Molyneux 1985

Mobilization without Emancipation?
Women's Interests, the State, and Revolution in

Nicaragua
Author(s): Maxine Molyneux
Source: Feminist Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Summer, 1985), pp. 227-254
Published by: Feminist Studies, Inc.
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MOBILIZATIONWITHOUT EMANCIPATION?
WOMEN'SINTERESTS,THE STATE,
AND REVOLUTIONIN NICARAGUA
MAXINEMOLYNEUX
The fall of the Nicaraguandictator,AnastasioSomoza,in July 1979

could not have been achieved without the mass urban insurrec-
tions which brought the capital, Managua,and other key cities
underthe increasingcontrolof the revolutionaryforces. This was
the culmination of a process of growing popular opposition
characterizedby the incorporationof a wide cross-sectionof the
populationinto politicalactivity.
Large numbers of women from all social classes joined the
youth and the unwaged poor men who entered the realm of
politics in the 1970s, many for the first time. Women'sparticipa-
tion in the Nicaraguanrevolutionwas probablygreaterthan in
any other recent revolution with the exception of Vietnam.
Women made up approximately30 percentof the FSLN'scombat
forces, and at its peak in 1979, the women's organizationof the
FSLN,the Associationof Women Confrontingthe NationalProb-
lem, or AMPRONAC,had over 8,000 members.' Many more
women who were not involvedin organizedpoliticsprovidedvital
logisticaland backupsupportto the revolutionaryforces,and still
others gave their support silently by refusingto denounce their
revolutionaryneighbors,or by hiding a fleeing combatant.2
The extent of women's participationin the struggle against
Somozahas been regardedby many authorsas an obviousenough
responseto the widespreadrepressionand brutalityof the regime
on the one hand, and the appealof the FSLN'svision and strategy
on the other.3The specificways in which women becamepolitical
subjects has not been subjected to rigorous analysis, partly
because it seems obvious and partly because women's extensive
revolutionaryactivism is seen as the effect of the universalizing
Feminist Studies 11, no. 2 (Summer 1985). ? by Feminist Studies, Inc.

228 Maxine Molyneux
characterof the oppositionto Somoza.In the words of one author,

this process dissolved the specificity of political subjects in the
generalizedstruggleagainstthe dictatorship." Put simply, all were
united againstthe dictatorship,and differencesof class, age, and
genderwere transcended.It was this unity that accountedfor the
strengthand ultimatesuccess of the oppositionmovement.
However, much depends upon what is impliedby subjects"los-
ing their specificity"and goals being universalized.For the uni-
versalization of the goals of revolutionary subjects does not
necessarilyentaila loss of theirspecificidentities,and it is certainly
doubtfulwhetherthis can be said to have happenedin the case of
women. As far as women were concernedit would be difficultto
argue that a loss of their gender identities occurred, except
perhapsto a limitedextentamongthe frontline guerrilleros where
a degree of masculinizationand a blurringof gender distinctions
took place.' Rather,representationsof women acquirednew con-
notations,ones that politicizedthe social roles with which women
are conventionallyassociated,but did not dissolve them.
The participationof women in political activity was certainly
part of the wider process of popular mobilization,but it was
enteredinto froma distinctivesocialpositionto men, one crucially
shaped by the sexual division of labor. Moreover,for different
classes and groups of women, the meaningof politicalparticipa-
tion also differed,whether in the case of students,young middle-
class women, or the women in the barrios.6 For many poor
women, entry into political life began with the earthquakeof
1972, when in the aftermath,the neighborhoodcommitteeswere
organizedto care for the victims, feed the dispossessed,and tend
the wounded. The angerthat followed Somoza'smisappropriation
of the relief funds intensifiedas the brutalmethods used to con-
tain oppositionescalated.Manyof these women experiencedtheir
transitionfrom relief workers to participantsin the struggleas a
naturalextension,albeitin combativeform,of theirprotectiverole
in the familyas providersand cruciallyas mothers.Thistransition
to "combativemotherhood" was assistedby the propagandaefforts
of the radicalclergy,the Sandinistas,and by AMPRONAC,which
linked these traditionalidentitiesto more generalstrategicobjec-
tives, and celebratedwomen's role in the creationof a morejust
and humanitariansocial order.The revolutionaryappropriationof
the symbol of motherhood has since been institutionalized in the

MaxineMolyneux 229
FSLN'scanonizationof the "Mothersof Heroes and Martyrs,"a

support group which remains an active part of the Sandinistas'
politicalbase.7
However, if the revolution did not demand the dissolutionof
women's identities,it did requirethe subordination of their specific
intereststo the broadergoals of overthrowingSomozaand estab-
lishing a new social order. This raises an important question
which lies at the heart of debatesabout the relationshipbetween
socialistrevolutionand women'semancipation.Forif women sur-
render their specific interests in the universalstrugglefor a dif-
ferentsociety, at what point are these interestsrehabilitated,legiti-
mated, and responded to by the revolutionaryforces or by the
new socialist state? Some feminist writing implies that they are
never adequatelyreestablishedand that this is why socialism'has
failed to fulfill its promise to emancipate women. Such critics
point out that not only does genderinequalitystill persistin these
states, but also in some ways women could be consideredto be
worse off than they were before the revolution.Far from having
been "emancipated" as the official rhetoric sometimes claims,
women'swork load has been increasedand therehas been no sub-
stantial redefinitionof the relations between the sexes. To the
traditionalroles of housewife and mother have been added those
of full-timewage workerand politicalactivist,while the provision
of childcareagencies remains inadequate.As one Soviet woman
recently summed it up, "Ifthis is emancipation,then I'm against
it."1
The negativeimage of socialiststatesin this regardis reinforced
by theirfailureto establishanythingnearsexualparityin the organs
of politicalpower, and by the absence of real populardemocracy.
The conventionalexplanationsof these shortcomings-at least in
the poorer states-in terms of resource scarcity, international
pressure, underdevelopment, or the "weight of tradition,"are
greetedwith increasingskepticism.A feminist writerrecently ex-
pressedan emergingconsensuswhen she wrote:"ifa countrycan
eliminatethe tsetse fly, it can get an equal number of men and
women on its politburo."10
An even more negativeview of the recordof socialiststatessees
them as representingmerely another form of patriarchaldomi-
nation. It suggests that the "revolutionaryequality"commonly
claimedas the experienceof women and men freedomfightersin

230 MaxineMolyneux
battleis replacedin the postrevolutionaryperiodby the statusquo

ante with men in the positionsof power.As the all-maleleadership
grows increasingly unconcerned about advancing women's in-
terests,it appearsthat women'ssacrificesin the strugglefor a bet-
ter society have gone unrewardedby those whom they helpedto
bringto power. Women,like the workingclass in anotherconcep-
tion, appearto have been "soldout"-only in this case, not by a
"newbureaucraticbourgeoisie,"but by a morepervasiveand at the
same time analyticallyelusive entity, "thepatriarchy.""
This article focuses on the Nicaraguanrevolutionand its pro-
gress since the seizure of state power by the Sandinistasin July
1979, in order to considerthe propositionthat women's interests
are not served by socialistrevolutions.The articleexamineshow
women are affectedby governmentpolicies in the aftermathof a
successful revolutionaryseizure of power in which they par-
ticipatedon a mass scale. The first part of the discussionreviews
some of the theoreticalquestionsraisedby this debate,particular-
ly the matterof "women'sinterests."The second section describes
and interpretsthe policies that the Sandinistastate has adoptedin
relationto women in order to determinehow women's interests
are representedwithin the Sandinistastate.'"Womenin Nicaragua
have certainlynot achieved full equality,let alone emancipation.
But the argumentset forth here takes issue with the view that
women's interestshave been denied representationor have been
deliberatelymarginalizedthroughthe operationsof "patriarchy."'
WOMEN'SINTERESTS
The conceptof women'sinterestsis centralto feministevaluations
of socialist societies and indeed social policies in general. Most
feministcritiquesof socialistregimesrest on an implicitor explicit
assumptionthat there is a given entity, women's interests,that is
ignoredor overriddenby policymakers.However,the questionof
these interestsis far more complexthan is frequentlyassumed.As
the problemsof deployingany theory of interestin the analysisof
postrevolutionary situations are considerable, the following
discussion must be considered an attempt to open up debate
ratherthan to attainclosure.
The politicalpertinenceof the issue of whether states, revolu-
tionary or otherwise, are successful in securing the interests of

MaxineMolyneux 231
social groups and classes is generally considered to be twofold.

First,it is supposedto enablepredictionor at leastpoliticalcalcula-
tion about a given government'scapacityto maintainthe support
of the groupsit claims to represent.Second,it is assumedthat the
natureof the state can be deduced from the interestsit is seen to
be advancing.'4Thus the propositionthat a state is a "worker's
state,"a capitaliststate, or even a "patriarchal state"is commonly
tested by investigatinghow a particularclass or group has fared
under the governmentin question.
However, when we try to deploy similarcriteriain the case of
women a numberof problemsarise. If, for example,we conclude
that because the Sandinistasseem to have done relativelylittle to
remove the means by which gendersubordinationis reproduced,
that women'sinterestshave not been representedin the state and
hence women are likely to turn against it, we are making a
numberof assumptions:thatgenderinterestsare the equivalentof
women's interests, that gender is the principal determinantof
women'sinterests,and thatwomen'ssubjectivity,realor potential,
is structureduniquely throughgender effects. It is, by extension,
also supposedthat women have certaincommon interestsby vir-
tue of their gender, and that these interests are primary for
women. It follows then that transclassunity among women is to
some degree given by this commonalityof interests."5
Althoughit is true that at a certainlevel of abstractionwomen
can be said to have some interestsin common, there is no consen-
sus over what these interestsare or how they areto be formulated.
This is in part because there is no theoreticallyadequate and
universallyapplicablecausal explanationof women's subordina-
tion from which a general account of women's interests can be
derived.Women'soppressionis recognizedas being multicausalin
origin and mediated through a variety of different structures,
mechanisms,and levels which may vary considerablyacrossspace
and time. Thereis thereforecontinuingdebateoverthe appropriate
site of feminist struggleand over whether it is more importantto
focus attempts at change on objective or subjective elements,
"men"or "structures"; laws, institutions, or interpersonalpower
relations-or all of them simultaneously.Because a general con-
ception of interests (one which has political validity) must be
derived from a theory of how the subordinationof a determinate
social categoryis secured, it is difficultto see how it would over-

232 MaxineMolyneux
come the two most salientand intractablefeaturesof women'sop-

pression-its multicausalnature,and the extremevariabilityof its
forms of existenceacrossclass and nation.These factorsvitiateat-
temptsto speakwithoutqualification of a unitarycategory"women"
with a set of alreadyconstitutedinterestscommon to it. A theory
of intereststhat has an applicationto the debate about women's
capacityto strugglefor and benefitfrom socialchangemust begin
by recognizingdifferenceratherthan by assuminghomogeneity.
It is clearfrom the extensive feministliteratureon women'sop-
pression that a number of different conceptionsprevail of what
women'sinterestsare, and that these in turn rest implicitlyor ex-
plicitly,upon differenttheoriesof the causes of genderinequality.
For the purposeof clarifyingthe issues discussedhere, three con-
ceptionsof women'sinterests,which are frequentlyconflated,will
be delineated. These are women's interests, strategicgender in-
terests, and practicalgender interests.
Women'sinterests. Although present in much political and
theoreticaldiscourse,the concept of women'sinterestsis, for the
reasons given earlier,a highly contentiousone. Because women
are positionedwithin their societiesthrougha varietyof different
means-among them, class, ethnicity, and gender-the interests
they have as a group are similarlyshaped in complex and some-
times conflictingways. It is thereforedifficult,if not impossible,to
generalize about the interests of women. Instead, we need to
specify how the various categoriesof women might be affected
differently,and act differentlyon account of the particularitiesof
their social positioningand their chosen identities.However, this
is not to deny that women may have certaingeneralinterestsin
common. These can be called gender interests to differentiate
them from the false homogeneity imposed by the notion of
women's interests.
Strategicgender interests.Gender interests are those that women
(ormen, for thatmatter)may developby virtueof theirsocialposi-
tioning throughgender attributes.Gender interestscan be either
strategicor practical,each being derived in a differentway and
each involving differing implications for women's subjectivity.
Strategicinterestsare derivedin the firstinstancedeductively,that
is, from the analysisof women'ssubordinationand from the for-
mulationof an alternative,more satisfactoryset of arrangements
to those which exist. These ethicaland theoreticalcriteriaassistin

MaxineMolyneux 233
the formulationof strategicobjectivesto overcome women'ssub-

ordination,such as the abolitionof the sexualdivisionof labor,the
alleviation of the burden of domestic labor and childcare, the
removal of institutionalizedforms of discrimination,the attain-
ment of politicalequality,the establishmentof freedomof choice
over childbearing,and the adoptionof adequatemeasuresagainst
male violence and control over women. These constitute what
might be called strategicgender interests, and they are the ones
most frequentlyconsideredby feminists to be women's "real" in-
terests.The demandsthat are formulatedon this basis are usually
termed"feminist" as is the level of consciousnessrequiredto strug-
for
gle effectively them.'6
Practicalgenderinterests.Practicalgenderinterestsare given in-
ductivelyand arise fromthe concreteconditionsof women'sposi-
tioningwithin the genderdivisionof labor.In contrastto strategic
gender interests, these are formulatedby the women who are
themselves within these positionsratherthan throughexternalin-
terventions. Practicalinterests are usually a response to an im-
mediateperceivedneed, and they do not generallyentaila strate-
gic goal such as women's emancipation or gender equality.
Analysesof femalecollectiveactionfrequentlydeploythis concep-
tion of intereststo explainthe dynamicand goals of women'spar-
ticipationin social action.Forexample,it has been arguedthat by
virtue of their place within the sexual division of labor as those
primarilyresponsiblefor their household'sdaily welfare, women
have a specialinterestin domesticprovisionand public welfare."
When governments fail to provide these basic needs, women
withdraw their support;when the livelihood of their families-
especiallytheirchildren-is threatened,it is women who formthe
phalanxes of bread rioters, demonstrators,and petitioners.It is
clear,however, from this examplethat genderand class are close-
ly intertwined;it is, for obviousreasons,usuallypoorwomen who
are so readilymobilizedby economicnecessity. Practicalinterests,
therefore, cannot be assumed to be innocent of class effects.
Moreover,these practicalinterestsdo not in themselves challenge
the prevailingforms of gender subordination,even though they
arise directly out of them. An understandingof this is vital in
understandingthe capacityor failureof states or organizationsto
win the loyalty and supportof women.
The pertinenceof these ways of conceptualizinginterestsfor an

234 MaxineMolyneux
understandingof women'sconsciousnessis a complexmatter,but

three initial points can be made. First, the relationshipbetween
what we have calledstrategicgenderinterestsand women'srecog-
nitionof them and desireto realizethem cannotbe assumed.Even
the lowest common denominatorof interestswhich might seem
uncontentious and of universal applicability(such as complete
equality with men, control over reproduction,and greaterper-
sonal autonomyand independencefrom men) are not readilyac-
cepted by all women. This is not just because of "false con-
sciousness"as is frequentlysupposed-although this can be a fac-
tor-but because such changes realized in a piecemeal fashion
could threatenthe short-termpracticalinterestsof some women,
or entaila cost in the loss of formsof protectionwhich arenot then
compensatedfor in some way. Thus the formulationof strategic
interestscan only be effective as a form of interventionwhen full
accountis taken of these practicalinterests.Indeed,it is the politi-
cization of these practicalinterestsand their transformationinto
strategic interests that women can identify with and support
which constitutesa centralaspect of feministpoliticalpractice.
Second,the way in which interestsare formulated-whether by
women or politicalorganizations- will vary considerablyacross
space and time and may be shapedin differentways by prevailing
political and discursive influences. This is importantto bear in
mind when consideringthe problem of internationalismand the
limits and possibilitiesof cross-culturalsolidarity.Finally,because
women'sinterestsare significantlybroaderthan genderinterests,
and are shapedto a considerabledegreeby class factors,women's
unity and cohesionon genderissues cannotbe assumed.Although
they can form the basis of unity around a common pro-
gram, such unity has to be constructed-it is never given. More-
over, even when unity exists it is always conditional,and the
historical record suggests that it tends to collapse under the
pressureof acute class conflict.It is also threatenedby differences
of race, ethnicity,and nationality.It is thereforedifficultto argue,
as some feminists have done, that gender issues are primaryfor
women, at all times."
This generalproblemof the conditionalityof women'sunity and
the fact that genderissues are not necessarilyprimaryis nowhere
more clearlyillustratedthan by the exampleof revolutionaryup-
heaval. In such situations, gender issues are frequently displaced

Maxine Molyneux 235
by class conflict,principallybecause althoughwomen may suffer

discriminationon the basis of genderand may be aware that they
do, they nonetheless suffer differentiallyaccordingto their social
class. These differences cruciallyaffect attitudestoward revolu-
tionary change, especially if this is in the directionof socialism.
This does not mean that, because gender interestsare an insuffi-
cient basisfor unity amongwomen in the contextof classpolariza-
tion, they disappear.Rather,they become more specificallyat-
tached to and defined by social class.
An awareness of the complex issues involved serves to guard
againstany simple treatmentof the questionof whether a state is
or is not acting in the interestsof women, that is, whether all or
any of these interestsare representedwithin the state. Beforeany
analysiscan be attemptedit is necessaryto specify in what sense
the term "interest"is being deployed.A state may gain the support
of women by satisfyingeither their immediatepracticaldemands
or certainclass interests,or both. It may do this withoutadvancing
their strategicobjective interests at all. However, the claims of
such a state to be supportingwomen'semancipationcould not be
substantiatedmerely on the evidence that it maintainedwomen's
supporton the basis of representingsome of their more practical
or class interests.Withthese distinctionsin mind, I shallturnnow
to the Nicaraguanrevolution,and consider how the Sandinistas
have formulatedwomen's interests,and how women have fared
under their rule.
THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION

The Nicaraguan revolution represents an extreme case of the
problemsof constructinga socialistsociety in the face of poverty
and underdevelopment,counterrevolution,and externalinterven-
tion. It could therefore be seen as an exceptional case, and its
usefulness as an example consequentlylimited. Yet althoughthe
Sandinistasface a particularlysevere constellationof negativecir-
cumstances, most socialist revolutions have encountered dif-
ficulties of a similarkind and even degree. One has only to think
of the encirclement and internal disruption by enemy forces
which the Bolsheviksfaced after 1917;the conditionsof dire scar-
city prevailingin postrevolutionaryMozambique,China,or South
Yemen; the blockade of poor nations such as Cuba; or the devasta-

236 MaxineMolyneux
tion throughwar wreaked on Vietnamto realizethat such condi-

tions are more common than not in the attemptsto build socialist
societies.
Yet the fact that Nicaraguashares certain circumstanceswith
the states referredto above does not imply that it belongs to the
categoryof revolutionsthat these countriesrepresent.They were,
or became, for the most part avowedly communist in their
political ideology, and anticapitalistin their economic practice,
moving rapidlyto place their main resourcesunder state control.
Most too, alignedthemselves directlywith the SovietUnion or at
least maintained a distance from the North Atlantic Treaty
Organizationblock of countriesin theirforeignaffairs.All of them
are one-partystates in which dissent is allowed little, if any, free
expression.
By contrast,the forces which overthrewAnastasioSomozain
July of 1979 distinguishedthemselves by their commitmentto a
socialism based on the principles of mixed economy, nonalign-
ment, and political pluralism. An opposition was allowed to
operate within certain clearly defined limits, and more than 60
percentof the economy remainedin privatehands, despitethe na-
tionalizationof Somocistaassets. "Sandinismo" promised to pro-
duce a different kind of socialism, one that consolidated the
revolutionaryoverthrowof the old regimethroughthe creationof
a new armyand its controlof otherorgansof statepower, but was
more democratic,independent,and "moderate" than many other
Third World socialisms had been. Through its triumph and its
commitmentto socialistpluralism,Nicaraguabecamea symbol of
hope to socialists,not only in LatinAmerica,but aroundthe world
as well. It was this perhaps,ratherthan its "communism," that ac-
counted for the ferocity and determinationof the Reagan ad-
ministration'seffortsto bring the process to an end.19
The Nicaraguanrevolutionalso gave hope to those who sup-
portedwomen's liberation,for here too, the Sandinistaswere full
of promise. The revolution occurred in the period after the up-
surge of the "new feminism"of the late sixties, at a time when
Latin American women were mobilizing around feminist de-
mands in countrieslike Mexico, Peru,and Brazil.The Sandinistas'
awareness of the limitations of orthodox Marxism encouraged
some to believe that a space would be allowed for the develop-
ment of new social movements such as feminism. Some members

Maxine Molyneux 237
of the leadership seemed aware of the importanceof women's

liberationand of the need for it in Nicaragua.The early issues of
SomosAMNLAE,one of two newspapersof the women'sorganiza-
tion, containedarticlesabout feminist issues and addressedsome
of the ongoingdebateswithin Westernfeminism. Unlike many of
its counterpartselsewhere,the FSLN,the revolutionaryparty,did
not denounce feminismas a "counterrevolutionary diversion,"and
some women officials had even gone on record expressingen-
thusiasm for its ideals.
In practicaltermstoo, there was promise.The FSLNhad shown
itself capableof mobilizingmany thousandsof women in support
of its struggle.It had done this partlythroughAMPRONAC,the
women'sorganizationthat combineda commitmentto overthrow
the Somozaregimewith that of strugglingfor women'sequality.At
its peak in 1979,two years afterit was founded,AMPRONAChad
attractedover 8,000 members. Feministobserversnoted the high
level of participationof women in the ranksof the combatforces,
epitomizedin Dora MariaTellez'srole as CommanderTwo in the
seizureof the PresidentialPalaceby the guerillasin 1978,and they
debated how the Sandinistacommitment to women's equality
would be realizedif they triumphed.
Once they were in power, these hopes were not disappointed.
Only weeks after the triumph, article 30 of decree number 48
banned the media's exploitationof women as sex objects, and
women FSLNcadres found themselves in senior positionsin the
newly establishedstate as ministers,vice-ministers,and regional
coordinators of the party. In September, AMPRONACwas
transformed into the Luisa Amanda Espinosa Association of
NicaraguanWomen (AMNLAE)to advancethe cause of women's
emancipationand carry through the program of revolutionary
transformation.Publicmeetingswere adornedwith the slogan"No
revolution without women's emancipation: no emancipation
without revolution."The scene seemed to be set for an imaginative
and distinctivestrategyfor women's emancipationin Nicaragua.
But after the first few years in power, the FSLN'simage abroad
began to lose some of its distinctive appeal.The combined pres-
sures of economic scarcity,counterrevolution,and militarythreat
were taking their toll on the Sandinistaexperimentin economic
and politicalpluralism,placing at risk the ideals it sought to de-
fend. In the face of mounting pressure from U.S.-backed counter-

238 Maxine Molyneux
revolutionariesin 1982, a furthercasualtyof these difficultiesap-

peared to be the Sandinistacommitmentto the emancipationof
women. AMNLAE,the women's union, reduced its public iden-
tificationwith "feminism" and spoke increasinglyof the need to
promote women's interests in the context of the wider struggle.
Already, at its constitutive assembly at the end of 1981, it had
defined its role as enabling women to integratethemselves as a
decisiveforcein the revolution.AMNLAE's firstprioritywas given
as "defenseof the revolution."But it was only in 1982,as the crisis
deepenedand the countrywent onto a war footingthat the priori-
ty reallydid become (asit had to) the revolution'ssurvival,with all
effortsdirectedto militarydefense. AMNLAEbecame actively in-
volved in recruitingwomen to the army and militia.Under such
circumstancesit is hardly surprisingthat the efforts to promote
women'semancipationwere scaleddown or redefined.Emancipa-
tion was to come about as a by-productof makingand defending
the revolution. Yet, even before the crisis deepened, little had
been achieved to tangibly improve the position of women, and
FSLNcadresconsideredthat progressin this area was necessarily
limited.In the firstmajorspeech on women'sstatussince the over-
throw, the ministerof defense, Tomis Borge,acknowledgedthat
although certain importantadvances had been made, "allof us
have to honestlyadmitthatwe haven'tconfrontedthe strugglefor
women's liberationwith the same courage and decisiveness [as
shown in the liberation struggle]. . . . From the point of view of
daily exertion,women remainfundamentallyin the same condi-
tions as in the past."20Was it the case then that women'sspecific
interests had not been adequately represented in Sandinista
policies?
SANDINISTA POLICY WITH REGARD TO WOMEN

As a socialistorganization,the FSLNrecognizedwomen'soppres-
sion as something that had to be eliminatedin the creationof a
new society. The FSLNgave supportto the principle of gender
equality as part of its endorsementof the socialistideal of social
equalityfor all. The 1969programof the FSLNpromisedthat "the
Sandinistapeople'srevolutionwill abolish the odious discrimina-
tion that women have been subjectedto comparedwith men"and
"willestablish economic, political and culturalequality between

Maxine Molyneux 239
women and men."This commitmentwas enshrineda decadelater

within the EstatuoFundamental,the embryonicconstitutionthat
proclaimed"theunconditionalequalityof all Nicaraguanswithout
distinctionof race, nationality,creed, or sex."It went furtherin
pledging the state to "remove by all means available. . .the
obstacles to achieving it."This providedthe juridicalcontext for
future legislativeand policy measuresaimed at securingsome of
the conditionsenablingthis equalityto be achieved.
Most contemporarystates have enshrinedwithin their constitu-
tions, or equivalents,some phrase which opposes discrimination
on the groundsof race, sex, or creed. Whatdistinguishessocialist
states such as Nicaraguais their recognitionof the specificityof
women's oppressionand their supportfor measuresthat combine
a concernto promoteequalitywith a desireto removesome of the
obstaclesto achievingit. Some of the strategicinterestsof women
are thereforerecognizedand, in theory, are advancedas part of
the processof socialisttransformation.In its essentials,the FSLN's
theoreticaland practicalapproachto women's emancipationbears
some resemblanceto that found in those state socialistcountries
that espouse Marxisttheory. They share an approachthat links
genderoppressionto class oppressionand believe women'seman-
cipationcan only be achievedwith the creationof a new, socialist
society and with the further development of the productive
capacity of the economy. In the meantime, however, measures
can be takento alleviatethe considerableinequalitiesbetween the
sexes and begin the task of '"humanizing life and improvingthe
quality and content of human relations.""21
Accordingto official views and party documents,this involves
implementingthe principlesof the classic socialistguidelinesfor
the emancipationof women as formulatedby the Bolsheviksand
broadlyadheredto ever since by socialist states." Some of these
guidelines have been incorporatedinto AMNLAE'sofficial pro-
gramwhich lists its main goals as (1) defendingthe revolution;(2)
promotingwomen's political and ideologicalawareness and ad-
vancing their social, political, and economic participationin the
revolution;(3)combattinglegaland otherinstitutionalinequalities;
(4)encouragingwomen'sculturaland technicaladvancementand
entry into areas of employment traditionallyreserved for men,
combinedwith opposingdiscriminationin employment;(5)foster-
ing respectfor domesticlaborand organizingchildcareservicesfor

240 MaxineMolyneux
workingwomen; and (6) creatingand sustaininglinks of interna-

tionalsolidarity.The 1969programof the FSLNalso made special
mention of eliminatingprostitutionand other "socialvices,"help-
ing the abandonedworkingmother,and protectingthe illegitimate
child. Eachof these issues has been addressedin subsequentlegis-
lationand socialpolicy. Thereis also officialconcernfor allowing
greaterfreedomof choice to women in the matterof childbearing,
by makingcontraceptivesmore widely availableand by not pro-
secutingthose who carryout abortions,except in a few cases.23
Although these goals, if realized, would be insufficient to
achieve the complete emancipationof women, based as they are
on a somewhatnarrowdefinitionof genderinterests,they do em-
body some strategicconcerns, in that they are directed toward
eliminating some of the fundamentalinequalities between the
sexes. However, progressin Nicaraguahas so far been uneven.
There is official supportfor the implementationof the full pro-
gram, but only some of the guidelineshave been translatedinto
policy and then only with limited effect. Employment oppor-
tunities in the formal sector have been slightly expandedbut re-
main restricted both in number and scope. Most Nicaraguan
women continue to eke out a living as petty commodity pro-
ducers, small tradersor house servants,remainingat the bottom
of the income structure.24"The socialization of childcare and
domestic labor has affected only a minority of women: by
mid-1984, forty-three childcare centers were able to absorb
around4,000 children,and furtherexpansionwas not envisaged
because of mounting financial difficulties,caused by the contra
war.25 The embryonicFamilyLaw, the Ley de Alimentos,passed
by the Council of Stateat the end of 1982, aimed to establisha
more democratic, egalitarian,and mutually responsible family,
but it was not ratifiedby the Junta,and public discussion of the
issues it raised all but ceased in 1983. The greatestbenefits that
women received were from the welfare programsand from cer-
tain areasof legalreform.Womenalso felt the impactof changein
the realmof politicalmobilizationin which they playedan increas-
ingly active part. Despite these advances it was evident that the
gap between intentionand realizationwas considerable.
Beyond the obvious problem of lack of time, there are three
other considerationsto be examined.The first concernsthe prac-
tical limitations, which restricted the state's capacity for social

Maxine Molyneux 241
transformation,the second involves factorsof a general political

kind, and the thirdconcernsthe natureof the policies themselves
and the way in which the Sandinistas'commitmentto women's
emancipationwas formulated.All these issues have to be takenin-
to account when assessing the position of women in postrevolu-
tionaryNicaragua,for they help to explainwhy the social policy
initiatives of the Sandinistasto improve the position of women
have been diluted, and why the government has on occasion
adopted different priorities- sometimes ones which are at
variancewith the goal of emancipatingwomen.
The problems of material scarcity in an underdeveloped
economy, or the tolls of militarythreat do not requireextensive
discussion here. Details can be found elsewhere of the parlous
state of the Nicaraguaneconomy, the ravagesof war and natural
disasters,the effect of the contrasand U.S. pressure,and the size of
the external debt. What is most striking in all of this was the
government'ssuccess in shieldingthe populationfrom the effects
of these difficultiesthroughout1982and much of 1983. However,
the combined effects of materialscarcity and the destabilization
efforts of internal and external forces limited the available
resources,which had to satisfy the militaryrequirementsof the
state, but also were crucialfor investmentin long-termeconomic
programs,meeting short-termconsumer needs and fulfillingthe
popularexpectationto expandsocial services. It is not difficultto
see how these factors reduced the scope of planning objectives,
channelingscarceresourcesof both a financialand technicalkind,
as well as human potential away from social programsinto na-
tional defense and economic development. By 1984 more than
one-thirdof the nationalbudgetwas being channeledinto defense.
These two factors, scarcity and threat, explain the restrictions
placed on the funding availablefor such projectsas buildingand
staffingnurseriesand expandingfemale employment,and they go
some way towardexplainingwhy the emancipationof women, ex-
cept within a rathernarrow interpretation,was not considereda
priority.
Even where the resource base existed, the government still
faced problems of implementation in the form of political op-
position to some of the proposed reforms. The Nicaraguan
revolution is a clear illustration of the truism that the acquisi-
tion of state power does not confer on governments absolute

242 MaxineMolyneux
power either in formulation or implementation of policies even

when they might have widespread popular support. The over-
throw of SalvadorAllende in 1973 was a dramatic demonstra-
tion of the ever-present threat of counterrevolutionand of the
diversity of sites within the state and civil society through
which it can be organized. The Sandinistaswere in a stronger
position internally than the government of Popular Unity in
Chile even if they faced a more determined threat from the
United States and its allies in the region. They dismantled
Somoza's repressive apparatus, replacing it with their own
military and police forces, and established control over a
number of state and government institutions. In the five years
since the fall of Somoza,the revolutionarygovernment has also
succeeded in consolidatingits power base throughthe establish-
ment of the "massorganizations,"the popular defense commit-
tees, the militia, and the FSLN itself. Moreover, the opposi-
tion -both civilian and military -was unable to offer a credible
alternative, in part because of its links to the United States and
to the Somocistas.
Despite the strategic and political advantages which accrued
to the Sandinistas as a result of these transformationsof the
state and of its institutions, they did not include the elimination
of the opposition. The constitutional commitment to the prin-
ciples of economic and political pluralism allowed a space,
albeit a restricted one, from which oppositional forces could
operate. The FSLNattemptedto maintain,as far as the situation
permitted, a broad multiclass base of support. It tried to win
over a sector of the capitalist class, and on the whole it also
sought to maintaina conciliatoryattitude toward its opponents,
sometimes in the face of considerable provocation. The opposi-
tion therefore had the right to make its views heard and could
organize to protect its interests, providing these did not jeopar-
dize the government'soverall survival or place the interests of
the majority at risk. When these were considered threatened,
the Sandinistasintervened. The State of Emergency,declared in
1982, allowed the state to curb some of the opposition's ac-
tivities and imposed censorship on the main opposition paper,
La Prensa. By international standards, these moves were
moderate ones, especially given the conditions of war which
have increasingly prevailed since 1983.26 Moreover, the govern-

Maxine Molyneux 243
ment lifted the State of Emergencyto allow for the preparations

of the late-1984 elections, and the opposition was encouragedto
contest them.
The commitment to allow dissent and opposition parties and
press represents an importantprinciple of socialist democracy.
Too many socialistcountrieshave interpretedsocialismas merely
the socializationof the economy and have failed to implementthe
otherside of the equation- the democratizationof politicalpower.
In this, the Sandinistasat least tried harderthan most. However,
as with most attemptsat compromise,there was a price;the com-
mitment to "pluralism" and to maintainingthe supportor at least
neutrality of the capitalistclass had as one of its necessaryeffects
the impositionof certainlimits on the transformativecapacityof
the state in some areas of policy. This was especially clear with
regardto the government'sprogramto improve the position of
women.
The maintenanceof a sizable private sector (78 percent of in-
dustry,60 percentof commerce,76 percentof agriculture)and the
grantingof a measureof autonomyto it allowed some employers,
especially in the smaller nonunionized enterprises, to evade
legislationdesignedto protectand improvethe workingconditions
of women, as well as to pursue discriminatoryemployment
policies.Thereare many otherexamplesof this kind. But the most
powerful ideologicalforce and that which offered the most sus-
tained resistanceto Sandinistareformswas the conservativewing
of the Catholicchurch. Its extensive institutionalpresence, forms
of organization,access to the media (it had its own radiostation),
and basewithina substantialsectionof the populationmadeit a for-
midable opponent. Its impact on slowing reform in the areas
directly concerned with women, was considerable.Conservative
clergy actively opposed educationaland family reforms,enforced
bans on weekend work (which made it difficult for voluntary
labor schemes to achieve much), opposed the conscription of
women, and were strongadvocatesof traditionalfamily life and
the division of labor which characterizesit.27The conservative
church also opposed divorce reform and urged adherenceto the
papal encyclical stating that it is sinful to employ "unnatural"
methods of birth control. It has also opposed the legalizationof
abortion,forcingthousandsof women to remainin the hands of
back street practitioners."

244 Maxine Molyneux
What was thereforea positive featureof the Sandinistarevolu-

tion-its democraticcommitment-did have the effect of diluting
policy measuresand weakeningthe government'scapacityfor im-
plementation. It is therefore erroneous to imagine that just
becausea statemighthave a coherentset of policiesand a unifying
ideology that is has the capacity to be fully effective in social
policy terms. It should be clear that the most favored solution
historicallyis a problematicone to say the least:the subjugationof
the oppositionand the strengtheningof the state.
A second political factor of a very differentkind, but equally
crucialto the success or failure of governmentpolicies is that of
the population'sdegreeof supportfor or resistanceto the policies.
As faras changesin the positionof women are concerned,the San-
dinistas were limited in what they could do both by the conser-
vative influenceof the Catholicchurchand by the relativelysmall
social base of support for feminism. There was no history of a
popularand militant feminism in Nicaragua(as there was for a
time in Argentina,for example), with the result that the San-
dinistashad to contendwith deeply entrenchedmachistaattitudes
and considerablehostility among much of the populationto the
idea of women's emancipation.
Nevertheless,the revolutionarywar providedthe initialcontext
for the weakening of the traditionalstereotypesand conventions,
and it was on this basis that the Sandinistasbeganto buildpopular
supportfor AMNLAE'scampaigns.These tended to be successful
when sufficienttime and energywas devotedto explainingthe ob-
jectivesand learningfromthe women'sresponses- thatis, creating
and reproducingan organiclink between the organizationand the
people it was representing,a process which amounted to syn-
thesizingthe practicaland strategicaspects of women's interests.
Yet, as we shall see shortly, the campaigns suffered from a
number of limitations,includingthe fact that they were directed
mostly at women and did not seek to make radicalchanges in
men'sattitudesand behavior.As the pressureof the war mounted,
AMNIAE abandonedthe more feminist themes in the belief that
they would alienate popular support. How far this was a risk,
however, could not be established in the absence of extensive
researchinto both attitudesand concrete conditionsto establish
the likely effects of the proposedreforms.
Only in this context is it relevant to discuss the third factor

MaxineMolyneux 245
that accounts for the limited achievements of the Sandinista

record on women -that of their conception of the place of
women's emancipation within the overall context of their
priorities. It is clear that the FSLNwas able to implement only
those parts of the programfor women's emancipationthat coin-
cided with its general goals, enjoyed popularsupport,and were
realizablewithout arousingstrongopposition. The policies from
which women derived some benefit were pursued principally
because they fulfilled some wider goal or goals, whether these
were social welfare, development, social equality, or political
mobilizationin defense of the revolution. This is, in effect, what
the Sandinistasmeant by the need to locate women's emancipa-
tion within the overall struggle for social reform and survival
against intensifying external pressure.
This kind of qualified support for women's emancipation is
found in most of the states that have pursued socialist develop-
ment policies. Indeed, the guidelines that form the basis of their
programfor women's emancipation (discussed earlier)all have
universalistic as well as particularistic goals, in which the
former is the justification for the latter. Thus, women's eman-
cipation is not just dependent on the realization of the wider
goals, but it is pursued insofar as it contributesto the realization
of those goals. There is thereforea unity of purpose between the
goals of women's emancipation and the developmental and
social goals of revolutionary states.29
Revolutionary governments tend to see the importance of
reformingthe position of women in the first period of social and
economic transformationin terms of helping to accomplish at
least three goals:to extend the base of the government'spolitical
support, to increase the size or quality of the active labor force,
and to help harness the family more securely to the process of
social reproduction.The first aim, of expandingor maintaining
the power base of the state, is pursued by attempting to draw
women into the new political organizations such as the
women's, youth, and labor unions; the party;and neighborhood
associations. There is a frequently expressed fear that unless
women are politicized they may not cooperatewith the process
of social transformation.Women are seen as potentially and ac-
tually more conservative than men by virtue of their place
within the social division of labor, that is, as primarilylocated

246 Maxine Molyneux
outside the sphere of production. More positively, women are

also regardedas crucial agents of revolutionarychange whose
radicalizationchallenges ancient customs and privileges within
the family, and has important effects on the next generation,
through the impact on their children. The political mobilization
of women supposes some attempt to persuade them that their
interests as well as more universal concerns (national,
humanitarian,and so forth) are represented by the state.3"
The second way in which the mobilizationof women is re-
gardedas a necessarypart of the overallstrategyis more directly
relevantto the economy.The educationof women and their entry
into employmentincreasesand improvesthe availablelabor sup-
ply, which is a necessaryconcomitantof any successful develop-
ment program.In most underdevelopedcountries,women form
only a small percentage of the economically active population
(usuallyless than 20 percent), and although the figures tend to
conceal the real extent of women's involvement, by registering
mainly formalratherthan informalactivities,the work they do is
frequentlyunpaid and underproductive,confined to family con-
cerns in workshopsor in the fields, and subjectto the authorityof
male kin. Government policies have therefore emphasizedthe
need for both education and a restructuringof employment to
make better use of the work capacitiesof the female population.
The thirdaim is to bringthe familymore into line with planning
objectivesand to place it at the centerof initiativesaimedat social
reconstruction.Postrevolutionarygovernmentsregardwomen as
key levers in harnessingthe family more securely to state goals,
whether these be of an economic or an ideologicalkind. The pre-
revolutionaryfamily has to be restructuredto make it more com-
patible with the developmental goals of revolutionarygovern-
ments. Once this has been accomplished,the reformedfamily is
expected to function as an importantagent of socialization,in-
culcatingthe new revolutionaryvalues into the next generation.
Women are seen as crucialin both of these processes.
Although these considerationsare shared by most socialist
states, the peculiar circumstancesof Nicaragua'stransitionhave
determinedthe relativeemphasisplacedon these policy objectives
and have shaped the state'scapacityto implementthem. For ex-
ample, in Nicaraguathere is no absoluteshortageof labor,nor is
productionbeing greatly expanded.There is as yet thereforeno

MaxineMolyneux 247
urgentrequirementfor women to enter employmentdespitesome

expansion in state sector demand. Initially, women were called
upon to supply a considerableamountof voluntarylaboras health
workers and teachers in the popularcampaigns(healthin 1981,
literacyin 1982).Buttherewas no strongmaterialincentiveto pro-
vide widespreadnurserycare while the economy did not depend
upon a mass influx of female labor. Moreover, because most
women worked in the informalsectorit was assumedthat a sub-
stantial percentage of these jobs were compatible with their
domestic responsibilities.This situation might be expected to
change if there is a significant escalation of military activities,
necessitatingthe entryof women intojobs vacatedby men serving
in the armed forces.3'
As noted earlier,the emphasis of the governmentwas on two
otherstrategies,that of politicalmobilizationand legalreform.The
new laws regardingthe familywere designedto strengthenthe in-
stitution,promotegreaterfamilycohesion, and removethe gender
inequalities that prevailed. The high rate of male desertion,
migrancy,and serialpolygamyleft largenumbersof women as the
sole providersfor their children:34 percentof Nicaraguanhouse-
holds were female headed -in Managua, it was 60 percent -a fac-
tor which contributeddirectly to the high incidence of female
poverty." The new ProvisionLaw made all adult membersof the
family, on a three-generationbasis, legally liable for maintaining
the family unit which included taking a share in the household
tasks. In additionto these changes, the health and safety provi-
sions of women workerswere improved,and new legislationgave
ruralwomen workersan entitlementto theirown wages to redress
a situationin which a family wage was usually paid to the male
head of the household."33
As far as the politicalmobilizationof women was concerned,by
1984therewere more women mobilizedthanat any time since the
months leading up to the overthrow.AMNLAEclaimed a card-
carryingmembershipof 85,000, and women made up 22 percent
of FSLN'smembershipand more than one-third,or 37 percent,of
the leadership." Women's participation in the other mass
organizationsand in the organsof populardefense also expanded
with the deepening of the crisis. Approximatelyone-half of the
members of the Sandinistadefense committees,a type of neigh-
borhoodassociation,were women, and women made up a similar
proportionof the militia.

248 Maxine Molyneux
These then, were the areasin which the greatestadvanceswere

registeredin relation to achieving policy objectives which con-
cerned women as such. Yet more women benefited, and have
benefitedmore,from the implementationof measuresdesignedto
secure generalobjectives.Chief among these was welfare.
A detailedanalysisof the impactof Sandinistasocial policies is
beyond the scope of this paper."Instead,I will brieflysummarize
some of the relevantconclusionsby consideringthe effects of the
reforms in terms of the three categoriesof interest referredto
earlier.
If we disaggregatewomen'sinterestsand considerhow different
categoriesof women fared since 1979, it is clearthat the majority
of women in Nicaraguawere positively affected by the govern-
ment'sredistributionpolicies. This is so even thoughfundamental
structuresof gender inequalitywere not dismantled.In keeping
with the socialist character of the government, policies were
targeted in favor of the poorest sections of the population and
focused on basic needs provisionin the areasof health, housing,
education,and food subsidies.In the shortspan of only five years,
the Sandinistasreducedthe illiteracyratefrom over 50 percentto
13 percent;doubledthe numberof educationalestablishments,in-
creased school enrollment, eradicated a number of mortal
diseases, providedthe populationwith basic healthcareservices,
and achieved more in their housingprogramthan Somozahad in
his entire period of rule.36In addition,the land reform canceled
peasants'debts and gave thousands of rural workers their own
parcelsof land or securedthem stablejobs on the state farmsand
cooperatives."3
These policies have been of vital importancein gainingthe sup-
port of poor women. Accordingto governmentstatistics,women
form more than 60 percent of the poorest Nicaraguans;in the
poorest categoryin Managua(incomesof less than 600 cordobas
per month),there are 354 women for each 100 men.8 It is these
women, by virtue of their classposition,who have been the direct
beneficiariesof Sandinistaredistributiveefforts,as have theirmale
counterparts.Of course not all women were to benefit from these
programs;women whose economicinterestslay in areasadversely
affected by Sandinistaeconomic policies (imports,luxury goods,
and so forth) have suffered some financial loss, as have most
women from the privilegedclassesas a resultof highertaxation.It

MaxineMolyneux 249
is also the case that while poorwomen benefitedfromthe welfare

provisions,they were also the most vulnerableto the pressuresof
economic constraintsand especially to shortagesin basic provi-
sions.39
In terms of practicalgender interests,these redistributivepoli-
cies have also had genderas well as class effects. By virtueof their
place within the sexual division of labor, women are dispropor-
tionatelyresponsiblefor childcareand familyhealth,and they are
particularlyconcerned with housing and food provision. The
policy measuresdirectedat alleviatingthe situationin these areas
has, not surprisingly,eliciteda positive responsefromthe women
affected by them as borne out by the availableresearchinto the
popularityof the government.Many of the campaignsmounted
by AMNLAEhave been directedat resolvingsome of the practical
problems women face, as is exemplifiedby its mother and child
healthcare program, or by its campaign aimed at encouraging
women to conservedomesticresourcesto makethe familyincome
stretch further and thus avoid pressure building up over wage
demands or shortages.'0 A featureof this kind of campaignis its
recognitionof women's practicalinterests, but in accepting the
division of laborand women'ssubordinationwithin it, it may en-
tail a denial of their strategicinterests.
With respect to strategic interests, the acid test of whether
women's emancipationis on the politicalagenda or not, the pro-
gress which was made is modest but significant.Legal reform,
especially in the area of the family, has confrontedthe issue of
relationsbetween the sexes and of maleprivilege,by attemptingto
end a situationin which most men are able to evade responsibility
for the welfare of their families,and become liable for a contribu-
tion paid in cash, inkind, or in the form of services. This also
enabledthe issue of domesticlaborto be politicizedin the discus-
sions of the need to sharethis work equallyamongall membersof
the family. The Land Reformencouragedwomen's participation
and leadershipin cooperativesand gave women work for their
wages and titles to land. There has also been an effortto establish
childcareagenciessuch as nurseries,and preschoolservices.Some
attemptshave been made to challengefemale stereotypesnot just
by outlawingthe exploitationof women in the media, but also by
promoting some women to positions of responsibilityand em-
phasizingthe importanceof women in the militiaand reservebat-

250 Maxine Molyneux
talions.'1And finallythere has been a sustainedeffortto mobilize

women aroundtheir own needs throughthe women'sunion, and
there has been discussionof some of the questionsof strategicin-
terest, althoughthis has been sporadicand controversial.
To sum up, it is difficultto discuss socialistrevolutionsin terms
of an undifferentiatedconceptionof women's interestsand even
more difficult to conclude that these interests have not been
represented in state policymaking. The Sandinista record on
women is certainlyuneven, and it is as yet too earlyto make any
comprehensiveassessment of it, especiallywhile it confrontsin-
creasingpolitical,economic, and militarypressures.Nonetheless,
it is clear that the Sandinistashave gone furtherthan most Latin
American governments (except Cuba) in recognizingboth the
strategicand practicalinterestsof women and have broughtabout
substantialimprovementsin the lives of many of the most de-
prived. When AMNLAEstates that its priorityis defense of the
revolutionbecausethe latterprovidesthe necessaryconditionsfor
realizinga programfor women's emancipation,it is, with certain
qualifications,correct.
Yet these qualificationsare importantnonetheless,and have a
significancewhich goes beyond the Sandinistarevolutionto the
wider question of the relationship between socialism and
feminism. Three of these issues can be listed here in summary
form. The first is that what we have called strategicgender in-
terests-although recognizedin the officialtheory and programof
women's emancipation- remains rathernarrowlydefined, based
as they are on the privileging of economic criteria. Feminist
theories of sexual oppression,or the critiqueof the family or of
male power have had little impacton officialthinking,and indeed
are sometimessuppressedas beingtoo radicaland too threatening
to popularsolidarity.42 There is a need for greaterdiscussionand
debatearoundthese questionsboth amongthe people and within
the organsof politicalpower, so that the issue of women'seman-
cipationremainsalive and open, and does not become entombed
within official doctrine.
The second issue concernsthe relationshipestablishedby plan-
ners between the goal of women's emancipationand other goals,
such as economic development,which have priority.It is not the
linkageitself that constitutesthe problem-principles like social
equality and women's emancipationcan only be realizedwithin

MaxineMolyneux 251
determinateconditions of existence. So linking the programfor

women's emancipationto these wider goals need not necessarily
be a cause for concern because these wider goals may constitute
the preconditionsfor realizing the principles. The question is
rather,the natureof the link. Are genderinterestsarticulatedintoa
wider strategyof economic development(forexample)or are they
irretrievablysubordinated to it? In the first case we would expect
gender intereststo be recognizedas being specificand irreducible,
and requiringsomethingmore for their realizationthan is general-
ly providedfor in the pursuitof the wider goals. Thus, when it is
not possible to pursue a full programfor women's emancipation
this can be explained and debated. The goal can be left on the
agenda,and every effortmade to pursueit within the existingcon-
straints.In the lattercase, the specificityof genderinterestsis like-
ly to be denied or its overallimportanceminimized.The issues are
trivializedor buried;the programfor women's emancipationre-
mains one conceivedin terms of how functionalit is for achieving
the wider goals of the state. It is difficultto say how these issues
will be resolvedin Nicaraguain the long run. Forthe moment,the
intensepressureswhich the Sandinistasare undermake it difficult
to resist the patternwhich has emergedelsewhere in the socialist
bloc of countries,that of subordinationratherthan linkageor ar-
ticulation.
And this raisesthe third generalissue, which is that of political
guarantees.For if gender interestsare to be realizedonly within
the contextof wider considerations,it is essentialthat the political
institutions charged with representingthese interests have the
means to preventtheir being submergedaltogether,and actionon
them beingindefinitelypostponed.Women'sorganizations,the of-
ficial representativesof women'sinterests,should not conformto
Lenin'sconception of mass organizationsas mere "transmission
belts of the party."Rather,they must enjoya certainindependence
and exercisepower and influence over partypolicy, albeit within
certainnecessaryconstraints.In other words, the issue of gender
interestsand their means of representationcannot be resolvedin
the absence of a discussionof Socialistdemocracyand the forms
of state appropriateto the transitionto socialism;it is a question
thereforenotjust of whatinterestsare representedin the state,but
ultimatelyand criticallyof how they are represented.

252 MaxineMolyneux
NOTES
This article is based on research carried out in Nicaragua with the help of the Nuffield
Foundation. It is part of ongoing research into state policies, women, and the family in
postrevolutionary societies. Many thanks to the readers of an earlier version of this text,
especially to Anthony Barnett, Ted Benton, Hermione Harris, and Azar Tabari. A
shorter version was published in Critical Social Policy (London), no. 10 (Summer 1984):
59-75.
1. The Association of Women Confronting the National Problem was founded in 1977
to counter Somoza's excesses and promote gender equality. Its general secretary was
Lea Guido, now minister of health. See AMNLAE, Documentos de al Asamblea de
AMNLAE, Managua, 1981, for an account of AMPRONAC's history and its list of aims;
and Margaret Randall, Sandino's Daughters (London: Zed Press, 1982).
2. For firsthand accounts of these activities see Randall; Jane Deighton, Rossana
Horsley, Sarah Stewart, and Cathy Cain, Sweet Ramparts (London: War on Want/
Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign, 1983); and Susan Ramirez-Horton, "The Role of
Women in the Nicaraguan Revolution," in Nicaragua in Revolution, ed. Thomas Walker
(New York: Praeger, 1982).
3. The women writers have been more interested in this question. See especially
Elisabeth Maier, Nicaragua, La Mujer en la Revolution (Mexico: Ediciones de Cultura
Popular, 1980).
4. Jose Luis Corraggio, "Posibilidades y limites de la politica en los procesos de tran-
sici6n: el caso de Nicaragua" (Paper presented at the Amsterdam Latin American Centre
[CEDLA] Conference on Nicaragua, 1983). The paper will be published in a forthcom-
ing collection edited by David Slater, CEDLA.
5. Margaret Randall, Inside the Nicaraguan Revolution (Vancouver: New Star Books,
1978); and Sandino's Daughters.
6. This is usually translated as "poor neighborhoods."
7. This organization is involved in various anti-imperialist and propeace campaigns and
gives support to the bereaved and those anxious about daughters or sons in the battle
zones.
8. The term "socialist"is used here for the sake of brevity. In relation to most of these
states, some qualification is required along the lines suggested by Rudolf Bahro ("actual-
ly existing socialism"), for the reasons he advanced in his The Alternative in Eastern
Europe (London: NLB, 1979). Others have not reached the level of economic socializa-
tion that qualifies them for inclusion in this category.
9. See, for example, the attitudes of women to this in Carola Hansson and Karin Liden's
book of interviews, Moscow Women (New York: Pantheon, 1983).
10. Quoted in Catherine MacKinnon, "Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An
Agenda for Theory," Signs (Spring 1982). For critical discussions, from differing perspec-
tives, of the record of socialist states, see Maria Markus, "Women and Work: Emancipa-
tion at a Dead End," in The Humanisation of Socialism, ed. A. Hegedus et al. (London:
Alison & Busby, 1976); and Judith Stacey, Patriarchy and Socialist Revolution in China
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).
11. This position is a logical extrapolation of its premises, and is one frequently ex-
pressed at meetings and discussions within the women's liberation movement.
However, there does not exist, to my knowledge, any written theoretical elaboration of it.

MaxineMolyneux 253
12. This discussion necessarily leaves out the specific situation of women in
Nicaragua's ethnic minorities. The Miskito Indian communities in particular require
separate consideration because they have, and have had historically, a very different
relationship to central government than that which is described here.
13. Male power-whether institutionalized or interpersonal-and the essentialist or
naturalist arguments which legitimate it, do play a part in the explanation of women's
continuing subordination after revolutionary upheavals; but the importance of such
factors should not be exaggerated. There are differing definitions of patriarchy, but
most of them agree that patriarchy describes a power relation existing between the
sexes, exercised by men over women and institutionalized within various social rela-
tions and practices, including law, family, and education.
14. There is a third usage of the term "interest"found in Marxism which explains collec-
tive action in terms of some intrinsic property of the actors and/or the relations within
which they are inscribed. Thus, class struggle is ultimately explained as an effect of the
relations of production. This conception has been shown to rest on essentialist assump-
tions and provides an inadequate account of social action. For a critique of this notion,
see Edward Benton, Realism, Power, and Objective Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982); and Barry Hindess, "Power, Interests, and the Outcome of
Struggles," Sociology 16 (1982): 498-511.
15. Zillah Eisenstein, editor of Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978), has produced a sophisticated version of the
argument that women constitute a "sexual class" and that for women, gender issues are
primary. See her "Women as a Sexual Class" (paper presented at "A Marx Centenary
Conference," Winnipeg, Canada, 1983).
16. It is precisely around these issues, which also have an ethical significance, that the
theoretical and political debate must focus. The list of strategic gender interests noted
here is not exhaustive, but is merely exemplary.
17. See, for example, Temma Kaplan, "Female Consciousness and Collective Action:
The Case of Barcelona, 1910-1918," Signs 7 (Spring 1982): 546-66; and Olwen Hufton,
"Women in Revolution, 1789-1796," Past and Present, no. 53 (1971): 90-108.
18. This is the position of some radical feminist groups in Europe.
19. One of the best accounts of the Reagan administration's policy of destabilizing and
attempting to overthrow the Sandinistas is Allan Nairn, "Endgame,"in NACLA 18 (May/
June 1984): 19-55.
20. Borge's speech was delivered on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of AMNLAE.
It was published in the newspaper Barricada on 4 October 1982, and is available in
translation from Pathfinder Press, 1982.
21. Ibid.
22. These principles were laid down at the 1921 Comintern Congress and stressed six
main goals: to encourage the entry of women into wage labor; to socialize domestic
labor and childcare; to provide juridical equality; to provide greater protection for
mothers and the family; and to promote the mobilization of women into political activi-
ty and public administration.
23. In the first three years, only one case had been tried and this was of an abortionist
accused of gross malpractice.
24. Approximately 20 percent of economically active women are in agriculture, with
similar percentages for personal services and marketing activities. Women account for
only 15.25 percent of the formal sector urban work force. See Deighton et al.
25. Figures from the Oficina de Mujer, the office which coordinates the activities of
AMNLAE with the FSLN.

254 Maxine Molyneux
26. Supporters of the White House view of Nicaragua as "totalitarian"forget that the
Western liberal democracies suspended certain civil liberties and normal democratic
procedures (including elections) during wartime.
27. Substantial numbers of women were in favor of conscription and bitterly resented
the council of state's decision in 1983 to exempt women. AMNLAE fought a popular
campaign to revoke the decision which resulted in women having the right to
volunteer.
28. In 1981 one Managua hospital was admitting an average of twelve women a day as
a result of illegal abortions. The main maternity hospital there records four to five ad-
missions weekly of women following abortions. In press reports in 1982, the number of
abortions was said to be rising. Quoted in Deighton et al.
29. For a fuller discussion of socialist policies with regard to women and the family, see
my "Women's Emancipation under Socialism: A Model for the Third World?' World
Development 9 (1981): 1019-37. Also published in Monthly Review 34 (July 1982): 56-100;
and in Magdalena Leon, ed. Sociedad, Subordinaci6n y Feminismo (Colombia: ACEP,
1982).
30. This viewpoint has to be compared and contrasted with many nationalist
movements that call for the sacrifice of women's interests (and those of other oppressed
groups) in the interests of the nation.
31. In agriculture this is already evident. In some of the regions most affected by the
war (Matagalpa, Jinotega), where male conscription is high, women had come to repre-
sent as much as 40 percent of the work force by February 1984. (Interview with Magda
Enriquez, a member of AMNLAE's national directorate, March 1984.)
32. Data are from figures supplied by the Oficina de la Mujer and the central planning
agency MIPLAN.
33. These provisions were contained in decrees 573 and 538.
34. Data are from Oficina de la Mujer, 1984.
35. For a fuller account of Sandinista social policies see Thomas Walker, ed., Nicaragua
Five Years On (New York: Praeger, 1985), and for their policies on women, see my arti-
cle "Women," chap. 6 in the same volume.
36. See Walker.
37. For a discussion of the agrarian reform and its effects on women, see Carmen Diana
Deere, "Co-operative Development and Women's Participation in Nicaragua's Agrarian
Reform," American Journal of Agrarian Economics (December 1983).
38. Data are from the Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos, December 1981.
39. Basic provisions were rationed and heavily subsidized until 1983 when it became
increasingly difficult to peg prices due to mounting economic pressures.
40. AMNLAE argued that the implications of women conserving resources under a
socialist government were radically different from those under capitalism because in
the first case the beneficiaries were the people, and in the second, private interests.
41. Although there are no women in the nine-member junta that constitutes the FSLN
leadership, the vice-president of the council of state (until the elections of November
1984) was a woman, and women assumed many key positions in the party at the
regional level. On three occasions after 1979, women filled ministerial posts.
42. This argument was put forward to quash the new Family Law in the council of
state. See reports in the national press during November 1982.


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