Actualist/Contingentist Logic

Olivia Roberts
March 2024

1 A
The language is identical to that of SQML, except that we use the abbreviation
E!x =df ∃yy = x. The basic inference rules of the propositional connectives are
identical to those of SQML:
R Γ1 ⊢ ϕ ∴ Γ1 , Γ2 ⊢ ϕ
ϕ∈Γ ∴Γ⊢ϕ
∧I Γ1 ⊢ ϕ; Γ2 ⊢ ψ ∴ Γ1 , Γ2 ⊢ (ϕ ∧ ψ)

∧E Γ ⊢ (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∴Γ⊢ϕ
Γ ⊢ (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∴Γ⊢ψ
∨I Γ⊢ϕ ∴ Γ ⊢ (ϕ ∨ ψ)
Γ⊢ϕ ∴ Γ ⊢ (ψ ∨ ϕ)

∨E Γ ⊢ (ϕ ∨ ψ); Γ2 , ϕ ⊢ θ; Γ3 , ψ ⊢ θ ∴ Γ1 , Γ2 , Γ3 ⊢ θ
→I Γ, ϕ ⊢ ψ; ∴Γ⊢ϕ→ψ
→E Γ1 ⊢ (ϕ → ψ); Γ2 ⊢ ϕ ∴ Γ1 , Γ2 ⊢ ψ
¬I Γ, ϕ ⊢ ⊥; ∴ Γ ⊢ ¬ϕ

¬E Γ1 ⊢ ϕ; Γ2 ⊢ ¬ϕ ∴ Γ1 , Γ2 ⊢ ⊥
DNE Γ ⊢ ¬¬ϕ ∴Γ⊢ϕ
However, we revise the quantificational logical rules to their free counter-
parts, where here τ always stands for a closed, constant term, and ν for a
variable term:

F∀I Γ, E!τ ⊢ ϕ(ν|τ ) ∴ Γ ⊢ ∀νϕ, for τ not in Γ or ϕ.

F∀E Γ1 ⊢ ∀νϕ; Γ2 ⊢ E!τ ∴ Γ1 , Γ2 ⊢ ϕ(ν|τ )

F∃I Γ1 ⊢ ϕ(ν|τ ); Γ2 ⊢ E!τ ∴ Γ1 , Γ2 ⊢ ∃νϕ

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F∃E Γ1 ⊢ ∃νϕ; Γ2 , ϕ(ν|τ ), E!τ ⊢ ψ ∴ Γ1 , Γ2 ⊢ ψ for τ not in Γ2 , ϕ, or ψ.
F=I Γ ⊢ E!τ ∴ Γ ⊢ τ = τ.
=E Γ1 ⊢ τ1 = τ2 ; Γ2 ⊢ ϕ ∴ Γ ⊢ ϕ′ , where ϕ′ is the result of
substituting one or more instances
of τ1 with τ2 .

We can add the following rules to express actualist constraints.

SA Γ⊢ϕ ∴ Γ ⊢ E!τ for atomic ϕ and τ in ϕ.

E!I ∴ Γ ⊢ E!τ

The next rules all have to do with the modal part of the language.

Nec∗ ⊢ϕ ∴ Γ ⊢ □ϕ given that E!I has not been

invoked in the proof of ϕ.
K Γ1 ⊢ □ϕ; Γ2 ⊢ □(ϕ → ψ) ∴ Γ1 , Γ2 ⊢ □ψ
Γ1 ⊢ ♢ϕ; Γ2 ⊢ □(ϕ → ψ) ∴ Γ1 , Γ2 ⊢ ♢ψ
T Γ ⊢ □ϕ ∴Γ⊢ϕ
Γ⊢ϕ ∴ Γ ⊢ ♢ϕ
R4 Γ ⊢ □ϕ ∴ Γ ⊢ □□ϕ
Γ ⊢ ♢♢ϕ ∴ Γ ⊢ ♢ϕ
B Γ ⊢ ♢□ϕ ∴Γ⊢ϕ
Γ⊢ϕ ∴ Γ ⊢ □♢ϕ
R5 Γ ⊢ ♢□ϕ ∴ Γ ⊢ □ϕ
Γ ⊢ ♢ϕ ∴ Γ ⊢ □♢ϕ
□♢ Γ ⊢ ♢ϕ ∴ Γ ⊢ ¬□¬ϕ
Γ ⊢ □ϕ ∴ Γ ⊢ ¬♢¬ϕ

For convenience, we note that (E!I) and the quantificational rules entail the
following derived rules, which are just the classical quantifier rules:

∀I Γ ⊢ ϕ(ν|τ ) ∴ Γ ⊢ ∀νϕ, for τ not in Γ or ϕ.

∀E Γ ⊢ ∀νϕ ∴ Γ ⊢ ϕ(ν|τ ).
∃I Γ ⊢ ϕ(ν|τ ) ∴ Γ ⊢ ∃νϕ.
∃E Γ1 ⊢ ∃νϕ; Γ2 , ϕ(ν|τ ) ⊢ ψ ∴ Γ1 , Γ2 ⊢ ψ for τ not in Γ2 , ϕ, or ψ.
=I ∴ Γ ⊢ τ = τ.

It should be noted that since these derived rules come from the use of E!I,
they place the same restriction on Nec as that rule does.

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2 Relation to SQML
Replacing (Nec∗ ) with (Nec), which may be used even when a formula ϕ is
proven only by invoking (E!I), results in SQML, since it allows the classical
quantifiers to be used freely across modal contexts, and proves that any indi-
vidual necessarily exists:

1. ⊢ ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ (PL)
2. ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ ⊢ E!τ (E!I)
3. ⊢ ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ → E!τ (→I: 2)
4. ⊢ E!τ (→E: 1, 3)
5. ⊢ □E!τ (Nec: 4)

SA becomes irrelevant, since it acts as simply an instance of existential

quantification.

2.1 Possibilist Schemas

The traditional possibilist/necessitist schemas
BF ∀ν□ϕ → □∀νϕ
CBF □∀νϕ → ∀ν□ϕ
NNE □∀ν□∃ξξ = ν
are theorems of SQML, but not of A. The proof of BF in SQML is as follows:
1. ∀ν□ϕ ⊢ ∀ν□ϕ (R)
2. ∀ν□ϕ ⊢ □ϕ(ν|τ ) (∀E: 1)
3. ⊢ ∀ν□ϕ → □ϕ(ν|τ ) (→I: 2)
4. ⊢ □(∀ν□ϕ → □ϕ(ν|τ )) (Nec: 3)
5. ♢∀ν□ϕ ⊢ ♢∀ν□ϕ (R)
6. ♢∀ν□ϕ ⊢ ♢□ϕ(ν|τ ) (K: 4, 5)
7. ♢∀ν□ϕ ⊢ ϕ(ν|τ ) (B: 6)
8. ♢∀ν□ϕ ⊢ ∀νϕ (∀I: 7)
9. ⊢ ♢∀ν□ϕ → ∀νϕ (→I: 8)
10. ⊢ □(♢∀ν□ϕ → ∀νϕ) (Nec: 9)
11. ∀ν□ϕ ⊢ □♢∀ν□ϕ (B: 1)

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 12. ∀ν□ϕ ⊢ □∀νϕ (K: 10, 11)
13. ⊢ ∀ν□ϕ → □∀νϕ (→I: 12)
In A, Nec∗ and not Nec must be used on lines 4 and 10; but Nec∗ cannot
be used there, since it requires that no instance of E!I or any derived rule based
on it (like the classical quantifier rules) is used to prove the necessitated formula;
so the proof fails. Similar remarks hold for the proof of CBF.
The proof of NNE in SQML is as follows:

1. ⊢ τ = τ (=I)
2. ⊢ ∃ξξ = τ (∃I: 1)
3. ⊢ □∃ξξ = τ (Nec: 2)
4. ⊢ ∀ν□∃ξξ = ν (∀I: 3)
5. ⊢ □∀ν□∃ξξ = ν (Nec: 4)

Nec is disallowed on lines 3 and 5 because lines 1, 2, and 4, used in the

proofs of 3 and 5, all invoke rules that rule out the use of Nec.

3 Semantics
Let K be the set of non-logical terminology–including constant terms, variable
terms, and predicates of arity ≥ 0–of A. Then let an interpretation for A be
a tuplet M = ⟨D, δ, I, W, α, #⟩, where D is the domain, δ is a function from
worlds to subsets of D giving the domain of each world, I is an interpretation
function whose domain is L × W , W is a set of possible worlds, α ∈ W is the
actual world, and # : Φ × W → N is a function from formulas open in no more
than one variable and worlds to N, including 0.
Suppose that δ(α) = D, and that I obeys the following conditions:

1. I(τ, α) ∈ D for all constant terms τ .

2. I(τ, w) = I(τ, α) for all constant terms τ and worlds w.
3. I(P n , w) ⊆ δ(w)n for all n-ary predicates P n and worlds w.
4. I(=, w) = {⟨a, a⟩ : a ∈ δ(w)}.
5. I(E!, w) = δ(w).

Let us define M [a/ρ] to be an interpretation just like M except that the func-
tion I[a/ρ] in M [a/ρ] assigns the name ρ, which must not be already assigned
by I to anything, to the element a in D: I[a/ρ](ρ, α) = a.
Let ϕ be a formula free in no more than one variable, ν. Then #(ϕ, w)
intuitively gives the number of objects in w that fulfill that formula. # then
must obey the following conditions:

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 1. #(ϕ, α) = |{a ∈ D : M [a/ρ], α ⊨ ϕ(ν|ρ)}|
2. #(ϕ, w) ≥ |{a ∈ δ(w) : M [a/ρ], w ⊨ ϕ(ν|ρ)}|
3. #(ν = ν, w) = #(ϕ, w) + #(¬ϕ, w)
4. #(ϕ ∧ ψ, w) ≤ max(#(ϕ, w), #(ψ, w))

5. #(ϕ ∨ ψ, w) ≥ min(#(ϕ, w), #(ψ, w))

6. #(ϕ ∨ ψ, w) ≤ #(ϕ, w) + #(ψ, w)
7. #(ϕ → ψ, w) ≥ min(#(¬ϕ, w), #(ψ, w))

8. #(ϕ → ψ, w) ≤ #(¬ϕ, w) + #(ψ, w)

9. In general, if ∀ν(ϕ ↔ ψ) is a theorem, then #(ϕ, w) = #(ψ, w).

We then determine whether formulas are true recursively, using P n for an

n-ary predicate, τ , τ1 , etc. for constant terms, and ν for a variable term:

M, w ⊨ P n τ1 τ2 · · · τn iff ⟨I(τ1 , w), I(τ2 , w), · · · , I(τn , w)⟩ ∈ I(P n , w).

M, w ⊨ ¬ϕ iff it is not the case that M, w ⊨ ϕ.
M, w ⊨ (ϕ ∧ ψ) iff both M, w ⊨ ϕ and M, w ⊨ ψ.

M, w ⊨ (ϕ ∨ ψ) iff either M, w ⊨ ϕ or M, w ⊨ ψ.
M, w ⊨ (ϕ → ψ) iff either it is not the case that M, w ⊨ ϕ or M, w ⊨ ψ.
M, w ⊨ ∀νϕ iff #(¬ϕ, w) = 0.
M, w ⊨ ∃νϕ iff #(ϕ, w) ≥ 1.

M, w ⊨ □ϕ iff M, u ⊨ ϕ for every u ∈ W .

M, w ⊨ ♢ϕ iff M, u ⊨ ϕ for some u ∈ W .

All of these definitions are identical to those of SQML except for the quan-
tifier definitions. Although the domain of any world w is stipulated to be a
subset of that of α (otherwise our domain would include objects that do not
actually exist), facts about these objects cannot be sufficient to account for all
qualitative truths about w, since we can say, for example, that another possible
world w includes a unicorn, even if we cannot name any object in the domain
which is a unicorn at w. The revised definitions of the quantifiers make up the
difference: #(U ν, w), that is, the number of unicorns in w, can be greater than
or equal to 1, even if d(w) contains no elements whose singletons are in I(U, w).
Since all the semantic rules except for the quantifier rules are defined as nor-
mal, all we need to show for completeness and soundness is that our definitions
for the quantifiers imply our free quantifier rules, E!I, SA, and Nec∗ .