Professional Documents
Culture Documents
This book examines Hong Kong cinema from its inception in 1913 to the
end of the colonial era, explaining the key areas of production, market,
film products and critical traditions. Hong Kong Cinema considers the dif-
ferent political formations of Hong Kong’s culture as seen through the
cinema, and deals with the historical, political, economic and cultural rela-
tions between Hong Kong cinema and other Chinese film industries on the
mainland, as well as in Taiwan and Southeast Asia.
The book discusses the concept of ‘national cinema’ in the context of
Hong Kong’s status as a quasi-nation with strong links to both the ‘moth-
erland’ (China) and the ‘coloniser’ (Britain), arguing that Hong Kong
cinema is a national cinema only in an incomplete and ambiguous sense.
Yingchi Chu
First published 2003
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© 2003 Yingchi Chu
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Preface vii
Acknowledgements ix
Introduction: National cinema and Hong Kong cinema xi
Notes 139
Chinese glossary 143
Filmography 151
Bibliography 159
Index 181
Preface
Hong Kong cinema could not have been written without assistance from
many people and various institutions. I should like to thank the Australian
government and Murdoch University for awarding me a Postgraduate
Scholarship and the Hong Kong Urban Council for its assistance in my
‘field work’. I am grateful to Krishna Sen for her help at the early stages of
my research; to the Directors of the Hong Kong Film Archive, Cynthia
Liu and Angela Tong; and to the Manager of Sub-Cultural Limited,
Jimmy Chi-Ming Peng. My thanks also go to the people who provided
special insights into the complexities of Hong Kong cinema: Law Kar, Li
Cheuk-to, Ng Ho, Yu Mo-wan, Ng See-yuan, Ann Hui, Allen Fong,
Michael Hui, Raymond Wong, Jonny To, Clara Law, Gordon Chan, Fruit
Chan, Peter Tsi, John Chueng, Joe Chueng, Manfred Wong, Law Waii-
Ming and Chan Pak-shen. Special thanks go to Geoffrey Davids who read
drafts of the original research; to Helen Gibson and Sit-ling Tull for assist-
ing me in my library research; to Cheryl Miller for her word processing
skills; and Anne Surma, who added a sense of fluency to my writing.
Hong Kong cinema is a re-worked and extended version of my doctoral
thesis, supervised by Tim Wright, Tom O”Regan and Stephanie Donald. I
am indebted to them for the time they spent with me discussing and debat-
ing ideas. Tim has remained the main inspiration for this research,
continuing to take supervisory responsibility even after his move to
Sheffield University. Tom O’Regan’s knowledge of national cinema
strongly influenced my research, while Stephanie Donald’s perspective on
Chinese cinema proved helpful to the overall argument. I also wish to
thank Horst Ruthrof for helping me to turn my doctoral dissertation into a
book, and for his advice on how to bring my research up to date in an
additional final chapter. A generous thank you to my editors at Curzon
and Routledge, Peter Sowden and Steve Turrington for their professional
guidance, dedication and encouragement.
I owe a special debt to my parents in Hong Kong, Zhu Wei and Huang
Ziqing, who have lovingly assisted me by sending me newspaper clips, videos
and journal articles, as well as searching for references over the past few
years. Lastly, I deeply appreciate the presence of Baca Chan, who has quietly
acted as my ‘psychiatrist’ and given me all sorts of assistance when needed.
Introduction
National cinema and Hong Kong
cinema
This book is a study of Hong Kong cinema in the light of the concept of
national cinema. As Hong Kong has not had all the attributes of a nation,
it is not surprising that its cinema does not fit comfortably into the theo-
retical category of national cinema. And yet, Hong Kong cinema exhibits
certain characteristics of a national cinema, which functions as part of a
web of economic and cultural institutions within a recognisable and
bounded society. Hong Kong cinema has played such a role: it provides
local employment, attracts overseas investment, contributes taxes and
export earnings and, at the same time, participates with the community in
the construction of a Hong Kong cultural identity, both in political and
cinematic terms. Hong Kong’s political status as a British colony, however,
might be seen to have excluded Hong Kong cinema from being recognised
as a national cinema. Furthermore, the colony’s ethnic Chinese identity
encourages a perception of Hong Kong cinema as either part of Zhonghua
minzu (Chinese national and/or ethnic Chinese) cinema or as haiwai
Huaren (overseas Chinese) cinema.
Before 1 July 1997 Hong Kong’s political and economic system was
determined by the triangular relationship between the British coloniser,
the Chinese motherland and Hong Kong. Hong Kong was a British
colony, but both China and the local Chinese community played signific-
ant roles in the shaping of the colony. China’s political and economic
interests in Hong Kong not only allowed the colony to flourish, but also
provided conditions for the British coloniser to undertake various political
reforms, which were fundamental to the colony’s political stability and
economic prosperity. Co-operation by the local Chinese community was
equally important in making Hong Kong one of the most successful trade
and financial centres in the world.
Given the particularity of Hong Kong in such a relationship, should
Hong Kong cinema be studied as a national cinema? Or should national
cinema studies exclude Hong Kong cinema on the grounds that Hong
Kong was not a sovereign nation, even though it was a recognisable and
bounded society? This introduction aims to address these questions by,
first, discussing the concepts of nation and national cinema with reference
xii Introduction
to Hong Kong and, second, by examining three common terms to describe
Hong Kong cinema in the Chinese literature: Zhonghua minzu cinema,
haiwai Huaren cinema, and bentu (indigenous) cinema.
A production-centred industry
To define a country’s cinema in economic terms is to account for
the degree to which cinema generates significance at both national and
international levels. Internationally, a country’s film industry secures
its foothold in the world market virtually by being recognised as a
xiv Introduction
geopolitically defined cinema. This also applies to the Hong Kong film
industry even after 1997 in that it operates as a territorially defined busi-
ness in the world market, and contributes a collection of specific ‘national’
products to film culture.
Within its domestic market, a country’s film industry is recognised as a
national economic institution. It shares a particular kind of relationship
with its national community in four main areas. First, a country’s film
industry operates under national laws and regulations. The Hong Kong
film industry indeed functions under Hong Kong’s laws and regulations,
which though not themselves strictly ‘national’, were based on legislation
produced by a distinct geopolitical unit with the consent of the British and
Chinese governments. Second, in principle, a national film industry is
owned by members of its national community and/or by its national
government. The industry may depend on a certain amount of foreign
investment but within the restrictions of national laws. The Hong Kong
community has owned and invested in the local film industry and produc-
tion from the late 1970s, in spite of the fact that the industry has always
attracted financial investment from Taiwan and countries in South-East
Asia. Third, a national film industry contributes to the national economy
through taxes, export earnings and other means. The Hong Kong film
industry has certainly played an active role in the economy in this aspect.
It has attracted tourists and investment, gained export earnings and pro-
vided employment to the local community. Finally, a national film industry
produces films that mainly target its national community. Along with local
television, Hong Kong films have always been the major source of enter-
tainment for the local community.
A country’s film industry contributes to the construction of a nation
through the industry’s engagement with national governmental agencies,
other national businesses and interest groups. In general, a national
government has two major concerns for its country’s film industry – its
national image and its national economy (Fehrenbach 1995: 1–91;
Chakravarty 1993: 55–79; Malkmus and Armes 1991: 36–59; Magder 1993:
3–28; Burton 1997: 123–42; Johnson 1997: 365–93; Souza 1996: 128–31).
Unlike some national governments, which provide various means of finan-
cial assistance to local film production (Petrie 1991: 65–107; Finney 1996:
114–38; Hill 1996: 101–13; Pendakur 1996: 148–71; Soila et al. 1998: 26–7,
68, 129, 194–5, 234), the Hong Kong government did not provide continu-
ous funding to local production or any means of protecting its domestic
market for the industry. However, the colonial government intervened in
the film industry by way of censorship, and by making ad hoc funds avail-
able to promote Hong Kong films through the Hong Kong International
Film Festival and other trade and cultural activities.
The relationship between a country’s film industry and other national
business institutions also contributes to the construction of the concept of
national cinema. In Britain, Italy, Japan and Canada, television networks
Introduction xv
play significant roles in the production of films. In the case of Hong Kong,
television networks have not been as significant as financial investors.
They are, however, resources to be drawn on for film talent and screen
productions of cultural identity. Other local business sectors, for instance,
real-estate, retail businesses, transportation, tourism and service industries
have been actively involved as financial investors in film business.
Participation of national interest and lobby groups in a country’s film
industry underscores the notion that a country’s cinema derives strength
from its national community (Hodsdon 1995: 158; Deromdy and Jacka
1987: 28–207; Kinder 1993: 441–4). From the early 1990s, interest and
lobby groups in Hong Kong launched a campaign to demand that the
government play a more positive role in the industry through the estab-
lishment of a film commission or development council to provide financial
assistance for ‘diversified development’ (Hong Kong Film Forum 94 1994:
24). Their particular concerns for the Hong Kong film industry resembled
those evident in the relationship between a national community and its
national cinema.
A text-based approach
A country’s cinema produces a collection of films from which a certain
national-cultural specificity is generated (Ukadike 1994: 201–22; Diegues
1997: 272–94; Diawara 1996a: 209–19; Petrie 1991: 134–67; Abel 1984:
69–248; Jordan and Morgan-Tamosunas 1998: 61–55; Nolletti and Desser
xvi Introduction
1992: 131–226). This national-cultural specificity is developed under the
influence of its indigenous cultural tradition and political and social
context, on the one hand, and in response to Hollywood and other
national films, on the other.
Studying cinematic, national-cultural specificity can be focused on
narrative, genre, code and convention, gesturality and morphology and
star image (Hayward 1993: 8–9). Narratives construct and present the
significance of a nation in two modes. One is the screen adaptation of
indigenous texts, which ‘offers up a double nation-narration’. The other is
the cinematic construction of a nation in either an explicit or an implicit
manner, confronting ‘the spectator with an explicit or implicit textual con-
struction of the nation’. In Hong Kong, screen adaptations are typically
based on both China and Hong Kong’s cultural texts, suggesting a dual
cultural identity for Hong Kong. Since the late 1970s many Hong Kong
films have presented Hong Kong as a geopolitically defined community
clearly separated from China and Britain.
National-cultural specificities are also displayed through film genres.
Film genres can claim a certain universality: comedy, melodrama, thrillers
or musicals. On the other hand, film genres may also be ‘specified, ampli-
fied, and even subverted, within a particular culture’ in historical, political
and economic contexts (Hayward 1993: 10). Having developed under the
generic influence of earlier Chinese films, the artistic tradition of China
and Hollywood films, Hong Kong film has been shaped mainly in relation
to Hong Kong’s own political, economic and social contexts.
Film-making is involved with codes and conventions in the process of
image construction and production. National cinemas vary so much
because the production process is influenced by cultural traditions, and
conditioned by political, economic and social contexts. Codes and conven-
tions therefore show in two areas: ‘labour and production practices’ and
‘the iconography of the image’ (Hayward 1993: 11). In Hong Kong, the tri-
angular relationship between the coloniser, motherland and the territory
have overdetermined both production and iconography.
Since film acting remains distinguishable from behaviour in everyday
life, and since methods of film acting are shaped by a history of artistic tra-
dition and social context, ‘gestures, words, intonations, attitudes, postures’
in film acting are therefore ‘deeply rooted in a nation’s culture’, and ‘assist
in the enunciation of the “national” of a cinema’. Languages, accents and
idiom used in film performance in Hong Kong suggested both difference
from and similarity to those of films produced in China. The dominant
Cantonese cultural tradition in the British colony together with pressure
from the overseas market encouraged the industry to produce star images
different from those produced by the Communist cultural environment in
China.
Introduction xvii
A criticism-led approach
Film archives, national film awards, film festivals and publications on films
all contribute to our understanding of national cinema. Darrell William
Davis (1996: 17–25) suggests three kinds of perception of the way in which
cinema generates its national significance. One he terms the ‘reflectionist
model’. This model is used to evaluate and write about a national film
industry and its films in relation to national politics and social issues. The
second he calls the ‘dialogic model’, which emphasises the similarities and
differences between a country’s cinema and other national films. The third
kind of perception views national cinemas as inherently contaminated.
This approach regards cinema as an international institution of which
national cinema is but a minor component.
These three approaches have all found their expression in Hong Kong’s
mainstream critical film discourses since the 1970s. Writing about Hong
Kong cinema has been conducted predominantly on the basis of the
‘reflectionist model’, with local films being evaluated in relation to both
Hong Kong’s political, economic and social contexts and Chinese tradi-
tional aesthetics. The dialogic and contamination models were also
common to film critique in local film magazines, film reviews, journals and
the government-sponsored publications of the Hong Kong International
Film Festival and Hong Kong Film Archive. These three modes of critique
implied and reinforced the idea that Hong Kong cinema was a type of
‘national’ cinema. They encouraged both the local and the international
communities to perceive Hong Kong ‘nationhood’ through Hong Kong
films and to understand Hong Kong cinema as a distinct cinema in its own
right.
However, Hong Kong cinema could by no means be regarded as an
‘ideal’ national cinema. For one, the notion of Hong Kong’s indigenous
identity only makes sense if we exclude mainland China. Is Hong Kong’s
indigenous identity then no more than its British colonial identity? And
how can we draw a distinction between Hong Kong and its British colonial
identity? Furthermore, the Hong Kong film industry has certainly been
effective in constructing a Hong Kong identity by adapting, borrowing
from and modifying China’s cultural texts and generic conventions. So to
what extent can we differentiate Hong Kong cinema from the notions of
Chinese minzu or haiwai Huaren cinema?
There is no doubt that Hong Kong cinema and Taiwanese cinema are
an important part of Zhongguo dianying (China’s cinema).
Similarly, Wang Jianye (1995: 1) writes with respect to Hong Kong liter-
ature:
In Chinese critical discourse, the term minzu cinema connotes the signific-
ance of an ethnic cultural tradition and/or geopolitically defined national
cinema. It centred on two major areas: film aesthetics in relation to tradi-
tional aesthetics and the arts; and film subject themes in relation to the
mainland. Chinese film theorist Luo Yijun (1992: 267) defines the term by
remarking that film-makers ‘consciously inherit and develop Chinese
traditional aesthetics (meixue sixiang) and philosophy of art (yishu guan)’.
In a similar vein, Zhang Chenshang (1985: 59–87; Y. Jun 1997: 196–230)
identifies six cinematic features in early Chinese cinema, all relating to
Chinese cultural tradition, that present Chinese minzu identity. Hong
Kong film scholar Lin Nien-tung (1984: 30–64, 73–115) also argues that
minzu film styles show as composition of images influenced by classical
poems, Confucian ideology and the yinyang philosophy.
How ‘traditional aesthetics and philosophy of art’ are inherited, modi-
fied or ‘invented’ is affected by political, economic and social contexts.
Introduction xix
Where minzu in the cinematic context almost exclusively refers to the ‘tra-
dition’ and national culture of China, there are difficulties in perceiving
Hong Kong cinema as part of Zhonghua minzu cinema when Hong Kong
films exhibit both traditional and modern characteristics, or Chinese famil-
ism and Western capitalism, ethnic Chinese identity and the cultural
identity of the British colony.
The triangular relationship between China, Britain and Hong Kong that
dominated the history of Hong Kong at the end of the twentieth century
also operated in the first half of that century, but in a very different way.
In the earlier period, the British policy of non-interference in local
Chinese affairs and the lack of a defined Hong Kong identity meant that
China played a far more dominant role in that triangle than it was to later.
As a result, Hong Kong cinema in the early period can be seen essentially,
if ambivalently, as part of Chinese national cinema.
The claim that Hong Kong cinema was part of Chinese national cinema
in the period of 1913–56 has its foundation in the fact that China was the
source and resource for Hong Kong cinema in terms of film market, film
talent and financial investment. However, in relation to the concept of
national cinema, this argument poses a number of problems. A national
cinema is located within national geopolitical boundaries; but Hong Kong
cinema was located in a British colony neighbouring China. A national
cinema is subject to the laws of the nation-state; but Hong Kong cinema
was under British law and colonial regulations. Usually, national films are
produced mainly for the domestic market; but successive Chinese national
government(s) have often excluded Hong Kong films from the mainland
market. Since the early 1950s, mainstream Hong Kong films have not been
part of film consumption in China.
These problems in defining Hong Kong cinema as part of Chinese
national cinema raise two important questions: In what ways did the Hong
Kong film industry function as part of Chinese national cinema? And how
did Hong Kong cinema present itself as part of Chinese national cinema?
This chapter advances two major arguments for Hong Kong cinema as
part of Chinese national cinema in the first half of the century. First, it
argues that the local Chinese community was encouraged to identify with
China by the British colonial dual system based on race and on mainland
Chinese nationalism. The community’s political and cultural identification
with China allowed the mainland Chinese to shape Hong Kong cinema in
the interests of China.
Second, as China was the major market for the Hong Kong film
2 Hong Kong Cinema 1913–56
industry, it encouraged the mainland politicians, bureaucrats, financial
investors, film-makers and film critics to play a dominant role in local
cinema. Hong Kong films were evaluated by mainland politicians and cul-
tural critics in terms of China’s national politics and society. As a con-
sequence, Hong Kong cinema in the first half of the century mirrored the
generalised Chinese community – its tensions, conflicts and ambiguity in
the filmic construction of Chinese national identity.
This chapter is organised into four sections. While the first section
examines the British colony in the context of the triangular relationship,
the other three sections discuss the Hong Kong film industry, its film prod-
ucts and film criticism according to Higson’s four approaches to national
cinema. Thus, the second section deals with the production-centred film
industry and its film markets. The third section explores the idea of
Chinese nationhood in Hong Kong film texts. The final section discusses
how film criticism in Hong Kong shaped Hong Kong cinema as part of
Chinese national cinema in the first half of the century.
Governor
Figure 1.1 The colonial structure of Hong Kong up to the late 1960s
4 Hong Kong Cinema 1913–56
Chinese also required them to be loyal to China through financial and
political contributions (Tsai 1993: 65–102).
Freedom of movement enabled the mainland Chinese the right to
access the colony. It made Hong Kong not only a place for economic
adventure but also a place for conducting political activities forbidden on
the mainland. In the 1850s, less than a decade after the British colony was
founded, the anti-Manchu Taiping movement drove many wealthy
Chinese in the south to the colony and, later, Taiping rebels and revolu-
tionaries themselves also sought political refuge in Hong Kong (Yuan
1993: 114). In the latter part of the last century, Dr Sun Yat-sen and
republican revolutionaries developed their ideas on overthrowing the
Qing Dynasty in Hong Kong. The colony was crucial in the republican
revolution in terms of gaining financial support from overseas and in pro-
viding an exile base for the mainland rebels and revolutionaries.
With support from the local Chinese community, Hong Kong continued
to play an important role in Chinese national politics. Between 1912 and
1913 the local Chinese organised a 3-month tramway boycott to protest
against the colonial government banning the use of mainland coins in
Hong Kong. They regarded the decision as ‘an unfriendly act and highly
disrespectful towards the new republic’ (M.K. Chan 1994: 29). A similar
popular nationalism was also shown in the support of the local Chinese of
the May Fourth movement, and in their participation in the boycott of
Japanese goods in 1919 and the Seamen’s Strike in 1922. Organised by the
Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party in 1925 and 1926 as part
of the nationalist movement against British imperialism, thousands of
Hong Kong workers left Hong Kong for the mainland to join the by then
18-month long Canton-Hong Kong General Strike. The strike paralysed
business and trade in Hong Kong to a degree that almost ruined British
interests in South China.
Japan’s invasion of China strengthened the Chinese nationalism in Hong
Kong. During the 1930s, mainland nationalists, including left-wing cultural
workers, the Communists and Guomindang supporters, went to Hong Kong
to promote the anti-Japanese war. Apart from the period of the Japanese
occupation of Hong Kong between 1941 and 1945, the colony again func-
tioned as a base for mainland Chinese to gain overseas financial support and
to conduct political activities that would have endangered their lives on the
mainland. After the British regained the colony in 1945, the population in
Hong Kong increased dramatically. Tens of thousands of mainland refugees
arrived in the colony, including those cultural workers who had worked and
co-operated with the Japanese during the Japanese occupation of Shanghai.
A large group of mainland Communists and left-wing activists also came to
Hong Kong to promote the anti-Guomindang movement. After the Guo-
mindang lost their battle with the Communists for control of the mainland,
another wave of mainland political and economic refugees arrived in Hong
Kong. From 1945 to the mid-1950s, over one million mainland Chinese
Hong Kong Cinema 1913–56 5
migrated to Hong Kong (Hong Kong 1956: 3). These included Shanghai
capitalists, wealthy merchants, professionals and labourers from the nearby
area of Guangzhou. Consequently, mainland national political culture was
transplanted to and intensified in the colony.
The British colony, Hong Kong, was founded to serve the interests of
the British. At the same time, however, the mainland Chinese also used
the colony to further China’s interests. The colonial dual system and
China’s involvement with the colony encouraged the Hong Kong Chinese
to seek belonging, security and authenticity from the mainland and, there-
fore, to identify themselves as part of the Chinese nation through progres-
sively strengthening ethnic ties, cultural tradition and mutual political and
economic needs. In the context of its part in a triangular relationship in the
first half of the century, Hong Kong was unable to develop its own cultural
identity that could resist mainland’s nationalism.
After the war, China’s film culture remained the dominant force in Hong
Kong. The idea of Chinese nationhood was strengthened by the main-
land’s perspective. Shanghai film culture had already been implanted in
Hong Kong Cinema 1913–56 17
Hong Kong to the extent that Hong Kong also became a centre for Man-
darin film production. More and more Shanghai film-makers arrived in
Hong Kong between 1946 and 1949, establishing the foundations for Man-
darin film production. The Mandarin film industry was dominated by a
number of big companies, Da Zhonghua, Yonghua, and Changcheng, and
stories of China were popular, including narratives depicting national poli-
tics between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, China under
Japanese occupation, film adaptations of classical literature and popular
novels, Shanghai urban lifestyles and Northern country areas. Stephen
Teo (1994: 17) comments on these films as follows:
In the eyes of the Mandarin directors, Hong Kong might as well not
have existed. The Hong Kong depicted in their films was an abstract,
cardboard city. In essence, the Shanghai emigres were making ‘Shang-
hai’ films – films set in that city or its environs with Hong Kong loca-
tions dressed up as its streets and quarters. Characters behaved like
typical Shanghai residents, their dialogue laced with Shanghai-isms.
The styles, themes and content of Hong Kong’s Mandarin films
evoked the classics of Shanghai cinema of the 30s. But by shying away
from realist depictions of Hong Kong society and setting their stories
in Shanghai and other Chinese cities of the north, these directors
betrayed their northern backgrounds and expressed their unfamiliarity
with Hong Kong.
Obviously, Hong Kong had yet to become a ‘place’ of historical action and
significance to these Shanghai Mandarin film-makers.
Mandarin cinema had bigger budgets, better technology and stronger
teams of film-makers. It also embraced narratives and themes different
from the mass-produced Cantonese opera and martial arts films in the
Cantonese film industry. It was commonly acknowledged that the Man-
darin audience was generally the white-collar class, the modernised urban
population, who preferred Hollywood and Shanghai films. By contrast, the
Cantonese film audience was comprised mainly of the working classes
from a rural background, who were likely to be superstitious followers of
Buddhism and Taoism, and with little or no formal education. Ian Jarvie
(1977: 86) outlined the general difference between Cantonese and Man-
darin films in the 1950s and 1960s.
Cantonese Mandarin
cheap expensive
simple arty
unpretentious prestigious
folk roots urban roots
southern northern
energetic stiff
18 Hong Kong Cinema 1913–56
Jarvie’s schematic grid may not be entirely accurate as it leaves out some
important features of Cantonese films, such as the social realist dramas of
the 1950s and the popular qingchun (youth) genre of the 1960s. Both
genres were neither artistically ‘simple’ nor based on folk roots. Neverthe-
less, his formula provides a general outline of the differences between
Cantonese and Mandarin films.
From the 1930s to the 1950s the Shanghai left-wing film-makers were
actively involved in Cantonese film production. A year after its establish-
ment by mainland left-wing film-makers in 1948, the Nanguo Production
Company produced a classical Cantonese film Zhujiang lei / Tragedy on
the Pearl River. This film was praised as a ‘breakthrough in Cantonese
film’ in terms of cinematic aesthetic style (E. Gu 1979: 88). The film resem-
bles Shanghai left-wing films of the 1930s – adopting the theme of class
conflict, from the proletariat’s point of view in social realist style. The film
depicts the hardship of life for Cantonese peasants under the landlords
and the ruling Guomindang government. Several years later, the leading
actor and Hong Kong Cantonese film star, Zhang Ying, recalled:
We could not help feeling disappointed that the most effective tool –
film – could not progress along with our nation’s liberation movement,
calling (our) people to participate militarily and ethically in the cam-
paign. In order to achieve our long-term target of resisting the Japan-
ese invasion, and to liberate our four hundred million people in China,
we should by no means allow these (Hong Kong) films to distract from
the current situation of our anti-Japanese campaign and our future.
Let’s make great efforts to reshape (Hong Kong) cinema.
(Quoted in W.Y. Wang 1999: 116)
A year later, a local film critic Song Wanli (1938) wrote in Yi Lin:
‘Chinese Hollywood’ has moved to Hong Kong during the era of the
Japanese occupation of Shanghai. Needless to say, Hong Kong cinema
has now taken the honour of Chinese art. A reader can discern that
the low-taste scripts have been transformed from the previous stereo-
types based on opera stories, to far more profound narratives of the
reality of Chinese society. In these films, one can see the awakening of
ordinary Chinese civilians and the courage of our soldiers. Even
romantic melodrama is no longer full of intimate scenes, but is a
romance with ‘defence’ spirit, a love between a hero [anti-Japanese
Hong Kong Cinema 1913–56 21
hero] and a beauty. As for the anti-Japanese sentiments and patriotic
spirit, these films have also provided the audience with an unexpected
excitement and aesthetic enjoyment. Oh! Great Southern Chinese
cinema, you have really taken responsibility for our nation.
After the war, mainland film critics remained active in Hong Kong. In
1948, film journals and film reviews were published and organised by the
Communists and left-wing organisations. Lin Nien-tung (1985: 108)
describes this kind of film criticism as ‘analysing the film industry from the
perspective of political ideology (Marxism)’, and as a ‘fresh approach to
Hollywood, Shanghai and Hong Kong films’. The critics’ powerful com-
ments were perhaps the most typical in Hong Kong film criticism of the
time. Newspaper columns such as Qiren yingping (Seven People’s Film
Review), including articles written by Ye Yiqun, Zhou Gangming, Meng
Chao, Qu Baiyin and Hong Di were under Xia Yan’s editorship, and ‘Can-
tonese film review’, including Mai Dafei and Lu Yu under Chen Canyun’s
editorship, also maintained the same ‘line’. One hundred and sixty-four
Cantonese film-makers published their manifesto of 1949 to clear up ‘feu-
dalism’ and ‘superstition’ in Cantonese films under the influence of the
left-wing and Communist film criticism in Hong Kong. In the 1950s, Can-
tonese melodrama inherited and developed the 1930s Shanghai left-wing
film – a style of social realism that depicts social injustice and class differ-
ences from the perspective of the working class. As Cai Chusheng advised
in his well-known essay, ‘Guanyu Yueyu dianying’ (‘About Cantonese
Cinema’), on the eve of the establishment of the People’s Republic of
China on 28 January 1949:
In the years after 1949, many Chinese nationals fled south to take
refuge in the British colony of Hong Kong. Does this amount to exile?
(Left-leaning commentators or Communist sympathizers have defined
this exodus as ‘going south’.) I do not propose to find a political
significance in this journey south. Besides, there is no one word or sen-
tence which can do justice to the economic misery, pain and suffering
which was the lot of those who took the journey . . . except perhaps to
sigh at the thought of exile, turbulent times, 1949.
Another definition of the term comes from SPAN (Mishra 1992/1993: 1):
To the mainland Chinese, the colony may not appear as much ‘foreign’
as countries in South-East Asia or in the West. But Britain and China’s
imposed sanctions against freedom of movement between the colony and
the mainland brought to the mainland Chinese in Hong Kong a particular
kind of experience of being ‘abandoned’ and living ‘in exile’ from their
homeland. Although they may not have experienced as much cultural
alienation as Chinese in other parts of the world, they certainly felt they
would ‘relate personally or vicariously, to that homeland in one way or
another, and their ethnocommunal consciousness and solidarity are [were]
importantly defined by the existence of such a relationship’ (Safran 1991:
83). From this perspective, Hong Kong can be seen as a host territory to a
diasporic population from China.
Similar to other diasporic communities in their host countries, the main-
land Chinese ‘retained their collective memories about the past’ and
intended to return when the time was appropriate. In his Turbulent
Writings (Luanshi zhi jia) published in 1967, Zhu Zijia writes:
The average Shanghainese who first set foot in Hong Kong harbored
the naive opinion that they could freely return to their beloved city
after three years or five years at most, and resume their businesses.
(Quoted in Ng 1990: 31)
Like most of the other film-makers from the north who went to Hong
Kong, Zhu never intended to settle there. When he left Shanghai, he
gave each of his two wives only a short-term living allowance of $500.
These mainland Chinese refugees also retained their own regional cultural
communities in Hong Kong. They formed their own institutions to provide
Hong Kong Cinema 1956–79 27
social welfare benefits, and to conduct business and cultural activities for
their members (Lau 1983: 132). As they regarded themselves as temporary
residents in Hong Kong, they continued to engage in Chinese national
politics. From the early 1950s to the late 1960s, several violent incidents
were caused by supporters of the Guomindang and the Communists. A
celebration of the 1911 Revolution on 10 October 1956 turned into a
3-day-long violent dispute attacking Communist businesses, offices and
schools in Hong Kong and causing the death of fifty-nine people, injuring
500, and causing US$1 million property damage (Lane 1990: 73). Influ-
enced by China’s Cultural Revolution of 1967, the 18-month dispute
headed by the left-wing unionists during 1967–8 resulted in the death of
fifty-one, the injury of 800, the arrest of 5,000 and millions of US dollars’
damage in property and trade.
Culturally, the mainland Chinese continued to perceive themselves as a
group distinct from the local Hong Kong Chinese. Lo Kwai-cheung (1990:
22) describes the mainland writers in Hong Kong in the 1950s and 1960s as
follows:
In addition, the colonial government also recognised the cultural and lin-
guistic diversity of the Chinese in the colony. Between the 1950s and the
early 1960s, the colonial Rediffusion radio and television company pro-
duced programmes in Shanghainese, Minnan, Hakka and Mandarin for
the mainland refugees.
However, there was a difference between the mainland refugees in
Hong Kong and other diaspora communities. Unlike members of diaspora
in other host countries where cultural differences from local communities
prevail for long periods, a lack of a distinct Hong Kong cultural identity
allowed the mainland migrants to share the colony with local residents in
many ways, for instance, through industrial manufacture, cultural produc-
tion, business, trade, education and community services. There is little
evidence to suggest that the mainland migrants were disadvantaged by the
local community in areas of political, economic, cultural or social welfare.
At the same time, the mainland Chinese also made efforts to assimilate
into the local community.
Other members of the Chinese diaspora migrated to Hong Kong as
their various positions in their host countries became unstable. The rise of
nationalism in South-East Asia after the Second World War caused the
indigenous communities to mount considerable resistance to the Chinese
28 Hong Kong Cinema 1956–79
diaspora (Purcell 1965: 329–49, 471–91). Fearing that Communism and
Chinese nationalism would spread over South-East Asia, the indigenous
governments tightened their policies towards Chinese immigration,
Chinese schools, the Chinese press and Chinese cultural products. In Thai-
land, the government continued to impose restraints on Chinese education
and newspapers from the 1940s. In Malaysia, debates on the rights of cit-
izenship of Malays, Chinese and Indians in the early 1950s further compli-
cated the relationship between the local Chinese community and the
indigenous people. Chinese cultural production was not encouraged by the
indigenous Malay government. The Indonesian government likewise sup-
pressed Chinese culture and community activities after gaining its sover-
eignty from the Dutch coloniser in 1949 (Mackie 1976: 77–138). Political
instability and ethnic conflicts in South-East Asia restrained Chinese cul-
tural production and impelled Chinese cultural workers to seek alternative
homes.
Hong Kong provided the best environment in the region for the
Chinese diaspora. It was a Chinese society, but with a British colonial
government whose political culture and legal system were nevertheless
familiar. Hong Kong’s geographic location enabled the South-East Asian
Chinese who were drawn to the colony to be seen as distancing themselves
from Chinese national politics in Taiwan and the mainland. This allayed
the suspicion of the governments in their host countries. The colony’s eco-
nomic policies of laissez-faire and low taxation further strengthened the
confidence of the Chinese diaspora in Hong Kong. Moreover, a lack of a
distinct Hong Kong cultural identity allowed the South-East Asian
Chinese easy access and integration into Hong Kong society.
Hong Kong was not a typically diasporic society in the sense that the
British colony was not a typical foreign territory to the mainland Chinese.
Nor were the mainland Chinese the only group of residents in the colony,
though they accounted for about 40 per cent of Hong Kong’s population.
There were also another 50 per cent local Chinese and overseas Chinese
who came to Hong Kong from South-East Asia, America and Australia
(D.L. Zheng 1992: 34, 71–2). However, like the mainland Chinese in Hong
Kong, this group also identified China as their motherland. Hence, China’s
closed door policy gave the local and overseas Chinese a feeling shared
with the mainland Chinese in the colony – the loss of the motherland. This
sentiment enabled the mainland refugees and migrants, Hong Kong
Chinese and the Chinese diaspora from South-East Asia to participate
together in the construction of a new Chinese cultural identity that was
different from that on the Communist mainland.
The theme of filial piety and the counter theme of the transgression of
the young runs through the sixties. In the beginning, the didactic tradi-
tion of Cantonese cinema ensured that society’s reverence for the old
was treated accordingly in cinema: in other words, the young must be
filial and the unfilial must be punished or condemned as pariahs.
Dependence on family and tradition was part of the natural progres-
sion of growing up. When parents grow old, it is the filial duty of the
children to care for them.
Unlike Hong Kong films in the 1980s, the relationship between Hong
Kong and China was not the major theme. Instead, there were a number
of popular films focused on the relationship between Chinese and the
indigenous people of a host country (M.W. Yu 1992: 124–6). For instance,
Hudie furen / Madame Butterfly (1956) presents the romance between a
Chinese man and a Japanese song-and-dance artiste in Japan, and exam-
ines minzu conflicts and cross-cultural problems. Similarly, Niangre yu
Dada / Niangre and Dada (1956) is about a romance in Malaysia between
a Chinese man and a Malay woman of Chinese origins. Tangshan Asao /
Woman from China (1957) is about a mainland woman who goes to South-
East Asia in search of her husband. Yelin yue / Moon under the Palm
Grove (1957) shows how the Chinese diaspora made an effort to promote
Chinese education in Singapore. Wangfu shanxia / Beneath Mt Wangfu
36 Hong Kong Cinema 1956–79
(1957) is a tragedy about a Chinese woman who marries a man who,
unknown to her, is already married in Malaysia. Nanyang Abo / Uncle in
Kuala Lumpur (1958) portrays the hardship of the lives of an old Chinese
man and his daughter in Malaysia, and Guofu xinniang / A Mainland
Bride (1959) depicts the life of a mainland Chinese woman in Malaysia
after the death of her fiancé.
Both Cantonese and Mandarin films developed similar themes of a
diasporic triangular relationship between the host territory, motherland
and self, a fear representing the experience of the Chinese diaspora when
living in a society which was not their own. Directed by Qin Jian, acted by
Cantonese film star, Xie Xian, and produced by Guangyi, Xue ran xiangsi
gu / Blood Stains the Valley of Love (1959) was one of the classical Can-
tonese films of the period combining romance, ghosts and exotic scenery.
The film begins with a Chinese man who falls in love with an indigenous
Malay woman. Their relationship confronts cross-religious and ethnic cul-
tural problems. The man’s mother believes that the Malay woman will cast
a spell on her son, so she sends her son to Hong Kong to get over the
romance. However, in Hong Kong, the man, unable to resist, falls in love
with two women at the same time. His passion and fear lead to a fatal acci-
dent, which he believes was caused by the curse of the Malay woman. He
then returns to Malaysia to take revenge.
The period from the late 1950s to the 1970s saw a rapid development in
Hong Kong film genres. Technology and division of labour in the cen-
tralised studio system enabled film-makers to build the Forbidden City,
classical Chinese courtyards, northern Chinese markets, temples, moun-
tains and forests in studio compounds. Through advanced technology in
lighting, camera and editing, film-makers were able to create special effects
to illustrate the religious significance of Taoism and Buddhism, both essen-
tial to martial arts films. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, colour film and
the wide screen were also brought to Hong Kong. This made Chinese tradi-
tional costume films no less attractive than Hollywood musicals. While few
classical costume and martial arts films were produced on the mainland
between the mid-1950s to the late 1970s, these two Chinese film genres
were the most popular that the Hong Kong film industry offered in the
1960s and 1970s: Mandarin opera films (huangmei xi) and Cantonese
martial arts (wuxia) in the 1960s, and Mandarin martial arts in the 1970s.
The popularity of these two genres showed the willingness of the Chinese
diaspora to maintain their ethnic cultural identity and to demonstrate an
awareness of their distinct identity in their host territories.
The coexistence of Mandarin and Cantonese cinemas in the 1950s and
1960s reflected the lack of a distinct Hong Kong identity. Although both
Mandarin and Cantonese cinemas produced comedies and melodramas,
the two genres utilised different conventions, iconography and recurrent
patterns. For example, Mandarin films tended to focus on Shanghai’s
lifestyle, the middle class and their renqing shigu (sophisticated ways of
Hong Kong Cinema 1956–79 37
dealing with people), and occasionally dealt with local social injustices
(Law 1985: 12). Cantonese films, especially comedies, on the other hand,
relied heavily on Cantonese idiom, centred on the working class and their
working environments. Most generally, a family theme is a convention of
Cantonese melodrama, whereas middle-class cosmopolitan lifestyles are
common themes in Mandarin melodramas. The Kung Fu film genre was an
icon of Cantonese cinema until the late 1960s when the Mandarin film
industry also produced martial arts films.
Star images are usually perceived as signs that represent a nation.
However, Hong Kong film stars of the 1950s and 1960s, while representing
a different image from the previous images of refugees, still did not project
a specifically Hong Kong cultural identity. From the late 1950s, a new gen-
eration of stars emerged. Most of them were born in China, but grew up
and were educated in Hong Kong. Their gestures, manners, and use of lan-
guage projected in general a Western and urban image. Law Kar (1996:
53) discusses three major types of star image in the 1950s and 1960s.
The new generation star from [the left-wing’s] ‘Great Wall’, such as
Xia Meng, Shi Hui, Chen Sisi, Fu Qi, Le Di, Gao Yuan represented
the rising generation of those Mainland Chinese who had come to
Hong Kong. They were Mandarin speaking; their behaviour and psy-
chology were marked by continental Chinese characteristics, and they
were proud of it. Their films were marked by the legacies of Shanghai
cinema; their terms of reference were the culture of the greater China
and there was a feeling of reticence, caution, indeed even criticism,
when regarding Hong Kong society.
The triangular relationship between Britain, China and Hong Kong that
dominated the history of the colony also played an important role in the
period leading up to the colony’s return to China. In 1979, when Hong
Kong Governor, MacLehose, visited Beijing to discuss the possibility of an
extension of the New Territories lease, Hong Kong was not the same
society as it had been in 1950 when it separated from the mainland.
Economically, Hong Kong was one of the leading financial and trading
centres in the world, known as one of the four ‘mini-dragons’ in Asia. Cul-
turally, the colony had developed its own identity. The term Xianggang
ren (Hongkongese) was popular both within and outside the territory. In
the early 1980s, when the Chinese government indicated that China would
take back the colony in 1997, Hong Kong was not enthusiastic about its
return. To Hong Kong, China was not just the ‘motherland’, but a country
with a Communist government and third-world economy. The uncertain-
ties of an unknown future beyond 1997 meant that the colony suffered a
crisis of both confidence and identity from the early 1980s. Between 1982
and 1984, Hong Kong was excluded from Sino-British negotiations about
its own future. Between 1984 and 1988, the colony battled against both the
Chinese and the British governments over changes to its political struc-
ture. China’s uncompromising decision to establish a nuclear power
station near the colony, and the drafting of Hong Kong’s constitution of
the Basic Law between 1985 and 1990 did not impress the community.
Furthermore, the Chinese government’s handling of the Beijing student
democracy movement in 1989 also reinforced Hong Kong’s view of the
Chinese government as an undemocratic Communist regime. The failure
of both Britain’s confidence-boosting scheme after the Tiananmen Square
incident and the political reforms instituted by the last Governor, Chris
Patten, on the eve of the colony’s return to China reflected the demise of
British influence in the triangular relationship. As a consequence, and
more than in any other historical periods, Hong Kong cinema has become,
in the 1980s and 1990s, a forum for the construction, exploration and ques-
tioning of Hong Kong’s sense of nationhood.
This chapter begins the second part of the book, which covers the
Hong Kong Cinema 1979–97 43
period from the late 1970s to 1997, when China regained Hong Kong.
Following the first two chapters, which carried out an historical examina-
tion of Hong Kong cinema, the second part of the book advances the argu-
ment that from the late 1970s Hong Kong cinema developed into a
quasi-national cinema. This chapter explores the argument by looking at
three aspects of Hong Kong cinema in relation to Higson’s approaches to
national cinema: a production-centred industry, an exhibition-led film
market and film criticism.
The first section shows how the ‘absence’ of China had allowed the
British coloniser and the local Chinese to manage their own political, eco-
nomic and social affairs. Consequently, Hong Kong enjoyed autonomy
and a geopolitically defined community. The section argues that this Hong
Kong community nevertheless identified with China in terms of a shared
ethnic cultural identity. Furthermore, Hong Kong’s identification with
China was strengthened by two other factors from the early 1990s – the
demise of British influence and the colony’s economic integration with
South China. The section argues that the nature of the duality of Hong
Kong’s identity in the triangular relationship was far more problematic in
Hong Kong’s ‘imagined community’ than in any other geopolitically
defined nation-states. Hong Kong, therefore, was a quasi-nation.
The second section in the chapter discusses Hong Kong’s domination of
local film production and its perception of domestic and overseas markets.
It argues that although Hong Kong was a quasi-nation, the Hong Kong
film industry – its infrastructures of production, distribution and exhibition
– operated as a national film industry in respects of its ownership and its
economic and cultural relationship with its community. The final section
discusses strategies in local film criticism that have shaped Hong Kong
cinema as a ‘national’ cinema. As the first section argues, though Hong
Kong was a quasi-nation, critical approaches to Hong Kong cinema in the
colony were similar to those that evaluate national cinema. However, a
few critical approaches to Hong Kong films also contested the status of
Hong Kong cinema as representing national cinema.
While this chapter focuses on the discussions of Hong Kong’s domina-
tion in local film production, exhibition and criticism, Chapters 4, 5 and 6
examine Hong Kong films as texts of national cinema. Each of the three
chapters will address the question of the extent to which Hong Kong films
contribute to the construction of the concept of the British colony as a
quasi-nation.
Students’ call for a ‘return to China’ could not last. Even if we accept
that Hong Kong is not an ideal society, we have to admit that the
colony has many good aspects that we value. Otherwise, how can we
explain that the Hong Kong population is always increasing; every
Mainland person legally or illegally wants to stay. And yet nobody in
Hong Kong would like to return. Till today we still see those disap-
pointed illegal Mainland migrants on television when the Hong Kong
police force them to return.
Wai [elder brother] mixes with artists, writers, journalists, and film dir-
ectors. His close friends are making experimental films, publishing
‘serious’ magazines, translating classic Russian novels, and studying in
prestigious foreign institutes like MIT and British Film Institute. They
hang out in coffee shops, bars, and clubs. On the other hand, Ah
48 Hong Kong Cinema 1979–97
Chian [the mainlander] mixes with disco dancers, triads, gamblers, and
kung-fu masters. He reads comics and watches television all day. He
pays frequent visits to cheap massage parlours and finally opens one
himself.
(Ma 1999: 74)
By the late 1970s, the idea of a Hong Kong community was firmly estab-
lished. When 128,000 mainland Chinese arrived illegally in the colony
between 1978 and 1979, they were regarded as a social burden on the
government and on society (Tong 1991: 17; Y. Yao 1979: 26–9; Wu 1979:
18–21; Qishi niandai vol.114, 20–35). The fear of having to share Hong
Kong’s prosperity with the mainland Chinese was further intensified in
1982, when the Chinese government indicated that China would regain the
colony in 1997. Fearing life under a Communist government, and having a
lack of confidence in the British coloniser after 2 years of Sino-British
negotiations, Hong Kong nationalism developed rapidly to pursue the
rights of the community in formulating a self-governing body under
Chinese sovereignty.
The Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 opened another chapter in
the triangular relationship. The colonial government was gradually with-
drawing its involvement in Hong Kong’s affairs and, increasingly, China
became involved in dealing with Hong Kong’s political, economic and
social interests. To China, Hong Kong’s return was not merely an issue
concerning Hong Kong, but the beginning of national reunification under
the Communist Party. Hong Kong provided China with an opportunity to
demonstrate its ability to control a capitalist society under Deng Xiaop-
ing’s policy of ‘one country two systems’. Economically, the colony also
played an important role in China’s modernisation programme. These
national, political, and economic agendas motivated China to make sure
that every step in the transition was made on their terms.
Given two major factors – the fear of living under the Communist
government and the lack of confidence in the British government’s deal-
ings with China – Hong Kong felt the need to articulate its concerns. In
theory, Hong Kong nationalism had little trouble with Deng Xiaoping’s
policy of ‘one country two systems’. But in reality, the question of how the
Chinese government would carry out its policies was unclear to the colony,
since China and Hong Kong interpreted some key concepts quite differ-
ently, for instance, those of sovereignty, election and high degree of
autonomy.
The transition period was politically turbulent but economically pros-
perous. A concern that China’s policy of ‘Hong Kong people rule Hong
Kong’ would not be implemented led Hong Kong nationalists to demand
that the colonial government keep their promise to assist the colony in
establishing a representative government before Hong Kong’s handover to
China. However, Hong Kong’s voice was overshadowed by Britain’s
Hong Kong Cinema 1979–97 49
cautious policy towards China. Under Governor David Wilson, the estab-
lishment of a representative government through direct election was
delayed. The Beijing student democracy movement in 1989 intensified
Hong Kong’s desire for democracy; at the same time, it caused a further
crisis of identity and confidence. The year 1990 saw a dramatic increase in
the number of Hong Kong residents migrating overseas: according to the
Hong Kong government’s conservative’ figures, numbers rose from 42,000
in 1989 to 62,000 in 1990 (Skeldon 1996: 141–5). Hong Kong’s last Gover-
nor, Chris Patten, was passionate in his launch of political reforms for
strengthening the ‘democratic’ system before the departure of the
coloniser. However, the reforms were viewed cynically by both the British
in the colony (Tambling 1997: 355–75) and the Hong Kong Chinese, espe-
cially those in the business sector, as an exercise enabling colonial retreat
with honour and dignity.
However, despite Hong Kong’s fear of the Beijing government and
despite the colony’s active engagement in the construction of a distinct
Hong Kong identity, the shared historical and ethnic cultural tradition
with China has always played an essential role in Hong Kong’s geopoliti-
cally defined ‘imagined’ community. The majority of Hong Kong Chinese
would not deny their ethnic cultural roots. Every year, thousands of Hong
Kong people cross the Chinese border to celebrate various traditional fes-
tivals with their families, and to renew their ethnic cultural links with
China. And every year, different political, professional and regional cul-
tural groups in Hong Kong celebrate significant Chinese national days
including Chinese Youth Day (4 May), National Day(s) of the People’s
Republic of China (1 October) and Republic of China (10 October).
Traditional cultural values, customs and ways of life have always been
maintained and developed in the colony. Since the early 1980s after China
opened its doors, Hong Kong’s ethnic cultural connections with the main-
land have been strengthened.
The shared ethnic cultural tradition with the mainland has encouraged
Hong Kong to view China as its motherland, despite the latter being under
Communist government. When Beijing students launched their democracy
movement in 1989, the British colony’s residents, like Beijing’s residents,
made heart-felt cries of ‘Chinese do not attack Chinese!’. Instantly, the
Hong Kong Chinese became the students’ comrades. They donated
money, gave blood and, finally, assisted student leaders to flee China.
About one in six Hong Kong residents took to the streets to express their
strong support for the students. Hong Kong’s support for the Beijing stu-
dents reflected the colony’s dual identity as people of both Hong Kong
and China. In the early 1990s when China suffered a flood diaster, the
colony, once again, offered generous donations. In 1996 when the Japan-
ese built lighthouses on the Diaoyu island, the Hong Kong residents of
Chinese origin organised public demonstrations to protest against Japan’s
claim to sovereignty over the islands. These events revealed that the
50 Hong Kong Cinema 1979–97
‘imagined community’ of Hong Kong was not simply confined to the
concept of a geopolitically defined community, but also subscribed to the
notion of a shared ethnic cultural identity with China.
During this time, Hong Kong’s identification with China was strength-
ened not only by the demise of British influence in the colony, but also by
the increase of China’s influence over Hong Kong’s economy. China had
become Hong Kong’s most important trading partner. The mainland was
the largest market as well as supplier for the colony’s re-exports, and the
second largest market for Hong Kong’s domestic exports (Hong Kong
1989: 68–9). Eighty-nine percent of goods re-exported through Hong Kong
were destined for, or originated from China (Hong Kong 1995: 68). China
was also the most significant location for Hong Kong investment, including
light manufacturing industries, tourist facilities, property development and
financial services. In Guangdong province, more than three million people
worked for Hong Kong companies (Hong Kong 1989: 68–9). At the same
time, China was also the major investor in Hong Kong, in the areas of
banking, importing, exporting, wholesaling and retailing, transportation,
warehousing, property development, financial services, and infrastructure
projects (Sung 1996: 182–208; G. Shen 1994: 469–84).
In the context of the demise of the British coloniser and with the ever-
increasing economic integration with China, Hong Kong could not be
‘imagined’ purely from the perspective of a geopolitically defined
community; the ‘imagining’ of the Hong Kong community overlapped with
the community’s identification with the mainland as the ‘great Chinese
nation’. Positioned within the triangular relationship, Hong Kong could
not but be a quasi-nation. This was not only because the colony lacked
political status as an independent nation, but also because the ‘imagining’
of self as a distinct community in the triangular relationship was far more
complicated and problematic than for other ‘imagined’ national
communities.
I end this section by citing from an essay by an undergraduate student
from the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Her feelings of ambiguity in
identifying with China are not only commonly shared with the Hong
Kong-born generation of Chinese origin, but also reflect the problematic
notion of a distinct Hong Kong cultural identity.
Until the ’89 student democracy movement, the kind of subtle feelings
[in identifying with China] mixed with untold remoteness and contra-
diction was again inspired by the up-surging call of Beijing University
students. . . . As a bystander, I felt that I shared their feelings. While
they were crying, I followed and cried; while they were calling out, I
followed and called out too. It was the first time that I had been so
proud of being Chinese. But, every time I read the [Beijing students’]
‘Statement of Hunger Strike’: ‘The nation is our nation, the people are
our people’, I felt at a loss. It doesn’t matter how much I participated,
Hong Kong Cinema 1979–97 51
how sincere I was, I always had a feeling that Beijing students had
more right than I did to make such a statement. The time when I felt
that I shared a direct line of descent with them, was also the time that
I felt extremely sorrowful.
(K.X. Luo 1996: 22)
1983 89 55 23 11
1985 91 62 29
1987 122 88 34
1988 129 107 22
1994 176 130 44 2
Source: This table has been put together from several sources: the 1983 figures from Yu
Mo-wan (1983); 1985, 1987 and 1988 from Chen Qingwei (1985 and 1988); and the 1994
figures are compiled from cinema theatres listed in Film Biweekly.
Hong Kong Cinema 1979–97 55
Table 3.2a Percentage of Hong Kong box-office takings, 1977–89
Source: Law Kar, ‘Hong Kong film market and trends in the 1980s’, Hong Kong films in the
1980s, Hong Kong: Urban Council, 1991, p.70.
Source: Hong Kong, Kowloon and New Territories Motion Picture Industry Association
1997. Foreign films also include the mainland Chinese and Taiwanese films. Box-office
takings of mainland and Taiwanese films are not available.
local films: Imperial, Regal and Modern. Among five local film exhibition
chains, only Golden Harvest and Mandarin, which was established in the
early 1990s, engaged in film production. This meant that there were more
opportunities for independent film-makers to exhibit their products than
in the 1980s. Although the industry became more diverse in the 1990s, it
remained under the control of Hong Kong business and community fac-
tions.
Equally, Hong Kong also increased its role in the local exhibition of
foreign films. The distribution of foreign films was divided between those
who managed their own cinema houses for screening foreign films, such as
56 Hong Kong Cinema 1979–97
Shaw Brothers’ Nanguo, Golden Harvest’s Panasia and Edko, and those
independent distributors who sought exhibitors to screen their films. In the
early 1980s, there were twenty-three cinemas showing foreign films, thirty-
five per cent of total local exhibition (M.W. Yu 1983: 20). Among them
about six showed exclusively foreign films, of which five were dominated
by Hollywood films, and one by independent American films and other
national films. In 1983, about 270 foreign films were screened in Hong
Kong, 65 per cent of which were Hollywood films, British 10 per cent,
French 9 per cent, Italian 8 per cent, and the rest Japanese, German and
Danish. The other seventeen cinemas showed principally foreign films but
popular Hong Kong films were also shown in these cinema houses (Q.W.
Chen 1985: 11–12).
Before the end of the 1980s, Hollywood majors distributed their own
films either through their own distribution agencies, such as Warner Bros
(the Far East) and Disney, or through their amalgamated distributors,
Fox-Columbia, or United International Pictures for Universal, Paramount,
MGM, and United Artists. But at the end of the 1980s, only Warner Bros
(the Far East) remained to distribute its own films; American films from
both the majors and independents were disseminated by local distributors
and shared between Golden Harvest, Golden Princess (Late Empire),
Newport, Edko and Astor. In 1989, Golden Harvest brought United Inter-
national Pictures to Hong Kong, which enabled the company to distribute
films produced by Universal, Paramount, MGM and United Artists. As
American products comprised about 75 per cent of foreign films exhibited
in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong market was eventually controlled by the
local film industry. Spanning both Chinese and foreign film exhibition, the
industry was able to control its domestic market for its own best interests.
For example, after Golden Harvest purchased UIP, announcing that it
would form an exhibition chain for UIP films, it also indicated that people
should not be surprised to see Golden Harvest films screened in these
cinemas (Q.W. Chen 1988: 9–11).
One of the major differences between Hong Kong cinema after the late
1970s and diasporic cinema was reflected in the development of overseas
markets. The restraints on the South-East Asian market in the late 1970s
shifted the industry from rather narrowly targeting the Chinese diaspora
to focusing on other national markets. As very few Hong Kong films were
able to receive as much attention in other countries as Hollywood films, it
was crucial to access Hollywood distribution and exhibition in the world
markets. Through financial investment, Golden Harvest produced a
number of American films, including Cannonball, Battle Creek Brawl, The
Killing of America, The Return of the Soldiers, The Rats, The Texans, Ter-
rible Game, The Rough Riders, High Road to China, Megaforce (Jiahe
dianying 1982) and Ninja Turtles. Golden Harvest also engaged with film
productions in different versions for different markets. For instance,
Jackie Chan’s The Protector 1985 involved three versions: the American
Hong Kong Cinema 1979–97 57
version was made by American film-makers; two other versions by Jackie
Chan with Hong Kong and Japanese film-makers were created for the
Hong Kong and Japanese markets, modulating plots, actors, patterns of
action and degrees of violence (X.Y. Chen 1985).
From the late 1980s, the Hong Kong film industry began to penetrate
other national film markets through distribution and exhibition. In 1987,
Golden Harvest and Perlis Plantation established an exhibition chain in
Malaysia, with forty-two cinemas sharing 36 per cent of the local market
(Xin Bao 8 and 14 November 1995), which did not conflict with the
Malaysian government’s policy that indigenous people should own and
manage no less than 30 per cent national business and wealth. In 1988,
with Australian Village Roadshow Ltd, Golden Harvest constructed a
cinema complex in Singapore and Malaysia. In 1993, they established
Entertainment and Theatre Network Co. Ltd to develop a cinema
complex in Thailand together with a local exhibition business group.
Because a national film industry functions as part of both national eco-
nomic and cultural institutions, it naturally draws the attention of the
government. Since the late 1970s, the Hong Kong government has pro-
vided a wide range of assistance to the industry. Unlike some European
countries, or Australia and Canada where national governments provided
funds for production, the Hong Kong government mainly played a role in
assisting and promoting its film industry. In the area of production, the
Television and Entertainment Licensing Authority (TELA), Police Public
Relations Branch, and the Broadcasting, Culture and Sport Branch hold
regular meetings with representative bodies and associations from the
industry seeking assistance.2 The government also involved in assisting the
industry in hosting the annual International Film Market in 1997.
In the area of promotion, the industry has been included in the overseas
promotion programmes headed by top Government officials during the
1980s and 1990s.3 The government also set up the Hong Kong Arts Devel-
opment Council (HKADC) to support and promote art, including films.
The Hong Kong Urban Council has held a 16-day annual International
Film Festival in Hong Kong since 1977. The Urban Council allocated
HK$150 million to set up a Hong Kong film archive.4 The Urban Council
and the Hong Kong Arts Centre have also organised the annual Hong
Kong Independent Short Film Competition since 1992. Furthermore, the
government has contributed funds for degree courses in television and film
at the Baptist University and the Hong Kong Academy for Performing
Arts.
Nationhood is reflected by various groups in a national community by
participating in the construction of its national cinema. From the 1980s,
lobby groups comprising politicians, journalists, cultural critics, film-
makers and other artists were involved in pushing the colonial government
to develop its domestic cinema as a cinema of Hong Kong. The groups
protested against the colonial government’s political censorship, arguing
58 Hong Kong Cinema 1979–97
that political censorship only demonstrated the government’s fear under
pressure from the Chinese government (Hong Kong Film Forum 94: 7–9).
They urged the government to establish the Hong Kong Film Archive to
preserve materials demonstrating Hong Kong’s own history as different
from that of China. They demanded the government allocate a seat in
Legislative Council for representatives of the Hong Kong film industry. To
assist film production, some lobby groups insisted that the government
should establish the Hong Kong Film Development Council or a Hong
Kong Film Commission to provide funds for ‘those art films that the indus-
try could not produce’ (W.M. Luo 1994). The reason was, as Luo Weiming
(1994) argues:
In terms of film as art, Hong Kong cinema could not keep up with
China and Taiwan. When the mainland Chinese and Taiwanese film-
makers received international awards in Cannes, Berlin, Venice, our
Hong Kong new wave film directors were either forced to make com-
mercial films, or had no films to make.
The most significant part of the festival is the section dealing with
Hong Kong films in retrospect and publication of research, essays and
primary materials. For more than a decade, its achievement does not
only contribute to the study of Hong Kong cinema. Significantly it
makes our International Film festival a unique place among many
international film festivals.
The input from the Hong Kong community in production, distribution and
exhibition, together with the participation of the Hong Kong government
and various lobby groups, has enabled the Hong Kong film industry to
become not only a profitable business, but also a distinct ‘national’ cinema
in the world of national cinemas. This distinguishes the industry from its
position during the earlier two historical periods, when it existed as part of
Chinese national cinema and Chinese diasporic cinema.
. . . artistic and formal qualities of the Hong Kong films; the character
of the industry; and also the changing social and economic face of
Hong Kong society.
(N.T. Lin 1978b: 7)
Film narratives
As a narrative is a cultural means of making sense of the world, a film
narrative can be understood ‘as a reflection of the nation’ (Hayward 1993:
64 Cultural specificity of quasi-national film
8). This reflexivity, according to Hayward, occurs in two ways. One is
through the process of screen adaptation, and the other is through the way
in which filmic narratives explicitly and implicitly construct the significance
of a nation. Insofar as filmic adaptations are based on indigenous cultural
texts, such adaptations serve the role of ‘confirming the natural heritage’
of that nation.
In terms of Hong Kong, the question of which indigenous cultural texts
are adapted is important for the question of cultural identity. In the 1950s
and 1960s, filmic adaptations were mainly based on China’s texts – clas-
sical Chinese literature, Chinese mythology, Cantonese folklore and Can-
tonese operas.1 The 1970s saw a dramatic decrease in the filmic adaptation
of Cantonese operas and folklore; however, screen adaptations of classical
Chinese literature remained popular.2 At the same time, the number of
filmic adaptations of Hong Kong’s cultural texts increased. By the 1980s,
the number of filmic adaptations of China’s literature dramatically
decreased, but did not disappear.3 In contrast, adaptations of Hong Kong
cultural texts – novels, radio plays, stage plays and cartoon series – consti-
tuted the mainstream in local screen adaptations.4 The popularity of Hong
Kong films and their relation to other indigenous Hong Kong cultural
texts exhibit a characteristic of the specificity of Hong Kong cinema as part
of the community’s popular culture. At the same time, the filmic adapta-
tions of China’s texts also project the ‘natural heritage’ of Chinese cultural
identity in the British colony. The co-existence of these two types of filmic
adaptations presents the duality of cultural identity, relating to both Hong
Kong and China.
The key medium, however, for the development of a specific Hong
Kong cultural identity was, as shown in Chapter 3, television. Therefore, it
was to television that film-makers looked for texts to adapt in the course
of developing the cultural specificity of Hong Kong. Adaptations of televi-
sion products became a major source of inspiration for local film-makers
in the 1970s (Kung and Zhang 1984: 10–17). Successful commercial films
include Chu Yuan’s Xianggang 73 / Hong Kong 73 (1974), Zhu men yuan /
Sorrow of the Gentry (1974), Xin tixiao yinyuan / Lover’s Destiny (1975).
There were also a number of films based on ideas from television, such as
Zhang Sen’s Afu zhengzhuan / The Little Man, Ah Fook (1974), Yang
Quan’s Daxiang li / The Country Bumpkin (1974), Zhang Sen’s Afu lao
shijie / The Stupid Sailor, Ah Fook (1975), and Chen Jiasun’s Lin Azheng /
Lim Ah Chun (1978).
Furthermore, even when films were not directly adapted from television
products, narratives often reflected television’s representation of Hong
Kong, as for example, in its reportage of real social problems (Kung and
Zhang 1984: 10–17). Gui Zhihong’s popular films Chengji chalou / The Tea
House (1974), Dage Cheng / Big Brother Cheng (1975), Ng See-yuen’s
Qibai wanyuan da jie an / Million Dollar Snatch (1976) are examples of
film narratives developed from television coverage of a bank robbery
Cultural specificity of quasi-national film 65
involving hostages, on 25 May 1974. Television reportage of police corrup-
tion and the investigation of drug dealer Wu Xihao in 1973–4 also pro-
vided primary material for two popular films, Ng See-yuen’s Lianzheng
fengbao / Anti-Corruption (1974) and Leong Po-chih’s Tiaohui / Jumping
Ash (1976). Law Kar (1984: 110–13) argues that Hong Kong new wave
films in the late 1970s and early 1980s also adopted the perspective of tele-
vision products in representing the colony. Shu Kei’s study of Ann Hui’s
television works reveals a continuity in the development of her narratives,
subject themes and filmic style from television to film (1988: 42–6). Her
first feature film, Feng jie / The Secret (1979), shows her interest in devel-
oping filmic narratives based on local events, and imitates her cinematic
style in her earlier police and crime television series CID and ICAC. Her
second and third films, Huyue de gushi / The Story of Woo Viet (1981) and
Touben nuhai / The Boat People (1982) resemble her television series
about Vietnamese boat people in Hong Kong, Ashi / Ah shi (1977) and
Lai ke / Boy from Vietnam (1978). Similarly, Alex Cheung’s Dianzhi bing-
bing / Cops and Robbers (1979) and Bianyuan ren / Man on the Brink
(1981) represent a continuation of his work in the television series CID
(Law 1984: 113). Allen Fong’s Fuzi qing / Father and Son is another film
that resembles Fong’s earlier style in television, in terms of subject, theme
and social realism. Johnny Mak’s cinematic representation of triads and
youth problems in the 1980s also recalls his popular television dramas of
the 1970s, Shida qi’an / Ten Sensational Cases (1976), Shida cike / Ten
Assassinations (1976), Da zhangfu / Operation Manhunt (1976–7) and Xin
da zhangfu / Operation Manhunt II (1976–7).
Narratives can ‘confront the spectator with an explicit or implicit
textual construction of the nation’ (Hayward 1993: 9). Since Hong Kong
was not a sovereign nation, films that explicitly present the British colony
as a nation are very scarce. However, a few Hong Kong films represented
the British colony as a nation on a connotative level, particularly through
exploring the boundaries in the triangular relationship between the British
coloniser, the Chinese motherland and Hong Kong. I will elaborate this
argument further through a number of detailed textual analyses in the
next two chapters. Here, I will offer just one example to illustrate my argu-
ment. Leong Po-chih’s film, Dengdai liming / Hong Kong 1941 (1984)
deals with a story at a particular historical moment of Hong Kong – a story
of survival, love and friendship between three young people under the
Japanese occupation of the colony. The film opens with scenes of the
British colonisers leaving Hong Kong on the eve of the Japanese invasion.
In the context of the imminent signing of the Joint Declaration in 1984,
these scenes were perceived by Hong Kong film critics as an indication of
Britain’s ‘lack of commitment to the colony’ (Shu Kei’s captions in The
China Factor in Hong Kong Cinema 1990: 111). At the same time, the film
also presents a special bond between the Hong Kong Chinese and the
mainland refugees through their mutual co-operation in fighting against
66 Cultural specificity of quasi-national film
the Japanese. The film, then, constructs an image of Hong Kong as an
indigenous community by exploring the relationship between Hong Kong,
the British coloniser and the mainland refugees. At the same time, the film
could also be understood as suggesting that the colony was part of the
Chinese community, in terms of sharing a bond of kinship when con-
fronted by the Japanese. Thus, the significance of Hong Kong ‘national’
identity is foregrounded through the construction of Hong Kong as an
indigenous community in relation to the British coloniser and through its
identification with Chinese ethnicity when confronted by the Japanese.
In the 1980s, Hong Kong’s identity was constructed mainly through its
identification with the British colony and with China on different levels.
The representation of the mainland Chinese as illegal migrants and as
unfamiliar with Hong Kong’s legal system, capitalist lifestyle and public
culture5 produced a notion of Hong Kong citizens as a distinct community.
At the same time, many film narratives also constructed Hong Kong iden-
tity offering the essentialist view that Hong Kong is fundamentally
Chinese. Two popular comedies, Michael Hui’s Hejia huan / Mr. Coconut
(1988) and Alfred Cheung’s Biaojie, nihao ye! / Her Fatal Ways (1990),
begin with the unwelcome guests from China arriving in the colony. The
guests’ ignorance of Hong Kong’s capitalist lifestyle, legal system and
popular culture presents the idea of two different civic communities exist-
ing on the mainland and in Hong Kong. And yet, a shared Chinese ethni-
city and family relationships bring about a happy reunion. These films
suggest that differences in political and economic systems do not after all
undermine Hong Kong’s Chineseness and its identification with China.6
Film narratives embody the notion of Hong Kong community through
presenting its own historical continuity. Nevertheless, representations of
Hong Kong’s past also show the colony’s historical links with China.
Stanley Kwan’s Yanzhi kou / Rouge tells the story of a young woman who
commits suicide in the 1930s and returns to Hong Kong in the 1980s to find
her lover. Through her, the film connects and contrasts the past and the
present of Hong Kong’s landscape. At the same time, it also displays the
images and the narratives of the colony’s cultural and economic connec-
tions with the Canton region in the 1930s. Li Zhiyi and Peter Chan’s Xin
nanxiong nandi / He Ain’t Heavy, He’s My Father (1994) deals with a story
of a young man in the 1980s who travels back to the 1960s and meets his
father and his father’s friends and neighbours.
The film displays the cultural symbols of popular music and films of the
1950s and 1960s, which, according to Linda Chiu-han Lai, is Hong Kong’s
way of collectively ‘remembering’ its past, since the colony has itself
written no ‘formal’ history (Lai 1997: 91). At the same time, the film also
reminds the audience of the historical connections between the colony and
the mainland: China’s political turbulence in the late 1940s impacted on
the colony as well as on China. Once again, images of Hong Kong history
produce the dual cultural identity of Hong Kong. Hong Kong is an histori-
Cultural specificity of quasi-national film 67
cally indigenous community, shaped over time by political, economic,
social and cultural influences from China.
Film genres
Film genres in Hong Kong define a specific cultural character for Hong
Kong. Although the Hong Kong film industry tends to seek inspiration
from Hollywood films, certain Hollywood film genres – science fiction, war
films, Westerns and road movies – have never been well developed in
Hong Kong. However, the comedy, slapstick and gangster genres have
integrated well with local culture. Absorption of and resistance to certain
Hollywood film genres suggest that Hong Kong films are part of inter-
national film culture while they retain a collection of cultural products
unique to Hong Kong.
Internally, Hong Kong film genres have developed in tandem with
changes to Hong Kong’s political, economic and social environment. As
discussed in earlier chapters, the popularity of film genres in the 1930s and
1940s – martial arts films, anti-Japanese war films, and social realist Can-
tonese melodrama – reflected the impact of China’s national politics in
Hong Kong. The popularity of certain types of films in the 1950s and 1960s
– Cantonese opera films and Mandarin Huangmei xi, Cantonese martial
arts films, Mandarin historical melodrama, Cantonese melodrama, filmic
adaptations of classical Chinese literature, and a certain proportion of
other dialects in Hakka and Minnan films – certainly shows a lack of Hong
Kong cultural identity in local film genres.
From the 1970s, film genres responded to new political, economic and
social changes in Hong Kong. In 1973, the stock market crash destroyed
many small shareholders, and the economic recession in 1974–5 had a
drastic impact on the public’s confidence in Hong Kong’s economy. Police
corruption scandals in 1974 shocked the community, and the Governor’s
compromise over the charges against corrupt policemen in 1977 aroused
the society’s doubts about justice.7 Cynicism about authority and tradi-
tional values grew. Local film critics argue that the popularity of social
satirical comedies, the police and crime genre, and strong violence in
martial arts films were all a response to Hong Kong society of the 1970s
(C.T. Li 1984b: 124–5). For instance, Michael Hui’s satirical comedies
present society as a crazy world where people relentlessly pursue material
pleasure.8 Zhang Che’s martial arts films show that violence is the only
way of solving problems and releasing tension.9 Li Hanxiang’s cinematic
representation of ancient China also accentuate images of sexuality,
corrupt authority and power struggles.10 Even though based on Taiwanese
writer Gu Long’s martial arts novels, Chu Yuan’s filmic adaptations of sus-
pense martial arts films11 are understood by Hong Kong film critic Li
Cheuk-to as a reflection of the insecurity of Hong Kong society following
the experience of economic prosperity. C.T. Li (1984b: 129–30) argues,
68 Cultural specificity of quasi-national film
Gu Long’s martial arts universe is characterised by a fear of politics,
authority and power; the relentless pursuit of materialism; the feeling
of insecurity once economic well-being is attained; the wanton feelings
towards women; and fatalism. All these parallel the psychology of the
Hong Kong people who regard themselves as a marginal people.
The popularity of Hollywood cop movies in the 1970s was one factor that
caused the ‘emergence’ of the police and crime genre in Hong Kong.
However, Hong Kong’s own political and social background also con-
tributed greatly to the popularity of the genre. Ng See-yuen’s Lianzheng
fengbao / Anti-Corruption (1975), Leong Po-chih’s Tiaohui / Jumping Ash
(1976), Alex Cheung’s Dianzhi bingbing / Cops and Robbers (1979) were
all based on local scandals involving police corruption, investigations into
drug dealing, and the complex relationship between law, morality, justice,
power and human nature. Police images were continually constructed in
relation to the political and social context of the colony. Danny Li’s Gong
pu / Law with Two Phases (1983), Huangjia fan / The Law Enforcer
(1986), Tiexue qijing / Road Warriors (1987) deal with stories of dedicated
Hong Kong policemen who not only face the tough reality of organised
crime, but also confront the difficult situations created by the British expa-
triate authorities and the Western-educated Chinese, who are more inter-
ested in their power struggles and promotion prospects than crime
investigation.
Throughout the 1980s, comedy and its various sub-genres – high-tech
comedy, Kung Fu comedy, action comedy, cop comedy, vampire comedy –
remained in the top ten of box-office takings. As comedy is commonly
understood as a genre serving a particular social and psychological func-
tion, ‘where repressed tensions can be released in a safe manner’
(Hayward 1996: 55), Hong Kong film critics argue that the popularity of
comedy responded to society’s anxiety about its future after 1997, and its
frustration at being unable to influence either the British coloniser or the
Chinese government over Hong Kong’s future (Film Biweekly, January
1986; N.K. Leung 1991: 18).
Similarly, changes in the police and crime genre responded to social and
psychological needs in society. After the mid-1980s, the yingxiong pian
(hero-triads-police action), fengyun pian (gangster-crimes-prison officers)
and xiaoxiong pian (historical and biographical triads-crime-police) genres
replaced that of police and crime. Typical films in these sub-genres are
John Woo’s Yingxiong bense / A Better Tomorrow (1986), Diexue
shuangxiong / The Killer (1989), Ringo Lim’s Jianyu fengyun / Prison on
Fire (1987), Longhu fengyun / City on Fire (1987) and Lawrence Ah Mon’s
Lei Luo zhuan / Lee Rock (I and II, 1991), Johnny Mak’s Bo hao / To be
Number One (1991). Although Wang Shen’s description below refers to
yingxiong pian, it can also be used to refer to the two other types of
movies, where:
Cultural specificity of quasi-national film 69
1. The protagonist . . . is a triad gangster while his mortal enemy – the
police – is relegated to the background (or practically ignored); the so-
called ‘hero’ is a thief with a conscience. 2. Intricacies of the plot give
way to emotions and feelings. 3. Women play minor roles. 4. Style is
uniformly consistent.
(Quoted in Law 1997: 60–73)
Chinese mainland film scholars agree with the argument that the popular-
ity of these movies in the crime-triads-police genre reflect Hong Kong
society in its transitional period. However, from China’s perspective, Hu
Ke (1994: 7) writes:
These films show the brutality of gangsters, but glorify their boldness
and courage. The films are not simply products that construct complex
characters of both good and evil. More importantly, these films reveal
some Hong Kong people’s mentality of fin de siècle. They want to reap
some profits from the particular historical period when power is in
transition from Britain to China, and when laws are not yet firmly
established. Of course, I do not mean that they will murder and rob.
At most, they have the desire of thieves but not their guts. Neverthe-
less, such ‘evil’ desire can only be released through watching these
types of movies.
The ghost story pandered to the prevalent sense of crisis felt by Hong
Kong people. The characters of Chinese ghosts personified the fear
with which Hong Kong people viewed their cousins from the Main-
land. Nevertheless, Hong Kong Chinese still maintained a profound
connection with the Mainland, although through a love and hate rela-
tionship. Their distrust of the Chinese was hence reserved for the ‘evil’
ghosts but they showed a happy face to ‘good’ ghost. A film with the
‘good’ ghost characters, The Happy Ghost (1984) was one of the most
commercially successful pictures in the ’80s.
Equally, the Kung Fu comedy genre presents the duality of Hong Kong
cultural identity. Ng Ho and Chan Ting-ching argue that Kung Fu comedy
is a film genre derived from Hong Kong’s capitalist and local popular
culture. The genre is characterised as reflecting the values of a modern
society, displaying modern attitudes and speaking in fashionable idioms
(Ng 1993: 139–46; T.C. Chan 1980: 147–8). At the same time, generic
Cultural specificity of quasi-national film 71
conventions, such as narratives set against the historical background of
China, still remain, for instance, in the films of Sammo Hung’s Zan xian-
sheng yu Zhao Qianhua / Warriors Two (1978), and Jackie Chan’s Shexing
diaoshou / Snake in the Eagle’s Shadow (1978), and Shidi chuma / The
Young Master (1980).
Further, the duality of Hong Kong cultural identity is evident in the
changes in the genres’ different representations of Hong Kong for differ-
ent markets. For instance, Jackie Chan’s comedies are becoming more and
more internationalised to suit the mainstream market in the West. In this
respect, Hong Kong comedies are quite different from other national
films. Typically, the success of a national film in the Hollywood-dominated
international market depends largely on its ‘success’ in representing its
national cultural specificity. But the success of Jackie Chan’s comedies in
the international market, on the contrary, demonstrates another side to
the argument. In the 1990s, most of his internationally successful films are
about stories that happen overseas. Although claiming himself to be of
Hong Kong origin in his films, Jackie Chan ‘travels’ around the world to
‘solve problems’ other than those of Hong Kong, as, for instance, in
Feiying jihua / Operation Condor (1991), Hongfan qu / Rumble in the
Bronx (1995), Jiandan renwu / First Strike (1996), Yige haoren / Mr. Nice
Guy (1997). Leading Hong Kong Kung Fu film stars, for instance, Michelle
Yeoh in Tomorrow Never Dies (1997) and Sammo Hung in the television
series Martial Law (1997) have each taken on the roles of a mainland
Chinese agent and a Shanghai policeman, respectively, in Hollywood pro-
ductions. Thus by representing themselves as mainland Chinese Yeoh and
Hung offer the West a more ‘authentic’ version of Chineseness. Once
again, Hong Kong’s ‘image’ in the international market has to rely on its
identification with China.
By contrast, other Hong Kong comedies are locally oriented and
focused. Some degree of ‘localisation’ excludes the mainland, Taiwan and
overseas Chinese spectators. An example of this type is from the series of
Stephen Chiau’s wulitou films (films of nonsense) of the late 1980s and the
1990s.13 His films cannot really be enjoyed by Chinese spectators outside
Hong Kong, as the films depend heavily on the use of Cantonese slang,
which, in Linda Chiu-han Lai’s words, ‘demands up-to-date knowledge of
contemporary linguistic practice and an appreciation for the comic defa-
miliarization of ordinary popular language’ (Lai 1997: 95). The popularity
of Stephen Chiau’s wulitou reveals Hong Kong’s desire to preserve its own
cultural identity on the eve of its return to China. Whilst other national
films are more aware of presenting national specificity in order to share
the international market with Hollywood, Hong Kong cinema appears
rather to reconstruct Hong Kong’s identity in the international market,
and yet to reinforce its cultural specificity in the domestic Chinese market.
This characteristic reveals Hong Kong’s different perceptions of self.
These contradictory perceptions of self generate Hong Kong cultural
72 Cultural specificity of quasi-national film
identity as quasi-national: on the one hand, through identification with
Chinese cultural identity so that the special character of Hong Kong is
assured in the international market and, on the other hand, through distin-
guishing itself from China by its exclusivity, a distinctiveness especially in
the films targeted for domestic spectators.
This and the following chapter offer textual analyses of cinematic con-
structions of Hong Kong nationhood. As representations of the past and
the territory of a country are two significant means of constructing a sense
of nation, this chapter focuses on cinematic constructions of Hong Kong’s
history and territory. It argues that narratives about the past and the terri-
tory of Hong Kong confront the spectator with cinematic texts represent-
ing Hong Kong as a nation: the British colony not as part of China but as a
geopolitically defined community that could only articulate itself in rela-
tion to the triangular relationship between the British coloniser, the
Chinese motherland and Hong Kong.
This chapter suggests that filmic constructions of Hong Kong’s history
and territory are similar to other nations’ constructions of their national
histories and territories. In general, a national history presents the signific-
ance of a nation in two broad and sometimes overlapping ways: it presents
an historically indigenous community or/and it explains how groups of
people from other places have gathered in one place and developed into a
national community. Narratives of the past and of the territory of Hong
Kong similarly present the British colony as an historically indigenous
community, and as a community that developed from collections of
refugees and migrants. However, unlike other nations’ constructions of
their national histories and territories, constructions of Hong Kong history
and territory are inextricably interwoven with a representation of the tri-
angular relationship between the British coloniser, the Chinese mother-
land and the territory. This ‘imperfection’ in the process of
nation-construction produces the British colony as the embodiment of a
quasi-nation.
This claim is presented in two sections, the first of which discusses the
idea that images of the past and of the territory of a country contribute to
the construction of the concept of nation. The second section offers textual
analyses of cinematic constructions of Hong Kong history and territory in
four films: Jackie Chan’s A jihua / Project A (1982) and its sequel, A jihua
(II) / Project A (II) (1987), Allen Fong’s Fuzi qing / Father and Son (1981),
and Ann Hui’s Ketu qiuhen / Song of the Exile (1991).
78 Constructions of history and territory
History, territory and nation
History and territory define a nation. According to Anthony Smith, a
nation must possess a defined territory, not any territory, but a geopoliti-
cally defined territory, which enables the community to form a historical
association with it (Smith 1991: 9). In his study The Ethnic Origins of
Nations, Smith (1989: 183) argues that writing history and territory into
‘historic’ land, ‘homeland’ or the ‘cradle of our people’ produces a sense of
the nation. He notes:
There are two ways in which the community can be located and its
‘true state’ revealed: through poetic spaces and golden ages. The first
involves the use of landscape, the second the use of history. The one
roots the community in its distinctive terrain; the other charts its
origins and flowering in the age of heroes. Both together provide a
history and metaphysic of the individuality of the community, from
which an ethic of regeneration issues to lead it forward.
Writing about the history of a nation produces its cultural identity. The
history of a nation does not reveal the ‘true’ past of that community.
Instead, it is a response to the present, in the words of Andrew Higson
(1997: 41), ‘as the transference of present values on to the past as imagi-
nary object’. The history of a nation is also a blueprint for the future
(Smith 1989: 182). It not only explains how groups of people developed
into a nation, but it provides ‘a visionary goal’ which offers some kind of
stability whenever the community faces a crisis. In the process of defining
and strengthening a nation’s entity, national history serves a particular
function. Smith (1989: 192) identifies eight ‘motifs and features’ of national
mythology, which provide community members a sense of self, and a sense
of belonging, authentic and secure:
Similarly, images of territory are always more significant than the actual
terrain. Arguing that ‘writing is constitutive, not simply reflective’, Trevor
Barnes and James Duncan (1992: 3) believe that the way we present the
Constructions of history and territory 79
world ‘reveals as much about ourselves as it does about the worlds
represented’. Landscape is not, in Brian Stock’s words (1993: 317), ‘what
the eye can take in through one viewing, or what can be seen from a single
perspective’, nor could it, as Stephanie Donald (1997: 100) states, ‘in any
way [be] made ordinary’. Landscape is cultural representation, argued by
Stephen Daniels and Denis Cosgrove (1993: 59) as ‘the discursive terrain
across which the struggle between the different, often hostile, codes of
meaning construction has been engaged’. It partakes of what James
Duncan (1993: 39) identifies as the dualism between ‘to be represented (a
geographical place), and the site (the geographical, cultural, political,
theoretical viewpoint) from which that representation emanates’. The way
we portray our territory reveals our possessive consciousness of that
particular piece of land.
Film is a powerful medium, which produces a public space for the image
processes of a nation to develop. Cinematic images of a nation are con-
structed and presented through selecting, modifying and reinventing
historical data and geographical features. In a classic Chinese film, Huang
tudi / Yellow Earth (1984), Chen Kaige and Zhang Yimou construct the
cinematic Chinese nation through the juxtaposition of politically loaded
historical data: the Shaanbei landscape and Chinese mythology. The
narrative is set in the period of the Sino-Japanese war in the 1930s. A
Chinese Communist soldier and musician, Gu Qing, visits villages to
collect folk songs to transfer them into Chinese nationalist songs against
the Japanese. The historical period of the Sino-Japanese war signifies a
Chinese national community derived from its exclusion of the Japanese.
The chosen location of Shaanbei, the region covered by yellow earth
beside the Yellow River, reinforces the idea of the Chinese nation through
identification of natural features with historical sites. In Chinese mythol-
ogy, the region is the origin and cradle of the Chinese ‘race’, Yan huang
zisun (descendants of Yan di and the Yellow Emperor). It is where
Chinese ancestors ‘ploughed’, ‘weeded’ and ‘battled’ (K.G. Chen 1990:
559–60; Y.M. Zhang 1990: 574–8). In the mainland’s national history,
Shaanbei is the region where the Communists have been nurtured and
where the ‘new’ China, Red China, ‘the People’s Republic’, originated.
Images of Shaanbei embody the notion of ‘origin’. The landscape signifies
not only the origin of the Han Chinese ethnic community, but also the
birth of the Chinese Communists and the People’s Republic of China.
Geographic features, yellow earth and the Yellow River are historicised to
imply that nature is a rendition of the community’s history. Villages and
peasants’ cave dwellings are also naturalised to become part of the natural
environment in Zhang Yimou’s cinematic landscape. The filmic narrative
deals with the relationship between a peasant family and a Communist
soldier. The peasant family represents the Chinese people as descendants
of Shennong (God of Agriculture), whereas the soldier is an agent of
national politics. A modern Chinese nation is cinematically constructed
80 Constructions of history and territory
through the fusion of Chinese mythology, national history and geographi-
cal features.
There is, however, no single strategy for the cinematic construction of
national identities. While the significance of the Chinese nation is con-
structed by historicising Shaanbei, Australian national identity, for
example, is presented using different strategies. It relies on a dialectic rela-
tion between culture and nature, in which, ‘ “we” culturally define our-
selves on the side of nature’ (Game: 1990: 108). This psychic ordering of
nature as the Other derived according to Ross Gibson (1992: 1–18) from
the ‘conquistadorial attitude to territory’ of the early European settlers.
Gibson explains:
The dialectical relations between culture and nature argued for by Gibson,
have developed in three distinctive stages in Australian films. The first two
stages occurred in the pre-1970s period. The first stage was dominated by
the attitude to the land as ‘object’ and as commodity. It is an attitude the
colonists associated with desire to control. The second stage is a series of
responses in tales and stories that ‘explain’ the laudable failure in dealing
with the land. In the 1970s and 1980s, Gibson argues that Australia
entered into the third stage where cultural treatments of landscape
. . . buy into the old myths of outback purgatory, [but] they do so with
a witty self-awareness, and more importantly they also treat the land-
scape not as an obstacle to be subdued, not as something unapproach-
ably sublime, but as something to be learned from, something
respectable rather than awesome.
(Gibson 1992: 17)
The dialectical relations between culture and nature are apparent in the
representations of Australian landscape in a number of internationally
known Australian films. A mysterious land takes, without trace, the lives
of three young women in Peter Weir’s Picnic at Hanging Rock (1975); a
vast harsh land represents a woman’s self-reliance striving for independ-
ence in Gillian Armstrong’s My Brilliant Career (1980); and the dry red
land becomes part of the Australian identity in George Miller’s Mad Max
(1979), and Stephan Elliott’s The Adventures of Priscilla: Queen of the
Desert (1994).
Constructions of history and territory 81
History and territory in Hong Kong films
Establishing boundaries in the triangular relationship
Writing about the past and about the territory of Hong Kong is
fundamentally bound up with writing about the triangular relationship
between the British coloniser, the Chinese motherland and Hong Kong.
This is not because the past of the British colony was developed in the
context of changes in the relationship. Rather, it is because cinematic con-
structions of the past reveal more about the present than about the ‘true’
past itself.
The idea that the text of history is a response to contemporary political
and social tensions is clearly demonstrated in Jackie Chan’s two popular
historical Kung Fu comedies about the early twentieth century of Hong
Kong. Project A (1983) and its sequel (1987) were produced during and
after the Sino-British negotiations (1982–4) over the colony’s future after
1997. These two films can be read as Hong Kong’s response to the Sino-
British Joint Declaration, which excluded the participation of Hong Kong
in deciding its own future after 1997. The two films reveal Hong Kong’s
perception of self in the triangular relationship, through drawing bound-
aries – boundaries between Hong Kong and the British coloniser in
Project A, and boundaries between Hong Kong and the mainland in
Project A (II). Images of Hong Kong’s past and of its territory in these two
films, in the words of Sek Kei (1988: 14), not only ‘bring up the difficult
social and political plight of Hong Kong in the transitional period to 1997’,
but also reveal Hong Kong’s perspective on herself as a ‘nation’ by estab-
lishing boundaries in the triangular relationship.
Jackie Chan’s two films construct boundaries that contribute to the
understanding of the British colony as a geopolitically defined community.
Set in the early twentieth century, these two films present stories of a
Hong Kong public servant, Sergeant Ma (acted by Jackie Chan), who
fights against British corruption, refuses to be influenced by Chinese
nationalism, and determines to serve the people of Hong Kong. The
narrative of Project A deals with Hong Kong coast guards under the
leadership of Sergeant Ma killing pirates in the South China Sea. Project A
(II) tells a story about Hong Kong police dealing with social disturbances
caused by mainland Chinese national politics and internal police corrup-
tion in the colony. To the south, Hong Kong coast guards protect the
‘Hong Kong economy’ from the threat of pirates. To the north, Hong
Kong police defend Hong Kong’s legal system, maintain the society’s
public order and reject China’s imposition of nationalism on the commun-
ity.
Both films present the Hong Kong community as a nation-state. It has
government institutions, executive committees, military force and police.
Although it is the British colony with the coloniser as head of the ‘state’
(or as head of a government department in Project A (II)), the films
82 Constructions of history and territory
present images of Hong Kong with few signs and events to suggest the
coloniser’s political and economic exploration or exploitation of the
colonised. The colony, in the early twentieth century, displays hardly any
signs of poverty. The place is dominated by European-style architecture,
hotels, bars, executive meeting rooms, along with a few traditional
Chinese scenes of tea-houses, markets and residential areas. Western and
Chinese costumes, army uniforms, women’s dresses and casual clothes are
both colourful and new. These cinematic constructions of territorial fea-
tures, together with a few confrontations based on racial difference,
suggest a pleasant atmosphere and lifestyle in the colony. Jackie Chan’s
comic performance, once again, reinforces the images of a healthy society
where people are, in general, satisfied with the way they are governed.
Both films present social sectors of Hong Kong that resemble those of
other nations, including the ruling class, the business or professional class,
public servants, and the working class. Hong Kong is governed by laws
with law-abiding citizens and criminals. Hong Kong’s political culture and
legal system enable an ordinary citizen like Sergeant Ma to challenge the
Governor in Project A, and also enables the community to distinguish
itself from the mainland Chinese in Project A (II). Both films present
Hong Kong as a self-regulating entity with internal problems of bureau-
cracy and corruption similar to those of other nations.
The boundaries in the triangular relationship are constructed through
the interaction between Hong Kong Chinese and the British coloniser, and
between Hong Kong Chinese and the mainland Chinese. Project A is
structured through drawing cultural and functional boundaries between
the British coloniser and the Chinese community. The film begins with a
scene illustrating how a lack of understanding of the Chinese language
provokes the Governor when dealing with a ‘debate’ between two Chinese
senior officers on the issue of whether Hong Kong coast guards should be
sent to fight the pirates in the South China Sea. The decision was,
however, a careless one, made without due consideration, because of the
Governor’s impatience and lack of understanding of the Chinese language.
The film also presents the Governor’s racial bias against the local Chinese.
After their vessels are sabotaged, the Governor dismisses Hong Kong
coast guards, and turns to Britain for help. However, on his way to the
colony, the British Admiral of the Royal Navy is captured by the pirates.
In order to rescue the Admiral and other captured British subjects, the
Governor is anxious to resort to any measure, including bribery. The Gov-
ernor’s action contrasts with his bureaucratic manner of ‘waiting’ for the
Chinese ships and fishing boats to be ‘rescued’ when they are looted. His
different reactions towards the British and the Chinese is pointed out by
Sergeant Ma: ‘Has the Hong Kong government paid even a cent to save
those people who were captured by the pirates before?’
The film implies that the coloniser is incapable of dealing with Hong
Kong’s affairs. Only after the Governor puts Ma in charge are the pirates’
Constructions of history and territory 83
headquarters in the South China Sea bombarded and the captured British
group rescued. In the historical context of the film’s making – during the 2
years of the Sino-British negotiations about Hong Kong’s future – the
comedy offers Hong Kong’s perspective on the negotiations: a ‘pleading’
for the authorities to ‘trust’ the community to manage its own affairs in
relation to the 1997 issue.
Whilst Project A deals with cultural and functional boundaries between
the coloniser and Hong Kong, Project A (II) constructs boundaries
between the colony and China. The boundaries are established in the area
of political culture, given that Hong Kong is governed by a legal system
not shared by China. The film suggests that the mainland Chinese disre-
gard local laws and behave as though they are not subject to Hong Kong
laws when they are in the colony. Both the mainland revolutionaries and
the Manchu emissaries in the film are involved in ‘illegal’ activities in the
colony: they hold political public meetings, arrest people without inform-
ing local police, engage in and encourage local police corruption, and
impose China’s nationalism on the local community to cause public dis-
order. When the mainland nationalists invite Ma to join the revolution to
‘save Chinese minzu together’, Ma distances himself from them by stating:
The film reinforces the stereotype of the lawless mainland Chinese con-
structed through local popular cultural products from the late 1970s to the
early 1990s. In the film, the mainland revolutionaries work with corrupt
local police to achieve their political aim of overthrowing the Manchu
government on the mainland. When the Manchu emissaries are under
arrest by the Hong Kong police, a Manchu prince orders the Hong Kong
police to release his men ‘immediately’. His attitude is similar to that
described earlier by a Hong Kong senior police officer: ‘The problem with
these people (the mainland Chinese) is that they have no consciousness of
law’. His comment not only presupposes two types of Chinese – one in
China and one in Hong Kong – but also explicates a civic and territorially
defined Hong Kong community: the people of Hong Kong are all subject
to and conscious of its legal system, whereas the mainland Chinese are not.
Jackie Chan’s two historical films neatly reflect the triangular relation-
ship in the construction of Hong Kong as a ‘nation’. Hong Kong’s ‘nation-
ality’ is constructed through the concept of a geopolitically defined nation
84 Constructions of history and territory
in relation to China, and through drawing cultural and functional bound-
aries in relation to the British coloniser. This characteristic of reliance on
the triangular relationship in making sense of Hong Kong as a nation
reflects the ambiguous nature of that process, which once again produces
the British colony as the embodiment of a quasi-nation.
The father forces his son to admit Western culture. Though the son is
not willing to, the father has to insist. Because that is the only way he
can lift the son’s social status [for the future].
(Film Biweekly no.57, April 1981, 24)
Father and Son dramatises the pressure that the local Chinese endure
under the colonial system, and the foreignness of the English language to
native community members.
The British colony is presented as a society deeply rooted in the
Chinese cultural tradition. It constructs a Chinese cultural identity through
the touching relationship between a devoted patriarchal father and his
introverted son. Ka-hing is not very bright at his school work. By the time
he is in year four, he has been expelled from three different primary
schools due to poor academic results. However, as Ka-hing is the only boy
Constructions of history and territory 85
of his five children, the father insists that his son completes his education
at all costs. The father’s determination precludes him from understanding
that the son has a passion and a talent for making films. After completing
high school, the son tries to find work in a local television station.
However, the father insists that his son should complete a tertiary educa-
tion overseas, despite the family having to survive at a below-average
living standard. The father’s obsession for his son to study for a degree
results in the former marrying off his eldest daughter to pay for his son’s
university education, and in his ordering his second daughter to work to
support the family by not taking advantages of her perfect scores in her
tertiary entrance examination. Though Ka-hing expresses his strong objec-
tion to the father’s arrangement, he cannot bear to see his father’s disap-
pointment. Reluctantly, the son fulfils the father’s wish. Ka-hing gives up
his chances to work in a television station and leaves Hong Kong for uni-
versity in America.
Father and Son reinforces the Chinese cultural identity of the colony by
borrowing generic conventions from Chinese left-wing social realist films
of the 1930s and 1940s, and Cantonese melodramas of family relationship
of the 1950s. With a focus on a socially deprived class and the conditions
they had to bear, Father and Son depicts a common theme in family lunli
(ethic) relations – a social realist approach to the story of a patriarchal
father and his obedient son in a lower middle-class family. The film was
commonly recognised by Chinese film critics as one of the very few Hong
Kong new wave films that inherited and developed the Chinese cultural
tradition. However, the absence of China and the mainland refugees in the
film transforms the 1950s from a period that historically characterised the
tiny colony struggling to cope with overpopulated mainland refugees, to a
period that highlighted the aspects of pre-industrial and pre-technological
Hong Kong. It produces an historically inherited and territorially self-
contained indigenous Hong Kong community.
The film presents the social progress of the colony from the 1950s to the
early 1970s. In the 1950s, the family lives in a shabby wooden house in the
slums. Ka-hing’s family lives solely on the father’s wage, which barely pro-
vides a living for the family of seven. Ka-hing’s ill-equipped school is
located on the roof of a small building. After school, children run around
on the nearby hill, where they play in the bush, on the rocks and inside
derelict old houses. A fire accident damages the entire area of the slum,
including their shabby house. The family then moves into a public housing
estate, where the changed environment is depicted by a high density of
urban infrastructure. These contrasting territorial features, the 1950s slum
and the 1970s public housing estate, display the economic progress and
social change from the poverty of the 1950s to the economic boom of the
1970s.
Local spectators also view the film as displaying social changes in Hong
Kong. Allen Fong’s style of realism certainly leads to the preferred
86 Constructions of history and territory
reading of his film as a reflection of social change in Hong Kong. The film
was mostly shot under natural light on locations in a slum and public
housing environment, with the majority of actors being amateurs and new-
comers. The Director of RTHK, Zhang Minyi, comments that the film is
about ‘a period without television’ (Film Biweekly no.58, 16 April 1981,
12). In a similar direction, Yuan Huaishen, head of the Social Work
Department of Shuren College, comments that the film presents a period
in Hong Kong ‘before the public housing programme was established’.
Likewise, Li Mingkun praises the film as ‘representative’ of Hong Kong
society:
As we have seen, this family had difficulties in the ’50s and ’60s. It has
overcome difficulties, and become part of the relatively stable and
wealthy society of today. It has survived terrible living conditions in a
slum and has also experienced economic recession. The fire incident in
the film is representative. It shows how the public housing programme
began. The experience of growing up under pressure from family and
school was common at the time. It was possible to send children to
study overseas. There were always opportunities as long as you
worked hard. To me this film shows the process of change in Hong
Kong [my emphasis] from the ’50s and ’60s to the industrial and urban
society it is now.
For the first time I worked with the people here. I closely monitored
their expressions and listened to their voices . . . I forgot about my
personal effects in England, my job applications . . .
History does not make sense if we are taken apart from China. This
colonial past is just an interlude. . . . It is only in comparison to
Chinese culture – where we’re better, where worse – that we can
define Hong Kong culture. It can’t be talked of in isolation.
(Cinemaya vol.7, Spring 1990, 23)
his wife evokes the vision of the Queen as the head of a nation
working for the happiness of her people to encourage her husband to
do the same as the head of his family. Zhang Ying is so moved by his
wife’s plea that he thinks better of going crooked and returns the
jewels to the safe.
It is this identification with the Queen as the head of the nation that,
Leung argues, prompts the protagonist to decide to stay in Hong Kong.
Although Cantonese films of the 1950s express an awareness of a Hong
Kong community, Hong Kong identity was essentially constructed as an
ethnic Chinese and a colonial identity. On the surface, Mo Kangshi’s The
Misarranged Love Trap presents the fear that the invasion of the mainland
Chinese would destroy the Hong Kong family. On the other hand, the film
can also be interpreted to suggest that the notion of a distinct Hong Kong
community is an illusion. After their mainland relatives move into the
couple’s home, both the wife and the husband furiously defend their own
relatives’ right to stay and oppose the other’s family members. Thus, it
could be understood that after all it is Hong Kong’s familial and cultural
connections with the mainland that constitute the essence of Hong Kong
cultural identity.
Only in the 1970s does the Hong Kong film industry begin to identify
the concepts of a geopolitical and legal-political Hong Kong community. I
will discuss this idea by briefly considering two films from the period,
which construct China as the other, and identify with the geopolitical terri-
tory of Hong Kong and the colonial legal system rather than the British
monarchy.
Zaijian Zhongguo / China Behind (1974), directed by Shu Shuen (Tang
Shuxuan), deals with a story of five tertiary students who flee China during
the Cultural Revolution. The film uses images of intense preparation by
the illegal migrants in Guangzhou, their troublesome journey crossing the
Chinese border, and their failure to adapt to the capitalist lifestyle of
Hong Kong. Through emphasising differences in political identity, China
Behind embodies the idea that Hong Kong is not part of China. Despite
speaking the same dialect, Chinese from Guangzhou cannot integrate in
Hong Kong society. China Behind dismisses the relevance of connections
with China by emphasising the significance of political inheritance. More-
over, none of the mainland refugees in the film have family members or
connections in the colony from whom they can seek help.
Ng See-yuen’s Lianzheng fengbao / Anti-Corruption (1975) is also con-
cerned with Hong Kong’s geopolitical and legal systems. The film is based
98 Constructions of quasi-national identity
on an actual police scandal in 1973–1974, when the deputy district police
commander in Kowloon, Peter Godber, was convicted of corruption. Anti-
Corruption tells the story of a British expatriate police officer involved in
embezzlement under the gradual influence of corrupt local Chinese offi-
cers. Though Anti-Corruption portrays a British colony with a colonial
government, the film presents positive images of the government’s efforts
in combating crime (Sek 1999: 163–4). The film constructs the British
colony as a legally structured geopolitical entity, wherein the British and
the local Chinese are bound by the same community laws.
China Behind and Anti-Corruption are pioneering films of the 1970s,
which develop the significance of Hong Kong as a geopolitical community.
This does not mean, however, that the construction of Hong Kong geopo-
litical identity has been advanced without any reference to Chinese ethnic
or the Cantonese regional identity. In the following section, I discuss three
major ways in which cinematic constructions of Hong Kong’s geopolitical
identity embody the notion of a quasi-nation. First, Hong Kong identity
appears as a fragmented identity, comprising elements of a British colonial
and a Chinese ethnic identity. Second, Hong Kong’s identity is projected
in relation to other geopolitically defined Chinese cultural identities.
Finally, the territory’s geopolitical identity has the hybrid character of the
British colonisation of a Chinese society. As I will argue through textual
analysis, what is common to these constructions is that they all imply that
the geopolitically defined Hong Kong community exists only as a quasi-
nation.
There is a fat baby in front of us. People say, there is no way to get it.
But this is not a big deal to us. A small river divides us into two differ-
ent worlds, and I am attracted to you.
Johnny Mak uses Cao Zhi’s famous ‘seven paces’ poem to describe his
connection with mainland Chinese. Cao Zhi (192–232) is a well known
historical character in the novel Romance of the Three Kingdoms. He was
the third son of Cao Cao, the Emperor of Wei. After the death of Cao
Cao, the eldest son Cao Pei succeeded his father as Emperor of Wei.
According to the novel, Cao Pei feels threatened by his younger brother’s
talent. He devises a plot to order Cao Zhi to compose a poem within the
time taken to walk seven paces. If Cao Zhi fails, he will be punished with
death. Within seven steps, Cao Zhi rattles off the following poem, plead-
ing for his life:
This poem has been widely used to refer to the ancestral blood relation-
ship between people.
The challenge facing Johnny Mak in 1984 was how to make Hong Kong
spectators identify with the mainland Chinese in a context in which Hong
Kong people faced returning to China in 1997. There was strong resistance
to the mainland Chinese, not only because of 1997, but also because of the
negative attitude towards illegal migrants from China and Vietnam.
Johnny Mak persuades Hong Kong spectators to see themselves through
watching the mainland Chinese in the film. On screen, the mainland
104 Constructions of quasi-national identity
Chinese desire a capitalist lifestyle and individual freedom. This desire is
shared by the people of Hong Kong. The reason that Hong Kong citizens
feared government by the Communists after 1997 was that they were
afraid of losing their lifestyle and freedom. On screen, the mainland gang-
sters spend their free time enjoying the fruits of capitalism. When a Hong
Kong prostitute refuses to have sex with one of the mainland gangsters, he
pulls out his gun and shouts at her in frustration: ‘Do it now! I don’t have
time!’. While the mainland Chinese live on ‘borrowed time in a borrowed
place’ on screen, the Hong Kong people live in their actual situation of
‘borrowed time in a borrowed place’. The similarity between the diegetic
world and the real world encourages the spectators to identify with the
mainland Chinese. Long Arm of the Law indicates that the people of
Hong Kong may not share a political identity with the mainland Chinese,
but the values of a capitalist freedom are desired by both.
In Long Arm of the Law, political identity, ‘the experience of living in
two different societies’, plays a more significant role than notions of iden-
tity based on ethnicity, class and gender. This reinforces the distinct
geopolitical status of Hong Kong as opposed to China. In the film, Lin Wei
is the leader of the mainland gangsters. His leadership was established in
the 1960s, long before the burglary in Hong Kong. Lin Wei sets up a deal
with Ah Tai, plans the burglary, directs the group, pays the expenses of his
followers in Hong Kong, and looks after their safety. As they did in the
Cultural Revolution, his mates follow him without question or challenge.
However, Lin Wei is slightly different from the rest. Having been
granted permanent residence in Hong Kong in 1979, Lin Wei finds it ‘diffi-
cult’ to understand his mates’ desire for Hong Kong. Each time one of the
gangsters indicates that they wish to stay in Hong Kong instead of return-
ing to Guangzhou, Lin Wei objects. He is more concerned about the
prospect of capture by the Hong Kong police. After the death of one
member in the Walled City, Lin Wei instructs the group to leave Hong
Kong immediately. One gang member refuses to follow Lin’s order.
Without being aware that the gang member speaks for the group, Lin
points his gun at the man to force him to move, as the police are approach-
ing. As he does so, the other two mainland gangsters point their guns at
Lin Wei. In spite of their shared ethnicity, gender and class, the bond of
‘brotherhood’ is strained by difference in political identity.
Long Arm of the Law constructs Hong Kong as a distinct community
through foregrounding its geopolitical status, through identification with
the British colonial legal system, and with Chinese ethnicity and national-
ism. The film presents a quasi-national identity in that Hong Kong can
only be articulated through the others of the British coloniser and the
Chinese motherland. It also reveals that Hong Kong is a nation without
sovereignty. In the narrative, the triadic constellation of the Royal Hong
Kong Police, the mainland gangsters and Ah Tai mirrors the relationship
between the British coloniser, the Chinese motherland and Hong Kong.
Constructions of quasi-national identity 105
Ah Tai is a metaphor for Hong Kong and his function is ‘trade’. He is the
‘dealer’ liaising between the mainland gangsters and local triads, between
local triads and the Hong Kong police, and between Hong Kong police
and mainland gangsters. He gains through ‘providing information’. He has
a distinct identity; however, his survival and future depend on others. In
this triangular relationship, the mainland Chinese have power to make
their own decisions – to enter Hong Kong territory and to leave. The colo-
nial government has the power to protect the colony by fighting back. Ah
Tai has no political power to claim a territory of his own and, furthermore,
he has no claim over the way political power should be exercised for his
benefit. Ah Tai represents Hong Kong – a geopolitically defined quasi-
nation has no political power of its own.
Full Moon in New York is filmed from the perspective of the diaspora. In
the absence of images of the Statue of Liberty and Christmas decorations,
New York is represented as a cold, impersonal, lifeless and colourless city,
a concrete jungle. The sky is foggy. Buildings stand side by side in the
misty, hazy air. Canyons between buildings viewed from a low camera
angle convey a feeling of oppression and depressing lifestyle. The three
dominant colours in the film grey, dark blue and white, present a gloomy
and sombre place.
In the film, New York people are just crowds, faceless and sombre.
Their dress is formal and their manner defensive. With background noise
of busy traffic, police and ambulance sirens, and images of Hong Kong
migrant Li Fengjiao being assaulted in the street, the city appears threat-
ening. There are three major images of local people in the film, each pre-
senting a negative impression of the city – crime, poverty and
Anglo-Saxon domination. In the early part of the film, Li Fengjiao is
assaulted by a street kid. Taiwanese Huang’s American boyfriend stays at
a rented house for several months without paying rent. When she is in an
audition, theatre directors appear to be particularly critical of her
performance. Furthermore, local American Chinese are constructed nega-
tively as mimicking Anglo-Saxon America in their American English,
their European-style homes, Western food, Western humour, their pre-
Constructions of quasi-national identity 107
dominantly Anglo-Saxon friends and their ‘curiosity’ about China.
Throughout the film, the same message comes across again and again:
New York is a cold city where life is insecure and lonely.
New York is filmed from the perspective of the diaspora, and yet Li
Fengjiao shows no signs of cultural displacement. Being a Hong Kong
Chinese migrant, Li’s relation with the West neither resembles the
self–other relationship as the mainland Chinese Zhao Hong’s does, nor
does it demonstrate the fragmented identity of the Taiwanese Huang, nor
the element of mimicry of the American Chinese Thomas. Li has no
particularly nostalgic feelings for her original home Hong Kong; she dis-
plays no sense of superiority as a Chinese, nor does she need to mimic the
West. Her lifestyle in New York is similar to her lifestyle in Hong Kong. Li
continues to assist her father in the family business of running a Chinese
restaurant, while managing her own real estate business and stock market
transactions between Hong Kong and New York. She puts down any dif-
ficulties she encountered when she migrated to New York to her igno-
rance of fengshui. She explains to Zhao and Huang,
When I came here, I kept losing money on the stock market. Then
someone told me that since I come from Hong Kong, unless I blend in
with the Ch’i [qi] in this place, nothing is going to work. I was told to
open all the windows at night. New York is so noisy but I have to do
it. Then things really begin to work. So if you want to make it here,
you have to blend with Ch’i.
Diaspora links identity to spatial location. While both Zhao and Huang’s
identities are constructed through their identification with their home-
land(s), China and Taiwan, Li seems to identify with no particular spatial
location. She says to Zhao and Huang:
Li’s attitudes are framed through different sets of criteria than are those of
mainland, Taiwanese and American Chinese characters. Li’s Hong Kong
political identity is ‘concealed’. There are no signs or symbols to indicate
any geopolitical identification with Hong Kong. In contrast, Zhao is tied to
memories of the Cultural Revolution, distinguishing her from the Tai-
wanese and American Chinese characters. What Zhao’s American
Chinese husband, Thomas, fails to understand about Zhao’s constant
requests to bring her mother to New York is precisely where he fails to
understand the significance of national political history, the Cultural
Revolution. Zhao’s relationship with her mother is not an ordinary one. It
is a special bond formed during the Cultural Revolution, after her father
was tortured to death by the Red Guards.
108 Constructions of quasi-national identity
Similarly, political identity also plays a significant role in the construc-
tion of Taiwanese cultural identity. Brought up in a family with a father
who is a veteran Guomindang supporter and a member of the Taiwanese
parliament, Huang appears to feel more ‘authentically’ Chinese than Li. In
her superior manner, Huang refers to Li’s restaurant as ‘unauthentic’
Chinese, a place where ‘Cantonese cook to fool Americans’.
Language is also used in the construction of political identity. In Zhao
and Huang’s cases, language constructs and signifies their relationship with
the host country. They ‘speak’ the relationship between China and
America, and between Taiwan and America. The relationship between
Thomas and Zhao resembles the self–other relation between America and
China, between the host nation and the migrant community. When Zhao
proudly tells her husband that her English has improved to the extent that
she wants to communicate with him in English, Thomas reminds her that
her Chinese is ‘more sexy’, and there is no ‘need’ for her to ‘struggle’ to
speak English. The self–other relation is also reinforced through Zhao’s
relations with the language of American English. Able to speak English
‘like an American’ as she puts it, Zhao utters the words ‘Oh! my God!’
and realises that these words are naturally articulated as if they are part of
herself. She gets into a panic and becomes uncomfortable with herself.
When Zhao speaks the language of the other, she begins to lose her sense
of purity of self.
Language also articulates Huang’s identity. As an ‘old migrant’,
Huang’s cultural identity shifts between Taiwan and America. Huang
speaks both English and Mandarin fluently. She plays Lady Macbeth in
audition for a part, but interprets the character through the story of
Empress Wu. Her crossing of cultural boundaries is symbolically
expressed through her use of language with her American and Taiwanese
boyfriends. Without a place of her own, Huang floats between the two
places and two cultures. She moves out of her American boyfriend’s home
and straight back into the flat of her Taiwanese ex-boyfriend. Her dias-
poric identity is constructed through her contrasting relations with the two
places. Unlike her American boyfriend’s house, big, cold and empty, the
Taiwanese boyfriend’s apartment is small, full of stylish modern furniture,
and warmed by a fire, light wine and hot coffee against a background of
music. With her American boyfriend, Huang’s conversation is about who
owns what (earrings and a few books). With the Taiwanese man, her con-
versation revolves around family members, their past in Taiwan, their
present in New York, and their passion for Chinese culture. When Huang
invites him to sleep with her in the bedroom instead of on the sofa, the
Taiwanese man struggles to find the right words to express his intention to
settle down with an American woman. Unable to express himself in
Chinese, he switches to English: ‘I am thinking of settling down with an
American girl.’ Also unable to express herself in Chinese, Huang replies in
English: ‘It is not going to work.’ ‘Why?’ he asks. ‘It didn’t work for me’,
Constructions of quasi-national identity 109
she answers. Then they smile at each other. Before she returns to the
bedroom, the man switches back to Chinese in a caring voice: ‘Have an
early night! You have an audition tomorrow.’
In the construction of Li’s identity, however, language is used to articu-
late the difference between Hong Kong and China/Taiwan. Li speaks
English with her clients and Cantonese with her employees at her restau-
rant, but Mandarin with Zhao and Huang. When the three women are
tipsy at a meal, Huang sings a 1930s’ song from China, while Zhao sings a
popular Taiwanese campus song of the 1970s. This scene suggests that the
mainland and Taiwanese Chinese, in fact, share the same cultural identi-
ties, though they think they support different political ideologies. By con-
trast, Li sings her Hong Kong Cantonese song of the 1980s which distances
her from both of her friends.
Stanley Kwan constructs no geopolitical boundaries between Li and her
host country America. Li’s life in America is almost the same as she had in
Hong Kong (of course, after she adjusts fengshui to blend in with the qi) –
she continues to assist her father with the family business and manages her
own stock market transactions. She shows no signs of being concerned
with any political or social issues that are particular to Hong Kong, for
instance, Hong Kong’s future after 1997.
At the same time, Li is located at the centre of Chinese culture in New
York. The most identifiable signs of Chineseness – Chinese food, arranged
marriage and jiaqing (family affection) – appear in her ‘impure’ Chinese
restaurant. Zhao Hong desires a close relationship with her mother in New
York, a relationship exemplified through Li’s caring partnership with her
father. Huang Xiongping searches for something to make her ‘feel like a
Chinese’, which she experiences through ‘stirring’ Chinese food in a hot
wok surrounded by Chinese cooking smells and Chinese cooks in Li’s
restaurant. It becomes impossible to perceive Li as a member of the
Chinese diaspora in the West, as a sense of cultural displacement is not
evident in her. Her life in New York is simply a continuation of her life in
Hong Kong.
As mentioned above, Anthony Smith argues that national identity is
constructed with ‘two distinct forms and concepts of the “nation”, territor-
ial and ethnic’. As Zhao, Huang and Li share Chinese ethnicity, differ-
ences between them can only be articulated through their difference in
geopolitical identity. In Full Moon in New York, the mainland and Tai-
wanese Chinese are differentiated by their geopolitical identities, which
make them as distinct as, in Vijay Mishra’s words (1995: 155), that of ‘new’
and ‘old migrants’ in the host territory, America. However, there are no
distinct differences or boundaries between Hong Kong and America in
geopolitical identity expressed from Li’s perspective; Li in New York is a
continuation of Li in Hong Kong. This absence of Hong Kong’s geopoliti-
cal identity, or the ambiguity in representing Hong Kong’s geopolitical
identity produces Hong Kong’s quasi-national identity. It is quasi-national,
110 Constructions of quasi-national identity
because a geopolitically defined Hong Kong identity implies a notion of
crossing geopolitical borders.
Over the last 15 years, Hong Kong taxpayers have spent at least
US$340 million on clothing and feeding them while they await reset-
tlement somewhere.
Furthermore, the film suggests that the people of Hong Kong are living in
preparation for the time when they are reduced to ‘refugees’. As China is
represented as a Communist dictatorship, Hong Kong’s return to China is
therefore a return to the government of Communist dictatorship. This
image is reinforced by deconstructing Hong Kong as a society of Chinese.
Chan allows people normally perceived to be at the periphery in main-
stream Hong Kong films – Eurasians, Hong Kong residents of British
origin and Chinese of South-East Asian origin – to speak for the centre.
He also reconstructs mainstream images of Hong Kong Chinese, the
middle-class Chinese professionals, by emphasising their mobility between
Hong Kong and the West.
In the film, Hong Kong is represented by Rubie, an Eurasian. It is
through her voice that the audience ‘hears’ the voice of Hong Kong. Her
Eurasian features symbolise Hong Kong as a hybrid of the West (British)
and the Chinese. Rubie speaks fluent English with an American accent
and Cantonese without a European accent. Her image as representing
Hong Kong comes from her constant use of ‘we, the people of Hong
Kong’, foregrounding her position as spokesperson for the community.
The identification also comes from her comfortable position within Hong
Kong society, her behaviour, her understanding of the community, her
concerns for the future after 1997, and her knowledge about the West, her
citing from Peggy Guggenheim, Ingmar Bergman and George Bernard
Shaw. Rubie negotiates skilfully between two languages, and between her
Chinese and Anglo-Saxon friends. She is neither a British coloniser, nor a
colonial mimic, nor an ‘authentic’ Chinese, but a hybrid of the British
colonisation of Chinese society.
The film constructs Rubie as a metaphor for Hong Kong. She was born
in the 1960s, the period when Hong Kong began to distance itself from
China and develop its own cultural identity. Her past resembles that of
Ka-hing, the character in Allen Fong’s film, Father and Son. Both grow up
in a lower middle-class family, and neither characters’ parents have
particular memories about China or any familial or cultural connection
with the mainland. As with Ka-hing, China plays no part in Rubie’s
growing up. However, there is one difference between the two characters.
Ka-hing’s family is a victim of British colonisation, whereas Rubie’s family
owes a great debt to the former British Christian missionary, Elsie Tu,
Constructions of quasi-national identity 113
who assisted the family to overcome the most difficult period in the 1960s.
The role of Elsie Tu in the past of Rubie’s family reinforces the message
that Hong Kong is not a Chinese society, but a society built up by the co-
operation between the British coloniser and the indigenous Chinese.
John, Rubie’s de facto husband, is also represented as a hybrid identity.
Originally from Indonesia, he follows his father to Hong Kong during the
period of anti-Chinese feeling in Indonesia. Like Rubie, John is bilingual
and comfortable with both his Chinese and European friends. His paint-
ings express his hybridity by using the two standard colours of Chinese ink
painting, black and white, to produce Western style oil paintings. If Rubie
and Ka-hing represent Hong Kong’s indigenous community – the group of
people who were born in Hong Kong – then John and Hueyin in Ann
Hui’s Song of the Exile represent the refugee and migrant community in
Hong Kong. In contrast to Hueyin, who identifies herself with Hong Kong,
John is ambiguous about his Hong Kong identity, so that he uses the term
‘you, the people of Hong Kong’ to distance himself from the community.
However, his manner, the way he speaks and reads English, and his use of
local idioms, makes him, in the words of local critic Liu Mingyi (1993:
108), ‘the most identifiable character’ to Hong Kong spectators.
In representing the centre of Hong Kong – the middle-class profes-
sional Chinese – Chan also deconstructs their Chinese cultural identity
through emphasising their connection with the West. Rubie’s elder
brother and his family are in Canada. Rubie’s younger brother Tony is a
typical middle-class Hong Kong professional whose application to migrate
to Australia has been granted. In the film, the couples presented are all
fractured families apart from Rubie’s parents. Rubie and John, Tony and
Teresa live together but are not married. Teresa is divorced and is much
older than Tony. Their relationship is not accepted by Tony’s mother who,
however, easily accepts the marriage of Elsie Tu to a younger Chinese
man because Elsie is a Guilao. The narrative presents cultural clashes
between East and West, reflected in the contrast between traditional
Chinese and modern Chinese families.
To Liv(e) has been widely criticised by local cultural critics as a film
which ‘expresses’ Hong Kong’s view through identification with the West
by the use of English (Ye 1992a, b and c; He 1992; Sek 1992; M.Y. Liu
1993: 95–109). Their criticism has some foundation. All Rubie’s letters are
delivered orally in English. Moreover, either through the subject matter
dealing with politics and art, or through techniques of aesthetics – asyn-
chronous sound, diegetic music, colour coding and other forms of symbol-
ism, To Liv(e) recalls Godard’s films Vivre sa Vie (My Life to Live) (1962)
and Letter to Jane: Investigation of a Still (1972). The film also cites a letter
written by George Bernard Shaw and quotations from Italo Calvino’s
Invisible City, all of which are shown to be ‘not genuinely addressed to the
people of Hong Kong’ (Erens 1996: 114). But at the same time, the film
also makes use of art works not produced in the West: the soundtrack of
114 Constructions of quasi-national identity
the mainland Chinese protest rocker, Cui Jian’s ‘Nothing to My Name’,
and dance dramas produced by Hong Kong, ‘Exhausted Silkworms’ and
‘Nuclear Goddess’. The film, therefore, composed of fragments of West
and East, and represents the hybridised society of Hong Kong.
The title of the film, both the Chinese Fushi lian or Fushi lianqu and the
English To Liv(e), captures double meanings. As denotation, To Liv(e)
indicates the film is a response to Liv Ullmann’s criticism of Hong Kong’s
repatriation of Vietnamese boat people. The Chinese title Fushi lianqu
(Secular Love, Secular Life) describes ordinary citizens’ love and life in
Hong Kong after 4 June 1989 and as 1997 approaches. It connotes that the
people of Hong Kong cope with life as it comes. They have ‘to live’ in
anticipation of Communist ‘dictatorship’ and their ‘refugee’ status after
1997.
The hybrid identity produced in the films discussed suggest that Hong
Kong is a distinct community, differentiated from China. Hybridity is also,
however, a symptom of the quasi-national status of Hong Kong: Hong
Kong is a nation without a name. As a quasi-nation, it can be imposed on
by the British government and the United Nations, who assign to Hong
Kong the position of first asylum for Vietnamese boat people. The same
quasi-national status also allows the British and the Chinese governments
to decide Hong Kong’s future after 1997 without the consent of Hong
Kong citizens in 1984.
However, her ‘Hong Kong identity’ is swept away when she follows
Brother Bao to ‘exile’ overseas.
Cinematic constructions of national identity are always modified
according to changing national political and social contexts. Images of
Hong Kong’s geopolitical identity have also developed along with changes
in the triangular relationship between the British coloniser, the Chinese
motherland and Hong Kong self. The films I have analysed in this chapter
were produced in the particular historical context of the triangular rela-
tionship when the colony was moving towards China. Hong Kong was
anxious about its future after 1997, and the colony wanted to play an influ-
ential role in the British and Chinese’s decision-making about Hong Kong.
Hong Kong needed to make sense of itself as a distinct ‘nation’ to claim its
right to a say over how political power should be exercised for Hong
Kong’s benefit.
The process of constructing Hong Kong as a ‘nation’ reaches the stage
when Hong Kong could only speak ‘self’ as a nation by defining its bound-
aries in relation to the coloniser and the motherland. Not only is the trian-
gular relationship essential to making sense of Hong Kong, but Johnny
Mak and Evans Chan’s films also indicate that Hong Kong was a nation
without political power of its own. Stanley Kwan’s film constructs a Hong
Kong ‘self’ independent of the triangular relationship, so the geopolitical
identity of Hong Kong in his film shows, indicating the necessity of cross-
ing geopolitical borders. The term quasi-nation as used in this chapter
expresses the imperfection, and ambiguity in both the process and the
product of cinematic constructions of Hong Kong as a nation.
7 Hong Kong cinema after
1997
So far I have described Hong Kong cinema before the return of the colony
to China, with an emphasis on the period between 1979 and 1997. In doing
so, I paid special attention to the Hong Kong film industry, market, film
criticism, cultural specificity of local films, as well as the cinematic con-
struction of the colony’s history, territory and the cultural identity of Hong
Kong.
In this chapter I want to ask the general question: what has happened to
Hong Kong cinema since the return of the colony to China? This question
is being posed against the overall claim of the book that Hong Kong
cinema can be defined satisfactorily only if we address the peculiar trian-
gular relationship between the British colonizer, the Chinese motherland
and Hong Kong. At the same time, the generality of the question is in
need of specification by a number of more precise queries.
• Has Hong Kong cinema continued in the same vein or has it changed
radically?
• Has Hong Kong cinema moved closer to Chinese national cinema?
• Have there been any changes in the film industry? Has there been any
shift in Hong Kong film markets?
• Has Hong Kong cinema developed cinematic techniques, genres, con-
ventions and narratives that are different from those of the pre-1997
period?
• Has the cinematic construction of Hong Kong history, landscape and
cultural identity changed since 1997?
• Are there any significant changes as to film critics?
Throughout the book, I have argued that Hong Kong cinema is shaped by
the shifts in the triangular relationship between the British coloniser, the
Chinese motherland, and Hong Kong. 1997 brought perhaps the most
significant change in this relationship – the retreat of the British coloniser
from the colony, and the official return of Hong Kong to China’s control
under the policy of ‘one country, two systems’. However, this change has
had a limited impact on Hong Kong cinema: certainly, new developments
120 Hong Kong Cinema after 1997
have taken place but they are not as radical as might be expected. Indeed,
we can observe a strong continuity of well established genres, visual styles,
narratives, as well as producers, directors and stars. Nor are such changes
as pervasive or as incisive as the momentous occasion of the historical
turning point may suggest.
There are a number of reasons for this, which I will discuss later in the
chapter. Here I want to draw the reader’s attention to the important fact
that the absence of the British coloniser after 1997 does not mean the end
of British presence in Hong Kong. British law, its laissez-faire economic
policy and governmental structures remain unchanged under China’s
policy of ‘one country, two systems’. The colony may have been returned
to China, but its high degree of autonomy continues. Indeed we note an
increase of trade, tourism, labour influx and cultural exchange between
Hong Kong and the mainland after 1997. Nevertheless, the border
remains. This separation is effective also in the domain of culture. Hong
Kong films, for example, are still considered by the Chinese government as
‘foreign’; they are subject to China’s quotas of foreign film importation of
less than fifteen films per annum. As a result, Hong Kong cinema cannot
be understood as part of Chinese national cinema.
In the following sections, I will first discuss Hong Kong society after
1997. I will argue that Hong Kong has remained a quasi-nation despite the
fact that the British coloniser has formally withdrawn from the colony and
the city’s political and economic relationship with China has been
strengthening. I will suggest that in spite of the political change of the tri-
angular relationship in 1997 Britain continues to exert a strong influence
on the cultural aspects of Hong Kong. My second section focuses on Hong
Kong cinema, in which I will address trends, changes and continuities in
the industry, markets, film texts and criticism in the post-1997 era. I want
to claim that Hong Kong cinema remains a quasi-national cinema after
1997.
Hong Kong television and films are becoming more and more un-
Hongkong-like. If you didn’t know that these actors were from Hong
Kong, you would not have known that these were Hong Kong films.
It is clear then that China’s policy of ‘one country, two systems’ is indeed
being carried out in the post-1997 era. This goes hand in hand with social
and cultural integration. So are there any changes in the way that Hong
Kong perceives herself after the coloniser’s retreat? As cultural identity is
always in process, how does the change of the triangular relationship affect
the cinematic construction of Hong Kong? First, the Hong Kong film
industry.
I reminded him that the Hong Kong ‘system’ has turned the territory into
one of the most viable and productive film-making locations in the world.
This ‘system’ mostly relies on a quick, slapdash approach, the non-
accounting of funds, and the absence of contractual security. As such, it
has many advantages in terms of time-saving, flexibility, freedom of
employment, ad hoc decision making, and a minimum of bureaucracy. On
the other hand, Chueng was perhaps right in suggesting that it was this
same informal ‘system’ that has led the downturn of the film business since
the early 1990s.
The belief in the superiority of the Hollywood system is reflected in the
local industry’s financial management. Media Asia has begun to practise
the Hollywood style by seeking funding from banks and by signing Com-
pletion Bonds to guarantee the success of the product. In the same vein,
Media Asia emulates other aspects of Hollywood film-making, such as the
requirement of completed scripts and detailed budget plans before shoot-
ing, early publicity including trailers and cross-media promotions, none of
which have been commonly practised in Hong Kong.5 Big budgets and the
latest special effects are now trendy in Hong Kong. These are interpreted
as a sign of the territory’s ability to produce on a par with Hollywood.
While the strengthening of the relationship with overseas markets,
including China’s, is one of the most noticeable characteristics of the local
film industry after 1997, the industry’s production centre – its ownership,
Hong Kong Cinema after 1997 127
its economic contribution and its main market – remains in Hong Kong.
Even though the industry is seen to be diverting its forces elsewhere, such
companies as Golden Harvest Pictures (China), China Star, Media Asia,
and such medium-sized studios as BOB, Milkway and Emperor have so far
remained controlled by Hong Kong investments. This very much meets
the expectations of the local community who feel that too much ‘Holly-
woodisation’ or even internationalisation, is a real threat to the cultural
identity of Hong Kong. What all of this suggests is that the Hong Kong
film industry continues to be fundamentally quasi-national.
Films
No radical changes can be discovered in the stylistic elements of Hong
Kong films after 1997. Local popular culture, social events and Chinese
literature remain major sources for narrative inspiration. Manfred Wong’s
youth and triads series Guhuo zai / Young and Dangerous, Wang Jing’s
series on metropolitan sex and violence, and Ann Hui’s Bansheng yuan /
Eighteen Springs are only a few of the many adaptations of local cartoons,
gossip magazines and Chinese literature. Hong Kong society remains the
cinematic centre of the local film. The social impacts of the handover and
the Asian economic crisis are depicted in many films, most directly in Fruit
Chan’s Xilu xiang/ Little Cheung, Qunian yanhua tebie duo/The Longest
Summer, and Lingo Lim’s Mulu xionguang / Victim.
So far there has not been any particular film genre that has dominated
Hong Kong cinema. Nor have any new genres emerged since 1997.
Instead, a variety of genres have been equally popular, such as police and
crime, youth triads, thriller and melodrama. In comparison, comedy and
swordplay films have been particularly weak. New stars have risen, while
the pre-1997 stars remain a dominant force, now perceived more strongly
as Hong Kong symbols, especially in co-production films. As the number
of co-production films has increased since 1997, non-Chinese and Chinese
actors from Japan, South Korea, America and Singapore appear more fre-
quently in Hong Kong films. More and more films are multi-lingual with
narratives about cross-cultural romances and international businesses. Co-
production is becoming a trend in the industry; it has been, and will con-
tinue to be, an important factor affecting cinematic style in Hong Kong.
Hong Kong’s return has not encouraged the local film industry to
explore further the territory’s relationship with China in the cinematic
space. In representing the mainland, geopolitical cultural identity con-
tinues to be perceived as the main difference between the mainland
Chinese and Hong Kong residents. As I argued in Chapter 6, Johnny
Mak’s Long Arm of the Law discloses Hong Kong’s fear for the invasion
of the mainland Chinese. This fear is revealed again, for example, in Zeng
Jinchang’s Kongbu ji / Intruder (1997). The film depicts a series of brutal
murders and kidnappings committed by a mainland Chinese woman in
128 Hong Kong Cinema after 1997
order to gain a Hong Kong identity card for her husband. She seduces a
Hong Kong taxi-driver and disables him by driving a car over his legs. She
then tortures him to get information about his past before killing him, so
that her husband can assume his identity. To round things off, she murders
the taxi-driver’s mother and attempts to kill his daughter. The barbarians
from the north knocking at Hong Kong’s door.
The pre-1997’s theme that the mainland Chinese are economically infe-
rior is revised after 1997. From a more sympathetic perspective, Fruit
Chan’s Liunian piaopiao /Durian, Durian (2000) portrays the experiences
of a young mainland woman and a 10-year old girl in Hong Kong. The film
constructs a wide economic gap between the mainland and Hong Kong
Chinese, caused by differences in geopolitical identity. The woman is in
Hong Kong on a 3 months’ work permit as a masseuse and prostitute,
while the girl is on a visiting visa with her family. The girl stays at a shabby
house helping her mother washing dishes for a living. Within her 3 months
stay in Hong Kong, the woman has not had a day for herself, resting, shop-
ping or visiting tourist sites. She serves 36 clients on her last day in Hong
Kong, working till the last minute before her visa expires. Her instant
economic ‘success’ is envied by relatives and friends on the mainland,
many of whom desire to pursue a promising ‘career’. Golden Harvest’s co-
production with the mainland studio also present similar images about
China. Para Para Lakuria (2001), a Kung Fu musical, is a romance
between a Hong Kong dance coach and a wealthy Japanese woman in
Shanghai. In the film, China’s economic prosperity is shown through
images of skyscrapers, night clubs, and a luxurious apartment in Shanghai.
However, the film creates two economic classes – the Hong Kong ‘expatri-
ate’ who consumes China’s ‘capitalist’ lifestyle, and the local Chinese
excluded from economic privilege.
Nor has Hong Kong’s return to China encouraged the industry to
participate in the exploration and construction of Hong Kong’s history.
‘History’ it seems has been considerably reduced as a motif, and is often
replaced by a certain loss of memory in the post-1997 films. Jackie Chan’s
Wo shi shui / Who Am I? (1998) is about a man who searches for his iden-
tity after he loses his memory during events involving an international
team of scientists and soldiers. The protagonist Jackie Chan, the only sur-
vivor, is rescued by an African tribe. When the chief wants to know his
name, Jackie Chan asks himself: ‘Who am I?’ ‘Who am I?’ subsequently
becomes his name, as well as his goal for seeking his lost identity. In the
process of his search, he inadvertently assists the CIA in solving the ‘mys-
terious’ air-accident in which ‘who am I?’ is the only survivor. By the end
of the film, the audience has not been given the real identity of ‘who am I’.
However, as the man speaks Cantonese, and is acted by Jackie Chan, we
assume that ‘who am I’ is a Hongkongese who works as part of the inter-
national team. As Hong Kong film critic Li Cheuk-to (1999: 90) suggests,
what the film reveals is that geopolitical identity is no more important than
Hong Kong Cinema after 1997 129
one’s surviving skill. The character has no name, no past and nationality,
and yet his skills enable him to survive in Africa, Europe and America.
The film indicates a rejection by Hong Kong of its new political cultural
identity as the People’s Republic’s citizen.
Memory loss becomes a frequent narrative motif in the post-1997 films.
Whether the ‘past’ is too ‘difficult’ to recall or too painful to remember,
identity cannot be articulated without a past. Likewise, concealing one’s
‘past’ is a rejection of one’s present identity. In Ann Hui’s Qianyan wanyu
/ Ordinary Heroes (1999), a female social worker ‘loses’ her memory in
order to replace the past by a new life. The protagonist in Fruit Chan’s
The Longest Summer is happy and content only after his memory of the
pre-1997 days is lost. Chen Deshen’s Ziyu fengbao /Purple Storm (1999)
deals with a man who is troubled by ‘remembering’ the false past of his
identity. In addition, local film critic Sek Kei (2000: 165) observes that
orphan identity is a popular theme in the post-1997 films. For instance,
major characters in Huanying degong / Hot War (1998), Annamadelianna/
Anna Magdalena (1998), Quanzhi dadao / The Group (1998), and Fengyun
xiongba tianxia / The Stormriders (1998) grow up in orphanages or survive
without knowing where they have come from.
Boli Zicheng / City of Glass (1998) is one of a few films that deals with
Hong Kong’s past after 1997. The film will illustrate the idea that the life
of Hong Kong people has been shaped by the triangular relationship
between the British coloniser, the Chinese motherland and the territory: a
major theme that deals with Hong Kong’s past before 1997. City of Glass
is a romance between two graduates of the University of Hong Kong. The
couple fall in love in the 1960s, get married to different persons in the
1980s, meet and fall in love again in the mid 1990s, and die in a car acci-
dent in London on the New Year’s Eve, 1997. As their spouses refuse to
identify them, their children are called upon to deal with legal procedures
involving property, which the lovers had bought without letting their
families know. In the process, the children discover much about their
parents’ past (a past of Hong Kong) and, in addition, they themselves fall
in love.
City of Glass is a film that indulges in nostalgic images of the colonial
education system, much of its architecture and lifestyle being framed in
soft lighting and soft focus. The plot develops around Hong Kong’s rela-
tion with Britain and China. The lovers are both educated in a colonial
institution. Driven by the Chinese nationalism of the early 1970s, the male
protagonist participates in the protests against the Japanese claim of the
Diaoyu islands. As a consequence, he is expelled from the university, and
subsequently leaves the colony for Paris to further his education. The man
returns to Hong Kong in the mid-1990s to expand his business with the
mainland as the year 1997 is approaching. He meets his former lover in a
Mandarin class. The love story ends at London’s Westminster Bridge in
1997, indicating the closing chapter in the triangular relationship of Hong
130 Hong Kong Cinema after 1997
Kong. The film also reveals the deep admiration and nostalgia amongst
Hong Kong’s elite for the coloniser. Both give their own child a Chinese
name, Kangqiao (Westminster Bridge), even though one is born in Paris
and the other in Hong Kong.
Few of the territory’s films after 1997 have continued the exploration of
Hong Kong’s identity in terms of sovereignty and recognition. Instead, a
number of films disclose psychological moods after the handover. Fear and
depression are shown in the portrayal of the Hong Kong landscape. In
Johnny To’s series of popular and award winning films, Feichang turan /
Expect the Unexpected (1998), Anzhan / Running Out Time (1999),
Qianhuo / The Mission (1999), or Ringo Lim’s Gaodu jiebei / Full Alert
(1998), Hong Kong’s skyscrapers and shopping centres are presented as
sites for potential dangers threatening unexpectedly and suddenly in ele-
vators, air-conditioned tunnels, nearby streets and parking areas. In con-
trast to the 1980s Michael Hui’s comedies, Cinema City’s series of Aces
Goes Palaces, or Jackie Chan’s series of Police Story, Hong Kong’s pride
in its modern buildings and confidence in the control of its technology are
absent in the post-1997 films. A sense of uncontrollable destiny also
unfolds in Wai Ka-fai’s Yige zitou de danshen / Too Many Ways to be No.
1 (1998). The film is about a man who faces two choices. It doesn’t matter
which choice he makes, the end result is the same no matter which path he
choses. Similarly Wang Kai-wai’s Huayang nianhua / In the mood for love
(2000) depicts feelings of uncertainty in the story of a couple who try to
cope with their spouses’ adultery.
Depression is another recurring mood in the post-1997 films. The last
Best Award’s winning film in the colonial era, Fruit Chan’s Xianggang
zhizhao / Made in Hong Kong (1997) displays a picture of despair on the
eve of the city’s return to China. Throughout the film Hong Kong is pre-
sented in under-exposed lighting, with images of narrow dark corridors,
streets crowded with vehicles in disarray, wire fences along a playground,
and buildings framed largely in high or low angles. The plot is about four
teenagers who grow up in the public housing area just before 1997. San is
sixteen and a devoted Christian. She commits suicide as she cannot cope
with her intimate relationship with her school teacher. Long is mentally
disabled, and a victim of sexual assault. He is beaten to death shortly after
his only protector, Chau, falls ill. Chau is unemployed. He dies after he
kills the leader of the murderers who have beaten Long to death. Unable
to obtain a kidney, Ping dies at the age of sixteen, shortly after she falls in
love with Chau. In this film, death is the only way to obtain peace. The
only happy moments of these teenagers occur in the graveyard. In a series
of long-distance shots, Chau, Long and Ping are jumping cheerfully from
the top of one grave to another, calling out for dead San, whom they have
never met. The graveyard is the only place where they are able to express
their love for each other, embracing and kissing.
The death theme runs deep throughout the film. The story begins with
Hong Kong Cinema after 1997 131
Long who passes Chau two letters which he picks up from San’s body after
she has jumped off a high rise building, dying on the ground. The film pro-
gresses with Chau’s gradual comprehension of his own surroundings and
death. As he narrates: ‘The world is changing faster than people can adapt
to it’; ‘Death is beautiful, because there is no need to face the uncertain
world’; and ‘Die young, we will be forever young.’ The film ends with Mao
Zedong’s words to the youth during the Cultural Revolution:
The world belongs to you and me. But ultimately, the world will
belong to you. You, so full of energy, are having the best time of the
lives, like the early morning sun. All our hopes are placed on the
young.
On the eve of the territory’s return to China in 1997, and with Mao’s
quotation at the end of the film, Made in Hong Kong presents the colony
as a dying community.
Fruit Chan’s other award winning picture, Little Chueng (1999), depicts
changes in Hong Kong after 1997 from the perspective of a 9-year old boy.
Little Chueng is born in Hong Kong, named after the most beloved local
opera singer and film star, Brother Chueng. The son of a small restaurant
owner, Little Chueng helps his father deliver food to neighbouring cus-
tomers on his bicycle. He grows up in a crowded and disordered street,
with his playground on an empty truck. And yet Cheung is a free and
happy child loved by his grandmother, his Philippino nanny, and neigh-
bours. His happiness gradually diminishes as we approach July 1997: his
Philippino nanny is leaving; his grandmother is losing her passion for
talking about the past; and the customers are beginning to leave Hong
Kong. Most importantly, his best friend, Ah Fen, is forced to return to
China.
Through his portrayal of an innocent childhood, Fruit Chan reveals a
deep tension between Hong Kong and China. Ah Fen’s disabled father is a
Hong Kong citizen, whereas Ah Fen is a mainland resident. After many
years’ waiting to obtain a Hong Kong residence, Ah Fen’s father pays a
great deal of money to arrange for his daughter to join him in Hong Kong,
hoping that the Chinese government will grant her the right to stay after
1997. From Little Cheung’s perspective, the film portrays the difference in
geopolitical identity: Ah Fen doesn’t go to school, and she always hides
when she sees a policeman. In this way, the film intensifies the difference
in identity. Ah Fen tells Little Cheung:
Film criticism
The least change in the overall perspective of Hong Kong cinema can be
observed in film criticism. All the trends analysed in Chapter 3 continue.
In the post-1997 period there are few signs indicating that film criticism,
Hong Kong Cinema after 1997 133
film awards and film festivals are developing a closer relationship with the
mainland than in the pre-1997 era. Annual Hong Kong Golden Film
Awards and Hong Kong International Film Festival remain the two most
significant events Hong Kong film culture. Similar to pre-1997, Hong Kong
Film Archive has played a major role in selecting, shaping and producing
Hong Kong (film) history, as well as theorising the contemporary local film
culture. The relationship between the Hong Kong Film Archive and the
Chinese national film archive in Beijing, in the words of the territory’s
director of the film archive, Angle Tong, affects mainly archive technique,
rather than cultural and political supervision.
Hong Kong film critics remain a separate body from film critics in
China and Taiwan. As I mentioned in Chapter 3, local film criticism has
become even more so as we approach 1997. Two local film critics associ-
ations, the Hong Kong Film Critics Society and Hong Kong Film Critics
Association, were established in the mid-1990s. Since then both associ-
ations have organised seminars, distributed their own critics’ film awards,
and produced their critical collections. Their publications focus on Hong
Kong films with little reference to films from China and Taiwan.
The obvious change is the SAR government’s attitude towards Hong
Kong cinema. The post-1997 period has shown that the relationship
between the local film industry and the government is strengthening. In
this respect, Hong Kong cinema is becoming more quasi-national than it
had been in the colonial period. Although the colonial administration
participated in the promotion of Hong Kong films, it is the SAR govern-
ment which has committed funds to promote Hong Kong cinema. For the
first time, Hong Kong film culture has been put on the governmental
agenda in the SAR’s initial financial report. In the report, the Chief Exec-
utive, Tung Chee-hwa, schedules various projects designed to assist the
Hong Kong film industry. Since then a special branch to assist film produc-
tion has been established. The government has also granted land for estab-
lishing film studios. In 1998 the government moved a further step by
budgeting HK$10 million for the creation of Hong Kong Film Develop-
ment Council. The fund is available for both the production and promo-
tion of Hong Kong cinema.
Conclusion
Hong Kong cinema and
quasi-national cinema
Guomindang
guopian
Guoyu pian
guzhuang pian
haiwai Huaren
Hanzu
He Dong / Robert Ho Tung
Hong Di
Huanan
Huanan dianying
huangmei xi
Huanle jinxiao
huaqiao
Huazi Ribao
huigui zuguo, rentong zuxian,
huiyin huidao
Jackie Chan / Cheng Long
jia qing
Jiang Boying
Jiang Jieshi
Jiang Wen
jianghu
Jin Yong / Zha Liangyong, Louis Cha
John Woo / Wu Yusen
Johnny Mak / Mai Dangxiong
Johnny To / Du qifeng
Kirk Wong / Huang Zhiqiang
Kwan Man-ching / Guan Wenqing
Lau Shing-hon / Liu Chenghan
Law Kar / Luo Ka
146 Chinese glossary
Mei Lanfang
Manfred Wong / Wen Jun
Mai Dafei
meixue sixiang
Meng Chao
Michael Hui / Xu Guanwen
Michelle Yeoh / Yang Ziqiong
Minjian
Minxin
minzu
minzu qixi
Mo Kangshi
Nan Guo
Nanyang
Nanyue
Ng Ho / Wu Hao
Ng See-yuen / Wu Siyuan
Peter Chan / Chen Kexin
Po Leung Kuk / Bao liang ju
Qin Jian
Qingchun
qiren yingping
Qu Baiyin
Raymond Chow / Zou Wenhuai
renqing shigu
Ringo Lam / Lin Lingdong
Sammo Hung / Hong Jinbao
Shao Cunren
Shao Renmei / Runme Shaw
Shao Yifu / Run Run Shaw
148 Chinese glossary
Shao Zuiweng
shehui lunli
shennong
Shenzhen
Shu Kei / Shu Qi
Shu Shuen / Tang Shuxuan
Siqin Gaowa
Situ Huimin
Stanley Kwan / Guan Jinpeng
Stephen Chiau / Zhou Xingchi
Sylvia Chang / Zhang Aijia
Tai Shan
Teresa Tang / Deng Lijun
Tianyi
Tsui Hark / Xu Ke
Tung Wah / Donghua
Wai Kar-fai / Wei Jiahui
Wen Tianxiang
wen yi zai dao
Wong Kar-wai / Wang Jiawei
Wu Hui
Wu Xihao
wulitou
wuxia pian
Xia Yan
Xianggang ren
xiao ti zhong xin
xiaoxiong pian
Xie Xian
Xin Hua
Chinese glossary 149
Xing-Zhong hui
Xinlian
Xu Hao
Yang Quan
Yan huang zisun
Yau Tai On Ping / Qiu Dai Anping
Ye Yiqun
Yeung Fan / Yang Fan
Yi Lin
yin yang
Yinguang
yingxiong pian
Yinmu
yishu guan
Yonghua
Yu Mo-wan / Yu Muyun
Yuen Kuei / Yuan Kui
Yueyu pian
Zhang Che
Zhang Minyi
Zhang Sen
Zhang Shankun
Zhang Yimou
Zhang Ying
Zhejiang
Zheng Zhengqiu
Zhongguo dianyin
Zhonghua minzu
Zhonglian
Zhou Gangming
150 Chinese glossary
Zhou Huashan
Zhu Ji
Zhu Shilin
Zhu Zijia
Zhuzhong jiu daode, jiu lunli, fayang zhonghua wenming, libi ouhua
ziyou gonghui
Filmography
Personal interviews
Allen Fong, film director, at Hong Kong Arts Centre, 9 March 1994.
Ann Hui, film director, at Hong Kong University, 10 March 1994.
Angle Tong, Director of Hong Kong Film Archive, at Film Archive, 23 August
2001.
Camy K.H. Mak, Chief Entertainment Standards Control Officer (Film), Televi-
sion and Entertainment Licensing Authority, Hong Kong, Wanchai, 15 Novem-
ber 1993.
Chan Pak-shen, Chief Editor, Film Biweekly / City Entertainment, 23 August 2001
Hong Kong.
Clara Law, film director, at Tsim Sha Tsui, 7 March 1994.
Cynthia Liu, Senior Manager of Hong Kong Film Archive, at Film Archive, 25
February 1994.
Edward K. S. Tang, producer, Golden Way Films Ltd. at Golden Harvest, 18
March 1994.
Fruit Chan, film director, Mandarin Hotel Central, 22 August 2001.
Gordon Chan, film director, Mandarin Hotel Central, 20 March 1994.
Joe Chueng, the President of the Hong Kong Film Directors Association, 22
August 2001.
Joey Kong (Kong Cho Yee), Chairman of Hong Kong Theatres Association,
Causeway Bay Centre, 17 February 1994, Hong Kong.
John Chueng, Managing Director of Media Asia, at Media Asia 23 August 2001.
Law Kar, film critic and programme coordinator of Hong Kong international film
festival, Hong Kong Cultural Centre, 8 November 1993 and 1 March 1994.
—— Head of the Research Section, Hong Kong Film Archive, 23 August 2001.
Bibliography 179
Lawrence Ah Mon, film director, Hong Kong Cultural Centre, 15 March 1994.
Li Cheuk-to, film critic and programme coordinator of Hong Kong International
Film Festival, Hong Kong Arts Centre, 29 November 1993.
—— President of Hong Kong Film Critics Society, 22 August 2001.
Michael Hui, film actor, director and producer, at Jackie Chan’s studio Kowloon
Tang, 22 March 1994.
Ng Ho, Associate Professor in Cinema and Television, School of Communication,
Hong Kong Baptist University, 4 March 1994.
Ng See-yuan, film producer and director, at Seasonal Film Corporation, 18 March
1994.
Peter Tsi, Chief Executive, Hong Kong Kowloon & New Territories Motion
Picture Industry Association, at MPIA office, on 11 March 1994.
Tony Shu, Executive Secretary in Movie Producers and Distributors Association
of Hong Kong and Kowloon Ltd. at MPDA office, 18 March 1994.
Raymond P.M. Wong, actor, script-writer in Cinema City, producer and director of
Mandarin Films Distribution and Mandarin Films Ltd. at Central, 12 March
1994.
Winnie Tsang, Manager in Panasia Films Limited, Golden Harvest, at Golden
Harvest Studio, 20 March 1994.
Wu Kam-yin, Assistant secretary for Recreation and Culture, Recreation and
Culture Branch, Hong Kong Government Secretariat, at Wanchai, March 7
1994.
Yu Mo-wan, film historian, at Tuen Mum, 25 November 1993, 1 March 1994.
Index