Derfication in Zen Budhism

Dereification in Zen Buddhism
Author(s): Robert J. Moore

Source: The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Autumn, 1995), pp. 699-723
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IN ZEN BUDDHISM
DEREIFICATION
RobertJ. Moore*
IndianaUniversity-Bloomington
In thisarticle,theconceptof dereification
in religionis developed,
boththeoreticallyand
empirically,by analyzingZenBuddhism.Thecentralthesisis thatZenBuddhism, by
virtueof theMahayana conceptof "emptiness" (sunyata), constitutes
a dereifyingperspec-
tive. Inaddition,usingthephenomenology of AlfredSchutz,theexperience of dereifying
perception,whichis acquired throughZenmeditation, is described
as a stateof focused
dure'e.Furthermore, severalof theinteractional
methodsthrough whichZenpractitioners
demonstrate theirdereifyingperspective areanalyzedfroman ethnomethodological and
conversation analyticperspective, and the role of these methods in koan trainingis
explained.
Conversionto Zen Buddhismhas distinctivefeaturesthat are not foundin most otherreli-

gions. While some sociologists (Bell 1979; Preston1988; Wilson 1984) have characterized
the processof becominga Zen Buddhistas "desocialization," I will arguethatthis process is
bettercharacterizedas resocializationin which dereifyingperceptionis acquired.According
to Berger's(1967) social constructionistapproach,'religionstend to legitimatealienatedand
reifyingviews of the social world. Thatis, the belief systemsof religiousinstitutionsobscure
the humanproductionof social objects,such as a moralcode or a familialrole, by depicting
them as the manifestationof some naturalor divine orderand, therefore,as beyond human
influence. However,Bergermentionsthata few religionslegitimatea dealienatedand derei-
fying view of theirsocial world. Unfortunately,his mentionof dereifyingreligionsis a pass-
ing one. Of them Bergerstates,"Whilethese differentpossibilitiesare of greatinterestfor a
generalsociology of religion,we cannotpursuethem furtherhere"(1967, p. 98). Nowhere
else does he pursuethis idea. My aim is to develop this conceptionof dereificationin reli-
gion, boththeoreticallyandempirically,by analyzingZen Buddhismand,at the same time, to
explainsome of the more enigmaticaspectsof Zen Buddhism,such as the notion of "empti-
ness" (sunyata),the meditativestateof "no-mind"(mushin),andthe practiceof koantraining.
First, I review the sociological literatureon desocialization,reification,and dereification.
Then, I presentmy centralthesis, thatZen Buddhism,by virtueof the Mahayanaconceptof
"emptiness"(sunyata),constitutesa dereifyingperspectiveof the social world. Next, I pro-
vide a descriptionof the experienceof dereifyingperceptionin Zen Buddhism,beginningwith
a descriptionof Zen meditation,followed by a phenomenologicalanalysisthat drawson the
workof AlfredSchutz. Finally,using ethnomethodology andconversationanalysis,I analyze
some methodsthroughwhich Zen practitionersdemonstratetheir dereifyingperspectiveto
to RobertJ. Moore,Departmentof Sociology,IndianaUniversity,Bloomington,IN 47405.

*Directall correspondence
The SociologicalQuarterly,Volume 36, Number 4, pages 699-723.

Copyright ? 1995 by The Midwest SociologicalSociety.
All rights reserved. Send requests for permissionto reprint to:
Rights and Permissions,Universityof California Press, Journals Division, 2120 Berkeley Way, Berkeley, CA 94720.
ISSN: 0038-0253.
700 THESOCIOLOGICAL Vol. 36/No. 4/1995
QUARTERLY
each other in face-to-faceinteraction,and I explain the role of these methods in the Zen
practiceof koan training.
BACKGROUND
Several sociologists have observedthat conversionto Buddhismand otherEasternspiritual

traditionsis radicallydifferentfromthatof otherreligionsandthatit shouldnot be conceptu-
alized as "resocialization."These scholars(Bell 1979, pp. 56-57; Preston1988, pp. 64, 70;
Wilson 1984, pp. 302-303)2arguethatearliersociologicalaccounts(Balch 1980; Bergerand
Luckmann1966; Straus1979) that conceive of religiousconversionas a resocializationpro-
cess (just like thatinvolvedin joining any type of new groupin which a new belief systemis
learned)are inadequatefor explainingconversionto Buddhismor Yoga. In these traditions,
one's intellect,the facultyby which one perceivesthe world throughlanguage,beliefs, and
culture,is viewed as a cause of ignoranceand delusionthat in turn causes alienationand
suffering. One of the centralgoals of these traditionsis to "liberate"individualsfrom the
oppressiveeffects of their own intellectand culture. Hence, accordingto these sociologists
conversionto BuddhismandYoga consistsof desocialization,the unlearningor eliminationof
habitualand problematicways of feeling, acting,perceiving,and thinking,acquiredthrough
childhoodsocialization,which are mediatedthroughlanguageand culture(Bell 1979, p. 55;
Preston 1988, p. 73; Wilson 1984, p. 303).
Desocializationhas seriousproblemsas a sociologicalconcept. First,the concept as de-
fined by the authors(Bell 1979; Preston1988; Wilson 1984) is too vague in that it does not
specify which socialized habits are eliminated. While the authorsgive some examples of
habits that are "unlearned"-suchas the tendency"to fear or worshipor lust after power"
(Bell 1979, p. 56), the inabilityto concentrate(Preston1988, pp. 72-73), or the tendencyto
experienceguilt or stress(Wilson 1984,p. 303)--they offerno criteriafor determiningwhich
socializedhabitsare "problematic" and thereforeeliminated. Second,the term"desocializa-
tion"is misleadingbecauseit impliesa reversalof all socialization,in whichcase the individ-
ual would lose the ability to participatein society. For example,Erving Goffmandefines
"desocialization"as a "loss of fundamentalcapacities to communicateand co-operate"
(Goffman 1961, p. 13n.). AlthoughInge Bell (1979), David Preston(1988), and Stephen
Wilson (1984) define"desocialization" as an empoweringprocessratherthanas a debilitating
one, earlierstudies of Buddhism3have definedit negatively;therefore,the use of the term
may lead sociologiststo mistakethis perspectivefor anotherto which it is diametricallyop-
posed. Third,the most serious flaw with desocializationis the idea of "unlearning."Un-
learningimpliesthat,in conversionto Zen Buddhism,old habitsare eliminatedwithoutbeing
replacedby new habits. In fact, new habits,such as meditating,are learned,and a sociologi-
cal accountof conversionto Zen Buddhismmust acknowledgeand analyzethem. Although
the idea of "unlearning" accordswith the languageof Buddhiststhemselves,it is problematic
as a sociological conceptand insteadshouldbe recognizedas a member'sconcept.
Withtheirdesocializationperspective,Bell, Preston,andWilsonappearto be attemptingto
capturehow resocializationinto a Zen groupis distinctlydifferentfromresocializationinto
most othertypes of groups:ratherthanconsistingof the substitutionof one belief system or
theoryfor another,it is characterized by a changeat the metatheoreticallevel. Whatis learned
by the initiate is not simply a new belief system but a new way of perceivingall belief
In
systems. my view, than
rather this
describing change as desocialization,which impliesthat
Dereificationin Zen Buddhism 701
everythinggainedthroughchildhoodsocializationis lost andthatnothingnew is learned,this

process is bettercharacterizedas resocializationin which dereifyingperceptionis acquired.
While the conceptof "reification"in religionfirst appearsin the works of Ludwig Feuer-
bach, G. W. F. Hegel, and KarlMarx,I will use Bergerand his colleagues'social construc-
tionist accountof reificationand dereificationas a springboardfor this study. Accordingto
BergerandLuckmann(1966), any social worldis inherentlyprecariousbecauseit is produced
and maintainedsolely throughhumanactivity. If the membersof a society were to stop
acting,not only would social institutionsstop functioning,but the social worldas such would
cease to exist. Althoughsocial realityis dependenton its members'ongoingactivities,it does
not necessarilyappearas such to the membersthemselves. Forthem,the social worldis just
there, apparentlyexisting independentlyof any person's constitutiveknowledgeor activity.
BergerandLuckmann(1966), drawingon Marx([1867-1895]1967), call this apprehensionof
the social world as an independentlyexisting world "reification."Accordingto Bergerand
Luckmann(1966, p. 89), "reificationis the apprehensionof the productsof humanactivityas
if they were somethingelse thanhumanproducts-such as facts of nature,resultsof cosmic
laws, or manifestationsof divine will." Membersof society may reify or attributean in-
dependentontologyto language,ideas,roles, norms,institutions,and even self-identities.By
denyingthe statusof these objectsas humanproducts,reificationhelps stabilizethe inherently
precarioussocial world.
Reificationis differentfromobjectification,the processby which the mind lifts one aspect
of realityout of the overallflow of experienceandmakesit a discreteobjectof consciousness
(Bergerand Pullberg1965, p. 200). Reification,on the otherhand,is the process of objecti-
fying reality and then, apprehendingthe object as an alien thing that is independentof its
producer.Furthermore, BergerandPullberg(1965, p. 200) conceptualizereificationin terms
of "alienation":
By alienationwe meantheprocessby whichtheunityof theproducing andtheproduct is

broken.Theproduct nowappears to theproducer as analienfacticityandpowerstanding
in itselfandoveragainsthim,no longerrecognizable as product.In otherwords,aliena-
tionis theprocessby whichmanforgetsthattheworldhe livesin hasbeenproduced by
himself.... Reification
is objectification
in an alienatedmode.
Thus, reificationis the objectificationof realityby an alienatedconsciousness.

Accordingto Bergerand his colleagues,althoughobjectificationis "anthropologically nec-
is
essary"for a society to exist, reificationis not. Therefore,dereification a theoretical
possi-
bility (Berger and Pullberg 1965, p. 209). Although people have historicallytended to
perceivethe social worldin a reifyingmanner,it is alwayspossiblefor themto recognizethe
objectsof the social worldas constructionsproducedsolely throughhumanactivity. Further-
more, in times of radicalsocial change,cultureshock, or social marginality,particularsocial
objects tend to be dereifiedby the people involved(Bergerand Pullberg1965, p. 209). For
example,duringthe 1960s and 1970s in the United States,proponentsof the women's rights
movementdrew attentionto the fact that the definitionof the woman's role in society is a
social construction,not a fact of natureor a manifestationof divine will, and,therefore,it is
alterable.But even in times of social change,whenparticularsocial objectsaredereified,they
tend to be replacedwith new reified objects, and hence, people's overall perceptionof the
social world tends to be reifying.
QUARTERLY
In TheSacred Canopy,Berger(1967) applieshis social constructionisttheoryto religion.

He assertsthatreligiousinstitutionshave functionedhistoricallyto stabilizethe social orderof
a society by legitimatingalienatedand reifiedviews of the social order(Berger 1967, p. 89).
Thatis, the mainstreamreligiousinstitutionsof a society providean explanationfor why the
world and the particularsocial orderdo andshouldexist, which identifiesdivine will as their
cause. Thus, the active role thatpeople play in producingtheir world is denied.
Berger(1967) also points to exceptionsto this historicaltrend:religionsthat legitimatea
dealienatedand, therefore,dereifyingview of the social world.4 These religions are found
especially among Westernand Easternformsof mysticism.5 In general,they identify"ulti-
mate reality"as beyondthe empiricalworld,and thus they relativizethe social orderand its
normsby assertingthatthe empiricalworldis a conventionallysustainedillusion. For exam-
ple, Bergerstatesthatthe "moresophisticatedsoteriologiesof India"assertthatthe empirical
world,includingthe social order,is an illusion(maya)constructedby the mindusing language
and commonsenseknowledge(Berger1967, p. 97; Bell 1979, p. 55; Watts 1957, pp. 40-42).
This notion of the empiricalworld as illusion was inheritedby Buddhism(Hajime 1987, p.
223) and is partof the conceptualbasis of dereificationin Zen Buddhism.Furthermore, these
dereifyingreligionspresentan interestingcase becausetheirgoal is to produceoverall derei-
fying perceptionin theirmembers. Thatis, particulardereifiedobjectsare not replacedwith
differentreifiedobjects;all social objectsare dereified.
Douglas Maynardand ThomasWilson (1980) offer an ethnomethodological conceptionof
reificationthatwill be useful in analyzingdereificationin Zen Buddhism.Theirdefinitionof
reificationis basedon the conceptof "reflexivedetermination," a kindof determination thatis
neithercausalnor logical, but contextual:a thing is whatit is only in the contextof the other
partsof the whole. Removea thingfromits context,and it ceases to be what it is. Maynard
andWilson illustratethe conceptof reflexivedetermination by usingperceptualpatternrecog-
nition as a metaphor.In the case of the face/gobletillusion, one partis a "nose"only in the
context of otherpartsthat form a "chin,"a "mouth,"and an "eye." Remove the curve that
constitutesthe nose from the whole context,and it ceases to be a "nose." In applyingthis
perceptualmetaphorto the social world, Maynardand Wilson (1980, p. 293) say that "the
whole context"includes not merely the picturebut also the perceiverand the actions the
perceiverperformsin relationto the picture:"Thecrux of this move is to recognizethatthe
perceiverandhis or heractionsarereflexivelycodeterminedwiththe featuresof the perceived
object in exactly the same way as the nose and chin were in the metaphoricalexample."
MaynardandWilsonthen defineabstractionandreificationin termsof reflexivedetermina-
tion. Abstractionconsistsof removingan objector relationbetweenobjectsfromits reflexive
context on the basis of some characteristicand treatingit as identicalwith otherobjectsof a
category(1980, p. 294). Abstractionis roughlyequivalentto Bergerand his colleagues'no-
tion of objectification.On the otherhand,MaynardandWilson(1980, p. 294) definereifica-
tion as the denial of the reflexiveembeddednessof an object in its context:
However,abstraction is notreification,
forwhileabstractionneglectsthereflexiveembed-
dednessof objectsorrelations, it doesnotdenythatembeddedness in principle.Butwhen
realitycomesto takeon theappearance of consisting
of abstractedobjectsandabstracted
relationsbetweenthem,theirreflexiveembeddedness is deniedeffectivefactualstatus,and
it is properto speakof reification.
Hence, while abstractionentailsneglectingthe reflexiverelationsof an objectto its context,

reificationentails the denial of those reflexiverelations.
Maynardand Wilson's conceptionof reificationhas a broaderapplicationthanthatof Ber-
ger andhis colleagues. Forthe latter(1965; 1966; 1967), only the social worldcan be reified,
not the world of nature. However, Maynardand Wilson's (1980) conceptionof reflexive
determinationappliesto all aspectsof the phenomenalworld, including"nature."Although
naturalobjectsthemselvesare not made by humanactivity,theirphenomenalstatusstill re-
quiresthe use of humanlanguageand commonsenseknowledge. Whenwe walk into a "for-
est," we often utilize our knowledgeof "forests"and see particularaspectsof our immediate
experienceas "trees,""rocks,""streams,"and "mountains."Under Maynardand Wilson's
conceptionof reification,the concept "tree"can be reified in the same way that a social
product(commodity,relationship,role, etc.) is reified:by denyingthe reflexiveconnectionsof
the objectnamedto its context,includingthe perceiver'sown constitutivepractices. Hence-
forth,when I use the term"socialworld,"I will be referringnot merelyto the world of social
institutionsand relationsbut to all aspectsof the worldas it is experiencedthroughthe cate-
gories of commonsenseknowledge. This refinementis necessarybecause, accordingto Zen
Buddhism,people reify not only social institutionsbut all kindsof objectsof theirphenome-
nal experiencethat they define using commonsensecategories.
BurkeThomason(1982) offersa Schutziandefinitionof dereification6thatexplicates,more
clearlythan that of Bergerand his colleagues,how dereificationoccursphenomenologically
and that accordsmoreclosely with MaynardandWilson's conceptionof reification.Thoma-
son (1982, p. 90) writes:
Our"... objectivities... [are]alwayscapable... of being'unfrozen'andbrought backto

theiroriginalactivestate"[Schutz1932,p. 77]. Schutzis sayingin effectthatwe cande-
reifyourexperiences, i.e. recallthe subjective processesout of whichthey
constituting
originallyarose.
Any thing that is perceivedas existing independentlyof the perceivercan be dereifiedby

recallingthe subjectiveexperiencesout of which the object was constitutedand by appre-
hendingthe reflexive connectionsof the objectto its context.
Finally, a truly dereifying perspectiveis "radicallyreflexive" (Pollner 1991), in other
words,one that,while it assertsthatall social objectsare constructedthroughhumanactivity,
also recognizes that its own assertionspossess this same characteristicand, therefore,are
vulnerableto reification. For example,Melvin Pollner(1991, p. 370) describes"radicalre-
flexivity"in earlyethnomethodologyas the appreciationof the accomplishedcharacterof all
social activity,includingethnomethodological work. In otherwords,while they were analyz-
ing the detailedpracticesin andthroughwhichpeople accomplishthe accountablefeaturesof
social settings, the early ethnomethodologistsalso analyzedthe detailed practices in and
throughwhich they themselvesaccomplishedthe accountablefeaturesof theirethnomethodo-
logical analyses. In a similarway, dereifyingperspectivesin religion7recognizethat their
own doctrines,even the doctrinethatthe empiricalworld is a conventionallysustainedillu-
sion, are conventionallysustainedillusions. Suchrecognitioncausesdoctrinesandtheoriesto
lose any "absolute"authoritythey may appearto possess when takenfor grantedand reified.
The resultof this radicalreflexivityin dereifyingreligionsis the total abandonmentof repre-
sentationas a means of realizing"ultimatetruth."
QUARTERLY
Thus, insteadof characterizing conversionto Zen Buddhismas "desocialization," this con-

version process is bettercharacterizedas resocializationin which the initiatelearnsto per-
ceive the social world in a dereifyingmanner. I will developthis conceptof dereificationin
religion, both theoreticallyand empirically,and at the same time explain some of the more
enigmaticaspectsof Zen Buddhism.
THE MAHAYANACONCEPTOF "EMPTINESS"
Zen Buddhismis a Sino-Japaneseformof MahayanaBuddhism,and it is with the Mahayana

conceptionof "emptiness"(sunyata)that we can begin to understanddereificationin Zen
Buddhism.Buddhismoriginatedin Indiaaroundthe sixthcenturybeforethe commonera,8as
a reactionagainstthe religiousand social orderof the Brahmanestablishment(G6mez 1987,
p. 52). The primarygoal of Buddhismis liberationfromthe cycle of birth-and-rebirth (sam-
sara). Accordingto the Buddhisttheoryof samsara,sentientbeings are continuallyreborn
into severalrealmsafterthey die. The law of karmaassertsthatwhen one performsvirtuous
actions, one is reborninto the higher,more pleasantrealms,and, conversely,when one per-
formsnonvirtuousactions,one is reborninto the lower, moreunpleasantrealms. Sakyamuni
(563-483 B.C.E.),the historicalBuddha("onewho has awakened"),taughtthatthe individual
can attainliberation(nirvana)from the cycle of birth-and-rebirth by eliminatingall attach-
ments to the things of this world. All attachmentsare eliminatedwhen one directlyrealizes
the fact of "no-self" (anatman)--in other words, that the self is an "illusion"(maya) and,
therefore,that there is no real basis for evaluatingthings as desirableor undesirable.The
Mahayana("greatervehicle")school of Buddhism,which emergedin Indiaby the first cen-
tury B.C.E., extendedthe notionof no-self to all phenomenawith the conceptionof "empti-
ness" (sunyata):9 not only is the self an illusion, so is every discrete phenomenon,and
therefore,thereareno real objectsto becomeattachedto in the firstplace andthereis no real
self to do the grasping. Thus, while the ordinaryconsciousnessof the normallysocialized
individualis in a state of "ignorance"(avidya)of the truthof emptiness,"enlightenment"
consists of the realizationof emptiness.
Nagarjuna(150-250 C.E.) systematizedthe conceptof "emptiness"(sunyata),which first
appearedin the Prajnaparamita Sutras(100 B.C.E.-200C.E.),andfoundedthe firstphilosoph-
ical school of MahayanaBuddhism(Madhyamika).Ratherthanestablishinga fixed dogmaof
his own, Nagarjunarefutedall dogmaticviews by showinghow theirinitialpropositionslead
to unwarranted conclusions(Hajime1987, p. 230). In otherwords,Nagarjuna'ssunyataphi-
losophy unfreezes all fixed and frozen(i.e., reified)conceptsand extremedichotomies10and
is a "radicallyreflexive"perspectivethat,like ethnomethodology,"unsettles"any version of
reality,makingvisible the work of settling(Pollner1991, p. 376).
One of severalways Nagarjunaexplainsemptinessis by identifyingit with "dependentco-
arising"(pratitya-samutpada): "Sincethingsarisedependently... they arewithoutessence of
their own; as they are withoutessence, they are void (i.e., devoid of the thing itself), and
hence emptyof 'own-being'" (Hajime1987,p. 230). Nagarjuna'sinterpretation of dependent
co-arisingis very similarto MaynardandWilson's(1980) "reflexivedetermination."Accord-
ing to the conceptof reflexivedetermination, a thing is what it is only in the contextof the
otherpartsof the whole contextin which it appears(Maynardand Wilson 1980, p. 293). T.
R. V. Murti(1955, pp. 137-138)explainsNagarjuna'sinterpretation of dependentco-arising
in a very similarway: "Anyfact of experienceis not a thingin itself;it is whatit is in relation
to otherentities,andthese in turndependon others .... Thereis no whole apartfromthe parts
and vice versa. Thingsthatderivetheirbeing andnatureby mutualdependencearenothingin

themselves;they are not real." Understanding emptinessinvolves an appreciationof the mu-
tual dependenceof or reflexiveconnectionsbetweenany phenomenonand its contextand the
ability to perceive "truereality"or "suchness"(tathata),in otherwords, realityjust as it is
withoutthe dualityimposedby conceptualcategories(Hajime1987, p. 223).
Being "radicallyreflexive"(Pollner1991),the sunyatadoctrinerecognizesitself, as well as
every otherBuddhistdoctrine,as a relativeconstructionand,therefore,as incapableof captur-
ing "ultimatetruth,"or emptiness(G6mez 1987, pp. 79-80). Instead,emptinesscan only be
"directlyrealized"or experienced,and this experiencecomes with the practiceof Buddhist
meditation.Forexample,Zen Buddhistsconsider"sittingmeditation"(zazen)the only neces-
sary practicefor directlyrealizing"ultimatetruth";sunyataphilosophyis only considered
valuable to the extent that it is useful as a complementto a student'smeditationpractice
(Kapleau1965, p. 30). By studyingsunyataphilosophystudentsmay learnto abandontheir
dogmaticreifiedviews of the world thatpreventthe perceptionof the world as a constantly
changingwhole. Mumon(1183-1260) statesthatwhen one directlyrealizes emptiness,"you
will be able to slay the Buddhashouldyou meet him anddispatchall patriarchs[Zenmasters]
you encounter"(Kapleau1965, p. 76), in otherwords,to dereifyall Buddhistdoctrines,in-
cludingsunyataphilosophyitself (Kapleau1965, pp. 85-86).
In this way, Buddhist theory can be translatedinto sociological terms. According to
MahayanaBuddhism,the consciousnessof the normallysocializedindividualis an alienated
consciousness(Bell 1979, p. 59) in which the individualprojectslinguisticdistinctionsand
commonsensecategoriesonto reality(Watts1957, pp. 40-42) and then reifies them. Becom-
ing enlightenedinvolves, at least in part,dereifyingperceptionof all phenomena. Further-
more, the enlightenedindividualstill uses abstractions(or objectifications)in everydaylife
but does so withoutreifyingthem. NakamuraHajime(1987, p. 223), a scholarof Buddhism,
summarizesthe conceptof emptiness:
Theultimate truthof existenceis comprehended by theterm"emptiness" oneof

(sunyata),
thesubtlestandmostsophisticated in thephilosophical
concepts armory of MahayanaBud-
dhism.Understanding sunyata entailstheawareness thatall thingsrelyfortheir
existence
on causal factorsand as such are devoid of any permanent"own-being"(svabhava). The
purely relativeexistence of all dharmas[phenomena]taughtby this doctrineentails the
realizationthatthe thingsof this world,the self (atman)included,are merelythe reifica-
tionsof conceptual
andlinguisticdistinctions influenceof
formedunderthe productive
fundamentalignorance(avidya). Insofaras thingsof this worldderivetheirrealitysolely
froma nexusof causalconditions
(pratitya-samutpada), whattheyall share,is
theirnature,
a
precisely "lack"of self-nature.
In the following sections,a phenomenologicaldescriptionof the experienceof Zen meditation

will be offered in an attemptto describeemptinessand thus dereifyingperceptionas it is
experiencedin Zen Buddhism.
The Phenomenology of Zen Meditation
The central practice of Zen Buddhism is "sitting meditation"(zazen). According to

Yasutani-roshi,all Buddhistdoctrine,scriptures,andphilosophyareno morethanintellectual
formalizationsof zazen; or rather,zazen is their practicaldemonstration(Kapleau1965, p.
QUARTERLY
30). Sitting meditationinvolves maintaininga particularbodily and mentalposture. The

preferredbodily postureis the full-lotusin whichthe meditatorplaces the rightfoot over the
left thigh andthe left foot overthe rightthighandmaintainsan erectspine. Inzazenthe hands
areplacedin the lap in a specificposition:the righthandis placedin the lappalm-upward,the
left handis placedin the palmof the righthand,also palm-upward, andthe tips of the thumbs
lightly touch formingan oval. Finally,the eyes are kept half-openand directeddownward,
but unfocused.
The mentalpostureinvolvedin sittingmeditationis thatof concentration.One's attention
may be focused on an object,such as one's breathingor on a koan,or it may be concentrated
withoutfocusing on an object, as in "justsitting"(shikan-taza).One of the more intriguing
forms of sittingmeditationis meditationon a koan. A koan is a kind of riddle,for example,
Whatwastheappearance of yourfacebeforeyourancestors
wereborn?
Whatis the soundof onehandclapping?
A monkin all seriousness
askedJoshu,"Hasa dogBuddha-natureor not?"
Joshuretorted,
"Mu!"
Koans serve both as meditationobjectsfor the studentand as testingdevices with which the
teacherevaluatesthe student'sprogressin Zen training.The latterfunctionwill be discussed
in a subsequentsection. In the followingquotation,Yasutani-roshiinstructsa studenton how
to meditateon the koan "Mu!"(quotedin Kapleau1965, p. 142):
Firstrepeattheword"Mu,"notaudiblybutin yourmind.Concentrate on becomingone

withit. Do notthinkof its meaning.I repeat:
justconcentrate onbecom-
wholeheartedly
ingonewithMu. Atfirstyoureffortswillbe mechanical,butthisis unavoidable.
Gradu-
ally,however,all of youwill becomeinvolved.
Through sitting meditation, the Zen Buddhist develops "one-pointedconcentration"

(samadhi) or "no-mind"(mushin). While such mental abilities can greatly enhance one's
ability to performall kinds of activities(Suzuki 1959, p. 114) (e.g., the Japanesesamurai
practicedZen meditationto improvetheirsword-fighting), the mainpurposeof practicingZen
meditationfor the Buddhistis to attainsatori-awakeningor enlightenment.Literally,satori
means "seeing into your truenature"and at the same time seeing into the true natureof the
universe. Accordingto Yasutani-roshi(Kapleau1965, pp. 143-144),satori is attainedwhen
the meditator's"I-concept"is completelydispelledfromconsciousness,and he or she exper-
iences the universeandhis or her self as a nondualisticwhole. Satoriis the director experien-
tial graspingof sunyata(Yasutani-roshiin Kapleau1965, p. 79).
The social phenomenologyof AlfredSchutzcanbe used to defineZen meditationsociolog-
ically as a realitywith distinctivecharacteristics.In his essay, "OnMultipleRealities"(1962),
Schutz states that we experiencemany realitiesincludingthe worlds of daily life, dreams,
daydreams,imageries and phantasms,art, religious experience, scientific contemplation,
child's play, and even psychoticepisodes. Eachof these constitutesa distinctive"finiteprov-
ince of meaning"or a set of experiencesthatsharea specificcognitivestyle andare internally
coherentand consistentwith othersin the set (Schutz 1962, p. 230). AlthoughSchutzmen-
tions religiousmeditationas an exampleof a finiteprovinceof meaning,he does not describe
it. This was mere economyor oversight,for using Schutz'sphenomenologyit is possible to

describeand analyzethe realityof meditationin Zen Buddhism.To this end, it will be useful
to review severalbasic concepts:conductandaction,experienceandmeaning,performingand
working,the naturalattitude,and the problemof enclaves.
"Conduct,"in Schutz's phenomenology,is meaningfulbehaviorthat involves no fore-
thought. "Action,"on the other hand, is meaningfulbehaviorthat is guided by a plan or
projectconceivedpriorto performance.Schutzsays thatwhen the plan appearsin conscious-
ness, it appearsin the futureperfecttense,thatis, it appearsas an alreadycompletedaction.11
Anotherpairof Schutzianconceptsis "experience"and"meaning."Experienceconsists of
two kinds of phenomena:"lived experience"(Husserl'sErlebnis)or "pureduration"(Berg-
son's duree ) on the one hand,and reflectivethoughton the other. Duree is a prereflective
state in which the world is in flux and there are no discreteobjects. Schutz (1932, p. 45)
writes:
In "pureduration" no mutualexternality
thereis no "side-by-sideness," of parts,andno
butonlya continuous
divisibility, flux,a streamof consciousstates.However,the term
"conscious states"is misleading,as it remindsoneof thephenomena of thespatialworld
withits fixedentities,suchas images,percepts,andphysicalobjects.Whatwe, in fact,
experience in duration buta constant
is nota beingthatis discreteandwell-defined transi-
tionfroma now-thusto a newnow-thus.Thestreamof consciousness by its verynature
hasnotyet beencaughtup in thenetof reflection.
Accordingto Schutz,only by stoppingandreflectingon the streamof duree can the ego lift a
particularexperienceout of thatflow and discriminateit fromthe rest of experience(Schutz
1932, p. 45). Reflection(or objectificationin the termsof Bergeret al.) is a necessarycondi-
tion for the constitutionof meaningfulexperience. Schutz(1932, p. 52) explains:
Becausetheconceptof meaningful experience alwayspresupposes of

thattheexperience
is a discreteone,it nowbecomesquiteclearthatonlya past
whichmeaningis predicated
canbe calledmeaningful,
experience thatis, onethatis presentto theretrospective
glance
as alreadyfinishedand done with.
Thus, all subjectivemeaning,includingthe spatio-temporal world,is constitutedin retrospect

throughreflection,ratherthanin the presentmomentof lived experience(Erlebnisor durde).
Both conduct and action are meaningfulin that they can be graspedby the retrospective
reflective glance as connectedwith the rest of one's experiences. Conduct-in-progress be-
comes meaningfulto the individualwhen the duree is suspended. Action has the further
featureof being graspedor at least adumbratedbefore the act is performed;but action too
involves a durnethat becomesmeaningfulupon completionof the act.
Schutz's descriptionof experiencecoincideswith that of Zen Buddhism. For both, there
are two fundamentaltypes of experience-nonreflectiveand reflective. In Zen, nonreflective
experience,which is referredto as suchness"(tathata)or as "direct"or "living"experience,is
consideredthe experienceof realityas it trulyis, while reflectiveexperienceis consideredan
experienceof illusions (maya) constructedby one's intellect using languageand common-
sense knowledge. D. T. Suzuki (1949, p. 299) illustratesthe importanceof this distinction
betweennonreflective,living experienceand reflectiveexperience:
QUARTERLY
In fact,the truthof Zenis the truthof life, andlife meansto live, to move,to act,not
merelyto reflect.Is it notthemostnatural thingin theworldforZen,therefore, thatits
development shouldbe towardsactingorratherlivingits truthinsteadof demonstrating or
it in words;thatis to say,withideas?
illustrating
Because, as Schutzalso points out, all meaningis attachedto nonreflectiveexperienceretro-

spectively,all meaningis relative. The "ultimatetruth"thatZen practitionersseek, therefore,
is not intellectualbut experientialor direct. Hence,the intellectualrenderingof this "ultimate
truth,""emptiness"(sunyata),is negative,specifyingonly that it is devoid of perceptualdis-
criminationsand intellectualdistinctions.
Just as "ultimatetruth"is referredto negativelyas emptiness,the mentalstatethatleads to
the apprehensionof ultimatetruthis referredto negativelyas "no-mind"(mushin). No-mind
is a form of durge. In both duredeand no-mind,one lives in the presentmomentor, rather,
does not stop to reflecton the past (recollection)or on the future(anticipation)(Schutz 1932,
pp. 49, 57; Suzuki 1959, p. 117). Both duree and no-mind are describedas a "flowing
stream"that is not interruptedby reflection(Schutz 1932, p. 45; Suzuki 1959, p. 111). In
addition,the nonreflectivestate of duree andno-mindare characterizedby the completeab-
sence of self-consciousness(Schutz 1962, p. 216; Suzuki 1959, p. 147), a phenomenonthat
Buddhiststake as evidenceof the illusorynatureof the self (anatman).
However, in additionto being a state of durke,no-mind consists of a second element:
concentration(samadhi)(Suzuki1959,p. 183);therefore,not all statesof dureeareequivalent
to the meditativestate of no-mind. For instance,when the nonreflectivemind jumps from
present activity to daydreamsto bodily sensations,it is in variousstates of durke,but not
concentration.Whenthe nonreflectivemindexclusivelyfocuses on the presentactivity,there
exists a state of concentrationand, therefore,the meditativestate of no-mind. For Schutz,
there are two types of duree that constituteconcentration:performingand working. Both
performingand workingare forms of action in which the self "lives within its acts and its
attentionis exclusivelydirectedto carryingits projectinto effect, executingits plan"(Schutz
1962, p. 213, emphasisadded). In otherwords,when performingor working,the self "lives
within its acts"and is, therefore,in a stateof durde. Furthermore, the actoris not distracted
from the task of accomplishingthe presentactivity. The differencebetweenperformingand
working is that the formeris mentalaction, such as solving an abstractproblem,while the
latteris physicalactionwhich gearsinto the outerworldand bringsaboutthe projectedstate
of affairsby bodily movements(Schutz 1962, pp. 211-212).
Because no-mindis a workingstate,it is relatedto whatSchutzcalls the "naturalattitude."
The naturalattitudeis the mentalattitudethatdominatesthe worldof daily life, to which we
invariablyreturnfromthe experienceof otherrealities. First,the prevalentformof spontane-
ity of the naturalattitudeis working(Schutz 1962, p. 212). Second,the naturalattitudeis
characterizedby "wide-awakeness," in otherwords,a statein whichthe self is fully interested
in life. Schutz says that only the performing,and especiallythe working,self is fully inter-
ested in life andthusmostwide-awake(Schutz1962,p. 213).12 Finally,the naturalattitudeis
characterizedby a specificformof experiencingone's self In the naturalattitude,one exper-
iences one's self as a workingself, "anundividedtotal self" (Schutz 1962, p. 216). Schutz
says thatthe "workingself" is equivalentto James'sandMead's"I,"which"getsinto experi-
ence only afterit has carriedout the act and thus appearsexperientiallyas a partof the Me,
that is, the Me appearsin our experiencein memory"(Schutz 1962, p. 216). Thus, the self
that is perceivedby the individualis a constructionof the reflectivemind and not an element
of durdeor of living experience.
Because no-mindis a workingstate and workingis characteristicof the naturalattitudeof
daily life, no-mindis also an integralpartof daily life. But there is one importantway in
which no-mind differs from the naturalattitudeas it is experiencedby most people. This
difference can be seen in what Schutz refers to as the "problemof enclaves." Although
nonreflectiveworkingis "prevalent"withinthe naturalattitude,Schutzrecognizesthat daily
life is by no meanspurelynonreflective.He admitsthata regionbelongingto one provinceof
meaningmay be enclosed by another:
If we "sitdown"in a majorcrisisof ourlifeandconsideragainandagainourproblems, if

we draft,reject,redraftprojectsandplansbeforemakingup ourmind,if as fatherswe
meditateuponpedagogical questionsor as politiciansuponpublicopinion-in all these
situationswe indulgein theoretical
contemplation in thewidersenseof thisterm.Butall
thiscontemplativethinkingis performed forpractical andends,andforthisvery
purposes
reasonit constitutes
an"enclave" of theoretical
contemplation withintheworldof working
ratherthana finiteprovinceof meaning. (Schutz1962,p. 245)
Theoreticalenclavesoccurringin the midstof workingactivitiesare distinguishedfromtheo-

retical contemplationproperthat does not serve any immediatepracticalpurpose, such as
scientificor philosophicaltheorizing,and thatthereforeconstitute"finiteprovincesof mean-
ing" (Schutz 1962, p. 245).
While enclavespose an analyticproblemfor Schutz,they pose a practicalproblemfor Zen
practitioners.Enclaves are distractionsthat interruptthe continuousflowing of no-mind.
Thus,the differencebetweenthe meditativestateof no-mindand the naturalattitudeof daily
life as it is experiencedby most people is thatin the formerone's consciousnessis emptyof
all distraction,includingunnecessaryenclaves of reflection,such as self-consciousnessor
daydreaming,while in the latterone's consciousnessmay be clutteredwith unnecessaryen-
claves. Therefore,the meditativestateof no-mindconstitutesa pure form of the naturalatti-
tude, in other words, one that is free of enclaves of reflective thought. This finding is
supportedby the Zen assertionthatthe mentalstateinvolvedin meditation,no-mind,and the
fruit of meditation,satori-awakening,are the same as "the everyday mind" (heijo-shin)
(Suzuki 1959, p. 147; 1949, p. 264). If the meditativestate of no-mind in Zen Buddhism
involves a pure naturalattitude,this tells us somethingof what the mystical experience
(satori) is like in Zen Buddhismandperhapsotherreligions. Satoriis not entirelyforeignto
anyone;it is not qualitativelydifferentfromeverydayexperience,only quantitativelydifferent
in that it is more unifiedbecause it containsfewer distractions.
The usefulnessof Schutz'sphenomenologyis in enablingus to defineZen meditationsoci-
ologically, as a finiteprovinceof meaningwith distinctivecharacteristics.The variousforms
of "sittingmeditation"(zazen) in Zen Buddhismare comprisedof uninterrupted performing
and working.13Zazenis performingin thatit requiresmentalaction,in otherwords,concen-
tratingon one's breathing,holdinga mentalobject such as a koan, or maintainingalertness.
But sitting meditationis also workingin that it requiresthe bodily action of maintaininga
precise bodily posture. Finally, when a competentmeditatorsuccessfully practicessitting
meditation,the meditator'sconsciousnessis emptyof all enclavesof reflection. The medita-
tor experiencesfocused duree and, therefore,has no awarenessof the passage of time, of
QUARTERLY
discretementalor physicalobjects(except for the meditationobject if it is used), or of any

self that is separatefromthe rest of the world. By meditating,the practitionerexperiencesa
mode of realitythatis emptyof all social constructionsandthatthus helps dereifyany of his
or her fixed conceptionsof reality.
OF THEDEREIFYING
DEMONSTRATION PERSPECTIVE
Zen practitionersdemonstratetheir understandingof "emptiness"(sunyata),and thus their
dereifyingperspective,to each otherin face-to-faceinteractionby using particularmethods.
These methodscan be foundin the Zen literature,which aboundswith the "recordedsayings"
(yDi-lu),the actualutterancesand actions,of Zen mastersthroughoutthe centuries.14Most of
these records consist of "questions-and-answers" (mondos)between Zen mastersand their
students. It is these recorded sayings,ratherthan Mahayanascriptures(sutras)or commenta-
ries (sastras), "that later followers of the school have looked to when they soughtto under-
standand recapturethe living spirit of Ch'an [Zen]"(Watson1993, p. ix). Furthermore, the
interactionalmethodsfor demonstrating one's dereifyingperspectiveplay important in
an role
the Zen practiceof koan trainingtoday.
The PracticalMethods of Zen Instruction

Suzuki(1949, pp. 267-313) analyzedmanyrecordedmondosand identifiedseveral"practi-
cal methodsof Zen instruction"that the mastersuse to demonstratetheir understandingof
emptinessand to help their studentsdevelop such an understanding.Suzuki divides these
"practicalmethods"into two generalcategories:verbalmethodsand direct methods. Verbal
methodsincludeparadox,going beyond opposites,contradiction,affirmation,repetition,ex-
clamation,silence, and counterquestioning.Directmethodsconsist of bodily actionssuch as
gesture, striking,performanceof a definiteset of acts, and directingothersto move about.
Suzukidoes not claim to have identifiedall of the "practicalmethods"thatZen mastershave
used or could use; he simplyidentifiesseveralmethodsthatare commonin the Zen literature.
Of Suzuki's "practicalmethods,"affirmations,exclamations,gestures, and strikingsare
similarin thatthey are all responsesto questionsthat,fromthe perspectiveof commonsense
reasoning,do not appearto constitute"answers."For example, affirmations,accordingto
Suzuki, are positive statements,in contrastto contradictionsor negations,producedin re-
sponse to a question,but which are not relevantto the meaning-contentof the question.
Suzuki (1949, pp. 283-284) gives the following examplesin which the second speakerre-
sponds with an affirmation:
(1) Monk:I readin the Sutrathatall thingsreturnto theOne,butwheredoesthisOne

returnto?
Joshu:WhenI wasin theprovinceof TsingI hada robemadewhichweighedseven
chin.
(2) (MasterBasoDoichiwassick)
Disciple:Howdo youfeel today?
Baso: Sun-faced Buddha,moon-faced Buddha!
(3) Monk:Whenthebodycrumbles to thedust,thereeternally
all to piecesandreturns
abidesone thing.Of thisI havebeentold,butwheredoesthisonethingabide?
Joshu:It is windyagainthismorning.
Another verbal method, exclamation, entails producing an exclamatory utterance that may
be a word, nonsense word, or shout in response to a question, ratherthan giving an intelligible
answer. The Chinese Zen master Lin-chi (Rinzai) (d. 866 C.E.) was famous for responding to
questions by exclaiming "Kwatz!" which has no literal meaning. In the following examples,
Lin-chi's "Kwatz!" is simply translated as "a shout":
(4) A monk asked,"Whatis the basic meaningof Buddhism?"

The Master[Lin-chi]gave a shout.
The monk bowed low.
The Mastersaid, "Thisfine monk is the kind who's worthtalkingto!"
(Watson1993, p. 9)
(5) Anothermonk asked,"Whatis the basic meaningof Buddhism?"
The Master[Lin-chi]gave a shout.
The monk bowed low.
The Mastersaid, "Do you thinkthatwas a shoutof approval?"
The monk said, "Thecountrysidethieves have been thoroughlytrounced!"
The Mastersaid, "Whatwas theirfault?"
The monk said, "A second offense is not permitted!"
The Mastergave a shout.(Watson1993, p. 14)
Zen masters also use nonverbal or "direct"methods that, like the verbal methods discussed
above, appear to have no relevance to the meaning-content of the question. Two of the direct
methods Suzuki identifies are gesture and striking. The examples below are two of gesture,
followed by two of striking:
(6) Monk: How were things beforethe appearanceof the Buddhain the world?
Reiun: (raises his fly whisk)
Monk: How were thingsafter the appearanceof the Buddha?
Reiun: (raiseshis fly whisk) (Suzuki 1949, p. 301)
(7) Monk: One light divides itself into hundredsof thousandsof lights;may I ask where
this one light originates?
Joshu: (throwsoff one shoe withouta remark)(Suzuki 1949, p. 271)
(8) The Master[Lin-chi]asked a monk,"Wheredid you come from?"
The monk gave a shout.
The Masterbowed slightlyand motionedfor him to sit down.
The monk was about to say something,whereuponthe Masterstruckhim a blow.
(Watson1993, p. 84)
(9) A certaindistinguishedmonknamedTing cameto the Master[Lin-chi]for an inter-
view and asked,"Whatis the basic meaningof Buddhism?"
The Mastergot down from his chair, grabbedhold of him and gave him a slap.
Then he let him go.
Ting stood in a daze.
A monk standingnearbysaid, "Mr.Ting, why don't you make a bow?"
As Ting was makinga formalbow, he suddenlyhada greatenlightenment.(Watson
1993, p. 97)
Using ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, the "practical methods of Zen instruc-
tion" identified by Suzuki (1949) can be further analyzed as orderly interactional accomplish-
QUARTERLY
ments with distinctivefeatures. In describingthe interactionalform of some of Suzuki's

"practicalmethods,"it will be informativeto discussfirstthe conversationanalyticnotion of
an "adjacencypair,"a class of widely used conversationalsequences(Schegloff and Sacks
1973). Adjacencypairs are pairedactions that include question-answer,greeting-greeting,
and invitation-acceptance/refusal.Eachpairtype consistsof a firstpairpart(e.g., a question)
and a second pair part(e.g., an answer). Furthermore,adjacencypairsexhibitthe following
features(Schegloff and Sacks 1973, pp. 295-296):
1. twoutterance length,
2. adjacent of component
positioning utterances,
3. differentspeakersproducing eachutterance,
4. relativeorderingof parts,and
5. discriminativerelations.
The following is a "clearcase"of a question-answeradjacencypair (Schegloff 1984, p. 33):
A: Whattimeis it?
B: It's noon.
The sequence consists of (1) two utterancesthat are (2) positionedadjacentlyand are (3)
producedby differentspeakers.Furthermore, (4) the questionprecedesthe answerand (5) the
two pairpartshave discriminativerelationsin thatthe pairtype, question-answer,of whichthe
firstpairpartis a memberis relevantto the selectionof the secondpairpart. In otherwords,
"a basic rule of adjacencypair operationis: given the recognizableproductionof a first pair
part,on its first possible completionits speakershould stop and a next speakershould start
andproducea secondpairpartfromthe pairtype of whichthe firstis recognizablya member"
(Schegloff and Sacks 1973, p. 296).
Returningto Suzuki's(1949) "practicalmethodsof Zen instruction,"the methodsof affir-
mation,exclamation,gesture,and strikingsharemany of the same featuresof the question-
answeradjacencypair. For example,the cases of affirmation(1, 2, and 3) exhibit the first
four featuresof an adjacencypair:(1) two utterancelength,(2) adjacentpositioningof com-
ponentutterances,(3) differentspeakersproducingeachutterance,and(4) relativeorderingof
parts. However,they do not appearto possess the fifth feature-discriminativerelations. In
otherwords, each secondutteranceis a statementthat does not appearto be of the same pair
type (question-answer)as the first utterance.Similarly,each case of exclamation(4 and 5)
exhibitsthe firstfourfeaturesof adjacencypairs;even thoughthe secondpairpartis simply a
shout, ratherthan a statement,it still qualifiesas an "utterance."
Althoughthe direct methodsof gesture(6 and 7) and striking(8 and 9) involve bodily
actions, they are quite similarto the verbalmethodsof affirmationand exclamation. If the
word "utterance"is replacedwith the word "action"in the five featuresof adjacencypairs,
then, like affirmationsand exclamations,gestureand strikingwould exhibitthe firstfour fea-
turesof adjacencypairs,butnot the fifth. Althoughin some types of adjacencypairsa bodily
actionmay be discriminativelyrelatedto a firstutterance(e.g., a wave of the handin a greet-
ing-greeting),the bodily actions involved in the above cases of gestureand strikingdo not
appearto displaydiscriminativerelevancefor the utterancesthey follow--they don't appear

to answerthe questions.
Hence,in the case of each"practicalmethod,"the Zen mastersviolate conventionalconver-
sationalpracticesby deviatingfromthe "basicrule"of adjacencypair operation. That is, in
using affirmation,exclamation,gesture,and striking,Zen mastersfail to producean answerin
the next turnwhen asked a questionby a student.
Althoughcoparticipantsin a conversationtend to follow the "basicrule"of adjacencypair
operation,deviationsare common. JohnHeritage(1984, p. 253) notes that in most cases of
deviation,whenthe selectedspeakerfails to produce,in the next turn,a secondpairpartof the
pairtype of the firstutterance,speakersdisplayan orientationto the normativeaccountability
of the question-answerpair structure.For example, one common class of cases in which
questionsare not followed by answersin the next turnis that in which the selected speaker
proposesignoranceof the substanceof the question. For example(Heritage1984, p. 249):
M: Whathappened at work,at Bullocksthisevening?

P: Well,I don'tknow.
In this case, by proposingignorance("Well,I don't know")the selected speakerdisplaysan

orientationto the question-answerpair structureand acknowledgesthat an answer is due,
despitethe fact thatit cannotbe provided,ratherthansimplyignoringthe question. Another
common class of deviations includes cases like the following (Heritage 1984, p. 251;
Schegloff 1972, p. 78):
A: Areyoucomingtonight?
B: CanI bringa guest?
A: Sure.
B: I'll be there.
In this case, B fails to producean answerto A's questionin the next turn,but B's response
displaysan orientationto the question-answer pairstructureby virtueof the fact that it has an
"analyzablerelatedness"to A's question(Heritage1984,p. 251). Thatis, B's counterquestion
("CanI bringa guest?")can be seen as relevantfor reachingan answerand thus accountably
displays an orientationto the question-answerpair structure.
The Zen masters'"practicalmethods"differfromcases of "proposingignorance"and"ask-
ing analyzablyrelatedcounterquestions" in thatthey do not displayan orientationto the nor-
mative accountabilityof the question-answerpair structure-they do not providean account
for the absenceof the answer. The uniquefeatureof the Zen masters'violationsof conven-
tional conversationalpracticesis not thatthey fail to providean answerin the next turn,but
thatthey do so unaccountably.In this way the Zen masters'practicalmethodsare very simi-
lar to HaroldGarfinkel's"breachingexperiments."Garfinkel(1963, p. 217; 1967, pp. 37-38)
studiedthe basic assumptions,or "background expectancies,"of everydaylife by deliberately
violating them. For example, in orderto breach the "interchangeability
of standpoints,"15
Garfinkel(1963, p. 223) instructedhis students"to entera store,to select a customer,and to
treatthe customeras a clerkwhile giving no recognitionthatthe subjectwas any otherperson
than the experimentertook him to be and without giving any indicationthat the experi-
714 THE SOCIOLOGICALQUARTERLY
Vol. 36/No. 4/1995
menter'streatmentwas anythingotherthan perfectlyreasonableand legitimate." The stu-

dents reportedthatviolatingthis basic assumptionproducedconfusionand angeron the part
of the "subjects."Accordingto Garfinkel,breachingthe backgroundexpectanciesof the atti-
tude of daily life violatespeople's basic sense of social "trust."Both Zen masters'practical
methodsand Garfinkel'sbreachingexperimentscan throwthe unsuspectingstudentor subject
into a momentarystate of senselessness.
If the ethnomethodologicalaim of basing one's analysis on members'analyses is to be
followed, it must be shown thatthe participantsin the interactiontreatthe Zen masters'ac-
tions as unaccountabledeviations.Unfortunately, the cases of affirmationscited above do not
includethe students'responsesto the Zen masters'actions,butthe othersdo. Forexample,in
case 4, the monk displayshis acceptanceof the master'sexclamationas an accountablere-
sponse to his questionby initiatingthe closing of the interactionwith a bow. Note that the
studentgives no indicationthatthe master'sshoutwas not the type of responseprojectedby
his question. The masterthen displayshis agreementwith the monk's interpretationof his
exclamationby stating,"Thisfine monkis the kind who's worthtalkingto!" In case 6, after
the masterraises his fly whisk in responseto the monk's question,the monk asks another
question(to which he receives the same response),displayinghis acceptanceof the master's
gesture as an accountableresponseto his first question. Therefore,because the studentsin
these cases treatthe Zen masters'exclamationand gestureas accountableresponsesto their
questions,thereis no basis in theseparticularinteractionsfor callingthe Zen masters'meth-
ods "unaccountable deviationsfromthe basic rule of adjacencypair operation."Insteadthe
Zen mastersand studentsareusing uniquetypes of adjacencypairs(question-exclamation and
question-gesture), which they make accountable in these specific settings. Of course, Zen
mastersalso use ordinaryquestion-answer adjacencypairson manyoccasions,but when they
respondto questionswith "exclamations" or "gestures,"they signalto the studentthatthey are
expressing "ultimate truth"ratherthan "conventional truth."
To those trainedin Zen Buddhismand Zen interaction,such as the monks and studentsin
the cases cited above,Zen masters'practicalmethodsof instructionaretreatedas accountable
responsesto questions. I wouldspeculate,however,thatto those who areunfamiliarwith Zen
settings,Zen masters'practicalmethodswouldbe treated,at least initially,as "unaccountable
deviationsfromthe basic rule of adjacencypairoperation,"althoughthe datapresentedabove
do not include such cases. Thatis, the questionerswould attemptto repairthe deviationand
pursuethe overdueanswer,or they might take the absenceof an answeras intentionaland,
therefore,as a displayof "rudeness,""disrespect," or some othersuch attitude. By breaching
everyday conversational conventions,Zen masters help facilitatedereifyingperceptionin their
studentsby exposing the constructedor achievednatureof social reality.
KoanTraining
The recordedmondosof Zen mastersthroughoutthe centuriesandthe practicalmethodsof
Zen instructionidentifiedby Suzuki(1949) are importantelementsin the currentZen practice
of koan training. Often mondosthemselvesare used as koans, such as the koan "Mu!"(see
above). After studentsmeditateon a koan in "sittingmeditation"(zazen),they appearbefore
the teacherin eithera privateinterview(dokusan)or a public interview(shosan) to offer a
"solution"to the koan. But in trying to solve the koan, the studentssoon find that every
attemptto interpretthe meaningof the koan fails the test. For example,Joshu's"Mu!"may
be interpretedas a denial of a majorMahayanadoctrine. Mahayanaschools of Buddhism,
includingZen, believe that all sentientbeings possess "Buddha-nature" (tathagata-garbha),

the innatepotentialto attainenlightenment.Joshu'sresponse"Mu!"which literallymeans
"No!"to the question"Has a dog Buddha-nature or not?"appearsto be-a contradictionof
Mahayana doctrine. But such an will neverlead to an acceptable"solu-
analyticinterpretation
tion"to the koan.'6 Instead,studentsareinstructedto "demonstrate" theirunderstanding in a
"direct"or "living"mannerwithoutrelyingon words or ideas. Yasutani-roshiexplainsto a
student(quotedin Kapleau1965, p. 142):
theexpression
Literally, means"no"or"nothing," butthesignificanceof Joshu'sanswer
doesnotlie in theword.Muis theexpression of theliving,functioning,
dynamicBuddha-
nature.Whatyoumustdo is discoverthespiritoressenceof thisMu,notthrough intellec-
tualanalysisbutby searchingintoyourinnermost being. Thenyou mustdemonstrate
beforeme,concretelyandvividly,thatyouunderstand Muas livingtruth,withoutrecourse
to conceptions,theories,or abstractexplanations.Remember, you can'tunderstand Mu
throughordinary cognition;you must graspit directlywith yourwholebeing.
The correctmannerin which to "demonstrate" one's understanding"concretelyand vividly

... without recourse to conceptions,theories, abstractexplanations,"and hence, to solve
or
the koan,is to respondspontaneouslyto the teacher'squestionwithouthesitationand without
any concernfor the rationalityof one's response. Thistype of solutionresemblesthe practical
methodsof Zen instructionidentifiedby Suzuki(1949).
In a conversationanalyticstudy of publicteacher-student interviews(shosan or "Dharma
combat")in a North AmericanZen monastery,RichardButtny and Thomas Isbell (1991)
examine"demonstrations of understanding" in koan training. The teacher'spresentationof
the koan,in theirdata(Buttnyand Isbell 1991, p. 294), is too long to reproducehere,but the
gist of it is this: The teacherreadsa statementby the Zen masterMumonin which he lists all
of the activitiesthatappearto constitutethe whole of Zen practiceandthen says thatthey are
all incorrect. The teacherthen asks, given Mumon'sstatement,"How will you practice?"
Hence,the questionwould appearto commonsense to be impossibleto answerwithoutcom-
pletelyrejectingZen. ButtnyandIsbell(1991, pp. 299-303) firstfoundthat,in the courseof a
teacher-studentinterview,the teacherwill call on the studentto "demonstrate" his or her
understanding.The following encountercontainsa typical case of what Buttny and Isbell
(1991) refer to as a "call for demonstration":
(10) NINTHTEACHER-STUDENT ENCOUNTER

T: ... so how- howto do it
(0.9)
S: In everything in everything
(1.0)
S: If >you'reif you'reone<with:
(7.2)
S: if you'reone withthatmoment
T: Whatis that(.) to be onewiththatmoment
(6.3)
T: Whenyou'rere:ally:be thethingitselfwhatis that?
(4.6)
T: That'semptiness: (1.3)sunyata(0.8)bodyandmindfall away
716 THESOCIOLOGICALQUARTERLY
Vol. 36/No. 4/1995
(1.5)
1-+ T: *So show me emptiness:*(1.0) rightnow
2-+ (5.0)
3-+ T: You'reworkingon therightkoanto findout=-
S: =HAHaha
T: Keepgoing
S: .HhThankyou
The teachercalls on the studentfor a "demonstration" of his understandingof "emptiness"

(sunyata), rather thanfor an intellectual of
interpretation it, when he says, "So show me emp-
tiness rightnow" (arrow1). The teacher'schallengeis followedby a five-secondgap (arrow
2) thatthe teacherinterpretsas an inabilityon the partof the studentto meet the challenge,as
is displayedin the teacher'sstatement,"You'reworkingon the rightkoanto find out"(arrow
3). In none of the cases in ButtnyandIsbell'sdata(1991) does a studentsuccessfully"solve"
the koan.17
The "call for demonstration" is a device thatalso occursin otherdatagiven in The Three
Pillars of Zen by Roshi Philip Kapleau(1965). These data consist of transcriptsof private
student-teacherinterviews(dokusan)that took place in Japanbetween Yasutani-roshiand
Westernstudentswho were beginnersin Zen training. The purposeof severalof the inter-
views was koantraining.In the followinginterview,the teacher(roshi)calls on the studentto
demonstrateunderstanding:
B
(11) STUDENT
STUDENT:
[excitedly]I knowwhatMuis! Thisis Muin one situation[picking
1-*
up theroshi'sbaton].In another thiswouldbe Mu[liftinganother
object].OtherthanthatI don'tknow.
2-* ROSHI: Thatis notbad. If youreallyknewwhatyoumeantby "Idon't
know,"youranswerwouldbe evenbetter.It is obviousthatyouwill
thinkof yourselfas an entitystanding
apartfromotherentities.
[Portionomittedin whichRoshireviewssomepointsfroma morning
lectureon Self-realization.]
ROSHI: Youmustlet go of logicalreasoning andgrasptherealthing!
STUDENT:
I cando that-yes, I can!
3-+ ROSHI: Verywell,tellme at oncewhatthesize of theRealYouis!
STUDENT:[pausing]Well... it dependson thecircumstances.In one situation
I maybe onething;in another, else.
something
ROSHI: Hadyourealizedthetruth,youcouldhavegivena concreteanswer
4-+ instantaneously.WhenI reachoutwithbotharmsthisway
howfardo theyextend?Answerat once!
[demonstrating],
STUDENT:[pausing]I don'tknow.All I knowis thatsometimes I feel I amthis
stickandsometimes I feel I amsomething
else--I'm notsurewhat.
ROSHI: Youarealmostthere.Don'tbecomelax now--doyourutmost!
(Kapleau1965, pp. 112-113)
The interviewcommenceswhen the studententersthe teacher'schambersand announces,"I

know what Mu is!" (arrow1). The studentthen employs"directmethods"similarto those
examinedabove (6 and 7) by pickingup the teacher'sbatonand lifting anotherobject as his
response to the question,"Whatis Mu?" The teachergives a weak approvalof student's
solutionbut then calls for anotherdemonstration

at arrow3, "Tellme at once whatthe size of
the Real You is!" In response,the studentpauses and then gives an analyticalanswer. The
teacherevaluatesthis answernegatively,saying that if he had really "realizedthe truth"he
could have given a "concrete"and"instantaneous" answer. Againat arrow4 the teachercalls
on the studentto demonstratehis understandingby asking,"WhenI reachout with both arms
this way, how far do they extend?" The studentresponds,"I don't know."
In anotherinterviewfrom Kapleau'sdata,the roshi producesa "call for demonstration":
(12) STUDENTJ
STUDENT:Mykoanis "WhoamI?"
1-+ ROSHI: [sharply] Whoareyou?
STUDENT:[Noanswer.]
2-+ ROSHI: Whoareyou!
STUDENT:[pausing] I don'tknow....
[Portionomitted.]
ROSHI: Whenyoucometo thesuddeninnerrealization of yourTrue-nature,
you will be ableto respondinstantlywithoutreflection.
3-+ Whatis this[suddenly strikingtatamimatwithbaton]?
STUDENT:[Noanswer.]
ROSHI: Probefurther!Yourmindis almostripe.(Kapleau1965,p. 153)
of understanding
At arrows1, 2, and 3, the teachercalls for a demonstration on the partof the
studentwith the questions,"Whoareyou?"and"Whatis this?" The studentis unableto give
a satisfactoryanswerto any of the teacher'scalls for demonstration.
On anotheroccasion,the teacheragaincalls for a demonstrationfromthe same student:
(13) STUDENTJ
STUDENT:My eyesarestrange.Theyfeel as thoughtheyarelookingnot
butinward,asking,"WhoamI?"
outward
ROSHI: Excellent!
[Suddenly]WhoareYou?
STUDENT:[Noanswer](Kapleau1965, p. 156)
Again the studentis unableto give a satisfactoryanswerto the teacher'scall for demonstra-
tion, "Whoare You?"
Althoughneitherin Buttnyand Isbell's (1991) nor in Kapleau's(1965) dataaretherecases
of a studentsatisfyinga teacher's"callto demonstration"and"solving"a koan,in both sets of
data the teachersinstructthe studentson how to do so. Accordingto these teachers,the
appropriateway for studentsto "demonstrate" theirunderstandingof a koan is to employ, in
an originaland spontaneousmanner,methodsthatcorrespondto the practicalmethodsof Zen
instructionidentifiedby Suzuki(1949). In the following encounterfromKapleau's(1965, p.
121) data,the teacherinstructsthe studenton how to answera koan:
(14) STUDENT
C
Vol. 36/No. 4/1995
l+ ROSHI: WhenI askstudents to showme Musomeseizemybaton,others

holdup a finger,stillothersembrace me,likethis[embracing
student].
STUDENT:I knowall that,butif I didit, it wouldbe premeditated,
not
spontaneous.
ROSHI: Thatis trueof course.Whenyouactuallyexperience Muyou will
2- be ableto respondspontaneously. Butyoumuststopreasoningand
justengrossyourselfin Mu.
In this interview,the roshiinstructsthe studentthatvariousbodily actions,or directmethods,

(arrow1) areappropriate responsesto a "callfor demonstration."Furthermore, he informsthe
studentthatwhen he has experiencedMu, he will be able to respondspontaneously(arrow2).
Yasutani-roshiidentifiesthe spontaneityof the responseas a featureof an appropriate"solu-
tion" to a koan. In earliertranscripts,Yasutani-roshitells one studentthatwhen he has real-
ized the truth,he will be able to respond"instantaneously" (11) and anotherstudentthat he
"will be able to respondinstantlywithoutreflection"(12). By requiringan instantaneous
response, the teacher prevents students from reflecting on the situation and using their
intellects.
Buttnyand Isbell's (1991) dataalso containcases in whichthe teacherinstructsstudentson
how to give an appropriate answerto the koan. Buttnyand Isbell foundthatnot only did the
teachercall on studentsfor a demonstrationof their understanding, but that sometimesstu-
dentscalled on the teacherfor a demonstration of his understanding.The following arethree
cases of a teacher'sresponseto a student's"call for demonstration":
(15) SIXTHTEACHER-STUDENT ENCOUNTER

S: Shosanshi
showme thisdon'tknowmind
(3.5)
T: Huhsunri:ses:(1.1)in theeastsetsin thewe:st
(16) THIRD TEACHER-STUDENT ENCOUNTER
S: If the buddha(1.0)banged thedoor(1.1)or on thefloor(1.5)or on the
on
wall:sduringtheservice(2.0)wouldya turnhimaway:?(0.9)if he refusedto
observetheruleof silence?(1.0)or wouldya hithimovertheheadwiththe
rulebook(1.6)or what
(1.3)
T: ((slaps floor four times loudly))
S: ((leaves))
(17) FIFTHTEACHER-STUDENT ENCOUNTER
S: How'syourpract-((clearsthroat))
how'syourpracticeprogressing
Dido
(1.3)
T: Ahh::URGH::MMMM::nn::
HAAaa::
(2.8)
S: Can'tseemto get anywhere?
(4.9)
T: *Doyouundersta:nd?*
(1.5)
S: *No*
By respondingto the students'calls for demonstration, the teachermodels acceptable"solu-

tions"to the koan. In the first demonstration(15), the teacherappearsto use the methodof
affirmation,by respondingto the student'scall withthe irrelevantstatement,"Huhsun rises in
the east sets in the west." In the next demonstration (16), the teacheruses a directmethodby
responding to the call with a bodily action,slapping floor fourtimes. Finally,in the third
the
demonstration(17), the teacher'sresponse,"Ahh::URGH::MMMM::nn::HAAaa::,"looks
very similarto what Suzuki(1949) calls "exclamation."
To summarize,the "practicalmethodsof Zen instruction"areimportantfor the Zen practice
of koan training. Zen mastersuse the practicalmethodsto directthe students'attentionto-
wardliving experience,or durge,andawayfromreflectiveexperienceor intellectualthinking.
Suzuki (1949, p. 300) explains:
Theideaof directmethodappealed to bythemastersis to getholdof thisfleetinglife as it

fleesandnotafterit hasflown.Whileit is fleeing,thereis no timeto recallmemoryorto
buildideas.No reasoning availshere.Language maybe used,butthishasbeenassociated
too longwithideation,andhas lost directness or beingby itself. As soonas wordsare
used,theyexpressmeaning,reasoning; theyhaveno directconnection withlife, except
being a echo
faint or of
image something thatis no longerhere. Thisis thereasonwhythe
mastersoftenavoidsuchexpressions or statements as areintelligiblein anylogicalway.
Hence, in Zen, the practicalmethodsare used to demonstrateone's understandingthat "ulti-

mate truth"lies in durde, or living experience,and not in intellectualrepresentationsand
reificationsof reality. In otherwords,these practicalmethodsare used to demonstrateone's
understandingof "emptiness"(sunyata)and one's dereifyingperspective.
CONCLUSION
The goal of this articlehas been to developthe conceptof "dereification" in religionbeyond
Berger's (1967) work and to explain certainaspects of Zen Buddhism. To this end, I have
arguedthat, contrary to Bell (1979), Preston (1988), and Wilson (1984), conversion to Zen
Buddhismis a resocializationprocess characterizedby the acquisitionof dereifyingpercep-
tion. Zen Buddhism,by virtueof the Mahayananotion of "emptiness"(sunyata),containsa
conception of dereificationthat is consistentwith the work of Berger and his colleagues
(1965; 1966; 1967), Maynardand Wilson (1980), Thomason(1982), and Pollner (1991).
Dereificationis the perceptionof the objects of the social world as socially relative and as
dependenton humanperceptionandactivity. In addition,accordingto the conceptof "depen-
dent co-arising"(pratitya-samutpada) and reflexive determination(Maynardand Wilson
1980), the identityof any social object exists only by virtue of its relationshipto the entire
context in which it appears,includingnot only its surroundingsbut also the perceiver. The
perceptionof emptinessanddereifyingperceptionentailthe appreciationof an object'sdepen-
dence on its contextand of realityas a seamlesswhole.
Next, the basis of the Zen practitioner'sdereifyingperspectiveis the experienceof empti-
ness, which is attainedprimarilythroughthe practiceof "sittingmeditation"(zazen). The
meditativestate of "no-mind"(mushin)consists of "living experience,"or duree, which is
empty of reflectiveconsciousnessand, therefore,of spatio-temporalconstructions,of a dis-
creteself or "I,"andof abstractmeaning. In additionto being a stateof durde,the meditative
state is focused on the performanceof mentaland/orbodily actions-what Schutzcalls per-
QUARTERLY
formingand working,respectively. The meditativestateof no-mindandsatori are not other-

worldlybut correspondto a pure formof the naturalattitudeof daily life, one thatis emptyof
enclaves of reflectiveconsciousness.
Finally,Zen practitionersdemonstratetheirunderstanding of emptinessandtheirdereifying
perspectiveto each other in face-to-face througha varietyof "practicalmethods"
interaction
identifiedby Suzuki (1949). These methods consist of distinctiveadjacencypairs that in-
clude, but are not limited to, question-affirmation,question-exclamation, question-gesture,
and question-striking.They enablethe Zen practitionerto demonstratethe understanding that
in
"ultimatetruth"is to be found living experience rather than in linguistic and conceptual
representationsof reality. Adequate"solutions"to koans consist of the spontaneoususe of
these methods.
While earlieraccountsof dereificationin religion (Berger 1967) have remainedat a very
generaltheoreticallevel, I have attemptedto give a moreempiricalaccountof dereificationby
showing(1) thatit correspondsto a conceptused by religiouspractitionersthemselves,empti-
ness, (2) thatit is developedthroughparticularreligiouspractices,meditation,and(3) thatit is
involved in actual forms of religious interaction,koan training. At the same time, I have
attemptedto explainthese aspectsof Zen Buddhism.
Futureresearchshouldlook for evidenceof dereificationin religionsotherthan Zen Bud-
dhism. Researchquestionsmightinclude:Do otherreligionscontainconceptssimilarto reifi-
cationor dereification?Do othertypes of religiousmeditationproducedereifyingperception?
Is dereificationin religionas rareas Bergerasserts? In addition,researchshouldexaminethe
consequencesof a dereifyingperspectivefor a religion'sorganizationalstructure.According
to Berger(1967), in the majorityof religions,reificationfunctionsto stabilizethe authorityof
various social institutions;therefore,religionsthat promotea dereifyingperspectiveshould
have distinctivetypes of authoritystructures.In a similarvein, what motivatesthe members
of dereifyingreligionsto adhereto moralcodes that,afterall, aresociallyrelative? Dereifica-
tion is a subtle and profoundfeature of religion that deserves much more sociological
attention.
NOTES
1. Bergerdevelopedthis theorywith StanleyPullberg(Bergerand Pullberg1965)and Thomas
Luckmann (BergerandLuckmann 1966).Fromhereforward, I willreferto BergerandPullberg (1965),
BergerandLuckmann (1966),andBerger(1967)simplyas "Berger andhis colleagues."
2. Theseauthorsalsouse theterm"deconditioning" interchangeably withdesocialization.
3. Forexample, Franz Alexander (1923) claims thatBuddhist meditation practicescausea reversalof
normalpsychological development and extreme regression to an narcissistic
infantile, state.
4. BecauseBerger and his colleagues (1965,p. 200; 1967, p. 86) define in
reification termsof aliena-
tion,the terms "dealienatingreligion" and "dereifyingreligion" are conceptually equivalent.I chosethe
term"dereifying" so thatI couldtie Berger'sdiscussion of religionto otherconceptions of reification.
5. If "mysticism"is definedintermsof dereification, thentheopposingextreme mightbe"fundamen-
talism," which would be defined as religionthat involves extreme reificationof religiousobjectsand
ideas. Althoughmostmainstream religionsinvolvesomedegreeof reification accordingto Berger
(1967),theterm"fundamentalism" wouldapplyonlyto thosereligionsthatshowthehighestdegreeof
reification,in otherwords,believingin the literalwordof doctrineandbeingextremelyintolerant of
thosewhoholdopposing views of the world. Thus a fundamentalism-mysticism continuum could be
definedin termsof degreesof reification.
6. Thomasonalso offers a Schutzianconceptionof reification,but I do not agree with his definition

becausehe confoundsreificationwith typification(i.e. abstractionor objectification).However,I concur
with his definitionof dereification.
7. ElsewherePollner(1987, pp. 129-132)brieflydescribesZen Buddhismas a "philosophicalcritique
of mundanereason";however,he does not discussthe radicalreflexivityof the Zen Buddhistperspective.
8. Buddhistscholarstend to use the expression"beforethe commonera"(B.C.E.) in place of B.C.
and "of the commonera"(C.E.) in place of "A.D.".
9. The Sanskritterm,sunyata,is pronounced"shoon-yah-tah."
10. My understanding of the conceptof sunyatais largelyinfluencedby ProfessorMinoruKiyotaat
the Universityof Wisconsin-Madison.In his lectures,ProfessorKiyota definessunyataas a principle
that "unfreezesfixed and frozenconcepts"and extremedichotomies.This "unfreezing"is dereification.
11. While Prestonarguesthat Schutz'sphenomenologyis inadequatefor describingZen meditation
becauseit qualifiesneitheras conductnor as action,I thinkthis is an oversimplification.Preston(1988,
pp. 86-87) equates"conduct"and "action"with "passive"and "active"behavior,respectively,asserting
that Zen meditationinvolves a special attitudeof "activepassivity"that he defines as "a posture of
wakefulattentivenessthatis at the same time a nondoing."As a concept,"activepassivity"is not clear.
More importantly,the conceptdoes not precludeZen meditationfrom being "action"in the Schutzian
sense. Furthermore, Prestonclaims thatSchutzfails to accountfor "regulatedimprovisation," which he
defines as "conductthat is perceivedby othersas appropriate,even exemplary,yet not plannedin ad-
vance"(Preston1988, p. 145). Preston's(1988, pp. 86-87) objectionsmay stem froma misunderstand-
ing of what Schutzmeansby actionbeing "plannedin advance."First,althoughaction is guided by a
plan that is formulatedin consciousawareness,this plan does not necessarilyoccupy awarenessduring
the courseof the action. Accordingto Schutz(1932, p. 63; 1962,p. 214), the actorcan continuallybring
the planbackto attentionwhile actingbutmoreoftenthe planis out of awarenesseven while guidingthe
action. Second,regulatedimprovisationis only one segmentof a largeraction. Thatis, althoughZen
meditatorsmay not have plannedout everythingthatthey will do duringa meditationsession, they are
formulatinga plan of actionwhen they decideto go to the meditationhall and to begin a particulartype
of meditation.Meditationis done correctlywhen the plan to meditateis kept out of consciousnessand
concentrationis maintainedthroughoutthe session,but the planis whatsets the activityin motionin the
first place and what gives it continuitythroughout.
12. Again,Prestonobjectsto the use of Schutz'sphenomenologyon the groundsthat,underSchutz's
definition,the meditativestate cannotbe the most "wide-awake,"which contradictsthe experienceof
Zen meditators,since only performingandworking(formsof action)arethe most wide-awake.As stated
above, meditationis action, and thus Preston'sobjectionis unfounded.Meditationis both performing
and working:performingin thatit involvesmaintaininga specificmentalpostureandworkingin thatit
involves maintaininga specific bodily posture.
13. Experiencesof uninterrupted performingor workingandof Zen meditationareequivalentto what
Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi(1975) calls "flow"states. Csikszentmihalyifound that when people are en-
gaged in demandingactivities,they may become so fully absorbedin the activitythat all awarenessof
time, space, and self vanishes. Csikszentmihalyicalls this experienceof absorptionin activity "flow."
Furthermore,Csikszentmihalyifound that "flow"states are "autotelic"or intrinsicallysatisfyingto the
experiencer.Csikszentmihalyi'swork on "flow"stateshas recentlybecomeof interestin the sociology
of religion because of the similaritybetween"flow"states and "religiousexperiences"(see Neitz and
Spickard1990).
14. The statusof these recordedsayings as data is questionablebecause their accuracycannotbe
verifiedandbecausethey have been translatedfromChineseinto Englishor even perhapsfromChinese
into Japaneseinto English. However,becausethese recordshave been used by subsequentZen practi-
tionersup to the presentas models for the correctdemonstrationof emptiness,I believe it will still be
useful to analyzethem. In the next section,I will show the relevanceof these recordsfor some modern
day Zen interactions.
Vol. 36/No. 4/1995
15. The "interchangeability of standpoints"is a basic assumptionof everyday life, identifiedby

Schutz,which can be statedas: "apersontakesfor granted,assumesthatthe otherpersondoes the same,
andassumesthatas he assumesforthe otherthe otherassumesfor him,thatif they wereto changeplaces
so thatthe otherperson'shere-and-nowbecamehis, and his becamethe otherperson's,that the person
would see events in the sametypicalway as does the otherperson,andthe otherpersonwould see them
in the same typical way as he does" (Garfinkel1963, p. 212).
16. Instead of giving an ordinaryanswer, Joshu appearsto be using "contradiction," anotherof
Suzuki's practicalmethodsnot discussedabove, which consists of an unqualifieddenial of an earlier
statementof one's own, of the statementof another,or of a well-establishedfact (Suzuki 1949, p. 279).
17. Thereis one case in which a studentsuccessfullydefendsher answeragainstthe teacher'schal-
lenges (Buttnyand Isbell 1991,pp. 299-300), but it is not clearif this defenseconstitutesa "solution"to
the koan.
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Derfication in Zen Budhism

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Derfication in Zen Budhism

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Dereification in Zen Buddhism

Author(s): Robert J. Moore

Conversionto Zen Buddhismhas distinctivefeaturesthat are not foundin most otherreli-

to RobertJ. Moore,Departmentof Sociology,IndianaUniversity,Bloomington,IN 47405.

The SociologicalQuarterly,Volume 36, Number 4, pages 699-723.

Several sociologists have observedthat conversionto Buddhismand otherEasternspiritual

everythinggainedthroughchildhoodsocializationis lost andthatnothingnew is learned,this

By alienationwe meantheprocessby whichtheunityof theproducing andtheproduct is

Thus, reificationis the objectificationof realityby an alienatedconsciousness.

In TheSacred Canopy,Berger(1967) applieshis social constructionisttheoryto religion.

Hence, while abstractionentailsneglectingthe reflexiverelationsof an objectto its context,

Our"... objectivities... [are]alwayscapable... of being'unfrozen'andbrought backto

Any thing that is perceivedas existing independentlyof the perceivercan be dereifiedby

Thus, insteadof characterizing conversionto Zen Buddhismas "desocialization," this con-

THE MAHAYANACONCEPTOF "EMPTINESS"

Zen Buddhismis a Sino-Japaneseformof MahayanaBuddhism,and it is with the Mahayana

and vice versa. Thingsthatderivetheirbeing andnatureby mutualdependencearenothingin

Theultimate truthof existenceis comprehended by theterm"emptiness" oneof

In the following sections,a phenomenologicaldescriptionof the experienceof Zen meditation

The Phenomenology of Zen Meditation

The central practice of Zen Buddhism is "sitting meditation"(zazen). According to

30). Sitting meditationinvolves maintaininga particularbodily and mentalposture. The

Firstrepeattheword"Mu,"notaudiblybutin yourmind.Concentrate on becomingone

Through sitting meditation, the Zen Buddhist develops "one-pointedconcentration"

it. This was mere economyor oversight,for using Schutz'sphenomenologyit is possible to

Becausetheconceptof meaningful experience alwayspresupposes of

Thus, all subjectivemeaning,includingthe spatio-temporal world,is constitutedin retrospect

Because, as Schutzalso points out, all meaningis attachedto nonreflectiveexperienceretro-

If we "sitdown"in a majorcrisisof ourlifeandconsideragainandagainourproblems, if

Theoreticalenclavesoccurringin the midstof workingactivitiesare distinguishedfromtheo-

discretementalor physicalobjects(except for the meditationobject if it is used), or of any

The PracticalMethods of Zen Instruction

(1) Monk:I readin the Sutrathatall thingsreturnto theOne,butwheredoesthisOne

(4) A monk asked,"Whatis the basic meaningof Buddhism?"

ments with distinctivefeatures. In describingthe interactionalform of some of Suzuki's

The following is a "clearcase"of a question-answeradjacencypair (Schegloff 1984, p. 33):

appearto displaydiscriminativerelevancefor the utterancesthey follow--they don't appear

M: Whathappened at work,at Bullocksthisevening?

In this case, by proposingignorance("Well,I don't know")the selected speakerdisplaysan

menter'streatmentwas anythingotherthan perfectlyreasonableand legitimate." The stu-

includingZen, believe that all sentientbeings possess "Buddha-nature" (tathagata-garbha),

The correctmannerin which to "demonstrate" one's understanding"concretelyand vividly

(10) NINTHTEACHER-STUDENT ENCOUNTER

The teachercalls on the studentfor a "demonstration" of his understandingof "emptiness"

The interviewcommenceswhen the studententersthe teacher'schambersand announces,"I

solutionbut then calls for anotherdemonstration

l+ ROSHI: WhenI askstudents to showme Musomeseizemybaton,others

In this interview,the roshiinstructsthe studentthatvariousbodily actions,or directmethods,

(15) SIXTHTEACHER-STUDENT ENCOUNTER

By respondingto the students'calls for demonstration, the teachermodels acceptable"solu-

Theideaof directmethodappealed to bythemastersis to getholdof thisfleetinglife as it

Hence, in Zen, the practicalmethodsare used to demonstrateone's understandingthat "ulti-

formingand working,respectively. The meditativestateof no-mindandsatori are not other-

6. Thomasonalso offers a Schutzianconceptionof reification,but I do not agree with his definition

15. The "interchangeability of standpoints"is a basic assumptionof everyday life, identifiedby

Pollner,Melvin. 1987. MundaneReason.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

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