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As humans we are social beings and when we talk we usually talk with or to others (unless we do a monologue).
Paul Grice, an English language philosophe, argues that speakers intend to be cooperative when they talk. For
Grice, cooperative means that the speaker knows that each utterance is a potential interference in the personal
rights, autonomy and wishes (a potential face-threatening act) of the other. That is why we have to shape our
utterances in a certain way. Grice formulated the principle of cooperation that underlies conversation, as follows:
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose
or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged (Grice 1975:45)
Grice’s cooperative principle is a set of norms that are expected in conversations. It consists of four maxims, we
have to follow in order to be cooperative and understood:
Quantity:
Quality:
Manner:
Don't be obscure.
Don't be ambiguous.
Be brief.
Be orderly.
Relevance:
Be relevant.
Central to Austin’s (1962) speech act theory is his argument that language is used to do things rather than just
refer to the truth or falseness of particular statements. According to Austin, there are three kinds of act which
occur with everything we say. These are the locutionary act, the illocutionary act and the perlocutionar act. The
locutionary act refers to the literal meaning of the actual words. For example, a speaker may say, “It is going to
rain” by which he/she refers to the weather condition. The illocutionary act refers to the speaker’s intention in
uttering the words. For example, the speaker may have the intention of not just informing but getting someone to
stand up and bring an umbrella. This can be a request to have an umbrella. The perlocutionary act refers to the
effect this utterance has on the thoughts or actions of the other person. The illocutionary force of what someone
says can really only be determined in relation to what has come before and what follows, rather than in isolation
from the overall discourse (Flowerdew, 1990).
Searle (1979:viii) states that there are five broad classifications of illocutionary acts. According to this scholar, “We
tell people how things are (Assertive), we try to get them to do things (Directive), we commit ourselves to doing
things (Commissives), we express our feelings and attitudes (Expressives), and we bring about changes in the world
through our utterances (Declarations). Searle also remarks that these five classifications of illocutionary acts may
not apply to “every one of the world’s two thousand or so natural languages.” According to him, there may be
some languages that have not got the syntactical devices for expressing all five types.
Politeness Principle
The literature review of politeness principle in this section draws much from the Politeness Theory developed by
Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987). Brown and Levinson’s theory of politeness is used in this study because it
acknowledges power. Though this theory has come under sustained attack from different scholars, it is widely
accepted and utilized as a basis for research by many researchers (Yuka, 2009:59; Meyerhof, 2006:83). Therefore,
this section discusses the relevance of this theory to the present study.
Brown and Levinson (1987) argue that interlocutors try to save and/attack others’ face in their interaction. When
interlocutors save or attack others’ face, conflict is likely to occur. As dramatic discourse comprises interaction
among characters, conflict is virtually there. As Herman (1995:21) states, “The potential for conflict is as much a
reality as the potential for harmony in communication, since not every member has equal access to the speech
networks or speech patterns in a community.”
Drama, by its nature, entails conflicts, or clashes in interest or disagreements between/among the characters. The
characters interact to settle the conflict and to establish a common ground. As they do so, power prevails in their
interaction to privilege their individual interests. As people try to maintain and exercise their power, or resist
power inequality, they also try to appear to be polite because they want to maintain social harmony. This means
that the interlocutors, depending on the context, choose their politeness strategy to initiate, exercise and maintain
power by adhering to the norm. Hence, as to Culpeper (1998:93), “Any analysis of dialogue needs to be sensitive to
the social dynamics of interaction. A politeness analysis attempts to describe how participants manipulate their
messages in order to support or give face.” This scholar further argues, “In the case of dramatic dialogue of plays
or films, writers, particularly in recent years, have exploited the full range of the politeness/impoliteness spectrum
for literary purposes.” Accordingly, Brown and Levinson’s politeness theory which involves face, face threatening
acts (henceforth FTAs), and politeness strategies is presumably suitable for conducting this study.
Politeness is worth investigating because it is an important aspect of human social interaction and therefore plays
an important role in plays (Short, 1996). When power is exercised politely, interactants show consideration for
their address’ face needs as well as protect their own face. Similarly, Bennison (1998: 81) argues, “The level of
formality and politeness used by a character in conversation with other characters may be a revealing area of
study in determining a character sense of his/her own power and confidence in a given conversational situation.”
The key concept of Brown and Levinson’s politeness phenomena is the idea of ‘face’. Brown and Levinson (1978,
1987) consider three basic notions in their politeness theory: face, face threatening acts (FTAs) and politeness
strategies. According to these scholars (1978: 66), face is defined as “the public self-image that every member
wants to claim for himself.” They argue that face has two aspects: negative face (the need for freedom or
autonomy) and positive face (the need to be valued and have approval from others (self-worth). These two face
aspects are the basic desires in any interaction.
As Yule (1996: 60) explains, a person’s negative face is the need to be independent, to have freedom of action and
not to be imposed on by others. A person’s positive face, on the other hand, is defined by Yule as the need to be
accepted, even liked by others, to be treated as a member of the same group, and to know that his or her wants
are shared by others. We might say that positive face emanates from people’s desire for reputation, prestige and
self esteem. According to Bloomer, et al. (2005: 119), these needs are so delicate that they require careful
treatment by all participants involved. Brown and Levinson (1987:65) argue that acts which run contrary to the
addresser’s and/or the speaker’s positive and/or negative face are face threatening acts. These scholars further
describe that a face threatening act is an act that inherently damages the face of the address or the speaker by
acting in opposition to the wants and desires of the other.
According to Brown and Levinson (1987), any human interaction comprises communicative acts whose contents
threaten the ‘face’ of the speaker. For example, these authors treat expressing thanks as offending the speaker's
positive face in that the speaker implicitly accepts a debt and humbles himself. They also argue that an apology, by
virtue of its subsuming an admission of guilt, may impose on the speaker’s want to be appreciated. Considering
every utterance as a potential threat to someone’s face, Brown and Levinson developed politeness strategies to
explain what speakers do to alleviate possible FTAs. Hence, politeness strategies are regarded as face saving acts
(Yule, 1996: 61).
To Yule (1996: 60), politeness is a means employed to demonstrate consciousness of another person’s face. To
Holmes (1995: 5), politeness can be used to refer to behavior that actively expresses positive concern for others, as
well as non-imposing distancing behavior. And to Culpeper (1998:85), politeness comes about when one signifies
concern to maintain others’ face.
Culpeper (1998:83) adds that politeness “is about the strategic manipulation of language, about expediting our
conversational goals by saying what is socially appropriate.” Politeness affects the way we speak which is also likely
to affect linguistic and other social behaviors (Brown and Levinson, 1987). During the course of social interaction,
interlocutors engage in a negotiation of face relationships and employ strategies to express a series of
communicative acts in conversation such as requesting, complaining, or refusing (Scollon and Scollon, 2001). When
a speaker and a hearer get involved in a conversation, both of them are under the pressure of social norms. In
other words, what they say are “subject to social pressures since participants rarely engage with each other only in
the discourse roles of speaker and hearer. They confront each other in social roles as well” (Herman, 1995:190).
Brown and Levinson specify five possible strategies to do the FTAs.
2. positive politeness
On record
With redressive action
Estimation
of risk of Do the FTA 3. negative politeness
face loss 4. off record
Greater
In order to deal with the FTAs, Brown and Levinson (1978: 74) suggest that a speaker should assess the required
face work according to the additive value of three independent and culturally sensitive social variables. They argue
that since human beings are rational, they assess and add the three variables to get an overall face threat value
before deciding how to encode an FTA. The three factors that determine the choice of politeness strategy are the
following (Ibid: 79).
1 The social distance (D) (degree of intimacy between the interactants) of S (the Speaker) and H (the
Hearer) as a symmetric relation. For example, between friends of the same age group and social class there will be
not a big social distance; however between persons of different ages and/or different social class and/or less
acquaintance (stranger), there will be a social distance. As Yule (1996: 59) argues, much of what we say, and a
great deal of what we communicate, are determined by our social relationships.
2 The Relative Power (P) of S and H (an asymmetric relation); in effect, the degree to which S can impose
will on H. This is a hierarchical system which places the participants a super ordinate or subordinate position
(Scollon and Scollon, 2001:55).
3 The absolute ranking (Rx) of impositions in the particular culture. For example, asking a student in a
classroom to go out and buy a packet of cigarettes from a shop nearby will have higher ranking imposition than
asking that same student to stand up and clean the board.
The values of D, P and R are then added in order to know the amount of ‘face’ work to be performed. The strategy
used is determined by Wx (the sum of D, P and Rx). The variables of Distance, Power and Ranking of the imposition
are calculated for individual acts by the formula: Wx = D(S,H) + P(H,S) + Rx. Wx is the numerical value that
measures the weightiness of the FTAx. As Wx increases, we would tend to choose to use the higher-numbered
strategies. D(S,H) is the value that measures the social distance between S and H. P(H,S) is a measure of the power
that H has over S. Rx is a value that measures the degree to which the FTAx is rated for an imposition in that
culture (Brown and Levinson, 1978:81). Hence, the greater the social distance, the larger the relative power of the
speaker over the recipient and the bigger the imposition of the act, the more face threatening a communicative act
will be.
Based on the above three variables, Brown and Levinson (1987:69) observe that participants in an interaction
choose from a set of five possible strategies (which will be discussed in detail shortly in the next few pages) to
mitigate FTAs. Birch (1991:65) observes that these “strategies keep the conflict at bay by one or more of the
participants in an exchange gaining and maintaining power, and minimizing the disturbance of interactional
cooperation.”
According to Reiter (2000:14), these five linguistic strategies are ordered in terms of the degree of politeness they
involve. The risk of the loss of ‘face’ increases as one moves up the scale from 1 to 5; the greater the risk the more
polite the strategy employed. The five super strategies of politeness that Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987) have
come up with are discussed in the following strategies.
The first strategy which is known as a strategy without redressive action “involves doing it [an action] in the most
direct, clear, unambiguous and concise way possible” (Brown and Levinson, 1978:74). Doing an act baldly, without
redressive is used when:
(a) S and H both tacitly agree that the relevance of face demands may be suspended in the interests of urgency or
efficiency; (b) where the danger to H’s face is very small, as in offers, requests, suggestions that are clearly in H’s
interest and do not require great sacrifices of S (e.g., ‘Come in’ or ‘Do sit down’); and (c) where S is superior in
power to H, or can enlist audience support to destroy H’s face without losing his own (Ibid).
Thomas (1995: 170–171) further elaborates Brown and Levinson’s explanation above that bald on record strategies
are used when:
• there is a need to speak with utmost efficiency (the demand for efficiency surpasses face concerns, e.g.
in urgent situation);
• the overall ‘weightiness’ of the FTA is very small (e.g. when making a minor request of someone you are
on intimate terms and who has no power over you);
The second and third strategies involve redressive action. According to Brown and Levinson (1987: 69-70),
redressive action “attempts to counteract the potential face damage of the FTA by doing it in such a way, or with
such modifications or additions, that the speaker in general recognizes the hearer’s face wants and himself wants
them to be achieved” (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 69–70). The redressive action involves positive politeness and
negative politeness. Each redressive action, positive politeness or negative politeness, contains specific strategies.
Positive politeness is defined as a “redress directed to the speaker’s positive face and his perennial desire that his
wants (or the actions/acquisitions/values resulting from them) should be thought of as desirable” (Brown and
Levinson, 1987:101). These scholars discuss fifteen substrategies of positive politeness (Ibid: 101-129) which are
represented here by the letter as follows. (The examples given under each strategy are mine. Where I took
examples from other sources, I have duly acknowledged).
Example:
You must be tired now; it has been a long time since you started working. What if you take some rest?
Example: What a fantastic garden you have! You are very good at mathematics.
Example: I have come with good tidings! Our articles have been published by a reputable journal.
B. Tomorrow!(repetition)
P8. Joke
Example: I must dash to dinner now. I’ve had a furious battle with hunger. And I’m running out of ammunition.
Examples: 1) Well, I understand that you want your computer very badly these days. So, shouldn’t I buy no
matter how costly it might be at this time?
2) I know you don’t want to miss classes, but since there is no taxi from here, we have to miss today’s class.
P11. Be optimistic
Example: You wouldn’t mind lending me your computer for my presentation, I hope.
Examples: 1) Why don’t we check if the library is open? (asking for a reason)
Examples: 1) I will be able to join you if you give me a lift. (assuming reciprocity)
2) I lent you my computer last week, so lend me your tape recorder today. (asserting reciprocity)
Example: I know how baffling the questions were. It’s really very good that you managed to score a passing mark
(understanding).
Brown and Levinson define negative politeness strategy as “a redressive action addressed to the addres’s negative
face: his want to have his freedom of action unhindered and his attention unimpeded” (1987:129), and state that
negative politeness is “the most elaborate and the most conventionalized set of linguistic strategies” (1987:130).
Negative politeness, according to Brown and Levinson (1987:70), “...is oriented mainly toward partially satisfying
(redressing) H’s negative face, his basic want to maintain claims of territory and self-determination.” These
scholars provide the following 10 strategies, designated by N.
N3. Be pessimistic
Example:I would appreciate having the opportunity to spend some time to discuss the issue with you.
N6. Apologize
One way of indicating that S doesn’t want to impinge on H is to phrase the FTA as if the agent were other than S, or
at least possibly not S or not S alone, and the addressers were other than H, or only inclusive of H. This results in a
variety of ways of avoiding the pronouns ‘I’ and ‘you’ (Brown and Levinson, 1978:195).
For example, instead of saying, “I tell you that it is so”, people say “It is so” where the pronouns “I” and “you” are
avoided. Instead of saying “I ask you to do this for me”, people say “Do this for me” (Brown and Levinson,
1978:195).
The other way of impersonalizing is deleting dative agents. For example, instead of saying, “It seems to me that the
case should be looked into,” people say, “It seems that the case should be looked into.”
Impersonalization can also be done by using passive voice. For example, instead of saying, “I have done it,” people
can say, “It has been done.”
A speaker can distance him/herself and the hearer from a particular imposition in the FTA by stating the FTA as an
instance of some general social rule, regulation, or obligation. In this case pronouns can be avoided by means of
the first item rather than the second in pairs of sentences (Brown and Levinson, 1978: 211).
Example:The college’s regulations require that every secretary reach the office on time.
N9. Nominalize
This strategy is applied by removing the actor from doing or feeling or being something.
Examples:1) I would always be indebted if you would help me carry this bag.
3) It wouldn’t trouble me; I can easily do this for you (for offers).
An off record strategy is used when the speaker wants to obscure his/her clear communicative intention. In other
words, an off record strategy is used in such a way that the hearer will not be able to attribute only one plain
communicative goal to the act (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 211). This would mean that the speaker speaks in such
a way that his/her utterance can have a number of justifiable interpretations. Hence, the speaker refrains from
taking responsibility for what has been said and leaves the decision to the hearer as to what interpretation it
should be given (Ibid).
Off record utterances are basically indirect uses of language. When the speaker uses indirect language, the hearer
has to make some inference to figure out the intended meaning. In order for the hearer to make inferences from
the utterances made, the speaker has to offer some clues. The speaker offers hints by breaching the Gricean
Maxims (which were discussed above) thereby generating a conversational implicature.
Explaining how off record strategies help a speaker avoid the responsibility of doing an FTA, Brown and Levinson
(Ibid) list 15 strategies. Each strategy is explained below.
This strategy is done when the speaker says something that is not explicitly related thereby inviting the hearer to
search for an interpretation of the possible relevance. In this case, the speaker breaches the Maxim of Relevance.
When giving association clues, a speaker mentions something associated with the act required of the hearer. He or
she can do this by breaching the Maxim of Relevance. However, the speaker gives hints either by instance in the
speaker/hearer’s experience or by shared knowledge irrespective of their interactional experience (Brown and
Levinson, 1978: 220). For example, a speaker says:
Life is getting more difficult these days. I cannot afford to buy exercise books for my children. I am running out of
money now. I don’t know what I should do until I collect my salary.
When a speaker says so, he/she might be urging the hearer to lend him/her some money. This inference would
possibly be made if the hearer had previously lent some money to the speaker when he/she had been in need of it.
Strategy 3: Presuppose
Strategy 4: Understate
2) This is the kind of girl I have been looking for all my life.
This strategy is used to generate inference by violating the Quantity Maxim in which patent and necessary truths
are uttered (Brown and Levinson 1978:225).
This strategy is used by violating the Maxim of Quality which states ‘Speak the truth, be sincere’ (Ibid).
Example: A: Are you happy about your married life? B: Yes and no.
Strategy 8: Be ironic
Being ironic is saying the opposite. By doing so, the speaker violates the Maxim of Quality (Ibid).
For example, a speaker might say: Daniel is really generous (when we know that Daniel has recently refused to
assist his own mother).
Since metaphors are literally false, they are Quality violations. The use of metaphors, Brown and Levinson
(1978:227) explain, may be considered on record, but the connotations of the metaphors the speaker intends to
make may be off record. Consider the following example:
In this strategy, the speaker asks questions with no intention of getting an answer. This violates the Maxim of
Quality which states ‘Be sincere.’
Example:Abebe is a sheep. (This can be either a compliment or an insult. In Amharic this may mean Abebe is
foolish or Abebe is an innocent man.)
Example: I’m going down the road for a bit (The intended meaning may be I’m going to have beer.)
In such kind of strategy, the hearer will have to decide if the general rule applies to him/her (Brown and Levinson,
1978:231).
In this strategy, the speaker “may go off record as to who the target for his FTA is, or he may pretend to address
the FTA to someone whom it will not threaten, and hope that the FTA is aimed at him” (Brown and Levinson, 1978:
231). For example, a student in laboratory may ask his/her friend who is far from him/her to pass a certain
chemical when in fact his professor is quite nearer both to the chemical and the student who needs the chemical.
In this strategy, the professor’s face is not threatened, but he can decide whether to pass the chemical himself.
Well, if I the door is left open...(Here the speaker has not given adequate information)
A person can also choose not to threaten another's face at all performing no FTA and gain no goal in return.