093: The Seleucid Empire – The Peace of Apamea

Once again, King Antiochus III suffered the bitter taste of defeat. Following his humiliating evacuation of
Greece, the destruction of his army on the plains of Magnesia meant that he was forced to come to
terms with the victorious Roman Republic. He had taken to Sardis while the Romans looted the
battlefield, and the Scipio brothers received the submission of neighboring cities like Magnesia-ad-
Sipylum. Antiochus and his family retreated to Apamea-in-Phrygia, leaving behind Sardis, Ephesus, and
Magnesia-on-the-Maeander to throw open their doors for the incoming Romans. The official Zeuxis was
sent to Scipio Africanus on the king’s behalf looking to begin the peace talks, to which the commander
agreed, but demanded the immediate payment of 500 silver talents along with 2,500 talents once the
Senate ratified any treaties they struck.1

In early 189, the Senate welcomed the arrival of Scipio’s officers, Antiochus’ embassy, Rhodian
delegates, and King Eumenes himself. The Attalid ruler made the first speech, praising the Roman
commanders for their victories on land, sea, and all the fanfare that went with it. He then emphasized
his loyalty and that of his father Attalus to the Roman cause, citing his accomplishments and the damage
inflicted upon his lands during the war. When the Senators inquired about what Eumenes asked for as a
reward, the king admitted that he would be fine with whatever the Romans had to offer – but he wasn’t
shy about stating that he would not be predisposed to ruling over whatever lands were stripped from
Antiochus’ control.2 Embassies from the Smyrnans and Rhodians followed suit, providing their
recommendations for what ought to be done. Last was the Seleucid mission, who acknowledged their
wrongdoing but asked to forward everything on behalf of the king.

The penalties were initially discussed with Antiochus’ representatives during the immediate aftermath
of Magnesia, but the final treaty was not ratified until the spring of 188. The document – preserved on
bronze tablets – is directly cited by both Polybius and Livy, who list the following terms: Antiochus was
to evacuate all lands north of the Taurus Mountains and west of the Halys River (the modern Kızılırmak),
thus restricting his westernmost territories to Cilicia and the border of Syria. An enormous indemnity of
12,000 talents was to be paid to Rome over a fixed period of 1,000 talents per year, having already paid
an additional 3,000 talents (making it a total of 15,000), along with 540,000 modii of wheat (about
135,000 bushels).3 This was to be accompanied by an indemnity of 70 talents of silver per year for five
years, plus a substitute payment of 127 talents instead of grain, all to be given to Eumenes for a total of
477 additional talents as compensation for the ravaging of his territory. Antiochus was to give up all his
elephants that were stationed in Apamea, along with all his warships outside of ten vessels. No
mercenaries will be recruited from Roman subject territories, and he was unable to wage war in Europe
nor against the islands of the Aegean. Members of the king’s circle responsible for fomenting war,
namely Thoas of Aetolia and Hannibal Barca above all others, were to be handed over. Lastly, twenty
hostages were to be held custody in Rome to ensure the king’s good behavior, including his own son
Prince Mithridates. He was therefore unable to sail past Cape Sarpedon (the modern Göksu Delta)
unless delivering tribute, hostages, or delegates. In return for all of this, Antiochus was to earn the
friendship of Rome for all time.4

1 Polybius, 21.16-17; Livy, 37.44-45; Appian, The Syrian Wars, 38-39

2 Polybius, 21.18-21; Livy, 37.52-53
3 One modii equals approximately ¼ of a bushel.
4 Polybius, 21.42; Livy, 38.38; Appian, The Syrian Wars, 38-39; Diodorus Siculus, 29.10, 29.13

Low Sensitivity
Such were the penalties of the king’s war against Rome. The Roman allies profited immensely: for his
loyalty and service in the war against Antiochus, Philip V of Macedonia was granted an early release
from the indemnities placed upon him in the treaty in the Second Macedonian War. He was also
reunited with his son Demetrius, who was held hostage in Rome.5 The Rhodians kept their autonomy
and secured trading privileges and gained the sizeable territories of Lycia and Caria. 6 Of all of Rome’s
allies, Eumenes would emerge from the conflict with the greatest reward. In addition to the financial
compensation for the attacks on his territory, most of the lands that were abandoned by Antiochus were
to be transferred over to Pergamene control. This more than quintupled the size of Eumenes’ kingdom
to encompass most of western, central, and southern Asia Minor. Of course, this would attract attention
from their neighbors (namely Bithynia and Pontus), but the Attalids were now the most powerful rulers
in the region and would nurture it into a prosperous realm. The Republic claimed no territories for itself,
but the removal of Antiochus from Asia Minor and the strengthening of their longtime allies was able to
secure a long-term peace, no longer troubled by the prospects of a Seleucid western expansion.

However, Rome’s short-term activities in Greece and Asia Minor were not yet over, as another Roman
commission would be organized similar to what they did in Greece following the war with Philip.
Antiochus was no longer directly involved in this process, and so I will dedicate the rest of this episode
to talk about the final part of his career. With the former crown prince Antiochus having died nearly five
years earlier, Seleucus had been designated the new co-ruler as early as April 189. 7 He was also married
to his sister Laodice, the widow to the now-deceased Antiochus. His final surviving son Mithridates was
shipped off to Rome, and we have no evidence that his young wife Euboea played any significant role
after the war. There must have been considerable time devoted to organizing the evacuation of his
garrisons or anyone loyal to the Seleucid crown that owned land in Asia Minor. An Antiochene orator
from the fourth century AD named Libanius states that the king settled many of these refugees in
Antioch to compensate them.8

With the king busy trying to consolidate his now reduced empire, there were other problems to contend
with. The Peace of Apamea had the unintentional side effect of broadcasting the weakening of Seleucid
power to its vassals. One of these was Armenia: Antiochus forced the submission of Xerxes I during his
anabasis in 212 and cemented the relationship with a marriage to his sister Antiochis. 9 Xerxes is said to
have died shortly thereafter, with one very late source accusing Antiochis of poisoning her now-
deceased husband so Antiochus could take it over.10 Strabo tells us that the country was divided
between two figures named Artaxias and Zariadris who are referred to as Antiochus’ generals, though a
final Orontid king known as Orontes IV is attested to in the sources before they seized control. It seems
that both men declared independence after the Apamea conference, taking the title of king. As the
founder of the Artaxiad dynasty, Artaxias took over “Greater” Armenia, while Zariadris formed the
Kingdom of Sophene in the southeast (the northern territory between the Tigris and Euphrates River). 11

5 Appian, The Syrian Wars, 23; Appian, The Macedonian Wars, 14

6 Polybius, 21.45; Livy, 37.56, 38.39.7-17
7 Boiy, T. (2004): 157-158
8 Libanius, Orations, 11.119-120; Grainger, J.D. (2015): 187-188
9 Polybius, 8.23
10 John of Antioch, IV.557
11 Strabo, 11.14.5, 11.14.15; Chahin, M. (2001): 190-194; Marciak, M. (2017): 113-126

Low Sensitivity
In nearby Cappadocia, Ariarathes IV abandoned the alliance with his father-in-law and made a deal with
the Roman Republic, offering to pay 600 talents to compensate for his collusion with the Seleucids. It
turns out that Eumenes was betrothed to his daughter Stratonice, and so he was able to get the penalty
reduced by half on account of the Pergamene king’s good word.12

There were others who are more ambiguous in their responses. In distant Bactria, King Euthydemus I
had since died and was succeeded by his son Demetrius I Soter. Demetrius had been the one to broker
the peace between Antiochus and his father in 206, and was technically promised a Seleucid princess to
wed (though no concrete evidence for this marriage exists). Yet the death of his father meant the Treaty
of Bactra was at an end, and Demetrius was on the verge of conducting his own expedition south of the
Hindu Kush into Arachosia, which would establish the line of the Indo-Greek rulers. Dated between 200-
195, the Kulyab inscription gives Euthydemus the title Basileos Megistos (“Greatest of All Kings”), no
doubt an attempt to outclass Antiochus’ title of Basileos Megas (“Great King”).13 Parthia also recently
had a new ruler named Phriapatius take over in 191, the third of the Arsacid dynasty.14 There is no
explicit evidence of him revolting or undertaking campaigns at this time, but he started to mint coins
that carried the more royal Basileos, replacing the title of Autokrator on earlier strikes.15

Though not stated outright, it is very possible that Antiochus planned another expedition to the east to
combat the growing unrest of his vassal states, for we find him journeying into the Upper Satrapies.16 In
the Babylonian Astronomical Diary documenting the events of 187, Antiochus made a visit to the temple
of Esagil to offer sacrifices in February. We are also told that he was met with the priests and the
governor of Babylon, who presented several gifts like a golden crown and other temple treasures, and
among these goods was a robe purportedly belonging to Nebuchadnezzar II (r. 605-562), the most
famous ruler of the Neo-Babylonian Empire.17 While a hated figure in the Jewish tradition, the
Babylonians revered him as the greatest king of their recent history, and he served as a model for the
Greeks as a conqueror and builder.18 By receiving his royal costume, Antiochus was thus literally and
symbolically presented as the heir of Nebuchadnezzar, much how like Greek and Roman statesmen
would wear the clothing of Alexander in emulation, which would fit his well broadcasted image of being
a world conqueror despite his recent defeats. Such a gift would certainly help massage his wounded
pride, but the offering of precious metals would have been of more practical value given the need for
cash to pay off the Roman indemnity.

Ironically, it would be for want of silver and gold which would cost Antiochus dearly. In the summer of
187, the king and his men traveled into the territory of Elymais, located along the northern coastline of
the Persian Gulf following the Tigris River, the lands of historical Elam in southwest Iran. Elymais was
under Seleucid authority and technically not in rebellion (they had provided troops for the Battle of

12 Polybius, 21.40.4-7, 21.44; Livy, 38.39.5; Strabo, 12.2.11

13 Strabo, 11.11.1; The Kulyab Inscription (SEG 54.1569) is dated between 200-195, and gives Demetrius the title Kallinikos,
“Glorious Victor”, implying military campaigns (initial strikes into Arachosia?). Wallace, S. (2016): 211-213
14 Justin, 41.5.8
15 Ellerbrock, U. (2021): 28; Overtoom, N.L. (2020): 150-153; Priapatus’ reign has been variously dated from 191 to 185, and

even the suggestion that he took the name Arsaces (III), see Assar, G.R.F. (2004): 80-82
16 Grainger, J.D. (2015): 191-192
17 Astronomical Diaries, no. 187, A rev. 10-15; See Madreiter, I. (2016)
18 Berossus F8a, Verbrugghe, G.P. and Wickersham, J.M. (1996): 57-59; Strabo 15.1.6 (citing Megasthenes); Madreiter, I. (2016):

123-129; Haubold, J. (2022): 79-82; Boiy, T. (2004): 156-157

Low Sensitivity
Magnesia), but there existed a temple dedicated to the Mesopotamian god Bel (Ba’al) which was richly
furnished with treasure. Seleucid kings already had a habit of making visits to the temples of local deities
to strip them of their wealth when in need of cash for campaigns – Antiochus himself had done so at
the temple of Anahita of Ecbatana in 211/210 when he seized about 4,000 talents worth of silver to help
pay for the enormous costs of his anabasis.19 3,000 talents had already been paid out to the Romans on
top of his own costs from the war, so cash was undeniably short on supply. Diodorus tells us that the
king accused the Elymaean leaders of revolt, but this was only after he decided to seize the goods inside.
As his men began to pillage the temple, a crowd of angry locals surrounded and attacked the
blasphemers. Antiochus seems not to have taken the bulk of his army into the temple, and during the
melee he was surrounded and slain by the vengeful Elymaeans.20

At the age of 56 years old, King Antiochus III Megas was killed in action after an unprecedented 35 years
on the Seleucid throne, the longest in the dynasty’s entire history. No other Hellenistic monarch since
Seleucus I or even Alexander the Great himself had gone so far and conquered so much. From his
earliest days as king he restored a dynasty on the brink of extinction, put down rebellious satraps from
Anatolia to Afghanistan, and reduced his long-hated Ptolemaic rivals to the status of a second class
power. When confronted with defeats such as at Raphia, he managed to bounce back with relentless
ambition. Even after the death of the crown prince Antiochus, he still had two surviving sons to take the
diadem when he was gone, and multiple daughters that were married off to the leading dynasts. If he
had died in 195 following the end of the Fifth Syrian War, his reputation would have been unparalleled.
Yet his final years on the throne saw major losses that severely affected the Seleucid realm.

The war with Rome was, I have made clear in the previous discussion, was born out of factors both
external and internal, but his final decision to invade Greece was a major tactical blunder. Clearly, he or
his advisors were not keeping abreast of the political situation in Greece to see if the Aetolians were
painting an accurate picture. The choice to head into Greece with only 10,000 men, which is stressed by
the sources as being far too small to conceivably conquer and hold the region, feels like a knee-jerk
reaction rather than a calculated move. It relied too much on the military support of the Aetolians, too
much on his supposed positive reception by the Greeks. If we are to assume he intended it to be a
gesture of goodwill to his Aetolian allies, then he was foolish to think that the Romans would not
retaliate to such an intrusion. Once in the thick of war, his performance was a far cry from the warrior
king that undertook the anabasis. Polybius considered Antiochus to be a “disappointment” in his later
years compared to the energy of his youth.21 There are several points where Antiochus is described as
indecisive, absent minded, or even afraid of having to deal with the likes of Scipio Africanus. Appian
even goes so far as to explain it using divine intervention. 22 The change in attitude is remarkable, and I
cannot help but speculate on whether the sudden death of Prince Antiochus and Queen Laodice in such
a short span of time may have sent the king into a state of depression which he never shook off.

Some have viewed the death of Antiochus as the beginning of the end of the Seleucid dynasty,
financially and militarily hamstrung by the Romans, doomed to wither away from either civil wars or

19 Polybius, 10.27.12-13
20 BM 35603, Rev. 6-7; Diodorus Siculus, 28.3.4-5, 29.15; Strabo, 16.1.18; Justin, 32.2.1-2; Taylor, M.J. (2014): 228-230; Krikona,
E. (2017): 19-22
21 Polybius, 15.37
22 Polybius, 21.13.1-2; Appian, The Syrian Wars, 28-29

Low Sensitivity
invasion. This is a bit of a hyperbole, since they remained quite powerful for a fair amount of time, but it
is worth looking at the state of the empire as it stood in 187. Though the loss of his territory Thrace and
Asia Minor was a major blow, Antiochus’ conquests had greatly expanded the empire and left it larger
than he inherited it. It is estimated that just prior to the Battle of Magnesia, roughly 15,000-20,000
talents of silver were brought into the treasury. Following the loss of the territories in Asia Minor, this
number may have been reduced to 10,000-15,000 talents.23 By any measure this was a massive hit, but
this still was an incredible sum to collect, and the empire was in a far better financial position at the end
of his career than when he started. Coele Syria was now his, and Seleucid authority over the Upper
Satrapies had at least been restored with all pretenders to the throne eliminated. Roman intervention
put the prospects of western expansionism to bed, but they did not infringe upon the king’s right to
wage war in Asia. The treasury would refill in time, new armies would be recruited, and the power of the
Seleucids could be restored to some capacity. Yet as is quite reasonably pointed out by scholar John D.
Grainger:
“[Antiochus’] final failure illustrates all too clearly the fatal weakness of the Seleukid kingdom: it was
large and wealthy, but it depended for its continuance on the life of one man and on constant activity by
the king. The necessary institutions of government were not strong enough to hold it together in the
absence of the king.”24

Before his meeting with the Roman Republic, the unprecedented length of Antiochus’ reign and his
seemingly endless energy allowed the Seleucid realm to become the most powerful state in the
Hellenistic world. With his death though, many of the treaties that he struck were going to be voided –
places like Bactria, Parthia, and Egypt. If they were looking to remain the dominant political force east of
the Mediterranean, then subsequent rulers would have to meet the challenges of empire head-on with
the same vigor and determination. Whether they would be capable of doing so is a question that will be
answered in due time.

23 Aperghis, G.G. (2004): 251-253

24 Grainger, J.D. (2015): 195

Low Sensitivity
 093 References

Primary
Appian – The Macedonian Wars
Appian – The Syrian Wars
Berossus – Babyloniaca
Diodorus Siculus – Library of History
John of Antioch – Fragments
Justin – Epitome
Libanius – Orations
Livy – The History of Rome
Polybius – The Histories
Strabo – Geography

Babylonian Astronomical Diaries

BM 35603 – Babylonian King’s List
SEG (Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum)

Secondary
Aperghis, G.G. (2004) The Seleukid Royal Economy: The Finances and Financial Administration of the Seleukid Empire
Assar, G.R.F. (2004) “Genealogy and Coinage of the Early Parthian Rulers I.”, Parthica, 6, pp. 69-93
Boiy, T. (2004) Late Achaemenid and Hellenistic Babylon
Chahin, M. (2001) The Kingdom of Armenia: a history (second revised edition)
Ellerbrock, U. (2021) The Parthians: The Forgotten Empire
Grainger, J.D. (2015) The Seleukid Empire of Antiochus III, 223-187 BC
Haubold, J. (2022) “Memory and Resistance in the Seleucid World: The Case of Babylon”, Cultures of Resistance in the
Hellenistic East, pgs. 77-94
Krikona, E. (2017) “Plunder of Temples by Seleukid Kings – The Cases Under the Reign of Antiochos III, Seleukos IV, and
Antiochos IV”, Journal of Ancient History and Archaeology, No. 4.1, pp. 19-28
Madreiter, I. (2016) “Antiochos the Great and the Robe of Nebuchadnezzar: Intercultural Transfer between Orientalism and
Hellenocentrism”, Cross-Cultural Studies in Near Eastern History and Literature, pp. 111-136
Marciak, M. (2017) Sophene, Gordyene, and Adiabene: Three Regna Minora of Northern Mesopotamia Between East and West
Overtoom, N.L. (2020) Reign of Arrows: The Rise of the Parthian Empire in the Hellenistic Middle East
Taylor, M.J. (2014) “Sacred Plunder and the Seleucid Near East”, Greece & Rome, Vol. 61, No. 2, pp. 222-241
Wallace, S. (2016) “Greek Culture in Afghanistan and India: Old Evidence and New Discoveries”, Greece & Rome, 63.2, pp. 205-
226

Low Sensitivity