T34D

TEAM CODE: T34D
2023
Before
THE GREATER AVENGERS COURT OF JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
KAROL DENVERS, NATASHA ROMANOFF, and PETER QUILL

(APPLICANTS)
versus
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF WAKANDA

(DEFENDANT)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table Of Contents i
List of Abbreviations iv
Index of Authorities v
Statements of Facts ix
Issues xii
Summary of Arguments xiii
Arguments Advanced 1
ISSUE 1: WHETHER WAKANDA'S ANNEXATION OF DEADPOOL ISLAND AND SUBSEQUENT

REMOVAL OF KAROL DENVERS' REFUGEE STATUS COMPLIES WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW. 1
[1.1] Annexation of Deadpool Island by Wakanda is Lawful. 1
A. Wakanda has historically claimed sovereignty over Deadpool Island 1
i) Deadpool Island was part of Wakanda until unlawfully occupied by Talokan

in 1835 1
ii) Talokan's annexation violated uti possidetis juris principle 2
iii) Wakanda lodged persistent protests and attempts to regain control 3
B. 2020 annexation followed legitimate self-determination process 3
i) Based on recognised remedial secession criteria 3
ii) Any external self-determination allows redrawing boundaries. 4
iii) GA resolution only recommends against it, and is not binding per se. 4
C. Wakanda has established effective control constituting sovereignty. 5
i) Under international law doctrines of prescription and acquiescence. 5
ii) Displaced prior disputed sovereignty claims of Talokan. 5
[1.2] Change in sovereignty removes prior refugee status. 6
A. Refugee status grounds on lack of national protection. 7
i) Requires showing loss/denial of citizenship rights per Article 1. 7
ii) Change in citizenship eliminates lack of state protection. 7
i
iii) Denvers is now protected as Wakandan national under domestic law. 8
B. Becoming Wakandan national negates refugee status. 8
i) Customary international law as reflected in UNHCR guidelines. 8
ii) Doctrine of cessation of refugee status applies under Article 1C. 9
C. Non-refoulement limited to removal from host state. 10
[1.3] Removing Refugee Status Upholds Non-Refoulement Obligations 10
A. No Indirect Risk of Chain Refoulement to Third State 11
i) Now Firmly Under Wakanda's Exclusive Territorial Jurisdiction and Control

11
ii) Protected by National Laws and Constitutional Rights as Wakandan Citizen

11
B. Exclusion Due to Security Risk Under Article 1F Overrides Any Non-

Refoulement Claims 12
C. Removing from Deadpool Island Consistent with Non-Refoulement Obligations

12
i) Sole Risk is Lawful Domestic Prosecution as Wakandan Citizen 12
ii) No Need to Indefinitely Protect Prior, Superseded Refugee Status 12
ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE REFUGEE APPLICATION OF COMMANDER NATASHA ROMANOFF BE

EXCLUDED AND WHETHER SHE SHOULD AT LEAST ENJOY THE PROTECTION OF NON-
REFOULEMENT? 13
[2.1] The extradition to Chitauria would be in line with established international norms
13
A. There is a well-defined basis that justifies the application of universal

jurisdiction in the present case 13
B. The definition of Ecocide has a precise articulation of the offense and its
essential components 15
[2.2] The proposed extradition of Commander Natasha Romanoff to Sokovia would not
constitute a violation of established norms of international law 16
ii
A. Alleged crime does not come under the definition of Political offence and thus
will not constitute a violation of Political offence exception 16
B. Natasha Romanoff is not a refugee under the 1951 convention 17
[2.3] The allegations of war crimes asserted by Wakanda against Commander Natasha
Romanoff are well founded and reasonable 18
A. Wakanda has the locus standi to prosecute Natasha Romanoff 18
i) Wakanda has the jurisdictional competence to prosecute Ms Romanoff 18
ii) Wakanda has an obligation to prosecute Natasha Romanoff under

international law- either to prosecute or extradite to Chitauria 18
B. Natasha has committed war crimes as envisaged under the Geneva Convention
and the Rome Statute 19
i) Natasha Romanoff has violated Article 35 and 55 of the Additional Protocol

to the Geneva Coventions 19
ii) Natasha Romanoff has violated the principle of proportionality under Rule 14
of customary IHL 20
ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE DEPRIVATION OF PETER QUILL’S REFUGEE STATUS IS LAWFUL

UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HE MAY NOT BE ACCORDED THE PROTECTION OF NON-
REFOULEMENT 20
[3.1] Climate change is not considered as a recognized refugee status admission ground
in international law 21
[3.2] the alleged charge of eco-piracy can be a valid ground for the refugee status
exclusion ground mentioned in Article 1F(c) 22
[3.3] Mr. Quill may not at the least be provided the protection of non-refoulement. 23
Prayer xvi
iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATION TERM
Wakanda The Federal Republic of Wakanda
Talokan The Socialist State of Talokan
Sokovia The Principality of Sokovia
Kreeland The Kingdom of Kreeland
Chitauria The Kingdom of Chitauria
GACJ The Greater Avengers Court of Justice and Human Rights
The Avengers' Convention on International Justice and

ACIJ
Human Rights
ICJ The International Court of Justice
3G Guardian of the Green Galaxy
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
iv
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Application for Revision of Judgement No 158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal,
Advisory Opinion [1973] ICJ Rep 166 18
Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v Senegal) [1991] ICJ Rep 53 14
Bundesrepublik Deutschland v B & D, Joined cases C‐57/09 and C‐101/09, Judgment (9
November 2010) 21
Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C‐181/16, Gnandi v État belge, Judgment (19
June 2018) 21
Ezokola v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) [2013] 2 SCR 678 23
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v Republic of Mali), [1986] ICJ Rep 554 13
Kuwait Airways Corpn v Iraqi Airways Co (Nos 4 and 5) [2002] UKHL 19 20
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v Honduras: Nicaragua intervening)
[1992] ICJ Rep 351 13, 14, 16
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v Norway) [1933] PCIJ 13, 16, 17
Lukman v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2559-97) 20
Maslov v Austria [2008] ECHR 546 21
Minister for Immigration v Savvin [2018] FCAFC 9 23
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), (2012) ICJ
Rep 144 30
R v Secretary for the Home Department Ex Parte Mehari (Eritrea) [1994] Imm AR 23
Reference re Secession of Québec [1998] 2 SCR 217, [1998] 161 DLR (4th) 385 15
Sepet v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] UKHL 15 21
Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge
(Malaysia/Singapore) [2008] ICJ Rep 12 13, 14, 16
Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2002] 1 SCR 3 23
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand) [1962] ICJ Rep 6 13
UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, United
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189 35
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, [1975] ICJ Rep 12 14
v
STATUTES
Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan 25

Criminal Code of Uzbekistan 25
Criminal Code Russian Federation 25
Criminal Code Tajikistan 25
Penal Code Kyrgyzstan 25
Penal Code Republic of Moldova 25
Penal Code Vietnam 26
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1
July 2002) 2187 UNTS 3 27, 29
UN DECLARATIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS
Clipperton Island Case (France v Mexico) (1931) 26 AJIL 390 (Mexico/France International
Arbitration) 393 16
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22
April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 18, 20, 29, 35
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UNGA Res 2625 (XXV)
(24 October 1970) UN Doc A/RES/2625(XXV) 15
Human Rights Committee, Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the Optional
Protocol, concerning communication No. 2728/2016 (Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand)
CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016 32
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (adopted 8 June 1977,
entered into force 07 December1979) 1125 UNTS 3 26, 29
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session UN Doc
A/49/10; Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-eighth session
UN Doc A/61 30
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October
1950) Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in time of War
(adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287 26, 30
vi
BOOKS AND COMMENTARIES
Brownlie I, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, (5th ed. Oxford University
Press, 1998) 24
Christine Van den Wyngaert, ‘The Political Offence Exception to Extradition: How to Plug the
“Terrorists’ Loophole” Without Departing From Fundamental Human Rights’ (1989) 19
Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 27
Goodwin-Gill GS, 'The Politics of Refugee Protection' (2018) 27 Refugee Survey Quarterly 8
18
Jennings RY, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law (Manchester University Press
1963) 17
Johnson DM, ‘Acquisitive Prescription in International Law' [1950-1951] 16
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection Under the 1951 Convention and
the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (2019) HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV19, 20,
22
JOURNAL ARTICLES AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Daniel P King, ‘The Political Offence Exception in International Extradition’ (1980) 13(3) The
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 247; ‘political offence' (OED
Online, OUP June 2013) 27
Darren Hawkins, 'Universal Jurisdiction for Human Rights: From Legal Principle to Limited
Reality' (2003) 9 Global Governance 25
European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Position on Exclusion From Refugee Status
PP1/03/2004/Ext/CA (March 2004) 28
Hathaway JC and Foster M, 'Membership of a Particular Social Group' (2007) 15 Int J Refugee
Law 477. 18
Henckaerts J-M and others, ‘Proportionality in Attack (Rule 14)’ (2005 CUP) 1 Customary
International Humanitarian Law 31
Jane McAdam, UNHCR, ‘Climate Change Displacement and International Law:
Complementary Protection Standards (May 2011), PPLA/2011/03 33
Jeanhee Hong, Refugees of the 21st Century: Environmental Injustice, 10 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 323, 332 (2001) (citing Jacques Vernant, The Refugee in the Post-War World
5–7 (1953)). 35
vii
Jérôme de Hemptinne, 'Ecocide: an Ambiguous Crime?' (EJIL Blog, 29 August 2022) 26
M. Cherif Bassiouni and Edward M. Wise, ‘Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Extradite or
Prosecute in International Law’ (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995) 30
Mark D. Kielsgard ‘The Political Offense Exception: Punishing Whistleblowers Abroad’ (EJIL
Blog14 November 2013) 28
Michael Aidan O’Connor, ‘International Extradition and the Political Offense Exception: The
Granting of Political Offender Status to Terrorists by United States Courts’ (1983) 4 NYL
SCH J INT'L & COMP L 613 28
Model Law on Extradition, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004 27
R.R. Baxter, ‘Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law’ (1965) 41
BYBIL 275 30
Scott M, Climate Change, Disasters, and the Refugee Convention (Cambridge University Press
2020) 33
Shacknove AE, ‘Who Is a Refugee? *’ [2017] International Refugee Law 163 33
Stephen Macedo, The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction (New Jersey: Office of
University Printing and Mailing Princeton University, 2001) 30
Stop Ecocide Foundation, Independent Expert Panel for the Legal Definition of Ecocide (June
2021) 26
UNHCR, 'The Cessation Clauses: Guidelines on their Application' (26 April 1999) UN Doc
EC/49/SC/CRP.13 22, 24
Xavier Phillipe, 'The principles of universal jurisdiction and complementarity: how do the two
principles intermesh?' (2006) 68 International Review of the Red Cross 25
viii
STATEMENTS OF FACTS
Karol Denvers is a Kree activist from Wakanda. After her protest against the de-Kreefication
policy of Wakanda, Wakandan law enforcement agencies arrested her. Subsequently, as a result
of Presidential clemency, she was released. Following her release, she was kept in surveillance.
Being frustrated due to this, she left Wakanda and reached the Deadpool Island in a fishing
trawler, where she made a request for asylum. Hearing about her escape, the Wakandan
authority instituted a case of sedition against her, and requested the Government of Talokan to
extradite her, and the government of Talokan decided to act accordingly. But Karol challenged
the decision of the Government of Talokan before the Supreme Court thereof – which decided
that the principle of non-refoulement would get violated if her extradition is allowed. Thus, she
received asylum status – and remained in the Deadpool Island. In 2020, Wakanda established
its full control over the Deadpool Island by military might. After occupation of the Deadpool
Island by Wakanda, she was again arrested. Then, General Thanos’s party won the General
Elections of Wakanda by a super majority. Subsequently, Wakanda set up a puppet government
in the Deadpool Island – which declared to join Wakanda. Following this, Wakanda annexed
the Deadpool Island. A notice was issued against her, as per which she would be sent to the
Infinity city to face sedition charge, and which stated that asylum status was granted to her
without properly evaluating her request. She challenged this before the Court of Deadpool
Island – which rejected her application. Then, she filed the case before the Supreme Court of
Wakanda – which also ruled against her. Subsequently, she filed a review petition, which got
rejected. The rationale of the Supreme Court – on both instances – was that the annexation of
Deadpool Island by Wakanda was lawful, and that no one can be a refugee in one’s own
country.
Commander Natasha Romanoff is a naval officer from Sokovia. She was sent by Prince Kang
XIV of Sokovia as the leader of four ships. The four ships were sent by the Prince to assist
Talokan, which was engaged in a war with Wakanda – both of whom wanted to be the
sovereign of the Ravengers Island. During the war, Wakanda had deployed a nuclear-powered
ship, SS T’Challa. Commander Romanoff, to gain military advantage, destroyed this ship. Its
destruction caused disastrous effects – resulting in many indigenous Ravengers losing their
lives, or getting exposed to nuclear radiations. As a result, the Government of Chitauria, under
its law that grants it universal criminal jurisdiction to punish international crimes, issued an
ix
international warrant for her arrest against her – for commission of ecocide. On grounds of the
trauma that she felt because of the destruction caused in Ravengers Island, she criticised
decision of the Government of Sokovia to join the war. Questioning any decision of the prince
is considered as a major crime (and as per statistics, any person convicted of the same faced
the death penalty) in Sokovia – and thus, Sokovia requested Talokan to extradite her. She
applied for asylum, but the Talokan government suspended refugee determination procedure
in the Deadpool Island, until the ongoing conflict ended. Immediately after her arrest, she made
an application for asylum – which was denied to her on the grounds that her act, which amounts
to an ecocide, attracts Article 1F(b) of the 1951 Refugee Convention – and accordingly, she
falls within the exception clause to the convention. General Thanos publicaly stated that they
will first send Commander Romanoff to Chitauria so that she faces trial there, then try her in
the Deadpool Island, and then send her to face the final trial to Sokovia. Accordingly, the
Government of Wakanda issued a notice to extradite her to Chitauria. She then, challenged the
denial of asylum and the notice before the Supreme Court of Wakanda, which ruled against
her. Subsequently, she filed a review against the decision – which was also rejected. The ground
of rejection of her application before the Supreme Court was that serious allegations of
commission of war crimes by her have been levelled against her, the Wakandan authority shall
deal with the matter first, as the issue falls within the forum of the state. The court refused to
deal with her other two arguments, since allegations against her were not established beyond a
reasonable doubt. The ground on which the Supreme Court rejected her appeal was that a Court
cannot foretell anything, until the executive makes a decision on extradition.
Peter Quill is one of the last inhabitants of the Ravengers Island. Although his family wanted
to remain in the Ravengers Island, the exposure to nuclear radiation caused by destruction of
SS T’Challa resulted in death of Peter’s son. As a result of the destruction, the water became
contaminated, and for essential goods the whole island became dependant on pirates – who
began exploiting the local people. Thus, he was not left with any option other than leaving the
island. Accordingly, he left the Ravegers Island in a vessel with 10 others, but the vessel
drowned. Then, a ship of Guardian of the Green Galaxy, a group of environmental activists
advocating against mining in the Exclusive Economic Zone of Wakanda, gave him shelter. As
3G activists are referred to as eco-pirates by Wakanda, the ship was chased by Wakandan Coast
Guards - which sent all persons on it to the Wolverine Island for prosecution under anti-piracy
legislation. Except Quill, all passengers of the ship were released following intervention by
Neverlands. In the Wolverine Island, Peter Quill filed an application for asylum on grounds of
x
climate change – which got rejected. The grounds on which the rejection took place were that
“climate change” is not a recognised ground for grant of refugee status, and even if it had been
a ground, because he indulged in piracy – refugee status would have still been denied to him.
He then challenged rejection of his asylum application before the Court of Wolverine Island
on 1 March – which also got rejected. Following this, he challenged the decision of Wolverine
Island’s court before the SC of Wakanda. The SC issued its judgement against him.
Subsequently, he filed a review petition, which got rejected. The Supreme court rejected its
application on the ground that “climate change” is not recognised as a ground for grant of
refugee status by the Wakandan refugee admission legislation. The court further stated that
Wakanda does not recognise eco-piracy as a form of piracy. The decision of the Supreme Court
on his review adds on to state that the principle of non-refoulement does not extend to high
seas.
The Federal Republic of Wakanda is the largest state in the Avengers Archipelago. It is run by
a parliamentary form of government, and its capital is located in Infinity City. Majority of its
inhabitants are Wakandan. It has ratified major international law instruments, including the
1951 Refugee Convention. It has a powerful economy and one of the mightiest armies in the
world. An allegation that it has always denied is that is secretly attempting to develop nuclear
weapons.
xi
ISSUES
I. Whether Karol Denvers may be stripped of the refugee status assessed by Wakandan
authority and whether she may be lawfully removed from Deadpool Island in
international law.
II. Whether the refugee application of Commander Natasha Romanoff be excluded and
whether she should at least enjoy the protection of non-refoulement.
III. Whether Peter Quill’s deprivation of refugee status is lawful in international law and
whether he should at least enjoy the protection of non-refoulement.
xii
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Wakanda seized Deadpool Island legally via proper territorial acquisition. As a consequence
of attaining Wakandan citizenship, Karol Denvers' Talokan refugee status expired. Removing
this outmoded recognition and transferring Denvers ensures non-refoulement duties are met.
Based on uti possidetis juris from colonial bounds, Wakanda holds permanent sovereign claim
on Deadpool Island. The reunification referendum in 2020 followed legitimate self-
determination principles. Following that, three years of peaceful government established
legitimate rule by prescription. Denvers cannot continue to assert an illegally separated past
citizenship against her current nationality state forever.
To qualify for refugee status, you must first demonstrate a lack of national protection. However,
being a Wakandan citizen diminishes Denver's presumptive statelessness by offering internal
privileges that are unavailable to foreigners. Both evolving state practice and Article 1C(3)
stipulate that adopting a new nationality renders one ineligible for refugee status. Non-
refoulement simply prohibits returning refugees to regions that continue to endanger them.
By retaining outmoded refugee status for protected nations, abuse claims might be made that
are unrelated to the framework's goal and purpose. As a Wakandan citizen, Denvers now has
strong constitutional protections against persecution. Speculations regarding indirect risks do
not trump established home solutions. Refugee law protects against being forced to return to
dangerous home nations, does not remove outmoded status, and requires legitimate residence
in one's new country.
As a result, when Deadpool Islanders obtained Wakandan citizenship, their refugee status was
immediately terminated. Forcing Denver residents to relocate risks only authorized domestic
prosecution, not qualifying persecution. Rescinding her outmoded protection conforms with
both cessation theories and the restricted extent of non-refoulement.
II
xiii
In light of the proceedings, it's respectfully asserted that Commander Natasha Romanoff's
application exclusion and denial of non-refoulement protection should stand. The extradition
request to Chitauria aligns with established international norms, meeting the requisites of
universal jurisdiction and presenting a clear basis for its application. The alleged crimes
committed by Romanoff fall within the scope of war crimes, violating the Additional Protocol
to the Geneva Conventions. The well-defined articulation of ecocide, encompassing acts
causing severe, widespread, and long-term environmental damage, corroborates her actions,
ensuring alignment with international norms.
Furthermore, the proposed extradition to Sokovia wouldn't contravene political offense

exceptions and doesn't qualify Romanoff as a refugee under the 1951 Convention due to her
actions breaching Article 35 and 55 of the Geneva Conventions. Wakanda holds the
jurisdictional competence and obligation to prosecute or extradite Romanoff under
international law. Her violations of the Geneva Conventions and the principle of
proportionality, as per Rule 14 of Customary IHL, warrant exclusion from refugee status and
asylum in Wakanda. Therefore, the allegations of war crimes against Romanoff by Wakanda
are grounded in reasonable and well-founded claims, establishing the necessity for legal action
against her under international law.
III
Climate change is not a valid ground for granting refugee status under international law. The
definition requires persecution based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion or social
group membership. Generalized climate impacts do not meet this criteria. As such, Peter Quill
cannot claim refugee status on climate change grounds.
Furthermore, the eco-piracy charge against Quill could justify excluding his refugee status
under the Refugee Convention's Article 1F(c). His association with 3G, which protests mining
in the EEZ, may constitute a maritime security threat. This could meet the threshold for eco-
piracy under international definitions. On this basis, he may be ineligible for refugee
protections.
In addition, Quill likely does not qualify for non-refoulement protections under treaty or
customary law. Non-refoulement requires probable persecution based on specific attributes.
Climate impacts do not satisfy this. Also, initial detention occurred on a registered state vessel,
where non-refoulement constraints may not apply.
xiv
In conclusion, climate change is not valid for refugee status per se. The eco-piracy allegation
could exclude protections. And non-refoulement does not clearly cover this situation. As such,
stripping Peter Quill of refugee status and protections would likely comply with international
law. Forced repatriation to the Neverlands would not constitute a clear violation of codified
refugee or human rights commitments.
xv
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE 1: WHETHER WAKANDA'S ANNEXATION OF DEADPOOL ISLAND AND SUBSEQUENT

REMOVAL OF KAROL DENVERS' REFUGEE STATUS COMPLIES WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW.
It is respectfully submitted before this Honorable Court that Wakanda lawfully incorporated
Deadpool Island. As such, Karol Denvers' refugee status from Talokan properly ceased with
her accession to Wakandan citizenship. Removal from Deadpool Island thus upholds, rather
than violates, international law. This requires demonstrating that: [1.1] Annexation of
Deadpool Island by Wakanda is Lawful, [1.2] Change in sovereignty removes prior refugee
status, and [1.3] Removing Refugee Status Upholds Non-Refoulement Obligations. Forcible
deportation is therefore consistent with Deadpool Island's annexation and Ms. Denvers'
renewed availability of domestic legal protections.
[1.1] Annexation of Deadpool Island by Wakanda is Lawful.
Wakanda's annexation of Deadpool Island persists as lawful notwithstanding the change from
Talokan's prior territorial control. Judicial precedents and scholarly opinion affirm that
territorial sovereignty endures despite disruptions in effective authority. Therefore,
establishing the legitimacy of Wakanda's 2020 annexation requires demonstrating: firstly,
Wakanda's enduring legal title rooted in colonial-era boundaries and uti possidetis juris despite
the islands' unlawful seizure, secondly, the lawful exercise of external self-determination
permitting Deadpool Island's reunification vote to rejoin Wakanda, thirdly, the subsequent
consolidation of sovereign control through the international law doctrines of prescription and
acquiescence from three years of stable administration, and finally, the displacement of
Talokan's comparatively brief and contested preceding rule failing to extinguish Wakanda's
latent sovereignty.
A. Wakanda has historically claimed sovereignty over Deadpool Island
i) Deadpool Island was part of Wakanda until unlawfully occupied by Talokan in 1835
1
It is an established premise that Deadpool Island originally formed an integral part of
Wakanda, only coming under disputed Talokan control in 1835.1 As affirmed in judgments
from the PCIJ and ICJ, at the time of independence existing administrative boundaries prima
facie become international frontiers under the uti possidetis juris doctrine.2 The underlying
rationale lies in preventing disruption and conflict by maintaining stability of title.3
More recently, the ICJ has clarified that uti possidetis serves an important post-colonial
function of freezing boundaries established by the colonial power, however arbitrary those
demarcated lines may be.4 In Temple of Preah Vihear, the Court gave effect to maps delimiting
frontiers drawn by the French authorities in power.5 Likewise, in Burkina Faso/Mali, the Court
enforced the inherited boundary lines that had divided the prior Upper Volta from French
Sudan.6
Here, on the facts, Deadpool Island lay plainly within Wakanda's boundaries as demarcated
under its former colonial rulers. Talokan's subsequent occupation and exercise of effective
authority between 1835 until 2020 cannot unwrite this enduring, internationally recognised
title.7 Prolonged control - even extinguishing competing effects jurisdiction - does not negate
the persistence of territorial sovereignty vested by uti possidetis where boundaries are clearly
established.8 As such, Talokan's seizure of Deadpool Island flies in the face of inherited
colonial borders, drawing into question its lawful claim against Wakanda's retained title.
ii) Talokan's annexation violated uti possidetis juris principle
Talokan's incorporation of Deadpool Island contravenes the uti possidetis juris principle
handing down agreed colonial delineations. At no point did Wakanda affirmatively surrender
or secede its claim or territorial title over the disputed area. While sovereignty may endure a
1
Moot Proposition, para 16.
2
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v Norway) [1933] PCIJ Ser A/B No 53, 45.
3
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v Republic of Mali), [1986] ICJ Rep 554, para 23.
4
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v Honduras: Nicaragua intervening) [1992] ICJ Rep
351, para 45.
5
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand) [1962] ICJ Rep 6.
6
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v Republic of Mali), [1986] ICJ Rep 554.
7
Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore) [2008]
ICJ Rep 12, para 80.
8
Ibid.
2
temporary blow by force, statehood always remains latent until voluntarily relinquished or
lawfully modified.9
As the ICJ has affirmed, uti possidetis rights do not lapse due to forcible dispossession
against a State's will or consent.10 Given Wakanda's self-evident inclusion of the islands within
pre-established borders, Talokan bore an affirmative duty not to disturb this territorial
allocation by aggressive seizure. Its blunt annexation in the face of Wakanda's vocal protests
therefore fails to extinguish the latter's lawful, inherited claim over the improperly appropriated
area.11
iii) Wakanda lodged persistent protests and attempts to regain control
Far from laying dormant, Wakanda instead continually resisted and challenged Talokan's claim
over Deadpool Island. In the 1960s it formally contested the annexation upon discovery of
strategically valuable resources,12 protesting the denial of its territorial sovereignty.13 It later
sought to reassert control when Talokan briefly withdrew in 1999,14 underscoring its opposition
to the unlawful encroachment.
The ICJ has readily construed such persistent acts of resistance as evidence a State never
intended to acquiesce in improper territorial deprivation.15 Here, Wakanda's sustained rejection
of Talokan's annexation and multiple attempts to re-exert sovereign authority corroborate that
it never relinquished legal title or claim over Deadpool Island notwithstanding the practical
negation of governmental powers. At all times sovereignty persisted as merely latent. Forcible
dispossession without submission does not terminate rights.16
B. 2020 annexation followed legitimate self-determination process
i) Based on recognised remedial secession criteria
9
Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v Senegal) [1991] ICJ Rep 53.
10
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, [1975] ICJ Rep 12, para 102.
11
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v Honduras: Nicaragua intervening) [1992] ICJ Rep
351, paras 333, 338, 380.
12
13
Ibid.
14
15
ICJ Rep 12, para 80.
16
Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v Senegal) [1991] ICJ Rep 53.
3
The declaration by government of Deadpool for incorporation into Wakanda represents a
legitimate exercise of external self-determination.17 Where a definable group with a coherent
identity finds itself excluded from meaningful political participation and persistently denied
basic human rights, remedial secession may well apply.18 The Friendly Relations Declaration
affirms that inadequately accommodated peoples retain the option "to pursue a different
political status, including independence".19 Independence referenda therefore require only a
simple majority to potentially satisfy the self-determination standard.
Here, the government of Deadpool Island had demonstrably sought reunification with
greater Wakanda and their Wakandan kin for over a century since unlawful separation in 1835.
As erstwhile citizens denied external self-determination under domineering Talokan rule for
generations, remedial secession under international law supports Deadpool Island's eventual
vote to rejoin the illegal departed motherland.20
ii) Any external self-determination allows redrawing boundaries.
Additionally, even absent concrete denial of internal rights otherwise warranting remedial
secession, external self-determination already embraces an elective concept potentially
revising boundaries. As the Supreme Court of Canada stated, determinative choice may take
forms "ranging from political independence to joining another State.”21 No principle confines
current territorial delineations as permanently unalterable should populations determine
otherwise. Where freely chosen without coercion, incorporation or reunification with an
adjoining sovereign State constitutes one such legitimate refashioning.22
iii) GA resolution only recommends against it, and is not binding per se.
In any event, the UN General Assembly resolution condemning Wakanda's incorporation of

Deadpool Island itself holds only non-binding recommendatory force. UN Charter Article 10
defines Assembly recommendations on such matters as devoid of any force to compel
17
18
Reference re Secession of Québec [1998] 2 SCR 217, [1998] 161 DLR (4th) 385, para 138.
19
Friendly Relations Declaration, principle 5.
20
Moot Proposition, para para 2, 19.
21
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) (24 October 1970) UN Doc
A/RES/2625(XXV).
22
Reference re Secession of Québec [1998] 2 SCR 217, [1998] 161 DLR (4th) 385, para 126.
4
compliance.23 Here the resolution employed only recommendatory language without further
operable effect.24 Thus the UNGA resolution alone fails to invalidate either Wakanda's
endurance legal title following uti possidetis or the recognised self-determination standards by
which Deadpool Island lawfully voted incorporation. It constitutes a recommendation against
political wisdom rather than an injunction banning the realised territorial outcome.
C. Wakanda has established effective control constituting sovereignty.
i) Under international law doctrines of prescription and acquiescence.
In the further alternative, Wakanda has established continual effective authority and
administration over Deadpool Island since 2020. Independent of prior sovereign title or modes
of territorial transfer, enduring peaceful occupation and public acts of sovereignty may
independently generate territorial rights over time. Where de facto control persists extensively
and is knowingly tolerated by the broader international community, territorial sovereignty
eventually passes via prescription.25
Here Wakanda has exercised open governmental authority over Deadpool Island for over
three years without interruption or concrete efforts to overthrow its administration.26 While the
law may initially view effectiveness alone suspiciously where obtained illegally, prolonged
rule brings assumption of lawfulness.27 The PCIJ itself stated prescription derives from
"evidence, arising out of the fact that this possession, of long duration and reaching back
beyond living memory, reveals a state of things which must be taken as the point of
departure".28 Simply, at some point effectiveness presumes legality. On the instant facts that
point has likely been passed, with Wakanda's undisturbed reign satisfying relative standards
and indicia of lawful sovereign ownership.29
ii) Displaced prior disputed sovereignty claims of Talokan.
23
Ibid para 155.
24
25
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v Norway) [1933] PCIJ Ser A/B No 53, 46; Land, Island and
Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening) [1992] ICJ Rep 394, para 384.
26
27
ICJ Rep 12, paras 127-128.
28
Clipperton Island Case (France v Mexico) (1931) 26 AJIL 390 (Mexico/France International Arbitration) 393.
29
Johnson DM, ‘Acquisitive Prescription in International Law' [1950-1951] 27 Brit YB Intl L 332.
5
Crucially, such effective prescription now protects Wakanda's control and claim to Deadpool
Island given the relative brevity and persistently embattled nature of Talokan's preceding
tenure. From pre-colonial times until forcible seizure in 1835, the islands had stood as
undisputed and piecemeal Wakandan possessions for centuries. Talokan exercised unstable
control for barely 85 years before ejection in 2020.30
Throughout, Wakanda continually refused to submit to the annexation's legitimacy
despite losing the ability to govern its stolen land.31 Where sovereigns oppose unlawful
appropriation, even lengthy occupation fails to override the displaced yet still living claim.32
Talokan's claim therefore remained embattled as against the dispossessed legitimate authority.
By contrast, in just three short years since 2020 no State has actively or formally
challenged Wakanda's stable administration, or sought its ejection from Deadpool Island
through recognised institutional channels.33 Only longevity and acquiescence eventually heal
unlawfulness in international law.34 On balance, Wakanda has attained both through its
presently unchallenged rule in distinction from Talokan's universally decried but forcibly
sustained previous stint.
[1.2] Change in sovereignty removes prior refugee status.
The fundamental logic underpinning refugee protection dissipates following intervening

nationality shifts. This holds true given Wakanda’s conferral of citizenship rights to Deadpool
Islanders like Karol Denvers. Authoritative precedents and international instruments affirm
that lawfully adjudicated refugee status cannot persist where alternative state protection
becomes available through citizenship. Therefore, establishing the cessation of Denvers' prior
recognition requires demonstrating: firstly, the grounding of status in a lack of national
safeguards per the Refugee Convention, secondly, the negation of this absence when Wakandan
citizenship eliminates de facto statelessness, thirdly, the customary and Convention bases for
withdrawal when acquiring new nationality, and finally, the confined scope of non-refoulement
only barring forced returns to persecuting countries, not impacting refugee status re-evaluation
where domestic integration now furnishes refuge.
30
Moot Proposition para 7-11.
31
Moot Proposition para 13.
32
Jennings RY, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law (Manchester University Press 1963).
33
Moot Proposition para 32.
34
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v Norway) [1933] PCIJ Ser A/B No 53, 46.
6
A. Refugee status grounds on lack of national protection.
i) Requires showing loss/denial of citizenship rights per Article 1.
It is a cardinal precept that refugee status turns centrally on the disruption of one's anchoring
national membership and attendant rights. Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention
defines a refugee precisely as one unable or unwilling to return to their country of nationality
"owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted."35 The essential predicating absence lies in
deprivation of the array of guarantees States must furnish their nationals – whether by
involuntary exile or refusal of repatriation conferring de jure statelessness. Where citizenship
itself persists, so too the apparatus and opportunity for legal vindication. Only unwillingness
or incapability of recovering one's national membership opens the door to substitute
international protection.
The underlying purposes and historical context of the Convention regime confirm this
remedial gap-filling purpose where domestic membership ties unravel. The refugees of early
international concern fled en masse without personal civil and criminal justice mechanisms
against which to appeal their plight.36 The Convention aimed to erect a passable surrogate shell
of rights where normal channels of national protection utterly failed internal outcasts. 37 So
confined, modifying the nationality nexus that first catalyzed externalised assistance
correspondingly alters the equation. As the ICJ recognised in Tunisia v Libya, "it is evident
that the rights of protection under international refugee law...could no longer apply to persons
who had acquired...national status" in their hosted state.38
ii) Change in citizenship eliminates lack of state protection.
It follows directly that change in underlying citizenship reknitting availability of national

shelter simultaneously extinguishes refugee status' logic. The UNHCR Handbook itself states
that "A person is no longer a refugee when they become a national of the country of refuge."39
35
Article 1, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April
1954) 189 UNTS 137.
36
Hathaway JC and Foster M, 'Membership of a Particular Social Group' (2007) 15 Int J Refugee Law 477.
37
Goodwin-Gill GS, 'The Politics of Refugee Protection' (2018) 27 Refugee Survey Quarterly 8.
38
Application for Revision of Judgement No 158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory
Opinion [1973] ICJ Rep 166, para 24.
39
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status
and Guidelines on International Protection Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees (2019) HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV, para 112.
7
Acquiring or reassuming citizenship represents the most common factual basis for cessation
precisely because the lack of appellate and remedial processes disappears.40 Where affirmative
rights to residency, property ownership, legal process or physical remedy become vested anew,
the entire justification for extraordinary externally-furnished humanitarian status fails.
On the facts, Deadpool Island's full annexation by Wakanda and automatic extension of
citizenship rights fundamentally recasts the persecution analysis.41 Karol Denvers and
compatriots now hold constitutionally protected national status within Wakanda, gaining the
encompassing strong citizenship rights and integration they had lost for generations. Any
notion of displacement disappears alongside the statelessness that previously attracted shelter.
The restoration of national anchoring alters the evaluation process by altering presumptions
against continuing externally provided refugee recognition.
iii) Denvers is now protected as Wakandan national under domestic law.
In concrete terms, the concerns of persecution that Ms. Denvers formerly had now entitle her
to domestically enforced remedy on par with other Wakandan citizens rather than second-class
foreign inhabitants. While de jure statelessness remains for her in relation to Talokan, such
inert nationality no longer has functional relevance in the face of current Wakandan integration
and assurances.
In particular under Wakandan constitutional principles, all people are guaranteed equal
protection against discrimination without exception. Whereas Denvers previously lacked basic
standing to report harassment as a visitor, let alone pursue civil or criminal justice complaints
against politically-connected aggressors in national courts, as a rediscovered member of the
national community, she now has legally enforceable and actionable anti-persecution rights.
Similarly, having previously been denied stability in employment, housing, healthcare, or
education, her national credentials now open Wakanda's socioeconomic endowment matching
other residents. In almost every relevant dimension the shift in national protection marks a sea
change – if not eliminating objective fears themselves, then surely fuelling avenues of redress
that refund refugee law's core purpose.
B. Becoming Wakandan national negates refugee status.
i) Customary international law as reflected in UNHCR guidelines.
40
Ibid, para 112-3.
41
Moot Proposition, para 31-2.
8
Independently authoritative UNHCR instruments corroborate the consensus view that
acquisition or restoration of national protection in the state of refuge serves to vitiate subsisting
international refugee status. Beyond the Handbook's guidance, the Office's Guidelines on
International Protection expressly characterise "acquisition of a new nationality" as cessation
of refugee status under the Convention regime.42 They reaffirm this follows naturally because
the refugee "is no longer in need of international protection and has found a durable solution
to displacement."43 Readily available domestic justice replaces the necessity of international
law gap-fillers.44 Customary international law as interpreted by UNHCR cements the premise.
ii) Doctrine of cessation of refugee status applies under Article 1C.
In parallel terms, Article 1C (3) of the Refugee Convention furnishes mandatory grounds for
refugee status cessation where "he has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of
the country of his new nationality". As the House of Lords has held, this particular basis for
cessation exists independently of whether material conditions in the home country triggering
flight have undergone meaningful change.45 By obtaining secure membership rights via
nationality, the prior refugee places himself under the protection of the country of fresh
allegiance, returning to parity with undisturbed nationals in manner that cuts off the unique
vulnerability grounding external aid.46 Where persecution emanates only from one identifiable
State, excising and superseding that national membership alone suffices.
On the instant facts, under both customary international standards and specific Convention
bases, Deadpool Islanders' undisputed conferral of Wakandan nationality following annexation
and constitutional inclusion categorically answers the examination.47 The operative triggering
state of de jure statelessness, de facto exclusion from national vindication processes, and
persecution vulnerability persisted for over a century. Yet that regrettable state of fear lasted
only so long as wrongful forced separation from original homelands. Necessarily, reunification
42
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection No 3: Cessation of Refugee Status
under Article 1C(5) and (6) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the "Ceased Circumstances"
Clauses) (10 February 2003) HCR/GIP/03/03, para 2.
43
Ibid.
44
Article 1C, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April
1954) 189 UNTS 137.
45
Kuwait Airways Corpn v Iraqi Airways Co (Nos 4 and 5) [2002] UKHL 19.
46
Lukman v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2559-97).
47
Moot Proposition, para 31-2.
9
on either territory or populous reknits the broken bond. As such, it meets the letter and spirit of
the Convention regime's cessation doctrine.
C. Non-refoulement limited to removal from host state.
Finally, the critical international legal principle of non-refoulement does not independently
prohibit cancellation of existing refugee status following demonstrated shifts in nationality or
state protection. Rather the rule narrowly but absolutely prescribes that recognised refugees
may not be forcibly returned ('refouled') in any manner to home territories where they face
persecution or threats to fundamental rights, whether directly or through optically voluntary
constructs.48 At base it protects only against forcible literal or de facto repatriation, not
withdrawal of tangible residency permits or social benefits in the state of provisional shelter
absent additional violation.
So confined, non-refoulement does not cover decisions restricting accrued refugee
status rights or even cancelling presumptive protection categorisation should the underlying
predication of de facto statelessness dissolve through remedial membership or protection
developments.49 It does not furnish affirmative guarantee of perfect asylum absent separately
unlawful threats of return attracting the principle's core purpose.50 Here Ms. Denvers and other
Wakanda-reintegrated Deadpool Islanders face no colouration of coercive return to Talokan or
elsewhere they might underground persecution given durable superseding Wakandan
nationality.51 Non-refoulement therefore operates no independent restraint on revisiting
refugee recognition.52
[1.3] Removing Refugee Status Upholds Non-Refoulement Obligations
The fundamental underpinning of international refugee law lies in providing surrogate

protection where domestic safeguards are unavailable. However, critical guidance equally
cements that properly acquiring an alternate nationality function to eliminate refugee status.53
48
Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C‐181/16, Gnandi v État belge, Judgment (19 June 2018), para
59.
49
Bundesrepublik Deutschland v B & D, Joined cases C‐57/09 and C‐101/09, Judgment (9 November 2010).
50
Sepet v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] UKHL 15.
51
52
Maslov v Austria [2008] ECHR 546.
53
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status
under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (2019) HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.
10
Additionally, prohibitions on refoulement to prospective harm crucially require demonstrating
tangible risks rather than just theoretical speculation.
In Ms. Denvers’ case, analysis will establish three key principles: First, her uncontested
formal citizenship as a Wakandan national following sovereign incorporation of Deadpool
Island in 2020firmly reactivates the availability of domestic legal remedies weighing against
any contention of persisting refugee rights. Secondly, reasonable inferences of security risks
properly trigger override exemptions to general non-refoulement obligations. Finally, in the
absence of substantiated threats beyond lawful domestic prosecution under protected
constitutional standards, removing Ms. Denvers from Wakandan territory would remain
consistent with international protections against arbitrary relocation to endangering
environments.
A. No Indirect Risk of Chain Refoulement to Third State
i) Now Firmly Under Wakanda's Exclusive Territorial Jurisdiction and Control
Following Deadpool Island's 2020 constitutional annexation, Ms. Denvers falls under
Wakanda's sovereign powers as affirmed in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo.54
Unlike in MSS v Belgium and Greece where partial extraterritorial authority created
refoulement risks, Ms. Denvers is firmly within Wakanda's domestic jurisdiction as
incorporated national territory.55 Relocating her elsewhere in Wakanda thus cannot violate non-
refoulement protections.
ii) Protected by National Laws and Constitutional Rights as Wakandan Citizen
Additionally, having acceded to formal Wakandan citizenship, Ms. Denvers enjoys associated
domestic rights protections.As decisions such as Suresh v Canada demonstrate, these
protections reduce any dangers that might trigger non-refoulement responsibilities.56 With
uncontested nationality status and enforcement of Wakanda's constitutional rights in the event
4, para. 112-114; UNHCR, 'The Cessation Clauses: Guidelines on their Application' (26 April 1999) UN Doc
EC/49/SC/CRP.13, para. 2-5
54
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda) [2005] ICJ Rep
168, [173].
55
MSS v Belgium and Greece App no 30696/09 (ECHR, 21 January 2011).
56
Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2002] 1 SCR 3 [75].
11
of a fresh prosecution, eliminating refugee status and maintaining her residence on Deadpool
Island poses no indirect refugee law dangers.
B. Exclusion Due to Security Risk Under Article 1F Overrides Any Non-Refoulement

Claims
Ms. Denvers' escape of authorised sedition charges suggests a danger, since instances such as
Ezokola v Canada demonstrate that unlawful evasion of severe domestic prosecution may
warrant exclusion.57 Her blocking appropriate legal procedures reveals realistic security
concerns warranting denial of status under Article 1F criteria rather than generic non-
refoulement grounds. Arrival Offering Sensitive Information Raises Security Questions
Similarly, Ms. Denvers' incentive offer of undefined information to Talokan in return for
expedited asylum protection raises concerns about security. The dubious nature and
ramifications of such sensitive facts supplied purely for personal refugee status rightfully call
into question the requisite levels for exclusion under Article 1F.
C. Removing from Deadpool Island Consistent with Non-Refoulement Obligations
i) Sole Risk is Lawful Domestic Prosecution as Wakandan Citizen
As affirmed in R v Secretary for the Home Department Ex Parte Mehari, ordinary domestic
prosecution does not inherently constitute threats prohibiting refoulement absent additional
political repression.58 Here, as a Wakandan citizen, Ms. Denvers solely risks standard criminal
proceedings, not persecution. Such lawful processes for a national do not trigger non-
refoulement protection per se according to cases like Minister for Immigration v Savvin.59
ii) No Need to Indefinitely Protect Prior, Superseded Refugee Status
Finally, as Executive Committee of UNHCR Conclusion No 15 articulates, refugee status

centres on demonstrating valid claims against one's country of origin. 60 But after acquiring
Wakandan citizenship, Ms. Denvers cannot invoke Talokan's superseded conferral to evade
domestic prosecution within her recognized nationality state. Nothing obliges Wakanda to
perpetually respect the now outdated grant.
57
Ezokola v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) [2013] 2 SCR 678 [32].
58
R v Secretary for the Home Department Ex Parte Mehari (Eritrea) [1994] Imm AR 169.
59
Minister for Immigration v Savvin [2018] FCAFC 9 [48].
60
UNHCR, 'The Cessation Clauses: Guidelines on their Application' (26 April 1999) UN Doc EC/49/SC/CRP.13,
[9].
12
ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE REFUGEE APPLICATION OF COMMANDER NATASHA ROMANOFF BE
EXCLUDED AND WHETHER SHE SHOULD AT LEAST ENJOY THE PROTECTION OF NON-
REFOULEMENT?
Before this Honourable Court, it is respectfully submitted that the exclusion of the application
of Commander Natasha Romanoff should not be reconsidered, and, she should not be accorded
the protection of non-refoulement. [2.1] With regard to the extradition request to Chitauria
under its purported universal jurisdiction law, it is contended that such an action would be in
line established legal norms, [2.2] The proposed extradition of Commander Natasha Romanoff
to Sokovia would not constitute a violation of norms of international law, and [2.3] The
allegations of war crimes asserted by Wakanda against Commander Natasha Romanoff are well
founded and reasonable.
[2.1] The extradition to Chitauria would be in line with established international norms
Universal jurisdiction is criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the crime, without
regard to where the crime was committed, the nationality of the alleged or convicted
perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any other connection to the state exercising such
jurisdiction.61 For universal jurisdiction to be effectively employed, it hinges upon three
fundamental prerequisites: Firstly, a well-defined basis justifying its application, Secondly, a
precise articulation of the offense and its essential components, and Thirdly, the existence of
domestic enforcement mechanisms that empower national judiciaries to preside over such
offenses.62
A. There is a well-defined basis that justifies the application of universal jurisdiction in

the present case
Universal jurisdiction can be asserted in relation to a limited number of international crimes

including war crimes, torture, crimes against humanity, genocide, piracy, hijacking, acts of
terrorism, and attacks on UN personnel.63
61
Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction (2001), Brownlie I, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International
Law, (5th ed. Oxford University Press, 1998) p. 451
62
Xavier Phillipe, 'The principles of universal jurisdiction and complementarity: how do the two principles
intermesh?' (2006) 68 International Review of the Red Cross 379
63
Darren Hawkins, 'Universal Jurisdiction for Human Rights: From Legal Principle to Limited Reality' (2003) 9
Global Governance 347
13
Crimes against the environment are already specifically punishable when committed
during international armed conflicts pursuant to Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) in the Rome Statute.
Additionally Article 55 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions prohibits
the use of methods or means of warfare that may cause damage to the natural environment. This
includes damage that could prejudice the health or survival of the population. Article 55 also
prohibits attacks against the natural environment as reprisals. Article 35(3) of Additional
Protocol I prohibits the use of “methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be
expected to cause, widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment”.
In addition to expert panels, states around the world have also acknowledged and
criminalized ecocide in their national jurisdictions. Ten countries have included ecocide as a
punishable crime in their penal code, including Vietnam, Uzbekistan,64 Tajikistan,65 Russian
Federation,66Republic of Moldova,67 Kyrgyzstan,68 Kazakhstan.69 Vietnam’s penal code
describes ecocide as “acts of annihilating en-mass population in an area, destroying the source
of their livelihood, undermining the cultural and spiritual life of a country, upsetting the
foundation of a society with a view to undermining such society, as well as other acts of
genocide or acts of ecocide or destroying the natural environment…”70
The Geneva Conventions impose on each State Party the obligation to search for persons
alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions, to bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts and
possibly also to hand over such persons for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned
by the case, provided such State Party has made out a valid case. 71 (aut dedere aut judicare
principle)
64
Criminal Code of Uzbekistan, art. 196 (1994)
65
Criminal Code Tajikistan, art. 400 (1998)
66
Criminal Code Russian Federation, art. 358 (1996)
67
Penal Code Republic of Moldova, art. 136 (2002)
68
Penal Code Kyrgyzstan, art. 342 (1997)
69
Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, art. 161 (1997)
70
Penal Code Vietnam, Ch. 5, art. 342 (1990)
71
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) Geneva
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in time of War (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into
force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287 art 146
14
Therefore, Chitauria has the jurisdictional basis to try Ms Natasha Romanoff for the crime
committed under Geneva Convention and thus Wakanda has the obligation to extradite Ms
Romanoff to either try or hand over her to Chitauria who has universal jurisdiction law.
B. The definition of Ecocide has a precise articulation of the offense and its essential
components
The proposed definition of ecocide, drawn up by the Expert Panel of Stop Ecocide
International, adopts terms and criteria from various legal frameworks, notably International
Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the ICC Statute. The Independent Expert Panel for the Legal
Definition of Ecocide defines ecocide as “unlawful or wanton acts committed with knowledge
that there is a substantial likelihood of severe and either widespread or long-term damage to
the environment being caused by those acts.”72 It directly borrows the terms ‘severe’,
‘widespread’ and ‘long-term damage’ from Art. 35(3) and Art. 55 of Additional Protocol I (AP
I).73 The proposed definition is also heavily influenced by provisions contained in the ICC
Statute, as illustrated by the three following examples.74 First, the definition refers to a
‘proportionality test’. This directly echoes a similar test introduced in the context of war crimes
by Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) of the ICC Statute.75 Such a proportionality test illustrates the delicate
tension that exists among States between the protection of the environment on the one hand
and the preservation of their strategic interests on the other. Second, the intentional element of
ecocide has, to a certain extent, been guided by Art. 30 of the ICC Statute and, thus, excludes
the applicability of ‘negligence’.76 Third, by mirroring Art. 25(1) of the ICC Statute, which
recognizes the principle of individual criminal responsibility.77 Therefore the definition of
ecocide as envisaged by Chitauria has a precise articulation of the offense and its essential
components and is concurrent to established international norms.
72
Stop Ecocide Foundation, Independent Expert Panel for the Legal Definition of Ecocide (June 2021)
73
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 07 December1979) 1125
UNTS 3 art 55 and 35
74
Jérôme de Hemptinne, 'Ecocide: an Ambiguous Crime?' (EJIL Blog, 29 August 2022)
<https://www.ejiltalk.org/ecocide-an-ambiguous-crime/ >accessed 10 December 2023
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187
75
UNTS 3 art 8
76
UNTS 3 art 30
77
UNTS 3 art 25
15
[2.2] The proposed extradition of Commander Natasha Romanoff to Sokovia would not
constitute a violation of established norms of international law
A political offence results from a dispute between the fugitive and the state that applies for
extradition on some issue connected with the political control or government of the country. 78
The political offence exception are rooted in the fact that the rule is built on a triple rationale
in which arguments of a very different nature converge that the political argument that States
should remain neutral vis-t-vis political conflicts in other States and that therefore extradition
of political opponents is to be a priori refused; the moral argument, based on the premise that
resistance to oppression is legitimate and that political crimes can therefore be justified; the
humanitarian argument, whereby a political offender should not be extradited to a State in
which he risks an unfair trial.79 Extradition may be refused, if, in the view of the, the person
sought would not receive the minimum fair trial guarantees in criminal proceedings in the
requesting State.80
A. Alleged crime does not come under the definition of Political offence and thus will
not constitute a violation of Political offence exception
In differentiating common crimes from political crimes, extradition law employs two tests: the
incidents and the predominance test.81 The incidents tests, developed from the United
Kingdom’s 1891 Castioni case, states that: (1) there must be a political matter, uprising, or
dispute in the State at the time of the behavior in question and (2) the act must be done in
furtherance of such political dispute.82 The predominance test followed in France, Switzerland,
and the United States balances the common criminal elements of the crime with its political
character. It weighs whether the act was perpetrated in connection with an existing political
78
Daniel P King, ‘The Political Offence Exception in International Extradition’ (1980) 13(3) The Comparative
and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 247; ‘political offence' (OED Online, OUP June 2013)
<https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199551248.001.0001/acref-9780199551248 >
accessed 10 December 2023.
79
Christine Van den Wyngaert, ‘The Political Offence Exception to Extradition: How to Plug the “Terrorists’
Loophole” Without Departing From Fundamental Human Rights’ (1989) 19 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights
297
80
Model Law on Extradition, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004,
<https://www.unodc.org/pdf/model_law_extradition.pdf > accessed 17th June 2018
81
Michael Aidan O’Connor, ‘International Extradition and the Political Offense Exception: The Granting of
Political Offender Status to Terrorists by United States Courts’ (1983) 4 NYL SCH J INT'L & COMP L 613 p 617,
618
82
ibid
16
struggle; whether it was causally motivated by political ideology; and whether the means were
proportionate to the political objectives.83
Natasha’s act would not pass either extradition law test. Applying Castioni, there was no
political uprising at the time of her act which her disclosure served to further.84
Evading the repercussions of her actions and hiding in Deadpool forest wasn't about political
motives; it stemmed from fear. If it were a political stance, every government critic venting on
social media could seek diplomatic asylum.
B. Natasha Romanoff is not a refugee under the 1951 convention
Article 33 protects refugees through a right to secure entry to a Contracting State, and the
right to remain there to escape persecution. To seek protection under the convention, one
needs to attain ‘refugee’ status as per Article 1A(2), or, prima facie have a case to qualify.85
To do so, migrants need to possess “a well-founded fear of being persecuted”. This fear
mandatorily needs to be based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion.86
Article 1F of the Convention states that the provisions of the Refugee Convention do
not apply if there are serious reasons to consider that an individual has committed a crime. It
states The provisions of the Convention do not apply to any person with respect to whom
there are serious reasons for considering that they have committed a crime against peace, a
war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up
to make provision in respect of such crimes.
Natasha's actions fall under the breach of Article 35 and 55 of the fourth Geneva
Convention Additional Protocol87, prohibiting environmental damage for military
83
European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Position on Exclusion From Refugee Status PP1/03/2004/Ext/CA
(March 2004)
84
Mark D. Kielsgard ‘The Political Offense Exception: Punishing Whistleblowers Abroad’ (EJIL Blog14
November 2013)< https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-political-offenseexception-punishing-whistleblowers-abroad/
>accessed 10 December 2023
85
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1979),
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3ae6b3314.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR Handbook] para. 5
86
Article 1(A)(2), 1951 Refugee Convention.
87
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 07 December1979) 1125
UNTS 3 art 55 and 35
17
advantage—recognized as war crimes under the Rome Statute.88 Consequently, her actions
classify as a war crime, making her ineligible for asylum under Article 1F (b) of the
convention in Wakanda.
[2.3] The allegations of war crimes asserted by Wakanda against Commander Natasha
Romanoff are well founded and reasonable
War crimes are defined as grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
namely, any of the following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of
the relevant Geneva Convention including but not limited to wilfully causing great suffering,
or serious injury to body or health and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.89 War crimes are those
violations of international humanitarian law (treaty or customary law) that incur individual
criminal responsibility under international law. As a result, and in contrast to the crimes of
genocide and crimes against humanity, war crimes must always take place in the context of an
armed conflict, either international or non-international. 90
A. Wakanda has the locus standi to prosecute Natasha Romanoff
i) Wakanda has the jurisdictional competence to prosecute Ms Romanoff
Universal jurisdiction allows states to prosecute individuals for grave crimes regardless of
where the offense occurred or the nationality of the perpetrator.91 Article 146 of the Geneva
Convention emphasizes the obligation to prosecute individuals responsible for grave breaches,
including war crimes.92 Wakanda, as a signatory, can claim jurisdiction based on this principle.
This grants Wakanda the legal authority to prosecute Natasha Romanoff for her alleged
involvement in war crimes, irrespective of the location of the offense.
ii) Wakanda has an obligation to prosecute Natasha Romanoff under international law-
either to prosecute or extradite to Chitauria
88
UNTS 3 art 8
89
ibid
90
Ntaganda Judgment [703]; Bemba Judgment [137]; Katanga Judgment [1186-1187]; Lubanga Judgment [534-
538].
91
Stephen Macedo, The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction (New Jersey: Office of University Printing
and Mailing Princeton University, 2001)
92
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) Geneva
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in time of War (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into
force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287 art 146
18
International law, under various conventions and agreements, places an obligation on states to
prosecute or extradite individuals accused of serious crimes.93 If Wakanda fails to prosecute
Natasha Romanoff, it could be in violation of its international obligations, particularly
concerning extradition treaties with Chitauria. Should universal jurisdiction be founded, the
customary94 obligation of aut dedere aut judicare, as supported by opinio juris,95 obliges
Wakanda to to prosecute or extradite Romanoff. The latter duty shall be fulfilled when a
requesting state is able and willing to prosecute. 96
Since Wakanda is competent to prosecute
Romanoff under universal jurisdiction, it will fulfil its obligation under international law.
B. Natasha has committed war crimes as envisaged under the Geneva Convention and
the Rome Statute
i) Natasha Romanoff has violated Article 35 and 55 of the Additional Protocol to the
Geneva Coventions
Natasha Romanoff's alleged actions, specifically targeting and destroying SS T’Challa, fall
under scrutiny concerning the means of warfare used and the resulting consequences. Her
choice of action in employing methods that caused widespread and severe damage to the
natural environment, as indicated by the destruction of SS T’Challa, aligns with the prohibited
conduct outlined in Article 35.
This action might have caused superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering to the
environment and the inhabitants of Ravengers Island. The deliberate destruction of an entity
causing long-term environmental harm surpasses permissible methods of warfare outlined in
the Geneva Conventions' protocols. Furthermore, her alleged actions align with the prohibition
set in Article 55, intending or expecting widespread damage to the natural environment, which
may prejudice the health or survival of the population. The contamination of the water and the
resulting impact on the inhabitants of Ravengers Island, as evidenced by Peter Quill's family
being exposed to nuclear radiation, illustrates the severe repercussions of the destruction of SS
T’Challa.
93
M. Cherif Bassiouni and Edward M. Wise, ‘Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute in
International Law’ (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995) p 73.
94
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), (2012) ICJ Rep 144.
95
R.R. Baxter, ‘Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law’ (1965) 41 BYBIL 275 p 285,
286.
96
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session UN Doc A/49/10; Report of
the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-eighth session UN Doc A/61/ p 397
19
ii) Natasha Romanoff has violated the principle of proportionality under Rule 14 of
customary IHL
Natasha Romanoff's actions, as per the facts presented, may have resulted in incidental loss to
civilians (the inhabitants of Ravengers Island) and damage to civilian objects (the ecological
integrity of the island). Rule 14 of Customary IHL prohibits launching attacks that cause
excessive loss to civilians or civilian objects compared to the concrete military advantage
anticipated.97
In this case, the alleged attack on SS T’Challa led to severe damage to the environment
and civilian casualties or harm, far outweighing any apparent military gain. The resultant
environmental contamination and health hazards faced by the islanders signify an imbalance
between the purported military objective and the grave harm caused, rendering Natasha
Romanoff's actions a potential breach of Rule 14 of Customary IHL. Therefore, the refugee
application of Commander Natasha Romanoff should be excluded and she should not be
awarded asylum in Wakanda.
ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE DEPRIVATION OF PETER QUILL’S REFUGEE STATUS IS LAWFUL UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HE MAY NOT BE ACCORDED THE PROTECTION OF NON-
REFOULEMENT
It must be noted that the Respondent is a member of the United Nations [“UN”], is a party to
the Charter of the United Nations [“UN Charter”], is a party to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights [“the ICCPR”] and the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees [“the 1951 Convention”], its subsequent 1967 Protocol [“the 1967 Protocol”] and
has ratified the Avengers’ Convention on International Justice and Human Rights of 2010 [“the
ACIJ”].
It is hereby submitted on behalf of the Respondent, that (a) climate change is not
considered as a recognized refugee status admission ground in international law, (b) the alleged
charge of eco-piracy can be a valid ground for the refugee status exclusion ground mentioned
in Article 1F(c), and (c) Mr. Quill may not at the least be provided the protection of non-
refoulement.
97
Henckaerts J-M and others, ‘Proportionality in Attack (Rule 14)’ (2005 CUP) 1 Customary International
Humanitarian Law 46
20
[3.1] Climate change is not considered as a recognized refugee status admission ground in
international law
There exists no clear definition for a category of people under the category of climate refugees.
It has no legal meaning in principle and in provision – people who are displaced across borders
by climate-related phenomena do not qualify to claim the refugee status under the 1951
Refugee Convention as they are not considered to be victims of discriminatory persecution.98
Therefore, those states to whom people flee to are not legally obligated to recognise them as
refugees and subsequently grant entry.99 Therefore, prima facie, Wakanda is under no
obligation to admit Peter Quill as a refugee under grounds of climate change.
The right so enshrined extends merely to people who have a well-founded fear of being
persecuted because of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion, and are unable or unwilling to seek protection from their home countries.
A prerequisite for a person to fall within this definition is ‘persecution’. Climate change
cannot be considered a persecution as it entails violation of human rights that are sufficiently
serious, either because of their inherent nature or because of their repetition.100
Even if climate change can be considered ‘persecution’ for the purposes of the
convention, such persecution must necessarily be on account of race, religion, nationality,
political opinion, or membership of a particular social group. This is, again, not possible in the
case of climate change.101
The 1951 Convention requires that the asylum seeker must fear “being persecuted”.
Persecution implies a persecutor; the idea that the predicament of the asylum seeker is brought
about by human agency.102 Notwithstanding the court’s decision vis-à-vis Commander Natasha
Romanoff, a “persecutor” is hard to identify in the context of climate refugees. Natural disasters
are assumed to be the result of “the uncontrollable forces of nature” from which the “role of
human agents is entirely absent”.103
98
Human Rights Committee, Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol,
concerning communication No. 2728/2016 (Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand) CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016, Para 2.9.
99
Ibid.
100
Jane McAdam, UNHCR, ‘Climate Change Displacement and International Law: Complementary Protection
Standards (May 2011), PPLA/2011/03.
101
Ibid.
102
Scott M, Climate Change, Disasters, and the Refugee Convention (Cambridge University Press 2020)
103
Ibid. [3]
21
This perceived absence of discriminatory persecution in the context of climate refugees
and that pertinent to the condition of Peter Quill results in the fact that the principle of
surrogacy, in which international refugee law is rooted, is not engaged. A “bond of trust,
loyalty, protection, and assistance” exists between the citizen and state, and the effective
severance of such obliges the international community of states to provide “surrogate
protection” to the individual via asylum.104 On a bare understanding of facts from the
proposition, the status of a ‘climate refugee’ is therefore, not applicable.
[3.2] the alleged charge of eco-piracy can be a valid ground for the refugee status exclusion
ground mentioned in Article 1F(c)
Piracy under international law grants states the right to exercise universal jurisdiction, provided
that all conditions of its definition are cumulatively met. According to the Division for Ocean
Affairs and the Law of the Sea – a subsidiary body of the UN – eco-piracy carries a threshold
for it to be ascertained against an individual. Acts of eco-piracy seek to threaten maritime
security by endangering welfare of seafarers and the security of navigation and commerce.
Such acts that are inherently criminal in nature may result in the loss of life, physical harm or
hostage-taking of seafarers, financial losses to shipowners, damage to maritime environment
and so on.105
An act of piracy makes a perpetrator hostes humani generis, which refers to common
enemies of mankind. Piracy is a universal crime, and therefore, any state ipso facto can detain
and arrest individuals seeming to fit the crime of piracy and take appropriate repressive
measures against them.106 However, said universal jurisdiction does not apply to acts that are
committed within national jurisdictions. Furthermore, no chase or pursuit of pirates may be
done by one state’s vessel/s in the waters of another state until made legal.
Applying the given legal standing, it may be noticed on comparison that the Wakandan
Coast Guard vessel initiated pursuit of the SS Green Wakanda only when it reached the
Wakandan EEZ – which it had all the right to do. Assuming that the SS Green Wakanda was
104
Shacknove AE, ‘Who Is a Refugee? *’ [2017] International Refugee Law 163
105
UN, ‘Piracy under International Law’ (United Nations, May 2012)
<https://www.un.org/depts/los/piracy/piracy.htm> accessed 8 December 2023
Piracy ÖZ. Part II. The Journal of International Maritime Law. 2010;16(2):161-168; Nordquist M, editor. UN
106
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. A Commentary. Vol. III. Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers;
1995. xlv. p. 687
22
among the ships registered in The Neverlands, such an act of entering the EEZ may in effect,
amount to maritime trespassing.107
Therefore, the charge of eco-piracy may very well be accorded to Peter Quill prima
facie on the grounds of his apparent association with 3G. It is not apparent whether the acts of
3G insofar as their advocacy against mining in the EEZ has ever amounted to endangering
maritime security, but it may be classified as a threat to the security of navigation and
commerce. Therefore, the definition of eco-piracy finds its place and Quill’s association with
3G when he was subsequently arrested.108
Furthermore, whilst the charge of eco-piracy is pending prosecution, it may very well
be allowed for the operation of the exclusion ground mentioned in Article 1F(c) to operate in
favour of the Respondent.
[3.3] Mr. Quill may not at the least be provided the protection of non-refoulement.
Article 33 protects refugees through a right to secure entry to a Contracting State, and the right
to remain there to escape persecution. To seek protection under the convention, one needs to
attain ‘refugee’ status as per Article 1A(2), or, prima facie have a case to qualify.109 To do so,
migrants need to possess “a well-founded fear of being persecuted”.110 This fear mandatorily
needs to be based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion.111
Firstly, the drafting history indicates that natural disasters as a cause for migration was
deliberately declined as a valid ground for refugee status.112 It is to be noted here, that natural
disasters has been known to be split into two components both linguistically and conceptually
– one, is a direct result of natural consequences, the true ‘natural’ hazard event; whereas two,
is a result subsequent to human conduct, the human ‘disaster’, resulting in environmental
damage or degradation. It is to be further noted, that the reference under this argument is being
made to the second component. Secondly, the ‘agents of persecution’ as per the convention,
107
Moot Proposition, [44]
108
109
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3ae6b3314.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR Handbook] para. 5
110
UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, United Nations, Treaty
Series, vol. 189, art 1 (A) (2).
111
Article 1(A)(2), the 1951 Refugee Convention.
Jeanhee Hong, Refugees of the 21st Century: Environmental Injustice, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 323,
112
332 (2001) (citing Jacques Vernant, The Refugee in the Post-War World 5–7 (1953)).
23
needs to be the government, or unlawful sections of the country acting beyond the
government.113 Nature and climate as agents of persecution are therefore ruled out. Thirdly,
climate refugees cannot claim protection under the ‘social group’ category, as mere ‘sharing of
persecution’ amongst citizens is not sufficient.114 This is reinforced by the state practice of the
UNHCR.115
Furthermore, the protection under the principle of non-refoulement cannot extend to
the high seas and registered ships of the State.116 From a bare understanding, Peter Quill was
found aboard the SS Green Wakanda when he first came into Wakandan custody. Therefore, by
virtue of his primary presence identified by the State being that of a traveler on board the ship,
the said protection may not be accorded to him.
113
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3ae6b3314.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR Handbook]; ‘Extending
Refugee Definitions to Cover Environmentally Displaced Persons Displaces Necessary Protection - SUNY
Geneseo’ <https://glocat.geneseo.edu> accessed 8 September 2023.
114
Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1979) pg.
77-78.
115
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3ae6b3314.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR Handbook] para. 65.
116
24
PRAYER
WHEREFORE IN THE LIGHT OF THE ARGUMENTS ADVANCED, ISSUES RAISED AND
AUTHORITIES CITED, THE DEFENDANT HUMBLY SUBMITS THAT THIS HON’BLE COURT MAY BE
PLEASED TO ADJUDGE AND DECLARE THAT:
I. Karol Denvers be stripped of the refugee status assessed by Wakandan authority and
that she shall be lawfully removed from Deadpool Island under international law.
II. The refugee application of Commander Natasha Romanoff shall be excluded and that
she shall not, at the least, enjoy the protection of non-refoulement.
III. Peter Quill’s deprivation of refugee status is lawful under international law and that he
shall not, at the least, enjoy the protection of non-refoulement.
And, further grant any other relief that this Court may be pleased to grant in the interest of
justice, equity and good conscience.
All of which is most respectfully submitted.
Counsels for DEFENDANT
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TEAM CODE: T34D

THE GREATER AVENGERS COURT OF JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

KAROL DENVERS, NATASHA ROMANOFF, and PETER QUILL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF WAKANDA

Summary of Arguments xiii

ISSUE 1: WHETHER WAKANDA'S ANNEXATION OF DEADPOOL ISLAND AND SUBSEQUENT

[1.1] Annexation of Deadpool Island by Wakanda is Lawful. 1

A. Wakanda has historically claimed sovereignty over Deadpool Island 1

i) Deadpool Island was part of Wakanda until unlawfully occupied by Talokan

ii) Talokan's annexation violated uti possidetis juris principle 2

iii) Wakanda lodged persistent protests and attempts to regain control 3

B. 2020 annexation followed legitimate self-determination process 3

i) Based on recognised remedial secession criteria 3

ii) Any external self-determination allows redrawing boundaries. 4

C. Wakanda has established effective control constituting sovereignty. 5

i) Under international law doctrines of prescription and acquiescence. 5

ii) Displaced prior disputed sovereignty claims of Talokan. 5

[1.2] Change in sovereignty removes prior refugee status. 6

A. Refugee status grounds on lack of national protection. 7

i) Requires showing loss/denial of citizenship rights per Article 1. 7

ii) Change in citizenship eliminates lack of state protection. 7

B. Becoming Wakandan national negates refugee status. 8

i) Customary international law as reflected in UNHCR guidelines. 8

ii) Doctrine of cessation of refugee status applies under Article 1C. 9

C. Non-refoulement limited to removal from host state. 10

[1.3] Removing Refugee Status Upholds Non-Refoulement Obligations 10

A. No Indirect Risk of Chain Refoulement to Third State 11

i) Now Firmly Under Wakanda's Exclusive Territorial Jurisdiction and Control

ii) Protected by National Laws and Constitutional Rights as Wakandan Citizen

B. Exclusion Due to Security Risk Under Article 1F Overrides Any Non-

C. Removing from Deadpool Island Consistent with Non-Refoulement Obligations

i) Sole Risk is Lawful Domestic Prosecution as Wakandan Citizen 12

ii) No Need to Indefinitely Protect Prior, Superseded Refugee Status 12

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE REFUGEE APPLICATION OF COMMANDER NATASHA ROMANOFF BE

A. There is a well-defined basis that justifies the application of universal

B. Natasha Romanoff is not a refugee under the 1951 convention 17

A. Wakanda has the locus standi to prosecute Natasha Romanoff 18

i) Wakanda has the jurisdictional competence to prosecute Ms Romanoff 18

ii) Wakanda has an obligation to prosecute Natasha Romanoff under

i) Natasha Romanoff has violated Article 35 and 55 of the Additional Protocol

ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE DEPRIVATION OF PETER QUILL’S REFUGEE STATUS IS LAWFUL

Wakanda The Federal Republic of Wakanda

Talokan The Socialist State of Talokan

Sokovia The Principality of Sokovia

Kreeland The Kingdom of Kreeland

Chitauria The Kingdom of Chitauria

GACJ The Greater Avengers Court of Justice and Human Rights

The Avengers' Convention on International Justice and

ICJ The International Court of Justice

3G Guardian of the Green Galaxy

EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone

Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan 25

UN DECLARATIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS

JOURNAL ARTICLES AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Furthermore, the proposed extradition to Sokovia wouldn't contravene political offense

ISSUE 1: WHETHER WAKANDA'S ANNEXATION OF DEADPOOL ISLAND AND SUBSEQUENT

[1.1] Annexation of Deadpool Island by Wakanda is Lawful.

A. Wakanda has historically claimed sovereignty over Deadpool Island

ii) Talokan's annexation violated uti possidetis juris principle

iii) Wakanda lodged persistent protests and attempts to regain control

B. 2020 annexation followed legitimate self-determination process

i) Based on recognised remedial secession criteria