminate enemy obstacle effort
or residual obstacles affecting the operational area. Commanders may order clearing operations to facilitate
mobility within an area of operations based on an analysis of the mission variables. They may also order a
critical route or area cleared of explosive obstacles. The operation could be conducted as a single mission to
open or reopen a route or area, or it may be conducted on a recurring basis in support of efforts to defeat a

Chapter 3
sustained threat to a critical route. (See ATTP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 for additional information on the
important aspects of clearing operations.)
3-4. (U) Figure 3-1 summarizes the engineer terminology for countering obstacles in support of movement
and maneuver. For engineers, clearing or reducing obstacles in support of movement and maneuver is to
render those obstacles incapable of interfering with a particular maneuver or movement mission or task. The
two tasks that engineers perform to achieve this are reducing and clearing.
Figure 3-1. (U) Engineer terminology for reducing and clearing obstacles in support of
movement and maneuver
3-5. (U) Reducing an obstacle is the creation of a proofed and marked lane through, over, or around that
obstacle. Reducing is the fourth of the five breaching fundamentals: suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and
assault. It is a task normally performed by combat engineers using their unique skills, equipment, and TTPs.
The endstate of a reduced obstacle is a proofed and marked lane that will allow passage of the assault force.
Figure 3-1 identifies the typical subtasks of reducing an obstacle: destroy, remove, span, and bypass obstacles
to create lanes.
3-6. (U) Clearing is the elimination of an obstacle that is usually not conducted under fire. Engineers
conduct route clearing or area clearing to eliminate obstacles on routes or in designated areas. Clearing is a
combined arms operation where maneuver units or other members of the combined arms team provide
security while engineers clear the obstacles. It is a deliberate, complex event that is typically time intensive
to complete. The endstate of a cleared obstacle is the elimination of that obstacle. However, it is important
to note that commanders may designate only a portion of an existing obstacle or location that they want
cleared. In these cases, engineers eliminate all parts of the obstacle or all obstacles in the given location. For
example, a commander may direct the clearing of only specific sections of a main supply route due to limited
time or resources. In these sections of a route, engineers eliminate all obstacles. Engineers eliminate obstacles
or portions of obstacles primarily by destruction or removal. Clearing operations as described in this
publication and ATTP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 are normally performed by engineer units due to their unique
equipment, organization, and training. While clearing operations are conducted primarily by engineer units,
EOD personnel can support in the elimination of the identified explosive obstacle.
3-7. (U) Engineers have organizations, equipment, and TTPs specifically designed for conducting obstacle
reduction or clearing tasks in support of movement and maneuver. As discussed earlier, the decision on
whether to reduce or clear is driven primarily by the likelihood of enemy contact and the speed in which the

Mobility Roles (U)
supported unit must get through, over, or around the obstacle. Engineer leaders will task-organize the optimal
engineer units to meet mission demands. For example, the engineer leader may task-organize a breach squad
with its assault breacher vehicles, armored vehicle-launched bridge, and joint assault bridges to a combat
engineer platoon that is supporting an armor company team attacking an enemy deliberately defending behind
minefields and tank ditches. It would not task-organize a route clearance platoon because the vehicles in that
platoon are not designed to destroy or remove obstacles while under direct or indirect enemy fire. It is
important to note that there are times when the expected enemy situation and urgency of the mission changes
during execution due to the actions of the enemy. For example, an unexpected enemy force ambushes a route
clearance platoon being provided security by an infantry platoon while clearing an IED. In this situation, the
clearing force commander could decide to shift from conducting a clearing mission to conducting a hasty
breach to defeat the defending enemy.
MOBILITY OPERATIONS TO COUNTER EXPLOSIVE OBSTACLES DURING THE OFFENSE AND

DEFENSE (U)
3-8. (U) During the offense and defense, the focus of mobility is on breaching for those maneuver forces
conducting movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. Engineers task-organize with these
maneuver forces to conduct the reducing of obstacles that impede friendly maneuver. For follow-on forces
providing support to the attacking units, engineers support by conducting clearing of obstacles to enable
movement (such as opening additional lanes through reduced obstacles and clearing situational obstacles
dropped on supply routes or in tactical assembly areas by enemy forces). (See figure 3-2 for additional
information.) In the defense, breaching and clearing operations are focused on maintaining open supply
routes, lateral routes, and counterattack axes of advance.
Legend:
BSA brigade support area rte route
IED improvised explosive device TAC tactical
obj objective UXO unexploded explosive ordnance
Figure 3-2. (U) Engineer reduction and clearing tasks in support of mobility

Chapter 3
MOBILITY SUPPORT TO COUNTER EXPLOSIVE OBSTACLES DURING STABILITY

OPERATIONS (U)
3-9. (U) During stability operations, mobility operations are more heavily focused on clearing operations
since there is normally less maneuver and more movement being conducted. Units tend to occupy the same
area of operations for longer periods, which requires area clearing to begin safe construction of base camps,
airfields, and other land-based facilities. Combat patrols and logistics units operate on the same road network
nearly every day to carry out their missions. Clear, safe lines of communication are essential to re-establishing
civil security and civil control. As part of combined arms clearing operations, engineers clear these lines of
communication of explosive obstacles to ensure safe movement. Breaching still takes place, but it is normally
on a much smaller scale than during the offense and conducted as part of local offensive operations or part
of cordon and search operations. (See ATP 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B for additional information.)
REDUCING EXPLOSIVE OBSTACLES (U)

3-10. (U) Engineers are primarily responsible for the reduction step of the breaching fundamentals of
suppression, obscuration, securing, reducing, and assault. Breaching involves the reduction of explosive and
nonexplosive obstacles and generally requires significant combat engineering support to accomplish the
implied and assigned tasks. Enemy forces will employ complex obstacles consisting of different types of
individual obstacles to create the most difficult reduction conditions. Mixing obstacles in depth forces the
employment of critical breaching assets of different types, increases the reduction time, and gives the enemy
more time to engage friendly forces. An example would be a defending enemy installing a wire roadblock
followed by a point minefield (antivehicle landmine, antipersonnel landmine) along a road in a heavily
wooded area. Friendly combat engineers supporting a breach operation must now find a bypass for the assault
force of one or both obstacles. If there is no bypass, engineers must plan for the means to create a lane through
the two obstacles. The wire obstacle could be reduced using Bangalore torpedoes, and the point minefield
could be reduced using the antipersonnel obstacle breaching system or hand-emplaced explosives. By
installing different obstacle types in depth, the enemy drives friendly engineers to carry multiple means of
reduction and be well trained in multiple reduction techniques to be able to rapidly reduce complex obstacles
under fire.
3-11. (U) For pure explosive obstacles (such as a minefield), table 3-1 provides a set of typical steps that
engineer units can apply when supporting mounted or dismounted combined arms breaching. The engineer
unit conducting these tasks will normally be mounted or dismounted, mirroring the method of mobility used
by the maneuver force they are supporting. This makes it imperative that combat engineers operate in vehicles
that are of the same speed and protection as the maneuver forces. Appendix B contains descriptions of the
key engineer equipment used in conducting breaching and clearing operations. ATTP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8
contains detailed descriptions of minefield reduction techniques and equipment and detailed descriptions of
lane and bypass marking.
3-12. (U) When breaching complex obstacles that include nonexplosive obstacles, engineer leaders can apply
the above steps to the overall obstacle and make appropriate changes to the detection, reduction, and proofing
methods based on whether the individual obstacle type is explosive or nonexplosive. For example, detection
of buried mines requires different equipment and techniques than detection of a triple standard concertina
fence. In planning and executing a breach operation, all individual obstacles must be clearly detected to allow
for the most effective reduction. Engineer leaders learn through training and experience how best to apply
these steps given the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available,
time available and civil considerations.
CLEARING OF EXPLOSIVE OBSTACLES (U)

3-13. (U) Clearing is designed to eliminate all obstacles, explosive and nonexplosive, from an identified
route or area. Engineers conduct clearing operations to eliminate the enemy obstacle effort or residual
obstacles affecting designated locations in the area of operations.

Mobility Roles (U)
3-14. (U) Purposes of route clearing operations include:

 (U) Providing passage for maneuver and logistics units along a defined route.
 (U) Opening a new line of communication.
 (U) Maintaining a maneuver corridor.
 (U) Allowing for the construction of a new route.
3-15. (U) Clearing of explosive obstacles requires engineer units with unique equipment, training, and TTPs
that is significantly different from the equipment, training, and TTPs required in clearing nonexplosive
obstacles. (See ATTP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 for additional information on clearing operations of all types of
obstacles.) This section focuses exclusively on engineer route and area clearing of explosive obstacles.
Table 3-1. (U) Typical engineer unit steps for conducting support to explosive obstacle
breaching
Task: To identify obstacles potentially impeding maneuver of friendly forces and assess enemy
countermobility capabilities.
Plan/
Purpose: To determine whether to bypass or reduce an obstacle and to ensure the unit has the
Prepare/
information requirements to effectively plan and execute the breach.
Recon
Endstate: The obstacles, planned point of breach, and all assets required are identified to
accomplish the breach.
Task: To confirm the actual location and composition of each obstacle identified by
reconnaissance or other intelligence.
Detect
Purpose: To locate the actual point of breach and the obstacles to be reduced.
Endstate: The plan of reduction confirmed by the breach element.
Task: To bypass, destroy, or remove obstacles past the point of breach.
Create a
Purpose: To pass the assault force or maneuver force.
Lane
Endstate: A lane is created to pass the assault force or maneuver force.
Task: To verify that the created lane is free of explosive obstacles.
Proof Purpose: To ensure that the created lane is trafficable.
Endstate: The created lane is trafficable for the passage of the assault force or maneuver force.
Task: To put in place the means by which the assault force is able to navigate the created lane.
Purpose: To ensure assault forces can maneuver quickly and safely to and through the created
Mark
lane.
Endstate: Lane is accurately marked to permit the safe passing of assault forces through the lane.
Task: To provide sufficient information about reduction to ensure all friendly forces have
knowledge about the created lane.
Report Purpose: To allow friendly forces to find and use the created lane and to inform leaders of status.
Endstate: Friendly forces on the battlefield are aware of the created lane and the breach has
been turned over to follow-on forces.
Task: To document the locations of obstacles, created lanes, and markers.
Record Purpose: To ensure friendly forces have and accurate picture of the area of operations.
Endstate: All friendly forces are aware of the reduced obstacle.
ROUTE CLEARING OF EXPLOSIVE OBSTACLES (U)

3-16. (U) Table 3-2, page 3-6, provides typical steps employed by engineer units conducting route clearing
of mines, explosive booby traps/IEDs, or UXO. Route clearing destroys or removes all explosive and
nonexplosive obstacles along a defined route. Like other engineer missions, route clearing of explosive
obstacles requires different equipment and TTP than route clearing of nonexplosive obstacles. Route clearing
is not normally conducted under direct enemy fire, but it should be planned for the possibility of coming
under direct or indirect enemy fires while conducting clearing operations. The route clearing force normally
organizes using a modified breaching force structure with two elements: a clearing element made up of
primarily of engineers and a security element, most often manned by maneuver forces or military police
forces.

Chapter 3
3-17. (U) Route clearing of explosive obstacles normally includes the steps of reconnaissance, detection,
marking, interrogating, classifying, eliminating, proofing, reporting, and recording. A combined arms
operation relies on a thorough reconnaissance of the route to be cleared. Commanders conduct route clearing
tasks to open a new route for traffic or on a recurring basis to minimize the risk along selected routes.
Depending on the mission variables, commanders may employ a combined arms force of various assets, to
include maneuver forces, engineers, EOD assets, and military police units that are task-organized, equipped,
and trained to support the overall clearing mission. (See ATTP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 for more information
on clearing operations.)
Table 3-2. (U) Typical engineer unit actions in support of route clearing of explosive
obstacles
Task: To identify the route to be cleared and assess the route for restrictions and potential
Plan/ explosive and nonexplosive obstacle locations and types.
Prepare/
Purpose: To ensure that the unit has the knowledge to effectively plan and execute the mission.
Recon
Endstate: The route is assessed, and the unit has completed the mission planning process.
Task: To search the route for potential explosive hazards.
Purpose: To identify the location of all potential explosive and nonexplosive obstacles along the
Detect
route or portion of the route to be cleared.
Endstate: All potential explosive and nonexplosive obstacle locations are identified.
Task: To put in place the means to navigate to the suspected explosive obstacle.
Purpose: Suspected explosive hazard location is known by forces operating near the potential
Mark
threat.
Endstate: All potential explosive obstacle locations are marked.
Task: To investigate a suspected explosive obstacle.
Interrogate Purpose: To determine the exact location and general composition of the explosive hazard.
Endstate: Explosive hazard location is confirmed and able to be identified.
Task: To determine the type of explosive obstacle and, if required, identify the exact explosive
obstacle composition.
Classify Purpose: To determine the correct method for clearing.
Endstate: All explosive hazards are identified, classified, and a reduction or clearance method
determined.
Task: To destroy or remove all confirmed explosive obstacles along the route.
Eliminate Purpose: To negate the explosive obstacle ability to affect friendly force movement.
Endstate: The route is clear of all explosive obstacles.
Task: Repeat detection through an alternate detection method.
Proof Purpose: To verify that the explosive hazard was cleared from the route.
Endstate: That location of the route was confirmed clear of explosive hazard.
Task: Provide sufficient information about the location of present obstacles and reduce or clear
explosive obstacles.
Report Purpose: To ensure that other units are aware of the route trafficability.
Endstate: All units on the battlefield are aware of the area and it is able to be used in further
operations.
Task: To document the status of the route and the location of present obstacles and reduce or
clear explosive obstacles.
Record Purpose: To ensure that friendly forces have an accurate picture of the defined route.
Endstate: Friendly forces are aware of the route trafficability of the conclusion of the route
clearing mission.
AREA CLEARING OF EXPLOSIVE OBSTACLES (U)

3-18. (U) Area clearing is the complete elimination of all explosive and nonexplosive obstacles in a defined
area to allow a military operation to continue with reduced risk. To clear areas of other explosive obstacles
(such as UXO) may require EOD personnel. For engineers, area clearing is normally limited to landmines

Mobility Roles (U)
and booby traps. To clear areas of other explosive obstacles (such as UXO) may require the augmentation of
EOD personnel. For engineers, area clearing of landmines includes detection, marking, interrogating,
classifying, reducing or clearing, proofing, reporting, and recording. Area clearing operations are combined
arms operations with engineer units performing the actual clearing of the landmines by the methods of
destruction or removal. The maneuver commander must clearly direct the location of the operational area to
be cleared of explosive obstacles. Additionally, the maneuver commander, in coordination with the engineer
leader, should direct applicable clearing depth and clearing standards to ensure proper risk mitigation and
allow the engineer leader to plan and task-organize the right engineer unit with the right equipment. (See
ATTP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 for more information on area clearing.)

Chapter 4
Enhance Protection (U)
(U) This chapter presents the application of general engineering, survivability and
countermobility to counter the effects of explosive hazards Condition 3 and Condition
4 as described in Chapter 1. These two conditions—moving IEDs (such as personnel-
borne or vehicle-borne IEDs) and CEA or bulk explosives—require engineers to
conduct construction-related tasks to mitigate the effects of blasts or potential blasts
and to install obstacles to deny freedom of movement to mobile IEDs.
GENERAL ENGINEERING AND SURVIVABILITY(U)

4-1. (U) General engineering is the engineering capabilities and activities, other than combat engineering,
that modify, maintain, or protect the physical environment. Examples include construction and repair of
infrastructure, facilities, lines of communication, and bases. ATP 3-34.40/MCWP 3-17.7 provides a full
picture of this critical engineer discipline.
4-2. (U) Survivability operations are those military activities that alter the physical environment to provide
or improve cover, concealment, and camouflage. Engineering tasks in support of survivability operations
include tasks to build protective positions or harden existing positions for weapon systems, command posts,
logistics sites, equipment storage sites, ammunition supply points, fuel sites aviation sites, and base camps.
(See ATP 3-37.34/MCWP 3-17.6 for additional information on survivability operations.)
4-3. (U) Engineers must execute general engineering and survivability tasks and activities to prepare
protective positions and to harden structures to counter explosive hazards primarily under these conditions
(discussed in chapter 1):
 (U) Condition 3. This condition exists when the enemy employs IEDs (vehicle-borne IEDs,
personnel-borne IEDs, airborne IEDs, and waterborne IEDs) against stationary targets in the area
of operations. This condition applies only to moving or mobile IEDs.
 (U) Condition 4. This condition exists when there are CEA and bulk explosives located in the
area of operations and under friendly force control. They are not impeding movement or
maneuver, but may require protective barriers constructed around them (in case of detonation) or
they require manpower to assist in proper disposal using demolitions. This condition applies only
to CEA and bulk explosives.
4-4. (U) Engineers conduct survivability operations and general engineering support to counter these two
conditions. The primary tasks that engineers conduct are:
 (U) Establish protective positions.
 (U) Harden structures.
 (U) Install barriers/obstacles.
4-5. (U) During stability operations, commanders must consider protecting vital resources (base
camps/living areas, fuel sites, ammunition holding areas, other logistics support areas) since the entire area
of operations has a greater potential for enemy attack from mobile IEDs. The priority of work for general
engineering/survivability assets may become more focused on protecting these types of resources than on
constructing fighting positions for combat vehicles or crew-served weapons. Vital resources requiring
protection may also include facilities critical to the civilian infrastructure (key industrial sites, pipelines,
water treatment plants, government buildings).

Chapter 4
ESTABLISHING PROTECTIVE POSITIONS AND HARDENING OF

STRUCTURES AGAINST EFFECTS OF MOBILE IEDS (U)
4-6. (U) The purpose of a protective position is to protect the personnel, vehicles, and equipment occupying
the position by allowing them to avoid or withstand hostile actions. Unlike fighting positions, protective
positions are not focused on providing a position to engage the enemy.
4-7. (U) Military forces often use existing facilities in addition to establishing fighting and protective
positions. When enhanced protection is required for a facility due to the threat of mobile IEDs, it can be
hardened to provide or improve cover to the structure and its occupants. Hardening helps to avoid or
withstand hostile actions, and it is accomplished by using barriers, walls, shields, berms, or other types of
physical protection. (See ATP 3-37.34/MCWP 3-17.6 for additional information on protective positions and
hardened facilities.)
4-8. (U) Hardening of facilities also includes the use of bridge protective devices (antimine booms, impact
booms, antiswimmer nets). These devices typically protect bridges or crossing sites from waterborne
demolition teams, floating mines, or floating debris.
CONSTRUCTION OR HARDENING OF STRUCTURES TO SECURE

CAPTURED ENEMY AMMUNITION AND BULK EXPLOSIVES (U)
4-9. (U) Engineers provide the expertise and assets to construct perimeter security fencing, barriers, and
similar structures to help secure the CEA and bulk explosive location from attack, pilferage, or theft.
Engineers conduct the same basic tasks of construction or hardening of perimeter fencing, berms, and other
barriers and obstacles employed in building protective structures for base camps and other facilities. Also,
combat engineers and EOCA-certified engineers may be tasked to work under the guidance of EOD personnel
to assist EOD in the destruction of CEA and bulk explosives if there are insufficient EOD personnel available.
4-10. (U) Commanders and leaders at all levels should normally involve EOD and trained ammunition-
handling specialists in the planning and execution of managing large or complex caches or CEA and bulk
explosives. The capturing unit is responsible for munitions security until higher echelon commands issue
disposition instructions, normally in coordination with EOD forces. Personnel should exercise extreme
caution in dealing with CEA and bulk explosives since the sensitivity of the ammunition is unknown and the
area may contain booby traps. EOD is responsible for determining if the CEA and bulk explosives are safe
for transportation or if it needs to be destroyed onsite. (See DA Pamphlet 385-64 or MCO P8020.10B, and
theater specific policy supplements for additional information on disposal of CEA and bulk explosives.)
4-11. (U) Securing CEA is resource-intensive and can decisively engage a maneuver commander’s combat
or security forces. Maneuver commanders should determine the composition of security forces placed on a
CEA location based on the type, amount, and location of enemy forces. Commanders should understand that
gaps in security of the CEA site could potentially lead to looting, stealing explosives for use in constructing
IEDs, and placing IEDs on routes to the CEA location. (See table 4-1 for additional information on techniques
associated with protecting positions and hardening structures.)
BARRIERS AND OBSTACLES (U)

4-12. (U) While protective berms and barriers mitigate the blast effects of mobile IEDs, engineers also install
barriers and obstacles to deny the enemy freedom of movement of their mobile IEDs to engage friendly forces
that are in static positions (such as base camps and checkpoints). One example of this is the serpentine
obstacle made up of concrete barriers used at the entry control point to a base camp, which forces in-bound
vehicles to slow down to a very slow rate to negotiate the serpentine obstacle. This denies the enemy the
ability to drive a vehicle-borne IED at a rapid speed into the base camp. This obstacle is employed in depth
to provide reaction time for the overwatching forces.
4-13. (U) At checkpoints, engineers may install more rapidly emplaced barriers and obstacles to deny mobile
IEDs freedom of movement into friendly areas of operation. In determining the type of barriers to use and in
what configuration, engineers consider such things as the likely target (vehicle-borne IED, person-borne
IED), location, time and resources available, and the duration of the checkpoint.

Enhance Protection (U)
Table 4-1. (U) Some techniques to protect positions and harden structures
• Select positions that offer the best natural protection from explosive hazards,
considering terrain, vegetation, and natural defilades.
• Construct bunkers and shelters.
Prepare protective • Construct protective earthen walls and berms.
positions
• Construct berms to withstand expected IED blast and fragmentation.
• Construct the berms using compacted earth fill, ensuring sides are sloped.
• Construct walls to withstand IED blasts and fragmentation.
• Enhance the protection of structures using sand bags, shields, berms, heavily
constructed walls, and by increasing standoff between structures and possible
threats.
Harden structures • Construct soil bin walls with revetments or soil-filled container revetments for
personnel and equipment.
• Construct T-walls or other blast resistant barriers around the location to harden.
• Construct predetonation roofs and/or predetonation (or triggering) screens.
Legend:
IED improvised explosive devices

Chapter 5
Reconnaissance (U)
(U) One of the most effective approaches to countering enemy use of explosive
materials against friendly forces is to deprive the enemy of necessary resources.
Commanders facilitate this by directing searches for explosive materials and indicators
of explosive hazards. A search is the systematic reconnaissance of a defined area, so
that all parts of the area have passed within visibility (JP 3-50). This chapter covers
common searches for explosives and explosive components and engineer searches for
these same items. Through the comprehensive analysis of collected EH information
and the development of systematic search procedures, commanders restrict the
operating capacity of the enemy, thereby advancing friendly-force objectives,
enhancing protection, and preserving the force. This chapter outlines search objectives,
describes search techniques, and identifies search resources in support of countering
EHs. Search is a subordinate form of technical reconnaissance for engineers.
ENGINEER ROLES IN RECONNAISSANCE (U)

5-1. (U) Engineer reconnaissance focuses on engineer-specific enemy or terrain information requirements.
Commanders use reconnaissance throughout the operations process to formulate, confirm, or modify their
courses of action or schemes of maneuver. Reconnaissance efforts assist the commander in enhancing force
protection. (See FM 3-34.170/MCWP 3-17.4 for additional information on engineer reconnaissance. See
ATP-73 Volume I and Volume II for additional information on military search.)
5-2. (U) Engineer reconnaissance efforts focused on the collection of tactical and technical information
relative to EHs enable the BCT/RCT freedom of maneuver and protection. Table 5-1, page 5-2, provides a
typical listing of combat engineering, general engineering, and geospatial engineering reconnaissance
support tasks.
OBJECTIVES (U)
5-3. (U) The goal of a search is to interdict the enemy ability to conduct missions through the collection of
information and the location of material resources. Information and appropriated supplies resulting from a
search enable counter-EH efforts and protect U.S. forces (personnel, equipment, facilities) against potential
EH attacks. To facilitate a constructive outcome, a search has four general objectives:
 (U) Secure material of possible exploitation value.
 (U) Gather forensic evidence that supports the development of information to facilitate follow-on
actions.
 (U) Deny an adversary resources and opportunity.
 (U) Protect potential targets.
5-4. (U) A search is enemy focused; it disrupts enemy EH activities by reducing the available resources or
forcing commitment of additional manpower to protect or move the cached munitions needed for an EH
attack. Typically, the enemy holds the initiative, and friendly forces have to react to its activities. However,
a search is one of the few tasks in which engineer forces have the ability to limit or influence enemy activities
by determining when, where, and how the search will take place.
5-5. (U) Successful search engagements integrate with reconnaissance efforts and reinforce weapons
focused technical collection resource actions. A search locates and identifies specific targets; whereas,

Chapter 5
weapons focused technical collection resources exploit EH-related incidents. Specific targets include people,
information, and material resources employed by the enemy.
Table 5-1. (U) Engineer reconnaissance tasks relative to EHs
Engineer Discipline Reconnaissance Task
• Area reconnaissance focused on establishing vehicle fighting positions or
protective positions.
• Area reconnaissance in support of urban combat with known explosive
hazards.
• Area reconnaissance focused on locating explosive hazards requiring area
clearing.
• Explosive hazard (obstacle) reconnaissance focused on bypassing or
breaching the explosive hazard.
• Obstacle reconnaissance, including demolition obstacles, focused on
establishing friendly tactical and protective obstacles integrated with fires.
• Reconnaissance for preplanning close air and artillery support to harass or
Combat engineering deny enemy units attempting to establish obstacles.
• Reconnaissance supporting the development and construction of maneuver
engagement area in support of maneuver forces to channel enemy forces into
one location for friendly forces.
• Obstacle reconnaissance in preparation for target turnover.
• Route reconnaissance focused on route clearing.
• Reconnaissance focused on creating alternate routes around a large
explosive hazard area for maneuver units.
• Reconnaissance of tunnels, caves, and underground structures involving the
potential enemy use of explosive hazards (such as booby traps).
• Reconnaissance in complex terrain with the potential for enemy integration of
explosive hazards with tactical or protective intent.
• Area reconnaissance of future combat outposts or forward operating bases
integrated with fighting and protective positions against person-borne or
vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices.
• Area reconnaissance of airfields or heliports damaged by explosive hazards.
General engineering
• Bridge reconnaissance focused on the replacement or repair of existing
bridging structures damaged by explosives hazards.
• Route reconnaissance to determine the level of improvements necessary
along main or alternate supply routes (such as vehicle turnouts).
• Reconnaissance objectives focused on confirming geospatial information
(terrain, mobility restraints).
Geospatial engineering
• Geospatial engineering products (mission-tailored data, tactical decision aids,
printed maps) that support engineer reconnaissance actions and activities.
5-6. (U) To maximize the effectiveness of a search, there should always be a distinct purpose. Some
common examples include—
 (U) Finding an enemy cache containing munitions and equipment.
 (U) Locating suspected enemy explosive booby traps/IEDs.
 (U) Collecting EH components before attacks.
 (U) Gathering information and material that may be of intelligence value.
 (U) Securing forensic evidence to arrest and prosecute the enemy within the framework and
conditions of the law in the host nation.

Reconnaissance (U)
PRINCIPLES (U)
5-7. (U) The commander plans and directs the execution of search by applying the same principles that are
keys to success in other military operations, particularly operating concepts (flexibility, integration, lethality,
adaptability, depth, synchronization).
SEARCH LEVELS (U)

5-8. (U) There are three search levels:
 (U) Basic.
 (U) Intermediate.
 (U) Advanced.
5-9. (U) Commanders determine the level of a search based on tactical requirements within their operational
environment and the skills, training, equipment, and experience of their force.
5-10. (U) The Counter Explosive Hazard Center, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, and the Marine Corps
Engineer School, Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, provide instruction in intermediate
search with additional information on three search levels. Maneuver and maneuver support personnel receive
instruction on management and the application of intermediate systematic search procedures to locate specific
targets. Training includes searching an occupied or unoccupied building, vehicle, persons, routes, and areas.
BASIC (U)
5-11. (U) Personnel conduct a basic search as a protection measure to improve personal security. A basic
search involves search awareness and the ability to carefully examine or investigate general areas incidental
to performing assigned missions and duties. It does not involve a preplanned search.
5-12. (U) The basic level of search requires the practical knowledge of and the ability to apply search
techniques to people, vehicles, and areas and conduct cursory building searches. It also requires an
understanding of the mission variables.
5-13. (U) Military personnel who simultaneously search and provide for their own security require additional
training in search techniques. This may include an understanding of the route and vulnerable checkpoint
procedures, hot-pursuit searches, cursory search techniques, and documentation requirements.
INTERMEDIATE (U)
5-14. (U) At the intermediate (and advanced) search level, the search for EHs closely resembles search and
attack or cordon and search. The intermediate search level is appropriate for deliberate search when
intelligence does not indicate the presence of EHs or environmental hazards.
5-15. (U) An intermediate search involves isolating the target area and searching the suspected person,
building, material, or area for EHs. The unit conducting the search must control the search environment by
establishing a security cordon (composed of nonsearch team personnel).
5-16. (U) Personnel who perform an intermediate search receive specific training on the tasks and equipment
needed for such missions. It is the first level at which units form teams to conduct a search.
ADVANCED (U)
5-17. (U) An advanced search is a deliberate engagement, often requiring the dedicated support of other EH
enablers. The U.S. forces conduct an advanced search when there is specific intelligence indicating the
presence of an EH, an environmental hazard, or the requirement for a high-assurance level (such as a high-
value target). Commanders generally conduct an advanced search only when a clear and evident requirement
exists. Because of the increased risks associated with an advanced search, military personnel on search teams
should receive progressive training on unique search skills, detection techniques, and force protection
measures.

Chapter 5
5-18. (U) During advanced search, a cordon security force protects the search team. While an advanced
search requires fewer searchers than other levels, the actions associated with the cordon security and reaction
forces may require considerable resources.
CATEGORIES (U)
5-19. (U) Commanders categorize search incidents according to potential threats, the tactical situation, the
target, and updated intelligence. Precategorize potential targets when possible. Safety is the primary concern
when planning a search, except when presented with a high-priority search incident. In all categories, the first
plan of action is performing remote procedures. Table 5-2 outlines the search incident categories and their
characteristics. (See ATP-73 Volume I and Volume II for additional information on search incident
categories.)
Table 5-2. (U) Characteristics of search incident categories
Category Characteristics
• Constitutes a grave and immediate threat.
• Threatens critical assets.
• Possesses the potential to cause—
 Mass destruction.
 Widespread contamination.
Category A  Significant casualties.
 Loss of critical facilities or infrastructures.
• Holds highest priority of all search incidents.
• Begins immediately and builds to an advanced search level.
• Prohibits unit maneuver and mission capabilities.
• Constitutes an indirect threat.
• Threatens critical assets.
• Requires at least an intermediate search level.
• Impairs unit maneuver.
Category B
• Prohibits mission capabilities.
• Includes items of technical intelligence value.
• Observes a safe waiting period.
• Reduces hazards to search personnel.
• Constitutes a minor threat.
• Threatens noncritical assets.
• Occurs after categories A and B, as the situation permits.
• Requires at least an intermediate search level.
Category C
• Reduces unit maneuver.
• Decreases mission capabilities.
• Adheres to all wait times and safety precautions.
• Minimizes hazards to search personnel.
• Constitutes no threat at this time.
• Exhibits little or no effect on unit capabilities or assets.
Category D
• Occurs as time and resources permit.
• Employs a basic search level team.
RESOURCES (U)
5-20. (U) Commanders use a variety of personnel, equipment, and other supporting assets during search.
Using the right resources enables units to conduct searches effectively, save time, minimize property damage,
and minimize disruption.

Reconnaissance (U)
PERSONNEL (U)
5-21. (U) Contributing to the intelligence picture of the operational environment, U.S. forces and
organizations use fundamental search awareness skills. Even relatively trivial information provided by
individuals may provide the necessary information from which to launch future searches. The searcher should
continually assess where the enemy may conceal munitions or EH-related material and information.
Searchers must be alert for and suspicious of anything out of place. The enemy may sometimes be careless
or hasty and leave telltale signs. Commanders use search coordinators, search advisors, search squad leaders,
and search teams to enable effective searches.
Search Coordinator (U)

5-22. (U) The search coordinator is normally a battalion level or higher-level staff officer trained on
advanced search who assists the maneuver commander in planning search activities. The search coordinator
integrates searches into the overall EH operation and is capable of coordinating multiple search missions.
Search coordinators conduct planning, preparation, rehearsals, or execution of a search. Search coordinators
support the commander as they integrate search objectives with those of the next higher command.
Commanders also use their search coordinator to coach, train, and advise subordinate search advisors. Other
search coordinator tasks include—
 (U) Learning the capabilities and limitations of the search teams and equipment.
 (U) Training search advisors, leaders, and team members.
 (U) Researching (during the planning phase) and learning the legal requirements for each specific
search.
 (U) Communicating the overall purpose and objectives of the search, to search members and the
chain of command.
 (U) Estimating threat conditions and templating how those conditions may impede the search.
 (U) Integrating during planning the appropriate supporting agencies and enablers to conduct
search.
 (U) Ensuring completion of necessary search documentation at the conclusion of each search.
 (U) Conducting debriefings for search teams and agencies involved in the search.
 (U) Briefing the commander on the results of the search.
Search Advisor (U)

5-23. (U) The search advisor is normally an experienced company grade officer, warrant officer, or senior
noncommissioned/staff noncommissioned officer who has received intermediate or advanced search level
advisor training. A search advisor completes detailed search planning, preparation, rehearsals, and mission
execution. The unit commander should delegate authority to the search advisor as needed to accomplish the
mission. The specific authorities delegated depend on the situation and the personalities involved. The search
advisor assists the commander on the ground in preparing risk assessments, developing risk mitigation
measures, and allocating search resources. When multiple teams are searching an area, the search advisor
will often assist the commander in controlling search team activity.
Search Squad Leader (U)

5-24. (U) The search squad leader is normally an experienced noncommissioned officer who has completed
intermediate search level training. The squad may consist of as many as 10 Soldiers or 13 Marines. The squad
leader directs and controls personnel during searches, ensuring that they adhere to safety requirements and
the requirements for handling evidence that may be of intelligence value. The search squad leader ensures
that personnel comply with stated search procedures.
Search Teams (U)

5-25. (U) Search teams are company level resources that are trained, qualified, and equipped to conduct
intermediate or advanced search tasks. The search team has a leader (usually the squad leader) and ideally an
assistant leader (such as a team leader). One member of the team is the recorder and is responsible for

Chapter 5
completing the required documentation. Other team members may perform tasks such as scribe,
photographer, biometrics gatherer, searcher, and explosive residue collector. Search teams may vary in the
number of search pairs but should never consist of fewer than two pairs.
Military Working Dog Teams (U)

5-26. (U) The unique capabilities of military working dog (MWD) teams make them invaluable assets to
maneuver commanders. Well-trained teams are versatile, deployable worldwide, and provide tactical utility
across the full range of military operations. MWD teams provide commanders with a responsive capability
to search, detect, track threats, and identify hazards in a way that protects the force. The intense training of
an MWD team, combined with natural canine abilities, offers a distinct type of support, particularly to
countering EHs.
5-27. (U) Combining a trained MWD with its trained handler establishes a single MWD team. Teams are
classified as single-purpose or dual-purpose. A single-purpose MWD is trained on one specialized task, while
a dual-purpose MWD is trained to perform several complex tasks.
5-28. (U) Veterinary support must be available throughout the deployment. Units being supported by the
MWD team supply logistical, administrative, and operational support.
5-29. (U) To fully maximize the value from the services of trained MWD teams, it is essential to possess a
sound understanding of their capabilities, limitations, and conditions for employment. (See ATP 3-39.34 and
MCIP 3-34.03 for additional information. These publications outline the framework for the employment of
MWDs and provide commanders and staffs with a reference document on TTP necessary for the employment,
sustainment, and integration of MWD support.)
TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT (U)

5-30. (U) The type of equipment needed by the search team depends on the mission and area of operations.
Commanders consider search training and resourcing during their predeployment preparation and conduct
readiness exercises as part of homestation and operational training. Most advance level search tools and
equipment are not organic to engineer units, and they will require predeployment training for them to be
implemented into searches. Commanders use intelligence and information resources to enable search
planning and template search areas. Resources such as aerial imagery assist commanders in identifying areas
where the normal pattern of soil or foliage has been disturbed, forming the basis for a targeted area of interest.
SUPPORTING ASSETS (U)

5-31. (U) A variety of assets and enablers are available to commanders to support their search. Leaders
conducting the search may require external resources to establish a secure area (cordon), transport seized
material, or provide civil affairs support. Assets that may be available to commanders include—
 (U) EOCA. EOCA support search efforts through specific UXO identification, protective works,
and authorized disposal of UXO.
 (U) EOD teams. When required, leaders request EOD support post discovery.
 (U) Weapons focused technical collection resources. These resources provide the practical skills
required to accurately gather evidence and intelligence in support of countering EHs.
 (U) Counter Radio-Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare (CREW)
systems. Commanders deploy specialized CREW assets to support a search.
 (U) Robots. In their simplest form, robots support detection and classification EHs.
 (U) Cameras. Cameras have a wide range of applications. They can use different film types
(infrared, ultraviolet) to disclose evidence that is indiscernible to the naked eye. For example,
infrared photography reveals differences in the heat emitted by objects and can often disclose
recent digging and buried or concealed objects.
 (U) Aerial photography. Aerial photography (particularly after photographs have been
interpreted or analyzed) is fundamental to planning searches.
 (U) Unmanned Aerial System (UAS). The use of UASs has given a significant advantage to
personnel in conducting a search. These systems provide additional real-time intelligence,

Reconnaissance (U)
surveillance, security, and targeting. Smaller systems may be organic to the unit; however, it is
the responsibility of the search advisor to request the appropriate system before the search.
 (U) Imagery. Specialized imagery allows penetration of target barrier materials.
 (U) Geographic products. Geographic products (such as typical tunnel design overlaid on terrain
imagery when specialized imagery is not available) have multiple applications.
 (U) Interpreters. When available, interpreters may be embedded with the search element and
assist personnel in conducting a search. Interpreters translate oral and visual communication from
one language to another. Their presence is a significant force multiplier, because they have the
ability to preserve and express the same tone and meaning as the original speaker. Female
interpreters may require separate billeting and latrine facilities. Male and female interpreters
typically remain with a unit during deployment.
 (U) Female engagement teams. Ideally, the searcher should be the same gender as the person
searched. Some countries may require that females conduct the search of a child (age determined
by the laws of the country).
 (U) Law enforcement personnel. Maximum legal compliance may require the presence of host
nation civilian police or United Nations police representatives throughout all searches.

Chapter 6
Explosive Hazard Planning (U)
(U) Maneuver commanders involve engineer leaders early in the planning process of
an operation where explosive obstacles are likely. Planning engineer support to defeat
explosive obstacles focuses on proactive measures (to identify known and potential
explosive obstacles) and reactive measures (to mitigate explosive hazard effects)
within the assured mobility framework. Leaders focus on proactive measures by
understanding the operational environment and current enemy TTP on using EHs.
Engineers support the maneuver commander’s reactive actions to detect, avoid, reduce
or clear, and protect against EHs. Reactive actions mitigate EH effects and typically
involve reducing and clearing. Commanders enable proactive and reactive EH
mitigation measures through directed actions (exploitation of EH-related incidents,
Soldier/Marine awareness training). During planning, engineers identify known and
potential explosive obstacle locations using available intelligence or information from
previously encountered obstacles, probable EH storage and movement locations,
emplacement activities, and other intelligence. Planning involves identifying task
activities, estimating durations, planning, scheduling activities, and implementing the
schedule. Force review analysis includes identification of gaps in completing engineer
tasks and specialized engineer units and enablers to mitigate those tactical level tasks.
For access to information on identifying EH threats, refer to the Marine Corps Engineer
School Web site.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS (U)

6-1. (U) When possible, leaders use standardized checklists and techniques to establish the best sequence
for task completion and develop control measures so personnel consistently and correctly execute tasks.
Managing countering explosive obstacles is a staff and company operations section priority of effort. For
example, monitoring clearing status involves tracking the completion of activities to meet timeline goals and
objectives. Simple tracking mechanisms (such as prioritizing routes or map overlays depicting percentage of
areas cleared) enable leaders to compare requirements and completed efforts in planning for resources.
Leaders should consider the following to aid the planning process:
 (U) Fundamentals of assured mobility. During planning, engineers must consider the framework
of assured mobility, which follows a continuous cycle of planning, preparing, executing, and
assessing decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. This framework applies six fundamentals
that enable friendly forces to move and maneuver while denying the enemy the ability to move
and maneuver. Commanders and staffs implement assured mobility by applying the six
fundamentals within the planning process, integrating processes, and continuing activities. (See
ATTP 3-90.4/MCIP 3-17.8 for the specific application of the fundamentals of assured mobility in
engineer operations.)
 (U) Knowing the commander’s priorities. Commanders are involved early in the planning
process to provide planning guidance, confirm priority intelligence requirements, establish
suspense dates, and initiate initial reconnaissance efforts. Leaders update commanders throughout
the operations process on timelines, work status, availability of resources, and risk.
 (U) Identifying the types and forms of enabling operations and supporting tactical tasks.
Tactical enabling tasks include reconnaissance, combined arms breach, security, and search used
in movement to contact. Tactical tasks describe the effect that commanders want to achieve in

Chapter 6
support of the enabling task. Specific to countering explosive obstacles, those tactical tasks could
be clear or reduce.
 (U) Allocating resources. Allocating resources involves the analysis of resources that are best
suited to reduce or clear the EH with the least risk while ensuring force projection in the manner
and speed that supports mission accomplishment. Leaders should assess each threat area
individually and then prioritize the efforts to meet command guidance and availability of
resources. The asset-to-threat assessment also enables leaders to track requirements and
completion status and adjust to changing requirements. Task organization allocates available
assets to subordinate commanders to aid in accomplishing their assigned tasks and missions. Task
organizing also establishes command and support relationships.
 (U) Assessing risk. Leaders conduct risk assessments throughout the operations process to
identify risk and mitigation measures and implement appropriate control actions. If the explosive
obstacle contains mixed ordnance types (mines, UXO), this increases difficulty and risk.
 (U) Using aerial imagery and reconnaissance. Aerial imagery and reconnaissance play an
integral part in supporting operations for personnel. They provide critical information (change
detection of the Earth’s surface, real-time imagery, full-motion video). These assets feed
information electronically, providing leaders data useful throughout the execution of tasks. If a
unit does not possess an organic aerial system, leaders should know the procedures for requesting
aerial support.
 (U) Integrating air assets. Lethal aerial platforms (close air support or close combat attack) are
critical when executing tasks to clear in restricted terrain. These platforms can support troops in
contact and, more importantly, deter enemy ambushes or IED triggermen by their presence.
 (U) Planning for sustainment/logistics support. Planning for support helps ensure that the
necessary sustainment/logistics assets are available. This also involves synchronization of general
and direct support assets for low-density specialized engineer and enabling equipment. Specialized
engineering units and equipment aid engineer leaders in executing clear tasks. However, low-
density equipment also experiences mechanical and sustainment/logistics troubles that the
supported engineer unit may not be able to fix. These are not new challenges for engineers but
require discussion and planning with maneuver commanders to mitigate risks that arise.
 (U) Planning for medical and casualty evacuation. Accidental or unplanned EH detonation may
occur during the conduct of a mission. To help ensure rapid treatment of the wounded, all
personnel should know which procedures to follow in the event of a medical or casualty
evacuation.
 (U) Integrating multinational assets. Conducting missions with multinational forces and
contract elements requires detailed planning and synchronization regarding capabilities, tasks,
interoperability between forces, and mitigation of mission risk.
 (U) Integrating EOD assets. Integrating EOD forces with engineer or maneuver forces requires
detailed planning and resource consideration. Leaders must be aware of the capabilities and
capacity of the EOD assets to effectively synchronize their efforts to counter the EH.
 (U) Integrating security forces. Countering EHs involves the execution of tasks in areas outside
security perimeters of forward operating bases or in other military cantonment areas. Security
forces regularly updated on mission status and security support is required. Daily briefings to
integrated security forces aids in building an understanding of the requirement and changing
environment.
 (U) Training on EH awareness. Engineer leaders should emphasize EH awareness at all levels
and skill sets. Leader skills involve planning missions, assessing situations, and tracking and
disseminating EH information. Operation orders should include specifics on EHs (identification,
reporting, marking, protective measure procedures).
 (U) Observing local national movement on routes and around areas with known EHs. Local
nationals typically use trails and paths along routes or throughout specific areas. It is important to
observe or speak to the local nationals who observe these routes and areas on a daily basis. During
the execution of an area clear mission, the technical survey should discern local national footpaths
that offer low-risk start paths into the hazardous areas.

Explosive Hazard Planning (U)
DATA RECORDING AND TRACKING (U)

6-2. (U) Regardless of the theater maturity level, catalogue ammunition supply points, major cache sites,
and EH trends. Proper recording and tracking of EHs provides actionable and tactical information to leaders
and their personnel and provide protection information to subordinate and adjacent units. Recording and
tracking of EH enables predicting the potential location of EHs given past EH attack locations and enemy
TTP. There is also the need to record subsequent clearance, reduction, and mitigating TTP.
6-3. (U) The Army and Marine Corps maintain repository information on EHs. The Army explosive hazard
database aids in the development of decisionmaking products and creation of a common operational picture.
An EH information repository enables shared understanding on EH locations, category, and status and builds
knowledge on areas to avoid, areas that have been bypassed, and areas or routes that have been cleared.
6-4. (U) The Explosive Hazard Coordination Cell (or senior engineer staff cell) and counter-IED cell staff
collect, collate, analyze, process, and disseminate information that flows continuously into the explosive
hazard database. The explosive hazard database provide valuable information on enemy use of EHs and other
EHs encountered in the area of operations (ammunition supply points, last known enemy locations) that
contain EHs. The information from the database enables pattern analysis in predicting possible locations
where enemy forces will use EHs.
6-5. (U) The explosive hazard database managing organization assists subordinate engineer organizations
in managing, gathering, and tracking EH incident data within the area of operations. The Explosive Hazard
Coordination Cell aids in coordinating for EOD assets, assessing technical information and, if needed,
collecting and safely handling all first-seen items. The Explosive Hazard Coordination Cell will also aid
engineer leaders in their planning and execution requirements associated with EHs in general and with a
focus on CEA.
6-6. (U) The explosive hazards database is geographically referenced catalog systems that take advantage
of geographic information systems functionality. Each database provides a capability to input, manage, track,
and disseminate EH-related data to maneuver units, route clearance teams, intelligence assets for use in
pattern analysis, and Army/Marine Corps institutions for training purposes. The database has reachback
capability to technical expertise in the engineer and counter-IED communities, intelligence organizations,
EOD units, the Counter Explosive Hazard Center, and the Marine Corps Engineer School.
6-7. (U) Obtaining accurate and timely information on EHs requires units, leaders, and personnel to report
contact with EHs to their higher headquarters. Personnel send reports by the fastest, most secure means
available. Failure to disseminate timely EH information potentially results in friendly casualties.
6-8. (U) At the BCT/RCT level, engineers should establish a central control cell for obstacle information
that feeds into the appropriate database. Functions associated with the control cell include—
 (U) Maintaining a current situation map and an overlay (digital or analog) that depicts friendly
and enemy EHs and obstacles.
 (U) Maintaining updated information on EH tracking and route status.
 (U) Receiving and maintaining minefield records within the area of operations (includes host
nation minefield data).
 (U) Collaborating with the Explosive Hazard Coordination Cell on BCT/RCT level EH-related
incidents and trends (friendly and enemy).
 (U) Processing, analyzing, updating, and disseminating EH information to subordinate
commanders, staff, and engineer leaders using a push or pull knowledge management system.
 (U) Planning transfer of obstacle information to the host nation or a relieving unit.

Appendix A
Metric Conversion Chart (U)
(U) This appendix complies with AR 25-30 which states that weights, distances,
quantities, and measurements contained in Army publications will be expressed in U.S.
standard and metric units. Table A-1 is a metric conversion chart for the measurements
used in this publication. For a complete listing of preferred metric units for general use,
see Fed-Std-376B.
Table A-1. (U) Metric conversion chart

U.S. Units Multiplied By Equals Metric Units
Feet 0.3048 Meters
Inches 2.54 Centimeters
Inches 0.0254 Meters
Inches 25.4001 Millimeters
Miles (statute) 1.60934 Kilometers
Miles per hour 1.6093 Kilometers per hour
Miles per hour 0.0447 Meter per second
Pounds 0.4536 Kilograms
Yards 0.9144 Meters
Metric Units Multiplied By Equals U.S. Units
Centimeters 0.3937 Inches
Kilograms 2.2046 Pounds
Kilometer 0.62137 Miles (statute)
Kilometers per hour 0.62137 Miles per hour
Meters 3.2808 Feet
Meters 39.37 Inches
Meters 1.09361 Yards
Meters per second 2.2369 Miles per hour
Millimeters 0.03937 Inches
Legend:
U.S. United States
21 January 2016 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D A-1

Appendix B
Counter Explosive Hazards Enabling Equipment (U)
(U) The operational environment is lethal, complex, and littered with EHs. These
hazards are often concealed, unmarked, or unknown until Soldiers or Marines are
within the hazard area. An EH presence poses a continual threat to personnel and
equipment and can significantly affect force mobility. To successfully counter and
mitigate EH effects, accurate and reliable detection equipment and technologies are
crucial. Personnel identify EHs through a variety of visual, physical, mechanical, and
biological means, including ground search techniques, mechanical clearing, and aerial
systems. This appendix provides general characteristics of EH detection enablers used
by Soldiers or Marines. It is a guide to help commanders and leaders successfully
integrate EH detection capabilities into mission planning and training development.
HANDHELD EXPLOSIVE HAZARD DETECTION DEVICES (U)

B-1. (U) Handheld detectors provide personnel with compact, lightweight, portable EH detection
capabilities. Handheld detection devices typically require minimal operator training and maintenance, while
sustaining their accuracy and durability. There are a variety of options available to personnel (metal and
nonmetal detectors, EH component indicators, explosive detection kits).
METAL AND NONMETAL DETECTORS AND COMPONENT DETECTORS (U)

B-2. (U) The Army and Marine Corps use handheld metal and low-to-no metal detectors to detect EHs. The
typical portable metal detector uses electromagnetic induction technologies to find metal objects at or below
the ground surface. Ground penetrating radar systems transmit radio waves subsurface to detect objects.
Table B-1 outlines the characteristics of some common metal and low-to-no metal detectors.
Table B-1. (U) Capabilities of metal and nonmetal detectors

Item Brief Description of Capabilities
• Offers handheld, battery-powered, and man-portable qualities.
• Facilitates easy transport with its lightweight and retractable design.
Vallon VMC1 Gizmo
• Features an easily adjustable length, even during operation, to facilitate
compact metal detector detection work in standing, kneeling, or prone positions.
(Army Only)
• Locates subsurface metal objects.
• Operates in dense vegetation, rocks, shallow water, and mud.
• Features a lightweight, handheld, and compact design.
• Detects metal and metal-free explosive hazards with dual-sensor
Vallon VMR3 Minehound technology.
dual-sensor metal detector • Offers a highly sensitive metal detection technology to locate even
(Army Only) minimum-metal mines.
• Offers simultaneous or separate employment of ground penetrating radar
and metal detection capabilities.
21 January 2016 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D B-1

Appendix B
Table B-1. (U) Capabilities of metal and nonmetal detectors (continued)

• Features a lightweight, handheld, and compact design.
• Detects metal and metal-free explosive hazards with dual-sensor
Vallon VMR2/VMR2.5 technology.
(VMR2+) Minehound dual– • Offers a highly sensitive metal detection technology to locate even
sensor mine detector minimum-metal mines.
• Offers simultaneous or separate employment of ground penetrating radar
and metal detection capabilities.
• Features a one-piece, compact, and handheld design.
• Allows immediate operational status and ease of transport with lightweight,
collapsible construct.
• Detects all magnetic and nonmagnetic metals through high-performance,
CEIA compact mine ultra-sensitive technology.
detector
• Ensures optimum detection over all types of terrain with exclusive
automatic soil compensation system.
• Features adjustable sensitivity over a wide range of values and a high
discrimination capability for adjacent targets.
• Provides a single Soldier- and Marine-operated, handheld mine detector.
• Combines ground penetrating radar and highly sensitive metal detection
Army-Navy/portable special technology.
search-14 (AN/PSS-14) • Enhances reliable and consistent detection with dual-detection
mine detecting set (Army technologies.
Only) • Identifies metallic and low-metallic antipersonnel and antitank mines.
• Uses sensor fusion and sophisticated data algorithms to reduce false
alarm rate.
• Precursor to the -14 model and provides a man-portable, metallic mine-
detection system.
Army-Navy/portable special
search-12 (AN/PSS-12) • Features a compact, lightweight frame.
handheld portable mine • Detects high- and low-metallic content antitank and antipersonnel mines.
detecting set (Army Only) • Offers fast and accurate terrain reconnaissance capabilities.
• Identifies mines in fresh or salt water.
Legend:
AN/PSS Army-Navy/portable special search
EXPLOSIVE OBSTACLE COMPONENT INDICATORS (U)

B-3. (FOUO) In an effort to circumvent traditional metal detectors, the enemy constructs explosive
obstacles with rudimentary materials (wooden boards, foam rubber, plastic containers). The finished obstacle
then contains very little metal, making it difficult for a metal detector to identify it. To counter these tactics,
personnel may use explosive obstacle component indicators as an alternative to handheld metal detectors.
Explosive obstacle component indicators detect command wires or enable the observation of explosive
obstacle emplacement activity. Table B-2 outlines the characteristics of some common explosive obstacle
component indicators.
B-2 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 21 January 2016

Table B-2. (U) Capabilities of EH component detectors

• Offers a rugged, handheld, battery-operated, explosive hazard component
indicator.
Detector special purpose- • Features a Kevlar material construction, making the detector lightweight
27 and easily portable.
• Enables all weather, day and night, explosive hazard component
identification.
• Presents users with an adjustable 15-foot pole with a sickle head.
Holley StickTM command • Offers a simplistic concept ideal for sifting through surface dirt to detect
wire locator tool kit potential explosive hazards.
• Transports easily due to the lightweight, carbon fiber construction.
• Possesses an enhanced optics technology.
• Allows for day or night, all-weather observation.
• Provides the capability to effectively identify explosive hazards and
observe emplacement activity at greater standoff
• Includes the following components:
Route clearance optics  Long-range television equipped with color video camera.
suite  Midwave infrared thermal imager.
 Handheld laser range finder.
 Digital magnetic compass.
 Infrared pointer.
 Mini-handheld thermal viewer.
 Image stabilized binoculars.
HOMEMADE EXPLOSIVE DETECTORS (U)

B-4. (U) Personnel use HME detectors to rapidly indicate the presence of explosive materials and identify
the type of explosive particles present. Test kits detect explosive material through chemical identification of
microscopic residues (from the explosive compound) that adhere to surfaces. Importantly, a positive
detection does not necessarily indicate the presence of an EH. Identified particles may be contamination
transferred through contact, directly or indirectly, with explosive materials. Table B-3, page B-4, describes
some common HME detectors used during countering explosive obstacles.
CAUTION
Use caution when using homemade explosive detector kits. A positive
indication does not necessarily mean there is a presence of HME. All
field detection kit results are to be considered presumptive.

Appendix B
Table B-3. (U) Capabilities of homemade explosive detectors

• Offers a compact, colorimetric explosives detection kit.
• Ensures maximum portability with minimum waste.
Pocket explosives test kit • Presents a simple-to-use, yet highly sensitive detection capability.
(Army only) • Identifies suspicious substances (liquids, powders, and solids) or reveals
traces of explosive residue on surfaces and individuals.
• Possesses preblast and postblast detection functions.
• Offers an aerosol-based field test kit.
• Detects and identifies Group A and Group B explosives and compounds
containing inorganic nitrates used in improvised explosive devices.
Expray explosive device • Provides a preblast analytical tool or a postblast investigative tool.
test kit (Army only) • Features a rugged and simple-to-use kit, enabling rapid deployment and
effective use.
• Facilitates use in the most austere environments.
• Requires no additional tools, equipment, or electrical power.
• Provides a means to rapidly identify bulk quantities of materials used in
homemade explosive mixtures.
Bulk homemade explosive • Screens bulk quantities of powders or prills for the presence of homemade
precursor detection (Army explosive precursor materials (nitrates, chlorates). Provides a lightweight,
only) compact, easily transportable detection kit.
• Requires minimal application requisites, facilitating use in rudimentary
areas of operation.
• Provides a handheld, portable, liquid detection screening system.
Fido® explosive detection
• Uses proprietary amplifying fluorescence polymers.
system (Army only)
• Detects trace levels of explosive materials in parts per quadrillion.
COUNTERMINE VEHICLES (U)

B-5. (U) Mines present a serious threat for personnel. Mines are intended to cause catastrophic damage to
personnel and equipment, but they also create significant barriers to conducting operations. To counter the
damaging effects of mines and to facilitate mission accomplishment, commanders use specialized vehicles
(see table B-4) to detect or clear mines within the area of operations.
Table B-4. (FOUO) Capabilities of countermine vehicles
• Clears large areas of antitank and antipersonnel mines.
• Features a series of 72 chains on a 3.7-meter wide flail shaft that
hydraulically rotates up to 440 revolutions per minute.
• Unearths, destroys, or detonates landmines that contain up to
Area mine clearance 10 kilograms of explosives.
system medium flail (Army • Requires only one operator or may be controlled by a remote.
only) • Features a 14-millimeter ballistic-rated armor steel plate capable of
withstanding the blast of an antitank mine.
• Possesses two 136-kilowatt diesel engines capable of simultaneous
application.
• Facilitates transport by loader vehicle, rail, or aircraft.

Table B-4. (FOUO) Capabilities of countermine vehicles (continued)

• Added to the Husky vehicle that uses ground penetrating radar to locate
Husky Mounted Detection and mark the position of mines.
System • Detects surface and buried threats (metallic and nonmetallic).
• Automatically mows with the contour of the ground during scanning.
• Detects buried metallic mines, improvised explosive devices, and
unexploded explosive ordnance.
Vehicle mounted mine • Uses pulse-induction type mine detectors.
detection system
• Detonates pressure-fused mines with mine detection trailers.
• Includes two Huskies, three mine detection trailers, and one red pack.
EXPLOSIVE OBSTACLE BREACHING EQUIPMENT (U)

B-6. (U) Breaching makes maneuver possible despite the presence of enemy obstacles. The significant
difference between reducing and clearing is that reducing usually occurs during an attack (while under enemy
fire) to project combat power to the far side of an obstacle. (See ATTP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 for additional
information on breaching.) Commanders can use the equipment described in table B-5 when breaching.
Table B-5. (U) Capabilities of explosive obstacle breaching equipment
• Counters tripwire and mined antipersonnel obstacles that restrict tactical
movement.
• Facilitates clearing and breaching through urban and complex mine or
tripwire environments.
MPLC® Tactical Line • Exposes, disrupts, reduces, or clears IED trigger mechanisms.
Charge (Army only) • Minimizes collateral effects on noncombatant personnel, structures, and
property.
• Offers a self-contained system in a lightweight rucksack (approximately 13
kilograms).
• Allows for easy transport and quick deployment by one Soldier or Marine.
• Offers a single-shot, rocket-projected, explosive line charge.
• Provides a close-in breaching capability for maneuver forces.
• Clears a path for tanks, vehicles, and personnel through minefields and
other explosive hazard obstacles.
Mine clearing line charge • Moves to the point of the breach via tow by capable vehicle.
(Army)/MK2 MOD 0 mine • Includes the following components:
clearance system (USMC)  M353 3.5-ton chassis.
 Launcher assembly.
 M147 firing kit.
 M58A3/4 line charge.
• 12.7-centimeter MK22 Mod 4 rocket.

Appendix B
Table B-5. (U) Capabilities of explosive obstacle breaching equipment (continued)

• Provides a self-contained system with operates via the amphibious assault
vehicle slave electrical power
MK 154/MK 1 MOD 0 Mine
• The system has the capability to house and fire (3) rocket motors, MK 22
Clearance Launcher Mod 3/Mod 4, and their corresponding linear demolition charges.
(USMC only)
• Clears a path for tanks, vehicles, and personnel through minefields and
other explosive hazard obstacles on land or water.
• Provides a self-contained, single-shot, expendable linear demolition
charge.
MK7 MOD1/MOD2 • Enables the safe breaching of complex antipersonnel minefields and multi-
antipersonnel obstacle strand wire obstacles.
breaching system • Reduces or clears explosive hazards using fragmentation grenades.
• Offers a breaching system that can be transported and deployed by a two-
person team.
Legend:
mod modification
MPLC man portable line charge
USMC United States Marine Corps
MINE-PROTECTED VEHICLES (U)

B-7. (FOUO) In recent overseas locations, IEDs were the greatest casualty producers within the joint
operations area. To counter this threat, the mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) family of vehicles and
other mine-protected vehicles were developed to provide multimission vehicle platforms capable of lessening
the effects of explosive booby traps/IEDs. These vehicles were designed to increase the survivability and
mobility of personnel operating in a hazardous fire area by providing protection against mine blasts, explosive
booby traps/IEDs, and direct arms fire. Some common MRAP and mine-protected vehicle variants are
described in table B-6.
Table B-6. (U) Capabilities of MRAP and mine-protected vehicles
• Provides a specialized 6X6 truck designed principally for area and route
clearing.
• Features all-around ballistic protection, including the windows and roof,
against blasts and small arms fire.
Buffalo, mine resistant • Includes an articulated hydraulic arm, which enables the crew to handle
protected vehicle, suspicious items from a distance.
category III • Includes an extendable boom with an attached claw, which combined with the
video camera mounted on the boom, allows the operator to manipulate the
claw and confirm explosive obstacles with standoff.
• Requires a two-person operating crew and has the capability to transport four
additional personnel.

Table B-6. (U) Capabilities of MRAP and mine-protected vehicles (continued)

• Features a vehicle design ideal for the transportation of personnel and
Cougar 6X6, hardened equipment through the area of operations.
engineer vehicle, • Maximizes occupant survival with hardened vehicle construction.
category II • Offers protection against mine blasts, explosive booby traps/IEDs, rocket-
propelled grenade impact, and small arms fire.
• Provides a platform for conducting route and area clearing missions, explosive
hazards reconnaissance, and explosive ordnance disposal.
RG-33L, mine-resistant, • Protects occupants against explosive booby traps/IEDs, mine blasts, and
ambush-protected direct fire weapons.
vehicle, category II
• Deflects blast effects with its V-shaped hull.
• Enables safe operation on any terrain with advanced power train.
• Features a vehicle design ideal for the transportation of personnel and
Cougar 4X4, hardened equipment.
engineer vehicle, • Maximizes occupant survival with hardened vehicle construction.
category I • Offers protection against mine blasts, explosive booby traps/IEDs, rocket-
propelled grenade impact, and small arms fire.
• Provides a platform for conducting route and area clearing missions and
performing explosive hazards reconnaissance.
• Protects occupants against explosive traps/IEDs, mine blasts, and direct fire
RG-33, mine-resistant, weapons.
ambush-protected • Deflects blast effects with its V-shaped hull.
vehicle, category I
• Enables safe operation of the vehicle on any terrain with advanced power
train.
• Offers significant interior volume for crew and mission equipment.
• Provides the occupant with an increased level of protection against small arms
MaxxPro, mine- fire, rocket-propelled grenades, mine blasts, and explosive booby traps/IEDs.
resistant, ambush- • Features a V-shaped hull designed to deflect blasts from explosive hazards.
protected vehicle,
category I • Utilizes standardized, easily available parts to ensure rapid repair and
maintenance.
• Protects occupants from explosively formed projectiles, rocket-propelled
grenades, and explosive booby traps/IEDs.
Caiman multitheater
vehicle, mine-resistant, • Improves survivability with an enhanced monolithic floor, blast absorbing
ambush-protected seats, and concentrically formed C-channel frame.
vehicle, category I • Handles extreme terrain (poor road infrastructure, mountainous landscape).
• Operates in intense temperatures, both hot and cold environments.
• Provides protected ground mobility against explosive booby traps/IEDs,
rocket-propelled grenades, and small arms fire.
Mine-resistant, ambush- • Travels easily through complex and highly restricted rural, mountainous, and
protected all-terrain urban terrain.
vehicle • Features an independent suspension system for maximum mobility and
survivability.
• Transports up to five personnel.
Legend:

Appendix B
VEHICLE ATTACHMENTS AND AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT (U)

B-8. (FOUO) Countering explosive obstacles is inherently complex, and the continually increasing range
of explosive obstacles makes countering these threats even more challenging. One solution is equipment that
is adaptable to the current threat, for example, augmenting an MRAP vehicle with a specific attachment
depending on the type of hazard faced (a mine roller to clear mine contaminated areas, a robotic arm to
investigate suspected explosive obstacles, a debris blower to uncover explosive obstacles on roadways).
B-9. (FOUO) Many of the vehicles described in tables B-4 through B-6 possess the option for adding
attachments and auxiliary equipment to the base platform. (Refer to the respective technical manual or
manufacturer’s guidance for specific information.) The auxiliary pieces of equipment identified in table B-7,
page B-8, are designed to enhance functionality, increase effectiveness, or provide redundant capabilities to
explosive obstacle detection and investigation assets.
Table B-7. (FOUO) Capabilities of vehicle attachments and auxiliary equipment
• Provides standoff detection of explosive hazards.
• Uses a probing or digging tool to expose objects.
Vehicle-mounted • Identifies the target with a metal detector or camera.
interrogation arm • Possesses a working range of more than 8 meters.
• Moves objects weighing up to 91 kilograms.
• Compatible with the RG-33 series and Husky vehicles.
• Removes debris and other objects used to conceal explosive booby
traps/IEDs, and other explosive hazards on roadways.
• Features a series of nozzle options to suit an array of applications, such as
Cyclone debris blower blowing heavy, wet, or matted-down debris; fine-tune blowing; and surface
drying for low spots and paved surfaces.
• Produces wind speeds up to 290 kilometers per hour with a sustained blast of
281 kilometers per hour.
• Detects hazards by pulling or disturbing components of buried explosive
hazards.
• Includes modular tine and blade configurations.
Iron scrape • Features a rear-mounting system that makes disturbances easily detectable
by follow-on clearing vehicles.
• Allows for towing of mine roller system using an interface bracket.
• Reduces high-operational load on the Husky operator.
• Defeats passive infrared-triggered IEDs by creating a false heat signature.
• Features a universal mounting bracket compatible with all combat and tactical
Rhino convoy protection vehicle platforms.
device
• Provides flexible integration with cyclone debris blower or self-protection
adaptive roller kit.
• Enables quick location and identification of explosive hazards with a 360°
camera system.
• Possesses night vision and thermal imagery capabilities.
Vehicle optics sensor
• Records video of operation, facilitating accurate after action review and
system
lessons learned.
• Attaches to a mine resistant ambush protected vehicle or a Cougar mine
clearing vehicle.
• Uses a mechanical sift to detect explosive hazards in earth berms.
Berm sifter • Separates antipersonnel mines and debris from previously flailed soil.
• Attaches to the bucket of armored wheeled loaders or excavators.

Table B-7. (FOUO) Capabilities of vehicle attachments and axillary equipment (continued)
• Uses a set of rollers and a dog-bone-and-chain assembly to activate or
reduce encountered mines.
• Clears a path 1.2 meters wide in front of each tank track.
M1 mine clearing roller • Detonates mines by exerting pressure against the mine pressure plates.
system • Trips tilt-rod mine actuators with the dog-bone-and-chain assembly.
• Activates magnetic-influenced, fused mines by projecting a magnetic field
that prematurely activates the mines.
• Mounts to the front of an M1-series Abrams tank.
• Supports the terrain and mission requirements while providing the same
operational features as previous models.
Operation Enduring • Includes additional lights for increased visibility during night patrols.
Freedom self-protection • Provides unique hydraulic capabilities that support auto-steering,
adaptive roller kit emergency braking, and special articulation abilities.
• Features a third front roller for maximum coverage against mines or
pressure-activated IEDs and increased protection for follow-on vehicles.
• Predetonates pressure-plated IEDs.
• Features blast-dampening capabilities for tactical wheeled vehicles.
• Includes a rear roller hydraulic system that controls rollers, allowing the
Self-protective adaptive host vehicle to move faster.
roller kit
• Uses full-width wheels with durable honeycomb design to increase
predetonation effectiveness.
• Disconnects quickly from host vehicle.
• Defeats pressure-plate activated mines, victim-initiated IEDs, and
explosive booby traps.
Mine roller system-
Panama City roller • Provides full-width protection coverage for the host vehicle.
generation II • Maintains detection accuracy while traveling at tactical convoy speeds.
• Mounts on a variety of tactical vehicles.
Legend:
ROBOTS (U)
B-10. (FOUO) Small robotic platforms are ideal tools for personnel conducting countering EHs. Robotic
systems provide the ability to perform EH tasks safely from a secure location via remote control, thus
enabling the remote detection, investigation, and reduction or clearance of EHs. Robotic capabilities multiply
force effectiveness, improve survivability, and increase standoff distance.
B-11. (FOUO) Many robotic platforms accommodate supplemental accessories (cameras, sensors, and
specialized tools). These modifications expand robot performance capabilities or concentrate applications to
fit specific mission requirements. Table B-8, page B-10, describes capabilities of some of the common Army
and Marine Corps robotic systems.

Appendix B
Table B-8. (FOUO) Capabilities of robotic systems

• Clears antipersonnel mines by destroying or detonating them with its rotating flail
head.
• Provides precision, mathematically calculated mine-clearing capabilities to destroy
even the smallest of antipersonnel mines.
M160 Antipersonnel Mine • Features simultaneous application of the flail and roller tools, thereby increasing
Clearing System clearing reliability.
• Clears constricted areas and other types of terrain that are inaccessible to larger
machines.
• Facilitates teleoperation from mounted and dismounted positions.
• Protects engine and vital components with steel armor plates.
• Offers a lightweight and compact design; easily transported in a rucksack.
iRobot® 310 small unmanned • Climbs stairs and overcomes obstacles with ease.
ground vehicle robot
• Operates in all-weather conditions.
• Allows dexterous manipulation of objects.
iRobot® 310 small unmanned • Reduces training time using a game-style hand controller.
ground vehicle robot
(continued) • Performs dismounted tasks such as surveillance, reconnaissance, and route
clearing missions.
• Offers a lightweight and compact design; easily transported in a rucksack.
• Climbs stairs and overcomes obstacles with ease.
iRobot®320 small unmanned • Features a thermal camera capable of capturing white light images in the dark and
ground vehicle robot through smoke, fog, and operational environment obscurants.
• Provides day and night surveillance capabilities with 312x optical zoom camera.
• Reduces training time using a game-style hand controller.
• Presents a small, low-profile, teleoperated, tracked robotic platform.
• Climbs stairs, rolls over rubble, and navigates narrow passages with sure-footed
efficiency.
iRobot® PACKBOT® 510 • Travels at speeds up to 9.3 kilometers per hour.
robot • Possesses a rear-mounted system that digs around and moves and carries objects
weighing up to 45 kilograms.
• Operates in low-light and all-weather conditions.
• Offers the advantage of remotely transporting and emplacing explosive charges.
• Provides the operator with real-time video and audio feedback.
• Uses a two-stage arm and gripper attachment to manipulate hazardous materials or
ordnance.
• Performs in day or night, all-terrain, and in all-weather conditions.
QinetiQ Talon TM IV robot • Includes a full-swivel manipulator arm with a 2.1-meter reach capable of lifting up 29
kilograms.
• Offers unique remote search capabilities, such as inside bins, in high vehicle cabs
and flatbeds, and behind guardrails.
• Accommodates portable mine detectors for conducting remote explosive hazard
searches.
• Provides real-time video reconnaissance of hostile or dangerous environments.
• Features aircraft grade aluminum and titanium construction.
ReconScout® throwable • Endures harsh emplacement tactics, such as being thrown through a window,
reconnaissance robot tossed over a wall, or dropped from a low-flying unmanned aircraft system.
• Uses a handheld operator control unit to govern movement.
• Powers up and deploys in less than 15 seconds.

COUNTER RADIO-CONTROLLED IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE

DEVICE ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEMS (U)
B-12. (FOUO) A CREW system disrupts the radio frequency of the initiating device for a radio-controlled
IED, preventing the signal from reaching the receiver of the explosive device. CREW systems use active and
reactive jamming techniques. Systems using active jamming transmit continuously while reactive systems
scan the spectrum and transmit only when a specific frequency is detected. Each CREW system targets
specific radio frequency dependent technologies, and it is often used as a suite of systems to collectively
defeat the entire spectrum of radio-controlled IEDs. The Army and Marine Corps use a variety of CREW
systems. (See table B-9.)
Table B-9. (FOUO) Capabilities of CREW systems
• Uses active and reactive jamming techniques.
• Stores up to 15 mission loads.
• Transmits preprogrammed signal patterns designed for specific threat or blocking of
CREW vehicle receiver frequencies.
jammer
• Detects and records threat signal into memory.
• Responds by transmitting frequencies to jam detected signals.
• Possesses 15 waveform programmable radio frequency channels.
• Minimizes communication interference with other systems.
• Counters current and emerging threat radio frequencies.
• Uses an advanced software-defined architecture that supports rapid reconfiguration
Duke version 3 to adapt to the continually evolving threat.
• Maximizes protection radius while minimizing power consumption requirements.
• Provides a single-unit system with minimal size and weight.
• Mounts easily in tactical vehicles.
• Uses active and reactive jamming techniques.
• Draws power from rechargeable batteries.
• Promotes portability with its compact design contained within a single rucksack.
3.3 THOR III system • Counters low-, mid-, or high-frequency bands.
• Stores up to five mission loads.
• Uses a common timing protocol to maintain compatibility with other systems.
• Detects and records threat signal into memory.
• Offers a lightweight, man-portable, handheld frequency locating system.
• Provides indications, threats, and warnings of enemy intentions and direction finding
capabilities.
• Aids in rapidly and accurately locating ground-based radio emitters.
Wolfhound handheld threat • Identifies and geolocates spotter positions and observation posts.
warning system
• Provides signals intelligence overwatch.
• Provides static and mobile operations.
• Performs as a standalone unit or networked unit.
• Mounts to a rucksack for hands-free operations.
• Uses active and reactive jamming techniques
CREW Vehicle Receiver • Uses a common timing protocol to maintain compatibility with other systems
Jammer (Version 2) • Transmits preprogramed signal patterns designed for specific threat or blocking of
frequencies
CREW Vehicle Receiver • Counters low, medium, or high frequency bands.

Jammer (Version 2) • Detects and records threat signal into memory
(continued) • Possesses 16 waveform programmable radio frequency channels.
Legend:
CREW counter radio-controlled improvised

Appendix B
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (U)

B-13. (U) A UAS supports commanders as they plan, coordinate, and execute countering explosive obstacles
by providing actionable intelligence to the lowest tactical levels. A UAS is a unique tool that broadens the
commander’s understanding of the operational environment and provides the ability to see, target, and
destroy EHs. A UAS significantly augments countering explosive obstacles by affording personnel the
capability to conduct missions more effectively and with less risk. Table B-10 provides a consolidated outline
of some of the common UASs used for countering explosive obstacles.
Table B-10. (FOUO) Capabilities of UASs
• Provides aerial observation at line-of-sight ranges up to 10 kilometers.
• Accommodates land-based and maritime operations.
• Weighs 5.9 kilograms with a 2.6-meter wingspan.
• Lands on land and water surfaces.
Puma AE unmanned aircraft • Carries an electro-optical and infrared camera.
system
• Features a vertical descent capability.
• Requires no auxiliary equipment for launch or recovery.
• Provides persistent intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting data.
• Provides compatibility with the Raven® platform.
• Navigates automatically or manually.
• Assembles easily and quickly (less than 3 minutes).
• Includes an electro-optical, color camera nose for daytime missions and two
infrared, thermal noses for night conditions.
RQ-11 Raven® unmanned • Climbs to operational altitude in less than two minutes.
aircraft system
• Transmits live airborne video images enabling operators to search for targets.
• Weighs 1.9 kilograms and has a wingspan of 1.4 meters.
• Operates on a single battery-powered motor.
• Achieves speeds up to 48 kilometers per hour.
• Sees targets up to 120 kilometers away.
• Recognizes tactical vehicles up to 2,400 meters above the ground.
• Operates day or night.
• Provides targeting data for precision weapons.
RQ-7B Shadow® tactical • Launches from a trailer-mounted pneumatic catapult.
unmanned aircraft system • Provides dedicated reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition.
• Offers a gimbal-mounted, digitally stabilized, liquid nitrogen-cooled, electro-
optical/infrared camera
• Relays video in real time via a C-band line-of-sight data link to the ground control
station.
Legend:
AE all environment

Appendix C
Forms (U)
(U) The EH forms are important tools in support of countering EHs. The forms provide
EH information critical to search activities, and they are important contributing factors
in successfully documenting and tracking EHs. Detailed recording of EH information
is critical to the success of the mission and the overall situational understanding of
units within an area of operations. It is essential that all forms provide adequate
information, reflecting pertinent facts, findings, and observations. This appendix
highlights commonly used Department of Defense (DD) forms for countering EHs.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXPLOSIVE HAZARD FORMS (U)

C-1. (U) Engineers use DD forms to provide detailed information when executing countering EHs. Units
must provide accurate information to their higher headquarters to ensure follow-on forces are well informed
of pertinent EH information in the area of operations. Units send these forms by the fastest and most secure
means available. Failure to disseminate EH information could result in friendly casualties.
C-2. (U) Personnel are required to fill out the DD forms when conducting missions that require
documentation. Whether a mission is productive or nonproductive, the forms must be completed and
forwarded to higher headquarters. The Soldier/Marine generally annotates a DD form by hand, completing
all applicable blocks and lining though empty blocks to prevent unauthorized entries on the forms. For the
purpose of this appendix, the forms were typed. Commanders and leaders ensure that the writing is legible
and accurate before sending the forms to higher headquarters.
C-3. (U) Engineers most commonly use the following forms during countering EHs:
 (U) DD Form 3007 (Hasty Protective Row Minefield Record).
 (U) DD Form 3008 (Explosive Hazards Clearance Report).
 (U) DD Form 3017 (Explosive Hazards Survey Report).
MINEFIELD RECORD (U)

C-4. (U) Units record protective minefields and munition fields on DD Form 3007. Conventional minefield
or munition field records are forwarded from the unit to the Explosive Hazard Coordination Cell. In the event
that the Explosive Hazard Coordination Cell has not yet been established, minefield or munition field records
are maintained on file with the assistant corps engineer of the area of operations where the EH field is located.
C-5. (U) When completed, the DD Form 3007 contains UNCLASSIFIED SENSITIVE INFORMATION
for current operations at company level and below. Current operations above company level are
CONFIDENTIAL. Future operations are classified SECRET. DD Form 3007 has two sides. Figure C-1, page
C-2, is a sample DD Form 3007.
21 January 2016 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D C-1

Appendix C
Figure C-1. (U) Sample DD Form 3007
C-2 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 21 January 2016

Forms (U)
Figure C-1. Sample DD Form 3007 (continued)

Appendix C
Legend:
1LT first lieutenant
2LT second lieutenant
APD Army Publishing Directorate
Aug August
BN battalion
cm centimeter
co company
DD Department of Defense
Dec December
det detonation
EN engineer
Eng engineer
Jul July
m meter
No. number
OIC officer in charge
plt platoon
SSN social security number
DA Department of the Army
Figure C-1. (U) Sample DD Form 3007 (continued)
EXPLOSIVE OBSTACLE CLEARANCE REPORT (U)

C-6. (U) Searchers use DD Form 3008 to document the handover of a cleared explosive obstacle area when
transferring with another unit. Figure C-2 is a sample DD Form 3008.

Forms (U)

Appendix C

Forms (U)

Appendix C

Forms (U)
Legend:
1LT first lieutenant
AL access lane
AP antipersonnel
BL boundary lane
BM benchmark
Bn battalion
CBT combat
cm centimeter
COL colonel
CPT captain
Dec December
EH explosive hazard
EHCC Explosive Hazard Coordination Cell
EL exploratory lane
HA hazard area
m meters
mm millimeters
MSR main supply route
N North
Nov November
RP reference point
SA safe area
SFC sergeant first class
SGT sergeant
SL safe lane
SP start point
SPC specialist
TP turning point
USA United States Army
EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS SURVEY REPORT (U)

C-7. (U) Searchers use DD Form 3017 to define subsequent clearance tasks and prepare an operation order.
Figure C-3, page C-10, is a sample DD Form 3017.

Appendix C

Forms (U)

Appendix C

Forms (U)

Appendix C
Legend:
AL access lane
AP antipersonnel
APD Army Publishing Directorate
AT antitank
BL boundary lane
BM benchmark
BN battalion
CPT captain
cm centimeter
COL colonel
Dec December
EH explosive hazard
EL exploratory lane
EN engineer
FLW Fort Leonard Wood
HA hazard area
m meter
MO Missouri
MSR main supply route
N North
N/A not applicable
RP reference point
SA safe area
SFC sergeant first class
SL safe lane
SP start point
SSG staff sergeant
TP turning point

Appendix D
Extraction from Minefields and Similar Areas (U)
(U) Despite the careful actions of Service members and units, it is possible to end up
in a minefield or similar area where the surrounding ground contains dangerous
explosive obstacles (mines, explosive booby traps/IEDs, and UXO). This appendix
describes actions to be taken to extract individuals from these dangerous areas.
EXTRACTION FROM EXPLOSIVE OBSTACLES (U)

D-1. (U) A well-developed, well-rehearsed evacuation drill is necessary to extract an individual or a unit
from a mined or other explosive obstacle-laden area. Units should develop two evacuation drills—one for
mounted extraction and one for dismounted extraction. Whether affected by explosive booby traps/IEDs,
mines, or UXO, Service members should first address the enemy situation, then friendly casualties, and
finally equipment recovery.
D-2. (U) Extraction battle drills differ from other drills, such as react to contact and react to indirect fire,
because the appropriate response is to stay still. Any movement in an explosive obstacle area (such as a
minefield) could cause a detonation and result in a fatality or injury. An established and trained extraction
plan will reduce personnel and vehicle losses. The plan should be flexible so that it can be adapted to fit
different scenarios and environments.
D-3. (U) A significant and unique resource in executing extraction from explosive obstacles is the mine
detection dog. Mine detection dog teams are composed of a trained handler and trained mine detection dog.
The primary mission of mine detection dog teams is to support infantry, combat engineer, and Army force
units in tactical operations. The ability to assist in minefield extraction is an important skill that mine
detection dog teams have. Commanders should consider mine detection dog teams, when available, to assist
in extraction. (See ATP 3-39.34 for additional information on mine detection dog capabilities.)
D-4. (FOUO) Personnel should use the memory aid for stop, assess, note, drawback, and inform (SANDI)
to remember the sequence of events for extraction. The memory aid, SANDI, includes the following:
 (FOUO) Stop and gain control. The individual who identifies the threat stops and gives a verbal
warning or the appropriate hand-and-arm signals. Everyone immediately stops. If dismounted,
personnel should not move their feet. If mounted, they should remain in the vehicle. Everyone in
the patrol repeats the warning. The leader should maintain control. The leader should calm the
element so that no one rushes, makes any additional movement, or takes any action without
permission.
 (FOUO) Assess the situation. The leader determines if absolute, strong, or weak EH indicators
are present by getting information from the individual identifying the threat and assessing the
information. Leaders evaluate the assets available to aid extraction efforts, to include using radio
communications to report the situation and request assistance—given minimum radio transmission
safe distance. The leader determines the nearest safe area not containing explosive obstacles and
the shortest route to the safe area. When possible, the leader scans the area by visual (or binocular)
means, looking for tripwires, exposed munitions or mines, or areas where the soil has been
disturbed.
21 January 2016 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D D-1

Appendix D
 (FOUO) Note the situation for future reference. Patrol members should mentally note the
discovered threat and take photographs (digital, if possible) or draw pictures, if necessary. To
provide the clearing team with as much pertinent information as possible, personnel should—
 (FOUO) Classify the explosive obstacle as accurately as possible. Note the shape, the color,
the orientation, the disposition, the material type (plastic, wood, metal, cast explosive), and
any descriptive markings.
 (FOUO) Indicate the quantity of explosive obstacles.
 (FOUO) Note the terrain and terrain considerations (easy bypass, steep incline making bypass
impossible, obvious hindrances to clearing personnel).
 (FOUO) Indicate the location using a standard 8-digit grid coordinate with a grid zone
designator or in relation to a major terrain feature or other easily identifiable landmark.
 (FOUO) Note anything else considered important (these notes are subjective in nature).
 (FOUO) Draw back to the last known safe area. (Self-extraction to the nearest safe area is
referred to as drawback.) Leaders generally ensure that only one Soldier/Marine moves at a time
and that the element maintains a minimum safe distance. If the dispersion of troops allows, more
than one member of the patrol may move at a time. Service members draw back using one of the
look-feel-probe drills or reverse out using footprints to the known safe area.
 (FOUO) Inform higher headquarters of the situation. Personnel mark the area, record the
information, and submit a situation report to higher headquarters (to include a UXO spot report)
once out of the hazard area. Before keying the radio transmitter, personnel should move to a safe
area using frontal and overhead cover to the maximum extent available.
DANGER
Entering an explosive obstacle to extract a fellow Soldier/Marine is
extremely hazardous and may result in additional serious injuries
or deaths. Resist the urge to race in and assist the casualty.
DANGER
Do not touch or approach an explosive obstacle after it has been
located and identified until command guidance is given on how to
proceed (bypass, breach). Approaching or touching an explosive
obstacle in any area may cause immediate personal injury or death.
DISMOUNTED EXTRACTION
D-5. (FOUO) Dismounted extraction occurs when personnel find themselves within an explosive obstacle
area where no assistance can be provided to perform the extraction. Personnel perform extraction drills when
they determine they are in a minefield or UXO field or when explosive obstacles have been used but cannot
be identified. When personnel identify a possible IED, they should immediately stop and notify others of the
potential danger and immediately leave the danger area and seek frontal and overhead protection
CASUALTY EXTRACTION
D-6. (FOUO) Leaders use the casualty extraction drill to extract casualties from explosive obstacle strikes.
This drill is significantly different from routine casualty evacuation procedures. (See ATTP 3-90.4/MCWP
3-17.8 and TC 20-32-5 for more information on casualty extraction drills.)
D-2 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 21 January 2016

Appendix E
Explosive Hazard Indicators (U)
(U) Indicators (observables and signatures) provide evidence of a threat network
activity or a feature of the threat organization in the area of operations, which points
toward an enemy capability, vulnerability, or intention. Indicators form the early basis
of patterns and expose information reflecting the intention or capabilities of an enemy
to adopt or reject a course of action. This appendix highlights EH indicators for each
EH category.
EXPLOSIVE HAZARD INDICATORS (U)

E-1. (U) Observable indicators are directly or indirectly evident. Personnel generally detect indicators by
visual, physical, mechanical, or biological means. Signatures are distinctive characteristics that consistently
recur and uniquely identify a piece of equipment, activity, individual, or event. Personnel use recorded
measurements from a sensor or collection platform to detect signatures.
E-2. (U) When requested, engineers may target indicators for collection and analysis. Some observables are
obvious, while others require a more detailed knowledge of threat activities and processes. The collection of
signatures usually requires specific requests for collection and data processing techniques or assistance from
supporting enablers.
E-3. (U) The ability to read indicators (including recognition of enemy deception indicators) contributes to
successful friendly operations. The individual Soldier/Marine is a great source of information because they
can generally detect observable indicators with the five senses. Engineers often integrate mechanical
reproductions of those five senses with information collection techniques (such as cameras or microphones
to collect observables). MWDs are other assets engineers may use given the dog’s ability to smell various
types of explosives. In contrast, signatures require technical measurements to detect or identify and can be
spatial, spectral, temporal, biometric, or activity-based. Measurements over time generally provide anecdotal
evidence of signature indicators.
E-4. (U) Indicators often allow personnel to identify EHs before they cause injury or death. The type of
sign, marker, or indicator encountered provides valuable information regarding EHs. Indicators generally
involve changes to the environment caused by the emplacement or detonation of an explosive device.
Changes to the environment include something that is not in the environment as an everyday occurrence.
Unusual erosion, plant growth, or animal casualties may be vital clues to alert forces to a possible EH. Leaders
should train their personnel to recognize the indicators of EHs within their area of operations. They should
look for anything unusual and for theater or area of operations specific indicators. (See table E-1, page E-2,
for typical EH indicators by type of EH).
21 January 2016 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D E-1

Appendix E
Table E-1. (U) Typical EH indicators

EH Type Sample Indicators
• Marking signs integrated with standard fencing material that outlines a land area.
• Streamers, flags, cans, and bottles placed in unusual locations indicating a
pattern, defined area, or path.
• Sticks and branches, specifically painted sticks, placed in an unusual position.
• Tree markings (such as an X leading to another marking).
• Painted rocks and bricks, normally red, placed along the edge of an area.
• Improvised or makeshift fencing obviously not intended to keep animals out.
• Animal or human remains along a field or path.
UXO • Damaged vehicles left on or off the road.
• Wilted or dead patches of vegetation.
• Circles of lush grass among thin grass.
• Overgrown, unattended fields and pastures next to cultivated, used areas.
• Trees and bushes not collected for firewood in areas stripped of other vegetation.
• Odd features in the ground or patterns that are not normally present in nature.
• Destroyed or unattended vehicles, trailers, boxes, and abandoned military
equipment (weapons, ammunition, uniforms, papers).
• Past mine dumps that enemy forces may have used to resource minefields.
• Attractive items left in the open.
• Valuable supplies (food, wood, metal, weapons, ammunition) that the local
population has not yet scavenged.
• Items left behind by the enemy that could have potential military value (maps,
drawings, papers).
• Lumps or bulges under rugs or in furniture.
Explosive Booby • Loose floorboards, windows ledges, or stair treads.
traps • Wrappers, sawdust, spoils, seals, and loose shell caps in unusual places.
• Pins, wires, strings, or nails where they would not normally be expected.
• Signs of recent work on old buildings (such as fresh nails or screws).
• Minor obstructions channelizing searchers to a specific location.
• Improvised methods of marking (piled rocks; tires; ribbons; tape; paint on the side
of the road, on walls, or next to trees).
• Unusual colors.
• Recent concrete or asphalt patches that do not match the surrounding area.
• Blast craters, depressions, or shallows indicating previous explosive detonations.
• Destroyed vehicles along a route (may indicate a previous IED ambush site).
• Unusual shapes or outlines.
• Indication of a victim-operated switch designed to initiate an IED when it is
tampered with or disturbed in a particular manner (sometimes referred to as an
antihandling or antidisturbance switch).
IEDs • Commercial coffee or gristmill grinders (used to grind the raw materials).
• Portable concrete mixers (used for mixing explosive ingredients).
• Power sources (such as batteries).
• Shrapnel (nails and screws, marbles, ball bearings).
• Excessive amounts of fertilizer, liquid or gas fuels, or other explosive chemicals.
• Unusual quantities of items that may serve as a container (cooking pots,
aluminum cans, jugs).
• Breaks in the continuity of dust, paint, or vegetation.
• Graffiti indicating some type of warning to locals.
E-2 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 21 January 2016

Explosive Hazard Indicators (U)
Table E-1. (U) Typical EH indicators (continued)

• Evidence of camouflage (such as withered or cut vegetation).
• Disturbances of the ground surface, scattered or loose soil, freshly dug holes,
IEDs (continued) pavement patching along or in the roadway, new dirt, or gravel piles.
• Ant trails indicating the presence of buried command wire.
Enemy ammunition • Piles of brass shell casings.
(pre-CEA) • Discarded ammunition dispensers or storage boxes.
Bulk explosives • Strange odors.
• Quarry or mining activities.
Legend:
EH explosive hazard
LOCATIONS (U)
E-5. (U) In addition to knowing typical indicators of EHs, personnel can benefit from knowing the range of
potential locations of EHs. (See table E-2 for typical locations by EH type.)
Table E-2. (U) Typical EH locations

• Abandoned military training areas.
• Abandoned defensive positions, trenches, or destroyed buildings.
• Ground surface.
• Partially or completely buried in the ground or hidden by vegetation, sand, or
UXO snow.
• Under water, in lakes, streams, or the ocean.
• On beachheads from previous amphibious assaults.
• In warehouses or other storage facilities.
• Previous attack sites.
• Urban areas and structures.
• Recently contested areas.
• Enemy command posts or headquarters.
• Logistic supply points (enemy equipment hides for fuel, supplies, or materials).
• Deserted defense locations.
• Important political or religious buildings.
Explosive booby • Key infrastructure (such as airfields and power plants).
traps • Stored or cached enemy ammunition.
• Road craters or any obstacle that must be cleared.
• Natural or covered resting places along routes.
• Likely assembly areas.
• Bridge or ferry sites.
• Focal points and bottlenecks in the road or rail systems, particularly the ones
engineer forces cannot bypass (such as key road or rail intersections).
21 January 2016 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D E-3

Appendix E
Table E-2. (U) Typical EH locations (continued)

• Roads that have been recently repaired.
• Areas or sections of road that civilians are video recording ordinary military
movement and maneuver.
• Previous IED sites.
• Roads leading to and from forward operating bases and combat outposts.
• Chokepoints, sharp turns in a road, and blind spots.
• Elevated positions (trees, signs, light posts, buildings, bridges, overpasses).
• Abandoned defensive positions, trenches, or destroyed buildings.
• Boundary turnaround points (pattern).
• Medians or roadway shoulders (usually within three meters).
• Culverts, drainage systems, or buried under the road surface.
IEDs • Trees, light posts, signs, overpasses, and elevated bridge spans.
• Unattended vehicles, trucks, cars, carts, or motorcycles.
• Guardrails (hidden inside) or under any type of material or packaging.
• Cinder blocks (hidden behind) or piles of sand to direct blast into the kill zone.
• Animal carcasses and deceased human bodies.
• Fake bodies or scarecrows in coalition uniforms.
• Culverts.
• Wadis and streambeds.
• Areas where rotary wing aircraft can land.
• Political or historical landmarks.
• Religious or public gathering places.
• Permanent weapon and ammunition storage sites or facilities.
• Ammunition storage points or past mine dumps.
Enemy ammunition • Established caches of ammunition.
(pre-CEA) • Military armories.
• Homes or the headquarters for insurgent or terrorist groups.
• Caves or tunnels.
• Previous enemy defensive positions.
• Agricultural fertilizer storage facilities.
• Known homemade production facilities.
Bulk explosives
• Areas with spills or residues on the ground that discolor the soil.
• Chemical filtrate pool that is dug into the ground.
• Barrels, drums, buckets, and plastic jugs.
Legend:
EH explosive hazard
E-4 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 21 January 2016

Glossary
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and
joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. Terms for
which ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D is the proponent are marked with an asterisk
(*). The proponent publication for other terms is listed in parentheses after the
definition.
SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ADRP Army doctrine reference publication
AFTTP Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures
AR Army regulation
ATP Army techniques publication
attn attention
ATTP Army tactics, techniques, and procedures
BCT brigade combat team
CREW counter radio-controlled improvised explosive device electronic warfare
DC District of Columbia
DOD Department of Defense
EH explosive hazard
EOCA explosive ordnance clearance agent
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
fed federal
FM field manual
HME homemade explosives
IDD improvised explosive device detector dog
JFOB joint forward operations base
JP joint publication
MCIP Marine Corps interim publication
MCO Marine Corps order
MCRP Marine Corps reference publication
MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication
MO Missouri
MRAP mine-resistant ambush-protected
MSCoE Maneuver Support Center of Excellence
MWD military working dog
No. number
21 January 2016 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D Glossary-1

Glossary
NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures

NWP Naval warfare publication
RCT regimental combat team
SANDI stop, assess, note, drawback, and inform
std standard
TC training circular
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
U.S. United States
UAS unmanned aircraft system
USA United States Army
USC United States Code
USMC United States Marine Corps
VA Virginia
SECTION II – TERMS
None.
Glossary-2 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 21 January 2016

References
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.
ADRP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols. 2 February 2015.
JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 8 November 2010.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.
ARMY
Most Army publications are available online at <www.apd.army.mil>.
AR 25-30. Army Publishing Program. 3 June 2015.
ATP 3-39.34. Military Working Dogs. 30 January 2015.
ATP 4-32. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Operations. 30 September 2013.
DA Pamphlet 385-64. Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards. 24 May 2011.
FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956.
TC 20-32-5. Commander’s Reference Guide: Land Mine and Explosive Hazards (Iraq).
13 February 2003.
JOINT
Most joint publications are available online at <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm>.
JP 3-15. Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations. 17 June 2011.
JP 3-15.1. Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations. 9 January 2012.
JP 3-34. Joint Engineer Operations. 30 June 2011.
JP 3-50. Personnel Recovery. 2 October 2015.
MARINE CORPS PUBLICATIONS

Most Marine Corps publications are online: <https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil>.
MCIP 3-34.03. IED Detector Dog (IDD) Operations. 10 February 2012.
<https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil/restrictedpubs/i33403.pdf>, accessed on 17 November 2015.
MCO P8020.10B. Marine Corps Ammunition and Explosive Safety Program. 31 October 2007.
<http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCO%20P8020.10B.pdf>, accessed on
17 November 2015.
MULTI-SERVICE
ATP 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP 3-2.62. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Cordon and Search Operations. 10 May 2013.
ATP 3-34.40/MCWP 3-17.7. General Engineering. 25 February 2015.
ATP 3-37.34/MCWP 3-17.6. Survivability Operations. 28 June 2013.
ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5. Combined Arms Countermobility Operations. 17 September 2014.
ATP 4-32.2/MCRP 3-17.2B/NTTP 3-02.4.1/AFTTP 3-2.12. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Explosive Ordnance. 15 July 2015.
21 January 2016 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D References-1

References
ATP 4-32.16/MCRP 3-17.2C/NTTP 3-02.5/AFTTP 3-2.32. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal. 8 May 2015.
ATTP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8. Combined Arms Mobility Operations. 10 August 2011.
FM 3-34.170/MCWP 3-17.4. Engineer Reconnaissance. 25 March 2008.
MCWP 3-31.2/NWP 3-15. Naval Mine Warfare Volume I. 1 September 2010.
OTHER
10 USC 401 Chapter 20. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided in Conjunction With Military
Operations. http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:10 section:401 edition:prelim) OR
(granuleid:USC-prelim-title10-section401)&f=treesort&edition=prelim&num
=0&jumpTo=true, accessed on 17 November 2015.
Fed-Std-376B. Preferred Metric Units for General Use by the Federal Government.
<http://www.nist.gov/pml/wmd/metric/upload/fs376-b.pdf>, accessed on
17 November 2015.
ATP-73 Volume I. Military Search. 28 April 2009.
<https://nso.nato.int/protected/nsdd/APdetails.html?APNo=902&LA=EN>, accessed on
17 November 2015.
ATP-73 Volume II. Military Search, Techniques, and Procedures. 12 March 2013.
<https://nso.nato.int/protected/nsdd/SODnld.cgi?id=7495&type=STANAG&lang=EN>,
accessed on 17 November 2015.
PRESCRIBED FORMS
DD forms are available on the Office of the Secretary of Defense Web site at
<www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/infomgt/forms/formsprogram.htm>.
DD Form 3007. Hasty Protective Row Minefield Record.
DD Form 3008. Explosive Hazards Clearance Report.
DD Form 3017. Explosive Hazards Survey Report.
REFERENCED FORMS
Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate Web site at
<www.apd.army.mil>.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
WEB SITES
Army Knowledge Online, Doctrine and Training Publications Web site,
<https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html>, accessed on 17 November 2015.
Army Publishing Directorate, Army Publishing Updates Web site, <http://www.apd.army.mil
/AdminPubs/new_subscribe.asp>, accessed on 17 November 2015.
Marine Corps Doctrine Web site, <https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil/>, accessed on 17 November 2015.
Marine Corps Engineer School Web site, <http://www.mces.marines.mil/StaffSections/S3Operations
/DefeattheDeviceBranch.aspx>, accessed on 17 November 2015.
References-2 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 21 January 2016

Index
Entries are by page number.
casualty, D-2
B S
dismounted, D-2
bombs, 2-5 safety, 2-5, 5-4
breaching operations, 3-4, B-5 G
search
breaching equipment, B-5 general engineer, 5-2 levels, 5-3
bulk explosives, 1-1, 2-6 geospatial engineer, 5-2 objectives, 5-1
search incidents, 5-4
C H
search levels, 5-3
clearing operations handheld detection devices, B-1 advanced, 5-3
area clearance, 3-7 component indicators, B-2 basic, 5-3
route, 3-6 homemade explosive intermediate, 5-3
combat engineer, 1-5, 5-2 detectors, B-3
metal detectors, B-1 search resources, 5-4
counter radio-controlled equipment, 5-6
improvised explosive device I military working dog, 5-6
electronic warfare systems, 5-6, improvised explosive device, 1-1, personnel, 5-4
B-10 B-10 supporting assets, 5-6
countermine vehicles, B-4 categories, 2-2 submunitions, 2-5
components, 2-1 survivability operations, 1-9
E
explosive hazard, 1-1 M T
indicators, B-2, E-1 military working dog, 5-6 tracking, 6-3, C-1
threat, 2-1 mine-protected vehicles, B-6
typical locations, E-3 U
explosive ordnance clearance R unexploded explosive ordnance,
agent, 5-6 reconnaissance, 5-1 1-9, 2-4
explosive ordnance disposal, robots, 5-6, B-9 unmanned aircraft system, 5-6,
1-10, 5-6 route clearance B-11
extraction, D-1 formations, 1-6, 3-3
21 January 2016 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D Index-1

ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D
21 January 2016
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
MARK A. MILLEY
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
GERALD B. O’KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
1600504
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: Distributed in electronic media
only (EMO).
PIN: 105987−000

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ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.

Countering Explosive Hazards

This publication supersedes FM 3-34.210, 27 March 2007.

Headquarters, Department of the Army

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ANTHONY C. FUNKHOUSER ROBERT S. WALSH

This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online

Army Techniques Publication Headquarters

Marine Corps Reference Publication

Countering Explosive Hazards

*This publication supersedes FM 3-34.210, 27 March 2007.

21 January 2016 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D i

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Establishing Protective Positions and Hardening of Structures Against Effects

ii ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 21 January 2016

21 January 2016 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D iii

iv ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 21 January 2016

21 January 2016 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D v

vi ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 21 January 2016

CATEGORIES OF EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS (U)

21 January 2016 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 1-1

ENGINEER DISCIPLINES/FUNCTIONS (U)

1-2 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 21 January 2016

ENGINEER FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTERING EXPLOSIVE

21 January 2016 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 1-3

Figure 1-1. (U) Engineer framework for countering explosive hazards

1-4 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 21 January 2016

EFFECT OF ENGINEER DISCIPLINES/FUNCTIONS IN

21 January 2016 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 1-5

ENGINEERS COUNTERING EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS DURING STABILITY OPERATIONS (U)

COMPLEMENTARY CAPABILITIES AVAILABLE TO COUNTER

1-6 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 21 January 2016

WARFIGHTER CAPABILITY TO REACT TO EXPLOSIVE OBSTACLES (U)

Offensive and Defensive Operations (U)

Stability Operations (U)

21 January 2016 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 1-7

ENGINEER CAPABILITY TO COUNTER EXPLOSIVE OBSTACLES (U)

Offensive and Defensive Operations (U)

Stability Operations (U)

1-8 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 21 January 2016

21 January 2016 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 1-9

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO EXPLOSIVE OBSTACLES

Offensive and Defensive Operations (U)

1-10 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 21 January 2016

Stability Operations (U)

21 January 2016 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 1-11

EXPLOSIVE BOOBY TRAPS/IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

21 January 2016 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 2-1

2-2 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 21 January 2016

MECHANICS OF LAND MINES (U)

Figure 2-1. (U) Mine components

COMPONENTS AND INITIATING ACTIONS (U)

21 January 2016 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 2-3

Figure 2-2. (U) Common methods of actuating mines

UNEXPLODED EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE (U)

2-4 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 21 January 2016

CAPTURED ENEMY AMMUNITION (U)

21 January 2016 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 2-5

BULK EXPLOSIVES (U)

2-6 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 21 January 2016

MOBILITY OPERATIONS FOR COUNTERING EXPLOSIVE

21 January 2016 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 3-1

3-2 ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D 21 January 2016