1.
The President of the Republic of the
Philippines issued an Executive Order
creating the Truth Commission tasked
to conduct a thorough factfinding
investigation of reported cases of graft
and corruption involving third level
public officers during the
administration of the predecessor of
the current President, and thereafter
submit its findings and
recommendations to the Office of the
President, Congress, and the
Ombudsman. The concerned public
officers questioned the
constitutionality of the Executive
Order, contending that the creation of
the Truth Commission is not among
the powers of the President as
contained in the Constitution. What is
the meaning of “Residual” powers of
the President? Is the contention of the
concerned public officers meritorious?
(10 points)
G.R. No. 192935
As declared by the Supreme Court, the
residual power is the power borne by the
President’s duty to preserve and defend
the Constitution. It may also be viewed as
a power implicit in the President’s duty to
take care that the laws are faithfully
executed. (Marcos v. Manglapus, 177
SCRA 668)
No, the contention of the concerned
public officers is not meritorious. Under
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the
President has the power to control all the
executive departments, bureaus, and
offices, and the duty to ensure that the
laws are faithfully executed. With the
creation of the Truth Commission, the
President has validly delegated the fact-
finding and investigatory powers of the
Department of Justice.
The Truth Commission was established to
ensure that the fundamental laws on
public accountability and transparency
are observed. The President’s powers to
conduct investigations and to create
bodies to execute that power, although
not explicitly stated in the Constitution,
are within the authority of the President
as entailed in his duty to ensure the
faithful execution of laws. The Truth
Commission was validly created by the
President of the Philippines within
authority of law. Therefore, the Executive
Order is constitutional.
2. A complaint is filed before the
Ombudsman against the PNP Chief for
alleged graft and corruption due to the
procurement of firearms without the
requisite public bidding. Before the
respondent could submit his counter-
affidavit and other evidence, the
Ombudsman placed him under
preventive suspension. The
respondent files a petition that seeks
to nullify the order of preventive
suspension on the ground that he was
denied due process, particularly his
right to notice and hearing. Is the
contention of the PNP Chief
meritorious? (10 points)
G.R. No. 219501
No, the contention of the PNP Chief is not
meritorious.
As held by the Supreme Court, the
Ombudsman may issue a preventive
suspension order prior to the filing of an
answer or counter-affidavit, considering
that the same is but a preventive measure.
The purpose of the suspension order is to
prevent the accused from using his
position to influence potential witnesses
or tamper with records which may be
vital in the prosecution of the case against
him.
Prior notice and hearing for the issuance
of a preventive suspension order is not
required because such suspension is not a
penalty but only a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation.
Therefore, the Ombudsman did not
violate the PNP Chief’s right to due
process, particularly his right to notice
and hearing, when the Ombudsman
issued the preventive suspension order
before the PNP Chief was able to file his
counter-affidavit and other evidence
because the issuance of a preventive
suspension does not amount to a
prejudgment of the merits of the case.
3. Prior to the effectivity of the Local
Government Code in 1991, Ms.
Mahusay was appointed by Provincial
Governor Matiwasay as Provincial
Administrator. Sometime in the year
1999, Provincial Governor Maligalig
who succeeded Governor Matiwasay,
ordered the dismissal of Ms. Mahusay
on the ground of loss of confidence. Ms.
Mahusay questioned her dismissal
from service, arguing that she occupies
a permanent position and as such, she
enjoys security of tenure. She further
argues that loss of confidence is not a
valid ground for her dismissal from
public service as Provincial
Administrator. Is the dismissal of Ms.
Mahusay valid? (10 points)
G.R. No. 185740
Yes, the dismissal of Ms. Mahusay is valid.
Jurisprudence dictates that security of
tenure in public office means that a public
officer or employee shall not be
suspended or dismissed except for causes
provided by law and after due process.
Moreover, since a primarily confidential
employee serves at the confidence of his
appointing authority, his term of office
expires when the appointing authority
loses trust in him.
Since Ms. Mahusay was a primarily
confidential employee being a Provincial
Administrator, loss of trust and
confidence is one of the just causes
provided by law as a valid ground for the
termination of her employment.
Ms. Mahusay cannot invoke her security
of tenure to oppose her dismissal because
security of tenure in public office does not
grant the right to such office. Her security
of tenure only protects her from being
suspended or dismissed for causes other
than those provided by law and without
due process. Therefore, the dismissal of
Ms. Mahusay on the ground of loss of
confidence was valid.
4. Congress enacts a law deregulating the
oil industry wherein “any person or
entity may import or purchase any
quantity of crude oil and petroleum
products and market such crude oil or
petroleum or use such for his own
requirement” subject only to the
monitoring of the Department of
Energy. This law ended the
government’s regulation of the oil
industry. Francisco files a petition
questioning the constitutionality of the
law, contending that the deregulation
law fails to meet the completeness and
sufficient standard test, as it empowers
the Department of Energy to exercise
undue delegated legislative powers.
Explain the meaning of the following:
a) Completeness Test; and b) Sufficient
Standard Test.
G.R. No. 124360
a. The completeness test provides that
a law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the
legislature so that when it reaches the
delegate, it will have nothing to do but
to enforce it. An enactment is said to
be incomplete and invalid if it does not
lay down any rule or definite standard
by which the administrative officer
may be guided in the exercise of the
discretionary powers delegated to it.
b. The sufficient standard test provides
that the law must stipulate adequate
guidelines to map out the boundaries
of the delegate's authority and
prevent the delegate from
overstepping its boundaries. To be
sufficient, the standard must specify
the limits of the delegate’s authority,
announce the legislative policy and
identify the conditions under which it
is to be implemented. The law satisfies
the sufficient standard test when
sufficient standards that saliently
outline the limits of the delegate's
authority by defining the legislative
policy and indicating the
circumstances under which it is to be
pursued and effected, are indicated.
5. Regional Director Diskitar was
administratively charged for
malversation of public funds, violation
of COA rules and regulations,
harassment and oppression. During
hearings conducted by the committee
that investigated him, he was not
 assisted by counsel. Record of the case
showed that Diskitar had moved for
resetting of the hearing to enable him
to engage the services of a lawyer, and
the motion of Diskitar was granted.
However, on the dates he himself has
chosen, Diskitar and his counsel failed
to appear, thus the case was deemed
submitted for resolution. Thereafter
the committee rendered a decision
finding Diskitar guilty as charged in
the administrative case, and
recommended his dismissal from
service. The President approved the
recommendation of the committee and
dismissed Diskitar from government
service. Diskitar filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus before the
Supreme Court contending that his
dismissal from service is invalid as he
was denied due process of law on the
ground that his right to counsel, which
is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights in
our Constitution, has been violated. Is
the contention of Diskitar correct? (10
points)
G.R. No. 187854
No, Diskitar’s contention is incorrect.
As held by the Supreme Court, in
administrative proceedings, the filing of
charges and giving of reasonable
opportunity for the person so charged to
be heard and to answer the accusations
against him, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of, constitute due process.
Diskitar was given a reasonable
opportunity to answer the accusations
against him when his motion to reset the
hearing to enable him to engage the
services of a lawyer was granted.
Despite having been given a reasonable
opportunity to answer the accusations
against him, Diskitar did not use that
opportunity to be heard when he and his
counsel failed to appear on the dates of
the hearings, he himself has chosen.
Therefore, Diskitar was not denied due
process
6. Dimagiba is appointed as
Administrative Officer II in a
temporary capacity since he lacks the
eligibility requirement. Nine months
after his appointment, he was able to
pass the Civil Service Examination.
Dimagiba now asserts that since he
passed the Civil Service Examination,
he is now eligible and consequently,
his temporary appointment becomes
permanent. Is the argument of
Dimagiba correct? (10 points)
G.R. No. 99336
No, Dimagiba’s argument is incorrect.
As held by the Supreme Court, a
permanent appointment is not a
continuation of the temporary
appointment because these are two
distinct acts of the appointing authority.
Here, Dimagiba’s appointment as
Administrative Officer II was only
temporary because he lacks the eligibility
requirement. Upon passing the Civil
Service Examination and acquiring
eligibility, a new appointment in a
permanent capacity should be granted to
Dimagiba for him to be able to acquire the
status of a permanent employee.
Therefore, to become a permanent
employee, there must be another act of
appointment, other than the temporary
appointment, by an appointing officer to
appoint Dimagiba in a permanent
capacity.
7. The Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) issued a circular
to discontinue payment of other
allowances and fringe benefits for
government officials and employees.
The said circular was not published.
May the circular be implemented even
if it is not published? (10 points)
G.R. No. 109023
No, the circular cannot be implemented if
it is not published.
According to a case decided by the
Supreme Court, all statutes shall be
published as a condition for their
effectivity. Administrative rules and
regulations must be published if their
 purpose is to enforced or implement
existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation.
The circular which discontinues payment
of allowances and fringe benefits to
government officials and employees is not
a mere interpretative or internal
regulation, nor a letter of instruction. It is
a regulation of general application, hence,
the government officials and employees
concerned should be alerted through
publication of the circular.
Therefore, the circular must go through
the requisite publication to be effective
and enforceable.
8. Due to an adverse decision rendered
by the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB)
regarding the validity of a Lease
Agreement, the Farmers’ Cooperative
filed an appeal in the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the
DARAB decision on the ground that the
issues involved are findings of facts,
thus, the Court of Appeals shall not
disturb the findings made by the
administrative agency. The Farmers’
Cooperative filed a petition for
certiorari before the Supreme Court
assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals that affirmed the DARAB
decision. May the petition prosper?
G.R. No. 184950
No, the petition may not prosper.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, before a party is
allowed to seek the intervention of the
court, he or she should have availed
himself or herself of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him or
her. Failure of a party to exhaust all the
means of administrative processes may
be a ground for dismissal of the case filed
in court due to lack of cause of action.
Since DARAB is an administrative agency,
its decision should have been first
appealed to the Office of the President
before seeking court intervention from
the Court of Appeals for judicial review.
Since the Farmers’ Cooperative failed to
exhaust all the means of administrative
processes afforded to it, the appeal may
be dismissed for lack of cause of action
upon motion of the adverse party.
Therefore, the petition for certiorari
before the Supreme Court may not
prosper
9. Congress enacted Republic Act No.
8973 entitled "An Act creating the
Province of Zamboanga Sibugay from
the Province of Zamboanga del Sur and
for other purposes". As consequence
thereof, the Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA) of the province of
Zamboanga del Sur (province, for
brevity) was reduced by thirty-six
percent (36%). Because of such
reduction, the provincial governor
sought the opinion of the Civil Service
Commission [CSC] on the possibility of
reducing the workforce of the
provincial government. In response,
CSC issued an opinion, the pertinent
portions of which are as follows:
"Please be advised also that in the
event reorganization is carried out in
that province, the same must be
authorized by appropriate
Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP)
resolution, so that necessary funds
may be correspondingly released,
among other purposes, to aid the
provincial government in the
implementation thereof. Should you
have further queries on the matter,
please feel free to coordinate with our
Civil Service Commission Regional
Office (CSCRO).”
Subsequently, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur
passed Resolution No. 2Kl-27
approving the new staffing pattern of
the provincial government consisting
only of 727 positions and Resolution
No. 2Kl-038 which authorized the
provincial governor to undertake the
reorganization of the provincial
government and to implement the new
staffing pattern. Pursuant to said
authority, the provincial governor
appointed employees to the new
positions in the provincial
government. Some employees who
were occupying permanent positions
in the old plantilla and have allegedly
been in the service for a long time
were not given placement preference
and were instead terminated. On
various dates, these employees filed
their respective letters of appeal
regarding their termination with the
provincial governor. However, no
action was taken on the appeals made;
hence, private respondents brought
the matter to the CSCRO. In the
meantime, the province submitted its
Report on Personnel Actions (ROPA) to
the CSCRO for attestation.
Upon review of the ROPA submitted by
the provincial government, the CSCRO
found that the subject appointments
violated the law on appointment of
personnel for allegedly failing to grant
preference in appointment to
employees previously occupying
permanent positions in the old
plantilla. As a result, the CSCRO
invalidated a total of ninety-six (96)
appointments made by the governor
after the reorganization. In addition,
the CSRO ordered the provincial
governor to reinstate the employees to
their former positions.
The provincial governor defended the
appointments and removal of the
employees as a consequence of a
reorganization made in good faith. The
provincial governor further argued
that the governor has the exclusive
discretion to appoint employees of the
provincial government and that the
CSC does not have the prerogative to
revoke the appointments made by the
provincial governor.
Is the argument of the provincial
governor valid? (10 points)
G.R. No. 180845
No, the argument of the provincial
governor is incorrect.
Jurisprudence dictates that there is no
encroachment on the discretion of the
appointing authority when the CSC
revokes an appointment on the ground
that the removal of the employee was
done in bad faith. A reorganization is
done in bad faith when the enumerated
circumstances in Section 2 of the Security
of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and
Employees law are present. Moreover,
under the same law, officers and
employees holding permanent
appointments in the old staffing pattern
shall be given preference for appointment
to the new positions in the approved
staffing pattern, and no new employees
shall be taken in until all permanent
officers and employees have been
appointed.
There was evident bad faith in the
reorganization of the Province of
Zamboanga del Sur as when the
provincial governor appointed ninety-six
(96) new employees, circumventing the
security of tenure of ninety-six (96)
former employees. It also violated the
rule on preference and non-hiring of new
employees when the ninety-six (96)
former employees were replaced by
either new employees or those holding
lower positions in the old staffing pattern.
The CSC, as the central personnel agency,
has the obligation to implement and
safeguard the constitutional provisions on
security of tenure and due process.
Therefore, it is within the power of the
CSCRO to invalidate the ninety-six (96)
new appointments made by the provincial
governor after the reorganization and to
order the reinstatement of the former
ninety-six (96) employees to their former
positions.
10. After due notice and hearing in an
administrative case where Makisig was
charged for Gross Misconduct, the
Hearing Officer rendered judgment
finding Makisig guilty as charged and
imposing upon him the penalty of
dismissal from service. The decision is
written in a one-page document, which
merely stated:
“WHEREFORE, finding Makisig GUILTY
as charged for Gross Misconduct, he is
hereby DISMISSED from government
service, effective immediately.
SO ORDERED.”
 There is no explanation as to the facts
or the law as basis for the decision. Is
the decision valid? (10 points)

G.R. No. 88709

No, the decision is not valid.

Under the Article VIII of the 1987

Constitution, no decision shall be
rendered by any court without stating
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is based.

Due process requires that the parties to a

litigation should be informed of how an
order was decided, with an explanation of
the factual and legal reasons that led to
the conclusions of the court. It would be
prejudicial to the rights of Makisig to not
know why he lost and identify possible
errors of the court for purposes of appeal.

Therefore, it would be a violation of

Makisig’s right to due process if the order
finding him guilty of gross misconduct
and dismissing him from service, with no
explanation as to the facts or the law as
basis for the decision, would be enforced.
11.