The Genesis of The Order-Neisse Line - Gotthold Rhode and Wolfgang Wagner - 1959 - Brentano-Verlag - Anna's Archive

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The Genesis of the Oder-Neisse Line
Sources and Documents

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THE GENESIS OF THE
ODER-NEISSE LINE
IN THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS DURING
WORLD WAR II
SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS
COMPILED ANDZEDITED iBY.
GOTTHOLD RHODE AND WOLFGANG WAGNER
Lenn f f
Pia
BRENTANO-VERLAG STUTTGART
1959
© Copyright 1957 by Brentano-Verlag Stuttgart
Printed in Germany
by Siiddeutscher Zeitungsdienst Stuttgart/Aalen Wiirttemberg

CONTENTS
Page
Preface VII
Detailed table of documents XI
Bibliography . XXVIII
Chapter I The Polish Fate in 1939 . 1

II Polish territorial claims up to 1942 . 12
III The Soviet Union and Poland in 1941 . 20
IV The Idea of Compensation. Sede 3 27°
V_ Allied plans regarding Germany up to 1943. 50
VI The Teheran Conference Eb ay na bate 62
VII Negotiations about Poland at the beginning of 1944 71
VIII Negotiations about Poland in the middle of 1944 . 116
IX Negotiations about Poland towards the end of 1944 127
X Allied Plans concerning Germany in 1944. 149
XI The Yalta Conference 172
XII From Yalta to Potsdam . 201
XIII The Potsdam Conference 235
XIV The Interpretation of Potsdam 263
Index 279
Maps 1, Germany — Poland: Proposed territorial changes .

2. Poland’s removal to the West .
if
Preface
Our collection of sources is intended to enable the reader to acquaint himself at

first hand with the most important documents and negotiations of the second World
War which are directly connected with the genesis of the Oder-Neisse Line. The
texts of treaties, agreements, and notes are therefore given as completely as possible
in the original language, as well as in the English translation, to which are added a
number of extracts from memoirs, newspaper articles and records of negotiations.
This collection of sources, therefore, is intended as a supplement to Wolfgang Wag-
ner’s book, “The Genesis of the Oder-Neisse Line“, but it also makes available to the
research student, politician, and journalist in as complete a form as possible sources
which are often widely scattered and difficult of access.
In compiling such a collection of sources the difficult question of limiting the
material always arises. We have in the first place imposed a chronological limita-
tion, in that we have not included any sources concerning the history of German-
Polish relations during the time prior to the second World War nor on events after
the war, such as the expulsion of the German population. We have furthermore
restricted ourselves to collecting sources on the negotiations and events which
contributed directly to the genesis of the Oder-Neisse Line. We have ignored all
indirect influences, in so far as these were not in any case reflected in the negotia-
tions. We therefore do not include any documents concerning the German expan-
sion eastwards, the compulsory resettlement of Poles from the annexed areas, the
policy of extermination of the Jewish population or other German expansion plans.
This is not intended to minimize the significance of these proceedings. It would,
however, have been impossible to give a documentary collection which would cover
this subject in a satisfactory way, without also including the pertinent questions of
German-Polish relationships and National Socialist foreign policy. Were the sub-
ject-matter to be expanded to this extent, it would have been almost impossible to
decide which documents should be included and which not.
Vil
t CL RAL Maia
The present collection is in the main an English edition of a collection which

appeared in German in 1956: “Quellen zur Entstehung der Oder-Neisse-Linie in
den diplomatischen Verhandlungen wahrend des Zweiten Weltkrieges“. Like the
latter, it is almost exclusively based upon material which has already appeared in
print. Mention should chiefly be made here of the published documents of the Polish
Embassy in London — Poland, Germany, and European Peace, Official Documents
1944-1948 — of the French Government — Documents francais relatifs a l Alle-
magne — and above all of those of the State Department. Three publications of
the latter, Postwar foreign policy preparation 1939-1945, A decade of American
foreign policy 1941-1949, and especially The Conferences at Malta and Yalta,
are also of the greatest importance to the history of the genesis of the Oder-Neisse
Line.
Further valuable sources are the official reports of debates in the two Houses of
Parliament and the House of Representatives of Congress.
The official dossiers received a further important addition by the publication in
1957 by the Foreign Ministry of the USSR of the correspondence exchanged during
the war between Stalin and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain on the one hand,
and the Presidents of the United States on the other. This enables us to include in
the collection a further number of sources which are not included in the German
edition, namely Nos. 59a, 64a, 64b, 64c, 65a, 66a, 66b, 66c, 68a, 131a, 131b, 132a.
In No. 64 we have been able to replace a newspaper report by Churchill’s own report
to Stalin, and in No. 69 we can set the original Russian text of Stalin’s letter to
Churchill in front of the translation which was all that was available up to now.
Until the Spring of 1958 only the Russian edition of the correspondence was
available to the editor. The Russian text of the letters has therefore been included
uniformly in the collection, followed by the editors’ English translations. When the
English edition with the original texts of the letters of the Anglo-American heads
of state to Stalin became available, printing had already reached the paging stage
and alterations would have been very troublesome. With the exception of Nos.
131a and 132a we have, therefore, left the Russian text of the letters of Churchill
and Roosevelt, although this is no longer necessary, but instead of our own retrans-
lations from the Russian we have given the original English text. In the case of
Stalin’s letters we prefer our own translations to those of the official edition. The
reproduction of the letters, therefore, is not quite in accordance with the rules
observed in the case of the other reproductions, since in some places the now super-
fluous Russian text is given before the English original text. But in the interests. of
early publication we thought it better to ignore these small defects, for which we
beg to be excused.
An official publication of the Polish United Workers’ Party (W dziesiata rocznice
powstania Polskiej Partii Robotniczej etc., — on the Tenth Anniversary of the
Foundation of the Polish Workers’ Party —) had indeed appeared as the German
edition came out, but could not be included. We are now able to give source No. 30
in the official Polish text and to include the documents 32a and 139a.
Vill
In spite of this extension of the group of official published sources through the
Russian and Polish publications, only a fraction of the actual diplomatic negotia-
‘tions were thus open to inspection. It was therefore necessary to draw upon the
abundant collection of memoirs, in which documents are also partly reproduced.
Foremost of these is Winston Churchill’s work on the second World War. Indis-
pensable supplementary material was furnished by the memoirs of the exiled Polish
diplomats and politicians Ciechanowski and Mikolajczyk, and the memoirs of
American diplomats and politicians such as Byrnes, Hopkins, Hull, Leahy, Stetti-
nius and Truman.
As a final group of sources mention must be made of articles from newspapers
and periodicals and certain small pamphlets concerning the question of the German-
Polish frontier. By testifying to public opinion they sometimes attain an import-
ance similar to that of parliamentary debates, moreover, some ideas, such as that
of compensation, were first discussed in newspaper articles, After the publication
of the German edition a new, important source became available to us in the form
of the newspaper of the pro-Soviet Union of Polish Patriots which appeared in
Moscow. This enabled us to supplement the introduction and text of No. 30; to
replace an inexact report in No. 58 by the original text of an important program-
matic article, as well as adding Nos. 28a, 58a and 58 b. Our thanks are due to a
Polish reviewer in London for giving us access to this important source otherwise
difficult to come at, and we should be grateful for further additions to this group
of sources.
With a view to reproducing all sources as accurately as possible, we adopted the
principle of giving all source material of a documentary nature, i.e. texts of treaties,
memoranda, declarations, proclamations and programmatic articles in the language
of the original text, followed by an English translation. Wherever official translations
existed, we have made use of these; in all other cases the translations are our own.
Solely in the case of a few short reports and extracts from articles have we dispens-
ed with the original text and only given the translation. For translations from the
Russian and Polish Gotthold Rhode is responsible, in all other cases the two editors.
In making the translations into English Miss Gwen E. Trinks has given important
assistance, for which special thanks are due to her.
In reproducing texts we have corrected obvious printer’s errors, without spe-
cially indicating this fact. We have further adopted a uniform manner of spelling
many names with very different orthography e. g. Teheran and Kénigsberg, which
often appear in the originals as Tehran and Koenigsberg. Finally we have introduc-
ed capital letters in writing many terms, such as Heads of Government, Eastern
Germany, Government-in-Exile, uniformly at least in such documents which con-
stitute a direct series.
In the case of all other errors, especially those which are characteristic of the
source in question, we have made corrections in the text, but added a note drawing
attention to the deviation from the original.
Further remarks which have been added here and there are not intended as a
IX
comment upon the sources. Only in cases where persons, facts or conceptions are
not generally known have we added a short explanatory comment. It further
appeared advisable, in the case of incorrect statistics or statements on historical
events which would not at once be recognized as incorrect by every reader, to draw
attention briefly to the official statistics or to represent the facts correctly.
Our sincere thanks are due to all libraries and institutes who put at our disposal
documents which were otherwise difficult of access, and who have thus enabled this
volume to be edited.
Mainz and Bonn, February 1959 Gotthold Rhode Wolfgang Wagner

‘
t
‘Detailed fablevot Gneuthents

' , I. The Polish Fate in 1939
No. Heading . Contents Taken from Page
4
Great Britain guarantees the independence Polish-British Mutual Société des Nations, Re- 1
of Poland Assistance Agreement cueil des traités, vol. 199
of August 25th, 1939 Keesing’s Contemporary
Engl. and Polish text Archives 1943-1945
2 The Soviet Union and Germany agree on Supplementary Das nationalsozialist.

a delimitation of their interests in Poland Protocol to the Deutschland und die
German-Soviet Pact Sowjetunion, 1948
of August 23rd, 1939 Nazi-Soviet Relations
1939-1941, 1948
3 The Soviet Union occupies Eastern Poland Soviet Note of Sep- Pravda No. 258,
tember 17th, 1939. September 17th, 1939
Russian text and
translation
The Soviet Union and Germany re-define German-Soviet Pact Reichsgesetzblatt,
the delimitation of their interests of Sept. 28th, 1939 1940
German and Russian Nazi-Soviet Relations,
text and translation 1948 ;
5 The Soviet Union withdraws from Central Secret Supplementary Das nationalsozialist.
Poland Protocol to the Pact Deutschland und die
of Sept. 28th, 1939 Sowjetunion, 1948
German text and Nazi-Soviet Relations,
translation 1948
at
Halifax points out: The Soviet Union has Speech of Lord Hali- Parliamentary De-
advanced as far as the Curzon Line fax in the House of bates, House of Lords,
Lords on October Official Report, vol. 114° _
26th, 1939
Poland to be restored after the war to Report of Prime Monitor Polski, 10

greater power than ever before Minister Sikorski vol. XXII
about his negotiations The New York Times,
in November 1939 November 20th, 1939
Polish text and trans-
lation, Report of
»Augur“ on the same
matter
II. Polish territorial claims up to 1942

Poland demands frontiers ,which could Statement of the The Bulletin of Vee
safeguard her security“ Polish Government- International News,
in-Exile of December vol. XVI ;
20th, 1939
Poland demands a secure and econom- Speech of the Polish War and peace aims 12
ically strong territory Minister on Foreign of the United Nations,
Affairs, Edward vol. I
Raczyhski, in St.
James’ Palace on
September 24th, 1941
XI
my a in! ¢ A” Fleet
nt oh, /
eee \ Pad 7,
No. Heading Contents Taken from ‘ Page. ban

10 The Polish National Council ‘in London Resolution of the Volumeof documents 435) ¢
demands: Shift the frontier to the West, Polish National in the possession of the
straighten and shorten it Council of December Polish Research Centre, — 1
2nd, 1942. Polish text London
and translation
11 Sikorski seeks to gain the support of the Report on the Dziennik Polski, 14,
Allies for the Polish plans for expansion negotiations between London, No. 294, 1952
Roosevelt and Sikor-
ski in December 1942
Polish text and
translation
12 Sikorski’s proposals in 1942 allegedly pro- Another report on The Observer, 16
vided for the division of East Prussia the same matter No. 8133, 1947
among Poland and Lithuania
is Sikorski wants a Polish Zone of Occu- Press Conferencesof War and peace aims, 18
pation bordered by the Oder Prime Minister Sikor- vol. I
ski in Chicago on
December 18th, 1942
14 The same demand is made from another Extract from a M. Seyda, Poland and
side writing Germany and the post-
war reconstruction
of Europe, 1942
III. The Soviet Union and Poland in 1941

15 As a result of June 22nd, 1941, Poland Report on a broad- St. Mikotajezyk, The 20
expects the Polish eastern territories to be cast of Prime pattern of Soviet
restored Minister Sikorski domination, 1948
in June 1941
16 The Soviet Union refuses to recognize the Report on Soviet- See No. 15 20
Russo-Polish frontier of 1939 Polish talks in Lond.
in summer 1941
17 The Soviet Union declares the German- Polish-Soviet Agree- Pravda No. 210, 1941 21
Soviet Frontier Agreements of 1939 to be ment of July 30th, Volume of documents
invalid 1941 in the Possession of -
Russian and Polish the Polish Research
text and translation Centre, London
18 Eden confirms: Territorial changes in Po- Note and Statement Parliamentary De- 22
land will not be recognized of Foreign Secretary. bates, House of Com-
Eden on the occasion mons, Official Report,
of the Agreement vol. 373
19 Sumner Welles confirms that the USA are Statement of the Polish Facts and 22
of the same opinion US Under-Secretary Figures, 1945
of State on the same
subject on July 31st,
1941
20 The Poles are discontented with the agree- Description of situa- St. Mikotajezyk, The 23
ments tion created by the pattern of Soviet
agreement domination
XII
4 No. Heading © Contents Taken from Page
Of!
gobs
f
Stalin wants to discuss the frontier between Report on Sikorski’s J. Ciechanowski, 24
Russia and Poland visit to Moscow in Defeat in victory, 1947
December 1941
22 The Soviet Union and Poland agree on Soviet-Polish decla- Pravda, No. 337, 1941 25
»good-neighbourly collaboration“ in peace ration on December Volume of documents
time 4th, 1941 in the possession of the
Russian and Polish Polish Research Centre,
text and translation London
23 Stalin says that Poland should receive East Eden’s report on his W. Churchill, The 26
Prussia visit to Moscow in second world war,
December 1941 vol. III, 1950
24 Churchill answers: First win the war Churchill’s answer to See No. 23 26
Eden of December
20th, 1941
IV. The Idea of Compensation

25 The idea of a compensation is put forward Description of situa- W. W. Kulski, The Pi
by the Soviet Union tion, as in the lost opportunity for
beginning of 1942 Russian-Polish
friendship, Foreign
Affairs, vol.25 (1946/47)
26 Pro-Soviet Poles discuss the idea of a com- Report on a proposal K. Pruszynski, Wobec 29
pensation of Polish Communist Rosji, Wiadomosci
leader W. Wasilew- Polskie, London,
ska. Polish text and No. 40, 1942
translation
27, The idea is rejected by the Polish emigrés Answer to this pro- W. Wielhorski, 32
in Great Britain posal. Polish text and O nienaruszalnosci
translation granic wschodnich,
Wiadomosci Polskie,
London, No. 43, 1942
28 The connection between the Eastern and Another answer T. Kiersnowski, 34
Western frontier of Poland is contested Polish text and trans- Interes Polski i Rosji,
lation Wiadomosci Polskie,
London, No. 43, 1942
28a Pro-Soviet Poles come out for a common Article in a Pro- Wolna Polska, 36
Polish-Soviet , Watch on the Oder“ Soviet Polish news- Moscow, No. 7, 1943
paper
lation
ix Stalin pronounces in favour of a strong Interview given by The New York 40

and independent Poland Stalin Times, No. 31148, 1943
30 Pro-Soviet Poles demand East Prussia, Declaration of a Wolna Polska, 41

Danzig, and Upper Silesia Congress of the Moscow, No. 15, 1943
»Union of Polish W dziesiata rocznice
Patriots“ held in powstania PPR,
Moscow on June 9th Warsaw 1952
and 10th, 1943
lation
XIII
No. Heading Contents Taken eee ie ‘
Bil The parties of the Polish resistance move- Agreement of the St. Mikotajezyk, The 447 b
ment refuse compensation and agree with main Polish under- pattern of Soviet
the demands of the Government-in-Exile ground parties on domination
August 15th, 1943
lation
ys 2 Churchill, on the other hand, contemplates Churchill’s letter to W. Churchill, The — 4B"
the idea of compensation Eden of October 6th, second world war,
1943 vol. V a
32a The Polish Communists in the ,,resistance“ Declaration of the W dziesigta rocznice 46 —
speak in favour of a compensation limited Polish Workers’ powstania PPR
to the ,,ethnographically Polish territories“ Party in November
1943
lation
33 Poland distrusts the Soviet proposal to an- Report on a talk: J. Ciechanowski, 47

nex German territory Cordell Hull-Ciecha- Defeat in victory
nowski in October ‘
1943
34 Mikotajczyk warns: German Eastern terri- Memorandum of St. Mikolajczyk, 48

tories are no compensation for East Poland Prime Minister The pattern of
Mikolajczyk before Soviet domination
the Teheran Con-
ference
V. Allied plans regarding Germany up to 1943

35 The Allies undertake to effect territorial Excerpt from the War and peace aims, 50
changes only in accordance with the free »Atlantic Charter“ vol. I
will of the population
36 Stalin calls for the destruction of the Ger- Excerpt from Stalin’s Pravda, tS
mans statement on Novem- November 7th, 1941
ber 6th, 1941
Russian text and
translation
37 The Soviet Union undertakes not to inter- ArticleV of the Société des Nations, «52
fere with the internal affairs of other states Soviet-British Agree- Recueil des traités,
ment of May 26th, vol. 204
1942
English and Russian
text
38 Roosevelt proclaims the war aim of ,,Un- Report on Rooseyelt’s R. E. Sherwood, 53.
conditional Surrender“ speech in Casablanca Roosevelt and Hopkins,
on January 24th, New York 1948
1943
chy) Roosevelt and Eden agree that Poland Report on a talk See No. 38 53
should be given East Prussia. Roosevelt Roosevelt-Eden on
proposes the compulsory resettlement of March 14th, 1943
Germans
LV
. Heading Contents Taken from. Page |
Roosevelt wishes to aid German separatists See No. 39 See No. 39 54 a

Litvinov confirms that Poland should have Report on a talk: R. E. Sherwood, 55
East Prussia Litvinov;Hopkins on Roosevelt and Hopkins
March 16th, 1943
42 The American Government obtains data Items of a memoran- Postwar foreign 55
concerning the German East dum set up by aca- policy preparation
demic investigators, 1939-1945,
dated April 15th, Washington 1949
1943
43 Churchill wants to isolate Prussia Churchill’s report on W. Churchill, The 56
his speech on May second world war,
22nd, 1943 vol. 1V
44 Roosevelt: The Corridor will no longer Report on a talk of J. Ciechanowski, ‘Berks
exist President Roosevelt Defeat in victory
with a member of the
ihe
Polish underground
45 Eden and Hull are in favour of a ,,natural“ Report on the Quebec The memoirs of 57
dismemberment of Germany Conference in Cordell Hull, vol. II
August 1943
Maisky confirms that Moscow agrees to the Report on a talk: J. Ciechanowski, — 58 0
separation of East Prussia Eden-Maisky in the Defeat in victory
autumn of 1943
47 Roosevelt is decidedly in favour of a par- Report on a talk: The memoirs of 59 |
tition of Germany Roosevelt-Hull on Cordell Hull, vol. If
October 5th, 1943
- 48 The three Big Allies agree that Germany Report on the See No. 47 604
is to return to her 1938 borders and cede Moscow Conference
East Prussia of Foreign Ministers
in October 1943
VI. The Teheran Conference

49 Stalin urges that Germany be made in- Churchill’s report on W. Churchill, The 62’
nocuous his talk with Stalin second world war,
on November 28th, vol. V
1943
Stalin and Churchill want to draw a front- See No. 49 See No. 49 63
ier line between Germany and Poland
Stalin proposes the Oder as frontier between Sherwood’s report R. E. Sherwood, 64

Germany and Poland on this meeting Roosevelt and Hopkins
Churchill agrees to the Oder Line Report on the ple- W. Churchill, The 64.
nary meeting on second world war,
December 1st, 1943 vol. V
53 The ,,Big Three“ come to a loose agree- See No. 52 See No. 52 67
ment concerning the partition of Germany
XV
.
No. Heading Contents Taken from
54 A ,formula* is put forward: Poland ex- See No. 52 See No. 52

tends to the Oder Line, Kénigsberg shall
belong to the Soviet Union
55 Churchill: This tragedy »cannot last“ Churchill’s reflexions See No. 52 69

on the Teheran Con-
ference
VII. Negotiation about Poland at the beginning of 1944

56 Churchill opens negotiations with the Poles Churchill’s cable to W. Churchill, The 71
with regard to the Teheran ,,formula“ Eden of December second world war,
20th, 1943 vol. V
56a Stalin also offers the Oder Line to the Poles Churchill’s telegram See No. 56 Thee
to Roosevelt of
January 6th, 1944
57 Mikolajczyk resists compensation Mikolajcezyk’s report St. Mikolajezyk, The 72

on his talk with pattern of Soviet
Eden domination
58 Pro-Soviet Poles demand Poland’s expan- Article in a Pro- Wolna Polska, 7S
sion to the West Soviet Polish news- No, 40, 1943
paper of December
24th, 1943
lation
58a » Wolna Polska* proposes to evict the Ger- Article in a Pro- Wolna Polska, 76
-man population Soviet Polish news- No. 1, 1944
paper of January 8th,
1944
lation
58b Hilary Minc emphasizes the great econom- Article in a Pro- Wolna Polska, 77
ic advantages which the Poles can obtain in Soviet Polish news- No. 3, 1944
the West paper of January
24th, 1944
lation
59 The Soviet Government publicly supports Declaration of the Documents on Americ- 80

Poland’s expansion to the West Soviet Government an foreign relations,
of January 11th, 1944 vol. VI
59a Soviet Government demands a reshuffle of Soviet Note to the Perepiska predseda- 82
the Polish Government-in-Exile in addition US Secretary of telja Soveta Ministrov
to the Curzon Line State, Cordell Hull, USSR, vol. 2
of January 23rd, 1944
Russian text and
translation
60 Churchill urges the Poles to agree to the Report on Churchill’s J. Ciechanowski, 84

Teheran ,,formula“ negotiations with the Defeat in victory
Polish Government
XVI
No. H eading ¢ Contents Taken from Page
61 Poland demands guarantees for the ann- Note of the Polish St. Mikolajezyk, The 85
exation of the German eastern territories Foreign Minister to pattern of Soviet
British Foreign domination
Office of January
23rd, 1944
62 The US Government is unwilling to give Note of US Govern- See No. 61 87
Poland a guarantee ment to the Polish
Government-in-Exile
of February 1st, 1944
63 The Polish Resistance Movement agrees to Statement of the T. Bér-Komorowski, 87 —
the Western frontier suggested and to the Polish Underground Armia Podziemna,
expulsion of the Germans, but rejects any Council of National London 1931
territorial cession in the East Unity of February
15th, 1944
lation
64 Churchill reports to Stalin on his negotia- Churchill’s letter to Perepiska Predseda-
tions with the Polish Government-in-Exile Stalin of January telja Soveta Ministrov
1944 etc., vol. 1
English and Russian Stalin’s correspondence
text with Churchill, Attlee,
Roosevelt and Truman
1941-45, vol. 1
64a Stalin says emphatically: Kénigsberg must Stalin’s answer of Perepiska Predseda- 91
become part of the Soviet Union February 4th, 1944 telja Soveta Ministrov
Russian and English etc., vol.1
text
64b Roosevelt asks Stalin: Will Mikotajezyk Roosevelt’s letter to Perepiska Predseda~- 94
stay out of any pressure if he accepts the Stalin of February telja Soveta Ministrov
»leheran formula“? 7th, 1944 etc., vol. 2
English and Russian
text
Curzon Line Stalin’s answer of

64c Stalin persists in his demand: See No. 64b
and a fundamental ,Improvement in the February 16th, 1944
composition of the Polish Government“ Russian and English
text
65 The Polish Government-in-Exile is in cer- Note of the Polish St. Mikotajezyk, The
tain circumstances prepared to recognize Government-in- pattern of Soviet
a demarcation line between Poland and Exile to Prime domination
the Soviet Union east of Vilna and Lvov Minister Churchill
of February 15th,
1944
65a Churchill urges a secret Polish-Soviet Com- Churchill’s letter to Perepiska Predseda- 101
pensation Agreement Stalin on his nego- telja Soveta Ministrov
tiations with the etc., vol. 1
Poles of February Stalin’s correspondence
20th, 1944 etc., vol. I
English and Russian
text
66 Churchill speaks publicly of the intention Churchill’s speech in Parliamentary De- 103
to give Poland compensation in Germany the House of Com- bates, House of Com-
mons on February mons, Official Report,
22nd, 1944 vol. 397
XVII
66a Roosevelt subscribes to Churchill’s propo- Roosevelt’s message Perepiska Predseda- 105
sals to Stalin in February telja Soveta Ministrov
1944 etc., vol, 2
English and Russian
text
66b Stalin rejects any compromise solution Stalin’s answer to Perepiska Predseda- 106
Roosevelt of March telja Soveta Ministrov —
3rd, 1944 etc., vol. 1
Russian and English
text
66c Churchill promises Stalin the Curzon Line, Churchill’s letter to See No. 66b 107
but warns him against dissension and vio- Stalin of March 7th,
lence 1944
English and Russian
text .
67 The Polish ,.National Council‘ pronoun- Statement of the Polski Silty Zbrojne 108
ces in favour of limited territorial demands Polish Underground w Drugiej Wojnie
Council of National Swiatowej, vol. III,
Unity of March London 1950
15th, 1944
lation
68 Mikotajczyk has misgivings regarding re- Extract from St. Mikotajezyk, The 109
settlement of the Germans Mikolajezyk’s letter pattern of Soviet
to Roosevelt of domination
March 18th, 1944
68a Churchill confirms that the efforts for a Churchill’s letter to Perepiska Predseda- 110
compromise solution have failed Stalin of March 21st, telja Soveta Ministrov
1944 etc., vol. 1
English and Russian
text
69 Stalin reproaches Churchill violently regar- Stalins’s letter to Perepiska Predseda- 111
ding the Polish question Churchill of March telja Soveta Ministrov
23rd, 1944 etc., vol. 1
Russian and English W. D. Leahy, I was
text there London 1950
70 Churchill reiterates the offer of compen- Churchill’s speech in Parliamentay De- 115,
sation in the House of Commons the House of Com- bates, House of Com-
mons on May 5th, mons, Official Report,
1944 vol. 400
VIII. Negotiations about Poland in the middle of 1944

71 Roosevelt promises the Poles Silesia and Mikotajezyk’s report St. Mikotajezyk, The 116
East Prussia on his talks with pattern of Soviet
President Roosevelt domination
of June 6th, 1944
72 Mikotajczyk opposes an excessive expan- Ciechanowski’s J. Ciechanowski, 117
sion of Poland towards the west report on Defeat in victory
Mikolajczyk’s talks
with Roosevelt
XVIII
i No. A eadin z Contents Taken from
’ i ee
2B Stalin offers the Poles all the country up to Ciechanowski’s “See No.72
the Oder report about
Mikolajezyk’s talk
with Professor Lange
of June 13th, 1944
74 The Pro-Soviet Poles call on their com- Manifesto of the Dziennik Ustaw 119
patriots to fight for the Oder »Polish Committee Rzeczy pospolitej
on National Libera- Polskiej, No. 1, 1944
tion“ of July 22nd,
1944
lation
B75 ‘The Soviet Government declares that Po- Statement of the Documents on 121
land should remain independent Soviet Foreign American foreign
Ministry of July relations, vol. VII.
25th, 1944
76 The Soviet Government transfers the ad- Agreement between Volume of docu- 121
ministration of the territories to the west the Soviet Govern- ments in the posses-
_ of the Curzon Line to the pro-Soviet Poles ment and the ,,Polish sion of the Polish
Committee on Natio- Research Centre,
nal Liberation® of London, No. 102 .
July 20th, 1944
f
lation
77 ,Stalin calls upon Mikolajczyk to come to Mikotajczyk’s report St. Mikolajezyk, 123.
an agreement with the pro-Soviet Poles about his talks with The pattern of Soviet
Stalin on August 3rd, domination
1944
78 Stalin promises the Poles Breslau, Stettin, Another report
and the Neisse about these talks
J. Ciechanowski,
Defeat in victory
124
79 Churchill: There is sufficient room in Ger- Report of General W. Anders, An army. 124
many for the expellees Anders about his in exile, London 1949:
talks with Churchill
on August, 26th, 1944
80 The ,Lublin Committee‘ demands the Report on a speech _ Report of Reuter’s 125
Oder and Neisse as frontier of Osdébka-Morawski special correspondent
of August 28th, 1944 in The Manchester
a
Guardian, August 30th,
a
1944
81 The pro-Soviet Poles obtain a Soviet gua- Report on a decla- A. Klafkowski, 126
rantee of the Oder and the Lausitz Neisse ration concerning this Podstawy prawne
matter made later on granicy Odra-Nisa na
by Osébka-Morawski tle uméw: Jaltanskiej
i Poczdamskiej, 1947.
1X. Negotiations about Poland towards the end of 1944

82 The Polish Government-in-Exile agrees to Extract from Polish St. Mikotajczyk, 127
the removal of the German population Government’s ,,New The pattern of Soviet
Plan* of August domination
30th, 1944
XIX
ht {
No. Heading Contents n Buben from
83 Stalin presents uncompromising demands Mikolajezyk’s report See! No. 82. .

to Mikolajczyk about his talks with
Stalin in Moscow in
the middle of Octo-
ber 1944
84 Churchill and Stalin agree to grant Poland Mr. Harriman’s re- The Conferences at 131584
- the Oder Line including Stettin port about these talks Malta and Yalta 1945.
Department of State
Publication 6199,
Washington 1955
85. Mikotajczyk begins to yield, but without Mikolajczyk’s report St. Mikolajezyk, 13278
success about his final con-— The pattern of
versation with Stalin Soviet domination
| 86 Churchill urges the exchange of Polish ter- Churchill’s speech in Parliamentary De-. 1326
ritory once more the House of Com- bates, House of Com-
mons on October mons, Official Report,
27th, 1944 vol. 404
87 Mikolajczyk seeks to obtain assurances Mikotajczyk’s report St. Mikolajezyk,

The pattern of
134
about his questions
to the British Soviet domination
Government
88 Great Britain agrees on principle with the The answering Poland, Germany 134
Oder Line, including Stettin »Cadogan Letter“ and European peace,
of November 2nd, Official documents
1944 1944-1948, London 1948
39°
The agreement cannot be unterstood but Statement of Mr. Parliamentary - 135
within the compass of the negotiations Bevin, the then Debates, House of
‘ Foreign Secretary, Commons, Official
concerning the Report, vol. 438
»Cadagon Letter“
of June 4th, 1947
90 The US Government offers to help Miko- President Roosevelt’s Poland, Germany 136
_ fajczyk in resettling the minorities answer to Mikotaj- and European peace
cezyk’s questions
91 Mikotajczyk fails Extract from a Documents on 137
declaration of the American foreign
Department of State relations, vol. VII
of November 25th,
1944
92 Churchill: An exchange of populations is Churchill’s speech in Parliamentary 137 —
no longer difficult today the House of Com- Debates, House of
mons on December Commons, Official
15th, 1944 Report, vol. 406
93 Objections to expulsion are heard in the Extract from the See No. 92 143
House of Commons following debate
94 The new Polish Government-in-Exile does Prime Minister Sunday Times, 147
not want ,,either Breslau or Stettin“ Arciszewski’s inter- London, December
view 17th, 1944
95 The United States Government re-states Declaration of Mr. Documents on 148
its policy in respect of Poland once more Stettinius, US Secre- American foreign
tary of State, of relations, vol. VII
December 18th, 1944
XX
ts
No! Heading ; Contents Taken from
X. Allied Plans concerning Germany in 1944

96 Churchill regards the Oder Line as having Churchill’s report to W. Churchill, The 149
been finally decided on the British Cabinet of second world war,
January 14th, 1944 vol. IV
Churchill finds approval in the House of Debate in the House Parliamentary 149
mmons of Commons on | Debates, House of
February 22nd, 1944 Commons, Official
Report, vol. 397
98 Objections are raised in the House of Debate in the House See No. 97 151
Commons to cessions and resettlements of Commons on
February 23rd, 1944
99 In the House of Lords objections are al’so Debate in the House Parliamentary 158
raised of Lords on Debates, House of
March 8th, 1944 Lords, Official
Report, vol. 130 |
100 Eden describes the Teheran agreement as Question-hour in the Parliamentary 163
not being final House of Commons Debates, House of
on July 12th, 1944 Commons, Official
Report, vol. 401
Churchill refers to the Peace Conference Question-hour in the Parliamentary 165

House of Commons Debates, House of
on July 18th, 1944 Commons, Official
Report, vol. 402
102 The US Government is to strive for lasting Extract from a Post-war foreign 165
territorial settlements Memorandum of the policy preparation
Post-War Programs 1939-1945
Committee of
July 28th, 1944
103 Churchill and Roosevelt sign the Morgen- Extract from the A decade of Americ- 167
thau Plan Morgenthau Plan an foreign policy,
Basic documents,
1941-1949,
Washington 1950
104 France and the Soviet Union agree on Ger- Report on de Gaulle’s Svenska Dagbladet, 168
man territorial questions 2 visit to Moscow in Stockholm,
December 1944 December 14th, 1944
105 Harriman expresses his concern over Sta- Report of the US The Conferences at 169
lin’s concept Ambassador in Malta and Yalta
Moscow of
December 19th, 1944
106 Bidault confirms that France agrees to the Bidault’s report to Journal officiel, 170
separation of East Prussia, Pomerania, and the Provisional Con- Paris, vol. 1944
Silesia sultative Assembly of
December 21st, 1944
XXI
‘ 2 neat
No. Heading ¢0 ) Contents
XI. The Yalta Conference

107 The US Department of State Sear the Extracts from the The Conferences at
Oder Line »Briefing Book“ Malta and Yalta
prepared for the
Yalta Conference
108 Stettinius and Eden are disturbed by the Stettinius’ report E. R. Stettinius,
extent of Polish demands about his talks with Roosevelt and the
Eden on Malta of Russians. The Yalta
February 1st, 1945 Conference, Garden
City, New York 1949
109 Stettinius and Eden agree on separations Extract from the The Conferences at
of lesser size protocol on the Malta and Yalta
British- American.
talks on Malta
‘ }
110 Eden recommends the adoption of a Eden’s report to See No. 109 178
,fluid* British position with regard to the Churchill on these
frontier question talks of February Ist,
1945
111 The Western Foreign Secretaries recom- Extract from a See No. 109
mend limited compensation memorandum drawn
up by.the US and
British Foreign
Secretaries
112 Roosevelt wants to indemnify the Nether- Report on Roosevelt’s E. R. Stettinius, 179
_ lands as well at the expense of Germany remarks in Yalta of Roosevelt and the
February 4th, 1945 Russians, W. D. Leahy,
I was there
113 Stalin and Roosevelt confirm each other in Extract from the The Conferences at 180
their aversion to Germany protocol on a con- Malta and Yalta
versation Roosevelt-
Stalin of Febr. 4th
114 A strategic survey shows that the Red Extract from the See No. 113 181
Army has reached the Oder protocol on the first
plenary meeting of
» February 4th
115 The dismemberment of Germany is discus- Extract from the See No. 113 181
sed anew protocol on the se-
cond plenary meeting
of February 5th
116 Stalin declares: The Soviet Union is in Extract from the See No. 113 182
favour of a frontier along the Western protocol on the third
Neisse plenary meeting of
February 6th
117 Stalin says that most Germans in the eastern Extract from the See No. 113 184
territories have already run away protocol on the
fourth plenary mee-
ting of February 7th
XXII
i No. Heading ; Contents Taken from
118 Sg US delegation opposes the Oder-Neisse US counter-proposal See No. 113
Line : of February 8th
119 Churchill advocates the Oder Line and a British counter-pro- See No. 113
resettlement posal of February 8th
120 The frontier problem proves to be closely Extract from the See No. 113 188
peneceae with the question of Polish free- protocol on the fifth
om plenary meeting of
February 8th
121 The Foreign Ministers negotiate about the Extract from the See No. 113 191
future government of Poland protocol on the For-
eign Ministers’ meet-
ing of February 9th
122 Agreement is reached with regard to the Extract from the See No. 113 193
establishment of the Polish Government protocol on the sixth
plenary meeting of
February 9th
123 The British War Cabinet raises objections Extract from the See No. 113 194
telegraphically protocol on the se-
cond Foreign Mini-
sters’ meeting of
February 9th
Joint draft article on
Polish questions
1
124 No final agreement is reached in respect of Extract from the See No. 113 195.
the frontier question protocol on the se-
venth plenary mee-
ting of February 10th,
1945
125 The Big Three decide: Poland shall receive Extract from the final A decade of Americ- 197
compensation ,in the North and West“ communiqué of the an foreign policy
Yalta Conference The Conferences at
English and Russian Malta and Yalta
text Pravda, No. 38, 1945
126 The Big Three decide: Germany shall be Text of a secret A decade of Americ- 200
dismembered decision taken at the an foreign policy
Conference The Conferences at
Malta and Yalta
XII. From Yalta to Potsdam

L27 Bierut announces Polish administration of Bierut’s declaration The New York 201
the German eastern territories of February 5th, 1945 Times, February 6th,
1945
The Lublin Government begins taking over Report on the situa- The Economist, 201
the administration in East Prussia and Si- tion in Poland February 10th, 1945
lesia
XXIII
Y
129 Churchill recommends compensation to the Churchill’s speech in Parliamentary

House of Commons the House of Com- Debates, House of
mons on February Commons, Official
27th, 1945 Report, vol. 408
130 Differences of opinion in the House of Extract from the See No. 129 206
Commons concerning the Polish frontiers following debate
131 Roosevelt describes the agreement on Po- Roosevelt’s report Congressional 214
land as a fair compromise to the US Congress Record, 79th Congress,
of March 1st, 1945 1st Session, vol. 91
131aRoosevelt is seriously worried by the diffi- Roosevelt’s message W. Churchill, The 215
culties encountered in forming a new Po- to Stalin of second world war,
lish Government March 29th vol. VI
Stalin’s correspon-
dence etc., vol. II
131bStalin insists on his point of view Stalin’s reply of Perepiska Predseda- 217
April 7th, 1945 telja Soveta Ministrov
Russian text and etc., vol. 2
translation
132 The United States refuse to be faced with Report on the US A. Bliss Lane,I saw 218
accomplished facts in the matter of the Soviet exchange of Poland betrayed,
German-Polish border Notes in April and New York 1948
May 1945
132aNo agreement is reached about the imple- Churchill’s letter to Stalin’s correspon- 220
mentation of the Yalta decisions Stalin of April 29th dence etc., vol. 1
133 The Soviet Union puts the new Poland Soviet-Polish agree- United Nations, 221
under an obligation to itself ment of April 21st, Treaty series, vol. 12
1945
Polish and Russian
text and translation
134 Osdbka-Morawski announces the Poloni- Extract from a speech Keesing’s Archiv der 223
zation of the German Eastern territories of Osdébka-Morawski Gegenwart, 1945
of May 3rd, 1945
135 Churchill observes the Soviet advance with Churchill’s exposé of W. Churchill, The 224
uneasiness May 4th, 1945 second world war,
vol. VI
136 Churchill speaks of the ,Iron Curtain“ Churchill’s message to W. Churchill, The 225
Truman of May 12th, second world war,
1945 vol. VI
137 The four great Allied Powers subdivide Statement on Ger- Official Gazette of 226
Germany into four zones of occupation many of June 5th, the Control Council
within the 1937 frontiers 1945 for Germany, Suppl.
English, Russian, and No. 1, Berlin 1946
French text
138 The four Allied Powers reserve the right Declaration of the See No. 137 227
of fixing the boundaries of Germany Allied Powers of
June 5th, 1945
English, Russian, and
French text
XXIV
No. Headin g Contents Taken from Page
139 The Western Powers move out of Central Churchill’s descrip- W. Churchill, The 228
Germany tion of the situation second world war,
as in May and June vol. VI
1945, Message to
President Truman
139aThe Polish Workers’ Party prepare Polish Circular letter of the W dziesiqta rocznice 231
settlement of the German Eastern territories Central Committee powstania Polskie;
in June 1945 Partii Robotniczej.
Polish text and trans- Materialy i doku-
lation menty, Warsaw 1952
140 The expulsion of the remaining Germans Report on an inter- Keesing’s Archiv der 233
is prepared according to a plan view given by a Gegenwart, 1945
Polish government
official
141 The Polish Government makes plans for Report of ,,Exchange“ See No. 140 Doak
the Polish settlement of the German on July 6th, 1945
Eastern territories
142 The Allies are faced with the problem of Churchill’s remarks W. Churchill, The 234
the German population in the East on the situation second world war,
in July 1945 vol. VI
XIII. The Potsdam Conference

143 The question arises: What is Germany? Leahy’s report on the W. D. Leahy, 235
second plenary mee- I was there
ting of July 18th,
1945
144 Stalin admits having handed over German Leahy’s report on the See No. 143 235
territory to Poland fifth plenary meeting
of July 21st
145 Churchill and Truman eau, about the Churchill’s report on W. Churchill, The 236
fate of the Germans this meeting second world war,
vol. VI
146 Churchill objects to a final decision on the Churchill’s report on See No. 145 239
German boundary the sixth plenary
meeting of July 22nd
147 The Heads of Governments confirm that Truman’s report on H. S. Truman, 242
K6nigsberg should fall to the Soviet Union the seventh plenary Memoirs, vol. I
meeting of July 23rd
148 A Polish Government delegation defends Mikolajcezyk’s report St. Mikotajczyk, 242
the Oder-Neisse Line on his negotiations The pattern of
during the Soviet domination
Conference
149 Churchill warns the Poles not to go too far Churchill’s report on W. Churchill, The 245
his talk with the second world war,
Polish delegation of vol. VI
July 24th
XXV
ot :
= \
A Not Heading _ Contents Taken from
150 Churchill declares that Poland demands too Churchill’s report on See No. 149
‘much ; ¥ his talk with Bierut
of July 25th
151 Truman refers to the connection with the Byrnes’ report on the J. F. Byrnes, Speaking 247 4
question of reparation first days of the frankly, New York,
Conference London 1947
152 Churchill: Poland wants to move too far Report on Churchill’s St. Grabski, Na nowej 249
“West talk with the Polish drodze dziejowej
delegation A. Klafkowski,
Podstawy prawne
granicy Odra-Nisa
153 Bevin shows little knowledge of the situa- Leahy’s report on a W. D. Leahy, 250
tion meeting Truman, I was there
Attlee, Bevin of*
July 28th
154 Molotov opposes any settlement other than Truman’s report on H. S. Truman, 250
the Oder-Neisse Line his talk with Molotov Memoirs, vol. I
of July 29th
155 The decision is made in connection with Leahy’s report on the W. D. Leahy, 251
questions of quite a different kind 12th plenary meeting I was there
of July 31st
156 Bevin: Eastern Germany must remain un- Truman’s report on H. S. Truman, 252
der Allied military control this meeting Memoirs, vol. I
157 The Potsdam decision is a compromise Byrnes’ report on J. F. Byrnes, 253

this meeting Speaking frankly
158 A last-hour discussion: What course shall Truman’s report on H. S. Truman, 254
the frontier take near Stettin? the 13th meeting of Memoirs, vol. I
August ist
159 Marshall: This settlement is not final Declaration of Mr. The New York 235
Marshall, US Secre- Times, April 10th,
tary of State, regard- 1947
ing the Potsdam
Conference of
April 9th, 1947
160 The German Eastern territories are trans- Extract from the Official Gazette of 255
ferred to Polish administration, the inha- Potsdam declaration the Control Council
bitants are expelled English, Russian, and for Germany, Suppl.
French text No. 1, Berlin 1946
XIV. The Interpretation of Potsdam

161 Truman: The final settlement will be ef- Extract from Voices of history, 263
fected at the Peace Conference Truman’s broadcast 1945-46, New York
speech on August 9th, 1946
1945
AXVI
No. Hiales, Contents Taken from Page
162 The French Government objects to German Second Note of the Documentes francais 264
cia authorities Provisional French relatifs 4 PAllemagne;
Government of Aott 1945 — Février
August 7th, 1945 1947, Paris 1947
‘French text and
translation
163 France raises no objections against the Fifth Note of the See No. 162 ° 265
Polish administration Provisional French
Government of
August 7th, 1945
French text and
translation
164 The French Government only takes note of Sixth Note of the See No. 162 266
the resettlement of the ,German minori- Provisional French
«
ties Government of
August 7th, 1945
French text and
translation
_ 165 Poland and the Soviet Union fix the bor- Soviet-Polish Agree- United Nations, 267
der line and divide East Prussia ment of August 16th, Treaty series, vol. 10
1945
Polish and Russian
text and translation
166 Churchill: The Oder-Neisse Line is not a Churchill’s speech in Parliamentary 269
good augury for Europe the House of Com- Debates, House of .
mons on August 16th, Commons, Official
1945 Report, vol. 413
167 Bevin: There was a kind of vacuum which Debate in the House See No. 166 270
had to be filled of Commons on
August 20th, 1945
168 A misunderstanding allegedly led to the Debate in the House See No. 166 2738
confusion of the two rivers Neisse of Commons on
August 24th, 1945
_ 169 Bierut calls attention to the connection Report on Bierut’s K. Klafkowski, 275
between the Oder-Neisse Line and the speech on a Press Podstawy prawne
. Curzon Line Conference of August granicy Odra-Nisa
24th, 1945
170 France refers to the connection of the Memorandum of the Documents frangais 276
Oder-Neisse Line with the general question Provisional French relatifs 4 |’Allemagne
of Germany’s frontiers Government of
September 14th, 1945
171 Truman: Potsdam was a »high-handed Extract from H. S. Truman, 278

outrage“ Truman’s letter to Memoirs, vol. I
Byrnes of
January 5th, 1946
XXVII
Bibliography — |
A. Unprinted material Extracts in No.
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Byrnes, J. F., Speaking frankly. New York, London 1947. ‘ 151157.
Carroll, M. J., see Documents.

Churchill, W., The second world war, vol. III, 1V, V, VI, London 1950-54. 23, 24, 32, 43,
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Conferences, The, at Malta and Yalta see Foreign Relations of the United
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Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 91, Washington 1945. 131
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Washington 1950. 103, 125, 126
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V6 AL7 USS
LI 20S 121.
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% Goodrich, L. M., see Documents isce '
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Hull see Memoirs
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man edition). 1945. 134, 140, 141
Keesing’s Contemporary Archives 1943—1945. 1
Klafkowski, A., Podstawy prawne granicy Odra-Nisa na tle umdw:
Jaltanskiej i Poczdamskiej (The legal foundation of the Oder-Neisse
frontier based on the agreements of Yalta and Potsdam). Posen
(Poznan) 1947. 81, 152, 169
Kulski, W. W., The lost opportunity for Russian-Polish friendship. For-
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' Lane A. B., I saw Poland betrayed. New York 1948. 132
Leahy, W. D., I was there. London 1950. 69, 112, 143,
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Memoirs, The, of Cordell Hull, vol. II. New York 1948. 45, 47, 48
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148
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Berlin 1946. 137, 138, 160
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98, 100, 101,
129, 130, 166,
167, 168
Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, Official Report, vol. 114, 130,
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Perepiska Predsedatelja Soveta Ministrov SSSR s Prezidentami SSA i
Prem’er-Ministrami Velikobritanii vo Vremja Velikoj Oteéestvenno})
Vojny 1941—1945 gg. Tom pervyj, Perepiska s W. Churchillem i b.
Attlee (ijul’? 1941 g. — nojabr’ 1945 g.). Tom vtoroj, Perepiska s
F. Rooseveltom i H. Trumanom (avgust 1941 g. — dekabr’ 1945 g.)
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or
7
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oD h|
Polish facts and figures, No. 16, New York 1945. a
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Stettinius, E. R., Roosevelt and the Russians. The Yalta Conference. Gar-
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Truman, H. S., Memoirs, vol. I: Year of decisions (1945). Garden City,

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Voices of history, 1945—1946. Ed. by N. Ausubel, New York 1946. 161
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Manchester Guardian, The, August 30th, 1944. 80
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24th, 1944. 58a, 58b
XXXI
CaN
Vein nF
I
The Polish Fate in 1939

1
Great Britain guarantees the independence of Poland
The British Government and the Polish Government concluded a Mutual
Assistance Agreement in London on August 25th, 1939, which contained the
following provisions inter alia:
Article 1
Should one of the Contracting Parties become engaged in hostilities with a
European Power in consequence of aggression by the latter against that Contract-
ing Party, the other Contracting Party will at once give the Contracting Party
engaged in hostilities all the support and assistance in its power.
Article 2
1. The provisions of Article1 will also apply in the event of any action by a
European Power which clearly threatened, directly or indirectly, the independence
of one of the Contracting Parties, and was of such nature that the Party in question
considered it vital to resist it with its armed forces.
2. Should one of the Contracting Parties become engaged in hostilities with a
European Power in consequence of action by that Power which threatened the
independence or neutrality of another European State in such a way as to con-
stitute a clear menace to the security of that Contracting Power, the provisions
of Article 1 will apply, without prejudice, however, to the rights of the other
European State concerned.
Article 3
Should a European Power attempt to undermine the independence of one of
the Contracting Parties by processes of economic penetration or in any other
way, the Contracting Parties will support each other in resistance to such attempts.
Should the European Power concerned thereupon embark on hostilities against
one of the Contracting Parties, the provisions of Article 1 will apply.
eee
Article6
1. The Contracting Parties will communicate to each other the terms of any
undertakings of assistance against aggression which they have already given or
may in future give to other States.
'
—-
eaa
2. Should either of the Contracting Parties intend to give such an undertaking

fi
after the coming into force of the present Agreement, the other Contracting
Party shall, in order to ensure the proper functioning of the Agreement, be in-
formed thereof.
3. Any new undertaking which the Contracting Parties may enter into in
future shall neither limit their obligations under the present Agreement nor
indirectly create new obligations between the Contracting Party not participating
in these undertakings and the third State concerned.
Article 7
Should the Contracting Parties be engaged in hostilities in consequence of the
application of the present Agreement, they will not conclude an armistice or
treaty of peace except by mutual agreement.
Polish text
Artykut 1
W razie gdyby jedna ze stron umawiajacych sie znalazla sie w dzialaniach
wojennych w stosunku do jednego z mocarstw europejskich na skutek agresji tego
ostatniego przeciwko tejze stronie umawiajacej sie, druga strona umawiajqca sie
udzieli bezzwiocznie stronie umawiajacej sie znajdujacej sie w dzialaniach wojen-
nych wszelkiej pomocy i poparcia bedacych w jej mocy.
Artykut 2
1. Postanowienia Artykulu 1 stosuja sie r6wniez w razie jakiejkolwiekbadz
akcji jednego z mocarstw europejskich, ktéraby zagrazala wyraznie, posrednio lub
bezpoSrednio, niezawistosci jednej ze stron umawiajacych sie, a ktéraby bylta
tego rodzaju, ze ta strona umawiajaca sie uwazalaby za zywotne przeciwstawié sie
jej swymi silami zbrojnymi.
2. Jezeli jedna ze stron umawiajacych sie znalaztaby sie w dziataniach wojennych
w stosunko do jednego z mocarstw europejskich na skutek akcji tego ostatniego,
zagrazajacej niezawistosci albo neutralnosci jednego z trzecich panstw europej-
skich w ten sposdb, ze stanowilaby wyraznq grozbe dla bezpieczenstwa tej strony
umawiajacej sie, postanowienia Artykulu 1 beda sie stosowa¢, jednakze bez usz-
czerbku dla praw danego panstwa trzeciego.
Artykut 3
Jezeli jedno z mocarstw europejskich czyniloby préby podwazenia niezawis-
losci jednej ze stron umawiajacych sie Srodkami gospodarczego przenikania albo
w jakikolwiek inny sposdb, strony umawiajace sie udziela sobie wzajemnego
poparcia w przeciwstawieniu si¢ takim prébom. Jezeliby to mocarstwo rozpoczelo
nastepnie dzialania wojenne przeciw jednej ze stron umawiajacych sie, postano-
wienia Artykulu 1 bedg sie stosowaé.
Artykut 6
1. Umawiajace sie strony bedq sobie wzajemnie komunikowaé teksty zobo-
Wwiazan pomocy przeciw agresji, ktére zaciagnely albo moglyby zaciagnaé w
przyszlosci w stosunku do panstw trzecich.
2. W razie gdyby jedna ze stron umawiajacych sie zamierzala zaciagnaé nowe
zobowiazania tego rodzaju po wejsciu w zycie niniejszego Uktadu, bedzie obo-
wiqzana z uwagi na dobre dzialanie tego ostatniego powiadomi¢ o tym drug
umawiajacq sie strone. ‘
3. Nowe zobowiazania, ktéreby strony umawiajace sie mogly zaciqagnaé w

przysziogci nie powinny ani ograniczaé ich wzajemnych obowiazkéw okreslonych
niniejszym Ukladem, ani stwarza¢ pogrednio nowych obowiazkéw miedzy strona
umawiajaca si¢ nieuczestniczaca w tych zobowiqzaniach, a panstwami trzecimi.
Artykut 7
Jezeliby strony umawiajace sie znalazly sie w dziataniach wojennych na skutek
zastosowania niniejszego Ukladu, to nie zawra one ani rozejmu ani traktatu
pokoju, jak tylko za wspélnym porozumieniem.
Société des Nations, Recueil des traités, vol. 199, pp. 57-63 (No. 4665).
A secret Supplementary Protocol was signed together with the Agreement,

Article 3 of which reads!:
The undertakings mentioned in Article 6 of the Agreement, should they be
entered into by one of the Contracting Parties with a third State, would neces-
sarily be so framed as not to prejudice in execution either the sovereignty or ter-
ritorial inviolability of the other Contracting Party.
Keesing’s Contemporary Archives 1943-1945, p. 7208.
2
The Soviet Union and Germany agree on a delimitation of their interests in
Poland
A Non-Aggression Pact was concluded in Moscow between V. Molotov,
Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, and von Ribbentrop, Reich Foreign
Minister, on August 23rd, 1939. A secret supplementary protocol was signed
on the same day, its contents being as follows?:
Aus Anlaf der Unterzeichnung des Nichtangriffsvertrags zwischen dem Deut-

schen Reich und der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken haben die unter-
1 The Polish text of this supplementary protocol was not available.

2 The Russian text was not available.
zeichneten Bevollmachtigten der beiden Teile in streng vertraulicher Aussprache
die Frage der Abgrenzung der beiderseitigen Interessenspharen in Osteuropa er-
drtert. Diese Aussprache hat zu folgendem Ergebnis gefiihrt:
2. Fiir den Fall einer territorial-politischen Umgestaltung der zum polnischen

Staate gehdrenden Gebiete werden die Interessenspharen Deutschlands und der
UdSSR ungefahr durch die Linie der Fliisse Narew, Weichsel und San abgegrenzt.
Die Frage, ob die beiderseitigen Interessen die Erhaltung eines unabhangigen
polnischen Staates erwiinscht erscheinen lassen und wie dieser Staat abzugrenzen
ware, kann endgiiltig erst im Laufe der weiteren politischen Entwicklung geklart
werden.
In jedem Falle werden beide Regierungen diese Frage im Wege einer freund-
lichen Verstandigung ldsen. ;
4. Dieses Protokoll wird von beiden Seiten streng geheim behandelt werden.
Das nationalsozialistische Deutschland und die Sowjetunion 1939-1941 (German edition of

Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941). Ed. by E. M. Carroll and F. T. Epstein, Department
of State 1948, p. 86.
Translation
On the occasion of the signature of the Nonaggression Pact between the German
Reich and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics the undersigned plenipotentiar-
ies of each of the two parties discussed in strictly confidential conversations the
question of the boundary of their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Europe.
These conversations led to the following conclusions:
2. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging

to the Polish state the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR shall be
_ bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San.
The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the main-
tenance of an independent Polish state and how such a state should be bounded can
only be definitely determined in the course of further political developments.
In any event both Governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly
agreement.
4. This protocol shall be treated by both parties as strictly secret.
Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941, ed. by R.].Sontag and J].S.Beddie, Department of

State 1948, p. 78.
4
«
3
The Soviet Union occupies Eastern Poland
Since the morning of September 17th, 1939, units of the Red Army have
advanced over the Eastern frontier of Poland in order to occupy the country
as far as the line of demarcation agreed upon on August 23rd. The Soviet
Government informed the Polish Ambassador in Moscow, Grzybowski, and
the foreign Governments by the following identical note:
Tocnoyun mocos! 17 centsxOpa 1939 roma.

IlompcKo-repManckast BOiiHa BHIABMIAa BHYTPCHHIOW HECOCTOATEIbHOCTh
NONIbCKOrO rocyfapcrBa. B rTeuenme WecATM Hei BOCHHEIX Onepalmit
Ilompma norepAua BCe CBOM NpOMBINeHHEIe paliOHE! UM KYIbTYpHBIE
eHtpH. Bapmasa, Kak croma Ilompmmu, He cymectByer Oombme.
TloubcKoe UpaBMTeIbCTBO pactasocb M He IpOABMAeT IPM3HAKOB *KU3ZHM.
TO 3HaAUMT, YTO MOMLCKOE TOCYAapCrBO UM ero MpaBUTebCTBO PakTMIeECKM
TlepecTalm cyuecTBoBatb. Tem caMbiM MpekpaTaim cBoe jelicTBue
WOrOBOpH, saKmioyeHHBIe Mey CCCP u Iouazmet. Ilpeqocrapnennaa
camoli ceOe u ocTaBeHHad 6e3 pyKoBoycTBa, Hloupma mpeBpaTusmach
B yoOuoe Nose IA BCAKUX CIyuaiiHoctTei MU HeOmuUAaHHOCTel, MOryuIMxX
coaqaTb yrposy yaa CCCP. Ilosromy, Oyayau yocene HeiitpanbHEIM,
CopercKoe 1paBMTeibCTBO He MO?KeT OOMbWE HeliTpaIbHO OTHOCHTbCA K
aTuM dakTaM.
CoBeTckKoe NpaBMTeIbCTBO He MOIKET TAKMe OespasIMIHO OTHOCUTLCA K
TOMY, 4YTOOLI EMMHOKPOBHEIC YKPaMHUbl UM Oeopycch, UpomMBaronjne Ha
Teppuropuu llonpnm, OpomieHHEe Ha MpoOMsBON CyAbOLI, OCTaBaIUCh
6e33allMTHEIMH.
Baugy tTaKoii oOcraHopKma CoBerckoe MpaBMTebCTBO OTAaIO pac-—
nopAsKenue ['naBHomy KOMaH_OBaHMIO KpacHoii Apmum yaTb upuKas
BolickaM llepelitu rpaHUlly WU B3ATb NOY CBOW BalllUTy *KU3Hb UW UMYIIeCTBO
HaceseHuaA Sanaquolw VRpamun u danaquol Benopyccun.
OqHospemeHHo CopeTcK0e 1paBUTeILCTBO HAMePeHO IIPHHATH BCe MepBI
K TOMY, YTOOK BEIBSBOJIMTb NOIbCKMM HapO U3 BONO yaHO BOWHH,
Kya OH ObI BBeprHyT erO HepasyMHEIMM PYKOBOAUTeIAMM UM WaTb eMy
BOSMO?KHOCTh 8asKUTL MUPHOM ?KU3HbIO.
IIpumute, rocnogquH n0con, yBepeHuA B COBepmieHHOM K Bam mourenun.
Pravda No. 258, September 17th, 1939.
Translation
Excellency! September 17th, 1939
The German-Polish War has demonstrated the internal bankruptcy of the Polish
State. Poland has lost all her industrial regions and cultural centres in the course
of ten days of military operations. Warsaw, as the capital of Poland, no longer
exists. The Polish Government has collapsed and no longer manifests any signs
of life. This means that the Polish State and the Polish Government have, in
practice, ceased to exist. The pacts concluded between the USSR and Poland are
thereby rendered invalid. Since she has been left to her fate and deprived of her
5
4 Py Marsh ait a ga bol A ut
leaders, Poland has become a convenient sphere for all kinds of chance happenings
and surprises which might develop into a threat to the USSR. Therefore in view
of the facts the Soviet Government, which has maintained its neutrality hitherto,
can no longer remain neutral.
Nor can the Soviet Government continue to watch with indifference how its
Ukrainian and White Ruthenian blood-brothers who live in Polish territory are
left to their fate and remain unprotected.
In view of this position the Soviet Government has instructed the Supreme
Command of the Red Army to order the troops to cross the frontier, and to
take the life and property of the West Ukrainian and Western White Ruthenian
population under their protection.
The Soviet Government at the same time intends to adopt all measures required
to liberate the Polish people from the disastrous war it has been plunged into by
its foolish leaders, and to give it a chance to lead a peaceful life.
Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.
The Soviet Union and Germany re-define the delimitation of their interests
On 28th September, 1939, after the conquest of Poland, a German-Soviet
eins and Friendship Treaty was concluded in Moscow. Its, text was as
ollows:
Die Deutsche Reichsregierung und die Regierung der UdSSR betrachten es

nach dem Auseinanderfallen des bisherigen polnischen Staates ausschlieflich als
ihre Aufgabe, in diesen Gebieten die Ruhe und Ordnung wiederherzustellen und
den dort lebenden Vélkerschaften ein ihrer vélkischen Eigenart entsprechendes
friedliches Dasein zu sichern. Zu diesem Zweck haben sie sich iiber folgendes ge-
einigt:
Artikel I
Die Deutsche Reichsregierung und die Regierung der UdSSR legen als Grenze
der beiderseitigen Reichsinteressen im Gebiete des bisherigen polnischen Staates
_ die Linie fest, die in der anliegenden Karte eingezeichnet ist und in einem ergin-
zenden Protokoll naher beschrieben werden soll.
Artikel II
Beide Teile erkennen die im ArtikelI festgelegte Grenze der beiderseitigen Reichs-
interessen als endgiiltig an und werden jegliche Einmischung dritter Michte in
diese Regelung ablehnen.
Artikel III
Die erforderliche staatliche Neuregelung iibernimmt in den Gebieten westlich
der im Artikel I angegebenen Linie die Deutsche Reichsregierung, in den Gebieten
dstlich dieser Linie die Regierung der UdSSR.
6
Artikel IV ; : ‘a
Die Deutsche Reichsregierung und dieRegierung der UdSSR betrachten die vor-
stehende Regelung als ein sicheres Fundament fiir eine fortschreitende Entwick-
lung der freundschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen ihren Vélkern.
Artikel V
Dieser Vertrag wird ratifiziert und die Ratifikationsurkunden werden so bald
wie méglich in Berlin ausgetauscht werden. Der Vertrag tritt mit seiner Unter-
zeichnung in Kraft.
Russian text
IIpasurexpctso CCCP u Tepmancnoe I[pasuresapcrso nocme pacnaa

OrBmero IonbcKoro rocyyapcTBa paccCMATPUBAIOT UCKTIOGMTeEIbHO Kak
CBOIO0 saylaxy BOCCTaHOBHTh MMp UM OpAROK Ha 9TO TeppuTopuu
oOecHeyMTh HapOaM, *KMBYIIMM TaM, MUpHOe CyMecTBOBAHUe, COOTBET-
CTBytolljee UX HalMOHaIbHEIM OCOOeHHOcTAM. C sto Wembio OHM Up
K cCOrmauieHmi0 B Culey,y1ouleM:
Cratpa |
IIpasurexsctBo CCCP wu Tepmaucxroe [[papuremberBo ycTraHaBsIMBalT
B KavecTBe rpaHulsl Meskyy OOOIOMHEIMM TocyfapcTBeHHBIMU MHTepecamu
Ha TeppuTopuu OnBmero IlombeKoro rocyfapcTBa JMHMIO, KOTOpaA
HaHeceHa Ha lIpWslaraeMylo pu cem KapTy u Ooee no_poduo Oyyzer
ommcaHa B JOMOUHUTeEIbHOM NpoOToOKOe.
Crarsa II
O6e Cropouni upusHaloT ycranoBueHHyw B cratse | rpanuny o601fHEIX
TrOcyapCTBeCHHEIX MHTepecoB OKOHYATeIbHOM MW ycTpaHAT BCAKOe BMe-
WateIbCTBO TpeThUX JepskaB B 9TO pellleHue.
Cratsa III
Heo6xoqumoe rocyqapcTBeHHoe HepeycTpolicTBo Ha TeppuTOpuM 3a-
nayee ykasaHHoii B cratbe | mmHuu upoussogut lepmancnoe IIpasutess-
CTBO, Ha TeppuTOpuu BocToUHee sTOM muHMu — I]paBurennetBo CCCP.
Cratpa LV
I[pasureapctso CCCP u l'epmancnoe IIpasurenberBo paccmaTpuBaloT
BHIMNIeMPpUBEACHHOe WepeycTpoiicTBO Kak HapeHHEI PyHFaMenT AIA Pasb-
Helimero pasBUTHA ApyKeCTBCHHELX OTHOMCHMM MexK]Y CBOUMY HapoyaMy.
Crataa V
OroT Forowop vwoyuexur patapuKanun. OOmen patupuKkalMoxHbmMn
rpaMoTaMy JoOJKeH UpomsoiiTu BOsMOmHO cKOpee B bepsmue.
Jloropop BCTymaeT B CMJIy C MOMeHTa ero ToAMMCAHMA.
Reichsgesetzblatt (Reich Law Gazette), 1940, vol. II, p. 4.

Translation
The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the USSR
consider it as exclusively their task, after the collapse of the former Polish state,
to re-establish peace and order in these territories and to assure to the peoples
living there a peaceful life in keeping with their national character. To this end,
they have agreed upon the following:
Article I
determine as the boundary of their respective national interests in the territory
of the former Polish state the line marked on the attached map, which shall be
described in more detail in a supplementary protocol.
Article II
Both parties recognize the boundary of the respective national interests esta-
blished in article I as definitive and shall reject any interference of third powers
in this settlement.
Article III
The necessary reorganization of public administration will be effected in the
areas west of the line specified in article I by the Government of the German
Reich, in the areas east of this line by the Government of the USSR.
Article IV
regard this settlement as a firm foundation for a progressive development of the
friendly relations between their peoples.
Article V
This treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications shall be exchanged in Berlin as
soon as possible. The treaty becomes effective upon signature.
Nazi-Soviet relations, pp. 105-106.
3
The Soviet Union withdraws from Central Poland
A secret supplementary protocol with the following text was signed at the
same time;
Die unterzeichneten Bevollmiachtigten stellen das Einverstandnis der Deutschen

Reichsregierung und der Regierung der UdSSR iiber folgendes fest:
Das am 23. August 1939 unterzeichnete geheime Zusatzprotokoll wird in seiner
1 The Russian text was not available.

Ziffer 1 dahin abgedndert, daf§ das Gebiet des litauischen Staates in die Interessen-
sphare der UdSSR fallt, weil andererseits die Wojewodschaft Lublin und Teile der
Wojewodschaft Warschau in die Interessensphire Deutschlands fallen (vgl. die
Karte zu dem heute unterzeichneten Grenz- und Freundschaftsvertrage). Sobald
die Regierung der UdSSR auf litauischem Gebiet zur Wahrnehmung ihrer Inter-
essen besondere Mafnahmen trifft, wird zum Zwecke einer natiirlichen und ein-
fachen Grenzziehung die gegenwirtige deutsch-litauische Grenze dahin rekti-
fiziert, da das litauische Gebiet, das siidwestlich der in der anliegenden Karte ein-
gezeichneten Linie liegt, an Deutschland fallt.
Ferner wird festgestellt, da die in Geltung befindlichen wirtschaftlichen Ab-
machungen zwischen Deutschland und Litauen durch die vorstehend erwahnten
Mafinahmen der Sowjetunion nicht beeintriachtigt werden sollen.
Das nationalsozialistische Deutschland und die Sowjetunion, p. 118.
Translation
The undersigned Plenipotentiaries declare the agreement of the Government
of the German Reich and the Government of the USSR upon the following:
The Secret Supplementary Protocol signed on August 23, 1939, shall be amended
in item 1 to the effect that the territory of the Lithuanian state falls to the
sphere of influence of the USSR, while, on the other hand, the province of
Lublin and parts of the province of Warsaw fall to the sphere of influence of
Germany (cf. the map attached to the Boundary and Friendship Treaty signed
today). As soon as the Government of the USSR shall take special measures
on Lithuanian territory to protect its interests, the present German-Lithuanian
border, for the purpose of a natural and simple boundary delineation, shall be
rectified in such a way that the Lithuanian territory situated to the southwest of
the line marked on the attached map should fall to Germany.
Further it is declared that the economic agreements now in force between
Germany and Lithuania shall not be affected by the measures of the Soviet Union
referred to above.
Nazi-Soviet relations, p. 107.
6
Halifax points out: The Soviet Union has advanced as far as the Curzon Line
Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, spoke about the Soviet advance
in Poland in the House of Lords on October 26th, 1939. He made the follow-
ing statements inter alia:
It is quite true, of course..., that it makes no difference to the Poles whether

they are invaded from East or West; and nobody who has any information as to
what is now going on in the several parts of Poland can feel any other than a
sense of the complete and utter tragedy of the suffering and want which... is
going to grow much worse this winter and of which even today we have the
)
- J 4
f : .
i
|
\
mii) { ’ , wie
most distressful reports. The last thing I would wish to do in this matter is to
defend the action of the Soviet Government at the particular time at which they
took it. But it is right to remember two things: Firstly, that they would never
have taken that action if the German Government had not started it and set the
example that they did set when they invaded Poland without any declaration of war.
In the second place, it is perhaps, as a matter of historical interest, worth recalling
that the action of the Soviet Government has been to advance the Russian boun-
dary to what was substantially the boundary recommended at the time of the Ver-
sailles Conference by the noble Marquess who used to lead the House, Lord Cur-
zon!, and who was then Foreign Secretary.
Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, Official Report, vol. 114, col. 1563.
Poland to be restored after the war to greater power than ever before
General W. Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Polish Government-in-Exile formed
in Paris, conducted negotiations with the British Government from Novem-
ber 14th to November 20th. He summarized the result of these negotiations
on baa 20th in a broadcast to the Polish people in the following
words:
Chciatbym wobec Was stwierdzié z przekonaniem i z cata moca, i to na pod-

stawie rozméw z angielskimi i francuskimi mezami stanu, ze nie naprézno walezyta
Polska do ostatniego tchu z inwazjq wroga...
Smieré, cierpienia i ofiary tysiecy obywateli polskich nie pdjda na marne.
Z krwi, popioléw oraz zgliszcz powstanie Polska nowa, sprawiedliwa dla swych
syndw i potezniejsza niz kiedykolwiek....
Informujac Was o naszych rozmowach i rokowaniach londynskich, podaje do
Waszej wiadomosci, ze nasz Sprzymierzeniec angielski, zgodnie ze swoja wielo-
wiekowg tradycja okazal sie lojalnym przyjacielem. Wielka Brytania stoi nie-
1 Halifax wanted to call to mind the Curzon Line which in its northern part had been
proposed as the provisional eastern frontier of Poland at the Paris Peace Conference under
the name of “Line of December 8th, 1919”. Lord Curzon, who had taken over the Foreign
Office only on October 24th, 1919, and who had taken no part in the meetings of the
Supreme Council concerning the question of the Polish frontier, had no influence
whatever on the fixing of the Line. His name was not connected with it until July 11th,
1920; on this day Lord Curzon sent a telegraphic note to the Government of the Soviet
Union from the Inter-Allied Conference in Spa on behalf of the British Government in
which the Line of December 8th, extended in respect of East Galicia by “Line A” which
had also been proposed at the Peace Conference but not yet definitely fixed, was given as
the Demarcation Line for the armistice between the Soviet Union and Poland which was
suggested in the same note, though in vain. The name of “Curzon Line” was subsequently
first applied by the Soviet Government and thus gained admission to the diplomatic
language and to literature. In fact, Curzon only acted as Prime Minister Lloyd George’s
agent at Spa as well and was not present at the talks with the Polish representatives
Grabski and Patek on July 10th, 1920, which preceded the despatching of the note.
By compressing several different happenings into one, and confusing a demarcation line
with a frontier, the presentation of Lord Halifax gives a wrong picture.
10
Gi p { Hl : |
zlomnie przy swoich przyrzeczeniach i dotrzyma danego slowa. Nietylko Rzad

Brytyjski, ale i opozycja tego kraju o$wiadcezaja zgodnie i solennie, iz tak dlugo
nie podejma wyciaganej dyskretnie dioni niemieckiej i nie zawra z Niemcami
pokoju, dopdki, jak o$wiadczyl premier brytyjski, wszelkie krzywdy wyrzadzone
Polsce nie zostana naprawione.
Monitor Polski (State Gazette of the Polish Republic), November 28th, 1939, vol. XXII,
No. 258-267.
Translation
I wish to assure you with conviction and most emphatically on the basis of
talks held with British and French statesmen that Poland did not fight in vain
to the last breath against the enemy invasion...
The death, the sufferings and the sacrifices of thousands of Polish citizens will
not have been in vain. A new Poland will arise from blood, ashes and rubble,
treating its sons justly and mightier than ever before... .
In telling you of our talks and negotiations in London, I am informing you
that our British ally has proved to be a loyal friend in conformity with her cen-
turies-old tradition. Great Britain holds unswervingly to her promises and will
keep her word. Not only the British Government, but also the Opposition of —
that country declare unitedly and solemnly that Germany’s discreetly offered
hand will not be accepted and no peace be concluded with Germany until — as
stated by the British Prime Minister — restitution has been made for all the
damage done to Poland.
A report of the New York Times went somewhat further than the official
statement. The journalist “Augur” (Poliakov) reported here}:
The conversations Premier Sikorski had with members of the government
revealed that Britain shares with France the will to proceed with the war until
the wrong done to Poland shall have received full reparation. In other words
there can be no peace with Germany until the Polish Republic has been recon-
stituted as an independent sovereign State. The British and French Governments
are in full agreement to recognise the necessity for Poland to be a powerful State
in the Baltic area so as to maintain a balance between Germany and Russia.
It may well be that this resurrected Poland will need a seabord on the Baltic
of greater extent than the narrow corridor allowed her under the Treaty of Ver-
sailles. \
New York Times, November 20th, 1939.
1 According to the text reproduced in earlier collections of sources from: ‘War and peace
aims of the United Nations’, edited by L. W. Holborn, vol. 1, Boston 1943, page 450, this
was allegedly said in statements made by Sikorski during a press conference held in
London on the same day. This is not, however, apparent from the text of the newspaper
which gave a separate report on this press conference, though the editress L. W. Holborn
refers to this. Sikorski’s speech, held during the reception of the foreign press on Novem-
ber 16th, which is also reproduced by the Monitor Polski, No. 258-267, also contains
only phrases of a much more general kind and refers in the main to the European task
of Poland and the organization of the Polish armed forces.
tl
il
Polish territorial claims up to 1942

8
Poland demands frontiers ,,which could safeguard her security“

The Polish Government-in-Exile addressed the Polish people in a broadcast
from Paris on December 20th, 1939. Regarding its content1 the following
was reported, inter alia:
They recognized as their supreme task efficacious participation in the war, to

deliver the country from enemy occupation and to assure to Poland — in addition
to direct and ample access to the sea — frontiers which would safeguard her
security.
The Germans had owed their progress in their march eastward primarily to
their skill in exploiting the internal dissensions of the Slavs. Poland now insisted
that the solidarity of the Slav States should be one of the bulwarks of the new
political organization of the European Middle East. Poland was to be a demo-
cratic State. Her national minorities would be assured justice, free national and
cultural development, and due legal protection.
The Bulletin of International News, vol. XVI, No. 26, December 30th, 1939, p. 50.
9
Poland demands a secure and economically strong territory
On the occasion of the consent to the Atlantic Charter Edward Raczynski,
the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Polish Government-in-Exile which
had meanwhile transferred to London, made a speech in St. James’ Palace in
London on September 24th, 1941. He said inter alia:
The Polish Government is confident that none of the illegal acts perpetrated by
Germany on the territory of Poland shall be recognized by the victorious demo-
cracies, which will finally convince the German nation that aggression does not
pay. In particular, the Polish population of the Western provinces, so ruthlessly
transplanted, must be given a possibility of an immediate reintegration in the
land of their ancestors and the German settlers, installed in Polish homesteads,
sent back to the Reich.
! The Polish text was not available since the Monitor Polski No. 289-292 of December
30th, 1939, does not reproduce this declaration.
ity
The Polish Government have a profound faith in the ‘sense of justice of Great
Britain as well as of the United States and are therefore persuaded that Poland —
the first country to stand up to the German onslaught, staking in this struggle her
territorial integrity — cannot emerge from this war with a territory reduced in
strength and importance. The future frontiers of Poland should safeguard the
country’s security as a part of the general security of Europe; they should assure
Poland’s vital need of a wide access to the sea adequately protected from foreign
interference, as well as her economic development in proportion to the number of
her population. Poland’s Free Access to the Sea“, stipulated in Point 13 of Presi-
dent Wilson’s 14 Points as a guarantee of our country’s independence, should this
time be made really free and secure.
War and peace aims of the United Nations, ed. by L.W. Holborn, vol. 1, p. 462.
10
The Polish National Council in London demands: Shift the frontier to the West,
straighten and shorten it
On December 2nd, 1942, the Polish National Council1 unanimously adopted

the following resolution on Polish war aims:
Po wystuchaniu sprawozdania Ministra Prac Kongresowych Mariana Seydy w

sprawie polskich cel6w wojny i zgodnie ze stanowiskiem w sprawozdaniu tym
zajetym, Rada Narodowa R. P. stwierdza, ze w kwestii naszej granicy wschodniej
trwa na gruncie traktatu ryskiego, w sprawie za$ niemieckiej wyraza przekonanie,
ze zasadnicza wytyczna polityki polskiej jest dazenie do zabezpieczenia Europy
pred ponowna agresja Niemiec. W tym celu Polska powinna otrzymaé zabez-
pieczenie swych granic, oraz warunki spokojnego rozwoju gospodarczego i kul-
turalnego przez szerokie oparcie o morze i uzyskanie wobec Niemiec granicy dosta-
tecznie przesunietej na zachéd wyprostowanej i skréconej. Jednoczesnie Rada
Narodowa R.P. stwierdza, ze dla zabezpieczenia trwalego pokoju w Europie i
swobodnego rozwoju narodéw, koniecznym jest utworzenie w Europie Srodkowo-
Wschodniej Scistego zwiazku pafstw, zlaczonych wspédlnoécia intereséw i dazen.
W konsekwencji Rada Narodowa wzywa Rzad do bezzwlocznego i wyraznego
postawienia tej sprawy na wszystkich wlasciwych terenach, réwniez brytyjskim
i amerykanskim.
Volume of documents in the possession of the Polish Research Centre, London, pp. 42-43.
Taken from a photostat.
1 The National Council met for the first time as a Parliament-in-Exile in Paris in January
1940. In June 1940 it and the Government-in-Exile transferred to London. Its members
were appointed by the President-in-Exile (W. Raczkiewicz was President from Septem-
ber 30th, 1939, to June 6th, 1947) in accordance with agreements made with the parties exist-
ing in exile. In 1942 the second National Council already met after the dissolution of the first
National Council (February 24th, 1942, to March 21st, 1945).
13
Translation Z *
After hearing the report of Marian Seyda, Minister for Congressional Affairs,
on the Polish war aims and in conformity with the point of view taken by this
report, the National Council declared its adherence to the basis of the Riga Treaty *.
With regard to Germany it expresses the conviction that it is the fundamental
principle of Polish policy to strive to safeguard Europe against another German
attack. For this purpose Poland’s frontiers should be made secure and she should
also be granted the prerequisites of a peaceful economic and cultural development,
by being provided with wide access to the sea and a frontier with Germany which
should be shifted sufficiently far to the West, and should be straightened and
_ shortened. The National Council at the same time found that the securing of
permanent peace in Europe and free development of the peoples would necessitate
the creation of a close liaison between the states of eastern Central Europe, which
are linked by mutual aims and interests. Consequently the National Council calls
upon the Government to deal with the matter immediately and emphatically in all
suitable spheres, including Great Britain and America.
11
Sikorski seeks to gain the support of the Allies for the Polish plans for expansion
In December 1942 General Sikorski visited America for the third time.
A Polish source reports:
W pierwszych latach wojny, kiedy zwycieskie Niemcy Hitlera staly nad Atlanty-
kiem, mocarstwa zachodnie pochtoniete byly catkowicie prowadzeniem wojny i
staly na stanowisku, ze rozwazanie powojennych rozwiazan terytorialnych jest cal-
kowicie przedwezesne, rzad polski narazilby sie niemalze na Smiesznosé gdyby
wystepowal z konkretnymi postulatami.
Niemniej jednak, bardzo wezesnie zaczat prygotowywaé grunt. Swiadeza o tym
dwa memorialy wreczone w grudniu 1942 r. rzadowi Stanéw Zjednoczonych w
_ ezasie trzeciej i ostatniej wizyty gen. Sikorskiego w Waszyngtonie. ‘
W pierwszym? z tych dwéch scisle poufnych memorialéw, ktérych fragmenty sq
tu dzi$ oglaszane po raz pierwszy, rzad polski rozwazat problem niemiecki z
punktu widzenia zapewnienia bezpieczenstwa i niepodlegtogci Polski oraz ,stwo-
rzenia warunkdéw politycznych, gospodarezych i innych dla ulatwienia realizacji
konstruktywnego planu federacji krajow Europy Srodkowej po wojnie“. Przypo-
mnie¢ tu nalezy, ze byly to czasy wytezonych wysilkéw na rzecz federacji polsko-
czechoslowackiej.
Memorial stwierdzat zaraz na wstepie, ze ,dla Polski Odra z Zalewem Szcze-
1 The Riga Peace Treaty of March 18th, 1921, had settled the Polish-Soviet boundary after
the Polish-Soviet War of 1920.
® In the original text by mistake: Pierwszy.
14
~ cifskimi jejAout para do granicy czeskiej (Nysa Luzycka) stanowi naturalng
linie bezpieczefstwa od strony Niemiec, poniewaz na wschéd od tej linii lezq bazy
wypadowe pruskie, skierowane przeciw Polsce, mianowicie Prusy Wschodnie, klin
slaski iPomorze Pruskie“. Nastepnie memoriat szczegdlowo rozwazal problem Prus
Wschodnich, Pomorza Pruskiego oraz Slaska, nie pozostawiajac wlasciwie wat-
pliwosci co do tego, ze rozwigzanie tych probleméw powinno polega¢ na wlaczeniu
ziem tych do Polski. Jedynie konkretne wytyczenie granicy pozostawiono na
pdzniej, poniewaz w tym momencie bylo rzeczq przedwezesng. Na ten temat
memorial glosil: ,,Sprawa polskiej granicy zachodniej nie zostala w pelni przedys-
kutowana w tym memoriale. Wystarczy stwierdzié w chwili obecnej, ze granica
powinna by¢ wyprostowana i skrécona przez niezbedne przesuniecie na zachéd w
celu zapewnienia Polsce zastuzonego bezpieczenstwa.“
Drugi memorial gen. Sikorskiego dotyczy! krokéw jakie nalezy natychmiast
po zakonczeniu dzialan wojennych podjaé wobec Niemiec. Punkt 10. tego memo-
rialu przewidywal ,,$cisla okupacje stref granicznych terytoridw niemieckich“,
przy czym wyjasnione byto, ze rozumie sie przez to ,,te terytoria, ktérych wlaczenie
do innych panstw jest przewidziane lub ktérych okupacja jest nieodzowna z wojs-
kowego punktu widzenia“.
11. punkt gtfosil, ze ,rejony Scistej okupacji winny byé¢ nastepujace: a) na
wschodzie: linia biegnaca wzdluz lewego brzegu Nysy Luzyckiej i lewego brzegu
Odry, facznie ze Szczecinem, wyspa w Zalewie Szczecifskim i wyspa Rugia.
Panstwem okupacyjnym winna byé¢ Polska, a w rejonie poludniowym, przylega-
jacym do Czechostowacji, Polska i Czechostowacja“.
Te dwa memorialy dajqa jasny obraz koncepcji jaka przy$wiecala rzqadowi
polskiemu. W éwezesnych okolicznogciach niemozliwosciq bylo wysuwac postulaty
bardziej konkretne. Ale zarys ich byt juz bardzo wyrazny.
Aleksander Bregman, Linia Odry i Nysy, to nie“wymyst Stalina” (The Oder-Neisse Line
is no “invention of Stalin”), Dziennik Polski, London, 13th vol., No. 294, December 9th,
1952.
Translation
During the first years of the war when Hitler’s victorious Germany stood on
the Atlantic, the Western Powers were fully occupied with waging war, and were
of the opinion that it was much too soon to consider postwar solutions. The
Polish Government would almost have made itself ridiculous if it had put forward
more concrete demands.
None the less, it began to prepare the ground very early on. Two memoranda
which were handed to the American Government in December 1942 during the
third and last visit of General Sikorski to Washington bear witness to this.
In the first of these two strictly confidential memoranda fragments of which are
being published here for the first time, the Polish Government goes into the German
problem from the angle of guaranteeing the safety and independence of Poland
and with a view to “creating political, economic and other conditions which would
facilitate. the realization of a constructive plan for the federation of the central
15
&
European countries after the war”. It must be remembered that intensive efforts
were being made during that time towards a Polish-Czechoslovak Federation.
The memorandum stated right at the beginning that the Oder together with the
Stettin Haff and its tributaries as far as the Czechoslovak border (the Lausitz
Neisse) represents a natural line providing security! against Germany, since the
Prussian operational bases from which attacks are directed against Poland -
namely, East Prussia, the Silesian wedge and Pomerania — are located to the east
of this line“. The memorandum then dealt exhaustively with the problems of East
Prussia, Pomerania and Silesia, and left no real doubt about the fact that the
solution of these problems should be based on the incorporation of those territories
into Poland. The only thing postponed to a later date was the concrete fixing of
the frontier, since it would have been premature to do so at that time. The memo-
randum says the following with regard to this subject: ”The question of the Polish
western frontier has not been fully dealt with in this memorandum. For the moment
it is sufficient to say that the frontier should be shortened and straightened by an
absolutely essential shift to the west, in order to guarantee Poland the safety she
has earned.“ :
General Sikorski’s second memorandum concerned the steps to be taken against
Germany immediately after the end of hostilities. Point 10 of this memorandum
provided for a “strict occupation of the frontier zones of German territories” it
being explained in this connection that this meant: “those territories which are to be
incorporated in other states, or the occupation of which is indispensible from the
military point of view”.
Point 11 stated that “the following territories must be strictly occupied: In the
East, the line along the left bank of the Lausitz Neisse and the Oder, including
Stettin, the Island in the Stettin Haff and the Island of Riigen. Poland should be
the occupying power; in the southern region bordering on Czechoslovakia Poland
and Czechoslovakia together should be the occupying powers.”
These two memoranda provide a clear picture of what the Polish Government
had in mind. It was impossible to formulate more concrete demands under the
conditions then prevailing, but they were already outlined very plainly.
12
Sikorski’s proposals in 1942 allegedly provided for the division of East Prussia
among Poland and Lithuania
When George Marshall, the American Secretary of State, four and a half
years later, in April 1947, presented proposals at the Moscow Conference of
Foreign Ministers for a final settlement of the German-Polish frontier
question, the diplomatic correspondent of the “Observer” reported:
1 The fact that this memorandum does not demand that the Oder-Neisse Line should be the
future German-Polish frontier, but refers to it merely as a “natural line providing
security” is also confirmed by J. M. Winiewicz, The Polish-German Frontier, 2nd ed.,
London 1945, p. 28.
16
The proposals Mr. Marshall made in Moscow last week for the final delineation
of Poland’s western frontiers, which would reduce the territorial acquisitions from
Germany to Southern East Prussia, the coalfield of Upper Silesia, and some frontier
rectifications on the north-eastern tip of Pomerania, correspond in a striking man-
ner to proposals made in 1942 by General Sikorski on behalf of the Polish Govern-
ment.
These Polish proposals were embodied in a memorandum handed to President
Roosevelt on the occasion of General Sikorski’s visit to Washington in March,
19421. I learn on good authority that they- envisaged the following territorial
settlement between Poland and Germany:
1. East Prussia to be divided between Lithuania and Poland, giving the north-
eastern part with Insterburg to Lithuania, the bulk of the province, with Koe-
nigsberg, to Poland.
2. Frontier rectifications in Poland’s favour in the north-eastern part of Pomerania
and West Prussia, moving the Polish frontier roughly to the area of Stolpmunde.
3. The Upper Silesian coal basin and industrial area around Gleiwitz and Oppeln
(roughly the plebiscite area of 1921) either to be divided between Poland and
Czechoslovakia, or (preferably) to be united with Polish Upper Silesia and
Teschen as a Polish-Czechoslovak economic condominium, possibly under some
form of international industrial supervision.
These demands represented the considered policy of the Polish Government. The
Polish Government deliberately abstained from more far-reaching claims in the
considered interest of Poland herself.
It is true that two factors which have since entered into the picture did not, at
that time, exist. There was no question of a possible mass-expulsion of settled popu-
lations, such as was later sanctioned at Potsdam. Nor was there any question of
Poland’s having to cede Lvov and Vilna to the Soviet Union.
Regarding the Polish Eastern frontier, all that had been demanded by Russia in
the talks between General Sikorski and Premier Stalin in Moscow in December,
1941, were frontier rectifications affecting about 100000 people in the areas of
Pinsk, Lutsk, and Rovno2. Demands for Lvov and Vilna were not at the time
made by Russia, and Mr. Vyshinsky specifically assured the Polish Government
that a campaign for Lvov in some minor Russian newspapers had not the backing
of the Soviet Government.
The question of “compensation” to Poland for these serious losses in the East
did not, therefore, at that time arise. The Polish territorial demands were made
on strategical grounds in the case of East Prussia, economic grounds in the case
of Upper Silesia, and mixed strategic and ethnical grounds in the case of the
frontier rectifications in North-Eastern Pomerania.
The Observer, No. 8133, April 13th, 1947.
' There appears to be an error involved here. According to other reports Sikorski did not
submit the Memorandum in March, during his second journey to America, but did so only
in December 1942, during his third journey.
21f the frontier rectifications were meant to include the towns of Pinsk, Luck, and
Réwne, considerably more than 100,000 people would certainly have been affected.
iy,
—
13
Sikorski wants a Polish Zone of Occupation bordered by the Oder
Following upon his talks with the President of the USA General Sikorski
held a press conference in Chicago on December 18th, 1942, during which he
also went into particulars of the Polish war aims. In reply to various
questions he said inter alia:
Poland must regain her independence, as one of the essential elements of a
just and permanent peace. To ensure peace, Poland must have a wider access to
the Baltic Sea. Her security will require certain frontier adjustments in the West,
in accordance with the Atlantic Charter, to safeguard territory inhabited by
people of Polish origin who for centuries have been exposed to ruthless Germani-
zation.
The Polish Government, under my leadership, favors Confederation of Central

and Eastern Europe. This is in accord with Poland’s traditions. As far back as the
16th century, Poland had formed a successful federation of neighboring states.
The Polish Government seeks a confederation of Poland with Czechoslovakia to
work in close harmony with the Confederation planned between Greece and
Yugoslavia. These confederations may become the basis of a future federation of
nations between the Baltic and the Adriatic and Aegean Seas, securing Central
and Eastern Europe against further German aggression, and safeguarding Russia
on her western borders...
Wd regard to the military occupation of Germany after the war Sikorski
Sala?
This matter has not yet been settled between the United Nations and the
question of how and for how long Germany shall be occupied is yet to be decided,
but as it ripens Poland undoubtedly will play her part in the occupation. I hope
that Polish armies will be used for the occupation of all German territory east
of the Oder...
War and peace aims, vol.I, pp. 482-483.
14
The same demand is made from another side
Marian Seyda', a Minister of the Government-in-Exile, published a writing

in 1942, in which he suggested the following regarding the occupation of
Germany after the war:
' Born in Posen in 1879, and founder and Editor-in-chief of “Kurjer Poznatiski”, a national
democratic, extremely anti-German newspaper, till 1939; he edited the Polish memoranda
on territorial claims in the West at the Paris peace conference in 1919. Foreign Minister
in the Cabinet of Witos, 1923. After the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of
July 30th, 1941, he demonstratively resigned from the Government-in-Exile, but later
rejoined it as Minister for Congressional Affairs. (Compare No. 10.)
18
The occupation of Germany’s territory will necessarily be of a more general
and less rigid nature in the areas which constitute the main body of the German
State. On the other hand, on the Western and Eastern borders it ought to be of a
stricter character. This latter form of occupation should be entrusted to Ger-
many’s neighbours, i. e., in the West to the Western Allies, in the East to Poland
and, in the area of Germany contiguous with Czechoslovakia, to this State. Just
as in the West the main natural boundary of the area requiring the stricter form
of occupation is formed by the Rhine, so in the East the natural boundary is
provided by the rivers Odra (Oder) and the Nisa Luzycka (Neisse).
M. Seyda, Poland and Germany and the post-war reconstruction of Europe, London,
1942, pp. 6-7.
19
Ill
The Soviet Union and Poland in 1941

15
As a result of June 22nd, 1941, Poland expects the Polish eastern territories to be
restored
The outbreak of the war between Germany and the Soviet Union on June
22nd, 1941, created a new relationship between Poland and the Soviet Union.
The Polish Government-in-Exile in London immediately attached certain
expectations tO: tt: .
Following our meeting of the Cabinet in London, General Sikorski beamed a

broadcast to Poland. Our country, he said, did not rule out the possibility of a
complete understanding with its former enemy, Russia. Poland had a logical right
to assume, said Sikorski, that Russia would cancel the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939
and return to the old Polish-Russian position recognized in the 1921 Treaty of
Riga. This would mean there could be a new beginning in Polish-Russian rela-
tions; it also meant the possibility of real collaboration between the two countries
in the common fight.
St. Mikotajczyk, The pattern of Soviet domination, London (1948), pp. 16-17.
16
The Soviet Union refuses to recognize the Russo-Polish frontier of 1939

Talks immediately began in London between representatives of the Soviet
Union and Poland. Mikolajczyk1, who later became the Polish Prime
Minister, reports about these:
To our astonishment, when we sat down with Russian Ambassador Ivan Maisky
in London to draw up a new pact, we learned that Russia was not willing to
accept our modest claims.
Stunned, we asked the British to help us obtain our minimum demands. When
we protested that we were only asking for a return to the pre-war status quo, we
were told to remain silent in the interests of “Allied unity” — a phrase used
repeatedly thereafter in good faith by the Western powers, but one which was to
be abused by the Russians. So we, engaged in a deadly fight with the Nazis, were
obliged to remain silent about the Ally of our Allies, Soviet Russia.
St. Mikotajczyk, The pattern of Soviet domination, p. 17.
1 Mikolajezyk had been Vice-President of the Polish National Council (i.e. of the Par-
liament-in-Exile) since January 23rd, 1940; since January 22nd, 1942, he had been a
member of the Government as Deputy Prime Minister.
20
iW
The Soviet Union declares the German-Soviet Frontier Agreements of 1939 to
be invalid
On July 30th, 1941, a Polish-Soviet Agreement was concluded in London
after difficult negotiations; it entered into force immediately without
ratification. The wording of the decisive Articles 1-3 of this Agreement was
as follows:
1. Mpasurenscrso CCCP upu3naer copercKo-repMaHcKMe fOroBopEl

1939 roqa kacaTeBHO TeppUToOpHasbHuBIX Nepemen Blompme yrpaTuBuuMn
cuy. Hombexoe IIpasmrenscrso saapaaer, aro Honma ne cBa3zana
HMKAKMM COralleHWeM ¢ KakoOli-1M00 TpeTbeit cTOpoHoOi, HAapaBJeHHbIM
mpoTus CopercKoro Cowaa.
2. Jlunmomarwyeckue cHomleHuA OyqyT BOCCTAHOBIeEHE Mey o6oumu
IIpasurexpcTBama 110 NOqNMcaHMM HacToAMero cormamenua mu OyperT
IpOM3sBeyeH HeMeIeHHEI OOMeH MOcaMM.
3. O6a IIpapurenporBa B3aMMHO OOAByIOTCA OKABEIBATh Apyr Apyry
BCAKOTO poOfa NOMOIMNS UM NOMepsRKY B HACTOAMei BOMHe MpoTMB ruT-
aeposcKolt Tepmanun.
Pravda No. 210, July 31st, 1941, p. 1.
Polish text
1/ Rzad Zwiazku Socjalistycznych Republik Rad uznaje, ze traktaty sowiecko-
niemieckie z 1939 roku dotyczace zmian terytorialnych w Polsce utracity swa moc.
Rzad Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej oSwiadeza, ze Polska nie jest zwiqzana z jakimkol-
wiek trzecim pafstwem zadnym ukladem wréconym przeciwko Zwiazkowi
Socjalistycznych Republik Rad.
2/ Stosunki dyplomatyczne miedzy obu rzadami beda przywrdécone po pod-
pisaniu niniejszego ukladu i nastapi niezwlocznie wymiana Ambasadordéw.
3/ Oba Rzady zobowiazuja sie wzajemnie do udzielania sobie wszelkiego
rodzaju pomocy i poparcia w obecnej wojnie przeciw hitlerowskim Niemcom.
Volume of documents in the possession of the Polish Research Centre, London, p. 43.
Taken from a photostat.
Translation
1. The Government of the USSR acknowledges that the Soviet-German Pacts of
1939 concerning the territorial changes in Poland have lost their validity. The
Polish Government declares that Poland is not tied by any agreement with any
third party which is directed against the USSR.
2. Diplomatic relations will be restored between the two Governments after the
signature of the Agreement, and an exchange of ambassadors will take place im-
mediately.
3. Both Governments mutually undertake to render each other every help and
support in the present war against Hitler’s Germany.
21
18
Eden confirms: Territorial changes in Poland will not be recognized
Mr. Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, addressed the following note to the
Polish Government-in-Exile on the occasion of the signature:
On the occasion of the signature of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of to-day’s

date, I desire to take the opportunity of informing you that in conformity with
the provisions of the Agreement of Mutual Assistance between the United Kingdom
and Poland of 25th August, 1939, His Majesty’s Government in the United King-
dom have entered into no undertaking towards the U.S.S.R. which affects the
relations between that country and Poland. I also desire to assure you that His
Majesty’s Government do not recognise any territorial changes which have been
effected in Poland since August, 1939.
When Mr.Eden on the same day made known the conclusion of the
agreement and his exchange of notes with Sikorski in the House of Com-
mons, a short game of question and answer ensued:
Captain McEwen (Berwick and Haddington): Am I right in assuming that, as a

result of this Agreement, no guarantee of frontiers in Eastern Europe will be under-
taken by His Majesty’s Government?
Mr. Eden: Yes, Sir. The exchange of Notes which I have just read to the House
does not involve any guarantee of frontiers by His Majesty’s Government.
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 373, cols. 1502 and 1504.
iy
Sumner Welles confirms that the USA are of the same opinion
Next day. July 31st, 1941, Mr. Sumner Welles, the American Under-Secre-
tary of State, also expressed his opinion on the subject to the press. The
following is reported on his statements:
Mr. Welles described as gratifying to this government the Russian-Polish

agreement signed in London yesterday. He made clear, in commenting on it at his
press conference, however, that he was discussing only general policy, not details.
The United States position toward Poland, he pointed out, was made clear im-
mediately after that country was invaded. It was one of not recognizing any change
in her status as a free, sovereign and independent nation. That position, he added, is
maintained and continued.
His understanding of the Russian-Polish agreement was that it was in line with
the United States policy of non-recognition of territory taken by conquest.
Polish Facts and Figures, No. 16, New York 1945, pp. 11-12.
22
20
The Poles are discontented with the agreements
Despite the declarations made by the British and the Americans the Polish
politicians in exile were dissatisfied with Sikorski’s agreements. Mikoltajczyk
reports:
The stark truth, however, is that we were completely unable to pin down Maisky
in the matter of pre-war eastern boundaries. We had asked for Russia’s recognition
of the 1921 boundaries by name, not just a dissolution of the Ribbentrop-Molotov
Line. In addition, we had fought against the inclusion of the word “amnesty” in
the agreement, for this word made it appear that Russia was acting magnani-
mously in releasing 1500000 Polish citizens who had in fact been carried off into
slavery.
We failed in our arguments, and subsequently we could not raise our voices. |
“Allied unity” was our muzzle. In protest, three members! of our Cabinet resigned.
The rest of us stayed on, hoping that the implications of the ominous handwriting
could be changed. We approved the Agreement as written because we knew that we
could get nothing better. We approved it knowing that the lives of 1500000 Poles
inside Russia were in peril. Without an agreement there would have been no
restoration of Soviet-Polish relations, no official Government to fight for the
enslaved — who might then, under the Russian type of justice, have been sentenced
as “enemy spies”.
General Sikorski, a great statesman as well as a military man, earnestly believed
that the solution of this friction lay in the camaraderie of arms. He dreamed of the
day when Polish armies, reformed in Russia, would fight at the side of Red Army
men and that in battle against a common foe the two groups would be united as
brothers.
21
Stalin wants to discuss the frontier between Russia and Poland
Mr. Sikorski paid a visit to Mr. Stalin in Moscow at the beginning of

December 1941. Mr. Ciechanowski, the Polish ambassador in Washington,
asked him some months later whether Stalin had said anything in regard to
the question of the Polish eastern frontier.
“I had the feeling”, replied Sikorski, “that Stalin would raise the issue regardless
of our agreement of July 30, 1941. And I was right, for he finally did raise it. But
I refused to discuss the subject. How could I agree to discuss it? Constitutionally
‘These were August Zaleski, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kazimierz Sosnkowski, Minister
for War, and Marian Seyda, Minister of Justice.
23
I had no right to do so, and I regarded this question as definitely eliminated by
our agreement.”
General Sikorski told me that after the Kremlin banquet Stalin suddenly turned
to him with a smile and asked: “Should we not now talk about the frontier be-
tween Poland and Russia?”
“T replied”, said General Sikorski, “that I did not see any reason to discuss a
matter finally settled since 1921.”
“Nevertheless I would like to see some alterations in these frontiers”, countered
Stalin.
eee
“However, Stalin continued to insist: ‘I think it would be useful if we dis-

cussed it’, he said. ‘After all, the alterations I want to suggest are very slight. You
seem to think, General, that I really want you to agree.to some great territorial
sacrifices. What I want is only a very slight alteration of your prewar frontier —
one which would hardly change your territorial status and would in no way seriously
affect it. In fact, a chut, chut, which in Russian means a hardly perceptible altera-
tion.’”
“Even a chut, chut alteration is more than I have the right to discuss”, replied
Sikorski. “You must realize that it is not only the territory of my country which
I must regard as inviolable, but especially the principle which I cannot compromise
with. So please let us not spoil the harmony we have achieved by insisting on rais-
ing this matter.”
].Ciechanowski, Defeat in victory. New York 1947, pp. 77-78.
22
The Soviet Union and Poland agree on “‘good-neighbourly collaboration” in peace

time
At the end of the visit Mr. ]. Stalin and Prime Minister Sikorski signed a
joint declaration on December 4th, the text being as follows:
IIpanurenpctBo Coxserckoro Corsa mu IIpasurenserso [lompcKoit

PecnyOsmeu, UcnoOuHeHHEIe yXOM Jpyeckoro cormacuaA um GoeBoro
COTPYAHMUGeCTBA, 3aABJAIOT:
1. Hemenko-rurmepoBckuii UMiepMaim3M ABIAeTCA 3uelilIMM BparoM
wesloBeyecTBa, — C HMM HeEBO3MO?KeEH HUKAKOM KOMIpOMUCc.
O6a T'ocygapersa, copmecruo ¢ BenmnoOpuranneit uw Apyrumu Cowsnn-
KaMM pw voy epsxKe Coeyunennnrx lraros Amepuku Oyqyr BecTu
BOliny JO NOUHON MOOeAE MU OKOHYATeILHOTO YHMYTOMeHUA HEMeIKUX
3AXBaTUMKOB,
2. Ocymecraaas JforoBop, sakmouvennbit 30 mona 1941 roma, o6a
[[papuresperBa OKAY? [pyr Apyry BO BpeMsA BOiiHEI NOTHYIO BOeHHYIO
ToMOMb, a Bolicka HouseKol PecnyO1mMKM, pacmomoReHHBIe Ha TeppI-
24
Topuu Cosercxoro Cotaa, OyqyT Becru BOiiHy c HeMelKUMM pasboiinuKamn
pyka 00 pyky ¢ coBercKuMM BolicKaMn.
B mupuoe Bpemal OcHOBOii UX B3aMMOOTHOMEHNII OysyT WOGpoe coceycKoe
coTpyAHMyecTBO, ApyHKOa mM OGOIOMHOe YeCTHOe BHIOJHEHMe TpMHATHIX
Ha ceOA OOABATEIbCTB.
Pravda, No. 337, December Sth, 1941, p. 1.
Polish text
Rzad Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej iRzad Zwiazku Radzieckiego ozywione duchem
przyjaznego porozumienia i bojowej wspdtpracy oSwiadczaja:
1. Niemiecko — hitlerowski imperializm jest najwiekszym wrogiem ludzkoéci;
wszelki kompromis z nim jest niemozliwy.
Oba panstwa wraz z Wielka BrytaniaiinnymiSprzymierzencami, przy poparciu
Stanéw Zjednoczonych Ameryki beda prowadzi¢ wojne do zupelnego zwyciestwa
i Ostatecznego zniszczenia niemieckich napastnikéw.
2. Realizujac uktad zawarty 30 lipca 1941 roku, oba Rzady okaza sobie nawza-
jem podezas wojny calkowita wojskowa pomoc, a wojsko Rzeczypospolitej Pol-
skiej, znajdujace sie na terytorium Zwiazku Radzieckiego bedzie prowadzi¢
wojne przeciw niemieckim rozbéjnikom ramie przy ramieniu z wojskiem
radzieckim.
W czasie pokoju podstawa ich wzajemnych stosunké6w bedzie dobrosasiedzka
wspolpraca, przyjazn i obustronne rzetelne wykonywanie przyjetych na siebie
zobowiazan.
Volume of documents in the possession of the Polish Research Centre, London, p. 95. Taken
from a photostat.
Translation!
Being inspired with the spirit of friendly harmony and comradeship-in-arms,
the Government of the Soviet Union and the Government of the Polish Republic
declare:
1. German Hitler imperialism is the worst enemy of mankind, and there can be-
no compromise with it. In company with Great Britain and other Allies, and
supported by the United States of America, both States will wage war until victory
is wholly won and the German invaders finally annihilated.
2. In fulfilment of the Pact concluded on July 30th, 1941, both Governments will
afford each other full military support for the duration of the war, and the troops
of the Polish Republic stationed in the territory of the Soviet Union will fight
shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet troops against the German bandits.
In times of peace their relations will be based on good-neighbourly collaboration,
friendship and mutual honest adherence to the obligations undertaken.
t The translation is based on the Russian text.
25
25
Stalin says that Poland should receive East Prussia
Shortly after, in the middle of December 1941, Mr. Eden, the British Foreign
Secretary, was in Moscow for talks. He himself reported about these':
... At my first conversation with M. Stalin and M. Molotov on December 16

M. Stalin set out in some detail what he considered should be the post-war territorial
frontiers in Europe, and in particular his ideas regarding the treatment of Germany.
He proposed the restoration of Austria as an independent State, the detachment of
the Rhineland from Prussia as an independent State or a protectorate, and possibly
the constitution of an independent State of Bavaria. He also proposed that East
Prussia should be transferred to Poland and the Sudetenland returned to Czecho-
slovakia. ... The “Curzon Line” should form the basis for the future Soviet-
Polish frontier...
W. Churchill, The second world war, vol. III, London etc. 1950, p. 558.
24
Churchill answers: First win the war
Prime Minister W.Churchill, who was immediately informed by Eden,

replied telegraphically on December 20th, 1941, inter alia:
The separation of Prussia from South Germany, and actual definition of Prussia
itself, will be one of the greatest issues to be decided. But all this lies in a future
which is uncertain and probably remote. We have now to win the war by a hard
and prolonged struggle. To raise such issues publicly now would only be to rally
all Germans round Hitler.
Even to raise them informally with President Roosevelt at this time would, in
my opinion, be inexpedient.
W.Churchill, The second world war, vol. III, p. 560.
* Compare also the detailed report on these talks in: The memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. II,
New York 1948, pp. 1166-1167.
26
IV
The Idea of Compensation

25
The idea of a compensation is put forward by the Soviet Union
It is said that the idea that Poland could be compensated for its loss of
territory in the east by German territory in the west was put forward by the
Soviet Union repeatedly during 1942. An official of the Polish Foreign Ser-
vice reports:
On the other hand, the Soviet Government was making the discussion of the
territorial issue easier for the Poles by introducing a new idea: compensation in
the west at the expense of Germany...
As early as December 1941, Stalin had told Anthony Eden that German military
and economic power should be smashed, and in this connection suggested that
Germany should be weakened territorially, for instance, by the transfer of East
Prussia to Poland. In 1942, the Soviet representatives often spoke to the Poles of
the possibility of the two countries reaching an understanding by drawing a new
frontier line between the Riga and the 1939 boundaries, with compensation for
Poland at the expense of Germany. They usually added that they would support
any degree of compensation. At that time they were moved as much by a desire to
appease the Poles for their eastern losses as to reduce the power of post-war
Germany.
W. W. Kulski, The lost opportunity for Russian-Polish friendship. Foreign Affairs,
vol. 25 (1946/47), p. 679.
26
Pro-Soviet Poles discuss the idea of a compensation
The idea of a compensation was given full publicity for the first time in
Britain during the autumn of 1942, in an article by the journalist Ksawery
Pruszynski, the text being as follows:
Politycznie, w stosunku do Rosji, stalismy zawsze na sztywnem stanowisku

pelnej nienaruszalnogci naszych granic wedlug traktatu ryskiego. Wanda Wasi-
lewska méwila o ,Polsce Boleslawa Krzywoustego“. Jesli nie jest to tylko frazes,
oznacza to jedno: Polske, ktéra na wschodzie siega ledwo po Bug czy San, ale
na zachodzie przesuwa sie do Szczecina i obejmuje Wroclaw. Przed oczami nas,
ar
Polakéw z Anglji, poprzez czerwone sztandary rewolucji powiewala jakby zacheta,
jakby zaczepka, taka wlasnie propocycja: ,,Przekreslcie pieéset lat historji, wyrzecz-
cie sie wschodu, a otrymacie Baltyk, wrécicie nad Odre, odzyskacie ziemie, 0
ktére ostatniemi slowami swych dziej6w Polski modlit sie Dlugosz“. Ale, by
odpowiedzieé w takiej sprawie, trzeba byé czem$ wiecej niz ambasadorem, czems
wiecej niz premjerem. Trzeba byé Chrobrym, Piotrem Wielkim, Kemalem Paszq.
Trzeba braé na swe barki decyzje za caly naréd i na cale stulecia, trzeba ciqé i
trzeba tama¢. Nie dziw, ze trudno o barki dosé mocne by unieg¢ ciezar decyzji tak
olbrzymiej i tak straszliwej. Czlowiek mySlat o tem... i wspominal dwa naraz
nazwiska: Poplawski i Dmowski.
Wieczna Rosja
Historyk francuski czy angielski, polityk francuski’czy angielski, rozcinajq

swe dylematy ostrym mieczem decyzji. ... Ale polscy politycy, polscy historycy
sa inni. Polscy historycy z rodzinnej historji robili niemal zawsze ciezki, gesty
barszcz, w ktérym byto i uwielbienie dla konfederatéw barskich i komplement dla
Stanislawa Augusta. To, ze konfederacja i Stanistaw August byli wrogami, weale
im nie szkodzito. Polscy politycy ...? Jeszcze ¢wier¢ wieku temu byli oni zupelinie
inni. Pilsudski i Studnicki zapatrzeni byli w Wilno i w Kijdw — ale wtedy nie
rozprawiali o swej milosci do Poznania czy Slaska. Poptawski i Dmowski méwili
o Gdansku i Prusach Wschodnich — ale wtedy nie patrzyli na wschdd. O ilez
aktywniejszy charakter posiadataby ambasada polska w Moskwie, gdyby z dale-
kiego grobu w Polsce powstal Poptawski, gdyby z cichej mogily na warszawskiem
Brédnie podnidst sie nanowo Dmowski... albo, gdyby w dzisiejszej Polsce Dmo-
wski, majac tylu zwolennikéw, posiadal chodby jednego ucznia.
Nie bytem nigdy narodowcem. Nie jestem uczniem Dmowskiego. Ale niewatpli-
wie, jesli co w mysli politycznej tego wielkiego czlowieka sprawia wrazenie glebi,
jesli co posiada ciezar spizu, to wlasnie jego rozwazenie 0 Polsce i Rosji. Dmowski
mial 19 lat, gdy rozpoczat karjere politycznq i rozpoczat ja jako zwolennik poro-
zumienia z Rosjq. Miat lat ponad 60, gdy ja zakonczyt. Ale nigdy tego swego
zdania nie zmienil. Rosja w ciagu tych lat kilkudziesieciu zmienila sie tak, jak
nie zmienil sie w podobnym okresie zaden inny kraj w historji $wiata. Z carskiej,
z prawoslawnej, polfeudalnej, stata sie komunistyczna, bezbozna, proletarjacka.
Dla Dmowskiego pozostala — Rosja. Wiecznym sasiadem Polski, obok ktérego zyé
musimy, z ktérym powinnismy-jego zdaniem-zyé mozliwie najzgodniej. Stad
Dmowski byt najwiekszym wrogiem jakiejkolwiek akcji antyrosyjskiej w Polsce,
1 nic go to nie obchodzilo, jaki ustréj ma w danej chwili Rosja. Dla bolszewikéw
nie mial napewno wiekszych sympatyj niz jego epigoni; ale rdéznit sie od tych
epigondw i tem, ze w jego oczach upodobania ustrojowe nie przestanialy istotnych
zalozen. Zalozeniem tem byto: wrogiem Polski sq Niemcy, Polska na dwa fronty
walczyé nie moze, Polska powinna szuka¢ porozumienia z Rosja. O, oczy Dmow-
skiego byly naprawde wpatrzone w niebieska Odre i w szary, kaszubski Baltyk!
Dzisiay Dmowski bylby najlepszym naszym ambasadorem w Rosji. Jego wyjazd
28
tam wywolalby nieopisana wscieklosé Berlina, zmusilby. Niemcy do wielu, wielu
rzeczy. Prasa sowiecka méwilaby o polskosci Pomorza 1 zachodniej czesci Prus
Wschodnich, 0 polskoSci Opola i Wroclawia. Swiat by sie przyzwyczail do mysli,
ze nasza granica zachodnia z traktatu wersalskiego byla krzywdgq nie dla Niemiec,
ale dia Polski. Niestety, Dmowski nie zyje, i doprawdy ,nie zostawil po sobie
zadnego dziedzica, ani dla swojej mysli, ani dla imienia“. A szkoda.
Oczywiscie, mozna mySle¢ kategoriami doznanych krzywd. Straszliwych bez-
rozumnych rzeczy, doznanych przez setki tysiecy naszych rodakébw. Damy wtedy
dowéd czulego serca—co jest wiele. Ale nie bedziemy sktadali dowodu politycznego
mySlenia. Albowiem, przedewszystkiem, na to, co bylo, nic nie poradzimy, a
natomiast, jesli chcemy szybko, jak najwiecej i jak najrealniej, pomdédc naszym
rodakom w Rosji, mozemy to zrobi¢é tem tatwiej, im nasze stosunki z rzqadem
rosyjskim sq lepsze, tem trudniej, im sq gorsze. Mozemy sie targowa¢, mozemy sie
opieraé, ale musimy tagodzié. Po drugie musimy pamieta¢, %e od samego poczatku
tej wojny wiekszo$¢ narodu polskiego — a obecnie i olbrzymia wiekszos¢ — cierpi
nie od Rosji, ale od Niemcéw, i to cierpi coraz gorzej, coraz dotkliwiej. To jest
okupant. To jest wrég.
Cokolwiek by sie stalo, Rosja pozostanie. Przetrwa. Rosja, co wiecej, ewoluuje.
Poraz pierwszy w swych dziejach, w tej sile i w tej skali, zapoznata sie z tem
czem sq Niemcy.... Dopiero obecnie naucza sie Rosjanie nienawidzie¢ Niemcéw.
A jednoczeSnie nigdy w swe; historji Rosja nie dala tyle dowodéw energji w walce,
heroizmu w oporze, ofiarnosci w cierpieniu, wysokiej wprawnosci bojowej. Jesli
ktos pociesza sie moze zluda, ze Rosja obecna sie przekresli i ze on z jaka$ ,,przy-
szia Rosjqa* potrafi sie dogadaé, bardzo sie myli. ...1I ot6z, jako publicysta myslacy
o dalekiem jutrze swego narodu, ciesze sie, ze nardéd rosyjski, rozmySlajac kiedy$
o tej chwili wielkiej i tragicznej, nie bedzie widziat narodu polskiego po przeciwnej
stronie, nie pomiesza go z Wegrami, z Wlochami, z Rumunami, z Stowakami i
innymi wasalami Niemiec, ale zapamieta w nas jedynego sasiada Rosji, ktéry
wbrew temu, co doznal, stanal nie przeciw, ale obok rosyjskiego narodu w jego
najciezszej walce. Nienawis¢ do Niemcéw, to uczucie nowe, masowe i szczegdlnej
mocy. Zapada ono bardzo gteboko w ziemie rosyjska: bedzie ono posiewem pod
bujny historyczny plon. Nienawisé do Niemcéw, potworna, o nieznanej nam
potedze nienawi8¢, to uczucie, ktére uzyznia glebe pod porozumienie Polski 1
Rosji.
Nie lekcewazmy mocy tego psychicznego superfosfatu! Jest ono olbrzymie.
Sadze, ze pod jej dziataniem nawet sprawa naszych ziem wschodnich przedstawia¢
sie moze lepiej. I wydaje mi sie, ze wielkie okazje sa po to, by je wyzyskac, nie
po to, by sta$ wobec nich biernie, ze realny polityk, ktéry przyszlej Polsce
przyniesie pokéj na wschodzie, dobrze sie jej zasluzy, a ci, co pierwsi powinni
byli robié porozumienie z Rosja, ale sie od tej misji uchylili, nie wrécq do Polski
ze zbyt przepracowanemi rekami.
K. Pruszynski, Wobec Rosji (Face to face with Russia), Wiadomosci Polskie, London,
No. 40 (134), October 4th, 1942.
Ps)
Translation
In our political relations with Russia we have always stood immovably for the
complete inviolability of our frontiers in accordance with the Peace of Riga.
Wanda Wasilewska1 spoke of the “Poland of Bolestaw? Krzywousty.” If this is not
merely a phrase, it means only one thing: A Poland reaching only to the Bug or the
San in the East, but advancing to Stettin in the West and including Breslau. It was
this very proposal which, seen through the fluttering red standards of the Revo-
lution, hovered before the eyes of us Poles, coming from England, like a challenge,
like an inducement: “Delete 500 years of history, renounce the East, and you will
be given the Baltic, return to the Oder and you will receive back the territories for
which Dtugosz? prayed in the last words of his Polish History.” But to be able to
give an answer on such a question one must be more than an Ambassador, more than
a Prime Minister. One must be a Chrobry4, a Peter the Great, a Kemal Pasha. One
must take upon one’s own shoulders the decision for the whole nation and whole
centuries. One must cut and break up. No wonder that it is hard to find such
shoulders which can bear the weight of such a tremendous and awful decision.
I thought about it... and at the same time I thought of two names: Poplawski
and Dmowski§®.
Eternal Russia
The French or British historians, the French or British politicians, cut through
their dilemma with the sharp sword of decision... But the Polish historian and
the Polish politician are different. The Polish historians have made an unpalatable
thick brew of their national history, which simultaneously contained veneration
of the Confederates of Bar? and a compliment to Stanislaw August’. It did not
matter to them at all that the Confederates and Stanislaw August were enemies.
The Polish politicians...? They were very different no more than 25 years ago.
Pitsudski and Studnicki® looked towards Vilna and Kiev, but said nothing about
their love of Posnania and Silesia. Poptawski and Dmowski talked about Danzig
and East Prussia, but then they did not look eastward. How much more active
1 A Polish communist, daughter of Leon Wasilewski, collaborator and temporary Foreign

Minister of J. Pitsudski. See note 1, p. 41.
* Bolestaw III, Krzywousty (Wrymouth), Duke of Poland 1102-1138. In 1135 he took
in fief from the German Emperor Pomerania, which he had conquered during campaigns
lasting for years.
8 Jan Dtugosz (1415-1480), the most important Polish historian of the middle ages.
4 Bolestaw I, Chrobry (The Brave), the second historic ruler of Poland, 992-1025. He created
a Polish empire which included Pomerania, Silesia and the Lausitz, the latter being held
in fief from the Emperor.
5 Jan Ludwik Poplawski (1854-1908), Polish politician, prominent leader of the national
democratic movement.
® Roman Dmowski (1864-1939), Polish politician, pupil and collaborator of Poptawski, the
unquestioned leader of the Polish national democrats.
7The Confederates of Bar rose against the Russian hegemony in the country and against
King Stanislaw August in 1769.
8 Stanislaw August Poniatowski, last King of Poland (1764-1795) and favourite of Cathe-
rine II.
9 Wiadystaw Studnicki (1865-1953), Polish journalist, advocate of a policy of coming to
an understanding with Germany and of opposition to Russia.
30
would the Polish Embassy in Moscow be if Poptawski were resurrected from his
distant grave in Poland or Dmowski were to arise again from the silent hill of
Brédno ... Or if Dmowski who has so many followers, had at least one pupil in
present-day Poland.
I never was a Narodowiec!. I am no pupil of Dmowski! But there is no doubt
about it, if the impression of profundity attaches to anything of the political idea
of this great man, if anything is as solid as rock, then it is his reflections on Poland
and Russia. Dmowski was 19 years of age when he entered on his political career,
and he began it as an advocate of coming to an understanding with Russia. He was
sixty when his career ended but he never changed his mind. Russia has changed
during these years to an extent to which no other country in the world’s history
has changed over a similar epoch. Formerly czarist, orthodox and semi-feudal, it
has become communist, atheistic and proletarian. It remained Russia to Dmowski.
The eternal neighbour of Poland, next to whom we must live, and with whom we
should, in his opinion, live as peaceably as possible. That was why Dmowski was
the greatest enemy of any anti-Russian action in Poland, and he did not care what
kind of constitution Russia had at the moment in question. He certainly sympathiz-
ed with the Bolsheviks no more than did his less able successors, but he differed
from them in as much as constitutional questions did not blind his eyes to the
essential foundation. This foundation was: Germany is the enemy of Poland.
Poland cannot fight on two fronts, so Poland must seek for an understanding
with Russia. Yes, Dmowski’s eyes really did look towards the blue Oder and the
grey Cashubic Baltic! Dmowski would be our best ambassador to Russia today.
His journey to that country would evoke indescribable rage in Berlin, and would
force Germany to do many, many things. The Soviet Press would speak of the
Polish character of Pomerania and the western part of East Prussia, and of the
Polish character of Oppeln and Breslau. The world would become accustomed to
the idea that our western frontier as fixed by the Treaty of Versailles was an
injustice not to Germany but to Poland. Unfortunately, Dmowski is not alive
anymore and he has really “left no heir, either to his thoughts or to his name”.
That is a pity!
Admittedly, one can think in terms of the injustice one has experienced, in the
terms of all the awful, senseless things hundreds of thousands of our compatriots
have gone through. We shall thus provide proof that we have a tender heart, and
that is a great deal. But then we should not provide proof that we think politically,
for above all we cannot change anything of what has happened in the past. But
if, on the other hand, we wish to help our compatriots in Russia as quickly, as much
and as substantially as possible, we can do it the more easily the better our relations
are with the Russian Government and the less easily the worse they are. We can
bargain, we can argue, but we must pacify. And in the second place we must
remember that at the beginning of the war the majority of the Polish nation — and
at present the overwhelming majority — suffered injustice not from the Russians
but from the Germans, and that it is suffering ever more and ever greater injustice.
1 Narodowiec = National Democrat, follower of Dmowski.
df
That is the occupant, that is the enemy. Whatever may happen, Russia will remain.
She will hold out. What is more, Russia is developing. For the first time in her
history she has learnt on this scale and with this intensity what the Germans are...
The Russians are only now learning to hate the Germans. And at the same time
Russia has never in all her history offered so much proof of her will to battle, her
heroism in resistance, her selfsacrifice in suffering, and her great fighting efficiency.
Should somebody perhaps console himself with the hope that the present Russia
will disappear, and that he will manage to come to terms with some “future
Russia’, then he is mistaken...
And since I am a publicist, who thinks of his nation’s far distant tomorrow,
I am glad that when the Russian nation one day remembers this great and tragic
moment it will not see the Polish people on the side of its enemies, and will not con-
fuse it with the Hungarians, the Italians, the Roumanians, the Slovaks and the
other German vassals, but will remember us as the only neighbours who, despite
all they had gone through, took up arms together with:the Russian people and not
against it, when it fought its hardest battle. The hatred of the Germans is a new
feeling, a mass-feeling of particular intensity. It has taken deep root in Russian
soil. It will become the seed of a rich historical harvest. The hatred of Germany,
a monstrous hate of unknown power, that is the feeling which will fertilize the
soil for an understanding of Poland with Russia. We should not despise the power
of this psychic superphosphate! It is tremendous. I think that under its influence
even the question of our eastern territories may develop favourably, and it seems
to me that great opportunities are offered in order to be made use of, and not to
be met passively, and that the realistic politician who brings peace in the East to
a future Poland will render her a good service, and that those who were primarily
under the obligation to come to an understanding with Russia but who evaded this
task will return to Poland with hands not much worn by toil.
27
The idea is rejected by the Polish emigrés in Great Britain
The paper received several protests in reply to Pruszynski’s article, among

them one from the well-known journalist Zygmunt Nowakowski. Wladys-
law Wielhorski, the Vilna historian, was even more vigorous in his rejection.
He wrote:
Gdy przyleciala swego czasu wies¢, ze Moskwa czyni starania, by Polske wy-
wlaszczy¢ z polowy wschodniej jej terytorium — instynkt samozachowawezy pols-
kiego ethosu zagral natychmiast w trzydziestu miljonach dusz polskich i zestroi! je
doskonale. W mgnieniu oka stworzyla sie potega jednomyInoéci zagrozonej grupy
socjologicznej. Wszyscy Swiadomi jesteSmy, ze tu chodzi 0 ,,byé albo nie byé* dla
narodu. Nie potrzeba Chrobrego. Nie ma w tem miejscu zagadnienia na miare
jego wielkosci. Jest prawda oczywista; jest pewnik, jasny dla zdrowego rozsadku
kazdego z nas.
o2
Polski historyk, etnograf, demograf, ekonomista, polityk, strategik wszyscy
widza jednako, cho¢ kazdy w innym aspekcie, konieczno§é zachowania tego, co
posiadamy na wschodzie. Niema czego ani ,ciaé“ ani »lama¢“, jak musialby,
wedlug p. Pruszyfskiego, czynié Chrobry. Pozostaje chyba do zlamania przysztos¢
Polski, gdy sig jej odbierze niezastapiony atrybut terytorjalny niepodlegtoéci.
Lezy on na obu polowach kraju: na wschodniej i zachodniej niepodzielnie. Przepo-
fowione cialo Rzeczypospolitej przestaje byé podstawa materjalna bytu narodo-
wego. W danym punkcie geograficznym niema miejsca na karlowaty twér poli-
tyczny posiadajacy réwnoczesnie znamiona istotnej niepodlegtosci. ...
Genjusz narodu, tak klétliwego nawet, jak my, gdy sie zespoli w uczuciu
prawdy wielkiej — nie znosi targania swych $wietosci. A dla kazdego z nas $wie-
toscia stalo sie dzisiaj prawo do walki o nienaruszalnogé naszych granic wschodnich.
Bo jest to walka o byt przyszlych pokolen. Nie mamy nic do ustapienia na
wschodzie.
W. Wielhorski, O nienaruszalnosci granic wschodnich (On the inviolability of our
Eastern frontier). Wiadomosci Polskie, London, No. 43 (137), October 25th, 1942.
Translation
At the time when the news came that Moscow was trying to take from Poland
the eastern half of her territory, the instinct of self-preservation of the Polish
ethos immediately awoke in 30 million Polish souls, and united them completely.
Immediately the power of the united thought of a threatened social group took
shape. We are all conscious of the fact that this is a case of “to be or not to be” for
the nation. No Chrobry ist needed — there is no problem involved here which
requires his greatness. There is an obvious truth, a certainty, which is clear to the
sound common sense of each of us.
The Polish historian, the ethnographer, the demographer, the economist, the
politician, the strategist — they all share the same view, though from different
angles, of the necessity of preserving what we possess in the East. There is nothing
to be ‘cut’ or ‘broken up’ here, as Mr.Pruszynski would have Chrobry do. All that
would be left to break would be Poland’s future, if she were robbed of her irre-
placeable territorial attribute of independence. That is vested in both halves of the
country, in the East and in the West, and it is indivisible. The two halves into which
the body of the Republic is divided cease to be the genuine foundation of the
nation’s existence. The existing geographic position offers no room for a geographic
dwarf-creation, which might at the same time possess the properties required for
true independence.
The genius of a nation, even of one as quarrelsome as ours, cannot bear to have
its sanctuaries bartered away when it has become united by the feeling of a great
truth, and the right to do battle for the inviolability of our Eastern frontier has
become sacred to each of us today. For that is a battle for the existence of future
generations. We have nothing to cede in the East.
33
28
The connection between the Eastern and Western frontier of Poland is contested
Tadeusz Kiersnowski, a wellknown Vilna lawyer expressed a similar opinion:
Koncepcja, ktérq zajmuje sie Ksawery Pruszynski..., jest calkiem niedwu-

znaczna: zrzeknijmy sie na rzecz Rosji naszych ziem wschodnich, a wzamian za to
dostaniemy granice Odry.
-Trzeba odrazu powiedzie¢ ze ,,ustepstwa“ na wschodzie nie maja zadnego
zwiazku z dazeniem naszem do rozszerzenia granic na zachodzie. Przeciwnie,
utrata ziem wschodnich wyklucza¢ bedzie uzyskanie czegokolwiek na zachodzie,
bo po utracie przeszlo polowy swego terytorjum staniemy sie panstwem, ktdre
juz nie bedzie mogto byé brane pod uwage jako samodzielny czynnik sily
w obronie przed niemczyzna, zwiekszenie wiec go na zachodzie w oczach ,,wielkich
tego §wiata“ nie bedzie juz miato sensu. Zeszliby’my wdwezas do roli ,malego
stowianskiego narodku“, jak to kiedy§ pisalt Suworin. O jaka$ wiec ,,zamiane“ tu
chodzi?
Pan Pruszynski powoluje sie na autorytet Dmowskiego ... Nie moze by¢
wiekszego nieporozumiena, a raczej trudno o wieksza nieznajomos¢ rzeczy i btedne
przedstawienie ideologji i programu, jaki glosif Dmowski. Nie mozna wszak dzié
nie wiedzie¢, ze granica wschodnia Komitetu Narodowego, ktérego ,,dusza* byt
Dmowski, szla ... wzdtuz Berezyny, a juz po odzyskaniu niepodlegtosci Dmowski
niejednokrotnie dawal wyraz swemu przekonaniu, ze kompromisowy traktat
ryski dal nam minimum tego, co do zdrowego rozwoju narodu jest niezbedne, i
ze wobec tego nic tam nie mamy do odstapienia. Bledny by!by réwniez poglad,
ze Dmowski nie doceniat znaczenia ziem wschodnich, choé byt to czlowiek, ktéry
podstawy mocy panstwa budowaé chcial na zachodzie. Jestem szczerym zwolen-
nikiem porozumienia z Rosja, chciatbym jednak oprze¢ je na prawdziwem poro-
zumieniu, a nie tylko na zasadach ,,ustepowania“ czy tez ,lagodzenia“, jak sie
wyrazil p. Pruszyfski. Przekonany jestem, ze w dobrze zrozumianym interesie
wilasnym Rosji lezy stworzenie silnej Polski, mogacej ja skutecznie odgrodzi¢ od
Niemcéw, ktérych dzié tak nienawidzi, a wiec z tego juz tylko wzgledu nie po-
winna, zdawaloby sie pretendowaé do terytorj6w, mogacych stanowié dla niej pare
dodatkowych ,, oblasti*, a dla nas — kwestje zycia.
W tym wzgledzie, nalezy stwierdzi¢, panuje we narodzie calkowita jedno-
my$lnoé¢: niema Polaka, ktéryby nie oddal za to swego zycia, gdyby zaszta ku
temu potrzeba. W tem jest nasza sila, na tem w znacznym stopniu mozna opieraé
swa wiare w zwyciestwo slusznej sprawy. W tych warunkach wlaSnie gtos publicysty
polskiego, ktéry rzeczy nie podlegajace dyskusji poddaje w watpliwos¢, dopuszeza
zrobienie z czesci Polski przedmiotu targéw, lub conajmniej jakiej§ ,sprawy* —
stanowil, zdaniem mojem, saczenie trucizny w szeregi oblezonej twierdzy i tylko
naszym nieprzyjaciolom wyjs¢ moze na dobre.
T. Kiersnowski, Interes Polski i Rosji (The Interests of Poland and Russia). Wiadomosci
Polskie, London, No. 43 (137), October 25th, 1942.
34
Translation
The conception with which Ksawery Pruszynski... is occupied is unambiguous:
Let us relinquish our Eastern territories in favour of Russia, but in exchange for
this we shall receive the Oder frontier!
It must be said at once that ,,cessions* in the East are not connected with our
endeavour to extend our frontiers in the West. On the contrary, the loss of the
Eastern territories will preclude any acquisition in the West. For when we have
lost more than half our territory we shall become a state no longer worthy of
consideration as an independent element of defence against Teutonism. Its enlarge-
ment in the West would therefore be of no avail anymore in the eyes of the
“Great Ones of this world”. We would be reduced to the part of a “little Slav
clan” as Suworin once put it. What sort of an exchange is involved here?
Mr. Pruszyfski quotes Dmowski as his authority... There can be no greater
misunderstanding — in fact, it would be hard to find greater ignorance of the sub-
ject and a more erroneous interpretation of the ideology and programme proclaimed
by Dmowski. It is impossible for anybody not to know today that the Eastern
frontier of the national committee, which was “inspired” by Dmowski, followed the
Beresina, and that even after independence was achieved Dmowski repeatedly
expressed his conviction that the compromise Treaty of Riga provided us with
only a minimum of what is indispensable for the healthy development of the
nation, so that we have nothing to cede there. It would also be wrong to assume
that Dmowski was unable to appreciate the importance of the Eastern térritories,
though he was a man who wished to lay the foundations of State power in the
West.
I am a sincere adherent of the idea of an understanding with Russia. But I
want this to be a genuine understanding and not one resting on a foundation of
“cessions” and “appeasement” as Mr. Pruszynski puts it. I am convinced that
it is in Russia’s own, well-understood interest to create a strong Poland, which
will form an effective barrier against the Germans for her — the Germans she
hates so much today — and that this should be reason enough for her not to
claim territories which would mean but a few additional provinces for Russia,
but are of vital importance to us.
It can be stated that the nation is solidly united on this point: There is no
Pole who would not give up his life for it if necessary. Therein lies our strength,
and on it one can largely rest one’s faith in the victory of a just cause. Under
these conditions I feel that the voice of a Polish publicist who casts doubt upen
matters which are not open to discussion at all, and who would permit a part of
Poland to become an object for barter or at least a point of controversy, has —
in my opinion — the effect of instilling poison into the ranks of a beleaguered
fortress and can be of service only to our enemies.
35.
28a
Pro-Soviet Poles come out for a common Polish-Soviet “Watch on the Oder”
The Polish weekly newspaper “Wolna Polska” has appeared in Moscow

since March 1st, 1943. As the organ of the Union of Polish Patriots it has
turned sharply against the Exile Government in London and urged closest
Polish-Soviet co-operation. One of the leading collaborators, Andrzej Marek’,
set forth the following ideas on Poland’s future borders in an article entitled
“Poland’s Place in Europe”:
Zwykia restytucja granic z przed wrzeSnia 1939r. ani nie lezy w naszym
interesie, ani nie bedzie stuzyla sprawie naszej niepodlegtosci i pokoju w Europie.
Granice Polski w latach 1918-21 zostaly wytyczone dla pafstwa, ktdre nie mialo
byé bastionem pokoju przeciw imperializmowi niemieckiemu, ale dla panstwa, ktore
mialo byé bastionem imperializmu przeciw Zwiqzkowi Radzieckiemu. Nasze granice
po wojnie nie moga i nie powinny byé¢ identyczne z granicami z przed wojny.
W wielu polskich wydawnictwach propagandewych zagranica znajdujemy teze:
“Granice Polski z wrzesnia 1939 r. sq nienaruszalne”. Teza ta ma by¢é podstawow4
tezqa naszej polityki. Teza ta jest falszywa.
Nasza granica zachodnia, nasza pozycja nad Baltykiem z wrzesnia 1939r. po-
winna byé zmieniona, powinna byé zmieniona na naszqa korzyS¢, na korzys¢
pokoju ogélno-europejskiego.
Nasza granica wschodnia z wrzesnia 1939 r., granica ustalona w roku 1921 ze
Zwiazkiem Radzieckim, ostabionym przez wojne domowa i interwencje zagranicz-
nq — otdz ta granica wschodnia juz nie istnieje i dazenie do jej restytucji r6wno-
znaczne jest z dazeniem do powtérzenia bledéw naszej polityki, do restytucji sta-
boSci naszego panstwa.
Granice odrodzonego panstwa polskiego musza by¢ wytyczone inaczej, niz granice
przedwojenne, tak jak inna bedzie Polska zar6wno co do swego charakteru we-
wnetrznego, jak i co do swej roli miedzynarodowe).
Stad nastepujace wytyczne naszej polityki:

Przyszly pokéj europejski winien uniemozliwi¢ zachowanie Slaska, jako jednego
z arsenaléw imperializmu niemieckiego.
Na Slasku, niemczonym przez 600 lat i dodatkowo gwaltownie germanizo-
wanym przez hitlerowcéw w latach ostatnich, winna zosta¢ odrestaurowana pol-
skoSé. 600 lat panowania niemieckiego i kolonizacji niemieckiej zniemczylo niemal
calkowicie Slask Dolny, zniemczylo w stopniu powaznym Slask Gérny. To tez
restauracja polskogci w stopniu calkowitym jest juz na tej prastarej ziemi polskie;
1 Andrzej Marek, born 1880, was a well-known play-wright and stage-manager in Warsaw.
The editors are not able to prove his identity with the author of this article. Marek’s ideas
appear again, partly word for word, in the “Declaration” of June 9th, 1943 (No. 30,
pp. 41-44).
36
niemozliwa. Na Gornym Slasku magnaci i obszarnicy, mieszczanstwo i powazna
cezes¢ bogaczy wiejskich — jest zniemcezona lub niemiecka. Polskim jednak pozostal
w masie swej chlop, robotnik rolny, wyrobnik wiejski, gérnik, hutnik, robotnik
fabryczny.
Przewazajaca czes¢ polskiej masy etnicznej na Slasku musi byé znéw polaczona
z ogélno-narodowym pniem macierzystym. Tego wymaga nie tylko nasz interes
narodowy. Tego wymaga sprawiedliwosé dziejowa. Polsko-slaska ludnogé, wy-
rwana z pod wladzy niemieckich junkréw, fabrykantéw broni, militarystéw i
imperialist6w, przywrécona narodowi pokojowemu i demokratycznemu, wzmocni
sily twérceze w Polsce, ostabi silty destrukcyjne w Niemczech i w Europie.
Przyszla polsko-niemiecka granica slaska nie moze nie uwzgledni¢, ze ta czesé
poteznego przemyslu Slaskiego, ktéra zostanie wlaczona do panstwa polskiego,
bedzie stuzyé celom odbudowy, a nie celom agresji. W razie zas, jesli mimo
wszystko imperializm niemiecki podnidstby raz jeszcze glowe, ze przemyst ten
bedzie sluzyl sprawie obrony wolnych luddw Europy przed nowym niebez-
. ,
pieczenstwem.
Ujscie Wisly, podstawowej, zyciowej arterii naszego kraju, nie moze pozosta¢
w rekach imperialist6w niemieckich.
Odzyé musi zduszona dzié polskos¢ na Warmii, Mazurach, Kaszubach, wyzwo-
lonych z pod straszliwej presji germanizacji.
Prusy Wschodnie — zbudowana na koéciach slowianskich i litewskich plemion
straznica wojujacej, niemczyzny, wysuniety na wschdd bastion imperializmu nie-
mieckiego —..., te Prusy Wschodnie, takie Prusy Wschodnie nie moga nadal istnie¢.
Szeroki pas od Wisly do Niemna, od Gdanska do Ktajpedy nie moze pozostaé¢
niemieckim pirackim place d’armes, odcinajacym Polske od morza.
Prusy Wschodnie musza sie sta¢ pomostem Polski na Baltyk, a nie bariera, od-
dzielajaca Polske od Baityku.
Jesli pazury niemieckiego imperializmu maja byé wyrwane, a nie przystrzyzone

tylko, jesli mozliwos¢ nowej agresji niemieckiej nie ma straszy¢ w Europie, i macié
wspdlpracy miedzynarodowej — po zwyciestwie, pokoju w Europie winien strzec
potezny zespé! panstw demokratycznych, w pierwszej linii na Wschodzie; zespot,
do ktérego obok Zwiazku Radzieckiego wejdzie przede wszystkim Polska i Czecho-
slowacja. Granice strategiczne tego zespolu, a wiec i granice strategiczne Polski,
leza na Odrze.
Podobnie jak i Zwiazek Radziecki, jestesmy zainteresowani, by na wschdéd od
Odry zadna wroga sila militarna nie mogla nigdzie i nigdy wiecej znalezé bazy
wypadowej przeciw ktéremukolwiek z narodéw Europy Wschodniej.
Przyznajmy: mamy w swej historii karty wspaniale, mamy w swej historii
Plowce i Grunwald, ale sami nie jestesmy obecnie, ani nie bedziemy jutro dos¢
silna zapora przeciw imperializmowi niemieckiemu.
37
Nasz sasiad i sojusznik natomiast, Zwiazek Radziecki — jak to wskazuje wojna
obecna — jest doéé silny, by byé potezna i skutecznq zapora przeciw temu imperia-
lizmowi. Nie tylko tama, ktéra powstrzyma rozszalale fale, gdy juz wyleja, ale
walem ochronnym, ktéry nie pozwoli wezbra¢ niepohamowanym wodom niemiec-
kiego “Drang nach Osten”.
Te zbawienng role Zwiazek Radziecki bedzie még! pelni¢ tym skuteczniej, im
$ciglejsza bedzie nasza wspdlpraca z nim. Uniemozliwienie nowej napasci Niemiec
jest dla nas sprawa zycia i Smierci. Taka jest tez dla nas waga przyjazni polsko-
radzieckiej. Silni za$ poparciem Zwiqzku Radzieckiego i pewni jego wspdéldzialania,
mozemy wzia¢é na siebie brzemie wspdtodpowiedzialnosci za ustalenie strazy
pokoju na Odrze.
Nie przesadzamy form, w jakich zostanie zabezpieczona ta straz pokoju na
Odrze, ktéra zapewni bezpieczenstwo olbrzymiego obszaru. Nie watpimy jednak,
ze demokratyczna Polska i Zwiazek Radziecki znajda formy, odpowiadajace in-
teresowi bezpieczefstwa i honoru obydwu panstw.
Wolna Polska, Moscow, No. 7, April 16th, 1943.
Translation
A simple restoration of the borders as before September 1939 is neither in our

interests nor will it serve our independence and the peace of Europe.
Poland’s borders were fixed in the years from 1918 to 1921 for a state which was
not to be a bastion of peace against German imperialism, but for a state which
was to be a bastion of imperialism against the Soviet Union. Our post-war boun-
daries can and shall not therefore be identical with pre-war borders.
In much of the Polish propaganda published abroad we find the thesis: “The
Polish borders as of September 1939 are unalterable.” This thesis should be the basis
of our policy. This thesis is false. Our Western border, our position on the Baltic
Sea as of September 1939 must be changed, and that to our benefit — to the benefit
of the general peace of Europe.
Our Eastern border as of September 1939 which now no longer exists was
established in 1921 as a buffer against the Soviet Union which had been weakened
by civil war and foreign intervention. The desire to re-establish this border is equi-
valent to a desire to repeat our political mistakes, to recreate the weakness of our
state.
The borders of the resurrected Polish state must be fixed differently from the
pre-war borders, just as Poland itself will be different in respect to its inner charac-
ter and its international part.
From the foregoing emerge the following guiding principles for our policy:
The future European peace should make it impossible for Silesia to be retained
38
as one of the arsenals of German imperialism. The spirit of the Polish people should
be recreated in Silesia which for six hundred years has been under German in-
fluence and, in addition, germanized by force by the Nazis in recent years. Six
hundred years of German domination and German colonization have made Lower
Silesia almost completely German and Upper Silesia German to a great extent.
Consequently the complete recreation of the Polish spirit on this ancient Polish
ground is already today impossible. In Upper Silesia the magnates and the big land-
owners, the bourgeoisie and a significant part of the wealthier villagers are germa-
nized or German. However, most farmers, agricultural workers, village craftsmen,
miners, foundry-men, and industrial workers remained Polish.
The majority of the Polish population in Silesia must be united again with the
general national parent stem. Not only our national interests but historical justice
demand this. When the Polish population of Silesia is torn away from the might
of the German Junkers, arms manufacturers, militarists, and imperialists and
reunited with a peaceful and democratic nation, the creative energy of Poland
will be strengthened. This will in turn weaken the destructive powers in Germany
and Europe.
In establishing the future Polish-German border in Silesia care must be taken
that the part of the powerful Silesian industry which will be united with the Polish
state will serve the goal of reconstruction and not the goal of aggression. However,
if despite everything German imperialism raises its head again, this industry will
serve the defense of the free peoples of Europe against a new danger.
The mouth of the Vistula, the decisive jugular vein of our land, must not remain
in the hands of the German imperialists.
The stifled Polish heritage in Ermeland (Varmia), in Masuria, in Kashubia must
revive once more when these areas are freed from the terrible pressure of germani-
zation.
East Prussia — this watch-tower of the militant German spirit, built on the
bones of Slavic and Lithuanian tribes, this bastion of German imperialism pushed
toward the East — ..., this East Prussia, such an East Prussia cannot continue to
exist. This broad strip of land stretching from the Vistula to the Memel, from
Danzig to Memel — must not remain a place d’armes for the German piracy that
cuts off Poland from the sea.
East Prussia must become a Polish bridge to the Baltic Sea, not a barrier that
separates Poland from the Baltic Sea.
If the claws of German imperialism are to be torn out and not merely cut — if
the possibility of a new German aggression is not to frighten Europe and cloud
international co-operation — then after the victory a mighty union of the demo-
cratic countries must protect the peace of Europe first in the East. This union will
include in the first line Poland and Czechoslovakia in addition to the Soviet Union.
39
e
The strategic boundaries of this coalition, and therewith also the strategic bound-
aries of Poland, lie on the Oder.
Together with the Soviet Union, it is our interest that a hostile military force
shall nowhere and at no time find a springboard east of the Oder for utilization
against any nation of Eastern Europe.
We must admit that we have in our history wonderful pages of fame. We have
Plowce! and Grunwald? in our history, but alone neither today nor tomorrow
do we constitute a sufficiently strong barrier against German imperialism.
However, our neighbour and friend, the Soviet Union, is, as the present war has
shown, strong enough to build a powerful and effective barrier against this im-
perialism. That is to say not only a dike which holds the furious waves back when
they are already surging, but a protective wall which prevents at the outset the
collection of the uncontrolled floods of the German “Drang nach Osten”.
The closer our co-operation with the Soviet Union, the more successfully it will
be able to carry out this happy rdle. For us the rendering impossible of a new
German attack is a question of life and death. The Polish-Soviet friendship means
this to us. Strengthened by the support of the Soviet Union and its co-operation
we can certainly take on the burden of co-responsibility for the peace watch on
the Oder.
We do not prejudice the form in which this peace watch on the Oder, which
guarantees the security of a mighty territory, is to be strengthened. However, we
do not doubt that democratic Poland and the Soviet Union will find a form
appropriate to the security of their interests and to the honour of the two states.
29
Stalin pronounces in favour of a strong and independent Poland
After diplomatic relations between the Soviet Government and the Polish
Government-in-Exile had been broken off on April 23rd, 1943, subsequent
to the discovery of the common grave at Katyn, Mr. Stalin granted the
Moscow reporter of the newspapers New York Times and Times, Mr. Ralph
Parker, a written interview on May 4th, 1943:
1. Question: Does the Government of the USSR desire to see a strong and
independent Poland after the defeat of Hitler’s Germany?
Answer: Unquestionably, it does.
2. Question: On what fundaments is it your opinion that the relations between
Poland and the USSR should be based after the war?
1 The Polish king Wladyslaw Lokietek was victorious over the Teutonic Order in the battle
of Plowce in 1331.
2 The combined Polish and Lithuanian forces under the Polish king Wladystaw Jagiello
were victorious over the Teutonic Order in the battle of Tannenberg in 1410. In Polish
historiography this battle is called after Griinfelde near Tannenberg. This name has been
changed to Grunwald.
40
Answer: Upon the fundament of solid good neighbourly relations and mutual
respect, or, should the Polish people so desire, upon the fundament of an alliance
providing for mutual assistance against the Germans as the. chief enemies of the
Soviet Union and Poland.
The New York Times, No. 31148, May 6th, 1943.
30
Pro-Soviet Poles demand East Prussia, Danzig, and Upper Silesia

In the meantime an organization of pro-Soviet Poles had been founded in the
Soviet Union under the name of the “Union of Polish Patriots’!. It held
a Congress in Moscow on June 9th and 10th, 1943, at which the participants
decided to adopt a declaration. Following upon bitter remarks against Ge-
neral Sikorski and the Government-in-Exile in London, it went on to say:
Za pierwsze, naczelne zadanie, jakie stoi przed naszym narodem, uwazamy

rozbicie wroga, ktéry czwarty rok panoszy sie na gruzach naszych miast, na
popieliskach naszych wsi.
ZPP2 chce dopoméc krajowi i wszystkim tym, ktérzy biora udzial w dziejowych
zmaganiach z faszyzmem.
Poprzez uformowanie polskiej jednostki wojskowej w ZSRR, poprzez brater-
stwo broni z Armia Czerwona w wojnie z Niemcami - ZPP zmierza do tego, by
umocni¢é istniejace juz wiezy sympatii miedzy narodem polskim i narodami
Zwiazku Radzieckiego i przyczynié sie do ich utrwalenia na przysztoé¢.
Wobec furii niszczycielskiej, cynizmu i brutalnoSci, z jaka hitlerowskie Niemcy
tepia nasz nardd, wysuwa sie jako naczelne zagadnienie polityki polskiej zabez-
pieczenie raz na zawsze naszego bytu narodowego przed mozliwoscia nowego
zagrozenia przez imperializm niemiecki.
Jedyna rozsadna polityka, dzi§ tak samo jak i przed rokiem 1939, jest sojusz
ze Zwiazkiem Radzieckim, naszym naturalnym sojusznikiem.
Zwiazek Patriot6w Polskich w ZSRR pragnie wspdlnie ze wszystkimi innymi
zrzeszeniami Polakéw na calym Swiecie dopia¢ tego, by w stosunkach miedzy
1 The Union appeared officially for the first time on May 8th, 1943. It had been
founded already before March 1943. The federation of all the Polish communists in the Soviet
Union on December 1st, 1941, had preceded it, and Wanda Wasilewska, the well-known
Polish communist, played a leading part in this. The “Union of Polish Patriots” was
intended to include all the Poles living in the Soviet Union, but in practice it represented
nothing but an expansion of the communist party. Wanda Wasilewska (compare
No. 26) had long possessed Soviet citizenship, and her third husband was Kornejéuk, the
Ukrainian writer, who became Deputy Commissar for Soviet-Ukrainian Foreign Affairs
during the same year, 1943. In addition to W. Wasilewska the leadership of the Union
comprised the following: Colonel Berling, the first commander of the Polish Army set up
by the Soviet Union, who played no further part in Poland after 1945, A. Zawadzki,
President of the Council of State since 1952, and thus the official head of the Polish
People’s Democracy, Z. Modzelewski, Foreign Minister from 1947 to 1951, St. Skrze-
szewski, Minister for Education from 1947 to 1951, Foreign Minister from 1951 to 1956,
and J. Sztachelski, Minister of Health of the Polish People’s Democracy from 1950 to
1956, since 1957 Minister without portfolio.
2 ZPP means Zwiazek Patriot6w Polskich = Union of Polish Patriots.
rs
«
Polska a ZSRR panowaly przyjazh i bojowa wspétpraca podczas wojny, naj-

$cislejsze wspdldziatanie i trwaly sojusz po wojnie.
Zwiazek Patriotéw Polskich w ZSRR dazy takze do tego, by miedzy Polska
i Czechoslowacjq skoficzy! sie wreszcie raz na zawsze okres dawnych sporéw i
waéni, by polsko-czechostowacka wspdlpraca polityczna i ekonomiczna stala si¢
rzeczy wistosciq.
Nawiazujac do wspanialych tradycji wielkich budowniczych pafstwa polskiego
— Bolestawéw, Lokietka — dazymy do umocnienia Polski na zachodzie i nad
Baltykiem.
Po zwycieskim zakonczeniu wojny na Slasku powinna zosta¢ odrestaurowana
polskosé. Polska masa etniczna na Slasku musi byé znédw potaczona z pniem
macierzystym. Ujgcie Wislty, podstawowej zyciowej arterii naszego kraju, powinno
“wréci¢é w polskie rece. Prusy Wschodnie nie moga nadal istnieé jako bastion
imperializmu niemieckiego, jako bariera oddzielajaca Polske od Baltyku.
Potepiajac udziat rzadu Rydza—Becka w rozbiorze Czechoslowacji, uwazamy,
ze nasza granica z Czechoslowacja na Zaolziu winna byé na nowo uregulowana
wspdlnie z odrodzonym panhstwem czechoslowackim, w sposdb pokojowy, nie
zaklécajacy trwalej przyjazni miedzy naszymi narodami.
Granica wschodnia Rzeczypospolitej moze i musi byé¢ lacznikiem, a nie prze-
groda miedzy nami i naszym wschodnim sasiadem.
Wyznajac zasade, ze calos¢ ziem polskich musi byé zjednoczona w granicach
panstwa polskiego, uwazamy, ze granice traktatu ryskiego nie odpowiadaly
uprawnionym dazeniom Ukraincéw i Biatorusindw. do wilasnego zjednoczenia
narodowego. Zgodnie z zasadami wolnosci, o ktére zjednoczone narody walcza
przeciw hitleryzmowi, nie zqadamy dla siebie ani jednej piedzi ziemi ukrainskiej,
bialoruskiej czy litewskiej.
Najwyzszy czas zasypa¢ sztucznie wytworzona przepaié, ktéra dzielifa nas diugo
od bliskich nam jezykiem, duchem, historia — narodéw ukrainskiego, bialoruskiego,
rosyjskiego, czeskiego. W atmosferze przyjazni i wzajemnego zaufania sprawa
mniejszosci narodowych moze byé i bedzie uregulowana pomySlnie, zgodnie z
interesami wszystkich zainteresowanych narodéw.
Zabezpieczeni od wschodu i poludnia, silni poparciem naszych sojusznikéw,
bedziemy mogli wzia¢é na siebie brzemie wspdlodpowiedzialnosci za ustalenie
strazy pokoju na Odrze, dla uniemozliwienia nowej napasci imperialistyeznych
Niemiec.
Wolna Polska, Moscow, No. 15, June 16th, 1943. Also:
W dziesiqtg rocznice powstania Polskiej Partii Robotniczej; Materialy i dokumenty (On
the Tenth Anniversary of the Foundation of the Polish Workers’ Party; Materials and
Documents), Warsaw 1952, pp. 229-237.
Translation
The first and greatest task facing our nation is that of destroying the enemy,
who has been swaggering on the ruins of our cities and our burnt villages since
four years.
42
The Union of Polish Pariots wants to help the homeland and all those who
are participating in the historic struggle against Fascism.
In setting up Polish military units in the USSR and in comradeship in arms
with the Red Army in the fight against the Germans, the Union of Polish Patriots
wishes to strengthen the existing bonds of sympathy between the Polish nation and
the peoples of the Soviet Union, and wishes to contribute to their permanency in
the future.
In view of the vandalism, the cynicism and the brutality with which Hitler’s
Germany is exterminating our nation, it appears to be the most important problem
in Polish policy to safeguard our national existence once and for all against the
possibility of a new threat by German imperialism.
The only sensible policy to adopt — today as in the years before 1939 — is an
alliance with the USSR, our natural ally.
The goal which the Union of Polish Patriots in the USSR wishes to attain
jointly with all the other Polish unions in the whole world is that of friendship
and comradeship in battle between the Poles and the USSR during the war, and
of a close collaboration and a permanent alliance after the war.
The Union of Polish Patriots is also endeavouring to terminate once and for
all the period of old disputes and differences between Poland and Czechoslovakia,
and to realize Polish-Czech collaboration in the field of politics and economy.
We are endeavouring to strengthen Poland in the West and on the Baltic, and
thus follow the glorious traditions of the great builders of the Polish State,
Bolestaw I, III, and Wtadystaw Lokietek.
After victorious termination of the war Silesia should be re-Polonized. The
Polish heritage in Silesia must be linked up with the mother-race again. The estuary
of the Vistula, the main artery of our country, should be returned to Polish
hands. East Prussia must not be left to stand as a bastion of German imperialism
and as a barrier separating the Poles from the Baltic.
We condemn the participation of Smigly-Rydz’ and Beck’s Government in the
partition of Czechoslovakia, and are of the opinion that our frontier with Czecho-
slovakia in the Olsa region should be re-fixed jointly with the resurrected Czecho-
slovak State by peaceful means, without disturbing the lasting friendship between
our peoples.
The Eastern frontier of the Republic can and must be a connecting link but
not a barrier between us and our eastern neighbours.
We profess to the principle that the entirety of the Polish lands should be united
within the frontiers of the Polish state, but we are of the opinion that the frontiers
drawn by the Peace Treaty of Riga did not satisfy the justified endeavours of the
Ukrainians and White Ruthenians to achieve a national union of their own. In
conformity with the principles of freedom for which the United Nations are
fighting against Hitlerdom we demand not one inch of Ukrainian, White Ruthe-
nian or Lithuanian soil for ourselves.
It is high time to fill in the artificial ditch which has separated us for a long
time from the nations related to us in language, spirit, and history — from the
43
-8
Ukrainian, White Ruthenian, Russian and Czechoslovak nations. A happy solution

of the problem of national minorities — in accordance with the interests of all
the nations concerned — can and will be found in an atmosphere of friendship and
mutual confidence.
Secure in the East and in the South, made strong by the support of our allies,
we shall be able to shoulder the burden of co-responsibility in the permanent
guardianship of peace on the Oder, and thus render impossible renewed attacks by
imperialistic Germany.
Bi
The parties of the Polish resistance movement refuse, compensation and agree
with the demands of the Government-in-Exile
The four Polish parties! continuing resistance work in Warsaw concluded

an agreement concerning their present and future policy on August 15th,
1943. Article 4 of the agreement, which was submitted to the Prime Minister
of the Polish Government-in-Exile, read as follows?
For the present, for the period of the Peace negotiations, and that immediately
following the conclusion of hostilities, the parties accept the following basic
principles as their war aims:
a) The basic principle of the foreign policy should be the collaboration with the
Allies, based on equality with a distinct emphasis on self-determination in
affairs concerning Poland, her sovereign rights and the integrity of her terri-
tory.
b) A constant watchfulness concerning Soviet influence, which is becoming in-
creasingly marked in the Allied countries and a ceaseless recalling to their
consciousness of the latent danger in Russian-Communist totalitarian peace
aims.
c) The securing to Poland of a Western and Northern frontier, which would
guarantee to her a wide access to the sea, together with integrity of her Eastern
frontier, as well as suitable indemnities.
d) The formation of a confederation of states of which the Polish-Czechoslovak
Union might be the nucleus.
e) The solution of the problem of national minorities, along the principles of
tradition, freedom and equality of rights and obligations.
* Peasant’s Party (Stronnictwo Ludowe SL), Socialists (Polska Partja Socjalistyezna PPS),
National Party (Stronnictwo Narodowe SN) and “Labour Party”, i.e. the former
Christian Democrats (Stronnictwo Pracy SP).
2 The original Polish text was not available.
44
32
Churchill, on the other hand, contemplates the idea of compensation
On October 6th, 1943, Mr. Churchill addressed the following letter to

Mr. Eden, which is obviously the reply to a question asked by the Foreign
Secretary:
It should be remembered that the reason why we sheered off making this
agreement about the western frontiers of Russia and substituted the Twenty
Years Treaty was the perfectly clear menace of very considerable division of
opinion in the House of Commons. I know of no reason for supposing that this
same opposition might not manifest itself again, perhaps in an even stronger
form. The opponents would have the advantage of invoking very large principles
against us.
At a Peace Conference the position can be viewed as a whole, and adjustments
in one direction balanced by those in another. There is therefore the greatest
need to reserve territorial questions for the general settlement. This is even more
true of the United States’ position, especially in an election year. It would be
well therefore to have the American attitude clearly deployed before we adopt a
new position in advance of the Twenty Years Treaty.
2. I think we should do everything in our power to persuade the Poles to agree
with the Russians about their eastern frontier, in return for gains in East Prussia
and Silesia. We could certainly promise to use our influence in this respect.
W. Churchill, The second world war, vol. V, pp. 588-589.
32a
The Polish Communists in the “resistance” speak in favour of a compensation

limited to the “ethnographically Polish territories”
The Polish Workers’ Party, the successor of the Communist Party of Poland,
which was dissolved in 1938, published a comprehensive programmatic
declaration in the Warsaw Underground Organization in November 1943.
This was entitled: “What we are fighting for”, and it contained the follow-
ing:
Wszystkie ziemie polskie muszqa by¢é wlaczone do Panstwa Polskiego:

1. Na zachodzie i nad Baltykiem musimy odzyska¢ ziemie etnograficznie polskie,
wynarodowione i zgermanizowane przemoca, zwlaszcza w okresie porozbiorowej
niewoli i obecnej okupacji niemieckiej.
2. Na wschodzie, na terenach zamieszkalych od wiekéw przez etniczna wiekszosé
ukrainska i biatoruska, naréd polski, ktéry tak krwawo oplaca wlasna wolnosc,
uznajac zasade prawa narodéw do samostanowienia, nie moze odmawia¢ bratnim
narodom ukraiftskiemu i bialoruskiemu prawa okreslenia swej przynaleznosci
panstwowej zgodnie z wolq ludnoSci. Zabezpieczy nam to pokdj na wschodzie 1
wzmocni naszq pozycje na zachodzie i nad Baltykiem.
45
he
}
a
+
3. Walczymy o peing niepodleglosé i suwerennosé Panstwa Polskiego. Celem f
q
zagwarantowania tej niepodleglogci i suwerennogci naréd polski walczy u boku x
trzech mocarstw sojuszniczych — ZSRR, Anglii i Stanéw Zjednoczonych —

przeciwko wspdélnemu wrogowi. Ulozenie dobrosasiedzkich i sojuszniczych sto-
sunkéw z ZSRR stanie sie waznym i decydujacym czynnikiem, wzmacniajacym
naszqa obronnogé, potencjat gospodarczy i pozycje w Europie. Tak samo bliskie
wezly przyjazni i wspélpracy winny byé nawiqzane i z innymi bratnimi narodami
stowianskimi...
Translation
All Polish territories must be included in the Polish State:

. In the West and on the Baltic Sea we must regain the ethnographically Polish
—_
territories which were depolonized and germanized by force, particularly

during the time we had lost our freedom after the partitions of Poland and
during the present German occupation.
2. In the East, the Polish people, who have to pay such a bloody price for their
freedom, and who recognize the right of the nations to decide their own
destiny, cannot, in the territories inhabited by an ethnic majority of Ukrainians
and White Ruthenians, deny the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian sister nations
the right to decide on their nationality in conformity with the will of the
population. This will secure peace for us in the East, and it will strengthen
our position in the West and on the Baltic Sea.
3. We are fighting for the complete independence and sovereignty of the Polish
state. In order to secure this independence and sovereignty, the Polish people
fights at the side of the three allied Powers — the USSR, Great Britain, and the
United States — against the common enemy. The establishment of good-
neighbourly relations and of an alliance with the USSR will become an impor-
tant and decisive factor which will strengthen our power to defend ourselves,
our economic potential, and our position in Europe. Close links of friendship
and collaboration with the other Slavonic sister nations should also be esta-
blished ...
Detailed reasons were given for the renunciation of the Eastern Polish terri-
tories in the further text of the declaration, while the demands made on the
West were not further explained. After a violent controversy against the
other parties of the resistance movement it went on:
Zagadnienie historycznego sporu o ziemie wschodnie miedzy Polska a carska

Rosja przeniosto sie wobec tego w tych nowych warunkach na inna plaszezyzne.
O przynaleznosci tych ziem do tego lub innego pafstwa nie moze juz decydowaé
ezynnik sily, ktéry decydowat w przesztosci. Obecnie zaistnialy warunki, aby
narody zamieszkale na ziemiach wschodnich same decydowaly zar6wno o formie
swojej niepodleglosci jak io swym ustroju spotecznym.
Odrzucajac argumenty wysuwane przez reakcj¢ jako obludna maske, Polska
46
Partia Robotnicza podkreSla, ze naturalng konsekwencjq powstania republik
Ukrainskiej i Bialoruskiej na gruzach dawnego imperium carskiego musi byé
uznanie przez nardd polski prawa do samookreSlenia narodéw zamieszkujacych
ziemie wschodnie, nalezace przed wrzesniem 1939 r. do Polski. Kto dzisiaj,
zamykajac oczy na zmiany zaszle na wschodzie w rezultacie rewolucji 1917 roku,
wysuwa historyczne prawa Polski do ziem wschodnich, przechodzi na faszystow-
ska plaszczyzng walki o Lebensraum“ (przestrzen zyciowa), 0 prawo do ujarz-
mienia innych narodéw.
W dziesiqta rocznice powstania Polskiej Partii Robotniczej; Materialy i dokumenty, pp.
190-191 and 207.
Translation
The question of the historic controversy about the eastern territories between
Poland and Tsarist Russia is under these new conditions on another plane.
‘Whether these territories belong to the one or to the other state cannot be
decided by the power factor alone, as was the case in the past. Under the con-
ditions prevailing at present the nations inhabiting the eastern territories decide
for themselves both in respect of the form of their independence and in respect of
the form of their society.
The Polish Workers’ Party opposes the arguments put forward by reactionaries
as a hypocritical mask and stresses that the natural consequence of the formation
of the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian Republics on the ruins of the former
Tsar’s Empire must be the recognition of the right of self-determination for the
peoples inhabiting the territories which belonged to Poland up to September
1939. Whoever closes his eyes today to the changes following in the wake of the
revolution of 1917 and puts forward historical claims to the eastern territories,
betakes himself on to the Fascist plane in the struggle for “living space” and the
right to subjugate other nations.
33
Poland distrusts the Soviet proposal to annex German territory
Shortly before his departure to the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers,

Mr. Cordell Hull, the American Secretary of State, had a talk with
Mr. Ciechanowski, the Polish Ambassador in Washington, on which the latter
reports:
I stressed in particular that my government was fully aware of the need of

understanding between the United States and Britain on the one side and the
Soviet Union on the other — an understanding toward which Poland had never
ceased to strive, despite the unfriendly reactions of the Soviet Government and
its claims, which were by no means directed against Poland alone.
The recently expressed readiness of the Soviet Government generously to
47
—
support the claims of Poland to some German territories, with the view to in-
ducing Poland to give up the eastern half of her territory to the USSR, was
interpreted by the Polish Government and people as an attempt on the part of
the Soviet Government to make Poland dependent on Russia, and possibly to
use her as a springboard for extended Soviet domination of Central Europe, and
of Germany in particular.
J. Ciechanowski, Defeat in victory, pp. 212-213.
34
Mikotajczyk warns: German Eastern territories are no compensation for East

Poland
Shortly before the Teheran Conference of the “Big Three” Mr. Mikolajczyk,
the Polish Prime Minister, addressed a Memorandum to Mr. Churchill and
Mr. Roosevelt! worded as follows:
The unwillingness of the Polish Government to enter into discussion on fron-

tier questions is based on the following considerations:
1. Poland, who entered the war in 1939 in defence of her territory, has never
given up fighting and has not produced any Quisling, is fully entitled to expect
that she will emerge from this war without reduction of her territory.
2. The Polish Eastern lands which are the object of Soviet claims extend to
half of the territory of the Polish Republic. They contain important centres of
Polish national life. They are closely knitted with Poland by ties of tradition,
civilization and culture. The Polish population which has resided there for cen-
turies forms a relative majority? of the population of these lands. On the other
! The fact that this Memorandum was also submitted to Roosevelt is evident from: The
memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. II, p. 1316.
2 In the territories ceded to the Soviet Union in 1945 with a population of about 10,5 mil-
lions, about 3,850,000 persons had stated “Polish” to be their mother tongue according to
the census taken on December 9th, 1931, as against about 3,980,000 whose mother tongue
was “Ukrainian”, or “Ruthenian” whilst 707,000 persons described themselves as “local
people”, and barely 970,000 as White Ruthenians. The “relative majority” mentioned by
Mikolajczyk was brought about only because the “Ukrainians” and “Ruthenians” were
listed separately in the census. It must also be stated that according to computations by
A. Krysinski, the Polish ethnographer, approximately another 292,000 persons of the
“local people” must be classed as Ukrainians. (Sprawy Narodowosciowe [Problems of
Nationalities], XIth year, 1937, p.571). — The number of Ukrainians would then be
considerably higher at 4,272,000 than that of the Poles at 3,850,000. In this connection
it must be borne in mind that the results of the census were disputed by the representa-
tives of the non-Polish nationalities as being unreliable. If the number of national Poles is
computed on the basis of their membership of the Roman Catholic Church, the figure for
1931 is approximately 3,250,000 Poles. (Computations according to: Maly Rocznik Staty-
styczny [Small Statistical Yearbook], Warsaw 1937, pp. 21-25, and Statystyka Polski
[Statistics of Poland], Series C, No. 36 et seq., Warsaw 1936-1938.) — As the border
line of 1945, which approximately corresponds to the Curzon Line, cuts through a number
of districts, no precise figures but only approximations could be computed.
48
hand the lower density of their population and their possibilities of economic
development furnish Poland with a socially sound means of solving the problem
of the overpopulation of her Western and Southern provinces.
3. The Polish Government could not see their way to enter a discussion on
the subject of territorial concessions above all for the reason that such a discussion
in the absence of effective guarantees of Poland’s independence and security
on the part of Great Britain and the United States would be sure to lead
further and further to ever new demands.
The attribution to Poland of Eastern Prussia!, Danzig, Opole Silesia? and the
straightening and shortening of the Polish Western frontier are in any case
dictated by the need to provide for the stability of future peace, the disarmament
of Germany and the security of Poland and other countries of Central Europe.
The transfer to Poland of these territories cannot therefore be treated fairly as
an object of compensation for the cession to the USSR of Polish Eastern lands
which for reasons adduced above do by no means represent to the USSR a value
comparable to that which they have for Poland. ;
St. Mikotajczyk, The pattern of Soviet domination, p. 301,
1 Since the traditional Polish claims during these years always included East Prussia, Dan-
zig and Upper Silesia, it may be assumed that East Prussia was meant also in this case
and not more generally “eastern Prussia”.
2 This is the usual translation for the Polish term Slask Opolski, which referred to that
part of Upper Silesia left to Germany in 1922.
49
V
Allied plans regarding Germany up to 1943

35
The Allies undertake to effect territorial changes only in accordance with the
free will of the population
Churchill and Roosevelt jointly drafted the “Atlantic Charter?’ during a
meeting on the Atlantic and this was proclaimed on August 14th, 1941, as
the expression of Allied war and peace aims. It was signed in London on
December 24th, 1941. By the end of the war the governments of 30 nations,
including the Soviet Union, had signed the Charter.
Joint declaration of the President of the United States of America and the
Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty’s Government in the
United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain
common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which
they base their hopes for a better future for the world.
First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;
Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the
freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;
Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government
under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-govern-
ment restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;
Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to
further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanished, of access,
on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are
needed for their economic prosperity;
Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations
on the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor stan-
dards, economic adjustment and social security;
Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see esta-
blished a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety
within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men
in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;
Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans
without hindrance;
Eighth, they believe that all the nations of the world, for realistic as well as
spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no
future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be
employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their
frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent
50
\
system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential.

They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will
lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.
War and peace aims, vol. I, pp. 2-3.
36
Stalin calls for the destruction of the Germans
In the course of his first great speech after the outbreak of the German-
Soviet war, Mr. Stalin made the following statement to the Moscow Soviet
on November 6th, 1941:
HemelikHe 8aXBaTYMKM XOTAT HMeTb UcTpeOMTeIbHY1O BOIHY ¢C Hapo-

gamu CCCP. Uro xe, ecm HeMIIEI XOTAT HMCTb UcTpeOuTeIbHYy10 BOitHy,
OHM ee TOTy ar.
Ornsine Hala sayqjaua, 3ayjaza Hapofzos CCCP, sagqaua Ooiinos, KomaH-
Upon 4 nomMTpaboTHMKOB Halleii ApMUM UM Halero Puota OyfeT cOCcTOATL
B TOM, 4ToOnI UcTpeOuTb Bcex HemIeB WO efuHOoro, NpoOpaBmuMmxcA Ha
TeppHTOpHio0 Halleli POAMHEI B KAYeCTBe CC OKKYMAHTOB.
Huxakoli nomlayqE HeMelKUM OKKynaHTam!
CmepTb HeMeLKHM OKKynaHTam!
Y Hac HeT H He MOMKeET OBITH TAKMX Wedel BOWHH, KAK 3aXBaT 4yKUX
TeppHTOpHii, NOKOpeHMe ay?KMX HApOAOB, BCe PaBHO, MfeT IM peyb O
Hapowax MU TeppuTopuAx Espons, mm 0 Hapofax uM TeppuropuaAx Asun,
B TOM uucse u Vpana. Hama nepBax Web COCTOMT B TOM, 4TOOEI OCBOO0-
TMTb Hall TeppHTOpMU UM Ham HapoOsE OT HeMeMKO-aliMcrTcKoro ura.
Y Hac HeT M He MOMET OFITE TAKMX Weseli BOMHEI, KAK HABASHIBAaHMe
cBoeii BOM M CBOerO perKMMa CJIABHHCKUM UM ApyrumM TopadonjeHHEIM
Hapofam Esponsi, #yyumM or Hac nomomu. Hama Web COCTOMT B TOM,
aTOOK MOMO4b 9TMM HapoyaM B Ux ocBOOOAMTeIbHOM OopHOe mpoTuB
TUTIeEpOBCKOit THpaHuM M NOTOM UpesocTraBuTbh MM BOTHE CBOOOAHO
YcTpOUTECA Ha cBOeii 8eMsle TAK, KaK OHM xoTAT. Hukakoro BMellaTeJb-
cTBa BO BHYTpeHHue Jesa [pyrux Hapoyos!
Pravda, November 7th, 1941.
Translation
The German invaders wish to have a war of extermination against the people
of the Soviet Union. Well, if the Germans wish to have a war of extermination,
they will get it!
Henceforth our task, the task of the peoples of the USSR, the task of the
soldiers, the commanders and the political instructors of our army and navy
will consist in the extermination to the last man of all Germans who have pene-
trated the territory of our native land in the capacity of invaders.
No mercy to the German invaders!
Death to the German invaders!
>
ee
We have no war aims and cannot have war aims such as the conquest of
foreign territories or the subjugation of foreign peoples, irrespective of whether
the people and territories of Europe or those of Asia — among them Iran — are
involved. Our first object is to free our territories and our peoples from the
fascist German yoke.
We have no war aims and cannot have war aims, with a view, say, to forcing
our will and method of government on the Slav nations and the other subjugated
peoples of Europe who expect help from us. It is our aim to help these peoples
in their war of liberation from Hitler’s tyranny, and then to leave them com-
pletely free to make the arrangements they wish on their own soil. No inter-
ference in the internal affairs of the other nations!
37
The Soviet Union undertakes not to interfere with the internal affairs of other
states
When the Soviet Government and the British Government concluded a

Twenty Years Treaty on May 26th, 1942, they also assumed obligations
phrased in a general way in Article V of the Agreement:
The High Contracting Parties, having regard to the interests of each of them,
agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after the re-establish-
ment of peace for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe.
They will take into account the interests of the United Nations in these objects,
and they will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial
aggrandizement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs
of other States.
Russian text
Briconne JloropapuBaiommeca CropoHEt ¢ yueTom WHTepecoB 6e30-

WacHOcTu KasKFOU U3 HUX COracMIMCch paboTaTb COBMeCTHO B TeCHOM H
Apy?#KkecKOM COTpyfHWueCTBe TOCNe BOCCTaAHOBIICHMA Mpa B WeJAxX
OpraHusaiuM OesonacHocTuw MW DKOHOMMYeECKOrO mpomperanua B Exspone.
Onn OynyT UpMnMMaTh, BO BHMMaHMe MNTepecHt OO’eqMHeHHEX Hammit B
OCYINeCTBIICHMUM yKa38aHHBIX Weseli U OynyT TaKsKe WelCTBOBAaThb B COOTBeT-
CTBUM C JBYMA IIpMHiwnaMa — He CTpeMMTBCA K TeppMTOPaJbHbIM
upwoOperenMAM [JIA CaMMX CeO MU He BMCIUMBATbCA BO BHYTpeHHue jJesa
apyrux rocyyapcrs.
Société des Nations, Recueil des traités, vol. 204, p. 357 (No. 4813).
52
38
Roosevelt proclaims the war aim of “Unconditional Surrender”
At a press conference in Casablanca President Roosevelt proclaimed after

several days of discussions with Prime Minister Churchill on January 24th,
1943, the war aim of “Unconditional Surrender”? of the Axis Powers. It
was said that he had devised this formula on the spur of the moment. Accord-
ing to the records of Hopkins, however, this formula had been well-
considered!. The following paragraph appeared on the sheets of paper which
Roosevelt held in his hands during the press conference:
The President and the Prime Minister, after a complete survey of the world
war situation, are more than ever determined that peace can come to the world
only by a total elimination of German and Japanese war power. This involves
the simple formula of placing the objective of this war in terms of an uncon-
ditional surrender by Germany, Italy and Japan. Unconditional surrender by
them means a reasonable assurance of world peace, for generations. Unconditional
surrender means not the destruction of the German populace, nor of the Italian
or Japanese populace, but does mean the destruction of a philosophy in Germany,
Italy and Japan which is based on the conquest and subjugation of other peoples.
R.E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins. An Intimate History. New Y ork 1948, p.696.
39
Roosevelt and Eden agree that Poland should be given East Prussia. Roosevelt
proposes the compulsory resettlement of Germans
On March 14th, 1943, President Roosevelt and Mr. Eden, British Foreign
Secretary, had a talk of some duration about problems of world politics on
the occasion of the latter’s visit to Washington, on the progress of which
Mr. Hopkins, Roosevelt’s personal adviser, noted inter alia:
Eden said he thought that Russia would demand very little territory of
Poland, possibly up to the “Curzon Line”*. This would not affect Poland unduly
from an economic point of view. Eden said he believed that Stalin wanted a
strong Poland, providing the right kind of people were running it and that
(Russian) policy at the Peace Table would depend on this.
The President said it would be difficult to work out geographical boundaries
on this basis because, while there might be a liberal government in Poland at the
time of the Peace Conference, they might well be thrown out within a year.
1 But compare in this connection also the statements of W. Churchill, The second world
war, vol. lV, pp. 614-616.
2 This was about 69,230 square miles, i.e. more than England, Wales and Northern dre:
land taken together (63,270 square miles). If Eden spoke of “very little territory”, it is to
be assumed that he was not exactly informed with regard to the course taken by the
Curzon Line and that of the Riga frontier.
53
*
ee
=
Eden said that the Poles are being very difficult about their aspirations...
Poland has very large ambitions after the war and Eden says privately they say
that Russia will be so weakened and Germany crushed that Poland will emerge
as the most powerful state in that part of the world. Eden thinks this is com-
pletely unrealistic. Poland wants East Prussia and both the President and Eden
agree that Poland should have it. Eden said that the Russians agree privately
with this but are not willing to tell this to the Poles because they want to use
it as a bargaining instrument at the Peace Table. Poland will want her original
boundaries as they existed prior to the war. The President said that, after all,
the big powers would have to decide what Poland should have and that he, the
President, did not intend to go to the Peace Conference and bargain with Poland
or the other small states; as far as Poland is concerned, the important thing is
to set it up in a way that will help maintain the peace of the world.
The President said he thought we should make some arrangement to move
the Prussians out of East Prussia the same way the Greeks were moved out of
Turkey after the last war; while this is a harsh procedure, it is the only way to
maintain peace and that, in any circumstances, the Prussians cannot be trusted.
R.E.Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 709-710.
40
Roosevelt wishes to aid German separatists
In the same talk post-war treatment of Germany was also dealt with.
Mr. Hopkins noted:
Eden said that the most important thing we had to get a meeting of the minds
on in regard to Germany was the question of whether we were going to be able
to deal with Germany as a unit after the war, disarming them, etc., and also for
the peace, or whether we were going to insist that it be broken up into several in-
dependent states. Eden said that from the conferences he had had with the
Russians he was sure that Stalin would not trust the Germans; that in his speech the
other day when he said the Russian armies were going to stop at the German
Border, this was for propaganda purposes inside Germany (Eden believed); that
he, Stalin, has a deep-seated distrust of the Germans and that he will insist that
Germany be broken up into a number of states. The President said he hoped we
would not use the methods discussed at Versailles and also promoted by Clemen-
ceau to arbitrarily divide Germany, but thought that we should encourage the
differences and ambitions that will spring up within Germany for a Separatists
Movement and, in effect, approve of a division which represents German public
Opinion.
R. E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p.711.
54
41
Litvinov confirms that Poland should have East Prussia
Two days later, March 16th, 1943, Mr. Hopkins talked with Mr. Litvinov,
the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, about the same questions. Hopkins
made the following notes concerning this talk, inter alia:
He said he thought Russia would agree to Poland having East Prussia but that
Russia would insist on what he called “her territorial rights” on the Polish fron-
tier. Said he did not anticipate any great difficulty with Poland about this
although he said Poland would make “outrageous” demands. He felt that Great
Britain and the United States should decide what was to be done about Poland
and “tell them” rather than ask them.
R. E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p.713.
42
The American Government obtains data concerning the German East

A staff of academic investigators set up by the American Government
examined the European territorial problems very carefully. Some items of its
Memorandum dated April 15th, 1943, dealt with territories that are of interest
here. In this way the American Government obtained data concerning East
Prussia, Danzig, the Sudetenland, and Upper Silesia. Here, as an example,
follow just the data concerning Upper Silesia:
German Upper Silesiat. - The area shown was awarded to Germany by the
Conference of Ambassadors, October 19,1921, following a plebiscite held in
accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919. It is claimed
by Poland. Substantially this same area is now demanded by the Polish Govern-
ment-in-Exile.
The territory claimed by the Polish Government has an area of 2,950 square
miles (1.62? of the area of Germany in 1937) and had a population of 1,354,000 in
1939. The industrial district in the extreme east had one-tenth the area and one-
third the population of the territory in question. In 1925 the exclusively German-
speaking population was 57 percent of the whole, 72 percent of the population
in the industrial district.
Postwar foreign policy preparation 1939-1945. Published by the State Department.
Washington 1949, p. 552.
1 It is not made quite clear what these data refer to. In any case, they do not refer to the
whole of German Upper Silesia (Administrative District of Oppeln) which in 1939 had an
area of approximately 3,736 square miles (9,715 sq. km) and a population of 1,529,000,
whilst the Memorandum gives 2,950 square miles (7,670 sq. km) and 1,354,000 inhabitants.
Nor are they correct in respect of that part of the territory where the plebiscite was held
which remained part of Germany (Administrative District of Oppeln without the urban and
rural districts of Neisse, the districts of Falkenberg and Grottkau, and a part of Neu-
stadt), which comprised 2,892 square miles (7,522 sq. km). (Statistisches Jahrbuch des Deut-
schen Reiches [Statistical Yearbook of the German Reich], 1928, pp. 28-29.)
2 What is probably meant is: per cent.
55
43
Churchill wants to isolate Prussia
On May 22nd, 1943, Mr.Churchill spoke of post-war problems in the British

Embassy in Washington in the presence of several members of the American
Government. He himself reports about this inter alia:
As for Europe, I thought that after the war it might consist of some twelve
States or Confederations, who would form the Regional European Council. It
was important to re-create a strong France; for the prospect of having no strong
country on the map between England and Russia was not attractive...
I also hoped that in South-Eastern Europe there might be several Con-
federations — a Danubian Federation based on Vienna and doing something to
fill the gap caused by the disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Bavaria
might join this group. Then there should be a Balkan Federation.
I said that I would like to see Prussia divided from the rest of Germany, forty
million Prussians being a manageable European unit. Many people wished to
carry the process of division further and divide Prussia itself into component
parts, but on this I reserved judgment.
W. Churchill, The second world war, vol. 1V, pp.717-718.
44
Roosevelt: The Corridor will no longer exist
In the summer of 1943, when President Roosevelt received a young member

of the Polish resistance movement whose name was Karski and who had
made his way to Britain as a courier, in the presence of Mr. Ciechanowski,
an informative talk ensued which Ciechanowski reports:
The President wanted to know about the situation in East Prussia, and after
Karski told him that in this part of Germany the Polish Underground cells were
even more active than in Germany proper, the President turned to me as if
thinking aloud:
“I wonder what we will do after the war with the Germans from East Prussia.
Should we force them to leave? Would they leave of their own will? Poland
would not like to keep them there, would she? Probably not. I think, however,
that quite a number of those people are really Poles by origin, forcibly Ger-
manized. Many might wish to stay on and again become Poles, as were their
ancestors.”
Karski interrupted with a rather grim smile: “I would rather be frank with
you, Mr. President. Nothing on earth will stop the Poles from taking some kind of
revenge on the Germans after the Nazi collapse. There will be some terrorism,
probably shortlived, but it will be unavoidable. And I think this will be a sort of
encouragement for all the Germans in Poland to go west, to Germany proper,
where they belong.”
56
The President nodded. “The Germans certainly deserve it, but this will not
solve the problem. We will have to solve it, because East Prussia will belong to
Poland.” And, accentuating each word, he turned to me: “No more Polish Corri-
dor, Mr. Ambassador, no more corridor this time.”
And then, as if speaking to himself, President Roosevelt went on: “The prob-
lem of the Baltic States, and particularly that of Lithuania, will be much more
difficult.”
“You know, Mr. Ambassador” — he turned in his chair and raised his voice —
“T am still unable to see Stalin, and this makes the settlement of many questions
and problems very difficult. We have to discuss with those people, but I am rather
disturbed by one possibility.”
President Roosevelt looked straight into my eyes and, as if seeking my
reaction, went on emphasizing every word: “What can we do if Stalin calmly
announces, for instance, that the question of Lithuania must be left out of the
discussions? I presume that he will also insist on his demands for some recti-
fication of the eastern boundaries of Poland. He may make out of it a question
of prestige. You know, Mr. Ambassador, the situation is best expressed by the
Chinese saying — ‘standing pat to save one’s face’. I am afraid that Stalin will
raise a question which will be very difficult for us; namely, that of compensation
for giving East Prussia to Poland.”
The President paused, as if waiting for my answer, and I voiced the opinion
that only a firm attitude on the part of the United States could stop Stalin’s
territorial demands and make him understand that his appetite would not be
satisfied.
“Well, yes, but we cannot afford a war with Russia”, said the President.
“T can only repeat, Mr. President”, I replied, “what I told you before on this
subject. Soviet Russia will try to make you believe that she is ready for anything
in order to achieve her territorial aims. But, in reality, she is bluffing, because she
cannot afford a war with Great Britain and the United States. If you and Mr. Chur-
chill refuse to yield any of your principles, you cannot fail to impress a realist
like Stalin.”
“Personally, I believe you are right, but it will not be an easy matter.”
45
Eden and Hull are in favour of a “natural” dismemberment of Germany
In August 1943 the question of a partition of Germany was again discussed

during the Quebec Conference. Mr. Hull, the US Secretary of State, reports
on it:
At the following day’s! session Eden and I and our advisers threshed out other
1 August 21st.
DA.
questions. I asked him how his thoughts were running on the question of
whether to leave Germany after the war as an entity or to dismember her. —
He replied that while some members of the British Government felt that
Germany should be dismembered, he himself — and he felt, in general, the
Cabinet also — were not in favor of imposing dismemberment, largely because of
the impracticability of carrying it out. He said it would be well to bring about
a separation of the different states of Germany if it could be done voluntarily.
I said that those of us at the State Department who were studying this question
seemed to be arriving at the same views as to the difficulties of imposing or
maintaining a separation of the different sections of Germany. We thought that
an imposed dismemberment of Germany might merely create a German national
slogan for union. A German economy must exist for the support of the people
of Germany, and toward this end such national systems as canals, railroads, post
office, and telegraph must exist as units. But it was not impossible to consider an
economic reorganization of Germany whereby in her own interests the de-
centralization of the country would unconsciously develop. Such a means might
be found through providing special access to a Mediterranean port for southern
Germany so that those regions might look south for their outlet to the sea rather
than be dependent on northern Germany. An area including Fiume and Trieste
might be the proper solution.
I threw this out simply as a thought we had been discussing, not as a decision
made or contemplated by our Government. Eden and Cadogan‘! gave the idea
considerable approval. The discussion indicated that the British, too, had been
giving much thought to the possibility of bringing about, by natural forces, a
separation of the German states, and specifically using the Adriatic ports as a
southern German access to water.
The memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. 11, pp. 1233-1234.
46
Maisky confirms that Moscow agrees to the separation of East Prussia
Between the Quebec Conference and the Moscow Conference of Foreign

Ministers there were talks in London between Mr. Eden and Mr. Maisky,
the Soviet Ambassador, in the autumn of 1943. The Polish Ambassador in
Washington reports on them:
For Britain, Poland’s ally, it was still impossible at that time to divorce the
problems of Soviet-Polish relations from any discussions with the Soviets on
matters of principle and policy. It was therefore natural that Mr. Eden discussed
with Maisky not only the results of the Quebec Conference and problems of
military and political planning, but also signified to Maisky the anxiety of the
British Government regarding the Polish issue. I learned that the British Govern-
" Sir Alexander Cadogan, Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office.
58
)
ment was surprised to find that even on this “vexatious” problem the Soviets
werde willing to make what the British considered at that time to be concessions.
At the outset, the conversations between Eden and Maisky, in which Ambassador
Winant! took part, showed considerable tension and began by a sharp exchange
of mutual recriminations. Mr. Eden, however, apparently strengthened by the
results of the Quebec Conference, showed a new spirit which resulted in con-
siderably toning down Mr. Maisky’s aggressiveness. The holding of a tripartite
conference with Marshal Stalin was discussed, but this time the Western Allies
suggested that it should be preceded by a meeting of the three Foreign Ministers
to clear up some of the differences on important problems before the Big Three
met for their talk. Mr. Eden also broached the subject of granting East Prussia,
with Danzig, to Poland at the end of the war, and, to his surprise, Mr. Maisky
replied that this would be entirely agreeable to Stalin. When further pressed, he
assured Eden that he was speaking with Stalin’s authority.
J.Ciechanowski, Defeat in victory, p. 200.
47
Roosevelt is decidedly in favour of a partition of Germany
Before departing to Moscow to attend the conference of the Ministers for

Foreign Affairs of the big Allied Powers, Mr. Hull, the American Secretary
of State, had several talks with President Roosevelt during the first days of
October 1943. He himself reports on the most important talk which he
had on October Sth:
As for Germany, the President said categorically he favored the partition of

that country into three or more states, completely sovereign but joined by a
network of postal arrangements, communications, railroads, customs, and per-
haps electric power, although he thought power arrangements should be made
on a continental basis. The new German states, he went on, should be deprived of
all military activities, including training, and of armament industries. East Prussia
should be detached from Germany, and all dangerous elements of the population
forcibly removed.
The President took up the argument others of us advanced, that partition
would have many undesirable results and that the customs-union arrangement
either would prove to be unworkable or would become a powerful instrument for
the reunification of Germany. He said we were inclined to exaggerate the effects.
He said he had traveled and studied in Germany, could speak German, and
thought he knew Germany better than we did. He insisted that partition was the
solution. The conversation shifted to other topics, but after a considerable time
the President suddenly brought it back to Germany by saying that, after all, it
was many years ago that he had become acquainted with Germany and perhaps
1 Ambassador of the United States in London.
59.
e
he didn’t know so much about her as he thought. He then said that the whole
transitional period would have to be one of trial and error, and that it might well
happen that we would discover that partition, undertaken immediately after the
war, would have to be abandoned. He thought that reparations should be exacted
in man power and equipment.
As for Poland and the Baltic States, the President said that, when he should
meet with Stalin, he intended to appeal to him on grounds of high morality. He
would say to him that neither Britain nor we would fight Russia over the Baltic
States, but that in Russia’s own interest, from the viewpoint of her position in the
world, it would be a good thing for her to say that she would be willing, two
years or so after the war, to hold a second plebiscite in the Baltic countries. While
Russia was satisfied that the plebiscite she had already held was conclusive, he
commented, the rest of the world did not seem to think so. He thought that the
same idea might be applied to eastern Poland, but that the new boundary in any
event should be somewhat east of the so-called Curzon Line, with Lemberg
(Lwéw) going to Poland, and that a plebiscite should be held after the shell shock
of war had subsided.
The memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. 11, pp. 1265-1266.
48
The three big Allies agree that Germany is to return to her 1938 borders and cede
East Prussia
The Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in October 1943 was the first
conference of high representatives of all three Big Allies. Post-war treatment
of Germany was also discussed in detail. Mr. Hull reports:
In the session on October 25, Eden said his Government would not like to see
a united Germany remain but would prefer to see her divided into separate states,
particularly a separate Prussia. He said his Government would therefore en-
courage any separatist tendencies within Germany, but that it was divided in its
opinion on the desirability of attempting to impose the dismemberment of Ger-
many by forcible means.
Molotov said the Soviet Union gave its full approval to all measures that would
render Germany harmless in the future.
I remarked that my Government had been struck by the widely divergent
views among Allied Governments on the subject of the dismemberment of Ger-
many. In high quarters in the United States, I added, when the study of this pro-
blem had begun there had been a general disposition to favor the dismemberment
of Germany. But, as the discussions progressed and conflicting and often very
convincing arguments werde advanced for or against, there was an increasing
disposition to keep an open mind on this point and to explore it more fully
60
before determining upon our final attitude — although dismemberment was still
in favor.
I myself had been opposed to dismemberment from the beginning.
Molotov added that his Government was somewhat behind in its study of the
post-war treatment of Germany due to the preoccupation of its leaders with the
war. He said that to the United States and to me in particular belonged the
honor of setting forth the first definite expression of an attitude toward Ger-
many. The plan we had prepared corresponded to the Soviet Government’s
ideas, but this should be regarded as a minimum and not a maximum proposal.
We all agreed that Germany should be made to give up all her conquests and
return to her pre-1938 borders, and that East Prussia should be separated from
Germany.
We later decided to refer the plan for detailed study to the European Advisory
Commission in London which we were setting up.
The memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. II, p. 1287.
61
Vi
The Teheran Conference

49
Stalin urges that Germany be made innocuous

The first conference of the “Big Three”, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin,
began in the Iranian capital of Teheran on November 28th, 1943. On the
evening of the first day Stalin and Churchill had a rather lengthy talk, at
the beginning of which post-war treatment of Germany was discussed in
great detail. Mr. Churchill himself reports on it:
“Let us”, said the Marshal, “first consider the worst that might happen.” He
thought that Germany had every possibility of recovering from this war, and
might start on a new one within a comparatively short time. He feared the
revival of German nationalism. After Versailles peace had seemed assured, but
Germany had recovered very quickly. We must therefore establish a strong body
to prevent Germany starting a new war. He was convinced that she would re-
cover. When I asked, “How soon?” he replied, “Within fifteen to twenty years.”
I said that the world must be made safe for at least fifty years. If it was only for
fifteen to twenty years then we should have betrayed our soldiers.
Stalin thought we should consider restraints on Germany’s manufacturing
capacity. The Germans were an able people, very industrious and resourceful,
and they would recover quickly. I replied that there would have to be certain
measures of control. I would forbid them all aviation, civil and military, and I
would forbid the General Staff system. “Would you”, asked Stalin, “also forbid
the existence of watchmakers’ and furniture factories for making parts of shells?
The Germans produced toy rifles which were used for teaching hundreds of
thousands of men how to shoot.”
“Nothing”, I said, “is final. The world rolls on. We have now learnt something.
Our duty is to make the world safe for at least fifty years by German disarma-
ment, by preventing rearmament, by supervision of German factories, by for-
bidding all aviation, and by territorial changes of a far-reaching character. It all
comes back to the question whether Great Britain, the United States, and the
USSR can keep a close friendship and supervise Germany in their mutual interest.
We ought not to be afraid to give orders as soon as we see any danger.”
“There was control after the last war”, said Stalin, “but it failed.”
“We were inexperienced then,” I replied. “The last war was not to the same
extent a national war, and Russia was not a party at the Peace Conference. It
will be different this time.” I had a feeling that Prussia should be isolated and
reduced, that Bavaria, Austria, and Hungary might form a broad, peaceful, un-
62
aggressive confederation. I thought Prussia should be dealt with more sternly
than the other parts of the Reich, which might thus be influenced against throw-
ing in their lot with her. ...
“All very good, but insufficient”, was Stalin’s comment.
W.Churchill, The second world war, vol. V, pp. 317-318.
50
Stalin and Churchill want to draw a frontier line between Germany and Poland
In the further course of the talk the statesmen came to speak about Poland.
Mr. Churchill reports:
I suggested that we should discuss the Polish question. He agreed and invited me
to begin. I said that we had declared war on account of Poland. Poland was there-
fore important to us. Nothing was more important than the security of the Russian
western frontier. But I had given no pledges about frontiers. I wanted heart-to-heart
talks with the Russians about this. When Marshall Stalin felt like telling us what
he thought about it the matter could be discussed and we could reach some
agreement, and the Marshal should tell me what was necessary for the defence
of the western frontiers of Russia. After this war in Europe, which might end in
1944, the Soviet Union would be overwhelmingly strong and Russia would have
a great responsibility in any decision she took with regard to Poland. Personally
I thought Poland might move westwards, like soldiers taking two steps “left
close”. If Poland trod on some German toes that could not be helped, but there
must be a strong Poland. Poland was an instrument needed in the orchestra of
Europe.
Stalin said the Polish people had their culture and their language, which must
exist. They could not be extirpated.
“Are we to try”, I asked, “to draw frontier lines?”
aS. 14
“T have no power from Parliament, nor, I believe, has the President, to define
any frontier lines. But we might now, in Teheran, see if the three heads of Gov-
ernments, working in agreement, could form some sort of policy which we could
recommend to the Poles and advise them to accept.”
We agreed to look at the problem. Stalin asked whether it would be without
Polish participation. I said “Yes”, and that when this was all informally agreed
between ourselves we could go to the Poles later. Mr. Eden here remarked that
he had been much struck by Stalin’s statement that afternoon that the Poles
could go as far west as the Oder. He saw hope in that and was much encouraged.
Stalin asked whether we thought he was going to swallow Poland up. Eden said
he did not know how much the Russians were going to eat. How much would
they leave undigested? Stalin said the Russians did not want anything belonging
to other people, although they might have a bite at Germany. Eden said that
63
what Poland lost in the east she might gain in the west. Stalin replied that possibly
she might, but he did not know. I then demonstrated with the help of three
matches my idea of Poland moving westwards. This pleased Stalin, and on this
note our group parted for the moment.
51
Stalin proposes the Oder as frontier between Germany and Poland
Another witness reports on the discussions of the same evening:
The conversation turned to the subject of post-war treatment of Germany and

the frontiers of Poland. Stalin said that Poland should extend to the Oder and
that the Russians would help the Poles to establish their frontier thus far west,
but he was not specific about Poland’s eastern frontier.
R.E.Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 782.
52
Churchill agrees to the Oder line
During the two following days other problems were discussed. Not before
the last plenary meeting on December 1st was Poland mentioned again. In
Churchill’s report on the conference he says:
The President began by saying that he hoped the Polish and Soviet Govern-
ments would resume relations, so that any decision taken could be accepted by
the Polish Government. But he admitted there were difficulties. Stalin asked
with what Government he would have to negotiate. The Polish Government
and their friends in Poland were in contact with the Germans. They killed the
Partisans. Neither the President nor I could have any idea of what was now
going on there.
I said that the Polish question was important for us in the United Kingdom,
because we had declared war on Germany for invading Poland. Although Great
Britain had been unprepared the German attack on Poland had launched us into
the war. I reverted to my illustration of the three matches — Germany, Poland,
and the Soviet Union. One of the main objects of the Allies was to achieve the
security of the Soviet western frontier, and so to prevent an attack by Germany
in the future. Here I reminded Stalin of his mention of the line of the Oder in
the West.
Stalin, interrupting, said that previously there had been no mention of re-
establishing relations with the Polish Government, but only of determining
Poland’s frontier. Today the matter had been put quite differently. Russia,
64
even more than other States, was interested in good relations with Poland, be-
cause for her it was a question of the security of her frontiers. Russia was in
favour of the reconstruction, development, and expansion of Poland mainly at
the expense of Germany. But he separated Poland from the Polish Government
in-Exile. He had broken off relations with the Polish Government-in-Exile, not
on account of caprice, but because it had joined with Hitler in slanderous propa-
ganda against Russia. What guarantee was there that this would not happen
again? He would like to have a guarantee that the Polish Government-in-Exile
would not kill Partisans, but, on the contrary, would urge the Poles to fight the
Germans and not concern themselves with any machinations. He would welcome
any Polish Government which would take such active measures, and he would
be glad to renew relations with them. But he was by no means sure that the
Polish Government-in-Exile was ever likely to become the kind of Government
it ought to be.
Here I said that it would be a great help if round that very table we could
learn what were the Russian ideas about the frontiers. I should then put the
matter before the Poles and say frankly if I thought the conditions fair. His
Majesty’s Government, for whom alone I spoke, would like to be able to tell
the Poles that the plan was a good one and the best that they were likely to get
and that His Majesty’s Government would not argue against it at the peace
table. Then we could get on with the President’s idea of resuming relations. What
we wanted was a strong and independent Poland, friendly to Russia.
Stalin said that that was true, but that the Poles could not be allowed to seize
the Ukraine and White Russian territory. That was not fair. According to the
1939 frontier, the soil of the Ukraine and White Russia was returned to the
Ukraine and to White Russia. Soviet Russia adhered to the frontiers of 1939,
for they appeared to be ethnologically the right ones.
Eden asked if this meant the Ribbentrop-Molotov Line.
“Call it whatever you like”, said Stalin.
Molotoy remarked that it was generally called the Curzon Line.
“No”, said Eden, “there are important differences.”
Molotov said there were none.
I then produced a map and showed the Curzon Line and the 1939 line, and indi-
cated also the line of the Oder. Eden said that the south end of the Curzon Line
had never been defined in terms.
At this point the meeting broke into groups. There was a general gathering
round my map and round a map which was produced by the Americans, and it
was difficult for the interpreters to take notes.
Eden suggested that the Curzon Line was intended to pass to the east of Lvov.
Stalin replied that the line on my map had not been drawn right. Lvov should
be left on the Russian side and the line should go westwards towards Przemysl.
Molotov would get a map of the Curzon Line and a description of it!. He said
1 The dispute described here was caused by the differences between the “Line of Decem-
ber 8th, 1919”, which is frequently, but incorrectly, also called “Curzon Line”, and the
65
ae
\
that he did not want any Polish population, and that if he found any district
inhabited by Poles he would gladly give it up.
I suggested that the value of the German land was much greater than the
Pripet Marshes. It was industrial and it would make a much better Poland. We
should like to be able to say to the Poles that the Russians were right, and to
tell the Poles that they must agree that they had had a fair deal. If the Poles did
not accept we could not help it. Here I made it clear that I was speaking for the
British alone, adding that the President had many Poles in the United States who
were his fellow-citizens.
Stalin said again that if it were proved to him that any district were Polish
he would not claim it, and here he made some shadowing on the map west! of
the Curzon Line and south of Vilna, which he admitted to be mainly Polish.
At this point the meeting again separated into groups, and there was a
prolonged study of the Oder Line on a map. When this came to an end I said
that I liked the picture, and that I would say to the Poles that if they did not
accept it they would be foolish, and I would remind them that but for the Red
Army they would have been utterly destroyed. I would point out to them that
they had been given a fine place to live in, more than three hundred miles each
way.
Stalin said that it would indeed be a large, industrial State.
“And friendly to Russia,” I interjected.
Stalin replied that Russia wanted a friendly Poland.
I then, runs the record, said to Mr. Eden, with some emphasis, that I was not
going to break my heart about this cession of part of Germany to Poland or
about Lvoy. Eden said that if Marshal Stalin would take the Curzon and Oder
Lines as a basis on which to argue that might provide a beginning.
At this point Molotov produced the Russian version of the Curzon Line, and
the text of a wireless telegram from Lord Curzon giving all the place-names. I
asked whether Molotov would object to the Poles getting the Oppeln district?.
He said he did not think so.
I said that the Poles would be wise to take our advice. I was not prepared to
make a great squawk about Lvov. Turning to Marshal Stalin, I added that I did
not think we were very far apart in principle. Roosevelt asked Stalin whether
he thought a transfer of population on a voluntary basis would be possible. The
Marshal said that probably it would be.
On this we left the Polish discussion.
actual Curzon Line which in fact does cut through East Galicia and leaves Lvov on the
Soviet side. The British delegation was obviously not as well informed as the Soviet dele-
gation in this respect. Compare in this connection p. 10, note 1, and G. Rhode: Die Ent-
stehung der Curzon-Linie (The Origin of the Curzon Line), Osteuropa, 5th Year, 1955,
No. 2, pp. 81-92.
‘ Probably an error; “east” would make sense in this connection.
® This probably meant the “Regierungsbezirk”. Its border touches the Glatz Neisse in
places without, however, following its course.
66
53
The “Sig Three” come to a loose agreement concerning the partition of Germany
In the further course of the plenary meeting the question of post-war treat-
ment of Germany was also discussed. Mr. Churchill reports:
Stalin now asked, “Are there any other questions?” The President replied,
“There is the question of Germany.” Stalin said that he would like to see Ger-
many split up. The President agreed, but Stalin suggested that I would object.
I said I did not object in principle. Roosevelt said that, so that there could
be some discussion, he and his advisers had had a shot at a plan some three months
before. This involved the dividing of Germany into five parts. Stalin, with a
grin, suggested that I was not listening because I was not inclined to see Germany
split up. I said that I considered that the root of the evil lay in Prussia, in the
Prussian Army and the General Staff.
Roosevelt then explained his plan for splitting Germany into five parts:
1. Prussia.
2. Hanover and the north-west part of Germany.
3. Saxony and the Leipzig area.
4. Hesse-Darmstadt, Hesse-Cassel, and the section south of the Rhine?.
5. Bavaria, Baden, and Wiirttemberg.
These five sections would be self-governing, but there were two more that
would be governed by the United Nations:
1. Kiel and its canal and Hamburg.
2. The Ruhr and the Saar.
These would be under the control of the United Nations as trustees. He was
only throwing this out as an idea which might be talked over.
“Tf”, I said, “I might use the American idiom, I would say that the President
has ‘said a mouthful’. Mr. Roosevelt’s plan is a new one to me. In my opinion
there are two things, one destructive and the other constructive. I have two
clear ideas in mind. First the isolation of Prussia. What is to be done to Prussia
after that is only secondary. Then I would like to detach Bavaria, Wiirttemberg,
the Palatinate, Saxony, and Baden. Whereas I would treat Prussia sternly, I would
make things easier for the second group, which I should like to see work in with
what I would call a Danubian Confederation. The people of those parts of Ger-
many are not the most ferocious, and I should like to see them live tolerably,
and in a generation they would feel differently. South Germans are not going to
start another war, and we would have to make it worth their while to forget
Prussia. I do not much mind whether there are one or two groups.”
I asked Marshall Stalin whether he would be prepared to go into action on this
1 Compare also the almost identical report by R. E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins,
pp. 797-798.
2 “The Leipzig area” is part of Saxony. Whilst this was perhaps added to clarify the term
“Saxony”, it is dubious what is meant by the “section south of the Rhine”. Compare
W. Wagner, The Genesis of the Oder-Neisse Line. Stuttgart 1957, p.51, note 224 (German
ed.: Die Entstehung der Oder-Neife-Linie, Stuttgart 1953, p. 63, note 2).
67
*
tront. Stalin said he would, but he preferred a plan for the partition of Ger-
many — something like the President’s plan, which was more likely to weaken
Germany. When one had to deal with large masses of German troops one found
them all fighting like devils, as the British and American Armies would soon
learn. The Austrians by themselves were different, and he described the way
they surrendered. All Germans were the same. It was the Prussian officers that
provided the cement. But fundamentally there was no difference between North
Germans and South Germans, for all Germans fought like fierce beasts. We
should be careful not to include the Austrians in any kind of combination.
Austria had existed independently, and could do so again. So also must Hungary
exist independently. After breaking up Germany it would be most unwise to
create new combinations, Danubian or otherwise.
President Roosevelt agreed warmly. There was no difference between Ger-
mans. The Bavarians had no officer class; otherwise they were exactly like the
Prussians, as the American troops had already discovered.
I said that if Germany were divided into a number of parts as suggested by the
President, and these parts werde not attached to other combinations, they would
reunite. It was not a question of dividing Germany so much as giving a life to
the cut-off bits and making them content not to be dependent on the Greater
Reich. Even if this were achieved for fifty years that would be a lot.
Stalin said that a Danubian combination would not be able to live, and the
Germans would take advantage of this by putting flesh on something that was
only a skeleton and thus creating a new great state. He asked whether Hungary
and Roumania would be members of any such combination. He then reiterated
the advantages which it would present to Germany in the future. It was far better
to break up and scatter the German tribes. Of course they would want to unite,
no matter how much they were split up. They would always want to reunite. In
this he saw great danger, which would have to be neutralized by various economic
measures, and in the long run by force if necessary. That was the only way to
keep the peace. But if we were to make a large combination with Germans in it
trouble was bound to come. We had to see to it that they were kept separate, and
that Hungary and Germany were not coupled. There were no measures possible
to exclude a movement towards reunion. Germans would always want to reunite
and to take their revenge. It would be necessary to keep ourselves strong enough
to beat them if they ever let loose another war.
I asked Stalin if he contemplated a Europe of little States, all disjointed, with
no larger units at all.
He replied that he was speaking of Germany, not Europe. Poland and France
were large States. Roumania and Bulgaria were small States. But Germany should
at all costs be broken up so that she could not reunite. The President pointed out
that his plan was a way of doing this. I said that I must make it clear that we
could now only take a preliminary survey of a vast historical problem. Stalin
said that it was certainly very preliminary.
68
' 54
A “formula” is put forward: Poland extends to the Oder Line, Kénigsberg shall
belong to the Soviet Union
Immediately thereafter the question of the frontier between Poland and

Germany was raised once again. Mr. Churchill reports:
I then brought the discussion back to Poland. I said I did not ask for any
agreement, nor was I convinced on the matter myself, but I would rather like
to get something down on paper. I then produced the following formula: “It is
thought in principle that the home of the Polish State and nation should be
between the so-called Curzon Line and the line of the Oder*, including for
Poland East Prussia (as defined) and Oppeln!; but the actual tracing of the fron-
tier line requires careful study, and possibly disentanglement of population at
some points.” Why not a formula on which I could say something like this to
the Poles: “I do not know if the Russians would approve, but I think that I might
get it for you. You see, you are being well looked after.” I added that we should
never get the Poles to say that they were satisfied. Nothing would satisfy the
Poles.
Stalin then said that the Russians would like to have the warm-water port of
KGnigsberg, and he sketched a possible line on the map. This would put Russia
on the neck of Germany. If he got this he would be ready enough to agree to
my formula about Poland. I asked what about Lvov. Stalin said he would accept
the Curzon Line.
W. Churchill, The second world war, vol. V, pp. 356-357.
55
Churchill: This tragedy “cannot last”

Mr. Churchill’s report on the negotiations in Teheran finishes up with the
following sentences:
The supreme question of the treatment to be accorded to Germany by the

victors could at this milestone only be the subject of “a preliminary survey of a
vast political problem,” and, as Stalin described it, “certainly very preliminary.”
It must be remembered that we were in the midst of a fearful struggle with the
mighty Nazi Power. All the hazards of war lay around us, and all its passions
of comradeship among Allies, of retribution upon the common foe, dominated
our minds. The President’s tentative projects for the partition of Germany into
* No question as to whether it should be the Eastern or Western Neisse had yet arisen.
1 Since the town of Oppeln is situated on the right bank of the Oder, and was thus in-
cluded by the Oder Line anyhow, it is most likely that the administrative area (Regie-
rungsbezirk) of Oppeln or the Province of Upper Silesia respectively are meant here as
well.
69
five selfgoverning states and two territories, of vital consequence, under the
United Nations, were of course far more acceptable to Marshal Stalin than the
proposal which I made for the isolation of Prussia and the constitution of a
Danubian Confederation, or of a South Germany and also a Danubian Con-
federation. This was only my personal view. But I do not at all repent having put
it forward in the circumstances which lay about us at Teheran.
We all deeply feared the might of a united Germany. Prussia had a great history
of her own. It would be possible, I thought, to make a stern but honourable
peace with her, and at the same time to recreate in modern forms what had been
in general outline the Austro-Hungarian Empire, of which it has been well said,
“If it did not exist it would have to be invented.” Here would be a great area
in which not only peace but friendship might reign at a far earlier date than in
any other solution. Thus a United Europe might be formed in which all the
victors and vanquished might find a sure foundation for the life and freedom of
all their tormented millions.
I do not feel any break in the continuity of my thought in this immense
sphere. But vast and disastrous changes have fallen upon us in the realm of fact.
The Polish frontiers exist only in name, and Poland lies quivering in the Russian-
Communist grip. Germany had indeed been partitioned, but only by a hideous
division into zones of military occupation. About this tragedy it can only be said
IT CANNOT LAST.
70
Vil
Negotiations about Poland at the beginning of 1944
56
Churchill opens negotiations with the Poles with regard to the Teheran “formula”
On his way from Teheran via Cairo to London Prime Minister Churchill was
held back by an illness. He therefore cabled from Carthage to his Foreign
Secretary in London on December 20th, 1943:
I think you should now open the Polish frontiers question with the Poles,
stating it is at my personal wish, and that I would have done it myself but for my
temporary incapacitation. You should show them the formula and the rough line
on the map on the eastern side, and the line of the Oder, including the Oppeln
district, on the west. This gives them a magnificent piece of country three or four
hundred miles across each way, and with over 250 miles of seabord, even on the
basis that they do not begin till west of Kénigsberg. The Poles should understand
of course that these are only very broad, tentative suggestions, but that they
would be most unwise to let them fall to the ground. Even if they do not get
Lvov, I should still advise their acceptance, and that they put themselves in the
hands of British and American friends to try to turn this plan into reality. You
should put it to them that by taking over and holding firmly the present German
territories up to the Oder they will be rendering a service to Europe as a whole
by making the basis of a friendly policy towards Russia and close association
with Czechoslovakia. This would give a chance for the rebirth of the Polish nation
brighter than any yet seen.
Once we know that they will accept and endorse these proposals we will
address ourselves to the Russians and endeavour to make matters firm and pre-
cise. On the other hand, if they cast it all aside I do not see how His Majesty’s
Government can press for anything more for them. The Russian armies may in a
few months be crossing the frontiers of pre-war Poland, and it seems of the
utmost consequence to have friendly recognition by Russia of the Polish Govern-
ment and a broad understanding of the post-war frontiers settlement agreed be-
fore then. I shall be most interested to hear what their reaction 1s.
W. Churchill, The second world war, vol. V, pp. 398—399.
71
56a
Stalin also offers the Oder Line to the Poles
Churchill met Dr. Benes, President of Czechoslovakia, in Marrakech early

in January 1944. He reported to Roosevelt by telegram on January 6th
about their talk:
Bene§ has been here, and is very hopeful about the Russian situation. He may be
most useful in trying to make the Poles see reason and in reconciling them to the
Russians, whose confidence he has long possessed. He brought a new map with
pencil marks by U. J.! showing the eastern frontier from K6nigsberg to the Curzon
Line, giving the Poles Lomza and Bialystok regions in the north, but not Lemberg
(Lvov) at the southern end. For their western frontier he offers the line of the Oder,
including the major part of Oppeln. This gives the Poles a fine place to live in, more
than 300 miles square, and with 250 miles of seaboard on the Baltic. As soon as I
get home I shall go out with the Polish Government to close with this or something
like it, and, having closed, they must proclaim themselves as ready to accept the
duty of guarding the bulwark of the Oder against further German aggression upon
Russia, and also they must back the settlement to the limit. This will be their duty
to the Powers of Europe, who will twice have rescued them. If I can get this tidied
up early in February a visit from them to you would clinch matters.
The Russians are quite agreeable to Bene§ having his old pre-Munich frontier
back, with a slight military adjustment along the northern crests of the mountains
and a little territory to the eastward linking them with Russia.
W. Churchill, The second world war, vol. V, p. 400.
EY/
Mikolajczyk resists compensation
Mikotajczyk reports as follows about the talks conducted by Eden on behalf

of Churchill with the Polish Government-in-Exile:
... my first information as to what had taken place at Teheran concerning Poland
specifically came from Eden. I saw him upon his return, immediately after he had
given our Ambassador, Edward Raczynski, a brief and shocking account of what
had occured when the Big Three concerned themselves with our country.
Eden reported that Stalin had expressed anger at the “insufficient co-operation”
of the Polish Underground with the Red Army and was extremely critical of the
Polish Government.
“The air was filled with suspicion and recrimination,” he said.
I asked for suggestions.
1 .U. J.“ means Uncle Joe, i. e. Josef Stalin.
gps
“In the first place I believe it would be wise on your part to prepare a Memo-
randum incorporating your previous efforts to co-ordinate the Underground
activities with those of the Russians. Our own relations with the Soviet Union
were considerably enhanced during the meeting at Teheran. We will send such a
Memorandum to Moscow and perhaps it will clarify matters.”
I outlined for him our repeated efforts to collaborate with the Russians, in-
cluding an agreement reached by General Zhukow and General Sikorski — an
agreement which produced absolutely no co-operation on the part of the Reds.
I reminded him, too, that we had submitted to the British Government a com-
plete account of our present and future plans to aid the expected entry of the
Red Army into Poland, in its vast counter-offensive against the Germans. I spoke
of our genuine fears of Russia’s aims towards Poland.
“I share the Prime Minister’s view that Stalin will not try to annihilate Poland
or incorporate it into the Soviet Union,” Eden said. “But it is obvious that Stalin’s
demands centre around the establishment of the Curzon Line as the future bound-
ary between his country and Poland. Naturally, we agreed to nothing in this
respect. We were not empowered to do so either by the British Government or by
your own.”
I replied that no one was empowered arbitrarily to seize or yield half of an
Allied country.
“Stalin is ready to make compensation to you in East Prussia and Opole
Silesia and establish the Western frontier of Poland on the Oder line. The Prime
Minister believes that if you would agree to this there would be a good chance
of an agreement with Russia, one that would make Poland independent and
stronger than before the war.”
My reply was that I could see no possibility of settling frontier questions now,
and that I was going forward with my plans to visit Roosevelt.
St. Mikotajczyk, The pattern of Soviet domination, pp. 52-53.
58
Pro-Soviet Poles demand Poland’s expansion to the West

Since its foundation the Union of Polish Patriots in the Soviet Union strongly
opposed the Exile Government! and demanded immediate armed resistance
to the German Occupation as well as a complete reorganisation of the Polish
State. In the winter of 1943/44 it intervened in the Soviet-Polish controversy
on Poland’s Eastern border in several articles and declarations in its Moscow
organ “Wolna Polska”. On December 24th a leader under the heading “The
way out” put forth the following programme ?:
1 Cf. Nos. 28a and 30. we

2 The report of the New York Times of 7. 1. 1944, reproduced in the German edition of
this volume, gives in its essentials a summary of this programme and in addition reports
the call to battle, apparently transmitted over the radio at the beginning of January 1944.
73
Drogi wyjscia
Dla nas jest rzecza oczywista, ze inicjatywa zmiany stanowiska Polski w Swiecie
iw kraju musi znalezé sie w reku Polakéw. Inicjatywa w polityce, jak i w strategji
przesqadza o powodzeniu. Ale t. zw. rzad londynski nie jest zdolny do powzigcia
inicjaty wy, nie jest zdolny do rozumnego dzialania, bo sam wydat na siebie wyrok
Smierci politycznej i wyrok ten sam wykonat.
Drég wyjécia szukaé musi demokracja polska — i musi je znalezé.
Uwazamy wiec jednosé wszystkich bez wyjatku Polakéw, stronnictw i party)

polskich —- za naczelna podstawe naszego dzialania. Dazy¢ bedziemy do poro-
zumienia z wszystkimi ludzmi dobrej woli w kraju, czy w Londynie, czy w
Nowym Jorku. Ale jednos¢é narodowa moze dokonaé sie tylko w walce z okupan-
tem, w walce z zaprzanstwem i w walce z reakcja.
Nardéd zjednoczony powinien dazy¢ do odbudowy kraju w duchu tradycyj

polskiej demokracji. Polska odbudowana nazajutrz po tej wojnie bedzie miata
ustroj parlamentarno-demokratyczny. Ale w imie rozwoju swojej demokracji
zlikwiduje ona doszczetnie wszelkie resztki skostnialej reakcji politycznej i gospo-
darczej. Przedewszystkiem chlop polski otrzyma ziemie.
Polska winna byé silna w swej niepodlegtosci i dlatego musi rozszerzyé swe
granice na zachéd, azeby mie¢ opore strategiczna przeciwko prusactwu, azeby
otrzyma¢ odwiecznie polskie ziemie, konieczne dla jej rozwoju gospodarczego.
Musimy sobie rdwniez jasno i dobitnie zda¢ sprawe z tego, ze na wschodzie
Bialorus i Ukraina nie wyrzeknq sie ziem etnograficznie do nich nalezacych. JeSli
nawet niektérzy Polacy nie uznaja prawa narodéw slowianskich na wschodzie do
laczenia swych ziem, jesli nawet niektérzy nie chca przyzna¢, ze posiadanie tych
ziem lezy tylko w interesie garstki obszarnikéw, to jednak wszyscy chyba rozu-
mieja, ze Nowa Polska, rozszerzona na zachodzie, nie moze zamieni¢é sie w
panstwo, w ktédrem Polacy beda nieznaczna wiekszoSciq. Taka Polska byltaby
tworem nietrwalym, szczegdlnie w sytuacji, gdy granice w Nowej Europie, przy
niezwyklym rozwoju lotnictwa i drédg transportowych, beda mialy zgola inna
wartos¢ anizeli granice Europy przedwojennej.
Po odwaznem wypowiedzeniu sie w sprawie granic raz na zawsze uregulujemy
nasze spory z ZSRR, ktéry w Nowej Europie odegra niewatpliwie role decydujaca.
Tem samem wzmocnimy naszq pozycje w bloku, ktérego trwale podstawy zostaly
stworzone w Teheranie.
Nowa sytuacja wymaga od Polski decyzyj nielatwych. Nielatwem jest przekre$-
lenie tradycyj jagiellofskich i powrét do wielkich tradycyj Piastéw. Ale w dziejach
narodéw, w chwilach przeltomowych, gdy ludzie reakcji lub tchérzliwego kompro-
misu z przeszioscia nie potrafiqa zdobyé sie na wielkie dziatanie — przychodza do
wladzy ludzie nowi. I ci ludzie nowi w rzadzeniu to tylko dowéd sity, odmtodzenia
i zywotnosci narodu.
Wolna Polska, Moscow, No. 40, December 24th, 1943.
74
i
Translation
The way out
It is for us an obvious fact that the initiative for a change in Poland’s position
in the world and at home must come from the Poles, for in policy as well as in
strategy it is initiative which influences success. However, the so-called London
Government is not capable of taking the initiative, it is not capable of acting
reasonably, for it has condemned itself to political death and has itself carried
out this sentence.
Thus Polish Democracy must look for and find a way out.
We hold the unity of all Poles, without exception, the unity of all Polish parties
and directions, to be the most propitious basis for our action. We shall strive for
understanding with all men of good will, whether they be at home, in London or in
New York. National unity, however, can only be achieved in battle with the
occupiers, in battle with the renegades and in battle with reaction.
The united nation should strive for the reconstruction of the home country
in the spirit of the tradition of Polish democracy. The Poland resurrected after
this war will have a parliamentary-democratic constitution. However, in the
interest of the development of its democracy, it will radically destroy all remains
of ossified political and economic reaction. First of all, the Polish peasant will
receive land.
Poland must be strong in its independence and must therefore extend its bound-
aries to the West in order to have a strategic bastion against the Prussians and
to obtain ancient Polish territories necessary to its economic development.
We must also realize, clearly and unequivocally, that in the East, White
Ruthenia and Ukraine will not relinquish territories which belong to them
ethnographically. However, if some Poles do not recognize the right of the
Slavic nations in the East to reunite their territories, if some of them even will
not realize that the possession of these territories only serves the interests of a
handful of big landowners, then all will at least understand that the New Poland,
extended in the West, must not become a state in which the Poles only form a
bare majority. Such a Poland would be an unstable structure, particularly since
the borders in the New Europe will assume a value totally different to Poland’s
pre-war borders in view of the unusual development of aviation and traffic routes.
After a courageous declaration on the border question we shall once and for all
settle our disputes with the Soviet Union, which will doubtless play a decisive role
in the New Europe. Thus we shall also strengthen our position within the block, the
lasting foundations of which were created in Teheran.
The decisions which the new situation demands from the Poles are not easy. It
is not easy to wipe out the Jagiellonian traditions and to revert to the great
traditions of the Piasts. However, in the history of peoples, if reactionary men or
men who compromise with the past in a cowardly manner cannot rise up to great
75
deeds in moments of great changes, then new men rise to power. These new men at
the helm are only proof of the strength, the rejuvenation and the living force of
the nation.
58a
“Wolna Polska” proposes to evict the German population

Several days after Red Army formations crossed Poland’s 1939 border and
the Polish Exile Government in its declaration of January Sth, 1944', expressed
Poland’s claim to the territories annexed by the Soviet Union in 1939,“Wolna
Polska” again took up the question of Poland’s Western borders in an article
by Professor Leon Chwistek2. After a reference to Polana’s alleged historical
claims to East and West Prussia, Danzig and Silesia, he concluded with ‘the
following sentences:
Jednem z najwazniejszych zagadnieh, zwiqazanych z przysziemi granicami, jest
sprawa bezpieczenstwa. Dostep do morza, ktéry még! byé przeciety w ciagu kilku
godzin, przemyst wparty we wroga granice, ktéry nawet na wypadek skutecznej
obrony byt narazony na nieustanne bombardowanie, — to przeciez absurdy, ktére
nie pozwalaly na wykoncypowanie rozsadegno strategicznego planu. Borykalismy
sie z tem, chwytalismy sie paljatiwdw, ale ostatecznie i tak popadlismy w zaleznos¢
od Niemcéw, ktéra zakofczyla sie hanba naszych zon i sidstr i przykuciem nas
do katorzniczych taczek.
Do powtdérzenia sie takiego stanu rzeczy nie dopuscimy w zadnym wypadku.
W okresie traktatu wersalskiego zagadnienie ludnosci niemieckiej osiadtej na
ziemiach polskich bylo jednym z najztosliwszych hamulcdw sprawiedliwego
rozwiqzania kwestji. Demokraci zachodni nie umieli da¢ sobie z niem rady. Trzeba
przyzna¢, ze wlasciwe rozwiqzanie dali sami Niemcy. Bez wielkiego gadania rzu-
cili hasto: Wysiedlenia.
Wolna Polska No. 1 (42), January 8th, 1944.
Translation
One of the most important questions in connection with our future boundaries
is the question of security. An access to the sea which could be cut off within a few
hours, an industry within immediate reach of the enemy border which, even in
case of successful defence, is continuously subjected to bombing attacks — all these
were absurdities which did not allow a reasonable strategic plan to be conceived.
We struggled against this — we tried remedies and yet we finally lost our in-
dependence to the Germans and ended with the shame of our wives and sisters
and with our being shackled to the convicts’ barrow.
On no account shall we ever permit such a situation to repeat itself.
* 'Text contained in: Documents on American foreign relations, vol. 6, pp. 647-649.
* Before 1939 Professor Leon Chwistek, born in 1884, was teaching mathematics and logic
9
at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow. He was also a well-known painter, but was not
active in politics.
76
At the time of the Versailles Treaty the question of the German population
settled on Polish territories was one of the most malicious drags on a just solution.
The Western democrats were helpless. One must admit that the Germans themselves
found the right solution. Without saying much they put up the slogan: Resettlement.
58b
Hilary Minc emphasizes the great economic advantages which the Poles can
obtain in the West
In an article entitled “Do not let the opportunity go by unutilized” which

appeared in “Wolna Polska” at the end of January 1944, one of the most
influential members of the Union of Polish Patriots, Hilary Minc1, declared:
Nie marnowaé okazji!
Jasne jest juz w tej chwili dla kazdego, w jakim kierunku pdéjda zmiany graniczne
w stosunku do stanu z wrzesnia 1939 roku. Mozna przyjq¢ jako pewnik, ze odejda
od nas ziemie ukrainskie i bialoruskie na wschodzie i ze otrzymamy znaczne tery-
torja na zachodzie. Granice Polski na wschodzie wykreSla t. zw. linja Curzona. Do
jakich zmian granicznych na zachodzie mamy niezaprzeczalne prawa, majqc zara-
zem realne mozliwoésci ich urzeczywistnienia, wiemy dobrze: chcemy, aby odwiecz-
nie polski Slask wrdécit do macierzy, aby ujscie Wisty nalezato do Polski, aby
poprzez Pomorze i Prusy Wschodnie rozszerzony zostat dostep Polski do morza.
W tych warunkach wynikiem zmian granicznych musi byé nietylko terytorjalne

przesuniecie Polski na zachdd, ale zasadnicza i gleboka zmiana calej jej struktury.
W rezultacie odlaczenia zacofanych gospodarczo terendw wschodnich i przylacze-
nia ziem odzyskanych na Niemcach, a zwlaszcza wielkoprzemystowego Slaska,
Polska z kraju rolniczego, stojacego pod wzgledem uprzemyslowienia na szarym
koncu panstw europejskich, gdzieS obok Bulgarji czy Rumunji, przemieni sie
w rozwiniety kraj przemystowo-rolny o znacznym potencjale gospodarczym.
Wystarczy to zilustrowa¢ dwoma przykladami:
Produkcja wegla z okoto 40 miljonéw tonn w 1939 roku wzrognie do ponad 100
miljonéw tonn, produkcja suréwki zelaza z niéspeina miljona tonn do okolo 5 mil-
jondéw tonn.
W mniejszym stopniu, ale r6wniez w sposdb bardzo wydatny, wzrosnie produk-
cja przemystu widkienniczego, elektrotechnicznego, energetycznego, budowy ma-
szyn itd.
W wyniku da to niezwykly wzrost sily gospodarczej Polski.
i Hilary Minc, born 1905, who came from a well-to-do Warsaw Jewish family, was from
1928 forward a member of the Communist Party. On Dec. 1st, 1944 he became Minister
for Industry and was later the actual dictator of Poland’s economic life for many years
as Director of the Gouvernmental Commission for Economic Planning and Deputy Prime
Minister. In October 1956 he was relieved of all offices at the wish of Gomulka.
77
Wzrost, ktéry w innych, najbardziej nawet sprzyjajacych warunkach wymagatby
dziesiatkéw lat wytezonej pracy i wielkich wysitkéw calego narodu.
Czynnikiem niezmiernej wagi dla pomyélnego i szybkiego rozwoju Polski jest

uzyskanie szerokiego dostepu do morza. Waski, 72-kilometrowy dostep do morza,
jaki posiadaligmy przed 1939 rokiem, byt w duzym stopniu iluzoryczny i nie
czynil zadogé naszym potrzebom. Teraz wraz z odzyskaniem ziem zrabowanych
ongié przez Niemcéw otwierajq sie przed nami perspektywy szerokiego dostepu
do morza, osiagniecia albo nawet przekroczenia wybrzeza, ktére byto w polskiem
posiadaniu za czaséw Boleslawa Krzywoustego. Mamy tu wiec, podobnie jak
w dziedzinie przemystu, rezultat nieomal cudowny: przemiang panstwa, od morza
faktycznie odsunietego, w panstwo o wielkiem morskiem wybrzezu.
W wyniku wojny wraz z terenami wysoko uprzemystowionemi i nadmorskiemi
przejda réwniez do Polski od Niemiec tereny 0 wysokim poziomie kultury rolnej.
50° tych terendw zajmuje niemiecka wielka wlasnoS¢, gospodarstwa junkréw
pruskich. Ta wielka niemiecka wlasnos¢ ziemska zostanie, rzecz jasna, zlikwidowana.
Odejs¢é bedzie musiala r6wniez znaczna czes¢ naplywowej ludnosci niemiedkiej.
Otworzy to dla osadnictwa polskiego wielkie mozliwosci. Za wezesnie dzis nawet
na szacowanie powierzchni gruntéw, ktére stanqg otworem dla osadnictwa. Jasne
jest jednak, ze chodzi tu o miljony hektardw. Tracac wiec na wschodzie tereny,
ktére, zwlaszcza jezeli chodzi o wojewédztwa poludniowe, byly ogniskami prze-
ludnienia rolnego, zyskujemy nowe wspaniale terytorja dla kolonizacji. Terytorja,
ktore stana sie powaznym czynnikiem rozwiazania kwestji agrarnej w Polsce,
terytorja, na ktérych znajdq moznoSé dostatniego zycia r6wniez i optanci z tych
ziem wschodnich, ktére odejda od panstwa polskiego.
W przededniu wojny, w r. 1939 Jézef Kisielewski w ksiazce p.t. ,Ziemia gro-
madzi prochy“, w ksiazce po$wieconej stowianskim, polskim ziemiom, zrabowanym
przez Niemcy, zastanawiajqc sie nad przyszlym losem tych ziem, pisal niemal
proroczo:
» Wiec tak, wigc nie ulega watpliwoéci, konjunktura nadchodzi jak najlepsza.
Korzystne wiatry historji poczynajq da¢ w nasze zagle. Po bardzo diugiej nielasce.
Chodzi tylko o to, aby okazji nie zmarnowac“.
Tak jest, chodzi o to, aby w pelni wykorzysta¢é moment historyczny, ktéry w
dziejach narodu zdarza sig raz na tysiac lat. Stoi przed nami mozliwosé uzyskania
Polski bez por6wnania mocniejszej, potezniejszej i zdrowszej, niz byla ona przed
1939 r., Polski przesunietej na zachdéd, Polski przemystowej, Polski morskiej,
Polski, w ktérej rolnikom nie zabraknie ziemi.
»Chodzi tylko 0 to, aby okazji nie zmarnowaé“.
Wolna Polska, No. 3, January 24th, 1944.
Translation
Do not let the opportunity go by unutilized
At the present time it is already clear to everyone in which direction border
changes will take place as compared with the status of September 1939. We may
78
assume for certain that we will lose the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian areas in
the East and receive important territories in the West. Poland’s border in the
East constitutes the so-called Curzon Line. As to the border changes in the West
to which we have unquestioned right as well as the real possibility of achieving
them: We desire that eternally Polish Silesia be returned to the motherland — that
the mouth of the Vistula belongs to Poland and that Poland’s approach to the
sea be broadened through Pomerania and East Prussia.
Under these conditions the results of the border changes must not only constitute
a territorial shift of Poland to the West but a fundamental and far reaching change
of its entire structure. As a result of the separation of the economically retarded
Eastern territories and the inclusion of the territory acquired from Germany —
in the first place Silesia with its heavy industry — Poland will be changed from an
agrarian country which stands last in Europe next to Bulgaria and Roumania with
respect to industrialization, into a developed agrarian-industrial country with a
significant industrial potential.
It is sufficient to illustrate this with two examples: The coal production will
rise from 40 million tons in 1939 over 100 million tons, and the production of
pig-iron from barely a million to around five million tons.
The production of the textile industry, the electric industry, the power works,
the machinery industry, etc. will increase, although to a lesser extent, but also in a
very profitable form.
The result will be an extraordinary growth of the economy of Poland, a growth
which would have taken decades of relentless labor and great efforts by the whole
nation under other conditions, even the most favourable ones.
A factor of boundless importance to the favourable and quick development of

Poland is the attainment of a broader approach to the sea. The narrow, 72 kilo-
metre1 wide approach to the sea which we had in 1939, was to a great degree an il-
lusion and was not adequate to our needs. Now prospects of a broad approach to
the sea are open to us together with the recovery of the territory previously stolen
by the Germans — that is to say that we acquire again the coasts which were in
the possession of Poland at the time of Bolestaw Krzywousty — or perhaps more?.
We have here, therefore, as in the industrial sphere, an almost miraculous result:
The transformation of a country practically shut off from the sea into a state with
a long sea coast.
As a result of the war, areas of high agricultural cultivation will pass from
Germany to Poland together with highly industrialized areas and the coastal
1 In fact, the Polish sea coast in 1939 was 140 km, including 68 km coast of the bay of
Putzig (Puck).
2 Bolestaw III. Krzywousty (Wrymouth) (1102-1138) after a long, bloody struggle sub-
jected the heathen Pomoranes in 1122 and was able to take their land Pomerania in 1135
in feudal tenure from Emperor Lothar. Thus his dominion stretched beyond the lower
Oder. After his death, his sons lost the sovereignty over Pomerania which — as to Western
Pomerania — was not re-established.
i?
®
territories. 50°/o of this area is occupied by the great Great German estates — ——
the estates of the German Junkers!. These large German estates will naturally be
liquidated. A substantial part of the immigrated German population must also
leave. This opens up great opportunities to the Polish settler. Today it is still
too early to estimate the acreage which will be available for settlement. It is,
however, clear that millions of hectares are involved. Although we shall lose
territory in the East, which was agriculturally over-populated particularly in the
southern voivodeships, we shall win wonderful new territories for colonization —
‘territories which will be a significant factor in resolving the agricultural problem in
Poland — territories in which also those who voted for return from the Eastern
areas, which were separated from the Polish state, will have the possibility of an
adequate existence.
On the eve of the war, in 1939, Jézef Kisielewski wrote in his book “The Earth
preserves the Past” which was dedicated to the Slavic, Polish territories stolen by
the Germans, in these nearly prophetic words his thoughts on the future of these
territories: ;
“It is so, there is no doubt, extraordinarily favourable trends are coming to the
fore. The favourable wind of fate begins to blow in our sails — — — after a long
period of disfavour. It is essential that the opportunity not be allowed to pass.”
That is how it is——-—the point is to exploit completely the historic moment
which appears once in a thousand years of a nation’s history. Before us stands the
possibility to win a Poland that will be uncomparably stronger, more powerful and
healthy than it was before 1939. A Poland that is shifted toward the West — an
industrialized Poland — a Poland on the sea — a Poland in which there will be no
shortage of land for the farmers.
“The point ist not to let the opportunity pass by.”
59
The Soviet Government publicly supports Poland’s expansion to the West
The Soviet Government emphasized the demands of Wolna Polska by making

a declaration which was published by the official News Agency TASS on
January 11th, 1944:
On January 5 in London was published a declaration of the emigré Polish

Government on Soviet-Polish relations which contains a number of incorrect
assertions, including an incorrect assertion about the Soviet-Polish frontier.
As is well known, the Soviet Constitution established the Soviet-Polish frontier
in conformity with the will of the population of Western Ukraine and Western
‘In reality 39 °/o of the arable agricultural area consistuted so-called large estates of above
50 ha. Of this, estates of 50-100 ha, i.e. 8.9/0, often did not actually represent proper
large estates in view of the special conditions in Eastern Germany. Cf. Die Ostgebiete des
Deutschen Reiches, edited by G. Rhode, 3rd and 4th ed., 1956 and 1957, p. 168.
80
Byelorussia, as expressed through a plebiscite! conducted on a broad democratic
basis in 1939. Then the territories of the Western Ukraine in which Ukrainians
form the overwhelming majority of the population were incorporated with the
Soviet Ukraine, and the territories of Western Byelorussia in which Byelorussians
form an overwhelming majority of the population were incorporated with Soviet
Byelorussia. The injustice committed by the Riga Treaty of 1921, which was im-
posed upon the Soviet Union, in regard to the Ukrainians inhabiting the Western
Ukraine and the Byelorussians inhabiting Western Byelorussia, was thus rectified.
The incorporation of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia with the
Soviet Union not only did not violate the interests of Poland, but on the con-
trary created a reliable foundation for stable and permanent friendship between
the Polish people and its neighbours, the Ukrainian and Byelorussian and Russian
peoples.
The Soviet Government has repeatedly stated that it stands for the re-establish-
ment of a strong and independent Poland and for friendship between the Soviet
Union and Poland. The Soviet Government declares again that it seeks to
establish friendship between the USSR and Poland on the basis of stable,
good-neighbourly relations and mutual respect and, if the Polish people will so
desire, on the basis of an alliance for mutual assistance against the Germans as the
chief enemies of the Soviet Union and Poland.
Poland’s joining of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of friendship, mutual assist-
ance and post-war collaboration could contribute to the accomplishment of this
task.
The successes scored by Soviet troops on the Soviet-German front daily
accelerate the liberation of the occupied territories of the Soviet Union from the
German invaders. The self-sacrificing struggle of the Red Army and the develop-
ing war operations of our Allies bring nearer the utter defeat of the Hitlerite
war-machine and are bringing to Poland and other nations liberation from the
yoke of the German occupationists.
The Union of Polish Patriots in the USSR and the Polish Army Corps
formed by it, which acts on the front against the Germans hand-in-hand with the
Red Army, are already fulfilling their glorious tasks in this struggle for liberation.
At present the possibility is opening for the rebirth of Poland as a strong and
independent state. However, Poland must be reborn not through the seizure of
1 This “plebiscite”, a term which would mean a vote given by the people, never took
place in reality. Nothing but general elections for the “National Assembly of the Western
Ukraine” and for the “National Assembly of Western Byelorussia” were held on October
22nd, 1939, i.e. one month after the occupation by the Red Army. At these elections,
which were strongly influenced by the Red Army, only one candidate was put up in
every division with only two weeks’ time for preparation. The former parties had no
chance whatever to nominate their candidates. The two National Assemblies which had
been elected in this manner and forgathered in Lvov and Bialystok respectively decided
unanimously at the end of October 1939 to request the Soviet Union to incorporate their
territories. This request was acceded to by two Incorporation Decrees of the Supreme
Soviet dated November 1st and 2nd respectively, 1939. Cf. B. Ku§nierz, Stalin and the
Poles, London 1949, pp. 50-55.
81
Ukrainian and Byelorussian lands, but through the restoration to Poland of
lands which belonged to Poland from time immemorial and were wrested by the
Germans from her. Only in this way trust and friendship could be established
between the Polish, Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Russian peoples.
The eastern frontiers of Poland can be established by agreement with the Soviet
Union. The Soviet Government does not regard the frontiers of 1939 as un-
alterable. These frontiers can be modified in Poland’s favor so that the areas in
which the Polish population forms a majority be turned over to Poland. In this
case the Soviet-Polish frontier could pass approximately along the so-called Cur-
zon Line, which was adopted in 1919 by the Supreme Council of the Allied
Powers, and which provides for inclusion of the Western Ukraine and Western
Byelorussia into the Soviet Union.
The western frontiers of Poland must be extended through incorporation with
Poland of ancient Polish lands previously wrested by Germany, without which it
is impossible to unite the whole Polish people in its state, which thereby will
receive a needed outlet to the Baltic Sea.
The just aspiration of the Polish people for its full reunion in a strong and
independent state must receive recognition and support.
The emigré Polish Government, isolated from its people, proved incapable of
establishment of friendly relations with the Soviet Union. It also proved in-
capable of organizing active struggle against the German invaders within Poland
herself. Furthermore, by its incorrect policy it not infrequently plays into the
hands of the German occupationists.
However, the interests of Poland and the Soviet Union consist in that stable,
friendly relations be established between our countries and that the people of
Poland and the Soviet Union unite in struggle against the common external
enemy, as demanded by the common cause of all the Allies.
Documents on American foreign relations, edited by L.M. Goodrich and M. J. Caroll,
vol. VI, pp. 649-650.
59a
Soviet Government demands a reshuffle of the Polish Government-in-Exile in

addition to the Curzon Line
Molotov explained the Soviet point of view to Mr. Harriman, United States
Ambassador, on January 18th, 1944, and formulated it more precisely in an
answering Note addressed to Mr. Hull, Secretary of State, on January 23rd,
in reply to an American mediation proposal:
Aye cooOmun r.appumany cpoit orper ycrHo, a Tenepb coobmaro

Bam nucbMenno, 470, BEIpantant Bam mpusHaTexbHOCTh 8a LOTOBHOCTB
HOcpeqHMAeCTBA, OJVKCH CKABATb BCe Me, YTO YCMOBMA TIA MoOcpequU-
WeCTBA, K COMATICHMIO, elle He CospeuM.
Cyyure camu.
82
Cosercroe IIpasurenberso momo Ha ycTynKu, oObABMB rpanuity
1939 rofa nofmemanleit UsMeHeHMI0, MU IpesIOMUMIO WMHMIO HKepsona B
KauecTBe COBCTCKO-TlONbCKO rpanmup. A l[loupcKoe I[papuresmberso B
JlonqOHe B OTBET HA DTO OOOMIIO BOMpOC oO WMHMM Kepsona um BMecTe Cc TEM
wepes CBOU OPUNMAIbHbIe JOKYMCHTHL pacipocrpausAer pelo, uro rpanmiya,
yeraHoBueHHan PusKkcKMM JOrOBOpOM, ABIIAeTCA Heu3sMeHHoO!.
Cosercxoe IIpasureascrso nopsaso c Toupcnum Ipasureancrsom B
Jlonfone u3-3a ero yuacTuA BO BpaKeOHoll KeBeTHUYeCKOM KaMIaHuM
TUTJepOBleB 10 NOBOY «yOulicrs B Harsme». ITO O50 B TO BpeMA, Kora
Bo ruase Ilombexoro [[panureasersa cross renepaa Cukopcrnit. A npasu-
TembcTBoO Munonatiumka BMeCcTO TOTO, YTOOB OTMEesKeBAaTbCH OT 9TOFO
auiucrcKoro akTa UpaBuresberBa CuKopcKoro, o6bABUIO, 4TO OHO
Oyqer MpofomKaT omuTuKy CuKopcKoro, Upu4yeM mpaBMTeECTBO
Muronatiumka He TOJbKO He JesaByupyer cBoux mocaoB B Mexcune,
B Kanaje mu cpomx croponumKos B CIA (rpynma Marymescroro), Bepy-
IMX OTKPHITO BpamkyeOuy10 CoBerckomy Colo3sy KammaHmio, a, HaodopoT,
MOOWpsAerT Ux.
Vs orux d@axtos BuygHuo, uto [lompcroe I[pasutresscrso B JloHqoHe o6pa-
maeTcd 3a WocpequMuecTBOM K IIpasurenperBam CIMA u Benuxobputrannn
He [JIA TOPO, YTOOEI FOOuTECA cormamenuA c Copetckum Ilpapurer_cTBoM,
a JIA TOPO, YTOOEI yrIyOUTL KOHPAUKT UM BTAHYTb B HeTO COIO3HUKOB, 100
ACHO, YTO OTCYTCTBUe OOMeli Fash WIA COrMAaMIeHUA OOpeKaeT LeperoBopHl,
Kak MW WOCpefHUYECTBO, Ha WpoBad.
oes
Mue kKaskeTCAH, YTO KOpeHHoe ysryumeHue cocraBa Ilompexoro [pasu-
TEJIbCTBa, C UCKJIIOYeHUeEM U3 HETO MpoPawiucTcKhUx UMilepuvasIucTu veCchUux
dJIEMCHTOB UM BHKJIIOUeHMeM B Hero FeMOKpaTMUyecHUX IICMeCHTOB, O YOM A
ye ropopua yctHo r. lappumMany, Moro Ont cosqaTbh OaronpuATHy1o
TOYBY Hak JIA BOCCTAHOBJICHUA COBeETCKO-HOJbBCKHUX OTHOMIeHMM pas-
pelmleHuA BOompoca O rpaHnle, TAK UW WIA IWIOAFOTBOpHOroO TlOCpeqHUAeCTBa.
Perepiska predsedatelja Soveta Ministrov USSR s prezidentami SSA i premier-mini-

strami Velikobritanii vo vremja Velikoj Otecestvennoj Vojny 1941-1945 gg. (The exchange
of correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union
and the Presidents of the United States and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain at the
time of the Great National War 1941-1945.) Tom 2, perepiska s F. Ruzvel’tom i G. Tru-
menom (Vol. 2, Exchange of correspondence with F. Roosevelt and H. Truman), Mos-
cow 1957, pp. 286-287.
Translation!
I have already replied to Mr. Harriman verbally, and would now inform you in
writing that I wish to express my gratitude for your willingness to mediate, but
that I must tell you that the conditions for mediation have not, unfortunately,
matured as yet.
Judge for yourself.
The Soviet Government has made concessions, has stated that the 1939 frontier
1 cf, Stalin’s correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman, 2 vols in one,
London 1958, vol. 2, pp. 291-292.
83
may be changed and has suggested that the Curzon Line should become the
Soviet-Polish frontier. But in replying to this the Polish Government in London
has passed over the question of the Curzon Line while at the same time giving
publicity to the view through official documents that the frontier established in
the Treaty of Riga is unalterable.
The Soviet Government has broken off relations with the Polish Government
in London because the latter took part in the hostile defamatory Hitlerite campaign
in connection with the “Katyn Murders”. At that time General Sikorski was the
head of the Polish Government. But instead of dissociating itself from this fascist
action on the part of the Sikorski Government, the Mikolajezyk Government
has stated that it intends to pursue Sikorski’s policy; in connection with this
the Mikolajczyk Government not only not disavows its Ambassadors in Mexico
and Canada, and its supporters in the USA (the Matuszewski! Group) who are
openly conducting a campaign of hostility against the’Soviet Union, but is on
the contrary urging them on.
It is obvious from these facts that the Polish Government in London does not
direct its plea for mediation to the Governments of the United States and Great
Britain in order to come to an agreement with the Soviet Government, but in order
to intensify the conflict and to involve its Allies in it, for it is clear that the lack
of a common foundation for an understanding will condemn both the negotiations
and the mediation efforts to failure.
It appears to me that a fundamental improvement in the composition of the

Polish Government — whereby the pro-fascist imperialistic elements should be
excluded and democratic elements included — might, as I have already told
Mr. Harriman, offer a favourable basis for the restoration of Polish-Soviet rela-
tions, for a decision on frontier questions and for fruitful mediation.
60
Churchill urges the Poles to agree to the Teheran “formula”
Shortly after his return to London® Mr. Churchill commenced negotiations

with the Polish Government-in-Exile.
Mr. Churchill, assisted by Mr. Eden and Under-Secretary Sir Alexander Cadogan,
conferred with Premier Mikolajczyk and Foreign Minister Tadeusz Romer on the
impression created by the advance of the Red Army into Poland. Considering
the situation as very grave and requiring immediate intervention, the British
1 Ignacy Matuszewski, a convinced adherent of Pilsudski’s, was Minister of Finance in four

Polish Governments from April 14th, 1929, to May 26th, 1931. In September 1941 he
entered the USA as an emigrant from Portugal, and then, as co-founder and speaker of the
National Committee of Americans of Polish Descent, he became very active in the jour-
nalistic field, his work being mainly directed against the close alliance with the Soviet Union.
® On January 20th or 22nd, 1944. The date given varies.
84
Prime Minister offered to intervene in Moscow and urged the acceptance of the
following five points by the Polish Government.
1. The Polish Government to agree to accept the so-called Curzon Line (pro-
longed through eastern Galicia) as a basis for negotiations with the Soviet
Government.
2. The final settlement of the eastern frontier to be linked with the grant to
Poland of East Prussia, Danzig, and Upper Silesia to the Oder River.
3. All Poles left on the Soviet side of Poland’s eastern frontier would be given
the right to return to Poland.
4. All the German population within Poland’s new boundaries to be removed
from Poland.
5. The solutions as enumerated above would receive the approval and guaran-
tee of the three principal United Nations.
If the Polish Government accepted his plan, Mr. Churchill was ready to cable
Premier Stalin, suggesting this solution on his own behalf, and asking the Soviet
Government to engage itself to refrain from any further calling in doubt of the
Polish Government and any interference in the internal affairs of Poland.
J.Ciechanowski, Defeat in victory, p. 269.
61
Poland demands guarantees for the annexation of the German eastern territories
Shortly thereafter, on January 23rd, 1944, the Polish Foreign Minister

addressed the following note to the British Foreign Office:
Referring to the conversations which have taken place recently between

members of the Polish and British Governments regarding the problem of Polish-
Soviet relations, and more particularly the conversations held with you on the
13th January last, and with Mr. Churchill on January 20th, I have been instructed
to place before you a number of questions the answers to which cannot fail to
have an important bearing on the decisions which the Polish Government is
called upon to take in the present situation. The views of His Majesty’s Govern-
ment on several of the questions enumerated below have been expressed in the
course of mutual conversations. The Polish Government would, however, be
greatly obliged to you if you would see your way, also with regard to these
questions, to confirm that they have recorded and interpreted them correctly.
1. What are the measures which the British Government would be prepared to
take in the event of a Polish-Soviet agreement being reached on the basis of
Mr. Churchill’s suggestions made to M. Mikolajczyk on Januar 20th, in order to
safeguard the independence of Poland and the non-interference by the Soviet
Government in Poland’s internal affairs? In particular:
a) Can the British Government secure the taking over by the Polish Govern-
ment and authorities appointed by them of the administration of Polish territory
as it is freed from German occupation?
85
b) Are His Majesty’s Government prepared to secure from the Soviet Govern-
ment their agreement to the participation of Polish and Allied contingents on an
equal footing and in comparable numbers in the occupation of Polish territories
(including those which would be attributed to Poland at the expense of Ger-
many), should such an occupation be made necessary by the course of military
operations against Germany?
c) Can they undertake to assure that this territory will be duly evacuated by the
occupying troops and authorities as soon as military operations against Germany
have come to an end on this front?
2. Are the Polish Government right in expecting:
a) A formal guarantee by Great Britain and if obtainable also by the United
States of America of the territorial integrity of Poland within her new frontiers,
of her political independence and non-interference in her internal affairs against
attempts from any quarter whatsoever? ‘
b) Should the United States prove unwilling to join in such a guarantee, would
Great Britain be willing to undertake it herself?
3. Can the Polish Government receive the assurance that neither of the three
Great Powers represented at the Teheran Conference will claim military, naval
or aerial bases on the territory of Poland or on that which would be allotted to
Poland by way of compensation at the expense of Germany?
4. Can the Polish Government take it for granted with regard to territories
offered to Poland at the expense of Germany, that:
a) They comprise with the full consent of the British Government all German
territories situated between the river Oder and the Polish-German frontier of
1939, and over and above the whole of Oppeln Silesia, the territory of the Free
City of Danzig and the entire territory of East Prussia?
b) Poland’s new Western frontiers will be definitely fixed at the same time as
Poland’s Eastern frontiers and embodied in one international document enacted
on the same basis with the participation and consent of the British, the Soviet
and the American Governments?
c) It will be stipulated that the arrangement is to be considered permanent and
that no ulterior German protests would be entertained?
d) The German territories allotted to Poland on the basis of this agreement
will be formally declared as severed from the German Reich in the terms of the
first armistice terminating hostilities between the United Countries and Ger-
many, this surrender being a sine qua non condition of the termination of
hostilities?
e) The three Great Powers represented in the Teheran Conference will under-
take to impose upon Germany in the same armistice the duty of accepting on
German territory, without undue delay, the entire population of German tongue
inhabiting at the moment of the signature of the armistice the territory of Poland
within her new frontiers? These Powers will also undertake to assist Poland in
the removal from her territory of unwanted Germans?
St. Mikolajczyk, The pattern of Soviet domination, pp. 312-314.
86
62
The US Government is unwilling to give Poland a guarantee
At the same time Mr. Mikolajczyk communicated Mr. Churchill’s Five Point
Program to President Roosevelt and also submitted to him a few questions
in connection therewith. The answer given on February 1st, 1944, was
worded as follows:
1. The basic position of the United States Government that general discussions
of the many European frontier questions during the period of active hostilities
will run the risk of creating confusion and diverting concentration from the over-
all object of defeating Germany is well known. This attitude, however, does not
preclude the possibility of any two countries having mutual territorial problems
from seeking a direct settlement by mutual accord. This Government recognizes
that recent developments present certain complex and vital considerations which
may render it desirable for the Polish Government to endeavour to reach a solution
with regard to its territory without delay.
2. The United States Government would in principle be prepared to assist in
helping the Polish Government freely to reach a settlement of its territorial pro-
blems through the offer of good offices to the Polish and to the Soviet Government
to facilitate direct discussions between them. While this Government is not in a
position to guarantee such a settlement, it would welcome the achievement of a
solution by friendly accord.
3. The United States Government is prepared to lend its support to Prime Minis-
ter Churchill’s endeavours to bring about the re-establishment of relations between
the Polish and Soviet Governments on the basis of a friendly solution of all out-
standing difficulties. As stated above, there can be no question of guarantee as far
as the United States is concerned.
63
The Polish Resistance Movement agrees to the Western frontier suggested and to
the expulsion of the Germans, but rejects any territorial cession in the East
The Polish Government-in-Exile passed on Mr. Churchill’s Five Point

Programme to the “Council of National Unity” — the Polish Parliament of
the Resistance Movement — in Warsaw. The Council made a Nine Point
Statement in reply to this on February 15th, 1944, the text being as follows:
1. Zgadzamy sie na proponowane granice na zachodzie i zobowiazania do

usuniecia Niemcéw,
2. Nie zgadzamy sie na iunctim migdzy granicami zachodnimi a wschodnimi.
te : : oy
Ziemie na zachodzie nie moga by¢ ekwiwalentem. Jest to tylko zwrot ziem ongis
nam zabranych, —
3. Jestesmy za podjeciem rozméw przy udziale aliantow, celem nawiqzania
87
.
stosunkéw dyplomatycznych z Sowietami, pod warunkiem respektowania pelnej

suwerennosci i nie mieszania sie w sprawy wewnetrzne, —
4. Kategorycznie sprzeciwiamy sie podjeciu dyskusji z Sowietami na temat
rewizji granic wschodnich w ogéle. Stoimy na stanowisku nienaruszalnosci granic
ustalonych w Traktacie Ryskim, podpisanym tez przez republike Ukraifska,
albowiem Sowietom nie chodzi o poprawki graniczne, tak jak Niemcom nie chodzilo
o Korytarz i Gdansk, lecz roszczenia ich dotycza suwerennoésci i calosci Polski.
6. Gdyby zatriumfowaé mialy nie prawo i sprawiedliwos¢ lecz przemoc i sila, to

spokoju w Europie nie bedzie, a Naréd Polski nigdy przemocy sig nie podda.
Naréd Polski wierzy jednak w uczciwe dotrzymanie zawartych sojuszéw i wierzy,
ze w interesie wszystkich narodéw milujacych pokdj zatriumfuja zasady Karty
Atlantyckiej. Dlatego tez jestesmy zdania, ze nalezy odroczy¢ uregulowanie sprawy
zasadniczo az do momentu, gdy to bedzie mozliwe. ‘
T. Bér-Komorowski, Armia Podziemna (The Underground Army). London 1951,
pp. 195-196.
Translation’
1. We agree to the proposed Western boundaries and welcome the pledge of

removing the Germans.
2. We do not agree to the tying up of our Eastern frontier with the question of our
Western boundaries. The Western territories cannot be an equivalent as their
reincorporation to Poland constitutes in fact the return of territories seized from
her in the past.
3. We favour entering into conversations, with the participation of the Allies, with
a view to the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviets, on condition
of respect of our full sovereignty and of non-interference in our internal affairs.
4. We object categorically to any discussions with the Soviets with regard to the
revision of the Eastern boundaries. We stand by the inviolability of the fron-
tiers as settled by the Treaty of Riga, which was signed also by the represen-
tatives of the Ukraine, for the reason that the Soviets in fact do not want fron-
tier readjustments, just as Danzig and the Corridor was not the real aim of the
Germans, but aim at the sovereignty and integrity of Poland.
6. There will be no peace in Europe if, instead of justice and right, violence and
force were to triumph. The Polish nation will never surrender to violence.
Nevertheless the Polish nation still believes in the bonds of alliance, and trusts
that, in the interest of all peace-loving peoples the principles of the Atlantic
Charter will prevail. For this reason we are of the opinion that the settlement
of essential problems should be postponed till that time.
1 Other translations, with some slight differences, are given by 7. Bér-Komorowski, The
Secret Army, London 1951, pp. 185-186, and by St. Mikolajczyk, The pattern of Soviet
domination, pp. 324-325.
88
t
64
Churchill reports to Stalin on his negotiations with the Polish Government-in-
Exile
Churchill had in the meantime continued his negotiations with the Polish
Government-in-Exile and gave Stalin an undated report on the subject,
which arrived in Moscow on February 1st. It was worded as follows:
eee
2. daTeM A CKasadl, YTO Ha OCHOBaHUM TOrO, ITO MpoMsomi0 B Terepane,

A cunraio, To Cosercxoe IIpasuresperso O40 ObI TOTOBO COrmacuTbhed
Ha TO, 4ToOn BocToUHBe rpanun Hompmm coorsercrBopasim mMHMMt
Repzona, ipu ycrosun o6cympenua stHorpaduyeckux coobpamenuil, u A
COBeTOBAI MM UpPMHATh JMHMIO Kepso0Ha B KaYeCTBE OCHOBEI JIA OOCYi-
qenusa. A ropopus 0 KomMeHcayuax, KoTopre Monpma nomyanma On Ha
ceBepe Mf Ha samaye. Ha cepepe oro Ona O41 Bocrounaan Hpyccun. Ho upu
8TOM A He KOCHYJICA BOoNpoca o Henurcbepre. Ha sanage oun Oniim Ont
B OesomacHocTH mM HOLyaMaM OH copelicrBue B TOM, 4¥TOOH saHATD l'ep-
MaHMi0 AO WuHuM Ojepa. A uM cKasa, 4TO OHM B pesybTaTe OCcBOOOHK-
WeHMA MX COIO3HEHIMM BOCKAaMM JOJUKHEI B8ATb Ha ceOA OTY Baqayuy
OXpaHATb CBOM TrpaHMIbl OT TepMaHCKOW arpeccuM, HalpaBNeHHOM Ha
Boctor. Al ckasaa, 47TO AIA BHIMONHeHUA STO Bagqaum onM OynyT Hy2-
aTbcA B pymecrBenHolt Poccuu, croamjeli 3a HMMM, U, KAK A Mosaraio,
onu Oyf_yT nosepKanbl TapanTuell Tpex BeNMKMX JepHKaB OT HOBOTO
TrepMaHckKOro Hanagenun. BenmnoOputanua Onima On roToBa FaTb TaKy10
rapaHTH10, ec Ha 9TO OypeT cormacue ee co1o3sHuKa — CopetcKont Poccun.
... A paspacnua, aro c Ilonpcxoro Ilpasurenbcrsa He OyyeT B3ATO 00A-
BaTeJIbCTBO COrIacMTbCA Ha sMHMIO Hepsona, Kak Ha OCHOBY OOcyaqeHUA,
KpOMe Kak B TOM CJly4ae, Kora OHA OyfeT YacTbIO CormalieHuA, KoTOpPOe
act eMy XOporyio KOoMMeHCalMio Ha CeBepe M Ha Banaye, ...
3. Hakonell, A Ckasad, 470, eCIM MomMTUKAa pyccKMx OyfeT pasBu-
BaTbCA B YKa3aHHOM MHOIO HallpaBleHuu, A yOequreibHO OyAy NpocuTh
Ilompckoe [IpasurenbcrBo ZoroBopurTsca Ha 9TO OCcHOBe, u IIpaBuresb-
ctpo Ero BesmuecrBa OyqeT pekoMeHyOBaTb, 4TOOEI Takoe pellenue
Borpoca OE yTBepsqeHO MUpHOt KoHepeHMel uM KOHPepeHuMAMH,
KOTOphie OyfyT pewlaTb Bompoc 06 ycTpoiicrBe Esponb mocae yHu4ro-
*KEHMA TUTIepu3sMa, MU He NOMMepsKUT HUKAKUX TePpUTOPMAabHBIX pe-
rensuit [lompmm cpepx storo. Ecam noabcKue MuHUCTpE OyAyT yOeeHEI
B TOM, 4TO MO7KHO JOCTHTHYTL COrmalleHuA Ha ITO OCHOBe, TO UX AOJITOM
OyqeT B COOTBeTCTByIolee BPpCMA He TONbKO COrsacMTbCA C HUM, HO
MY?KeCTBCEHHO PeKOMeHAOBATH ero CBOeMy Hapopy, Mame ecum On OHM
NOABepriuch pucky ObITh OTBeprHyTHIMU KpaiiHuMU dJIeMeHTAaMM.
4, [loubcnme MuHucTpH OI O4eHb JaseKU OT TOLO, YTOOKI OTKIIOHUTH,
TAKUM OO0pasoM, OTKPBIBUIMeCA MepCleKTUBEI, HO OHM WpocusM Oo mpejo-
CTABJICHUM UM BpeMeHU [JIA paCCMOTpeHMA BOIpOCa COBMECTHO C OCTAIIB-
HbIMM CBOUMM KOJeraMu, M BBMLY STOTO OHM NOCTaBMIM PA BOMpOCoB, U3
KOTOPHIX HM O/[MH, KasKeTCA, He UpoTMBOpeuMT oOMeMy xXapaKTepy
peAIOHKeHUM, KOTOPLIe A UM Cyema. B wacTHOCTH, OHM *eTaloT Oy 4UTb
BgaBepeHue B TOM, uTO IloubuIa Ha OTBEAeCHHOL eli HOBOM TeppuTOpuu Oye
cBoooyqHa M HesaBucuMa; 4TO OHA LOTyuMT apPeKTUBHY10 TapaHTMo BevIM-
89
*
KMUX JlepsKaB OT HeMeIIKOTO peBaHila; YTO dTM BeMMKMe epKaBbl TAKE

TOMOLYT M3rHATh HeMI[eB C HOBLIX TeppUTOpui, KOTOPHIe [OJIKHI OBITS
nepenanst [oumpmre; u 4ro B paiioHax, KOTOPHIe JOJVKHBI OLITL BKJIIOUCHEL
B Copercky1o Poccuio, TeM NONAKaM, KOTOpEIe TOrO WoseaioT, OyAeT
oKa3aHo copelicrBue B BbIese HA UX HOBOC MCCTOPKUTECIBCTBO. ...
Perepiska Predsedatelja Soveta Ministrov etc., vol. 1, No. 235, pp. 194-195.
English text
2. I then said that I believed from what had passed at Teheran that the Soviet
Government would be willing to agree to the easterly frontiers of Poland con-
forming to the Curzon Line subject to the discussion of ethnographical considera-
tions, and I advised them to accept the Curzon Line as a basis for discussion. I
spoke of the compensations which Poland would receive in the North and in the
West. In the North there would be East Prussia; but here I did not mention the
point about Kénigsberg. In the West they would be secure and aided to occupy
Germany up to the line of the Oder. I told them it was their duty to accept this
task and guard their frontiers against German aggression towards the East in conse-
quence of their liberation by the Allied forces. I said in this task they would need
a friendly Russia behind them and would, I presume, be sustained by the guarantee
of the three Great Powers against further German attack. Great Britain would be
willing to give such a guarantee if it were in harmony with her ally, Soviet Russia.
I made it clear that the Polish Government would not be committed to agree
to the Curzon Line as a basis of examination except as part of the arrangement
which gave them the fine compensations to the North and to the West,...
3. Finally, I said that if the Russians’ policy was unfolded in the sense I had
described, I would urge the Polish Government to settle on that basis and His
Majesty’s Government would advocate the confirmation of such a settlement by
the Peace Conference or by the conferences for the settlement of Europe following
the destruction of Hitlerism, and would support no territorial claims from Poland
which went beyond it. If the Polish Ministers were satisfied that agreement could
be reached upon these lines, it would be their duty at the proper time not merely
to acquiesce in it but to commend it to their people with courage, even though they
ran the risk of being repudiated by extremists.
4. The Polish Ministers were very far from rejecting the prospects thus unfolded
but they asked for time to consider the matter with the rest of their colleagues,
and as a result of this they have asked a number of questions none of which seem
to be in conflict with the general outline of my suggestions to them. In particular
they wish to be assured that Poland would be free and independent in the new
home assigned to her; that she would receive the guarantee of the Great Powers
90
against German revenge effectively; that these Great Powers would also assist in
expelling the Germans from the new territories to be assigned to Poland; and that
in the regions to be incorporated in Soviet Russia, such Poles as wished would be
assisted to depart for their new abodes.
oe
Stalin’s correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman 1941-1945, vol. I,
No. 235, pp. 193-194.
64a
Stalin says emphatically: Kénigsberg must become part of the Soviet Union
On February 4th Stalin replied in a note, which was devoted exclusively

to the Polish question:
Al Bury, uro Bur yqeasnere 6ombuI0e BHUMaHUe BOIIpOCy O COBeTCKO-

NOJIBCKUX OTHOMIeHMAX. MEI BCe OYCHD CHUM 9TU YCuIMA.
Mue mpeycTaBuJIAeTCA, YTO HepBLIM BOMPOCoM, 10 KOTOpOMy y7Ke Tellepb
OuHKHA OLITh BHeCeHa NOJHaA ACHOCTb, ABJIAeCTCH BOIpOC O COBeETCKO-
MOUbCKOM rpanuye. Br, KOHEYHO, UpaBUALHO 3ameTusu, aro Iloupma B
esTOM BoTpoce OUHKHA OLITh PyKOBOAUMA colosHuKaMU. Uro KacaercA
Cosercxoro IlpasurembcTBa, TO OHO y2Ke OTKPEITO M ACHO BLICKA3ZAaIOCh 10
Boupocy 0 rpanune. Mr sanBusM, ao He cuuTaem rpanuy 1939 roja
HeM38MeHHOM, MU cormacumMch Ha WuHuIO Hepsona, mo0iqA TeM CaMBIM Ha
BecbMa 6o01buIMe ycTymKM TouAKamM. A mMempy tem IlompcKoe IIpasu-
TEIbCTBO YKJIOHMJOCh OT OTBETA Ha Halle UpeqNORenue O WHHuM Hep3ona
MW WposomHKaeT B CBOUX OPUUMAILHEIX BLICTYNJICHMAX BbICKABLIBATLCA 3a
TO, 4TO rpaHuia, HaBA3aHHaA HaM 110 PusKcKkoMy JOroBopy, ABIAeTCA
Heu3sMeHHOH. V3 Bamero mucbMa MO?KHO CeaTb 3aKII0UeHMe, ATO
Iloapckoe [IlpasurenpcTBo roToBO UpMsHaTb sMHMIO Hep3ona, HO, Kak
W3BeCTHO, NOJAKM HUurye 00 STOM He 3aABMJIM.
AA cunraw, uro Hloapcroe [IpapurerbcrTBo AOUKHO 88ABUTh OPUINMAIbHO
B cBoei JekKapaluu, WTO IMHUA TpaHMb, ycranoBsenHad PusscKumM
JOTOBOpPOM, TofWeskUT U3MeHeHMIO HM 4TO WMHUA Kepsona ABIAeTCA IMHMeli
HOBO rpanums Mey CCCP u Monpmeii. Ono fousKHO 00 sTOM 3aABUTh
Tak ae O*uNMaIbHO, KaK 9TO cyeman0 CopetcKoe IIpapurespcTBo, ...
Uro nacaetca Bamero 3aAdBJeHuA NOAKaM O Tom, ¥ToO IlombuIa Morsa
ObI 3HAYMTCILHO pas{BUHYyTb CBOM rpaHMIb Ha saaye WM Ha CeBepe, TO,
Kak Bui 3HaeTe, MBI C 9TMM COrsmacHbl ¢ OAHO MOMpaBKol. OO srol m0-
npapke # ropopua Bam u Ipesugentry ws Terepane. Mui mpererjyem Ha TO,
yToOb ceBepo-BocTouHad uactb Boctounol IIpyccuu, BKmto4aA opt
Kenurc6epr, Kak Hesamepsaionuit opt, oromsma K Coserckomy Corosy.
OTO e7MHCTBeHHEIM KycoueK TepMaHCKOM TeppUTOpuM, Ha KOTOPbIM MBI
nperenyyem. Bes yqopuerBopenua dToli MMHMMAaIbHOM mpereHsum Coser-
cKoro Cowsa yeryuKa Cosercxoro Coosa, BbIpasuBllaicA B Upu3sHaHun
mmunuu Hepsona, Teper BCAHKMI CMEICI, Kak 00 oTomM A ye Bam ropopuat
B Terepane.
91
.
Haxkonen, 0 camom cocrase Ilomzcxoro IIpasurenscrsBa. Bam, A Jymato,

HOHATHO, 4TO C HEHemHuM IlomEcKum IIpaBurembcTBOM MBI He MOZKeEM
BoccTaHOBUT, oTHOMeHUM. M B camom jere. Kako MomerT OBIT CMBICJ
B BOCCTAHOBJCHUM OTHOMeHM GC WpaBMTeJIbCTBOM, Kora HeT HUKAKOM
YBepeHHOCTH, YTO 3aBTpa MBI OATH He OYAeM BHIHYKeHbI MpepBaTb oTu
OTHOMIeCHMA M3-3a Kakoli-1u60 OvepeqHOK pamMucTcKON MpoBOKalMM Cc ero
cTopoust, Bpoge « KarsrmcKol ucropuu». Ha mporamenun Bcero mocaez-
Hero nepuofa Ilompcxoe IIpasuremberso, rye TOH saqaeT CocnKoscKul,
He IIpeKpaljaeT BparkeOHBIX BEICTyNNeHMi MpoTuB CoBercKoro Cowaa.
IIpu rakom mouoKeHum Oe3 KOpeHHOrO yayumenua cocraspa Ilomp-

cKoro IIpapuresbcTBa HeIb3A *#aTb HMYero xopomero. UcKmouenue me
M3 ero cocTaBa UpoauiMcTcKUX MMMepwasucTM4eCKUX DJIEMeHTOB U
BKOUeHMe B Hero JWioqew FeMoKpaTM4ecKOro OOpasa MBICIIM, MO?KHO
HaJleATbCA, COBaIO ObI HafeHKalMe YCOBMA JIA YCTAHOBIeHMA xXopo-
IUMX COBECTCKO-IIOJIBCKUX OTHOUICHMM, pelieHwA BOIIpOCca O COBeTCKO-
NOUbCKOM rpaHule U BOOOMe AIA BOspompenuaA IlonbUIM Kak CUIbHOTO,
cBoOosHOrO MU HesaBucuMoro rocyyzapcTBa. B rakoM yy 4nleHuM cocTaBa
Ilonpcxoro [[papureibcTBa 3a“HTepecoBaHbl pemjye BCeTO CaMM NOJIAKH,
BaMHTepecoBaHbI CaMBle WIMpOKMe CJIOM MOMbCKOrO Hapofa. Hanomut,
KCTAaTMU, 4TO B Mae Upomsoro roqa Bet MHe mucasm, uro coctaB IlombcKoro
IIpapuresbcoTBa MO*KHO YIyuMMTS u aro Bui Oyfere AelicTBoBaTb B 9TOM
HalpaBueHuu. Torga Br ne cura, ¥TO sTO OyfeT BMeIaTebCTBOM BO
BHYTpeHHuit cyBepenurer Ilompmu.
OTHOCHTeILHO BOMpOCoOB, MOCTaBJICHHBIX I0JIbCKUMM MMHMCTpaMi, 0 KO-
TOPbIX roBOpuTcA B IyHKTe 4 Baniero mucbMa, A yMaio, HeTpyqHO Oyzer
JOroBOpuTECA.
Translation é
I see that you are devoting great attention to the problem of Soviet-Polish
relations. All of us appreciate these efforts very much.
It seems to me that the first problem which requires complete clarification al-
ready now is that of the Soviet-Polish frontier. You stated quite rightly that
Poland must allow the Allies to guide her in this matter. The Soviet Government
has already expressed its opinion on the frontier openly and clearly. We have
stated that we do not consider the 1939 frontier as being unalterable, we have
agreed to the Curzon Line, and have thus made very great concessions to the
Poles.2 The Polish Government, on the other hand, has evaded an answer to our
1 cf, Stalin’s correspondence etc., vol. 1, pp. 195-197.

2 The chief difference between the Molotov-Ribbentrop-Line of 1939 and the Curzon
Line is that according to the latter the greater part of the district (Voivodeship) of Bialy-
stok and the town of Bialystok itself, together with a small area on the San river to the
south of Przemy$l should remain Polish.
92
suggestion regarding the Curzon Line, and continues to state in its official pro-
clamations that the frontier forced upon us by the Treaty of Riga is unalterable.
The conclusion could be drawn from your letter that the Polish Government is
ready to recognize the Curzon Line, but it is known that the Poles have never
made an open declaration to this effect anywhere.
I am of the opinion that the Polish Government should state officially in a
declaration that the frontier laid down by the Treaty of Riga is to undergo a
change, and that the Curzon Line is the new boundary line between the USSR
and Poland. It should state this as officially as has been done by the Soviet
Government...
As you know, we agree with the statement you made to the Poles, namely, that
Poland will be able to extend her frontiers considerably to the west and north,
but there is one correction. I talked to you and the President about this cor-
rection in Teheran. It is our claim that the north-eastern part of East Prussia,
including the ice-free port of Kénigsberg, shall fall to the Soviet Union. This is
the sole small part of German territory which we claim. If this minimum claim
on the part of the Soviet Union is not granted, the Soviet Union’s concession,
which finds expression in the recognition of the Curzon Line, will become
meaningless, as I already told you in Teheran.
Coming to the question of the composition of the Polish Government, I think
you will understand that we cannot take up relations with the present Polish
Government. In fact, what use would it be to take up relations with a government,
if we can never be sure that tomorrow we shall not be forced to break off these re-
lations again owing to another fascist provocation on their part on the lines of the
“Katyn Affair”. The Polish Government, in which Sosnkowski! plays a leading
part, has of late manifested an unceasing hostility towards the Soviet Union.
After further complaints about the Anti-Soviet attitude adopted by the

Poles abroad and those in the underground forces, Stalin refers to Molotov’s
suggestions (see No. 59a):
In view of this state of affairs, nothing useful can be expected without a radical
improvement in the composition of the Polish Government. If, however, the
pro-fascist imperialistic elements were to be excluded from it, and democratically-
minded people included, we may entertain the hope that suitable conditions
for the restoration of good Soviet-Polish relations, for the decision regarding the
Soviet-Polish frontier question, and for the rebirth of Poland as a strong, free, and
independent state might have been created. It is chiefly the Poles themselves — the
1 General Kazimierz Sosnkowski was the Deputy President of the State in Exile; he had
been Minister without Portfolio in the Sikorski Government, from which, however, he
resigned in protest against the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30th, 1941 (see above
p. 23, note 1). After the death of General Sikorski on July 4th, 1943, he was made Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces and as such was also in command of the
»Armia Krajowa“, the underground forces operating in Poland.
93
great mass of the Polish nation — who are interested in such an improvement
in the composition of the Polish Government. I take this opportunity to remind
you that you wrote me in May last year that the composition of the Polish Govern-
ment might be improved, and that you would work actively towards this end.
At that time you did not think that this would be an interference in Poland’s
internal sovereignty.
As regards the questions put to you by the Polish Ministers, which are referred
to in point 4 of your letter! I think it will be no difficulty to come to an agreement
on this subject.
64b
Roosevelt asks Stalin: Will Mikotajczyk stay out of any pressure if he accepts the
“Teheran formula”?
President Roosevelt addressed the following note2 on the Polish question
to Stalin on February 7th, 1944:
AA caMbIM BHUMaTeJIbHEIM 00pa3s0M CieqMI 3a NocTeqHuMU cOOLITHAMH

B Bammx oTHomeHnuax c Ilonpmei. A cuuratw, aro MHe TOJHOCTbIO
usBectua Baia TouKa 8peHuA 10 FaHHOMY BOMpocy, UM MOdTOMY A TOJIb-
ByYI0Cb HaCTOAMUM CJIyaaeM IA Toro, 4wroOnr HanucaTb Bam o cBoux
cooOpasKeHMAX Ha OCHOBe Hallux MeperoBoposB B Terepane. IlosBoubrte
MHe TIpesKle BCCTO pasbAHCHUTh, ATO A He *KeTalo WM He HAMepeH BLIABUraTh
TIPeAOMCHUA UM TeM Oouee FaBaTb Bam B KaKOM-IMO0 OTHOMeHUM
COBeTHI 10 IOBOJY TOTO, B YeM BakKIIOUaIOTCA UHTepecE! Poccuu B WaHHOM
BOIIpOCce, TAK KaK A IOTHOCTHIO OCO3HAaL, 4TO OyAyMIad GesonacHoctTs Ba-
pieli CTpaHEl, M STO COBEPUICHHO CUpaBeIMBO, B MepBy!o O4epesb KacaeTcH
Bac. CooOpaskenua, KOTOpHe A COOMpaloch U3I0KUTL, BLI3SBAHEI JMB
Ooxee MIMpOKMMM BOMpOCaMM, 8aTparuBalouluMu Hallty oOMyI Web, K
KOTOpOM MbI 00a CTpemuMcA.
Kax Bui snaere, nofaBsaiomee OOAbUIMHCTBO Hatlero Hapoga u HKou-
rpecc C SHTY3Ma3MOM IIpUBeTCTBOBAIM WMpOKMe PMH, OTHOCUTeIbHO
KOTOPBIX OBLIO FOCTUrHYTO cormanteHue Ha Mockoscroii u Terepancnoii
KOHPepeHIMAX, U A BHaI0, YTO Bul cormacuTecb CO MHOMi B TOM, 4TO BeCbMa
BajKHO, YTOOBI Bepa B dTM CormamenuA He Mora OnITH MO_BeprHyta
KakOMy-JIM00 comHenwio. Al yBepeH, 4TO MOsKeT OnITH HaliqeHo TaKoe
pelleHve, KOTOpOe TNOUHOCTHIO 3anjuTMao On uNTepecht Poccum mw yyo-
BleTBOpUIO Ont Bame merwanme BUeETh ApyskeCTBeHHY!O, He3aBMCUMy1O
Ilombmy uM KOTOpoe B TO *Ke BpeMA He OTPasM0cb Ont WaryOHo Ha cOTpPyT-
HMWeCTBe, YCTAHOBJICHHOM TAKUM 8aMeyaTeIbHBIM OOpasom B MockKse ut B
Terepaue.
Al BHUMaTeIbHO paccmoTpen TOouKy speHua Bamero IIpanurespcrsa,
m3s107KeHHY10 r-HOM Moworosnm™ r-ny Vappumany 18 aupaps, orHocuTenbHO
H€BOSMOJKHOCTM, © COBCTCKOM TOUKM B8peHMA, UMCTB KaKOe-TMO0 Teo ¢
1 See pp. 90-91.

2 cf. The memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. 2, pp. 1439-1440.
94
HaxoyAnMMcA B MsrHanuM [loupckum [[papuresmbcrBom B ero HEIHeMIHEelt
(bopMe mM mpeyomenue r-Ha Moworosa 0 Tom, wrodst Iompceroe Ipann-
TeIbCTBO ObIIO PeOpranusoBaHo MyTeM BKJNOUeCHUA B Hero TMObCKUX
SJIEMeCHTOB, HAXOAIMMXCH B HacTrosmee BpemA B CoeyuHennerx Irarax,
B BesmnoOpurannuu u B Coperckom Covwse. Al nomHocrbio nonmmaro Bane
melaHue MMeTb jleIO TOUBKO ¢C TakuM LlombcKum LIlpapuresmbersom,
KoTOpomMy Bt Momere AOBepATS HM HA KOTOPOe MOMKHO paccuMTHIBATS
B TOM OTHOIIeHMM, 4YTO OHO YCTAHOBMT NOCTOAHHBIe [pyskeCTBeHHEIe
oTHOmeHUA ¢ CopercKum Co1o3som. Ho # ucKpeHHe Hayelocb, 4T0, moKa
eTa WpoOsema ocraercA Bce emje HepaspenleHHoll, He Oyper cyesmtaHo
HMUUerO TAKOLO, YTO MpeBpaTuo OBI sTOT OCOOEI BOMpOC B TAKOM BOMpPOC,
KOTOphii MaryOuo orpasnucsa Ont Ha Gomee KRPYMHEIX MpOOmemax Oymymero
MevKyHaposHOro coTpyquMyectBa. B Tro BpeMsA Kak OOmeCcTBeHHOe MHeHMe
CKlaQbIBaeTCA B MOUb3SY NOWMepKKU UPMHIMWOB MesyHapoOHOrO Co-
TpyuMuecTBa, Ham OcoObMi Jour cocrouT B TOM, 4roOBI u3sberaTbh KAKUX-
am00 lelicrBuli, KOTOpEe MOT Obl WOMeMMaTb FOcTusKeHMIO Hallelt riaB-
HOM Wen.
Ilpempep-Munucrp Uepunsaib cooOmum MHe, 4To OH IBITAaeTCA yOeAUTE
nmoubeKoro Ilpembep-Munuctrpa coBepmieHHo omnpeseneHHO Upw3HaTb
B KavecTBe Oasbl (IA WeperoBopoB TeppuTopMabHble W3MeHeCHUA, KOTOPHIe
OnIm mpequomeHtt Bamum Ilpasurenpcrsom. Heab3sa am Ha atoit Gaze
HaliTu KaKoli-sm00 oTBeT Ha Bompoc 0 cocrasBe IloupcKoro I[pasurenpcrsa,
KOTOpHt UpeqocraBust Ob BO3MO7KHOCTB caMoMy ToOmBCKOMy [lpembep-
MUHUCTPY IpousBecTH TakKUe U3MeHeHHA B cocTaBe cBoero I[paBurebcTBa,
KOTOpHIe Moram Ont OnITh HeOOXOAMMEI, O6€3 KaKUX-IM00 Mpu3sHaKOB
WaBIeHUA WIM TOTO, YTO 9TO OBO MpOMMKTOBAHO Apyroii crpauoii?
Mue kKasKeTCA, GTO C TOUKM 3PeCHUA OYePEAHOCTM BOMPOCOB B TepBYIO
ouepeqb B HACTOAMIece BPCMA HY*KHO paccMOTpeTb BOMpOC O TOM, 4TOOEI
NOUbCKMe MapTUsaHbEl JelicTBoBaM coBMecTHO ¢ Bawumu npoyBuraiou-
MUCA BOUCKaMU, a He MPOTUB HUX. JTO — BOMpOC aKTyaIbHOM BayKHOCTH,
M B KayecTBe HepBoro mara OnIIO Obl BeCbMa HOe3HO KaKOe-JIM00
BaBepeHe CO CTOPOHEI BCEX ILOJIAKOB.
English text
I have been following the recent developments in your relations with Poland
with the closest attention. I feel that I am fully aware of your views on the sub-
ject and am therefore taking this opportunity of communicating with you on
the basis of our conversations at Teheran. First of all, let me make it plain that I
neither desire nor intend to attempt to suggest much less to advise you in any way
as to where the interests of Russia lie in this matter since I realize to the full that
the future security of your country is rightly your primary concern. The observa-
tions which I am about to make are prompted solely by the larger issues which
affect the common goal towards which we are both working.
As you know, the overwhelming majority of our people and Congress welcomed
95
rote
with enthusiasm the broad principles subscribed to at the Moscow and Teheran
conferences, and I know that you agree with me that it is of the utmost import-
ance that faith in these understandings should not be left in any doubt. I am sure
that a solution can be found which would fully protect the interests of Russia and
satisfy your desire to see a friendly, independent Poland, and at the same time not
adversely affect the co-operation so splendidly established at Moscow and Teheran.
I have given careful consideration to the views of your Government as out-
lined by Mr. Molotov to Mr. Harriman on January 18th! regarding the impossi-
bility from the Soviet point of view of having any dealings with the Polish
Government-in-Exile in its present form and Mr. Molotov’s suggestion that the
Polish Government should be reconstituted by the inclusion of Polish elements at
present in the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. I fully appre-
ciate your desire to deal only with a Polish Government in which you can repose
confidence and which can be counted upon to establish permanent friendly relations
with the Soviet Union, but it is my earnest hope that while this problem remains
unsolved nothing should be done to transform this special question into one ad-
versely affecting the larger issues of future international collaboration. While
public opinion is forming in support of the principle of international collaboration,
it is especially incumbent upon us to avoid any action which might appear to
counteract the achievement of our long-range objective.
I am told by Prime Minister Churchill that he is endeavouring to persuade the
Polish Prime Minister to make a clean-cut acceptance as a basis for negotiation of
the territorial changes which have been proposed by your Government. Is it not
possible on that basis to arrive at some answer to the question of the composition
of the Polish Government which would leave it to the Polish Prime Minister him-
self to make such changes in his government as may be necessary without any evi-
dence of pressure or dictation from a foreign country?
It seems to me, as a matter of timing, that the first consideration at this time
should be that Polish guerillas should work with and not against your advancing
troops. That is of current importance and as a first step some assurance on the
part of all Poles would be of great advantage.
Stalin’s correspondence with Churchill, Attlee etc., vol. 2, No. 159, pp. 119-120.
64c¢c
Stalin persists in his demand: Curzon Line and a fundamental “Improvement in

the composition of the Polish Government”
Stalin replied with a note dated February 16th, addressed to Roosevelt,

using nearly the same sentences as in his note to Churchill (64 a). He wrote
inter alia:
1 Compare No, 59a, p. 82.
96
Bech UMeCIOTCA [Ba OCHOBHEIX ITyHKTa: HepBbIit — COBeTCKO-ObCKaA
rpanuia, Bropoit — cocras [loupcxoro [Ipasurenscrsa. ...
IIpeskye Bcero 0 coBercKo-nombCKOl rpanuue. Kar usBectHo, Copercrkoe
Upasurerbcrso ounmanbyo saxBu0, YTO OHO He cuMTaer rpanuny
1939 rojja Hem3MeHHOL, U cormacumoch Ha manmio Kepsona. ... Taroe
3acdBleHwe O TpW3sHanum mMuna Kepsona [lompexoe Ipasurenperso
HOWKHO OWI ObI CheTAaTb CTO Ke OUNMAbHO, Kak 9TO yee CjeTaJO
Coserckoe Ipasurenscrso. Tem ue menee [loapcnoe IIpanurenperso B
JlonfoHe He CABUHYIOCh C6 MecTa, M0-IpesxHeMy B CBOMX ouMasbHBIX
BHICTYIICHMAX BHICKASHBaAHCh 38a TO, 4TO pana, KOTOpad Oniia B
Tpyquyl0 MMHyTy HaBA3aHa Ham 0 PucKomMy oroBopy, omHHAa
ocTaTbcA HeusMeHHoOH. CaeqoBareibHo, 3{eCb HeT MO 4BBI AIA Cormamenua,
mu00 TOUKAa speHuA HEIHeMHero [lompcKoro IIpapuresbcrBa, Kak BUAHO,
MCKJUOUeT BOSMO7KHOCTH COTrMaeHuA.
B cBa3sm ¢ oTuM OOcTOATeILCTBOM ObocTpusICA HM BOTIpOC 0 cocTaBe
Ilompcxoro Upasurexsersa. II[pu atom scuo, aro Ilompcroe pasuress-
CTBO, B KOTOPOM rulaBHYy0 POuJIb Urpator BparKfeOuLIe Coperckomy Corosy
upodalmMercKWe UMIepMasMcTH4eCcKMe DJIEMeHTH Bpofe CoCHKOBCKOrO u
B KOTOPOM IOYTH HeT JeMOKPATM4eCKUX BIIEMCHTOB, He MO?KET UMeTb
HOUBEI B CaMoli [lombme M He MO?KET, KAK MOKa8a ONBIT, yYCTAHOBUTb
JIPy*KeCCTBCHHEIX OTHOMWCHMi C COcCeqHUMM WeMOKpaTu4deckuMM rocy-
qapeTBamu. EcrecrBpenuo, uro tTakoe [loupcxoe IlpasurenberBo He B
COCTOAHUM YCTAHOBUTS JpyKeCTBeHHEIX OTHOMeHU c CoBpercKkuM Co1030M
M OT HeTO HeIb3A *HaTb, TOOL OHO HE BHOCHIO paslaga B Cpexy Aemo-
KpaTH4eCKUX CTPaH, KOTOPHe, HANpOTUB, 3aMHTepecoBaH! B YKpenMeHun
eqMHCTBa Meskyy HuMM. Orciofqa culeqyeT, 4TO KOpeHHOe yyumeHue
coctasa [lompcxoro IlpasurenbcTBa ABIIAeTCA HaspeBlleli 3ayayeilt.
Perepiska Predsedatelja Soveta Ministrov etc., vol. 2, No., 160, pp. 120-121.
Translation
eee
There are two fundamental points: the first of these concerns the Soviet-
Polish frontier, and the second concerns the composition of the Polish Govern-
ment.
First of all, about the Soviet-Polish frontier: It is known that the Soviet Govern-
ment has declared officially that it does not consider the 1939 frontier to be un-
alterable, and that it is in agreement with the Curzon Line.
The Polish Government should have made a statement about the agreement with
the Curzon Line in the same official manner as has already been done by the Soviet
Government. Nevertheless, the Polish Government in London has not moved a
finger, and its official proclamations have continued to insist that the frontier
forced upon us at a difficult moment at the Peace of Riga should be left unchanged.
Consequently there is no basis for an understanding, for the point of view of the
1 cf. Stalin’s correspondence with Churchill, Attlee etc., vol. 2, No. 160, pp. 120-121.
97
present Polish Government excludes any possibility of an understanding as
becomes plain from this.
The problem of the composition of the Polish Government has also become more
acute in connection with this state of affairs. It is obvious that the Polish Govern-
ment, in which pro-fascist imperialist elements of Sosnkowski’s! kind, who are
hostile to the Soviet Union play a leading part, and which contains practically no
democratic elements, cannot have a basis in Poland, and, as experience has
shown, cannot establish friendly relations with the neighbouring democratic states.
Such a Polish Government is naturally not in a position to establish friendly re-
lations with the Soviet Union, and it is to be expected that it will sow dissension
among the democratic countries, which are after all interested in strengthening
their unity. It would thus appear that a radical improvement in the composition
_ of the Polish Government is an urgent matter.
65
The Polish Government-in-Exile is in certain circumstances prepared to recognize

a demarcation line between Poland and the Soviet Union east of Vilna and Lvov
In the course of further negotiations the Polish Government-in-Exile sent

the following note to Churchill on February 15th, 1944:
The Polish Government is ready to start conversations with the Soviet Gov-
ernment, with the co-operation of the British and American Governments, on
-all outstanding questions. We do not exclude frontier discussions relating to the
east, west and north.
The dictatorial demand by the USSR that we must agree in advance to the
recognition of the Curzon Line as the future Polish frontier cannot be accepted
by the Polish Government. The result of conversations concerning frontiers can
be realized only after the end of the war.
During war hostilities, we would consent to a Demarcation Line, running east
of Wilno and Lwow. The territory west of this Demarcation Line, after this
territory is freed from German occupation, should be taken over by the Polish
Government. The territory east of the Demarcation Line should go to the
administration of the Soviet military authorities, with the full participation of:
representatives of all Allied powers.
The Polish Government considers it a duty to state that the intention of in-
corporation into the Soviet Union of a part of East Prussia with KGnigsberg is
against the interests of the Polish State and painfully restrains her free access to
the sea.
1 See note 1 on page 93.
98
65a
Churchill urges a secret Polish-Soviet Compensation Agreement
After conducting further lengthy negotiations with the Government-in-Exile,

Churchill sent an extensive message to Stalin on February 20th, 1944, the
text of which had been agreed upon with Mikolajczyk and Romer, the
Polish Foreign Minister 1. It was worded as follows:
Ilomscroe I]pasurenberso rorono sanBuTh, uTo Puskckad JIMHMA Tenepb

ye He COOTBETCTBYeT JeiicTBUTeILHOMY MOJO?7KeHMIO Beleli HM 4YTO OHO
roToBO Ip Hamlem yuacruu oOcyquTL ¢ Coperckum IIpaspuresbeTBoM Kak
wacTb BceoOmlero yperyiMpoBaHuA BOTpOC 0 HOBO rpaHune Mery
Hombueti 1 Coperckum Co1030M BMecTe ¢ BOTIpocoM o 6yfzyumx rpanuiax
Ilompum Ha ceBepe Mt Ha sanage. Tak Kak, OMHAKO, KOMMeHCAIMU, KOTOPETe
Iloubma mosyauT Ha ceBepe M Ha samaye, He MOoryT OnITh B HacTOAIee
BpeMA TpefaHbl TacHOCTH WIM yTOUHeHHI, ACHO, 4TO IlompcKoe IIpaBu-
TeJIbCTBO He MO?KET BEICTYHUTH C HEMeAIeHHOM myOmM4HO FeKIapaluelt
0 cBoelt TOTOBHOCTM yCTYNUThL TeppUTOpMO, KaK yKa3aHO BBIMe, TAK Kak
ONyOTMKOBaHMe TAaKOrO COrmalleHMA BHITIAReIO Obl COBepuIeHHO O{HO-
CTOPOHHMM aKTOM, YTO MOBIEKIO Ob He MeqIeHHoe FesaByuposanue IIpasu-
TEJIbCTBA B8HAYMTEILHOM YacTbIO HAapOfa 38a Tpanuyell M MOANOAbHEIM
BusKenuem B [loubUIe, C KOTOPHIM OHO TOAepskUBaeT NOCTOAHHBIM KOH-
takT. Ilosromy oO¥4eBHHO, YTO TOUbCKO-COBeTCKOe TeppuTOpuasbHoe
corlalieHve, KOTOpOe OJKHO OLITA COCTaBHOM yacTbIo obmero Teppu-
TOpMaIbHOrTO yperyiupoBanua B Espone, moet OnITh (hopMasbHO
cormacoBaHoO MU paTumuUMpoBaHO TOTbKO TOTAa, Kora PepKaBel-no0bequ-
TeAbHUIMB COOepyTCA 8a CTOJIOM B MOMeHT paspaoorKU ycOBMi nepemupuA
WIM Mupa. GG6 FO
Ilo strum npuannam [lonpcroe [Ipasurenbcrso, 10Ka OHO HE A Fei
Ha IOJIbCKYy!0 TeppuToOpuio UU He OyeT UMCTb BO3MO?KHOCTU KOHCYJIbTUPO-
BaTbCA C HOJbCKUM HapoOOM, OYeBUAHO, He CMO7KeT POPMAILHO OTPe4bCA
OT CBOMX MpaB Ha Kakyio-1m00 uacTb Iloubmm B TOM Buje, B KAKOM OHA TO
cMx Nop cyllecTBoBasa, HO 9HeprM4uHoe BefeHue BOE MpoTuB Tep-
MaHMM B COTPYAHMU4ECTBE C COBETCKUMM BOCKAMM OBLIO OBI B 8HAYMTEIb-
HO creneHu oOerdeHo, ecau Ont Cosercnoe IIpasurenbcrBo mocopeilt-
cTBOBasIO BOsBpameHui0 Iloupcxoro IlpapurenpcrBa Ha ocBOOOmeHHYIO
TePppUTOpHIO B BO3MO7KHO CKOPOM BpeMeHM UM ecu Ob OHO, KOHCYJIbTU-
pycb co cBoumMu OpuTaHCKUM M aMepMKaHCKUM CO1lO3HUKaMM, 10 Mepe
IpOABUsKeHUA PYCCKMUX BOCK COrMACOBEIBAJIO ObI BpeMA OT BpeMeHM C
Ilompcxum I[papurenpcrBom co3fqanme opraHoB rpaskyancKoi ayMMHu-
ctpauuu Iloupcxoro [[papurempcrBa B ompeeueHHErx paiionax. Taxaa
upolesypa B oOulem cooTBercrBoBasa Ont TOM, KOTOpaA OJPKHA IpH-
MeHATECA B Apyrux crpaHax moO Mepe ux ocBoOompenua. EcrecrBenHo,
arto Iloupcxomy I[papurenpcrBy BeCbMa *KeaTebHO, YTOOHI palioHE,
KOTOpbie OyyT MepefaHbl B BefeHWe NOMbCKOM rpameyqaHcKou ayMuHu-
1 In his accompanying letter of the same date, Churchill says: “The following telegram
was shown to the Polish Prime Minister and the Polish Foreign Minister, written after
full consultation with them, and despatched with their approval.”
99
Ye.
** a
cTpalluu, BKIOUAIN Ob TAaKMe IYHKTH, KaK Busbuo uJ] bBo, rye cocpejo-
TOYCHO MHOFO IONAKOB, HM TOOL! TeppUTOPUM K BOCTOKY OT JeMapKallMou-
HOM JIMHUM HAaXOMIMCh MO yupaBsJeHWeM COBETCKUX BOCHHEIX BlacTelt
pm cofelicrsum upegzcrapureseit OdObequunennpix Haynii. Hompenoe
I[papuresxbcrBo yKa3biBpaeT Ha TO, 4TO TAKUM O6pas0M OHO uMesO OBI
HausyuuiMe BOSMO;KHOCTH AIA UpMBAeVeHMA BCeX UsM4eCKM TOMHEIX
IlOJIAKOB K y4acTMio B BOCHHELX yousMmAX. Al uM CoOOMMI, M OHM OTUeTIMBO
noHuMator, aro Bs He cormacutecb ocrapuTs Buspno u JIbBoB Nop NOb-
eKUM yipaBileHuem. C Apyroi cropousl, A xoTed Onl ObITh B COCTOAHUM
BaBepUTb MX, 4TO paiioH, KOTOpHI WoWKeH OLITh MepefaH B Beene
HOUbCKOM rpaKqaHcKol aqMunucTpayun, OyfeT BKIUOUATL NO Kpaiinei
mepe Bc10 Ilouputy K 3anafqy oT 1mHuM Kepsona.
IIpu BeqeHuu MeperoBopos, UpexyCMOTpeHHEIX BO BTOPOM absalle BEIM,
o rpanuyax, HoupcKoe I[pasurenbcrBo, yauTEIBaA CMelIaHHBIil xapakTep
Hacenenua Bocrounot Houpmu, ofo6puno Onr-rpanuiy, UpoBeseHHy10
Tak, 4TOObI OHA OOeCMeUMBAIAa MAKCMMAJIbHYIO OMHOPOAHOCTh HaceJeHuA
c 06eMxX CTOPOH, 10 BO8MO%KHOCTH YMeHbUIAaH B TO Ke BpeMA OOMeH
HaceeHUA MU CBABAHHBIe C HUM TpyqHOcTU. AA WM4HO HE COMHEBAIOCS, B
ocoOeHHOCTH BBU]y HeMe]JICHHEIX IpakTUYeCKUX Mep, pes yCMOTPeHHEIX
Iloapcxum [[papurexbcTBoM M M3107KeHHEIX B TpeTbeM aOsalle BBIMe, YTO
BTM WeperoBophl Hew3beHKHO IpUBexyT K *MemaemMoMy Bamu pesyubrary
OTHOCUTeAbHO Oy yWIHOCTM NOUbCKO-cOBeTCKOM TpaHMUb, HO MO,yepRI-
BaTb 9TO WyOM4HO B HaCTOAMIee BpeMAH MHE Ka?KeTCH HCHY/KHEIM Hf
He@7KCMATCIILHBIM. ...
6 deppasA B nepBEIit pas A cooOmua IlonpcKomy I[papureasnerBy, 4To
Coperckoe [I[paBurenbcrBo sellaeT yCTaHOBUTb rpaHuuy B BocrcuHoli
Ilpyccuu taxum 06pa3o0M, 4TOOEI BRIIIOUMTH B COCTAB pyCCKOli TeppuTopun
HKenurc6epr. JTo cooOnlenue ABMsIOcb yqapom yaa IlonpcKoro IIpasu-
TeJIbCTBA, YCMATPMBalOMerO B TaKOM pelIeHMM 38HAUYMTeIbHOe YMeHb-
HIeHMe B BeIMUMHE M B SKOHOMUYECKOM 8HAYeHUM TOI repMaHCKOll Teppu-
TOpMM, KOTOpad OWHKHA OBIT UIpMcoequHeHa K IlombUe B BAe KOMICH-
cauuu. Ho A cKasas, 470, 10 MHeHuIO IIpaBureabcTBa Ero Benuuecrsa,
oTO ABUIACTCA CUpaBeIMBOM Wperensueli co cropoHEt Poccun. Paccmarpu-
Bah, KAK A OTO eal, oTY BOliHy NpOTMB TrepMaHCKOii arpeccum Kak
OHO Wesoe M Kak TPUWaTUeTHIOIW BOlHy, HayaButyiocA B 1914 ropy,
Al HamomMuua r-Hy Muxouaiiuanky o TOM dakTe, 4TO BeMIA 9TOM YacTH
Bocrounon Ipyccum oOarpena pycckKoii KpOBbW, meqpo uposmmroli sa
oOmee femo. 3fecb pyccKue BOlicKa, HacTynaA B aBprycre 1914 roza u
BBIMrpaB cparkeHue 107, 'yMOwHHeHOM M Apyrue OuTBE, CBOMM HacTy-
IWleHveM MB yiepO coOcTBeHHOL MOOMIMBAalUM BacTaBUJIM HeEMIeB CHATb
aba apMelickux KOplyca, HacrynaBumx Ha Ilapmx, yTO cHIrpamo cyme-
CTBCHHY10 pOwJlb B obeye Ha Mapne. Heygaga nog Tannendeprom nu B
Kakol cTeleHM He aHHyJIMpoOBasa oTUX OombMIMX yconexoB. IloaTomy MHe
KasaJloch, YTO pyccKkMe MUMewT UcTOpMuecKylO HM XOpomMo OOocHOBaHHy10
IIpeTeH3UI0 Ha DOTY HEMeIKYIO TeppMTopHo. ...
Kem On B Cormamenmu, BRIO UAIONIeM B CeOA BEIM yKasauHEle IYHKTEL,
Cosercnoe [I[pasuresberso u Ilpasurerperso Ero BeamuectBa coBmMecTHo
oOn3aIMCh B OTHOMeHMM {pyr Apyra u [lomum, Bo-nepBEIX, IpMsHaTb
YBaKATL CYBepeHUTeT, HEZABUCMMOCTh MU TeppUTOPMAMbHYW IeMOCTHOCTh
100
nepecrpoenHoti [loubmm mu mpaBo KarKQoro Ges BMeIMATebCTBa BeCTM CBO
BHYTpeHHue fea; BO-BTOPHIX, CqelaTb BCe OT HUX saBucAIee, aroOnI
oOecnewTb B CBoe BpemA IpucoeyMHeHue K Tombmte cBobomHOro ropoma
Januura, Onnestbua, Cunesun, Bocrounoit IIpyccuu k sanapy uk lory oT
IMHuM, uyueit or Kenurcbepra, uw Tako uactu TeppuTopuu zo Oxepa,
Koropyr Houmbexoe Upasurenserso Haiiqer memecooOpasHhM IpuAATH;
B-TpeTbUX, OCYIMeCTBUTH Mepecemenue HeMelKoro HaceseHuA u3 Ilompmm,
BEJIIO¥aA TEPMAHCKMe TEppUTOPUN, KOTOPHIe OIKHEL OLITE IpUCoeAMHeHBI
kK Ilompme; u, B-yYeTBepTEX, COrmacoBaTb Upoleqypy oOMena HaceseHuA
mesmpty Honupmeii mu Coperckum Cos0m um upomenypy BosBpaienua Ha
pomMHy rparwyqan STMX TocyapcTB, TO 9TO COOTBeTCTBOBAIO OBI TeM
gaBepeHuaMm, KoTOpHIe Brt mMue gaa. Boe oOa3aTesbLcTBa B OTHOIMeHMM
Apyr Apyra co croponnt Ilompmm, Coperckoro Coosa u CoeyquHeHHoro
KopouescrBa, 10 MOe€My MHeHM10, JOKHH OHITB OdOpMseHI TAKUM
o6pasom, 4rOOEI UX MO?KHO OLINO BKIIOUNTH B OAMH JOKYMeHT MIM Ba~ukKcu-
poBaTb locpesCTBOM OOMeHa IMCbMaMm.
Al cooOmma1 NOTECKUM MUHMCTpaM, 4TO, ecu cormameHue, HaMedeHHOe
K HacTOAIeMy BpeMeHM B pesybTaTe OOMeHa TeerpaMMaMU, OcyIe-
CTBUTCH WM BCe CTOPOHE! OyfyT AelicrBoBaT, B ero Ayxe, [[paBuTrembcTBO
Ero BesmuectBa noyyepsRuT Takoe cormalleHue Ha KOHMepenyuM mocme
modean Hag Curmepom, a Take 4TO OHO TOTOBO rapaHTMpOBaTb Takoe
corualieHue B MOcsepyiouMe TOE, WOCKOILKY 9TO OypeT B ero cuuaXx.
Perepiska Predsedatelja Soveta Ministrov etc., vol. 1, No. 243, pp. 202-205,
English text
The Polish Government are ready to declare that the Riga Line no longer cor-
responds to realities and with our participation to discuss with the Soviet Govern-
ment, as part of the general settlement, a new frontier between Poland and the
Soviet Union together with the future frontiers of Poland in the North and West.
Since however the compensations which Poland is to receive in the North and
West cannot be stated publicly or precisely at the present time the Polish Govern-
ment clearly cannot make an immediate public declaration of their willingness to
cede territory as indicated above because the publication of such an arrangement
would have an entirely onesided appearance with the consequence that they would
immediately be repudiated by a large part of their people abroad and by the
underground movement in Poland with which they are in constant contact. It is
evident therefore that the Polish-Soviet territorial settlement which must be an
integral part of the general territorial settlement of Europe could only formally
be agreed and ratified when the victorious Powers are gathered round the table
at the time of an armistice or peace.
For the above reasons the Polish Government, until it had returned to Polish
territory and been allowed to consult the Polish people, can obviously not formally
abdicate its rights in any part of Poland as hitherto constituted, but vigorous
prosecution of the war against Germany in collaboration with the Soviet armies
would be greatly assisted if the Soviet Government will facilitate the return of
the Polish Government to liberated territory at the earliest possible moment; and
101
in consultation with their British and American Allies as the Russian armies ad-
vance, arrange from time to time with the Polish Government for the establish-
ment of the civil administration of the Polish Government in given districts. This
procedure would be in general accordance with those to be followed in the case
of other countries as they are liberated. The Polish Government are naturally very
anxious that the districts to be placed under Polish civil administration should
include such places as Vilna and Lvov where there are concentrations of Poles
and that the territories to the East of the demarcation Line should be administered
by Soviet military authorities with the assistance of representatives of the United
Nations. They point out that thus they would be in the best position to enlist all
such able-bodied Poles in the war effort. I have informed them and they clearly
understand that you will not assent to leaving Vilna and Lvov under Polish ad-
ministration. I wish on the other hand to be able to assure them that the area
to be placed under Polish civil administration will include at least all Poland west
of the Curzon Line.
At the frontier negotations contemplated in paragraph 2 above the Polish Gov-
ernment, taking into consideration the mixed character of the population of
Eastern Poland, would favour a frontier drawn with a view to assuring the highest
degree of homogeneity on both sides, while reducing as much as possible the extent
and hardship of an exchange of populations. I have no doubt myself, especially in
view of the immediate practical arrangements contemplated by the Polish Govern-
ment set out in paragraph 3 above, that these negotiations will inevitably lead to
the conclusion you desire in regard to the future of the Polish-Soviet frontier, but
it seems to me unnecessary and undesirable publicly to emphasise this at this stage.
For the first time on February 6th I told the Polish Government that the Soviet
Government wished to have the frontier in East Prussia drawn to include, on the
Russian side, K6nigsberg. The information came as a shock to the Polish Govern-
ment, who see in such a decision substantial reduction in the size and in the eco-
nomic importance of the German territory to be incorporated in Poland by way
of compensation. But I stated that, in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government,
this was a rightful claim on the part of Russia. Regarding, as I do, this war against
German agression as all one and as a thirty-years’ war from 1914 onwards, I
reminded M. Mikolajezyk of the fact that the soil of this part of East Prussia was
dyed with Russian blood expended freely in the common cause. Here the Russian
armies advancing in August 1914 and winning the battle of Gumbinnen and other
actions had with their forward trusts and with much injury to their mobilisation
forced the Germans to recall two army corps from the advance on Paris which
withdrawal was an essential part in the victory of the Marne. The disaster at
Tannenberg did not in any way undo this great result. Therefore it seemed to me
that the Russians had a historic and well-founded claim to this German territory.
As regards the composition of the Polish Government, the Polish Government
cannot admit any right of a foreign intervention. They can however assure the
Russian Government that by the time they have entered into diplomatic relations
102
with the Soviet Government they will include among themselves none but persons
fully determined to cooperate with the Soviet Union. I am of the opinion that
it is much better that such changes should come about naturally and as a result of
further Polish consideration of their interests as a whole. It might well be in my
opinion that the moment for a resumption of these relations in a formal manner
would await the reconstitution of a Polish Government at the time of the liberation
of Warsaw when it would arise naturally from the circumstances attending that
glorious event.
It would be in accordance with the assurances I have received from youthat in an
agreement covering the points made above the Soviet Government should join
with His Majesty’s Government in undertaking vis-a-vis each other and Poland,
first to recognise and respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial inte-
grity of reconstituted Poland and the right of each to conduct its domestic af-
fairs without interference, and secondly to do their best to secure in due course
the incorporation in Poland of the Free City of Danzig, Oppeln, Silesia!, East
Prussia, west and south of a line running from K6nigsberg and of as much terri-
tory up to the Oder as the Polish Government see fit to accept; thirdly to effect
the removal from Poland including the German territories to be incorporated in
Poland of the German population; and fourthly to negotiate the procedure for
the exchange of population between Poland and the Soviet Union and for the return
to the Mother Country of the nationals of the Powers in question. All the under-
takings to each other on the part of Poland, the Soviet Union and the United
Kingdom should in my view be drawn up in such a form that they could be
embodied in a single instrument or exchange of letters.
I informed the Polish Ministers that should the settlement which has now been
outlined in the various telegrams that have passed between us become a fact and
be observed in spirit by all the parties to it, His Majesty’s Government would
support that settlement at the Conference after the defeat of Hitler and also that
we would guarantee that settlement in after years to the best of our ability.
66
Churchill speaks publicly of the intention to give Poland compensation in

Germany
Inareport onthe Teheran Conference inthe House of Commons Mr. Churchill
said on February 22nd, 1944:
I took occasion to raise personally with Marshal Stalin, the question of the
1 The wording “Oppeln, Silesia” is probably due to an error. Obviously it was said:
“Oppeln Silesia” or “Opole Silesia”, i.e. Upper Silesia. This expression was used in
Mikolajczyk’s Memorandum to Churchill and Roosevelt prior to the Teheran Conference
(No. 34) and also played an important part (cf. No. 59) in Churchill’s talks with Miko-
fajezyk which took place before the message reproduced here was sent. The fact that
Oppeln is a Silesian town also tells against “Oppeln, Silesia” version. It would be illogical
to name a single town, if the province is to be mentioned immediately thereafter.
103
future of Poland. I pointed out that it was in fulfilment of our guarantee to
Poland that Great Britain declared war upon Nazi Germany and that we had
never weakened in our resolve, even in the period when we were all alone, and
that the fate of the Polish nation holds a prime place in the thoughts and policies
of His Majesty’s Government and of the British Parliament. It was with great
pleasure that I heard from Marshal Stalin that he, too, was resolved upon the
creation and maintenance of a strong integral independent Poland as one of the
leading Powers in Europe. He has several times repeated these declarations in
public and I am convinced that they represent the settled policy of the Soviet
Union.
Here I may remind the House that we ourselves have never in the past
guaranteed, on behalf of His Majesty’s Government, any particular frontier line
to Poland.1 We did not approve of the Polish occupation of Vilna in 1920. The
British view in 1919 stands expressed in the so-called Curzon line which attempted
to deal, at any rate partially, with the problem. I have always held the opinion
that all questions of territorial settlement and re-adjustment should stand over
until the end of the war and that the victorious Powers should then arrive at
formal and final agreements governing the articulation of Europe as a whole.
That is still the wish of His Majesty’s Government. However, the advance of the
Russian armies into Polish regions in which the Polish underground army is
active makes it indispensable that some kind of friendly working agreement
should be arrived at to govern the war-time conditions and to enable all anti-
Hitlerite forces to work together with the greatest advantage against the com-
mon foe.
During the last few weeks the Foreign Secretary and I together have laboured
with the Polish Government in London with the object of establishing a working
arrangement upon which the Fighting Forces can act, and upon which, I trust, an
increasing structure of good will and comradeship may be built between Russians
and Poles. I have an intense sympathy with the Poles, that heroic race whose
national spirit centuries of misfortune cannot quench, but I also have sympathy
with the Russian standpoint. Twice in our lifetime? Russia has been violently
assaulted by Germany. Many millions of Russians have been slain and vast tracts
of Russian soil devastated as a result of repeated German aggression. Russia has
the right of reassurance against future attacks from the West, and we are going
all the way with her to see that she gets it, not only by the might of her arms
but by the approval and assent of the United Nations. The liberation of Poland
may presently be achieved by the Russian armies after these armies have suffered
1 ret in this connection No. 1, and above all Article 3 of the secret supplementary
protocol.
2 In August 1914, however, German troops did not invade Russian territory, but Russian
troops invaded East Prussia. It was precisely the Soviet Government which decisively
supported the thesis of the war guilt of the Czarist Government by its publication of
documents: MeZdunarodnye otnoSenija v epoku imperializma, ed. by M. N. Pokrovskij,
13 vols, Moscow 1931-1940; German edition: Die internationalen Beziehungen im Zeit-
alter des Imperialismus (International Relations in the Age of Imperialism), ed. by
O. Hoetzsch, Berlin 1931-1942.
104
millions of casualties in breaking the German military machine. I cannot feel
that the Russian demand for a reassurance about her Western frontiers goes
beyond the limits of what is reasonable or just. Marshal Stalin and I also spoke
and agreed upon the need for Poland to obtain compensation at the expense
of Germany both in the North and in the West.
Here I may point out that the term “unconditional surrender” does not mean.
that the German people will be enslaved or destroyed. It means, that the Allies
will not be bound to them at the moment of surrender by any pact or obliga-
tion. There will be, for instance, no question of the Atlantic Charter applying
to Germany as a matter of right and barring territorial transferences or adjust-
ments in enemy countries. No such arguments will be admitted by us as were
used by Germany after the last war, saying that they surrendered in consequence
of President Wilson’s 14 points. Unconditional surrender means that the victors
have a free hand. It does not mean that they are entitled to behave in a barbarous
manner nor that they wish to blot out Germany from among the nations of
Europe.!
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 397, cols. 697-699.
66a
Roosevelt subscribes to Churchill’s proposals
Roosevelt supported Churchill’s proposals of February 20th (No. 65a) in

the following telegram which arrived in Moscow on February 28th:
Mue uspecteu Tekct nocuanua IIpempep-Muuuctpa or 20 despana Ha

Bate UMA OTHOCHTeIbBHO MpeATOHeCHUA O UpeBapMTeIbHOM yperysMpo-
BaHMM BOMpoca O NOCUeBOCHHOM NOMbCKOM rpaHuye MyTeM corsamleHuA
Mesxnty Coperckum u Ilonpckum IlpasutrenpctTBamnu.
Ilpezsomenue IIpempep-Munucrpa, ecu ono OyfeT upuHATO, Oyer
WMeTb Jaseko Uymee 8HAYeHMe WIA yIyUWeHUA NepcMeKTUB CkOporo
nopamenua Tepmanuu, u A “Melo yOBObCTBHe peKoMeHyOBaTb Bam
paccmoTpeTb ero OsarosKemaTeIbHO M COUYBCTBEHHO.
Kak « cooOmas panbmie, A yMaio, 4TO caMmoii HacyuIHO mpoOmemolt
ABJIACTCA TapanTupoBanue Toro, aro Bamum apmusm, Korfa Bur soryuute
B Ilombury, OyaqyT DoMoraTb NOJAKM.
English text
The text of the Prime Minister’s message of February 20 to you on the subject
of a tentative settlement of the Polish post-war boundary by an agreement be-
tween the Soviet and Polish Governments is known to me.
If accepted, the Prime Minister’s suggestion goes far toward furthering our
1 Excerpts from the debates which followed these statements, part X of this volume.
105
®
prospects of an early defeat of Germany and I am pleased to recommend that you

give favorable and sympathetic consideration to it.
I think, as I intimated before, that the most realistic problem is to be assured
that when you get into Poland your armies will be assisted by the Poles.
Stalin’s correspondence with Churchill, Attlee etc., vol. 2, No. 171, p. 127.
66b
Stalin rejects any compromise solution
Despite American approval Stalin brusquely rejected Churchill’s suggestions

of February 20th in a short Note on March 3rd:
OsHakOMUBIIMCh ¢C MOqpoOHEIM usnoeHuem Baumx Oeceq c fea-

TeIAMM SMUrpaHTCKOLO HOJIbCKOTO UpaBUTebCTBa, A ele MU emje pas
IIpMed K BLIBOAY, YTO TAakMe IIO{M He CIOCOOHEI ycTaHOBUTb HOpMaJb-
HbIe oTHOIMeHMA c CCCP. JlocrarouHo yKa3aTb Ha TO, YTO OHM He TOJIBKO He
XOTAT IpusHaTb wuHMI0 KHepsoua, HO ele UpeTeHAYyIOT Kak Ha JIBBOB, Tak
“Ha Bunbyo. Aro se KacaeTcA CTpeMIICHUA MOCTABMTh NO MHOCTpaHHHit
KOHTPpOJb ypaBJeHWe HeEKOTOPEIX COBeCTCKUX TeppuTOpuli, TO TaKMe
IIOMOI3HOBCHUA MBI He MO?KEM IIPUHATH K OOcy#eHMI0, M00 JarxHKe camy
MOCTaHOBKY TaKOrO posa BOMpoca CuuTaeM OcKOpOuTeIBHOM Aaa Coxert-
ckoro Corsa.
AA yoxe nucan IIpesugenry, aro pelienue Bompoca 0 COBETCKO-HOTECKUX
OTHOMeHMAX emje He Haspeno. I[puxogquTcA eme pas KOHCTaTMpOBaTb
IpaBUIbHOCThb 9TOrO BEIBOAA.
Perepiska Predsedatelja Soveta Ministrov etc., vol. 1, No. 249, p. 208.
Translation'
Having acquainted myself with the detailed record of your negotiations with the
functionaries of the Polish Government-in-Exile, I have once again come to the
conclusion that such persons are not suited to restore normal relations with the
USSR. It will suffice to point out that they not only refuse to recognize the Curzon
Line, but that they claim both Vilna and Lvov in addition. As regards the intention
to place the administration of certain Soviet territories under foreign control, we
cannot agree to discuss unreasonable demands, because we feel it is an insult to the
Soviet Union for such a question to be put at all.
I have already written to the President that the decision on the subject of Polish-
Soviet relations has not yet matured. I can only say again that this conclusion was
correct.
1 cf. Stalin’s correspondence etc., vol. 1, No. 249, p. 207.
106
66c
Churchill promises Stalin the Curzon Line, but warns him against dissension and
violence
Churchill replied already on March 7th with the following letter:
1. Baarogapro Bac 3a Bame nocuanue or 3 Mapra 10 nomBCKOMy
BOIIpocy.
2. Al pasbAcnMd nOnAKaM, YTO OHM He NOwyyat Hu JIbBOBa, HM Busbno,
A CCBLIKM Ha STM TOposa, KAK BUHO M3 MOeTO TOCMAHUA, MpeycraBlAIM
cool mmb MpepzToweHue 06 OOpase JelicrBuli B OTHOMIeHUM DTUX paiio-
HOB, KOTOPHIM, 10 MH€HM10 I1OJIAKOB, OHM MOTI Ob MOMOUB OOMeMy Jeuy.
HKoneuno, He O10 HAMepeHUA HU Y MOAKOB, HU y MeHA, YTOORI Mpeps0-
#KeHUA OBLIM OCKOpOMTeTLHEIMM. OgHaKo mocKombKy Bai waxoyute, 47To
OHM ABJIAIOTCA IpenATCTBMeM, TO A Upoury Bac cumTaTb “WX U3bATHIMM
BEIYCPKHYTHIMM U3 WOCTaHuA.
3. Ilpeacranaenupte MHo1 Bam mpepuomenua emair sanatue Poccueit
qe-PakTo uuHuu Kep30ua peasbHocThi M0 AOroBopenHoctTu ¢ NOTAKAaMM
m0 jjocTusKeHuuM ee Banmomu Bolickamu, u A cooOmma Bam, uo upu
YcIOBUM pelleHuA BOMpOCa Tak, Kak BEI MU MbI HAMeTHIM B Hallux Mepe-
ropopax u B mepenucKe, [IpasutrenpctBo Ero Bpurauckoro Besauuecrsa
NOW WepskUT STO peliieHve Ha KOHepeHuUM O NepemMupuu uM Ha MUpHO
KOoHepenuuu. fl He COMHEBAIOCh, YTO TaKOe IpepoKeHUMe OyeT paBHEIM
o6pasom no”gepskano Coequnenuiimnu Llraramu. Caeqosparenbuo, Bai m0-
Jryamm On amnuI0 Hepso0na fe-PakTo © COrmacMA NOJIAKOB, KaK TOJIbKO
Br ee jocTuruete, uw c OnarocnoBenua Bammx s3anlayjHErx CcOl3HUKOB
pu BceoOmjem yperysMpoBaHun.
4. Cua MoO?KeT JOCTUTHYTL MHOTOLO, HO CuO, noAWepmanHol AoOpor
BOueli BCerO MUpa, MO?7KHO JOCTUTHYTE ee Ooubmero. A ucKpeHHe
Hajlerocb, 4uTo Bui He BsakpoeTe OKOHYATEILHO JIBepb [JIA 8akIOUeHMA
padouero cormalieHuA ¢ MONAKAMM, KOTOpOe NOMOmKeT OOMeMy Jey BO
BpeMA BoltHEI u Zact Bam Bce HeoOxoquMoe Ip 3aKOYeHMM Mupa. Ecum
coruaileHue COBCeM He MO?KET OLITL POcTUrHYyTO MU But He cmomeTe UMeTh
Kakue 6n1 TO HU OnI0 OTHOMeHUA c Llompckum IIpaputresbcrBom, KOTOpoOe
MBI OyfeM IpooWHKAaTL UpUsHaBaTb Kak I]papurebcTBO TOFO CoI3HuKA,
M3-3a KOTOpOrO MBI OODABMAM [uTaepy BOliHy, A Oyfy Kpaline oropuex.
Boenusiii KabuHeT MpocuT MeHA coobmMTh, ITO OH OyjeT pasfeATS 9TO
cosKaseHue. ...
5. Bet ropsopuau ocay HKuapxy Heppy 06 onacnocru toro, 4ro
HOUbCKUM BOMpOC MOET COsfaTb pasiaq Mesx_y Bamu u muow. A Oypzy
BCAYCCKM CTapaTbcA UpesoTBpatTuTp sto. Bce mou napermpb Ha OyAyuee
MMUpa OCHOBAHE! Ha Apy#Oe MU CcOTpyHMyeCTBe sallaqHBIx JeMoKpaTuii ¢
Cozetcrnoi Poccuei.
Perepiska Predsedatelja Soveta Ministrov etc., vol. 1, No, 250, pp. 208-209.
English text
I thank you for your message of March 3rd about the Polish question.
2. I made it clear to the Poles that they would not get either Lvov or Vilna
107
and references to these places as my message shows merely suggested a way in
those areas in which Poles thought they could help the common cause. They were
certainly not intended to be insulting either by the Poles or by me. However,
since you find them an obstacle, pray consider them withdrawn and expunged
from the message.
3. Proposals I submitted to you make the occupation by Russia of the Curzon
Line a de facto reality in the agreement with the Poles from the moment your
armies reach it and I have told you that provided the settlement you and we have
outlined in our talks and correspondence was brought into being, His Britannic
Majesty’s Government would support it at the armistice or peace conferences. I
have no doubt that it would be equally supported by the United States. Therefore
you would have the Curzon Line de facto with the assent of the Poles as soon
as you get there, and with the blessing of your Western Allies at the general settle-
ment. :
4, Force can achieve much but force supported by the good will of the world
can achieve more. I earnestly hope that you will not close the door finally to a
working arrangement with the Poles which will help the common cause during
the war and give you all you require at the peace. If nothing can be arranged and
you are unable to have any relations with the Polish Government which we shall
continue to recognise as the government of the ally for whom we declared war
upon Hitler, I should be very sorry indeed. The War Cabinet ask me to say that
they would share this regret. Our only comfort will be that we have tried our
very best.
5. You spoke to Ambassador Clark Kerr of the danger of the Polish question
making a rift between you and me. I shall try earnestly to prevent this. All my
hopes for the future of the world are based upon the friendship and cooperation
of the Western democracies and Soviet Russia.
67
The Polish “National Council” pronounces in favour of limited territorial

demands
The “Council of National Unity” in Warsaw published a major statement
of its policy on March 15th, 1944, which said the following with regard to
the German-Polish frontier and the Eastern frontier of Poland}:
Zgodnie zaréwno z uzasadnionymi prawami dziejowymi i interesami Polski,

jako tez zgodnie z warunkami trwalego pokoju w Europie, winno Patstwo Polskie
uzyska¢ odpowiednie ramy terytorialne.
Do Rzplitej winny by¢é wigc wlaczone cale Prusy Wschodnie, zniemczone sila i
' A more precise formulation of the principles stated on February 15th, 1944, appears to
be involved (cf. No. 63).
108
podstepem, odwieczny port dorzecza Wisly Gdatsk, przylegajacy do dawnej
granicy Polski, klin pomorski pomiedzy Baltykiem i ujSciem Odry a Notecia,
ziemie migdzy Notecia i Warta, wreszcie Slask Opolski z odpowiednim pasem
bezpieczefistwa. Na terenach tych powinno nastapi¢ niezwloczne zabezpieczenie
w sposob trwaly interesdw Polski.
Na calej Odrze i w portach nadodrzanskich winny byé trwale zabezpieczone
zywotne, gospodarcze interesy Polski.
Szeroki pas ziem, polozonych na zachéd od nowej granicy Polski, winien byé
poddany dlugotrwalej okupacji polskie}.
...Na wschodzie Polski utrzymana byé musi granica Polska, ustalona w trak-
tacie ryskim.
Polskie Sily Zbrojne w Drugie} Wojnie Swiatowej, tom. III, Armia Krajowa (The Polish
Armed Forces in the Second World War, vol. III, The Home Army), London 1950, p. 67.
Translation
The Polish State should be given a territorial frame corresponding to, and in
conformity with the well-founded historical rights and interests of Poland and
the conditions for a permanent peace in Europe.
The following should therefore be incorporated in the Republic: the whole of
East Prussia which was Germanized by force and treachery, Danzig, the ancient
port of the Vistula region, which is situated directly on the old Polish frontier,
the Pomeranian wedge between the Baltic, the mouth of the Oder and the Netze,
the regions between the Netze and the Warthe and finally Upper Silesia together
with an appropriate safety-zone. Immediate and lasting protection should be
provided for Poland’s interests in these territories.
Poland’s vital economic interests should be permanently secured along the
entire Oder and in the Oder ports. A broad strip of the territories to the west of
Poland’s new frontier should be put under Polish occupation for a long time.
Poland’s frontier in the East must remain as fixed by the Treaty of Riga.
68
Mikolajczyk has misgivings regarding resettlement of the Germans
On March 18th, 1944, Mr. Mikolajcezyk addressed a long letter to President

Roosevelt in which he wrote:
The accusation! that the Polish Government is undemocratic, when in reality

it is composed of men who by their origins and by their lifelong struggle for
democracy have proved their sincere attachment to democratic ideals, is slan-
derous. It is a serious wrong to insult that Government which enjoys the con-
1 i.e. of the Soviets.
109
=
fidence of its nation and is its expression, merely because it refuses to countenance
the cession of eleven millions of its citizens to a country where individual freedom
is unknown. Nor can one blame it for refusing to hand over half of its national
territory, to agree to the transfer from Eastern Poland of at least five million
Poles!, in exchange for the transfer of millions of Germans, or because it appre-
hends the prospect of a turning tide which within 50 years or so, in accordance
with the changing European political situation, may once more cause the shifting
of populations on its territory.
St. Mikolajczyk, The pattern of Soviet domination, pp. 319-320.
68a
‘
Churchill confirms that the efforts for a compromise solution have failed
Stalin answered Churchill’s letter of March 7th on March 16th with nothing
but a brief complaint because the British press had been informed of the
content of their exchange of correspondence. Churchill rejected the reproach
on March 21st, and expressed his disappointment about the course nego-
tiations had taken so far as follows:
3. B BecbMa CKOpOM BpeMeHM MHe UpuyeTcA cfewaTb 3aABaeHue B

Ilanare o6mmH 0 HObCKOMy BOMpocy. JTO mpuBefeT K TOMY, 4TO A
ouwKeH OyAy cKkazaTb, YO HOULITKM JOCTUTHYTb OTOBOpeHHOCTH Mery
Cosercxum ut Iloupcxum [[papurentctBamu noreplieam Heyfady; ITO MBI
rpoqomKaem upu3sHapatb Ilompcxoe [IpapureabcTBo, © KOTOPEIM MBI
ObLIM B MOCTOAHHEIX OTHOWeHMAX C MOMeHTa BropKeHuA B IlombuTy
B 1939 roxy; 4¥TO MBI TeHepb CUMTAeM, 4TO BCe BOMPOCH O TeppuToOpHasb-
HBIX U3MCHCHMAX JOJPKHEI OBIT OTIIOFKCHI JO NePeMUPUA UM AO MUPHOH
KOHepenuuu epHaB-n0FequTebHUM MW 4TO TEM BpeCMeHEM MBI He MO?KEM
IipW3HaBaTb HUKAKMX Mepeay TEPpUTOPUM, MpOMsBeeHHEIX CUO!t.
4. A mocpimaio Kommio stot Tenerpammnt IIpesmpenry CoequneHHErx
IIlraros. Xorenocb Obl TOMBKO pay Hac Bcex, 4TOOHI y MeHA OBI QUA
Hero JtyauiMe BecTu.
5. Hakonell, W03BObTe MHe BIPasUTbh MCKPeHHIOIO Hayewy Ha TO,
4TO Heyfaya, Wpoucmieymad MesKY Hamu no noBoAy Moubum, He OyzerT
MMeTb HUKAKOLO BIMAHMA Ha Halle COTPYAHW4CCTBO B MHBIX ciepax, re
cOXpaHeHMe e7MHCTBA Hallux WelcTBull ABIAeTCA BOMpOcomM Bemmualimert
BasnHOCTH.
1 Compare note2 on page 48. According to the Polish census of 1931 there were only about
3,850,000 Poles; on the basis of a count according to confession of faith their number
was only 3,250,000, but this might have increased to 3,500,000 by 1939. In actual fact
only 1,503,263 Poles were resettled from the Soviet Union to Poland between 1944 and
the conclusion of the resettlement in 1948. Another 132000 were resettled in 1955-1957,
partly from remote areas of the Soviet Union where Polish inhabitants of Polish eastern
territories were deported since 1940. In 1958 another 100000 were expected.
110
English text
3. I shall have very soon to make a statement to the House of Commons about
the Polish position. This will involve my saying that attempts to make an arrange-
ment between the Soviet and Polish Governments have broken down; that we
continue to recognise the Polish Government, with whom we have been in con-
tinuous relations since the invasion of Poland in 1939; that we now consider all
questions of territorial change must await the armistice or peace conferences of the
victorious Powers; and that in the meantime we can recognise no forcible trans-
ferences of territory.
4. I am repeating this telegram to the President of the United States. I only
wish I had better news to give him for the sake of all.
5. Finally, let me express the earnest hope that the breakdown which has
occurred between us about Poland will not have any effect upon our cooperation
in other spheres where the maintenance of our common action is of the greatest
consequence.
69
Stalin reproaches Churchill violently regarding the Polish question
Stalin replied to Churchill’s messages of the 7th and 21st of March with a
detailed letter! dated March 23rd, 1944, by which the discussion between
Sara Roosevelt and Stalin on the Polish question temporarily came to
an end.
3a TocseqHee BpeMA A TOTyausn oT Bac 7Ba nocIaHuA 10 NOAbCKOMY

BOUpocy M O3HaKOMMICAH c 3anBeHuem r. Heppa B. M. Mousorosy,
cfeiaHHEimM mo Bautemy nopy¥eHuio 10 TOMy 2Ke BoMpocy. AA He Mor
CBOCBPeMCHHO OTBETUTh, TAK Kak Fea PpOHTa YacTO OTBJEKAIOT MCHA OT
H€BOCHHBIX BOIMPOCOB.
OrBeyat 10 BolIpocam.
Bpocaerca B ruiasa, 4ro Kak Baum mocaanna, Tak UM OcoOeHHO 3anBseHMe
Keppa mepecsimaHbl yrposamu m0 oTHOmeHMIO K CoBpetcKomy Cotsy.
Al Ont xorem oOparurs Bate BHuMaHMe Ha 9TO OOCTOATEIECTBO, TAK Kak
MeTO, yrpos He TOAbKO HelpaBUJIeH BO B3AMMOOTHOIMCHMAX COIO3HUKOB,
HO UM BpeeH, 100 OH MOET IPMBECTH K OOpaTHBIM pesybTaTamM.
Ycunuaz Copsetckoro Corw3a B fese OTCTaMBaHMA UM OCYIUecTBIeHMA
aunun Kepsoua Bui B of HOM M3 NOCIaHuit KBAaIMpUIMp yeTe Kak NOJMTUKY
cuss. OTO 3HauuT, ¥ro sMHuI0 Hepsona Bet nrraeTech KBaAIMPUIMpPOBaTh
Tellepb Kak HelipaBoMepHylo, a OopboOy 3a Hee Kak HecipaBeIMBylo.
Al puak He MOry corJmacuTbcd C TaKolt no3sumMelt. He mory He HamoMHUTS,
aro B Terepane Bu, I[pesuqent u A oroBopuuimch 0 MpaBoMepHocTu
munuu Kepsoua. Ilosuuuio Copercroro [pasurenpctTBa B 9TOM BOpOce
1 The text was simultaneously sent to President Roosevelt.
111
Bui cuuTasM TOrAa COBepIIeHHO MpaBUIbHON, a upepcTaBuTedel oMurpant-
CKOLO MOJIbCKOrO IpaBuTetLCTBa Bul HasbiBaM CYMACINeAMUMM, CCIM OHM
OTRAKYTCH MIpwHATD sMHuI0 Hepsona. Tenepp me Burt orcrausaere
HeYTO IIpAHMO IIpOTMBOTIOJIO#KHOe.
He suauur mm oro, 4uro Br He upMsHaetTe OombMe TOTO, 0 4eM MBL
qoropopusuch B TerepanHe, UM TeM CaMbIM HapyllaeTe TerepaHCKoe coruia-
menue? Al He comHeBatoch, 4To ecu On Ber npopouKanM TBepfO CTOATE
m0-ipestHemy Ha Bameit rerepancKol no3sMyuu, KOHJIMKT © OUbCKUM
IMUTPaHTCKMM IpaBUTeIbCTBOM Ob OE ye paspemen. Aro KacaeTcA
MeHA u Coperckoro IlpaspurenbcTBa, TO MBL UpoOOuHaeM CTOATL Ha
TerepaHcKoli NOo3MUMM uM He JyMaeM OT Hee OTXOAUTb, MOO cuMTaeM, 4TO
ocylecTBieHue uuHuM Hepso0Ha ABUIAeTCH He IPOABIeHMeM NOJIMTUKU
CHIBI, a IIPOABJEHMEM NOSMTURM BOCCTAHOBIeCHMA 3QKOHHEIX mpaB Coper-
ckoro Cosa Ha Te 3eMiM, KOTOpBIe Fase Hep30n u Bepxosusiit Coser
Coro3Hprx Jlepsxas eme B 1919 roxy upusHaiM HelnObCKMMM.
Bot 8aABuiAeTe B MOCIaHUuu OT 7 MapTa, ATO BOIMPOC 0 COBETCKO-NOJIbCKOM
rpaHule MpUpeTcCA OTIOMUTE JO CcOsbIBa KOHPepeHuMM oO MepemMupunu.
Al ymaio, 4TO MBI MMeeM Bech e0 C KAKMM-TO HefopasyMeHuem. CoBert-
ckuii Coio3 He BOIoeT M He HaMepeH BoeBarTs C Iloabmet. CopercKuii Co103
He MMeeT HUKAKOTO KOHPAMEKTA C NOUbCKUM HapofoM UM cuMTaeT ceOA
coro3sHuKom [oupmm uw nombeKoro Hapoga. WmMenHo noaTomy CoBercruit
Co1o3 mpommBaeT KpOBb pagu ocBobompenua Ilombum or HeMel{KOrO
ruera. Iloaromy 6x10 Ob cTpaHHO TOBOPpUTL O Hepemupun Mempy CCCP
u Ilompmew. Ho y Cozercxoro I[pasurenberBa uMeeTCA KOH®IMKT C 9MM-
TpaHTCKMM IIOJIbCKUM IIpaBUTeJIbCTBOM, KOTOPOe He OTpasKaeT MHTepecoB
IOMECKOTO Hapoyja WM He BbIpasKkaeT ero uanHuit. Brimo Ont emje Oosmee
cTpaHHo oTompecTBIATE c [loupe oropBaHHoe oT [lombmMm sMurpanHtT-
cKOe NOTbCKOe UpaBuTerbcTBo BJlonjone. Al sarpyHAIOCck Jake yRas8aTb
pasHuy Mewkyy 9MUrpaHTCKUM UpaBuresbeTBoM IlombwMt uw TAakKMM se
SMUrpaHTCKUM WpaBMTebcTBOM TOrocaaBuu, paBHO Kak Mery HeKO-
TOPBIMM TeHepasaMM MOJIbCKOTO SMMIpaHTCKOrO WpaBuTesbCTBa HM cep6-
ckuM reHepasiom MuxaiizoBuyem.
B Bamem nocaanum or 21 mapta Ber coo6ujaete, uro Bet HamepeHEt
BEICTyuMTH B Ilanare oOOMMH ¢ 8aANBIeHMeM 0 TOM, YTO BCe BOMPOCHI 0 Teppu-
TOPMaJIbHBIX U3MCHCHUAX JOJKHEI ObITH OTIOKCHEI AO TepeMupuA ua
MUpHOM KOHepeHyuM WepKaB-nobequTeIbHU MW ATO WO Tex nop Bsr He
MO?KeTe IIpMU3sHaBaTh HUKAKMX Tepeaxy TeppuTopHit, mpowsBeq_eHHEIX
cunoli. Al moHMMaro dTO Tak, ¥TO Bu BricraBsAete CopercKuit Cows Kak
Bpamqeduyio Ilombme cusy uw 10 cyTH Zeta oTpuaere OcBOOOAMTeBHBIE
xapaktep Boiinpt CopercKoro Co1o3a mpoTuB repMaHcKoli arpeccum. JToO
PAaBHOCHJbHO NOMbITKe NpunMcath Coperckomy Cosy To, vero HeT Ha
yee, M TeM AucKpeyuTMpoBaTD ero. Al He COMHeBaI0Cb, YTO Haposamu
Cosercroro Cowsa Mu MMpoBBIM OOmecTBeHHKIM MHeHMeM TaKoe Bate
BEICTYIeHue Oyler BOCIIPMHATO Kak HesacJymeHHOe OCKOpPOeHMe m0
aypecy CopetcKoro Corsa.
Kone ano, Bat BoObHEI cyemarb Ju060e BEICTynseHue B Ilanare o6mj1ZH —
sto Bame yeno. Ho ecam But cqemaere rakoe Buicrynmtenue, A Oymy cun-
TaTb, TO Bet coBepuimsim akT HecIpaBeIMBOCTM M HepyKeOOUA B
oTHomenum CopercKoro Corsa.
112
B cpoem nocaanuu But Brrparkaere Haesyty, YO Heyaqa B MObCKOM
Bompoce He NOBIMAeCT Ha Halle COTPyAHM4eCTBO B MHEIX cPepax. Uro
KacaeTCA MeHA, TO A CTOAJI MU MpOMOIKAalO CTOATL 3a coTpymHuyectBo. Ho
A 0010Cb, YO MeTOR yrpos UM AucKpepMTaNMH, ecu On OyReT MpopomMKaTBeA
M Bupefb, He OyAeT OlarompuMATCTBOBAT HallleMy CoTpyAHMECTBY.
Perepiska Predsedatelja Soveta Ministrov etc., vol. 1, No. 257, pp. 213-215, vol. 2,
No. 180, pp. 132-134.
Translation
I have recently received from you two messages on the Polish question and
have Mr. Kerr’s statement? to Mr. Molotow on the same question. I could not
give you an early reply because matters at the front frequently distract me from
non-military questions. Answers to your questions are given herewith.
Your message, and particularly Kerr’s statement, are interspersed with threats
in regard to the Soviet Union. I should remind you that the method of threats
is not only incorrect in the relationship of the Allies, but is harmful, as it can
bring about reverse results.
You speak of the efforts of the. Soviet Union in defending the Curzon Line
as a policy of force. This means that you now attempt to qualify the Curzon
Line as not rightful and the fight for it unjust. I cannot agree. I must on the
contrary remind you that in Teheran, you, the President (Roosevelt), and I came
to an agreement regarding the rightfulness of the Curzon Line. At that time, you
considered the position of the Soviet Government entirely correct, and you
called the representatives of the emigrant Polish Government insane if they
should reject the Curzon Line. ;
Now you are defending something entirely opposite. Does that mean that you
do not recognize any longer the matters we agreed upon in Teheran and that by
so doing this you are breaking the Teheran Agreement?
I do not doubt that if you had continued to stand firmly on your Teheran
position, the conflict with the Polish emigrant Government would have already
been solved. As for me and the Soviet Government, we shall stand by the
Teheran position, as we consider the realization of the Curzon Line not a mani-
festation of a policy of force, but the re-establishment of lawful rights of the
1 cf. Stalin’s correspondence etc., vol. 1, No. 257, pp. 212-213, vol. 2, No. 180, pp. 133-134.
2 This concerns a verbal explanation given by the British Ambassador, Sir Archibald
Clark Kerr on March 19th, 1944, to Foreign Minister Molotov. According to the Soviet
statement it expressed apprehension that a public declaration that the Curzon Line would
in future represent the Polish-Soviet frontier would cause general diappointment in Great
Britain and the United States. The refusal of the Soviet Union to accept Churchill’s pro-
posals would engender difficulties in British-Soviet relations and cast a shadow on the
realization of the military operations agreed upon at Teheran. Compare Perepiska etc.,
vol. 1, note 71, p. 397, and vol. 2, note 62, pp. 287-288, and Stalin’s correspondence etc.,
vol. 1, note 63, p. 391, and vol. 2, note 54, pp. 292-293.
113
L
Soviet Union to those lands which even Curzon and the Supreme Council of the
Allied powers in 1919 recognized as non-Polish’.
In your March 7 message2, you propose that the question of the Soviet-Polish
border should be postponed until the peace conference... The Soviet Union is
not at war and does not intend to fight against Poland. The Soviet Union has no
conflict with the Polish people and considers itself an ally of Poland. That is
why the Soviet Union is shedding blood for the liberation of Poland from German
oppression. Therefore it would be strange to talk about an armistice between the
USSR and Poland.
But the Soviet Government does have a conflict with the emigrant Polish
Government, which is not expressing the interests of the Polish people and does
not express their hopes. It would be strange to identify Poland with the Govern-
ment in London, which is separated from it. It is difficult for me even to point
out a difference between the London Polish Government and the like emigrant
Government of Yugoslavia, as well as between certain generals of the Polish
emigrant and the Serbian General Mikhailovich.
In your message of March 213, you say you intend to make a statement in the
House of Commons that all questions regarding territorial changes should be
postponed until peace conferences of the victorious powers are held, and that
until then you cannot recognize any transference of territory effected by force.
As I understand it, you are showing the Soviet Union as hostile to Poland and
are practically renouncing the liberative character of the war of the Soviet Union
against German aggression. This is ascribing to the Soviet Union things that do
not exist in reality, and thus discredit it. I do not doubt that the people of the
Soviet Union and world public opinion will regard such a speech as an undeserved
insult to the Soviet Union.
You are free to make any speech in the House of Commons. That is your
affair. But if you make such a speech, I shall consider that you have committed
an act of injustice and unfriendliness toward the Soviet Union.
You express the hope to me that the failure of the Polish question will not
influence our co-operation in other spheres. As to me, I stood and continue to
stand for co-operation. But I am afraid that the methods of threats and dis-
creditation, if it will be used also in the future, will not favour this co-operation.
W.D.Leahy,I was there, London 1950, pp. 273-275.
* Stalin here gives a simplifying and coarsening account of the occurrences during the
years 1919 and 1920. Compare note 1 on page 10 and G. Rhode: Die Entstehung der
Curzon-Linie (The Origin of the Curzon Line), pp. 81-92.
2\ cf. No. 66,
5 cf. No. 68a.
114
70
Churchill reiterates the offer of compensation in the House of Commons
On May 24th, 1944, Mr. Churchill again reported to the House of Commons
on the situation in foreign affairs. He said:
Our effort to bring about a renewal of relations between the Polish Govern-
ment and Russia in London has not succeeded. We deeply regret that fact, and
we must take care to say nothing that would make agreement more difficult in
the future. I must repeat that the essential part of any arrangement is regulation
of the Polish Eastern frontier, and that, in return for any withdrawal made by
Poland in that quarter, she should receive other territories at the expense of
Germany, which will give her an ample seaboard and a good, adequate and
reasonable homeland in which the Polish nation may safely dwell... I have
seen here men who came a few days ago out of Poland, who told me about it,
and who are in relation with, and under the orders of, the present Polish Gov-
ernment in London. They are most anxious that this underground movement
should not clash with the advancing Russian Army, but should help it, and
orders have been sent by the Polish Government in London that the under-
ground movement is to help the Russian Armies in as many ways as possible.
There are many ways possible in which guerillas can be successful, and we must
trust that statesmanship will yet find some way through.
1S
Vill
Negotiations about Poland in the middle of 1944

71
Roosevelt promises the Poles Silesia and East Prussia
On June 12th, 1944, Mr. Mikotajczyk paid a visit to President Roosevelt in

Washington.
Stettinius! took a lot of notes for the President, and when I saw Roosevelt
the following day I found him well prepared, though strikingly older and more
depleted than when I had met him with General Sikorski in 1941. Roosevelt
had only a few months before agreed, I later learned, to turn over to Stalin the
huge section of Poland which the Red Army had invaded while an Axis partner.
But at this time his manner was one of great courtesy.
“Poland must be free and independent,” he said.
“What about Stalin?” I asked.
“Stalin is a realist,” Roosevelt replied, lighting a cigarette. “And we mustn’t
forget, when we judge Russian actions, that the Soviet regime has had only two
years of experience in international relations. But of one thing I am certain,”
he added, “Stalin is not an imperialist.”
I thought to myself, “Here is the perfect idealist, but his faith in Stalin is
tragically misplaced.”
Roosevelt continued in a cheerful manner. He said that personally he and
Stalin had gotten along famously at their Teheran meeting; better, he added
with a laugh, than had Stalin and Churchill. I asked him what had been decided
about the future Polish frontiers at Teheran.
“Stalin wasn’t eager to talk about it,” he went on. “I want you to know that
I am still opposed to dividing Poland with this line, and that eventually I will
act as a moderator in this problem and effect a settlement.”
Roosevelt paused before he went on.

“I haven’t acted on the Polish question because this is an election year,” he
said. “You as a democrat, understand such things.” He laughed suddenly. “You
know, I mentioned the matter of our forthcoming American elections to Stalin
and he just couldn’t comprehend what I was talking about. I guess he’ll never
become accustomed to understanding that there is a device known as free
elections — by which political matters within one’s country, as well as office
holders, may be changed.”
1 Later the Secretary of State.
116
That aspect of Stalin’s outlook on mankind was my worry, too, I told the
President. He was more thoughtful when he answered.
“In all our dealings with Stalin we must keep our fingers crossed,” he said.
Then his mood changed again. “And you Poles must find an understanding with
Russia. On your own, you’d have no chance to beat Russia, and, let me tell you
now, the British and Americans have no intention of fighting Russia.
“But don’t worry,” he added. “Stalin doesn’t intend to take freedom from
Poland. He wouldn’t dare to do that, because he knows that the United States
Government stands solidly behind you. I will see to it that Poland does not
come out of this war injured.”
“But there is every indication at the present that we will,” I protested.
“Tm sure I'll be able to manage an agreement in which Poland will get Silesia,
East Prussia, Konigsberg, Lwéw, the region of Tarnopol and the oil and potash
area of Drohobycz”, he said, showing a surprising knowledge of our country.
“But I don’t believe I can secure the city of Wilno for you.”
Mikolajczyk opposes an excessive expansion of Poland towards the west
With regard to Mr. Mikotajczyk’s talks with Mr. Roosevelt described in the
preceding source we have also a report of Mr. Ciechanowski, at that time
Polish Ambassador in Washington, where the questions concerning Germany
have been dealt with in greater detail:
The President... then referred to the question of Poland’s future boundaries.

He thought that if contact with Stalin could be satisfactorily established and if
a more friendly atmosphere could be created, Stalin might be less insistent in his
territorial demands. If an easier relationship existed, the President thought, he
might help personally in getting Stalin to agree that Poland should retain the
city of Lwéw, the city and oil fields of Drohobycz, and the region of Stanis-
lawow. Wilno, he said, appeared more doubtful, but he did not entirely exclude
Stalin’s ultimate agreement to leave Wilno to Poland. Then turning to the
question of the western boundaries, Poland, he said, should get East Prussia.
When Mikolajezyk interjected that Stalin claimed Kénigsberg for the USSR, the
President said he did not think Stalin’s claim to that city should be regarded
as final, and that he might ultimately persuade him to drop it.
According to the President, Poland should obtain the whole of East Prussia,
including Kénigsberg, which, as he remembered, was so situated that it could
strategically threaten Danzig if it were in foreign hands, thus endangering
Poland’s free access to the sea. The President said he wanted Poland also to have
Silesia. He knew that Stalin had suggested Poland be extended westward up to
the Oder River and Stettin. He asked what Mikotajczyk thought of this sug-
gestion.
117
#
ny
Mikolajczyk replied that regarding Silesia and western territories, generally

speaking, he was of the opinion that the German territories, with large per-
centages of population of Polish origin, should be joined to Poland. This cer-
tainly applied to Silesia. But there was another important reason why Silesia
should be incorporated into Poland; namely, to prevent Germany from preparing
future wars, which the highly developed Silesian industries had so greatly facili-
tated in the past.
On the other hand, Mikotajczyk said, he was definitely opposed to any ex-
dggerated expansion of Poland westward, as this would burden Poland with a
large German minority. Moreover, experience had taught the Poles that the
British and American people quickly forgot what Germany really stood for and
were only too ready to become sympathetic to Germany after defeating her.
The President agreed with Mikolajczyk, and expressed approval of his sober
views on this problem.
].Ciechanowski, Defeat in victory, pp. 305-306.
73
Stalin offers the Poles all the country up to the Oder
On June 13th, 1944, Mr. Mikolajczyk had a talk with the American-Polish
Professor Lange who had just returned from an official visit to Mr. Stalin.
Mr. Ciechanowski reports:
The conversation lasted two hours. Mikolajezyk asked many questions con-
cerning the attitude and disposition of the Polish people in Russia, with whom
Lange had been in contact, but expressed no personal opinions.
From the text of the conversation, as dictated on the same day by Mikolaj-
czyk, it appeared that Stalin had told Lange he understood the hesitation of
the Polish Government in agreeing to a territorial compromise so long as they
could not be sure of receiving the compensation which Poland was to obtain in
the west “up to Stettin inclusively”. As soon as Russia would be in a position
to give these German territories to Poland, Stalin said it would be easier for the
Polish Government to make concessions in the east. He added, according to
Lange, that Poland could not turn down so generous an offer, which would give
her a wide access to the sea, with East Prussia and Silesia up to the Oder River
and territories in the west to Stettin inclusively.
Lange admitted that Stalin had said he wanted to keep Krélewiec (K6nigs-
berg) in East Prussia for the Soviets, but Lange did not think this condition
was final.
Lange further stated that Stalin told him he was aware that the attitude of the
Polish people, and even of the soldiers in the Soviet-sponsored Polish Army, was
untractable on the subject of Lwéw, but explained he had to consider his
Ukrainians who regarded it as Ukrainian territory.
According to Lange, even this very crucial point was advanced by Stalin in a
118
way which made one think he might be willing to reconsider it in the future.
He assured Mikolajczyk that Stalin had convinced him he had no intention of
governing Poland. There would not even be a military Soviet administration.
Should no Polish-Soviet agreement be reached before Poland was occupied by the
Soviet forces, Stalin said he would entrust the administration to the local govern-
ment authorities. He added that he was not in the least interested in the internal
regime of Poland. He did not think Poland was adaptable to a communist rule.
But he had added that he was greatly interested in Poland’s foreign policy and
her foreign relations. The whole attitude of the Soviets would depend, accor-
ding to Lange’s version of his talk with Stalin, on the direction of Poland’s
foreign policy. This certainly confirmed Mikolajezyk in his belief that Russia
was especially anxious to sever Poland from its close contacts and friendships
with the Western world.
74
The Pro-Soviet Poles call on their compatriots to fight for the Oder
After the Soviet troops had crossed the Bug river in the middle of July 1944,
a “Polish Committee of National Liberation”: was set up by members of the
communist resistance movement and the “Union of Polish Patriots? at
Cheim, the first indisputably Polish city occupied. This Committee proclaim-
ed the following Manifesto on July 22nd:
Chwytajcie za bron! Bijcie Niemcéw wszedzie, gdzie ich napotkacie! Atakujcie

ich transporty, udzielajcie informacyj, pomagajcie zolnierzom polskim i sowieckim!
Na terenach wyzwolonych wypetniajcie karnie nakazy mobilizacyjne i spieszcie
do szeregow Wojska Polskiego, ktére poméci kleske wrzesniowq i wraz z armiami
Narodéw Sprzymierzonych zgotuje Niemcom Nowy Grunwald!
Stawajcie do walki o wolnos¢ Polski, o powrédt do Matki-Ojczyzny starego
polskiego Pomorza i Slaska Opolskiego, o Prusy Wschodnie, 0 szeroki dostep do
morza, o polskie slupy graniczne nad Odra!
Stawajcie do walki o Polske, ktérej nigdy juz nie zagrozi nawala germanska, o
Polske, ktérej zapewniony bedzie trwaly pokdéj i moznosSé tworczej pracy,
rozkwit kraju!
Historia i dogwiadczenia obecnej wojny dowodza, ze przed naporem germans-
kiego imperializmu ochronié moze tylko zbudowanie wielkiej slowianskiej tamy,
ktérej podstawa bedzie porozumienie polsko-sowiecko-czechostowackie.
Przez 400 lat miedzy Polakami i Ukraifcami, Polakami i Bialorusinami, Pola-
kami i Rosjanami trwat okres nieustannych konflikté6w ze szkoda dla obydwu
stron. Teraz nastapit w tych stosunkach historyczny zwrot. Konflikty ustepujq
przyjazni i wspétpracy, dyktowanej przez obopélne zyciowe interesy. Przyjazn 1
1 Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego, abbreviated PKWN.
119
voi
st
bojowa wspétpraca, zapoczatkowane przez.braterstwo broni Wojska Polskiego

z Armia Czerwona, winny przeksztalci¢ sie w trwaly sojusz i w sasiedzkie wspol-
dzialanie po wojnie.
Krajowa Rada Narodowa i powolany przez niq Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia
Narodowego uznaja, ze uregulowanie granicy polsko-radzieckiej powinno nasta-
pi¢ w drodze wzajemnego porozumienia. Granica wschodnia powinna byé linia
przyjaznego sasiedztwa, a nie przegroda miedzy nami a naszymi sasiadami, i
powinna byé uregulowana zgodnie z zasadq: ziemie polskie — Polsce, ziemie
ukrainskie, biatoruskie i litewskie — Radzieckiej Ukrainie, Bialorusi i Litwie.
Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskie} (Law Gazette of the Polish Republic), No. 1,
August 15th, 1944, Annex.
Translation
Take up your arms! Strike at the Germans wherever you find them! Attack
their transports, help the Polish and Soviet soldiers and give them information.
Obey the mobilization orders in the liberate regions in a disciplined manner and
hasten to the ranks of the Polish Army, which will avenge the defeat in Sep-
tember! and prepare jointly with the armies of the United Nations a new
Tannenberg? for the Germans!
Take part in the battle for Poland’s freedom, for the return of ancient Polish
Pomerania and Upper Silesia to the mother country, for East Prussia, for a wide
access to the sea, and so that the Polish boundary posts may be set on the Oder!
Take part in the battle for a Poland which will no longer be threatened by
the Germanic flood, for a Poland which will be sure of permanent peace, of the
opportunity for creative work and of prosperity!
The history and experiences of the present war show that only the establish-
ment of a great Slav barrier can offer security from the pressure of German
imperialism, and the foundation of this barrier will be a Polish-Soviet-Czecho-
slovak understanding.
The epoch of incessant conflicts between Poles and Ukrainians, Poles and White
Ruthenians, Poles and Russians has lasted for fourhundred years to the damage
of both sides. A historic turn has now taken place in these relationships. Friend-
ship and collaboration, dictated by the essential interests of both sides are taking
the place of conflict. Friendship and collaboration in war which were begun by
the comradeship in arms of the Polish Forces and the Red Army will be turned
into a firm alliance and neighbourly collaboration after the war.
The National Council of the country and the Polish Committee of National
Liberation appointed by it acknowledge that the settlement of the Polish-Soviet
frontier must be effected by mutual agreement. The Eastern frontier should be a
1 i, e. September 1939, According to Polish usage “September” has become a fixed term
for September 1939 or the German-Polish War.
® What is meant is the defeat of the Teutonic Order at Tannenberg on July 15th, 1410.
The battle is known in Polish historiography and literature as the “Battle of Grunwald”
and was named after the village of Griinfelde. It is a symbol of the triumph of Poland
over Germanism.
120
line of friendly neighbourliness and not a wall separating us and our neighbours,
and it should be fixed according to the following principle: Polish territories to
go to Poland, Ukrainian, White Ruthenian and Lithuanian territories to go to the
Soviet Ukraine, Soviet White Ruthenia and Soviet Lithuania.
Lo
The Soviet Government declares that Poland should remain independent
On July 25th, 1944, the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs published a
declaration which contained the following:
The Red Army, successfully advancing, has reached the State frontier between
the Soviet Union and Poland.
Pursuing the retreating German armies, Soviets troops, together with the
Polish Army operating on the Soviet-German front, have crossed the Western
Bug River, have crossed the Soviet-Polish frontier und have entered the limits
of Poland.
The Soviet Government declares that it considers the military operations of

the Red Army on the territory of Poland as operations on the territory of a
sovereign, friendly, allied state. In connection with this, the Soviet Government
does not intend to establish on the territory of Poland organs of its own ad-
ministration, considering this the task of the Polish people.
It has decided, in view of this, to conclude with the Polish Committee of
National Liberation an agreement on relations between the Soviet Command
and the Polish Administration.
The Soviet Government declares that it does not pursue aims of acquiring any
part of Polish territory or of a change of social structure in Poland, and that the
military operations of the Red Army on the territory of Poland are dictated
solely by military necessity and by the striving to render the friendly Polish _
people aid in its liberation from German occupation.’
Documents on American foreign relations, vol. VII, p. 854.
76
The Soviet Government transfers the administration of the territories to the west
of the Curzon Line to the pro-Soviet Poles
The announced agreement was concluded in Moscow on July 26th, 1944,

and signed by Mr. Molotov and Mr. Osdbka-Morawski, the Chairman of
the Polish Committee of National Liberation. It contained the following}:
1 The Russian text was not accessible.
121
Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego i Rzad Zwiazku Socjalistycznych Re-
publik Radzieckich, pragnac, by stosunki miedzy Radzieckim Wodzem Naczelnym
i Polska Administracjg na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej zostaly roz-
strzygniete w duchu przyjazni, zawarly niniejsze Porozumienie w nastepujacej
sprawie:
Artykul 1
W strefie dzialan wojennych na terytorium Polski po wkroczeniu Wojsk Ra-
dzieckich wladza najwyzsza i odpowiedzialnos¢ we wszystkich sprawach, dotycza-
cych prowadzenia wojny w okresie czasu, niezbednego dla przeprowadzenia
operacyj wojennych, koncentruja sie w reku Wodza Naczelnego Wojsk Ra-
dzieckich.
Artykul 2
Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego na wyzwolonym od wroga polskim
terytorium:
a/tworzy i kieruje zgodnie z ustawami Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej ustalonymi
przez sie organami administracyjnymi;
b/wprowadza w zycie zarzadzenia w sprawie dalszej organizacji formowania i
uzupelniania Wojska Polskiego;
c/zapewnia czynna pomoc Radzieckiemu Wodzowi Naczelnemu ze strony
organow polskiej administracji w przeprowadzaniu przez Armie Czerwongq opera-
cyj wojennych oraz w zaspokojeniu jej potrzeb podczas pobytu na terytorium
polskim.
Artykul 6
Z chwila, gdy jakakolwiek czes¢ wyzwolonego terytorium Polski przestanie
byé sfera bezpoSrednich operacji wojennych, Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodo-
wego obejmie calkowite kierownictwo wszystkimi sprawami administracji cy-
wilnej.
Volume of documents in the possession of the Polish Research Centre, London, No. 102,
pp. 178-179. Taken from a photostat.
Translation
In the desire that the relations between the Soviet Supreme Commander and
the Polish administrative authorities.in the territory of the Republic of Poland
shall be governed by the spirit of friendship, the Polish Committee of National
Liberation and the Government of the USSR have concluded an agreement con-
cerning the following matter:
Article 1
Upon the entry of Soviet troops into the zone of military actions in the
territory of Poland, the supreme command and responsibility for all matters
122
concerning warfare shall be combined in the hands of the Supreme Commander
of the Soviet troops for the period of time indispensably required for military
operations.
Article 2
In the Polish territories liberated from the enemy the Polish Committee of
National Liberation shall:
(a) form and establish its administrative authorities and give them instructions
in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Poland,
(b) implement arrangements regarding the further organization, setting-up,
and recruitment of the Polish Army,
(c) guarantee to the Soviet Supreme Commander the active support of the
Polish administrative authorities in the carrying out of military operations by the
Red Army and in satisfying the requirements of this Army during its presence
in the Polish territories.
Article 6
As soon as any part of liberated Polish territory is no longer within the zone of
direct military operations, the Polish Committee of National Liberation shall
assume complete management of all civilian administrative affairs.
Uf
Stalin calls upon Mikolajczyk to come to an agreement with the pro-Soviet Poles
On August 3rd, 1944, Mr. Mikolajczyk was received in the Kremlin by

Mr. Stalin. In his memoirs he reports with regard to this talk inter alia:
... he moved the talk along to the touchy matter of our frontiers.
“You must realize this,” he said, “that nothing can be done for Poland if you
do not recognize the Curzon Line. For the loss of Eastern Poland you'll get the
Oder Line in the West, including Wroclaw (Breslau), Stettin and East Prussia.
Konigsberg (I thought instantly of Roosevelt’s assurances) will remain with the
Soviet Union, as will the area around it.”
I protested that this was a direct violation of the Atlantic Charter, whose
principles the USSR had accepted, and of existing Polish-Soviet pacts. After
hearing me out Stalin shrugged and said:
“Maybe we can make some changes in the Curzon Line which will be of benefit
to Poland. But first you must reach an agreement with the Lublin Polest. Here-
after I intend to deal with only one Polish Government, not two.”
St. Mikotajcezyk, The pattern of Soviet domination, p. 81.
1 The Polish Committee for National Liberation was called “Lublin Committee” since it
had moved from Chelm to Lublin a few days after it had been constituted.
123
78
Stalin promises the Poles Breslau, Stettin and the Neisse
Mr. Mikolajczyk later communicated further details of the talks in a cable

to President Roosevelt.
He also informed the President that Stalin had promised him help for the
Polish Home Army fighting in Warsaw.’ He had not kept his promise. He had
discussed the question of Poland’s western frontier and had declared that he
would see to it that Poland was extended to the Oder and Neisse rivers, including
Breslau, and in the northwest to Stettin. He had likewise said that he would
clear that territory of all its German population. He promised Poland East
Prussia, but without KGnigsberg, and the region northeast of that city which was
to be incorporated into the Soviet Union. He insisted on the Curzon Line as the
“future Soviet-Polish frontier”, but did not appear to close the door entirely on
the question of the city of Lwéw and of Poland’s only oil fields in the district
of Drohobycz.
J]. Ciechanowski, Defeat in victory, p. 326.
ifs)
Churchill: There is sufficient room in Germany for the expellees
On August 26th, 1944, Churchill visited General Anders, the Commander

of the Polish Corps in Italy. They had a lengthy talk during which the
following was said inter alia:
Prime Minister Churchill: “In concluding the treaty of alliance with Poland,
Great Britain has never guaranteed her frontiers. She pledged and undertook the
obligations for the existence of Poland as a free, independent, sovereign and great
state, in order that her citizens might live happily with the opportunity for their
unfettered development, free from any alien interference. I can assure you, Gene-
ral, that we have not changed our point of view; Poland will not only exist but
she must be a champion of Europe. You must trust us; we will keep our pledges.
But you must not rigidly insist on the maintenance of your eastern boundaries.
You will get territories in the west much better than the Polesie marshes. The
Oder will be your frontier in the west, and as regards the littoral, there are many
much better and wider prospects than any sort of corridor. All Germans, even
women and children, will be removed to Germany from the territories which will
be granted to Poland. There are people who pretend that there will be no room
for evacuated Germans in a diminished Germany. But I assume that more than
1 The Polish uprising against the Germans, which had been prepared for a long time,
broke out in Warsaw on August Ist, 1944. It was in the first weeks not supported by the
Soviet Army, though the latter had already reached the Vistula.
124
of
six million Germans have already perished, and still more will perish, and that
there will be no trouble on this account.”
General Anders: “History tells us that some corrections of frontiers occur
after each war. I understand that frontiers may be moved 10 kilometres to the
west or 15 kilometres to the east. But the problem of frontiers should be definitely
and exclusively dealt with at a peace conference, after the war has been completely
finished. But we will never consent to the Bolsheviks, even during the war, taking
as much territory as they wish. We will never consent to faits accomplis.”
Prime Minister Churchill: “Obviously these matters can be settled at a peace
conference.” (Turning to the General and touching him with his hand): “You
will be present at the conference. You must trust us. Great Britain entered this
war in defence of the principle of your independence, and I can assure you that
we will never desert you.”
General Anders: “Our soldiers have never for one moment lost faith in Great
Britain. They know that first of all Germany must be beaten, and they are ready
to carry out any task for this end. This can be confirmed by General Alexander,
who knows well that all his orders have always been and will always be carried
out. But we cannot trust Russia, knowing her too well, and we are convinced that
all Stalin’s announcements that he wants a free and strong Poland are lies and
impostures. The Bolsheviks want our eastern provinces in order that they may
ruin us the more easily and enter more deeply into Europe, to make her Communist.
The Russians entering Poland are arresting and deporting our wives and children
to Russia as they did 1939. They disarm the soldiers of our Home Army, shoot our
officers, and imprison members of our Civil Administration, destroying those who
have been fighting the Germans without interruption since 1939. Our wives and
children are in Warsaw, but we prefer that they should perish there rather than live
under the Bolsheviks. We all prefer to perish fighting rather than to live cringing.”
Prime Minister Churchill (deeply moved): “You should trust Great Britain, who
will never abandon you — never. I know the Germans and Russians are destroying
your best elements, particularly the intellectuals. I deeply sympathize with you. But
be confident, we will not desert you and Poland will be happy.”
W. Anders, An army in exile, London 1949, pp. 210-211.
80
The “Lublin Committee” demands the Oder and Neisse as frontier
On August 28th, 1944, the Chairman of the Lublin Committee of National

Liberation! made a speech. A report on it says:
Mr. Edward Bolestaw Osébka-Morawski, chairman and director of foreign

affairs on the Polish Committee of National Liberation, told foreign corre-
1 The Committee resided in Lublin from July 25th, 1944, until its transformation into a
Provisional Government on December 31st, 1944.
125
spondents at a press conference on Monday that Poland would not allow Ger-
mans to remain in East Prussia. Replying to a question about the problem of a
German minority in Poland he said: “We will not have a German minority. When
we take over East Prussia I hope that the Red Army will have sent all adult
Germans into the Russian interior for reconstruction work so that we will not
find any there. As for German women and children, we will not do to them what
the Germans did with ours, but we will not allow them to remain.”
Mr. Osdbka-Morawski defined the future frontier of Poland as following the
River Neisse (in German Silesia) to its confluence with the Oder, then north-
ward! to Stettin. ,,This will be a good strategic border and will give us contact
with Czechoslovakia,” he added.
Report of Reuter’s special correspondent in The Manchester Guardian, August 30th, 1944.
81
The pro-Soviet Poles obtain a Soviet guarantee of the Oder and the Lausitz
Neisse
It appears that the Polish “Lublin Committee” at that time actually con-
cluded a secret Special Agreement with the Soviet Government concerning
the Polish Western frontier. At any rate, an explanation given two years
later on September 30th, 1946, by Mr. Osobka-Morawski, the then Chair-
man of the Committee, at the Party session of the Polish Socialist Party at
Kattowitz appears to indicate this.
The three World Powers had laid down the Eastern frontier along the
Curzon Line at Teheran, and at that time this problem was no longer subject
to discussion... The Polish Committee for National Liberation obtained a
guarantee of the support of the Soviet Union, and the right to a Western frontier
running along the Lausitz Neisse, the Oder with Stettin, Swinemiinde and the
Baltic, by a Special Agreement. On the other hand Churchill, who professed to be
a friend of Poland, agreed to the Curzon Line, but would not agree to the Oder-
Neisse Line.
A. Klafkowski, Podstawy prawne granicy Odra-Nisa na tle uméw: Jaltarskiej i
Poczdamskiej (The legal foundation of the Oder-Neisse frontier based on the agreements
of Yalta and Potsdam), Posen (Poznan) 1947, p. 36.
The original text says, obviously by mistake, westward.
126
IX
Negotiations about Poland towards

the end of 1944
82
The Polish Government-in-Exile agrees to the removal of the German population
On August 30th, 1944, the Polish Government-in-Exile in London decided

on a “New Plan” for the post-war period which contained the following
inter alia:
Poland would expect fully to participate in the planning for the safeguarding
of peace by a system of general security of peace-loving nations. Also to take part
in the occupation of Germany, especially of her Eastern territories adjacent to
the future Western boundaries of Poland.
With regard to the settlement of the frontiers of Poland, the Polish Govern-
ment will act on the following principles agreed upon with the Soviet Govern-
ment in the spirit of friendship and the respect of the fundamental interests of the
Polish nation.
Poland, which has made so many sacrifices in this war and is the only country
under German occupation which produced no Quisling, cannot emerge from
this war diminished in territory. In the East, the main centres of Polish cultural
life and the sources of raw materials indispensable to the economic life of the
country shall remain within Polish boundaries. A final settlement of the Polish-
Soviet frontier on the basis of these principles will be made by the Constitutional
Diet in accordance with democratic principles.
All Germans will be removed from the territories incorporated into Poland in
the North and the West by mutual Soviet-Polish co-operation.
Question of citizenship and repatriation will be duly settled. Polish citizens
who have been interned, arrested or deported both in Poland and on territories
of the USSR will immediately be released by the Soviet authorities who will
assist in their repatriation.
A voluntary exchange of the Polish, White Russian and Ukrainian population
will be carried out.
127
83
Stalin presents uncompromising demands to Mikolajezyk
In the middle of October 1944 Mikolajczyk went to Moscow again at

Churchill’s request. He himself reported later}:
We met on the 13th with Stalin, Churchill and Eden. Harriman was the
observer for the U.S. Molotov, the chairman, seated us around an oval table and
welcomed the American and the Britishers. At the end of his flowery speech he
referred to my party as “our Polish guests”, and then unexpectedly called on me
to speak first.
I restated the post-war plan which Stalin had apparently ignored, emphasized
its fairness to all parties and its consonance with all existing Big Three Declara-
tions, and concluded: “Our aim is to bring about an agreement between Poland
and Russia, not between Russia and a handful of Poles, arbitrarily and unilaterally
chosen by a foreign power.”
“Your plan has two big defects,” Stalin said. “It ignores the Lublin Poles, who
have done such a good job in that part of Poland which the Soviet Army has
liberated. And, secondly, if any Polish Government wants relations with the
Soviet Union it must recognize the Curzon Line as an actuality.”
Stalin thought a moment and then added, “Perhaps the rest of your plan is
acceptable. But these two flaws must be corrected.”
Churchill now expressed a great and sudden happiness.
“I see now a new hope for agreement,” he said with enthusiasm. “Regarding
the new frontier along the Curzon Line, I must announce in the name of the
British Government that, taking into account the huge losses suffered by the
USSR in this war, and how the Red Army has helped liberate Poland, the
Curzon Line must be your Eastern frontier.”
“Don’t worry,” he added, looking at me. ““We will see to it that for the land
you lose in the East there will be compensations in Germany, in East Prussia and
Silesia. You'll get a nice outlet to the sea, a good port at Danzig, and the priceless
minerals of Silesia.”
“You'll have a nice big country. Not the one created at Versailles, certainly,
but a real, solid, new home in which the Polish nation can live and develop in
security, freedom and prosperity.”
He was watching my face, so after a bit he said, “And if I should sit at the peace
table, I'll make strong use of these same arguments.”
I looked at Stalin. “You accuse me of ignoring the Lublin Committee,” I said.
“You’re ignoring the Polish Government which has fought the Germans, our
common foe, for five years. You’re ignoring the Polish Government which
created strong armies, a navy and an air force, and which now fights on all
fronts!”
' Compare W. Churchill, The second world war, vol. VI, pp. 207-209.
128
“T recognize this”, he answered. “I have given the proper credit.”
“Anyway,” I said, “I cannot accept the Curzon Line. I have no authority to

yield forty-eight per cent of our country, no authority to forsake millions of my
countrymen and leave them to their fate. If I agreed, everyone would have the
right to say, ‘It was for this that the Polish soldiers fought — a politician’s sell-
out’.”
“You’re an imperialist,” he answered. Then he went into a lengthy argument
in which he insisted that the Polish lands East of the Curzon Line were, in fact,
parts of White Russia and the Ukraine. This, of course, was not true. He spoke
again of heavy Red Army and Russian civilian losses, but I reminded him of
Poland’s losses which, proportionately, were the greatest suffered by an Ally
fighting Germany.
“If Soviet losses, great as they are, entitle the USSR to half of Poland, then
Poland’s losses demand at least that our country be returned to us in the East as
it was before the war,” I argued. I concluded that even if we did yield the vast
area, we still would have no guarantee on the future independence of what was
left of Poland.
“Who is threatening the independence of Poland?” Stalin thundered. “Soviet
Russia?”
It might have been the time to say “Yes!” But I had come to Moscow charged
with effecting an accord. I answered only that we wanted the full independence
and the freedom we had so richly earned.
But there was no way to evade the matter of the Curzon Line and its accep-
tance, and when I continued to argue against it, Molotov suddenly stopped me
roughly.
“But all this was settled at Teheran!” he barked. He looked from Churchill to
Harriman, who were silent. I asked for details of Teheran. And then he added,
still with his eyes on Churchill and the American Ambassador:
“If your memories fail you, let me recall the facts to you. We all agreed at
Teheran that the Curzon Line must divide Poland. You will recall that President
Roosevelt agreed to this solution and strongly endorsed the Line. And then we
agreed that it would be best not to issue any public declaration about our
agreement.”
Shocked, and remembering the earnest assurances I had personally had from
Roosevelt at the White House, I looked at Churchill and Harriman, silently
begging them to call this damnable deal a lie. Harriman looked down at the
rug. Churchill looked straight back at me.
“I confirm this,” he said quietly.
The admission made him angry and he demanded that I agree then and there
to the Russian demands. He reminded me of Britain’s aid to Poland and of my
“duty” now to accede to demands which Britain had come to support. I could
answer only that while there were no words to express Poland’s gratitude for
Britain’s war aid, I personally had no authority to agree to give up half of Poland.
129
“T didn’t expect to be brought here to participate in a new partition of my
country!” I shouted.
“You don’t have to make a public announcement of your decision,” Churchill
urged. “I don’t want to put you in a difficult position with the Polish people.”
I could make no private deal either, I told him. So he went on:
“But you can at least agree that the Curzon Line is the temporary frontier,
and, remember, you may appeal for adjustment at the Peace Conference.”
But before he could continue, Stalin rose indignantly.
“I want this made very clear,” he said gruffly. “Mr. Churchill’s thought of any
future change in the frontier is not acceptable to the Soviet Government. We
will not change our frontiers from time to time. That’s all!”
Churchill held out his hands, looked up to the ceiling in despair, and wheezed.
We filed out silently.
In a subsequent meeting with Churchill and Eden, the Prime Minister frankly
blamed me for not appeasing the Russians early in 1944, when enough of the
secret agreements of Teheran had been revealed to indicate that the Big Three —
without recourse to Polish opinion — had decided to split our country. My
stubborn refusal to consent to this cleavage at that time was what caused Stalin
to set up the Lublin Committee, he charged.
“How near we got at the beginning of the year!” he said, stalking the room.
“If you had come to an agreement with the Russians at that time, you would
not have today those Lublin people. They are going to be a frightful nuisance.
They will build up a rival Government and gradually take over authority in
Poland.”
I reminded him again of the Atlantic Charter and other pacts which directly
or indirectly pledged sovereign rights to Poland.
“T shall tell Parliament that I have agreed with Stalin,” Churchill declared
flatly. “Our relations with Russia are much better than they have ever been.
I mean to keep them that way.”
He added: “I talked to your General Anders the other day and he seems to
entertain the hope that after the defeat of the Germans the Allies will then beat
Russia.”
“This is crazy! You cannot defeat the Russians! I beg of you to settle upon the
Curzon Line as a frontier. Suppose you do lose the support of some of the Poles?
Think what you will gain in return. You will have a country. I will see to it that
the British Ambassador is sent to you. And there will be the Ambassador from
the United States — the greatest military power in the world.”
I shook my head and it infuriated him.
“Then I wash my hands of this,” he stormed. “We are not going to wreck the
peace of Europe. In your obstinacy you do not see what is at stake. It is not in
friendship that we shall part. We shall tell the world how unreasonable you are.
You wish to start a war in which twenty-five million lives will be lost!”
“You settled our fate at Teheran,” I said.
“Poland was saved at Teheran,” he shouted.
130
“T am not a person whose patriotism is diluted to the point where I would give
away half of my country,” I answered.
Churchill shook his finger at me. “Unless you accept the frontier you’re out
of business forever!” he cried. “The Russians will sweep through your country and
your people will be liquidated. You’re on the verge of annihilation. We'll become
sick and tired of you if you continue arguing.”
Eden smoothed matters for a moment, but Churchill came back strongly.
“If you accept the Curzon Line the United States will take a great interest in
the rehabilitation of Poland and may grant you a big loan, possibly without
interest. We would help, too, but we shall be poor after this war. You are bound
to accept the decision of the Great Powers.”
I reminded him of his gloriously worded speeches early in the war, speeches
that decried the taking of territory by force, and I spoke of the better treatment
the Allies were according such turncoat Axis enemies as Italy and Roumania. But
he dismissed this argument.
“You're no Government,” Churchill said. “You’re a callous people who want
to wreck Europe. I shall leave you to your own troubles. You have no sense of
responsibility when you want to abandon your people at home. You are in-
different to their sufferings. You have only your miserable, petty, selfish interests
in mind.
I will now call on the other Poles. This Lublin Government may function
very well. It will be the Government, that is certain. Your arguments are simply
a criminal attempt to wreck agreement among the Allies by your Liberum Veto.
It is cowardice on your part!”
I resented everything he said, and told him so.
“[’m not going to worry Marshal Stalin,” he replied. “If you want to conquer
Russia, we shall let you go your own way. You ought to be in a lunatic asylum!
I don’t know whether the British Government will continue to recognize you.
You hate the Russians. I know you hate them.”
84
Churchill and Stalin agree to grant Poland the Oder Line including Stettin
The following is said about this talk in an embassy report of Mr. Harriman’s
to President Roosevelt dated October 14th, 1944:
Mikolajezyk... explained at great length why he could not accept the Curzon
Line. The cession of territory must be decided by the Polish people. Churchill told
Mikotajezyk that he must accept the Curzon Line as the de facto line of de-
marcation. He suggested a formula on this basis which would allow the Poles to
present their case for adjustment and final settlement at the peace table. He
warned Mikolajczyk however that he and the British Government were com-
13d
mitted to support the Curzon Line as the basis for settlement and bluntly told
him that this was no time for the Poles in London and the British Government
to separate.
Both Churchill and Stalin committed themselves to support the claims of Poland
in the west including East Prussia south! and west of Kénigsberg and the line of the
Oder including Stettin. Molotov interjected that the Curzon Line had the support
of the three major allies since at Teheran you had indicated that you considered
that the Curzon Line was right although you did not consider it advisable to
make your position public. He added that he recalled no objection on your part
to the Polish claims in the west as outlined. Molotov did not refer to me for
confirmation and I decided it would only make matters worse if I being present
as an observer had attempted to correct his statement. I talked to Churchill about
Molotov’s statement afterwards at dinner. He recalls as clearly as I do that
although you showed interest in hearing the views of ‘Stalin and Churchill in the
boundary question you had expressed no opinion on it one way or the other at
Teheran. I intend to tell Molotov privately at the next opportunity that I am
sure you will wish that your name not [be] brought into the discussions again in
regard to the boundary question.
Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. The Conferences at Malta and
Yalta 1945. Department of State Publication 6199. Washington 1955, pp. 202-203.
85
Mikotajczyk begins to yield, but without success
Before leaving Moscow Mikotajczyk had yet another talk with Stalin.
“Poles will bless your name forever if you make a generous gesture here and
now,” I told him. “Even if we retain only the area around Lwéw and Wilno, in
addition to the promised lands in the West, we will be grateful.”
“JT cannot and will not do this”, Stalin said.
86
Churchill urges the exchange of Polish territory once more
On October 27th, 1944, Prime Minister Churchill reported again to the

House of Commons:
The most urgent and burning question was of course that of Poland, and, here
again, I speak words of hope, of hope reinforced by confidence. To abandon hope
1 The word “south” is missing in the original, but should logically be added.
TZ
in this matter would, indeed, be to surrender to despair. In this sphere there are
two crucial issues. The first is the question of the Eastern frontier of Poland with
Russia and the Curzon Line, as it is called, and the new territories to be added
to Poland in the North and in the West. That is the first issue. The second is the
relation of the Polish Government with the Lublin National Liberation Com-
mittee. On these two points, apart from many subsidiary and ancillary points,
we held a series of conferences with both parties. We saw them together and we
saw them separately, and, of course, we were in constant discussion with the
heads of the Soviet Government. I had several very long talks with Marshal
Stalin, and the Foreign Secretary was every day working on these and cognate
matters with Monsieur Molotov. Two or three times we all four met together
without anyone else but the interpreters being present.
I wish I could tell the House that we had reached a solution of these problems.
It is certainly not for want of trying. Iam quite sure however, that we have got
a great deal nearer to the solution of both. I hope Monsieur Mikoltajczyk will soon
return to Moscow, and it will be a great disappointment to all the sincere friends
of Poland, if a good arrangement cannot be made which will enable him to form
a Polish Government on Polish soil — a Government recognised by all the great
Powers concerned, and indeed by all those Governments of the United Nations
which now recognise only the Polish Government in London. Although I do not
underrate the difficulties which remain, it is a comfort to feel that Britain and
Soviet Russia, and I do not doubt the United States, are all firmly agreed in the
re-creation of a strong, free, independent, sovereign Poland loyal to the Allies
and friendly to her great neighbour and liberator, Russia. Speaking more parti-
cularly for His Majesty’s Government it is our persevering and constant aim that
the Polish people, after their suffering and vicissitudes, shall find in Europe an
abiding home and resting place, which, though it may not entirely coincide or
correspond with the pre-war frontiers of Poland, will, nevertheless, be adequate
for the needs of the Polish nation and not inferior in character and quality,
taking the picture as a whole, to what they previously possessed.
These are critical days and it would be a great pity if time were wasted in
indecision or in protracted negotiation. If the Polish Government had taken the
advice we tended them at the beginning of this year, the additional complication
produced by the formation of the Polish Committee of National Liberation at
Lublin would not have arisen, and anything like a prolonged delay in the
settlement can only have the effect of increasing the division between Poles in
Poland and also of hampering the common action which the Poles, the Russians
and the rest of the Allies are taking against Germany.
133
87
Mikolajcezyk seeks to obtain assurances
After his return to London Mr. Mikotajczyk began to negotiate once more
with his own Cabinet and with the British and US Governments. In the
course of these negotiations he caused a number of questions to be put to
the British Government, among which were the following:
Does Britain favour advancing Poland’s post-war Western frontier as far as

the Oder River, including Stettin?
Is Britain prepared to guarantee the independence and integrity of the new
Poland, in a joint declaration with Russia, pending the establishment of UN
guarantee?
88
Great Britain agrees on principle with the Oder Line, including Stettin
Sir Alexander Cadogan, the British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign

Affairs, replied to Mikotajczyk’s enquiries in the following letter, dated
November 2nd, 19441:
Dear Monsieur Romer 2,

I duly reported to the Prime Minister the conversation which I had with your
Excellency and the Polish Ambassador on October 31st, in the course of which
you put to me three questions for the consideration of His Majesty’s Government.
2. The Prime Minister, after consultation with the Cabinet, has now directed
me to give you the following replies.
3. You asked in the first place whether, even in the event of the United States
Government finding themselves unable to agree to the changes in the western
frontier of Poland foreshadowed in the recent conversations in Moscow, His
Majesty’s Government would still advocate these changes at the Peace Settle-
ment. The answer of His Majesty’s Government to this question is in the af-
firmative.
4. Secondly you enquired whether His Majesty’s Government were definitely
in favour of advancing the Polish frontier up to the line of the Oder, to include
the port of Stettin. The answer is that His Majesty’s Government do consider that
Poland should have the right to extend her territory to this extent.’
1 The public was not informed of the “Cadogan Letter” till June 1947. The Polish
Government in Warsaw also stated that the letter had first become known to it in this
way.
2 Tadeusz Romer was Foreign Minister in Mikotajezyk’s Government-in-Exile.
8 Compare in this connection the subsequent document. For sequence see W. Wagner, The
Genesis of the Oder-Neisse Line, pp. 86-87 (Germ. ed., pp. 97-98).
134
5. Finally you enquired whether His Majesty’s Government would guarantee
the independence and integrity of the new Poland. To this the answer is that
His Majesty’s Government are prepared to give such a guarantee jointly with the
Soviet Government. If the United States Government could see their way to
join also, that would plainly be of the greatest advantage, though His Majesty’s
Government would not make this a condition of their own guarantee in conjunction
with that of the Soviet Government. This Anglo-Soviet guarantee would, in the
view of His Majesty’s Government, remain valid until effectively merged in the
general guarantee which it is hoped may be afforded by the projected World
Organisation.
6. With regard to what you said in regard to anticipated difficulties in the way
of negotiations in Moscow for a reformation of the Polish Government, the
Prime Minister observes that the success of these negotiations must depend on a
solution of the frontier question. It is impossible to ignore the possibility that
agreement might be reached on the frontier question and that it might never-
theless prove impossible to reach agreement on the other matter. That would, of
course, be most unfortunate, but the Polish Government would be in a much better
position if negotiations broke down on this point, on which they would have the
support of His Majesty’s Government and probably of the United States Govern-
ment, than on the frontier question.
Yours sincerely,
Alexander Cadogan
Poland, Germany and European peace. Official documents 1944-1948. Ed. by the Polish
Embassy in London. London 1948, pp. 105-106.
89
The agreement cannot be understood but within the compass of the negotiations
For the evaluation of the so-called “Cadogan Letter” the statement given
by Mr. Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, in the House of Commons
during question-hour on June 4th, 1947, when the letter became known,
is of importance.
Mr. Driberg asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will make a
statement on the contents of the letter written by Sir Alexander Cadogan to the
Foreign Minister of the former Polish Government regarding the western fron-
tier of Poland; and if he will publish the text of the letter in Hansard.
Mr. Bevin: I assume that my hon. Friend is referring to a letter from Sir
Alexander Cadogan, as Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, to
Monsieur Romer, Foreign Minister in the Polish Government in London, dated
2nd November, 1944. This letter stated as regards Poland’s western frontier that
His Majesty’s Government considered that Poland should have the right to
extend her territory up to the line of the Oder, to include the port of Stettin.
eS
ny
This letter, which was confidential, formed part of lengthy diplomatic discussions
with the Soviet, Polish and United States Governments subsequently continued
at the Crimea Conference and concluded in the Potsdam Agreement, by which
the Polish Government undertook, pending the final delimitation of Poland’s
western frontier, the administration of territory beyond the Oder as far as the
Western Neisse. The House is fully aware of the Potsdam Agreement, and I see
no advantage in singling out this letter for special publication.
Mr. Driberg: Could my right hon. Friend say whether this letter assured the
Poles that we would support their frontier claims, whatever the Americans or
other people might say?
Mr. Bevin: My view is that the whole correspondence was superseded by the
Potsdam Agreement, which decided this thing, or at least laid down how this
‘territory was to be administered pending the official peace settlement. I am
sorry that I cannot carry continuity too far.
90
The US Government offers to help Mikolajczyk in resettling the minorities
Mr. Mikotajczyk had written to President Roosevelt at the same time (on
October 26th)1. In reply he received the following letter from the President
(dated November 17th, 1944) via Mr. Harriman:
I have constantly in mind the problems you are facing in your endeavors to
bring about an equitable and permanent solution of the Polish-Soviet difficulties and
particulary the questions which you raised in your message of October 26th. I
have asked Ambassador Harriman, who will bring you this letter, to discuss
with you the question of Lwéw.
While I would have preferred to postpone the entire question of this Govern-
ment’s attitude until the general postwar settlement in Europe, I fully realize
your urgent desire to receive some indication of the position of the United
States Government with the least possible delay. Therefore I am giving below in
broad outline the general position of this Government in the hope that it may
be of some assistance to you in your difficult task.
1. The United States Government stand unequivocally for a strong, free and
independent Polish State with the untrammeled right of the Polish people to
order their internal existence as they see fit.
2. In regard to the future frontiers of Poland, if a mutual agreement on this
subject, including the proposed compensation for Poland from Germany, is
reached between the Polish, Soviet and British Governments, this Government
1 Text in St. Mikotajczyk’s “The pattern of Soviet domination”, pp. 331-332. The text
of Roosevelt’s reply is also reproduced in the same book, but in an abridged version.
136
would offer no objection. In so far as the United States guarantee of any specific
frontiers is concerned I am sure you will understand that this Government, in
accordance with its traditional policy, cannot give a guarantee for any specific
frontiers. As you know, the United States Government is working for the
establishment of a world security organization through which the United States
together with the other member States will assume responsibility for general
security which, of course, includes the inviolability of agreed frontiers.
3. If the Polish Government and people desire in connection with the new
frontiers of the Polish State to bring about the transfer to and from the territory
of Poland of national minorities, the United States Government will raise no
objection and as far as practicable will facilitate such transfer.
4. The United States Government is prepared, subject to legislative authority,
to assist in so far as practicable in the postwar economic reconstruction of the
Polish State.
Poland, Germany and European peace, pp. 107-108.
91
Mikolajezyk fails
Mr. Mikotajczyk’s negotiations with his Cabinet remained unsuccessful. He

resigned on November 24th, 1944. As the version emerged in London that
Mr. Mikotajczyk had failed because the US Government would not guarantee
the Polish frontiers, the State Department published a declaration on No-
vember 25th, 1944, in which the following was said:
The specific question of the guarantee of the Polish frontier by this Govern-
ment was not and could not have been at issue, since this Government’s tradi-
tional policy of not guaranteeing specific frontiers in Europe is well known.
Documents on American foreign relations, vol. VII, p. 895.
92
Churchill: An exchange of populations is no longer difficult today
On December 15th, 1944, Prime Minister Churchill again spoke about the
future of Poland in the House of Commons:
The hopes which I thought it proper, and indeed necessary, to express in

October, have faded. When Mr. Mikotajczyk left Moscow my hope was that he
would return within a week or so with the authority of the Polish Government
in London to agree about the Polish frontiers on the basis of the Curzon Line
137
=
and its prolongation to the Southward called “the Curzon Line A”1, which
comprises, on the Russian side, the city of Lvov. I have several times drawn
Mr. Mikolajczyk’s attention to the dangers of delay. Had he been able to return
after the very friendly conversations which passed between him and Marshal
Stalin, and also the conversations which he had with the Lublin National
Liberation Committee; had he been able to return, with the assent of his col-
leagues, I believe that the difficulties inherent in the forming of a Polish Govern-
ment in harmony with the Lublin Committee, might well have been overcome.
“In that case he would be at this moment at the head of a Polish Government, on
Polish soil, recognised by all the United Nations, and awaiting the advance of
the Russian Armies moving farther into Poland as the country was delivered
from the Germans. He would also be assured in his task of the friendship and
help of Marshal Stalin. Thus he could at every stage have established a good
relationship between the Polish underground movement and the advancing Rus-
sians, and a Polish Administration would have been set up by him in the newly
delivered regions as they expanded.
I have the greatest respect for Mr. Mikolajczyk, and for his able colleagues
who joined us at Moscow, Mr. Romer and Mr. Grabski. I am sure they are
more qualified to fill the place of the late General Sikorski than any other of
the Polish leaders. After endless discussions, into some of which we were drawn,
on Mr. Mikolajczyk’s return from Moscow the Poles utterly failed to obtain
agreement. In consequence, on 24th November, Mr. Mikolajezyk, Mr. Romer and
a number of other Polish Ministers resigned from the Polish Government, which
has been almost entirely reconstituted in a form which in some respects I certainly
am not able to applaud. Mr. Mikolajezyk and his friends remain, in the view of
His Majesty’s Government, the only light which burns for Poland in the imme-
diate future.
Just as I said that if the Polish Government had agreed, in the early part of this
year, upon the frontier there never would have been any Lublin Committee to
which Soviet Russia had committed herself, so I now say that if Mr. Mikotajezyk
could swiftly have returned to Moscow early in November, as he hoped and
expected to do, with the power to conclude an agreement on the frontier line,
Poland might now have taken her full place in the ranks of the nations contend-
ing against Germany, and would have had the full support and friendship of
Marshal Stalin and the Soviet Government. That opportunity, too, has been, for
the time being, suspended. This prospect has vanished like the last. One is re-
minded of the story of the Sybilline books, in which on every occasion the price
remained the same and the number of volumes decreased, until at last they had
to be bought on the most unfavourable terms. Mr. Mikolajezyk’s ordeal has been
a most severe and painful one. Torn between the love of his country and the
1 See in this connection page 10, note 1. Compare G. Rhode: Die Entstehung der Curzon-
Linie (The Origin of the Curzon Line), pp. 81-92, and above all the map on p. 83. The
term “Curzon Line A” is not quite correct. What is meant is the “Line A” of June 17th
1919 to which the Curzon Line later corresponded in essentials.
138
intense desire to reach a settlement with her mighty neighbour, which was most
abhorrent to many of his fellow-countrymen, confronted with the obstinate and
inflexible resistance of his London colleagues, whose veto was like the former
Liberum Veto, which played so great a part in the ruin of Poland, with these
circumstances around him, Mr. Mikolajezyk decided to resign. Almost a month
has passed since then, and now I imagine that the prospects of a reconciliation
between the Polish Government and the Lublin Committee, with the Soviet
Government behind them, have definitely receded; although they might perhaps
advance again were Mr. Mikolajczyk able to speak with authority for the fortunes
of the Polish nation.
The consequences of this rescission of hopes of a working agreement between
Russia and the Poles have been masked to British eyes by the fact that the
Russian Armies on the long Vistula front have been motionless, but when they
move forward, as move forward they surely will, and the Germans are expelled
from large new tracts of Poland, the area administered by the Lublin Committee
will grow, and its contacts with the Soviet Government will become more
intimate and strong. I do not know what misfortunes will attend such a deve-
lopment. The absence of an agreement may well be grievous for Poland, and the
relationship and misunderstandings between the advancing Russian Armies and
the Polish underground movement may take forms which will be most painful
to all who have the permanent well-being of Poland and her relationship with
Russia at heart. The fact that a Prime Minister resigns and that a new Govern-
ment is formed does not, of course, affect the formal diplomatic relationship
between States. We still recognise the Polish Government in London as the
Government of Poland, as we have done since they reached our shores in the
early part of this war. This course has been continued up to the present by all
the rest of the United Nations, excepting only Russia which is the Power most
concerned and the Power whose Armies will first enter the heart of Poland. It
is a source of grief to me that all these forces could not have been joined
together more speedily against the common foe.
I cannot accept the view that the arrangements which have to be proposed
about the frontier of the new Poland are not solid and satisfactory, or that they
would not give to Poland that ,,abiding home“ of which I spoke to the House in
February. If Poland concedes Lvov and the surrounding regions in the South, on
the line known as Curzon Line A, which my right hon. Friend the Foreign
Secretary will deal with in more detail later on in the Debate — if Poland makes
this concession and these lands are joined to the Ukraine, she will gain in the
North the whole of East Prussia west and south of the fortress of Koenigsberg,
including the great city and port of Danzig, one of the most magnificent cities
and harbours in the whole of the world, famous for centuries as a great gather-
ing place of the trade of the Baltic, and, indeed, of the world. This will be hers
instead of the threatened and artificial Corridor, which was built so laboriously
after the last war, and Poland will stretch broadly along the Baltic on a front of
over 200 miles. The Poles are free, so far as Russia and Great Britain are con-
132,
‘
cerned, to extend their territory, at the expense of Germany, to the West. I do

not propose to go into exact details, but the extensions, which will be supported
by Britain and Russia, bound together as they are by the 20 years’ Alliance, are
of high importance. Thus, they gain in the West and the North territories more
important and more highly developed than they lose in the East. We hear that a
third of Poland is to be conceded, but I must mention that that third! includes
the vast track of the Pripet Marshes, a most desolate region, which, though it
swells the acreage, does not add to the wealth of those who own it.
Thus I have set before the House what is, in outline, the offer which the
Russians, on whom the main burden of liberation still falls, make the Polish
people. I cannot believe that such an offer should be rejected by Poland. It would,
of course, have to be accompanied by the disentanglement of populations in the
East and in the North. The transference of several millions of people would have
to be effected from the East to the West or North, as well as the expulsion of the
Germans — because that is what is proposed: the total expulsion of the Germans —
from the area to be acquired by Poland in the West and the North. For expulsion
is the method which, so far as we have been able to see, will be the most satis-
factory and lasting. There will be no mixture of populations to cause endless
trouble, as has been the case in Alsace-Lorraine. A clean sweep will be made. Iam
not alarmed by the prospect of the disentanglement of populations, nor even by
these large transferences, which are more possible in modern conditions than they
ever were before.
The disentanglement of populations which took place between Greece and
Turkey after the last war — my noble Friend opposite may remember — was in
many ways a success, and has produced friendly relations between Greece and
Turkey ever since. That disentanglement, which at first seemed impossible of
achievement, and about which it was said that it would strip Turkish life in
Anatolia of so many necessary services, and that the extra population could never
be assimilated or sustained by Greece having regard to its own area and popu-
lation — I say that disentanglement solved problems? which had before been the
causes of immense friction, of wars and of rumours of wars. Nor do I see why
there should not be room in Germany for the German populations of East Prussia
and of the other territories I have mentioned. After all, 6,000,000 or 7,000,000
Germans have been killed already in this frightful war, into which they did not
1 In reality it was not a matter of a third but of 45.7°/o of the territory of the Polish
State of 1939, or approximately 68,726 square miles. But of these only about 14,286 square
miles belonged to the sparsely populated voivodeship of Polesia where the Pripet Marshes
mentioned by Churchill are situated.
? It is true that the Greco-Turkish exchange of populations solved a number of problems
in the case of Turkey, but it had confronted little Greece, which had had to take in over
a million more people than she gave up, with an abundance of the most difficult problems
which had not yet been solved satisfactorily even by 1944. Churchill does not mention
that by virtue of this arrangement the Greeks had to abandon territory on the west coast
of Asia Minor where Greeks had been settled for three thousand years. See in this con-
CES, B. Ladas, The exchange of minorities; Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey. New
ork :
140
hesitate, for a second time in a generation, to plunge all Europe. At the present
time, we are told that they have 10,000,000 or 12,000,000 prisoners or foreigners
used as slaves in Germany, who will, we hope, be restored to their own homes
and lands when victory is gained. Moreover, we must expect that many more
Germans will be killed in the fighting which will occupy the spring and summer
and which we must expect will involve the largest and fiercest battles yet fought
in this war.
When these ideas, which arose at the Teheran Conference, were first foreshadowed
by me to the House, the British and American Armies had not landed on the
Continent. France was not liberated. She was powerless, not like now when she
is rising with great rapidity to a strong and fine position among the nations of the
world. The Armies of General Eisenhower did not stand along the Rhine when
these matters were discussed. They were still gathering in this island, not along
the Rhine, where they are now growing in strength as the waves of American
manhood cross the Atlantic and take their places in the crusade and in the line
of battle. Nor had the Russians advanced to the Vistula; vast distances separated
them even from the frontiers of Poland. Nor was one large German army cut off
in Courland, the peninsula which has Memel and Libau at its base. Nor was there
that great position which the Russian Armies held in the extreme North, with
their right hand, nor was their left hand reaching out beyond Budapest in the
South, threatening an advance into the very heart of Austria. Nor had Rome
been occupied, nor the Apennines pierced.
In those days, the Poles might well have had some show of reason in asking
whether the great Allies would have the power, even if they were so minded, to
deliver the new territories to Poland which were to compensate her for what she
was giving up in the East, but the situation has changed vastly in favour of the
Allies, and it seems to me extremely unlikely that, after the spring and summer
campaigns have been fought, if it be necessary to go so far in the business — and
we shall go whatever distance is necessary to complete our object — it seems
extremely unlikely that the evil and hateful forces in Germany, who plotted, plan-
ned and began this war, will have the power to resist the decisions of a peace or
armistice conference, at which the principal victorious Powers will be assembled. The
prospects of final victory have, in the time that has passed since these matters
were first discussed at Teheran, become for the Allies solid and spacious. Therefore,
as I say, it has always been said by the Poles, when I have been discussing the
matter with them here, “We know what we have to give up; what certainty
have we of receiving compensation in other quarters?” They have much more
certainty of it now than at this time last year. In fact, I cannot see any doubt
whatever that the Great Powers, if they agree, can effect the transference of
population.
GO
Iam particularly careful not ever to pretend to speak in the name of any other
Power unless so directed beforehand, and I hope the House will make allowances
for the care with which I pick my words upon this point. All I can say is that
141
.
I have received no formal disagreement in all these long months upon the way
in which the future of Poland seems to be shaping itself — or is being shaped —
but no doubt when the time comes the United States will make their own pro-
nouncement on these matters, bearing in mind, as they will, the practical aspect
which they assume and also that failure on the part of the three greatest Powers
to work together would damage all our hopes for a future structure, a world
government which, whatever else it may fail to do, will at any rate be equipped
with all the powers necessary to prevent the outbreak of further war.
It is asked, why cannot all questions of territorial changes be left over till the
end of the war? I think that is a most pertinent question and it is, in fact, the
answer which I and the Foreign Secretary gave in almost every case that has been
presented to us. Well, Sir, I understand the argument. The armies, it is said, may
move here and there, their front may advance or recede, this country or that
may be in occupation of this space of ground or the other, but it is at the peace
table alone that the permanent destiny of any land or people will be decided.
Why cannot that be said in this case? It can be said in every case, or almost every
case, except in that of Poland. So why should Poland be excepted from this
general rule? It is only for Polish advantage and to avoid great evils which might
occur. The Russian Armies — I know nothing of their intentions, I am speaking
only of what is obvious to anyone who studies the war map — will probably, dur-
ing the early part of next year, traverse large areas of Poland, driving the Germans
before them. If, during those marches, fierce quarrels and fighting break out
between large sections of the Polish population and the Russian troops, very
great suffering — which can still be avoided — will infallibly occur, and new
poisoned wounds will be inflicted upon those who must dwell side by side in
peace, confidence and good neighbourliness if the tranquillity of Europe is to be
assured or the smooth working of the world organisation for the maintenance
of peace is to be created and maintained.
All these matters are among the most serious which could possibly be examined
as far as our present lights allow. Our British principle has been enunciated that,
as I have said, all territorial changes must await the conference at the peace table
after the victory has been won, but to that principle there is one exception, and
that exception is, changes mutually agreed. It must not be forgotten that in the
Atlantic Charter is I think inserted the exception that there should be no changes
before the peace table except those mutually agreed'. I am absolutely convinced
that it is in the profound future interest of the Polish nation that they should
reach agreement with the Soviet Government about their disputed frontiers in
the East before the march of the Russian Armies through the main part of Poland
takes place. That is the great gift they have to make to Russia, a settlement now
at this time which gives the firm title of mutual agreement to what might other-
wise be disputed at the Peace Conference. I must, however, say, because I am
1 In the course of the ensuing debate Mr. Eden said that this exception was not to be
found in the Atlantic Charter but in a statement of policy made by the Prime Minister
in September 1940.
142
most anxious the House should understand the whole position, speaking on be-
half of His Majesty’s Government in a way which I believe would probably be
held binding by our successors, that at the Conference we shall adhere to the
lines which I am now unfolding to the House, and shall not hesitate to proclaim
that the Russians are justly treated, and rightly treated, in being granted the
claim they make to the Eastern frontiers! along the Curzon Line as described.
The Foreign Secretary and I have laboured for many months, we have spared
no labour of travel, no risk of political rebuff and consequent censure, in our
effort to bring about that good understanding between the Poland whom we
still recognise and the mighty Ally which has so heavily smitten the German mili-
tary power. We have never weakened in any way in our resolve that Poland shall
be restored and stand erect as a sovereign, independent nation, free to model her
social institutions or any other institutions in any way her people choose, provided,
I must say, that these are not on Fascist lines, and provided that Poland stands
loyally as a barrier and friend of Russia against German aggression from the West.
And in this task, of course, Poland will be aided to the full by a Russian and Bri-
tish guarantee and assistance and will also, Icannot doubt, though I cannot declare,
be aided by the United States acting at least through the world organisation which
we are determined to erect — that she and the whole of the United Nations are
determined to erect — for the salvation of mankind toiling here below from the
horrors of repeated war.
Another great war, especially an ideological war, fought as it would be not
only on frontiers but in the heart of every land with weapons far more destruc-
tive than men have yet wielded, would spell the doom, perhaps for many cen-
turies, of such civilisation as we have been able to erect since history began to be
written. It is that peril which, according to the best judgment of this National
Government of all parties, which has so lately renewed its troth to stand together
for the duration of the war against Germany — it is that peril that we have
laboured and are striving sincerely and faithfully to ward off.
93
Objections to expulsion are heard in the House of Commons
After Churchill’s speech there was a fairly long debate in the House of
Commons during which the following was said inter alia:
Mr. Raikes? (Essex, South-East):... Regarding these two reciprocal offers to

which the Prime Minister referred as compensation for the Poles, all I say is that
the offer of East Prussia means East Prussia without Kénigsberg, without Pillau,
1 Churchill was apparently thinking of the Eastern frontier of Poland, although he

spoke of the Russians.
2 Conservative.
143
the fortress of Kénigsberg which would dominate the Gulf of Gdynia and also
control the Port of Danzig. As regards the offer of German lands to the Oder, it
is easy enough to consider on the map depopulating millions of people. But does
the House appreciate what that means — 4,000,000 Poles East of the Curzon Line
dragged from the homes in which they have lived for generations, 4,000,000
Ukrainians left to be Russian citizens, whether they wish it or not, and 5,000,000
Germans again forced from their homes and transferred to Western Germany?
What a sum of human misery. I do not know that the basis of the settlement of a
‘new world after the war would be improved by removing 5,000,000 Germans
from one side of the Oder to the other, not the sort of settlement the Atlantic
Charter proposed to stand for in the days before the Atlantic Charter had
become merely a ghost and that ghost was laid today finally by the Prime
Minister.
Mr. Mander! (Wolverhampton, East): ... The Prime Minister referred to the
word “compensation” in connection with the sacrifices which Poland has made in
the East. I have never felt very happy about that word. It seems to me that it is
not compensation that is contemplated, but a change on strategic grounds. East
Prussia, for instance, has always been a great danger to her neighbours. Germany
was able to strike from there, and on those grounds alone there is a good case for
taking it away from Germany. I think it is quite right to give it to Poland and to
transfer the populations. It is tragic that we should have to come to things of
this kind. Transfers of population are taking place in Europe under conditions of
the most incredible brutality, but an orderly migration such as is contemplated
is a wholly different matter. As a matter of fact, I imagine that at the end of this
war there will not be many Germans left in East Prussia. There may not be many
in the Eastern parts of Germany, because I fancy that, as the Russians approach,
they will make rapid strides towards the interior of their country.
Mr. Ivor Thomas? (Keighley):... I have never risen to speak with such a heavy
heart as I do today. It is melancholy to think that after more than five years of
fighting, in a war which we entered to defend the independence of Poland, we
should be debating whether Poland is to be a State at all. For, make no mistake,
that is the issue before us. The frontier question is entirely subordinate. ...
There are many more important considerations to be borne in mind. What is
proposed by the Prime Minister is that Poland should be shifted bodily West-
wards. The right hon. Gentleman did not seem to realise all the problems which
that would involve for Poland. She is already involved in considerable hostility
with the Soviet Union, and, if anything is calculated to make a permanent enemy
of Germany, it is such a proposal. I do not say that it should not be carried out;
it looks to me as though it will have to be, but it is certainly going to create
1 Liberal.
2 Labour.
144
immense problems for Poland, and, if the Allies urge the Polish Government to
adopt such a solution, they must do one thing more — they must give a joint and
several guarantee to Poland. That raises formidable problems for us, because we
are traditionally averse to giving such guarantees. But we have no right to urge
on Poland a solution bristling with such difficulties unless we are prepared to
make our own contribution to it.
Mr. Petherick! (Penryn and Falmouth):... It is suggested that East Prussia

should be given to Poland as compensation. But the Poles do not want East
Prussia as compensation. It is the same as if you took away East Anglia from
Britain, and gave it to Germany, and offered us Normandy instead. It is a
monstrous suggestion.
Mr. Boothby? (Aberdeen and Kincardine, Eastern):... I also think — and here
I find myself again in substantial agreement with the Prime Minister — that East
Prussia, which remains today what it has been for the last two centuries, the focal
point of the infection of Prussian militarism, should be excised from the German
body politic by a surgical operation; and that the German population of East
Prussia should be, as the Prime Minister said, expelled. It is rough but, by God,
they deserve it.
Mr. Pethick-Lawrence? (Edinburgh, East):... I do not propose to say anything

further about the specific frontier proposed for Poland on the East. The dis-
advantages of it are quite apparent. It may be thought that that is what it will be in
the end, but I do not propose to go into that any further, but to say a few words
about the frontier suggested on the West. I think that the famous Danzig Corri-
dor worked so badly that we are perfectly right to get rid of it, and that on
general grounds, quite apart from the present situation, Poland should have
proper access to the sea. I do not think that the Germans, considering what they
did, have the slightest right to complain of our taking that course. I would go
further, and say that, after the transferences of population which the Germans
have effected in all parts of the world, the ruthless way in which they have torn
people up from their homes and even removed their own people about, they have
no right to complain if we on our part forcibly remove some of their people.
I would even go further. The Prime Minister quoted certain reasons for thinking
that there would be room in Germany, even a smaller Germany, for some of the
people who lay outside the inner Reich. The German Government have murdered
or driven out of their country a large number of Jews, and the place that these
people occupied will also be available for others outside. So that, although the
1 Conservative.
2 Conservative.
3 Labour.
145
ca
Germans will complain, I do not think they will have any right to complain
about any forcible changes of population that we may desire to make.
That is not to say that we can play about with territories which have been
German and that we can move about not hundreds of thousands but millions of
people. I think that there are in the territory about which the Prime Minister is
speaking something like 5,000,000 Germans, which is a very large number. That
may be an exaggeration, but the number, at any rate, runs into millions. I do not
think we can play about with territories and masses of populations of those dimen-
sions except at very grave peril. Whether we incorporate in Poland a great piece
of German territory with the Germans in it, or incorporate the territory and turn
the Germans out of it, we are creating a situation for the future that will not
make for the peace either of Poland or of the world. I do not say that we cannot
get over the difficulty of the Danzig Corridor. It may be that we have to take
away from Germany that part which rendered the Corridor necessary, but I do
not think we should encourage the Poles, still less force the Poles, to have Ger-
man territory which is not absolutely necessary for the purposes we have in
mind. If we encourage too wide an extension of Poland on the west at the
expense of Germany, we are sowing the seed of grave danger for the future of the
world.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Eden): ... 1 come to a question
which I do not think has played a great part — and which should have played a
greater part — except in the speech of the hon. Gentleman who spoke just now.
That is the Corridor. There has been a great deal of discussion about Eastern
Poland, but hardly a word about the Corridor. I have taken the view for many
years, as an individual, that it is impossible for the Polish State to have an indepen-
dent national life with the Corridor system perpetuated. I have told the House
that once or twice before. I sat at Geneva as rapporteur on this wretched Danzig
business. Actually it was quite unworkable. Some people seem to think, quite
wrongly, that the Corridor was German. It was not; the population of the
Corridor was Polish. But, even so, the cross-traffic and the endless problems of
the Free City of Danzig, and the growing Herrenvolk attitude of the German
officials towards Poles, made it absolutely impossible for there to be any arrange-
ment on those lines. I say to the House that, quite independently of this Polish-
Russian problem at all, long ago I think I am on record as having said this. The
only way to solve this problem was that East Prussia should go to the Poles and
that the population of East Prussia should be shifted out. That is the only way to
get a permanent settlement.
In conclusion, I want to say a word about the movement of population. Of

course, my hon. Friend is right — it is an immensely difficult question. I do not
think it is impossible, and, if it is the only way to solve this problem of the
Corridor, as Iam convinced it is, then we have got to face it. The House should
146
remember that there were certain populations of Polish descent when East
Prussia was under Polish suzerainty. I repeat my own conviction that it is the
only way in which we can hope to obtain a lasting settlement there.
94
The new Polish Government-in-Exile does not want “either Breslau or Stettin”
Following upon the debate in the House of Commons, Mr. Arciszewski, the
Prime Minister of the new Polish Government-in-Exile, was asked his
opinion by a London newspaper. He stated during the interview:
The Polish-Russian dispute can be divided into four parts.

(1) Guarantees for the re-establishment of a free sovereign independent Polish
State;
(2) the frontier problem;
(3) civil administration in the territory liberated by the Red Army;
(4) future Polish-Russian relations.
With regard to the first problem I greatly appreciate all the favourable state-
ments about the future of the Polish State made by Churchill and other members
of King George VI Government in the House of Commons. But those do not
seem to justify making the amputation of the eastern part of Poland which is not
all marshland but includes territory of vital importance — the preliminary con-
dition of any Russian-Polish settlement.
The debate in the House however has raised the problem not only of our
Eastern but of our Western frontier with Germany, and here I would like to
state that we have no grand ideas of expansion. We are trying only to preserve
the unity and integrity of the Polish State. We have put forward our claims
against Germany and demanded the incorporation into Poland of East Prussia,
Upper Silesia and parts of Pomerania and appreciate the positive attitude of the
Allies, including Soviet-Russia who promised us help in this matter. But we do
not want to expand our frontier in the West to include 8-10 million Germans.
Wedo not wantthatiseither Breslau or Stettin. We are claiming just
our ethnical and historic Polish territories which are under German domination.
When the full guarantee of our national existence is obtained my Government
should be able without any difficulty to deal with all other outstanding questions ©
such as those I have mentioned, including good neighbourly relations between
Russia and Poland within the framework of general security in Europe and in
the world.
Sunday Times, London, December 17th, 1944.
147
95
The United States Government re-states its policy in respect of Poland once more
The new US Secretary of State, Mr. E. R. Stettinius, made a declaration

on policy in respect of Poland on December 18th, 1944.
The United States Government’s position as regards Poland has been steadfastly
guided by full understanding and sympathy for the interests of the Polish people.
This position has been communicated on previous occasions to the interested
governments, including the Government of Poland. It may be summarized as
follows:
1. The United States Government stands unequivocally for a strong, free, and
independent Polish state with the untrammeled right of the Polish people to
order their internal existence as they see fit. 4
2. It has been the consistently held policy of the United States Government
that questions relating to boundaries should be left in abeyance until the ter-
mination of hostilities. As Secretary Hull stated in his address of April 9, 1944,
“This does not mean that certain questions may not and should not in the
meantime be settled by friendly conference and agreement.” In the case of the
future frontiers of Poland, if a mutual agreement is reached by the United
Nations directly concerned, this Government would have no objection to such an
agreement which could make an essential contribution to the prosecution of the
war against the common enemy. If, as a result of such agreement, the Govern-
ment and people of Poland decide that it would be in the interests of the Polish
State to transfer national groups, the United States Government in cooperation
with other governments will assist Poland, in so far as practicable, in such trans-
fers. The United States Government continues to adhere to its traditional policy
of declining to give guarantees for any specific frontiers. The United States
Government is working for the establishment of a world security organization
through which the United States together with other member states would
assume responsibility for the preservation of general security.
3. It is the announced aim of the United States Government, subject to legis-
lative authority, to assist the countries liberated from the enemy in repairing the
devastation of war and thus to bring to their peoples the opportunity to join as
full partners in the task of building a more prosperous and secure life for all men
and women. This applies to Poland as well as to other United Nations.
The policy of the United States Government regarding Poland outlined above
has as its objective the attainment of the announced basic principles of United
States foreign policy.
Documents on American foreign relations, vol. VII, pp. 897-898.
148
X
Allied Plans concerning Germany in 1944 -
96
Churchill regards the Oder Line x having been finally decided on
On January 14th, 1944, Mr. Churchill reported to the British Cabinet on

the plans for the post-war treatment of Germany:
First, they! are to be completely disarmed and deprived of all power to rearm.
Second, they are to be prohibited from all use of aviation, whether civil or
military, and from practising the art of flying.
Third, large numbers of persons alleged to be guilty of atrocities are to be
handed over for judgment to the countries where their crimes were committed...
Fourth, the British, United States, and Russian Governments are, I understand,
agreed that Germany is to be decisively broken up into a number of separate
States. East Prussia and Germany east of the river Oder are to be alienated for
ever and the population shifted. Prussia itself is to be divided and curtailed. The
Ruhr and other great centres of coal and steel must be put outside the power of
Prussia.
W. Churchill, The second world war, vol. IV, pp. 617-618.
97
Churchill finds approval in the House of Commons
There was a debate on foreign policy in the House of Commons on February

22nd, 1944, following Mr. Churchill’s report on the Teheran Conference ?,
in the course of which the question of the future frontier between Germany
and Poland was touched upon by several speakers:
Commander Sir Archibald Southby? (Epsom): ... Russia naturally has very
definite views as regards her frontiers and, if the rectification of frontiers can
guarantee peace ir Europe, in God’s name let us rectify them. But the rectification
must take place by agreement and not by force. I do not think that we can do
other than say that, so far as Poland is concerned, we must agree to the Curzon
1 i.e. the Germans.

2 Compare part VII, pp. 103-105.
3 Conservative.
149
Line provided that concessions are made in other directions which would re-
compense Poland for territories that she will have lost in the East.
Major Vyvyan Adams! (Leeds, West):...I hope that no pedantic insistence

on the former frontiers of Poland will be allowed to disturb the good will which
should subsist between Russia and the Western Powers. If, as |hope may happen —
as, in fact, has happened already — Russia wishes her frontier to be further West
than the line of 1939, let us not forget that there are areas of the German Reich
which should certainly not be allowed to stay under any German sovereignty
which may be permitted to survive. I see no geographical reason, and certainly
no political reason, why East Prussia should be allowed to continue as a territory
exclusively reserved for German inhabitants. Why should not that territory go to
Poland, and the German population of East Prussia be sent somewhere else? It
is quite wrong, it is pure sentimentality, to say that populations cannot be shifted
from point to point. Germany knows perfectly well that they can be shifted.
Sentimentalists, in this country and abroad, used to lap up the propaganda which
said that Germans anywhere and the territory they inhabited should belong to
the German Reich. That doctrine was even sought to be promulgated in the
United States of America. And for a time how well that propaganda worked!
The Saar, Austria, Sudetenland, Memel, Danzig — every place used as a strategic
point in conquering the world; and such sentimental surrender to that doctrine
meant insecurity, and at a short remove it meant war. I believe that the reverse
process would mean security and peace. It would not be a political expedient; it
would be a duty.
Miss Rathbone? (Combined English Universities): May I ask the hon. and
gallant Member one question? Does he think that it is going to conduce, either
to a quick end of the war or to peace afterwards, which he so much desires, if we
teach the German, people that we intend not only to take from them a huge
province, such as East Prussia, but deprive a few million Germans of the homes
they have had for generations?
Major Adams: There are many answers to the hon. Lady’s questions. One is that
the mere fact of the density of population in Germany has not had any effects,
one way or the other, upon war, because Germany before the last war had
enormous overseas territories and had the opportunity to emigrate populations
to colonies overseas and never made any use of them at all. As to the first point,
I believe in being truthful even with your enemy about the future.
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 397, cols. 711, 782-786.
1 Conservative.
2 Indepedent.
150
98
Objections are raised in the House of Commons to cessions and resettlements
When the debate was continued on the following day, February 23rd, 1944,
this question was discussed again:
Mr. G. Strauss! (Lambeth, North): ... The other matter I want to deal with is
the statement of the Prime Minister concerning the difficulties which have arisen
between Poland and Russia. I do not want to say anything of the contributions
to the war of these two countries or of our admiration of their people. That is
not my purpose. I want to comment upon the two declarations made by the
Prime Minister. One was that Russia needed reassurance against future attack by
a readjustment of her frontiers. The second was that Poland should be compen-
sated by having some part of German territory in the north and the west. There
may be excellent reasons for readjustment of this or the other boundary, ex-
cellent ethnographic reasons. In this case there is such a reason. To suggest,
however, that the alteration of boundaries can possibly create any reassurance to
any country against further aggression is extraordinarily dangerous. To start
with, it is nonsense.
Never in history has any boundary, however strategically favourable it may
be, prevented a country from being attacked if another country wanted to
attack it, and that is less likely today than ever since the aeroplane has come to
play such a major part in war. Therefore, it is ridiculous to suggest that we should
alter any boundaries in any part of Europe on strategical grounds so as to prevent
ca further outbreak of German or other aggression. I hope that that principle
will not be accepted by His Majesty’s Government or by any other member of
the United Nations. If it is, it will lead to demands from all over Europe for
boundary readjustments which are completely unjustifiable. Some such demands
are already being made. The net result will be the creation of groups within new
boundaries which are more likely to lead to further unrest and war than to a
pacification of Europe.
Mr. Bartle Bull? (Enfield): Suppose East Prussia were a part of Poland; does not
the hon. Gentleman think that that would be a solution?
Mr. Strauss: I am coming to that in a moment. The statement by the Prime
Minister that East Prussia is to become part of Poland is a very important new
declaration of policy. May I read what the right hon. Gentleman said, referring
to his conversation with Mr. Stalin:
“J also spoke and agreed upon the need for Poland to obtain compensation
at the expense of Germany both in the North and in the West.”
The Prime Minister agreed that a part of Germany — I assume that he meant
East Prussia — should go to Poland. This is an important matter of principle, and
it is a proposal with which I totally disagree. I would like to know whether he
1 Labour.
2 Conservative.
151
was speaking for a united Government in this matter, whether the Labour
leaders in the Government agree to this proposal, and whether it may be assumed
that the Labour movement is committed by it. It has never been before the
House and never agreed among my colleagues that Germany is to be cut up after
the war. This proposal is wrong for a variety of reasons. It is not likely to lead
to any settlement of European affairs but will lead, if carried out, to a grave
deterioration of European affairs. Moreover, it will be a piece of gross and stupid
injustice. Let us consider the situation of East Prussia. By all tests it is a German
territory inhabited by German people. By tests which have been made 97 per
cent of the people speak German.
Mr. Bull: All Poles speak German.
Mr. Strauss: German is the native language of 97 per cent of the people. Of
_ the plebiscites made by the League of Nations after the last war, one showed that
92 per cent and another that 98 per cent of the people of that country wanted
to remain with Germany. It will not be denied that by history and culture the
area is German. I have no sympathy for a moment, and nobody in the House will
have, with the Prussian landlords who have dominated that country for far too
long. By their behaviour and outlook they have been the major enemies of
European peace for a long time, and I want to see them uprooted and driven out.
To suggest, however, that these German people, 2,500,000 of them, should be
taken over by Poland, and that that will lead to any betterment in the European
situation, or to permanent settlement, seems to me to be quite wrong in justice
and to be bound to lead to the opposite result.
Mr. Boothby!: This is an important matter, and I would like to ask the hon.
Gentleman one question. Does he regard Bismarck’s Empire as sacrosanct, and
does he want the future of Europe to be constructed on the basis of Bismarck’s
Empire?
Mr. Strauss: I do not think anything of the sort. I do not consider any
boundary sacrosanct. I am prepared to change any boundary which can be shown
to be bad from the ethnographic, historic and cultural points of view, but to
change a boundary as the result of some other reason in the case of Poland
because another bit of Poland is going somewhere else, and to do that for alleged
military purposes, is a change to which I am wholly opposed.
Lieut.-Colonel Sir Thomas Moore? (Ayr Burghs): Would not a transfer of
population solve the problem?
Mr. Strauss: Even if we desire to contemplate moving millions of people, there
are no Polish populations in Germany which can be transferred.
Mr. Bull: There are many working in Germany.
Mr. Strauss: We want to know how far this proposal goes. It has been
suggested by the Polish Committee in Moscow? that not only East Prussia, but
Lower Silesia, Upper Silesia and the Danzig Corridor, comprising 7,500,000
! Conservative.
2 Conservative.
8 The Union of Polish Patriots is referred to. Compare pp. 36 and 41.
152
people, should be transferred. It is true that these proposals have not been
endorsed by the Russian Government or anybody else, but these demands are
being made. We should have some clear declaration of policy from the Govern-
ment at this stage — because this matter is obviously urgent — about the breaking
up of Germany, or any other territory, not for the sake of appeasement or the
readjustment of unsatisfactory boundaries, but as plunder to other nations. Has
that been agreed to, and if so, to what extent?
Major Woolley? (Spen Valley): Would the hon. Member apply the same two tests
to Austria that he has applied to Poland, of the percentage of the people who
speak the language and the other regarding bad landlords? If there were the
same results, would he then say that Germany had a right to Austria?
Mr. Strauss: I cannot see the hon. Member’s point. If the people of Austria
speak German and the people of Germany speak German — as of course they do —
and by some voluntary, democratic investigation they decide that they would
like to have some economic or political union, that is one thing, but the hon.
and gallant Gentleman must know that it is an unfortunate fact that the Poles
and the Germans have never got on well together. They have always been at
daggers drawn. To put under Polish domination a large, real German population
would be quite wrong. It certainly would not accord with the principles of the
Atlantic Charter, and would be bound to lead to disaster and future war. When
it is suggested that some steps such as these are desired, in order to prevent
Germany attacking Europe again and taking aggressive action, I am amazed at the
lack of confidence of the United Nations in the actions which they are able to
take to this end.
It does not seem difficult, if the United Nations are agreed and determined, to
prevent another outbreak of war from Germany. It is, partly, a very simple tech-
nical problem. One has to deprive Germany of certain raw materials, and prevent
any aeroplanes, military or civil, from being built in Germany, and the training
of any German air crews. If you take those simple technical precautions and are
prepared to see them carried out, it is quite possible to prevent Germany from
attacking another country. If there is determination by the United Nations to
do that, then there will be no war, but if there is no agreement among the
United Nations on this matter, you can readjust your frontiers how you like,
and you will achieve nothing. It may be asked whether Poland is not to be
compensated for the loss of territory which may go to Russia for very good
reasons, by being allowed to take under her domination some German territory.
Mr. Pickthorn? (Cambridge University): May I interrupt the hon. Member for
one second, honestly not attempting to be unfriendly, but because I am not quite
sure that I am following his argument? I did gather a few minutes ago that the
one reason for redrawing a frontier which was always wrong, was the strategic
reason but that you could have an ethnographic reason. I understand now that
1 Strauss, of course, spoke without knowledge of the events in Teheran.

2 Liberal.
3 Conservative.
153
the redrawing of frontiers on the Russian side may be right. Is that for strategic
reasons, or for what sort of reasons?
Mr. Ivor Thomas! (Keighley): The latest form of the proposal includes a
suggestion that Koenigsberg should be in the Soviet Union. Does my hon.
Friend’s censure apply to that proposal also?
Mr. Strauss: Certainly. I am not an expert on these matters and I would not
like to give a decisive answer, but there appear to be ethnographic grounds for
accepting something like the Curzon line.
Mr. Pickthorn: Are we not getting rather dangerously near to racialism? How
do we distinguish between racialism and ethnography?
Mr. Strauss: I would most strongly oppose the transfer of Koenigsberg, which
is a wholly German city, and a stronghold of Social Democracy by the way, to
any other country, unless the people of Koenigsberg were willing. To insist upon it
for strategic grounds would be wholly wrong. :
I am sorry that I have been so long over my speech, but I have been inter-
rupted very much. I only want to make one more point. What is fair compen-
sation to the people of Poland, for being deprived of some of their previous
territory? What the people of Poland want is prosperity. They want employment
and peace and to be able to live a decent life.
Mr. Pickthorn: They want to be Poles, as the English people want to be
English.
Mr. Strauss: The Polish Government may want something different, but it
seems to me that ample compensation for the people of Poland would be to
see to it that they got all the materials needed by them, in the way of machinery
for their agriculture and industries, fertilisers, and electrical development facili-
ties, to build up a prosperous economy. Poland has been poor and restless in the
past, largely for lack of those things, and for lack of credit and other facilities
which would enable her to build up a prosperous economy. Provide those facili-
ties for Poland and make Poland a prosperous country. Insist, if you like, that
the Germans supply that machinery and materials, and I do not think that
Poland will have any grievance whatever. In fact, she would be a far happier
country than she has ever been before.
Lieut.-Commander Hutchison? (Edinburgh, West): How would the hon.
Member arrange for her to have access to the sea?
Mr. Stokes? (Ipswich): It is not necessary.
Mr. Strauss: That is a matter of arrangement and of having railway facilities
and leasing dockyards. With good will, that could be done. Switzerland, one of the
most prosperous countries in Europe, has no port.
Lieut.-Commander Hutchison: That would re-create the Corridor.
Mr. Strauss: I believe that it is along the lines of promising, not only to Poland
but to our other Allies, that the United Nations will do their utmost when the
1 Labour.
2 Conservative.
3 Labour.
154
war is over, not to readjust their boundaries, but to see that they are given
facilities to build up a prosperous economy — and will see to it that they have
them — so that they can increase, and may be to double the fertility of their soil,
to set up small industries and enable them to trade and carry on their work with-
out restrictive customs barriers, that peace can be secured in Europe. It is not
along the line of redrawing boundaries.
It is along those lines that the Foreign Secretary, on behalf of the Government,
should declare our policy for Europe. It is not enough to talk about the
establishment of independent countries or the re-establishment of democracy.
That is alright, but is largely words. Moreover, it may conceal the fact that we
must bring about such an economic reorganisation of Europe as will bring
prosperity to its countries. We must tell the people of Europe that it is our firm
intention, not only of Great Britain but of the United Nations, to assure them
security and prosperity, not through frontier re-adjustments, but by devising
such changes in their economic structure, whatever private interests may have
to be uprooted in the process, as will make freedom from want for those people
not just a slogan but a reality.
Mr. Stokes:...I say to the Deputy Prime Minister! that the tearing up of the
Atlantic Charter indicated in the Prime Minister’s speech is entirely contrary to
the opinion he himself has stated and which the Labour Party stands for. The
right hon. Gentleman himself said on 18th November, 1939:
“There shall be no dictated peace. We have no desire to humiliate, crush
or defeat the German nation. All idea of revenge or punishment must be
excluded. Peace, to be lasting, must result from the agreement of all, and
not from the dictation of a few nations.”
With which sentiment I entirely agree, and I trust he still holds it. He went
on, on 9th February, 1940:
“We are opposed to any attempt from outside to break up Germany. We
do not seek the humiliation or dismemberment of your country... We
wholeheartedly desire to welcome you without delay into the peaceful
collaboration of civilized nations.”
I did not read the Prime Minister’s speech as conforming in any way whatever
to these sentiments.
Mr. Boothby (Aberdeen and Kincardine, Eastern): ... I cannot understand the
attitude of hon. Members who were shocked by the Prime Minister’s attempt to
get agreement between Poland and Russia on the basis of the Curzon Line in the
East, and compensation for the Poles from Germany in the West. I hope that the
Foreign Secretary will deal with this matter. Are we going into a Peace Con-
ference regarding Bismarck’s Reich as sacrosanct? It was a mushroom empire,
founded on the most ruthless use of force. The people of Prussia, of Saxony, of
1 Attlee.
155
.
Bavaria, of the Hanseatic towns, and of the Rhineland, differ profoundly from
each other. It was merely because Bismarck “pulled a fast one” in 1870.
Mr. Bevan!: Is the hon. Member proposing to separate some portions from
Germany, in the interests of Germans? Will he ask the Germans, or will he
act over their heads?
Mr. Boothby: On the question of separation, I would be in favour of asking
Germans. I have long thought, and thought after the last war, that if Bavaria
had been given the chance of separating from the rest of Germany, it would
have been a good thing for Bavaria, for Europe, and for the world...
Mr. Hore-Belisha? (Plymouth, Devonport): ... Before I leave this question
of Poland may I say — because I think it is one’s duty at this juncture to say
what one thinks in these matters — that there is a proposal to compensate Poland
for an adjustment of her boundaries on the East in favour of Russia by a gain of
territory at the expense of Germany on the West. None of us in this House can
have any tender feeling towards Germany, nor can anybody be so narrow as
to hold the opinion that frontiers can never be adjusted. Of course they can be
adjusted. I only want to enter this caveat. If it is proposed to resort to the
uprooting of a great bulk of the German population and its transference some-
where else, then I think there is a risk that you will create another irredenta in
Europe.
Sir Malcolm Robertson (Streatham): What does my right hon. Friend mean
by uprooting of Germans? From what part of Germany?
Mr. Hore-Belisha: I say that if there is a proposal to uproot a bulk of the
German population...
Sir M. Robertson: From which part?
Mr. Hore-Belisha: From East Prussia. If that is the proposal I say that we
must be careful about the creation of a new irredenta. I do not wish at this stage
to say any more on that point.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Eden): ... Let me say one word
about Poland, and it will only be one word, because the House will understand
that the Prime Minister’s words which he used yesterday were very carefully
chosen, and that we are still in negotiations, the outcome of which all of us have
very much at heart, and I may only too easily say something which might make
our task harder than it is. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister said:
“Marshal Stalin and I also spoke and agreed on the need for Poland to obtain
compensation at the expense of Germany both in the North and in the West.”
The hon. Member for North Lambeth‘ said that he took exception’ to that
1 Labour.
2 The former Secretary of State for War; Independent.
3 Conservative.
4 G. Strauss.
5 There are two versions in the original texts: “that he did not take exception to that”
eA “that he took exception...”. According to the sense, only the second version can be
right.
156
because of the action which he conjured up of a possible large transference of
German territory to Poland and so on. I am not going into that at this time,
and quite obviously, whatever is done or is agreed, if agreement is reached and
and when it is reached, it will come before the House, but I do want to put
this consideration before the House. The hon. Gentleman was speaking as though
the position in that part of Europe could bear some parallel to the position at
the outbreak of the war. It bears hardly any. An enormous and horrible trans-
formation has taken place, for instance, over the whole of what was formerly
Western Poland. Germany has removed populations wholesale from vast tracts
of territory, millions of people, and in many cases they are now dead. The
position is, as the Prime Minister said yesterday, and, I ought to add, said with
the knowledge and approval of his colleagues, that he and Stalin spoke and
agreed upon the need for Poland to obtain compensation at the expense of
Germany in the North and West. That represents the position of His Majesty’s
Government.
Mr. Stokes: Does that then mean that His Majesty’s Government have aban-
doned the principles of the Atlantic Charter?
Mr. Eden: The hon. Member is always just: a little quicker than I am. I was
just coming to the Atlantic Charter myself. I think it was very well dealt with
by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Edinburgh (Mr. Pethick-
Lawrence)! a little while ago. What I am about to say does not mean that we
wish to try to claim some strained or unilateral interpretation for the Atlantic
Charter. All the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister intended to convey,
as indeed he clearly said, was that Germany would not, as a matter of right, be
able to claim to benefit from the Atlantic Charter in such a way as to preclude
the victorious Powers from making territorial adjustments at her expense. There
are certain parts of the Atlantic Charter which refer in set terms to victor and
vanquished alike. Article 4 does so. But we cannot admit that Germany can
claim, as a matter of right on her part, whatever our obligation, that any part
of the Charter applies to her.
Mr. Stokes: That is not the point.
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 397, cols. 890-896,
901-902, 914-915, 920-921, 936-937.
1 Without mentioning the Atlantic Charter, Mr. Pethick-Lawrence had said that Ger-
many could not expect that the victims of German aggression would leave the country
after the war in the position which it occupied before the war, or that even the possibility
of a repetition of these horrors would be left open. (col. 926.)
157
99
In the House of Lords also objections are raised
An extensive debate concerning the question of resettlement took place in

the House of Lords on March 8th, 1944.
The Earl of Mansfield! had the following Notice on the Paper: To ask His
Majesty’s Government, whether when consulting the other Allied Governments
about the post-war delimitations of the boundaries of the truncated German
Empire, as well as of other countries whose frontiers are likely to require
adjustment, they are bearing in mind the vital necessity of avoiding, wherever
possible, the leaving of considerable minorities within the political boundaries
of States the majority of whose population has a different racial, religious or
cultural outlook; and whether to achieve this, they will consider the advisability
of proposing that members of such minorities as are likely to be a future menace
to the peace of Europe shall be compulsorily transferred to the land of their
racial origin; and to move for Papers.
The noble Earl said: ... We know what great advantages at home and abroad
Nazi Germany derived from the alleged ill-treatment of the German minority in
Poland immediately previous to the outbreak of war and the equally alleged ill-
treatment at an earlier date of the Sudeten Germans by the Government of
Czechoslovakia. The first thing which I think is quite obvious is that it is
undesirable that ever again should large bodies of Germans be permitted to
exist as an entity within the boundaries of another State...
I suggest that among our peace aims should be the transference — the compul-
sory transference — of all German citizens from these territories back into the
Reich or, as I should prefer, into those various States which should succeed the
Reich...
The first great problem is one which has to be touched on somewhat delicately,
but which a sense of justice insists should be dealt with — that is, the question
of the western boundaries of Poland. It has been suggested, apparently more or
less officially, that Poland shall be recompensed for any changes that may occur
on her eastern boundaries by receiving certain German territories to the west and
to the north-west of her former boundary. Should this come to pass it is essential
in the interests of Poland that the German population presently resident therein
should be removed, for the worst enemy of Poland could wish her no more
deplorable fate than that she should be faced with not even her former problem
of a moderately substantial German minority but a really substantial German
minority. Such a solution would be bound to lead to trouble, and probably to
war, within a fairly short space of time. Therefore no matter how hard such a
solution would seem to be for the German population concerned, that solution
will have to be faced.
The mere suggestion of it has already caused a storm in various circles of self-
1 Conservative.
158
styled advanced thought. One paper of the Left hysterically cried “How could the
trade unionists of this country face their brothers at Koenigsberg after the war if
Koenigsberg were to be transferred either to Polish or Russian suzerainty?” Why
anybody in this country should be particularly anxious at the present time to
look at their so-called brothers in Koenigsberg other than along the barrel of a
rifle or the lenses of a bombsight, is beyond my comprehension, but apparently
such people do exist. The same suggestion has caused consternation in the mind
of the honourable and gallant Member for Ormskirk (Commander King-Hall) in
another place, and he is now bombarding all persons holding any kind of public
position with his views on the subject. It appears to me that the last people who
are deserving of any consideration in this matter are the Germans. Whilst we do
not wish to inflict cruelty, or indeed unnecessary hardship, upon the people of
Germany, they should be considered last; our Allies should be considered a long
way before them.
Lord Strabolgit:...I am advised that the first great problem in Europe, when
we are able to tackle the whole scheme of reconstruction, will be transport. The
European transport system already is badly disorganized, with ports bombed and
railways damaged, and it will be much more so in the course of the military
operations that will take place before the fighting is over. That is the greatest
priority of all. It will not be a question of whether a man belongs to this or that
racial group in such-and-such an enclave of Europe, but whether he is starving
and how he can be kept alive. The second priority will be medical relief, and
then you will have to try and get industry and husbandry going again. You may
have to send corn and to help in renewing the cattle stock, provide raw material,
and so on. The ordinary machinery of life will have to be restored. In addition to
that, we are planning on the presumption that the war with Japan will not yet
be over, so that we shall have a shipping shortage to add to all these other diffi-
culties. I do not think the noble Earl or those who think with him have considered
these questions at all, when they talk glibly of shipping the whole of these three
million Germans from East Prussia and sending them to Wiirttemberg and so on.
The noble Earl talks about the “compulsory transfer of minorities to the land of
their racial origin”. We shall be lucky if we can prevent many hundreds of thou-
sands of innocent people dying of starvation.
Further, frontiers as we at present know them are for some years going to be
meaningless terms. The whole idea of laying out new frontiers in this chaotic and
anarchic Europe and allowing people to set up new customs barriers is grotesque.
You have to treat Europe as a unit and make use of any means to help rescue it
from starvation...
With regard to the general proposition of the transfer of populations, this is in
practice a most difficult thing to bring about. When we are talking about these
different minorities and their ill treatment, according to Lord Mansfield’s ideas —
1 Labour.
152
although I do not for a moment suggest this solution — it ought to apply to one
of the sore spots of Europe with which we are familiar — Northern Ireland. What
would he or his friends say if it were suggested as a solution of the difficulties
in Ireland, that the whole of the Protestants in the Six Counties should be
shipped back to the countries of their racial origin, back to Scotland and England?
What would be said if that were the suggested solution? That is just as logical as
what the noble Earl has argued with regard to East Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia,
or the Balkan countries. One has only to state the case to show how impracticable
‘it would be...
The Earl of Perth1:...In any case, there has got to be a most enormous
resettlement of all the populations of Europe, and I would ask whether it is
really likely that a German minority is going to live happily in that strong and
reconstructed Poland, that independent Poland, which we all hope to see created.
I do not think, however, that a Government is likely to wish for the complete
transfer of a minority if by doing so it is likely to destroy its own economic life.
I quite agree with the noble Lord that a great difficulty is going to be transport.
That is a problem with which we shall be faced, but I sincerely hope there will be
some method of overcoming it.
Viscount Cecil of Chelwood?:...I do not deny that there must be cases, after
this war, in which it would be impossible to leave populations under the same
sovereignty as that which they lived under before the war. Something has been
said about the Sudeten province. I cannot doubt that the restored Government
of Czechoslovakia will desire to get rid of some at any rate of the German popu-
lation in the Sudeten province, who showed themselves thoroughly disloyal to
the Government of the Republic, and were one of the causes — one of the excuses
at any rate — of the great misfortunes that have happened to that country. They
will have to be removed, I have no doubt. There are many other cases of the
same kind, unhappily, that have occurred in Europe. The people who have been
guilty of such conduct, I entirely agree, must be removed, and this must cause
a great deal of difficulty. The practical difficulties will be very great, but I feel
sure that the Governments concerned will insist on transfers of that kind. All
I venture to plead — and that is where I do not agree with this Motion at all —
is that that must be left to the Governments concerned. Czechoslovakia will have
to settle what she will do with the people within her borders, and I think it
would be a most disastrous thing if anything like pressure were employed, or
advice were given to her, as to what she should do with the populations which
will come under her rule. I feel very certain that any attempt of that kind will
do nothing but harm, and will cause far greater suffering than it will relieve
and much danger to the peace of Europe.
I do hope that whatever we do we are going to avoid all sympathy with, and all
actions depending on, the doctrines which have been put forward in Germany
recently, these racial doctrines...
! Conservative.
2 Conservative.
160
Lord Noel-Buxton'!:... The population of East Prussia is 2 200 0002 and other
countries discussed in connexion with this proposal would bring the total popu-
lation probably between Germany and Poland up to 8000000. They talk also
of Pomerania, of Silesia, and of course of Danzig, and if you add the 3000000 or
more Germans of the Sudetenland the population may come to 11000000. That
mass, it is assumed, would be thrown into Germany at a time of great disorder.
The Greek affair’ was a big thing but this would be on a scale perhaps ten times
larger than that. These people would be pushed in no doubt without undue
delay, and if there is to be also at the same time very considerable disorder in
Germany, the position of those British officers of AMGOT4, or it may be of some
more permanent force of occupation, who will be in charge, will not be very
enviable. We are told that the economic reconstruction of Germany is to be
desired, and we are told to foster recovery. Surely an economic upset of that
kind in Germany would work in the opposite direction and it would not be an
easy job for our officials and others responsible for carrying out the avowed
policy.
Then my noble friend Lord Strabolgi said there would be the question of the
physical transport of the people at that time. That would surely be of equal
urgency for the movement of the populations who have been atrociously trans-
ferred by Germany to other countries. It is estimated this may mean 15000000.
Lord Strabolgi: 20000000.
Lord Noel-Buxton: Possibly more than 15000000, I do not know. It may be
20000000. In any case the question of transport involved in this proposal
cannot be ignored. It is very attractive, especially to those of us who know
something of Eastern Europe, to think of a more consolidated, homogeneous
population and of clean frontiers, but it cannot be denied that the objections to
this proposal are very great. As I said, there is no element of exchange to give
a sort of justification for it. There are no Poles to speak of in Germany with
whom to exchange. Again, would it not be a bad start for Poland to begin by
treading on the principle of nationality and of nationa! autonomy? The case for
Poland itself is based on the claims of nationalism and we should all be sorry to
see the Poles begin with any sort of minor imperialistic action. That is to be
avoided, if possible. The principle of democracy would come off rather badly
under this plan.
Again, supposing the virulence of nationalism across Eastern Europe should
die down. It may die down. Indeed it is already giving way to other idealisms, and
another ideology may take its place. If that happened then all this gigantic suf-
fering would have been in vain. We must of course work with those great Allies
1 Labour.
2 On May 17th, 1939, the resident population of East Prussia (without Memelland) was
2,488,122 (Statistik des Deutschen Reiches [Statistics of the German Reich], vol. 552,
Berlin 1943, No. 1, p. 18).
3 Reference is made to the Greco-Turkish resettlement of the twenties. Compare p. 140,
note 2.
4 Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory.
161
with whom we are fighting the war. But on these points I do see already that
in America protests are being voiced in the Press against this very proposal and
I doubt whether it would go through without very much difficulty. Would it
not be a kind of defeatism to accept the impossibility of bringing about some
happier order in Europe, some better relations than have existed between these
intermixed nationalities? We surely must not abandon that hope...
The Secretary of State for Dominions Affairs (Viscount Cranborne)!: ... It
may possibly be that in certain cases - and I emphasize the words “in certain
cases” — no other solution than that of transfer will eventually be found possible
by the United Nations, if the peace of Europe is to be secured. If, for instance,
on other grounds the frontiers of a State have to be drawn in such a way as to
include a minority, hating and hated by its fellow-citizens and liable to perse-
cution by them, and obviously out to promote civil and political disharmony in
the State in which it lives, the case for an outright transfer is certainly one for
very serious consideration, as the noble Earls, Lord Mansfield and Lord Perth,
have said. In my view, however, we should be under no illusions. Such a solution
in itself is no panacea for the troubles of Europe. Even in the limited spheres
in which it operates, grave difficulties are likely to be encountered. I am very
far from saying that they are insuperable, but the fact should be faced that they
exist.
eee
Politically speaking, the ultimate results of such transfers might well be bene-
ficial, but they would certainly, as Lord Strabolgi has said, involve short-term
economic difficulties of a most formidable kind, entailing, in particular, serious
though temporary setbacks in production, which would require, in all probability,
liberal assistance from outside for their successful solution. All this, moreover,
must be set against the background, as I mentioned earlier, of a disorganized and
impoverished Europe, whose speedy return to prosperity is of the utmost urgency
if worse is not to befall us. Last, but not least, there is the suffering of the people
concerned themselves. It is very easy in the consideration of political issues and
of abstract economic statistics to forget the human factor involved, and the
multitudinous ties of sentiment and association which make up the fabric of
human society.
This aspect which has been mentioned in this debate is not, I can assure the
House, forgotten by His Majesty’s Government. It can fairly be said, I think,
that the suffering caused by a week’s war would be more than the suffering
caused by the efficient resettlement of these populations whose present situation
is liable to endanger future peace. If, therefore, transfer, and transfer alone,
seemed likely to ensure peace, I should personally take the view that the hu-
manitarian argument must not be given more than its proper weight in the
balance of considerations.
1 Conservative.
162
The Earl of Mansfield: ...If the transference of the Greeks and Turks took
approximately six years', it may well be that the other transferences, if they
ever come to pass, may take up to twenty years or even more. It is certainly a
matter which must not be hurried...
Throughout the debate, upon the Benches opposite, there ran a peculiar current
of what one can only term that sympathy with Germany which I have already
mentioned.
Several Noble Lords: No, no.
The Earl of Mansfield: It seemed to me that the suffering of the disposed
German minorities was being stressed to an unnaturally large extent. It is per-
fectly true that they represent the biggest problem. The noble Viscount, answer-
ing for the Government, spoke about charters for minorities, but very wisely
went on to add that minorities themselves must also learn how to behave. The
experience of the past has shown that no German minority anywhere has ever
behaved properly at all, and that it would at once quietly violate the terms of
any charter and cause in future the trouble it has caused in the past. You can-
not really judge the German nation by the standard of any other country.
I protest very forcibly against the idea that you can separate Nazi Germany from
the rest of Germany as a whole. It has been made apparent through the history
of centuries that Germany is, as a nation, aggressive, and therefore it seems to
me that Germany must pay the penalty.
Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, Official Report, vol. 130, cols. 1097-1134.
100
Eden describes the Teheran agreement as not being final
The question of East Prussia cropped up during question-hour in the House

of Commons on July 12th, 1944.
Mr. Stokes? asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether any
guarantee has been given to the Government of Poland or the USSR that after
the defeat of Germany, East Prussia will be divided between Poland and Russia.
Mr. Eden: So far as His Majesty’s Government are concerned no final decisions
have been taken regarding future territorial arrangements in Europe, which will
clearly be a matter for subsequent discussion between them and other United
Nations Governments. I would, however, remind the hon. Member of the state-
ment of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in this House on 22nd February,
and also that on the 24th May my right hon. Friend stated that there was no
question of Germany enjoying any guarantee that she would not undergo terri-
torial changes if it should seem that the making of such changes would render
more secure and more lasting the peace of Europe.
1 Compare p. 140, note 2.

2 Labour.
163
Mr. Stokes: Are we to understand that no definite decision was taken at
Teheran and, in connection with this matter, will the right hon. Gentleman
bear in mind that the Prime Minister himself has described East Prussia as more
German than Germany itself; and how does he expect peace to last, if it is taken
away from Germany?
Mr. Eden: I think that the hon. Member’s final argument might be in the
nature of a boomerang if he reflected upon it. With regard to the first part of
the question, no final decision has been taken.
Mr. G. Strauss!: How does the right hon. Gentleman reconcile the last state-
ment he made, that no final decision has been taken, with the Prime Minister’s
definite statement that he agreed at Teheran on behalf of this country, that East
Prussia should go to Poland? The Prime Minister stated that in this House.
Mr. Eden: We have expressed a point of view in discussion with other Govern-
ments. I referred to what the Prime Minister said; there is no inconsistency.
Final decisions can only be taken in agreement with the countries concerned.
Mr. Bellenger?: Is it not obvious that Germany will, possibly, have to undergo
reconstruction just as other countries had to undergo it at their hands? Never-
theless, may I suggest to the right hon. Gentleman that if he is aiming at the
peace of Europe, the division of East Prussia between Russia and Poland will
not be the way to achieve it?
Mr. Eden: That is a matter about which many views may well be expressed.
Commander Sir Archibald Southby?: May I ask my right hon. Friend whether
he will bear in mind, in considering the question of the future of Polish frontiers,
the very strong feeling which exists in this country that we should see to it that
Poland gets a square and an honest deal?
Mr. Gallacher4: Will the Government make certain that the impossible situ-
ation that existed as a consequence of the Polish Corridor will not be repeated,
and that a better frontier arrangement will be made; and is the right hon.
Gentleman further aware that the East Prussians, the most Prussian of all, will
hurry to get out of East Prussia and into some other parts of Germany?
Mr. Eden: With regard to the last point, as I say, it is a matter of opinion; and
in reply to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Epsom (Sir A. Southby),
certainly, I have many times made it plain that His Majesty’s Government have
not forgotten that we entered this war voluntarily when Germany made her
attack upon Poland.
1 Labour.
2 Labour.
3 Conservative.
4 Communist.
164
101
Churchill refers to the Peace Conference
On July 18th, 1944, Mr. Stokes repeated his question.
Mr. Stokes asked the Prime Minister whether in view of the conflicting ac-
counts, of the decisions arrived at at Teheran with regard to the disposal of
East Prussia after the defeat of Germany, he will take an early opportunity of
making a statement as to the facts.
The Prime Minister: It is better not to debate these matters further until the
war is over and the victorious Powers meet around the Peace Table.
Mr. Stokes: In view of the Prime Minister’s reply may I ask him whether his
version of what happened at Teheran, as stated in this House on 22nd February,
is correct, or the version given by the Foreign Secretary last Wednesday, as they
are completely contradictory?
The Prime Minister: I have not had the opportunity of comparing them line
by line.
Mr. Stokes: Can we have an assurance that no secret undertaking was entered
into? The Foreign Secretary did not seem to be aware of it.
The Prime Minister: I do not know of any secret understanding that was
entered into.
Mr. Stokes: Are we to understand that there was no promise given to cede
East Prussia to Poland? In view of the most unsatisfactory nature of the reply,
I shall take the earliest opportunity of raising this matter.
The Prime Minister: The hon. Member must have a lot of matters on hand.
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 402, col. 23.
102
The US Government is to strive for lasting territorial settlements
The Post-War Programs Committee, which had been set up by the Govern-
ment of the United States, laid down principles for a US policy in respect
of territorial disputes in Europe on July 28th, 1944. The following was said
in this document:
I. Summary Recommendations
1. Participation by the United States in the making of territorial settlements
in Europe should in each case be in association with other nations, either within
the framework of the present wartime relationships or within that of the project-
ed international organization. This Government might withhold express approval
of a given territorial settlement which, in its opinion, is contrary to the require-
ments of a durable peace.
2. The United States should maintain its declared policy that individual
165
territorial questions should be settled preferable within the framework of the
general structure of peace. While this policy implies the postponement of de-
cisions until after the cessation of hostilities, we should recognize that it may be
possible and desirable to settle certain territorial disputes before that time. In such
cases the solution adopted should, if possible, be based on the same permanent
factors which we expect to govern the territorial settlements reached after the
war.
3. The Government should examine each territorial dispute on its merits and
should seek a solution which would contribute to peace and orderly development
in Europe. The freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned and the political
and economic aspects of proposed solutions should be given more weight than
historic or strategic claims. Consideration should be given to the advisability of
transferring minority populations as a means of making the boundary settlements
more stable. The relationship of the various claimant states to the Allies is a
factor to be considered but should not unduly influence the American position on
any given territorial problem.
II. American Interest and Participation in the Settlement of Territorial Disputes

in Europe
American participation in territorial settlements should in every case be a

matter of joint action with other governments. Having once arrived at a decision
as to its own policy on a given territorial question, the United States should
advocate in international councils a settlement consistent with that policy,
but should be prepared to accept a different settlement in case the American
view should be clearly in the minority. However, this Government might
refuse to give its express approval of settlements which it is convinced are
not just or durable but which are insisted upon by states with a more direct inter-
est. In the case of settlements made before the cessation of hostilities and in the
immediate post-hostilities period, presumably this Government would act within
the framework of its present war-time association with allied states; in the case
of settlements made at a later date it would act as a member of the international
organization. Whatever the final settlements, they should be made upon the
responsibility of all the United Nations, and the United States should undertake
no individual responsibility for making or maintaining them.
III. The Time of Making Territorial Settlements
The United States need not adhere rigidly to its declared formula of postpon-
ing decisions on boundary questions until after the war. It should be willing to
proceed to the settlement of some territorial disputes as soon as it is possible to
do so with the assurance that no harm will thereby be done to the successful prose-
cution of the war and that full weight will be given to the permanent factors on
which we believe durable settlements should be based. In certain cases involving
166
Soviet claims this Government is not disposed to object to settlements arrived at
during hostilities by mutual agreement. In addition, in working out plans for the
post-surrender treatment of Germany, the pressure of events may oblige this Gov-
ernment to take part in settling the territorial status of certain parts of Germany,
which can hardly be held open for later settlement.
IV. Principles for the Settlement of Territorial Disputes
This Government should seek a settlement of each dispute based on the merits
of the specific problem and on the relation of that problem to the whole settle-
ment. Each proposed solution should be judged, above all, in the light of its
contribution to peace and orderly development in Europe. The chief criteria
would appear to be the wishes of the populations involved, the economic effects
on the area in dispute, on the claimant states and on other countries, and the
political effects on the states directly concerned and on the international organi-
zation. Claims based on historic possession and on strategic considerations should
be given less weight, if any.
Postwar foreign policy preparation 1939-1945, pp. 592-595.
103
Churchill and Roosevelt sign the Morgenthau Plan
The plan worked out by Henry Morgenthau, US Secretary of the Treasury,

for the post-war treatment of Germany, was signed by both Churchill and
Roosevelt! at the Quebec Conference in September 1944. The plan contained
the following:
2. New Boundaries of Germany

a) Poland should get that part of East Prussia which doesn’t go to the USSR
and the southern portion of Silesia.
b) France should get the Saar and the adjacent territories bounded by the Rhine
and the Moselle Rivers.
c) As indicated in 4 below an International Zone should be created containing the
Ruhr and the surrounding industrial areas.
3. Partitioning of New Germany
The remaining portion of Germany should be divided into two autonomous,
independent states,
1)a South German state comprising Bavaria, Wiirttemberg, Baden and some
smaller areas and
1 Though it was signed, the Morgenthau Plan newer became an official part of US policy
towards Germany. Roosevelt withdrew his signature shortly afterwards. The plan is thus
merely characteristic of the general attitude of the Western statesmen towards Germany
during this period.
167
2)a North German state comprising a large part of the old state of Prussia,
Saxony, Thuringia and several smaller states.
There shall be a custom union between the new South German state and Austria,
which will be restored to her pre-1938 political borders.
A decade of American foreign policy. Basic documents, 1941-1949. Washington 1950,
pp. 502-503.
104
France and the Soviet Union agree on German territorial questions
In December 1944 General de Gaulle and M. Bidault, the French Foreign

Minister, paid a visit to Mr. Stalin. A Soviet-French Treaty of Friendship
was concluded. The New York correspondent of the paper Svenska Dag-
bladet wrote the following on the manner in which the German question
was dealt with in Moscow:
The Franco-Russian Pact is, admittedly, so far the only visible result of the
negotiations between Stalin and de Gaulle, but in Washington it is considered
that what has been left unexpressed in the Pact is far more important than the
treaty itself. It is emphasized by the French in the United States that the discus-
sions of Stalin and de Gaulle concerning the treatment to be meted out to
Germany during the armistice and after the conclusion of peace represented the
really important part of the Moscow negotiations.
This is also in agreement with what a semi-official Gaullist speaker — a journalist
of the official French newsagency, who accompanied de Gaulle to Moscow —
explained, when saying that the result obtained by the French in the Russian
capital was “that two mighty armies, the Russian and the French, would stand
on guard and that Germany would be driven back both from the eastern Oder
and from the western banks of the Rhine. It had long been realized in Moscow
that France required help with regard to armaments in the creation of this strong
army”.
This is the first more or less official statement of the intention of the French
and the Russians to deprive Germany of the left bank of Rhine. This would
not involve separating the Ruhr from Germany, but it is believed here that
France wishes the Ruhr to be put under the control of an international authority,
which would consist mainly of Frenchmen. The Saar is also to become part of
this territory.
It is asserted in diplomatic circles in Washington that Stalin has approved this
plan, which would in effect rob Germany both of the Rhineland and of the
Ruhr. The view is also held that Stalin is supporting the French demand of
equality within the Allied Control Commission which will assume power in
Germany after the smashing of the Armed Forces.
Svenska Dagbladet, Stockholm, December 14th, 1944.
168
105
Harriman expresses his concern over Stalin’s concept
The American Ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Harriman, addressed the fol-

lowing telegraphic report to the Secretary of State on December 19th, 19441:
Iam somewhat concerned over the expanding concept of the Soviet Govern-
ment in connection with the future western frontier of Poland.
The first Soviet proposal indicated a willingness that Poland should have East’
Prussia except the Koenigsberg area and an expansion of her western frontier
perhaps even as far as the Oder and possibly including the cities of Stettin and
Breslau. Subsequently the Soviet intention appeared fixed that the western bound-
ary should be the line of the Oder including Stettin and Breslau. In discussions
with de Gaulle, Stalin now proposes the line of the Oder to the confluence of the
lower Neisse and then south along the Neisse to the Czech border near the city of
G6rlitz. (This proposal was confirmed by the recent Pravda article.) In this con-
nection Stalin indicated to de Gaulle that the Czechs might wish to expand their
boundaries to the north somewhat into Silesia, although this suggestion was not
defined precisely. BeneS, in talking with me a year ago, did not appear to be inter-
ested in taking German territory which would increase his problems.
When Mikolajczyk was in Moscow he indicated that he was not at all certain
that it was wise for the Polish boundary to go as far as the Oder and particularly
to include the cities of Stettin and Breslau, as these cities and certain of the area
were almost completely German. The Lublin Poles, however, showed complete
readiness to assume these new responsibilities. Churchill indicated that he was
willing to have the Polish frontiers go as far as the Poles wished, but I believe
that at that time he had in mind only the line up to the Oder, but not beyond.
What the British position is on the question of the lower Neisse line I do not
know.
Both the Lublin Poles and Mikolajczyk indicated in the October talks that
they did not wish any German population to remain within Polish territory
because of the acute minority problem that this would create. The Russians and
British accepted this principle. Churchill in his recent speech mentions the trans-
fer of six million Germans out of territory to be given to the Poles. The new
suggested boundary to the Neisse would evidently necessitate the transfer of
several million more Germans.
Stalin also agreed with Bene¥ in December 1943 that some if not all the
Sudeten Germans should be transferred.
We have not here exact information on the total transfers of Germans involved
in these various areas nor have we information on where these people could be
re-established within Germany. We have little information to appraise the con-
sequences to European economy and stability if so large an area were to be
occupied by Poles presumably evacuated largely from the backward districts in-
1 Compare W. Churchill, The second world war, vol. VI, pp. 223-227.
169
corporated into the Soviet Union and to answer the question of where the
technical skill could be found to administer and operate these highly developed
and industrialized areas.
The Soviet policy towards Poland superficially appears to be that the Soviets
are attempting to justify their annexation of old Polish territory and their
domination of the internal affairs of Poland by expandingly generous offers of
territory in the West at the expense of Germany.
_ I fully recognize our policy is not to commit ourselves in boundary questions
‘until the peace settlement. The question I have in mind however is whether, if we
have reservations in the present case, they should not be registered on an appro-
priate occasion with the British and Soviet Governments before these concepts
become so fixed that they are virtually a fait accompli.
The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 219-221.
106
Bidault confirms that France agrees to the separation of East Prussia, Pomerania,
and Silesia
M. Bidault reported to the Provisional Consultative Assembly in Paris on
December 21st, 1944, on the Moscow visit. He said among other things:
But no system of alliance, no security-organization can offer an adequate

guarantee if we permit the continued existence in central Europe of a Germany
which retains its former frontiers and the control over its natural wealth and
industrial potential.
If Germany is to be deprived of the power of doing damage, this will not only
involve surrounding her with a cordon of reliable alliances, but also necessitate
her being deprived of the means of doing damage. Our Russian friends and we
ourselves have decided to put this into practice today — for tomorrow and for
ever.:
We have raised no objections to the frontier demarcation intended in the East
by the Soviet Government, and have therefore agreed to the cession of East
Prussia, Pomerania and Silesia to Poland. In our opinion this transfer represents
compensation to Poland for her cession of her Eastern provinces, and at the same
time it deprives Germany on the one hand of the territories which bred Prussian
militarism and on the other of the entire Silesian industrial region.
As far as we are concerned, we have informed our partners in the talks plainly
and emphatically, that we intend robbing Germany for good of the territories
which have so far simultaneously served her as an armoury and a stepping-stone
for attack to the West, i.e. in essentials the Rhineland including the territories
of Rhineland-Westphalia.
1 The Protocol records applause here.
170
y
n ee no |ne deta ilsoft isPantsectee because

: ae a notrot uncerest to ae alone We must settle it jointly with all our
ths‘crinmind our own requirements. |
171 Store
XI
The Yalta Conference

107
The US Department of State opposes the Oder Line
In order to make preparations for the conferences at Malta and Yalta, the
US State Department produced a “Briefing Book” for President Roosevelt
and Mr. Stettinius about the turn of the year 1944-1945, which was to
instruct the American statesmen regarding the views of the State Department
on the most important world problems. One of the documents, dated January
12th, 1945, said with regard to German frontier problems:
The Department of State believes that in establishing the post-war boundaries

of Europe it should be the policy of this Government to seek a solution of each
dispute based on the merits of the specific problem and on the relation of that
problem to the whole settlement. The Department believes the chief criteria to
be (1) the most reasonable prospect of general acceptance and stability and (2)
the maximum contribution to the orderly development of general international
order.
A. Recommendations
In the light of such considerations, the Department of State submits the follow-
ing recommendations with respect to the frontiers of Germany:
1. That the Danish-German frontier should remain unchanged.
2. That the water-boundary between the Netherlands and Germany should be
moved from the western shore of the Ems Estuary to the main channel and that
subsequent consideration be given to any Netherlands claims on German
territory as compensation for damage to Netherlands soil.
3. That the Belgian-German frontier should be returned to the 1920-1940 line.
4. That Alsace-Lorraine should be returned to France.
5. That the present administrative boundaries be maintained as the frontier
between Austria and Germany.
This recommendation would restore the pre-1938 frontier except for a small
area in the Sonthofen district which was transferred to Bavaria for administra-
tive convenience and which should remain in Bavaria unless there is convincing
evidence that the inhabitants wish to return to Austrian rule.
6. That the pre-Munich frontiers between Czechoslovakia and Germany be in
principle restored, subject to any minor rectifications which the Czechoslovak
Government might wish to propose.
7. That Poland acquire East Prussia (except for the Koenigsberg area), the former
7
Free City of Danzig, German Upper Silesia, and the eastern portion of
Pomerania possessing an area of approximately 6,812 square miles.1
The Department of State proposes this solution of an extremely difficult fron-
tier problem as the one representing in the light of present circumstances the
most equitable settlement and the one offering the best promise of international
tranquillity in eastern Europe. It is realized, however, that there may well be
strong pressure for the acquisition by Poland of a still larger portion of German
territory. If this is the case it is not believed that it would be feasible for the
United States to oppose such a proposal.
The solution just recommended would mean the addition for Poland of an
area of about 21,000 square miles? containing approximately 4,200,000 inhabit-
ants. The Polish-German frontier north of Upper Silesia would be straightened
and shortened by 130 miles. Poland’s sea coast would be lengthened to some
200 miles with adequate port facilities in Gdynia and Danzig. The annexation of
Upper Silesia would substantially strengthen Poland’s industrial resources and
would make possible a unified and rationalized operation of the greater Upper
Silesian district.
Because of the importance of this question, a special study of it, prepared in the
Department, is attached.
B. The Transfer of German Minorities
The cessions to Poland recommended above would bring under Polish
sovereignty approximately 3,400,000 Germans in addition to more than 700,0003
resident there before the present war. Both the Polish Government-in-Exile and
the Lublin Committee have expressed the desire to expel this German population.
In addition the Government-in-Exile of Czechoslovakia wishes to remove more
than 1,500,000 Sudeten Germans.
During the final stages of war, and during the early post-war period, it is the
belief of the Department of State that an indiscriminate expulsion of so many
people would add enormously to the confusion likely to exist in that area,
threatening the public health of much of Europe and jeopardizing the peace and
good order of the continent. Nevertheless, it is not considered that it would be
expedient for the United States to oppose such general transfers if they are
1 That part of Pomerania which is under Polish administration since 1945 comprises about
12,085 square miles. Compare Statistisches Jahrbuch fiir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland
(Statistical Yearbook for the Federal Republic of Germany), 1952, p. 12, and Die Ost-
gebiete des Deutschen Reiches (The Eastern territories of the German Reich), ed. by
G. Rhode, 3rd ed., Wiirzburg 1956, 4th ed. 1957, p. 88.
2 The territories in eastern Germany under Polish administration since 1945 comprise
altogether 38,917 square miles. But the figure mentioned in the text obviously also includes
the territory of the Free City of Danzig with 731 square miles, so that the proposal referred
to about 20,270 square miles of Reich territory within the boundaries of 1937. Compare
Statistisches Jahrbuch etc., p. 12, and Die Ostgebiete, 3rd and 4th ed., pp. 85-92.
3 According to the results of the Polish census of 1931, the number of Germans living in
Poland was 741000. According to their own census or estimates, however, it ought to
have been computed at 1022000 in 1939. Compare Th. Bierschenk, Die deutsche Volks-
gruppe in Polen 1934-1939 (The German ethnic group in Poland 1934-1939), Kitzingen
1954, p. 10.
73
e
.
insisted upon by the Czechoslovakian and Polish governments having the support
of the British and Soviet governments. The Department of State believes,
however, that in so far as possible this government should endeavor to obtain
agreement on selected transfer of those portions of the German minority from
Poland and Czechoslovakia whose transfer would contribute to the improvement
of relations between the countries concerned and to a greater stability in that
part of Europe. The Department favors a policy whereby these transfers would
be held to a minimum, would take place gradually in an orderly manner and
under international auspices agreed upon by the Principal Allies on the one hand
and Poland and Czechoslovakia on the other.
With reference to the Polish frontier questions the following was said in the
Briefing Book:
Although the frontier question has figured prominently in the discussion of the
Polish-Soviet dispute, it is felt that this matter is definitely secondary to the
major problem, the establishment of a viable and truly independent Polish
Government.
In this regard it is felt that the United States Government should use its
influence to obtain a solution of this problem which would minimize future
points of friction, possible irredentism and minimize the number of minority
groups which would have to be transferred as part of the settlement in order that
the solution would contribute to the fullest possible extent to the peace and
future tranquillity of Europe.
The provisional government of Lublin and its predecessors including the
Moscow-sponsored Union of Polish Patriots have for more than a year and
a half been steadily increasing their demands for “compensation” for Poland from
Germany. While the motivation for these increased demands is not clear, it is
possible that the following factors may have figured in making these increased
demands:
1. By including a large section of German territory in Poland and the probable
transfer of some eight to ten million Germans, the future Polish state would in
all probability be forced to depend completely on Moscow for protection
against German irredentists’ demands and in fact might become a full-fledged
Soviet satellite. ;
2. If it should not prove possible to establish a world security organization and
the Soviet Union should thus be forced to rely on its own resources for its
security, the advantages are obvious of having the Polish frontier as far West
as possible, particularly if the future Polish Government should be more or less
under the domination of Moscow.
3. By giving the future Polish state maximum compensation in the West, it may
be the hope of the Soviet authorities that the Polish people would more
willingly accept the loss of forty-two percent! of former Polish territory in the
East.
1 In reality it was 45.7°/o. Compare above p. 140, note 1.
174
While it appears that the Soviet Government is now sponsoring “compen-
sation” for Poland from Germany, up to the so-called Oder-Neisse River Line
(Line [a] on attached map) which would include the cities of Stettin and Breslau
in Poland and make it necessary to transfer from eight to ten million Germans
from these areas, and while the British Government may not object to “compen-
sation” for Poland up to the Oder (Line [b] on attached map), the United States
Government should use its influence to obtain the less radical solution outlined
below which it is felt would, from a long range point of view, contribute
materially to the future peace and tranquillity of Europe. Moreover, the suggested
solution would in all probability be much more acceptable to world opinion and
increase the prospects of American acceptance of membership in a world security
organization, the existence of which would not be jeopardized from the start by
having to back up possible untenable settlements such as that suggested by the
Lublin group.
It is believed, therefore, that every effort should be made to persuade the
British Government and, if necessary, the Polish Government to stand for
a frontier settlement along the following lines in order that efforts could be made
to persuade the Soviet Government to accept this solution.
In regard to the Eastern frontier, efforts should be made to effect a solution
with the Curzon Line as a basis but including the province of Lwéw in Poland
in order that that predominantly Polish city and the economically important
oil fields to the southwest would remain within the frontiers of the Polish state.
In the North, Poland should receive the bulk of East Prussia and in the West,
the only rectification of the 1939 frontier should be to include in Poland a small
strip of Pomerania west of the so-called Polish Corridor in order to eliminate the
German salient in this area, and Upper Silesia which is predominantly Polish in
population and is particularly important from an industrial point of view.
While this solution would reduce considerably the size of Poland compared to
its pre-war frontiers, it would include only areas which are predominantly Polish’,
would make for a viable Polish state from an economic point of view and would
reduce to a minimum the problems of the transfer of populations (these boundar-
ies are indicated on the attached map?).
1 In these in the opinion of the US State Department “predominantly Polish territories”

— southern East Prussia, western Upper Silesia, and East Pomerania — the following had
opted for Germany at the plebiscites of 1920 and 1921: In the plebiscite area of Allenstein:
97.84/o; in the plebiscite area of Marienwerder: 92.420; in the part of the Upper
Silesian plebiscite area which had remained part of the German Reich in accordance with
the Geneva arbitration: 71.2/o. No plebiscites were held in the East Pomeranian frontier
districts of Lauenburg and Biitow, since their German character was not queried by the
Paris Peace Conference. The census of 1925 showed that 89.23°/o in the district of
Biitow and 98.43%%o in the district of Lauenburg spoke German, whilst the remaining
districts of East Pomerania had no population speaking a foreign tongue. Compare Die
Ostgebiete des Deutschen Reiches, 1st and 2nd ed., pp. 136-137, 3rd and 4th ed., pp. 153 to
155, and K. Keller, Die fremdsprachige Bevolkerung in den Grenzgebieten des Deutschen
Reiches (The population speaking a foreign tongue in the frontier districts of the German
Reich), Berlin 1929, p. 53.
2 See map No. 1 at the end of this volume.
175
In regard to the British attitude on this question, Mr. Churchill has already
indicated that he would not oppose the suggested Soviet solution in the East with
Lwéw and the oil fields included in the Soviet Union rather than in Poland and
has indicated that he favors compensation for Poland in the West. While he did
not define exactly the extent of compensation Poland should receive from
Germany, he stated in Parliament on December 15th that the new Poland would
stretch broadly along the Baltic on a front of two hundred miles. This statement
would indicate that the British Government’s plan for compensation from Ger-
‘many would correspond roughly with Line (c) on the attached map (which
approximates the suggested American solution outlined above).
Before discussing the proposal for a frontier solution with the Soviet authori-
ties, it might be well to make an effort to obtain tentative concurrence with the
British on this proposed solution.
If our full efforts determined to attain this solution fail, we should then
concentrate on obtaining a solution of the Polish frontier which would minimize
the possibility of irredentism and population transfers and should resist any
proposals for a solution based on either the Oder or the Oder-Neisse Line (Line
[b] and [a] on the attached map’).
In connection with any final frontier settlement agreed upon, we should in so
far as practicable and in collaboration with the other United Nations be prepared
to assist in the orderly transfer of minority groups provided the Polish Govern-
ment so desires.
The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 188-190, 232-234.
108
Stettinius and Eden are disturbed by the extent of Polish demands
On their way to Yalta the Foreign Secretaries of the United States and
Great Britain, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Eden, met on Malta on February 1st.
With regard to their talks Mr. Stettinius reports:
We also discussed the Polish question at great length. I told Eden that re-
cognition of the Lublin National Liberation Committee as the government of
Poland would cause great resentment in the United States. I explained that we
had hoped for some kind of a coalition government with Mikolajezyk, former
head of the London Polish Government, invited to join. Eden made it plain that
the British could not recognize the Lublin Government either. We both agreed
to present a joint memorandum to the President and to the Prime Minister urging
the formation of a new Polish Government.
Eden wondered whether the Russian might give assurances to Great Britain
and to the United States of really free elections in Poland. He realized, he added,
that this would be asking ‘rather a lot’. I am not sure just what prompted this
1 See map No. 1 at the end of this volume.
176
remark. It may have been merely an expression of apprehension, but at Yalta the
British certainly joined wholeheartedly with us in insisting on and securing such
an agreement. I pointed out that the whole unsatisfactory Polish situation
jeopardized the participation of the United States in a world organization. Then
I said that Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill simply had to get this fact across
to Marshal Stalin. Eden remarked that if the Russians did not agree to our
approach to the Polish problem we would have to announce to the world a dead-
lock on the question.
On the question of the Polish-German frontier, Eden said that he was worried
over the clamours of the Lublin Poles for more German territory. He remarked
that he thought the proper western boundary of Poland should recognize the
cession to Poland of East Prussia, Silesia, and a coastal sector of Pomerania. He
pointed out that this would include eight million Germans! and would be all
that the Poles could swallow. There was general agreement with this statement,
and Matthews? added that the United States hoped that the necessary transfers
of population would not be carried out in too precipitate a fashion.
E. R. Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians. The Yalta Conference. Garden City,
New York 1949, pp. 64-65.
109
Stettinius and Eden agree on separations of lesser size
The joint protocol drawn up by the British in Malta contains the following
with regard to the German-Polish frontier:
Mr. Eden said that the apparent desire of the Lublin Provisional Government
to secure for Poland large additional sections of Germany involving eight
million persons was causing him some anxiety. He thought that Poland was
entitled to East Prussia and part of Upper Silesia, and certain other territories
up to the Oder.
Mr. Matthews said that that was the American view and referred also to the
inclusion of the eastern tip of Pomerania. He stressed also the American view
that the transfer of populations should be gradual and not precipitate.
Sir A. Cadogan thought that agreement in principle between the Americans
and British on this point might be registered now. This was agreed to.
The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 505.
1 As demonstrated by the following excerpt from the protocol,amisunderstanding between

Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Eden occurred here. The figure of eight millions did not refer to
the territories which in Eden’s opinion the Poles were to receive, but to the territories
claimed by the Lublin Government.
2 H. Freeman Matthews, at that time head of the European Section of the US Depart-
ment of State.
177
110
Eden recommends the adoption of a “fluid” British position with regard to the
frontier question
Following upon his discussions with Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Eden reported to Mr.
Churchill on February 1st, 1945:
7. There remains the territorial problem. As regards Poland’s eastern frontier,

H. M. G. have already agreed with the Russians and announced publicly that this
should be the Curzon Line, giving Lvov to the USSR. The Americans may
however still wish to press the Russians to leave Lvov to Poland. As regards
Poland’s western frontier, we and the Americans agreed that Poland should
certainly have East Prussia south and west of K6énigsberg, Danzig, the eastern
tip of Pomerania and the whole of Upper Silesia. The Lublin Poles, no doubt
with Soviet approval, are however also claiming not only the Oder Line frontier,
including Stettin and Breslau, but also the western Neisse frontier.
8. The cessions upon which we and the Americans are agreed would involve the
transfer of some 2 !/2 million Germans. The Oder frontier, without Breslau and Stet-
tin would involve a further 21/4 millions. The western Neisse frontier with Breslau
and Stettin would involve an additional 31/4 millions making 8 millions in all.
9. We were prepared last October in Moscow to let M. Mikolajczyk’s Govern-
ment have any territories they chose to claim up to the Oder, but this was con-
ditional upon agreement then being reached between him and the Russians and
there was no question of our agreeing to the western Neisse frontier. It was
agreed before we left London that we should oppose the western Neisse frontier.
I also think that we should keep the position fluid as regards the Oder Line
frontier, and take the line that H. M. G. cannot be considered as having accepted
any definite line for the western frontier of Poland, since we need not make the
same concessions to the Lublin Poles which we were prepared to make to
M. Mikolajczyk in order to obtain a solution of the Polish problem. Even the
Oder Line frontier would severely tax the Polish capacity for absorption and
would increase the formidable difficulties involved in the transfer of millions of
Germans. We agreed with the Americans that in any event these transfers should
be gradual and not precipitate.
10. If the Russians refuse to accept any solution such as that outlined above,
the present deadlock must continue. That would be bad, but a simple recognition
of the Lublin Government would be even worse.
178
111
The Western Foreign Secretaries recommend limited compensation
On the first morning of the Conference in the Crimea (February 4th, 1945),
Mr. Stettinius, the US Secretary of State, transmitted to the President a
number of recommendations on which the Foreign Secretaries had agreed at
Malta. With regard to Germany and Poland it contained the following:
3) Treatment of Germany
eee
(b) Boundaries: It is not expected that definitive detailed commitments will have
to be made at this time. However, if it proves necessary, our detailed position
has been prepared and is available.
(c) Minorities: We should oppose, so far as possible, indiscriminate mass transfer
of minorities with neighboring state. Transfers should be carried out gradually
under international supervision.
4) Poland
(a) Boundaries: We favor the Curzon Line in the north and center and, in the
south, the eastern line of Lvov Province, which would correspond generally
with one of the frontiers proposed in 1919 to the Supreme Allied Council.
Transfer of German territory to be limited to East Prussia (except Kénigsberg
to Russia), a small coastal salient of Pomerania, and Upper Silesia.
(b) We should be prepared to assist in the formation of a new representative
interim government pledged to free elections when conditions permit. We
should urge inclusion in a provisional government of Mikolajczyk (Peasant
Party is most important in Poland) and other moderate Poles abroad.
We should not agree to recognize the Lublin “government” in its present form.
112
Roosevelt wants to indemnify the Netherlands as well at the expense of Germany
On this occasion President Roosevelt at once expressed his opinion with

regard to the problems:
On the Polish question, he! examined a map and said that if the Russians would
not agree to the Poles retaining Lvov, perhaps they might at least agree to the
Poles retaining the oil-fields as a matter of saving face. Bohlen? commented that,
while the oil-fields were not too important from the Russian point of view, they
were important to Poland. He added that Poland would receive about one-third
less German territory than she would lose to the Soviet Union.
1 Roosevelt. :
2 Charles W. Bohlen, American expert on Russia and interpreter.
Zhe)
On the composition of the Polish Government, the President agreed with us
that the Lublin Government should not be recognized. He was quite familiar
with Mikolajezyk’s proposal for a presidential council, composed of represen-
tatives of the various Polish groups, which would operate as an interim govern-
ment until elections could be held. “They wouldn’t have a king,” the President
observed, “and they needed a regency council.” He asked us to prepare a short
paper, expressing our views on Poland, for him to hand to Stalin and Churchill.
Then he asked us whether we had given any consideration to making German

land available for those Dutch farmers whose lands had been flooded by the
Germans. Queen Wilhelmina had recently discussed this with the President, and
he commented to us that we should permit these Dutch farmers to take any land
they wanted in western Germany for a period of five years, or for whatever time
might be required to restore productivity to the land flooded by sea water.
/
E, R. Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, pp. 87-90.
Another statement also obviously refers to the same talk:
Stettinius did not appear agreeable to the transfer of German territory to

Poland in the West that would necessitate the evacuation of 9,009,000 German
inhabitants across a new boundary between Poland and Germany.
W.D. Leahy, I was there, p. 351,
113
Stalin and Roosevelt confirm each other in their aversion to Germany
In the afternoon of this day, but before the beginning of the first plenary
meeting, Mr. Roosevelt had a talk with Mr. Stalin.
The President said that he had been very much struck by the extent of German
destruction in the Crimea and therefore he was more bloodthirsty in regard to
the Germans than he had been a year ago, and he hoped that Marshal Stalin
would again propose a toast to the execution of 50,000 officers of the German
Army.
Marshal Stalin replied that because of the honest blood shed in fighting the
Germans, everyone was more bloodthirsty than they had been a year ago, adding
that the destruction in the Crimea is nothing compared to that which occurred
in the Ukraine. He said in the Crimea the Germans had been out-flanked and
had had little time to carry out planned destruction, whereas in the Ukraine
they had done it with method and calculation. He said the Germans were
savages and seemed to hate with a sadistic hatred the creative work of human
beings.
The President agreed with this.
180
The President said he had recently heard that the French Government did not
plan to annex outright any German territory but they are willing to have it
placed under international control.
Marshal Stalin replied that was not the story de Gaulle had told in Moscow —
there he said the Rhine was the natural boundary of France and he wished to
have French troops placed there in permanency.
114
A strategic survey shows that the Red Army has reached the Oder
4
The first plenary meeting of the Conference on February 4th dealt in the
first place with military questions. The Soviet General Antonov reported
on the latest offensive:
A. During the 18 days of the advance, the Soviet troops moved forward up to
500 kilometers in the direction of the main offensive.
Thus the average speed of forward movement was 25-30 kilometers per day.
B. The Soviet troops came out onto the Oder River on the sector from Kiistrin!
(north of Frankfurt) and south and seized the Silesian industrial area.
C. They cut across the main roads and cut off enemy groups in East Prussia
from central Germany; thus, in addition to the Courland group (26 divisions)
isolated 27 divisions of the enemy group; a series of divisional groupings were
surrounded and annihilated in the region of Lodz, Thorn, Posen (Poznan),
Schneidemiihl? and others, an approximate total of up to 15 divisions.
The dismemberment of Germany is discussed anew
The second plenary meeting of the Conference on February Sth dealt with
Germany.
Marshal Stalin replied that what he wished to find out here was whether or
not it was the joint intention to dismember Germany or not...
The Prime Minister stated that the British Government agreed in principle to
dismemberment but he felt that the actual method and a final decision as to the
manner of dismemberment was too complicated to be done here in four or five
days... He said that we are agreed that Germany should lose certain territories
1 In the original: Kyustrin.

2 In the original: Torne, Poznan, Shneidmul.
181
conquered by the Red Army which would form part of the Polish settlement,
but he added that the question of the Rhine valley and the industrial areas of
the Ruhr and Saar capable of producing armaments had not yet been decided...
The Prime Minister said he did not feel there was any need to discuss with
any German any question about their future — that unconditional surrender
gave us the right to determine the future of Germany which could perhaps
best be done at the second stage after unconditional surrender. He said that we
reserve under these terms all rights over the lives, property and activities of the
Germans.
Marshal Stalin said that if the French were given a zone, would not that
change the Tripartite control of Germany to a four-nation control.
The Prime Minister replied that the British Government expected that if
France were given a zone they would, of course, participate in the control
machinery, but that in regard to other nations that might assist in the occupation,
such as Belgium or Holland, there would be no question of a specific zone and
thus no part in the participation of the control machinery [sic].
Marshal Stalin stated that he thought it would bring up many complications
if we should have four nations instead of three participating in the determination
of German matters. He thought that some method might be evolved whereby
England might let the French, Belgians and Dutch assist in the occupation but
without the right to participate in the Three Power decisions for Germany. He
said that if this was accepted the Soviet Government might desire to ask other
states to help in the occupation of the Soviet zone without any right to parti-
cipate in the decisions of the control commission.
116
Stalin declares: The Soviet Union is in favour of a frontier along the Western
Neisse
At the third plenary meeting on February 6th the Polish question was on
the agenda.
President: I should like to bring up Poland. I come from a great distance and
therefore have the advantage of a more distant point of view of the problem.
There are six or seven million Poles in the United States. As I said in Teheran, in
general I am in favor of the Curzon Line. Most Poles, like the Chinese, want to
save face.
Stalin (interrupting): Who will save face, the Poles in Poland or the émigré
Poles?
President: The Poles would like East Prussia and part of Germany. It would
make it easier for me at home if the Soviet Government could give something to
182
Poland. I raised the question of giving them Lvov at Teheran. It has now been
suggested that the oil lands in the southwest of Lvov might be given them. I am
not making a definite statement but I hope that Marshal Stalin can make a gesture
in this direction.1
Roosevelt then proposed that a Presidency Council should be formed from
among the Polish party leaders, which should take on the constitution of
a new government until elections could be held.
The President said he had merely put forth a suggestion but he thought if we
could solve the Polish question it would be a great help to all of us. He added
he didn’t know personally any members of the London government or Lublin
government, but he had met Mr. Mikolajczyk who had made a deep impression
on him as a sincere and an honest man.
The Prime Minister said that he had consistently declared in Parliament and
elsewhere that the British Government would support the Curzon Line, even
leaving Lvoy to the Soviet Union. He had been criticized for this and so had
Mr. Eden, but he felt that after the burdens which Russia had borne in this war
the Curzon Line was not a decision of force but one of right. He said he remained
in that position. Of course, he added, if the mighty Soviet Union could make
some gesture to the much weaker country, such as the relinquishment of Lvov,
this act of magnanimity would be acclaimed and admired. He said he was much
more interested in sovereignty and independence of Poland than in the frontier
line — he wanted to see the Poles have a home where they could organize their
lives as they wished... It must not be forgotten, however, that Great Britain
had gone to war to protect Poland against German aggression at a time when that
decision was most risky, and it had almost cost them their life in the world. He
said Great Britain had no material interest in Poland, but the question was one of
honor and that his government would therefore never be content with a solution
which did not leave Poland a free and independent state.
Marshal Stalin then gave the following summary of his views on the Polish
question: Mr. Churchill had said that for Great Britain the Polish question was
one of honor and that he understood, but for the Russians it was a question
both of honor and security. It was one of honor because Russia had many past
grievances against Poland and desired to see them eliminated. It was a question
of strategic security not only because Poland was a bordering country but because
throughout history Poland had been the corridor for attack on Russia. We have
to mention that during the last thirty years Germany twice has passed through
this corridor?. The reason for this was that Poland was weak. Russia wants
1 The minutes of Matthews have been used so far; the further text follows Bohlen’s
notes.
2 This thesis of Stalin’s is historically wrong. When the First World War broke out,
Poland was under Russian domination, and when the Second World War broke out, she
was divided between the Soviet Union and Germany. But in former centuries Russian
troops repeatedly penetrated through Poland to Central Europe, for instance during
the Seven Years’ War and during the Napoleonic Wars.
183
a strong, independent and democratic Poland. Since it was impossible by the force
of Russian armies alone to close from the outside this corridor, it could be done
only by Poland’s own forces...
In regard to the Curzon Line, concessions in regard to Lvov and the Lvov
Province, and Mr. Churchill’s reference to a magnanimous act on our part, it is
necessary to remind you that not Russians but Curzon and Clemenceau fixed
this line.! The Russians had not been invited and the line was established against
their will. Lenin had opposed giving Bialystok Province to the Poles but the
Curzon Line gives it to Poland. We have already retreated from Lenin’s position
in regard to this province. Should we then be less Russian than Curzon and
Clemenceau? We could not then return to Moscow and face the people who
would say Stalin and Molotov have been less sure defenders of Russian interest
than Curzon and Clemenceau. It is, therefore, impossible to agree with the
proposed modification of the line. I would prefer to have the war go on although
it will cost us blood in order to compensate for Poland from Germany. When
he was in Moscow Mr. Mikolajczyk was delighted to hear that Poland’s frontier
would extend to the Western Neisse River and I favor the Polish frontier on the
Western Neisse and ask the conference to support this proposal.”
The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 677, 668-669.
117
Stalin says that most Germans in the eastern territories have already run away
Consultations concerning Poland were continued at the fourth plenary

meeting on February 7th.
The President said in regard to the Polish question he wished again to empha-
size that he was less interested in the tracing of the frontier lines than he was in
the problem of the Polish Government. He said that he did not attach any im-
portance to the continuity or legality of any Polish Government since he thought
in some years there had in reality been no Polish Government.
Mr. Molotov then read his proposals in regard to the Polish question, as
follows:
1. It was agreed that the line of Curzon should be the Eastern frontier of Poland
with a digression from it in some regions of 5-8 kilometers in favor of Poland.
2. It was decided that the Western frontier of Poland should be traced from the
town of Stettin (Polish) and farther to the South along the River Oder and
still farther along the River Neisse (Western).
1 In connection with this erroneous assertion compare above note 1 on page 10 and
G. Rhode, Die Entstehung der Curzon-Linie (The Origin of the Curzon Line), pp. 81-92.
2 Compare Churchill’s report on this section of the negotiations in: The second world
war, vol. VI, pp. 320-324.
184
3.It was deemed desirable to add to the Provisional Polish Government some
democratic leaders from Polish émigré circles.
4.It was regarded desirable that the enlarged Provisional Polish Government
should be recognized by the Allied Governments.
5.It was deemed desirable that the Provisional Polish Government, enlarged as
was mentioned above in paragraph 3, should as soon as possible call the popu-
lation of Poland to the polls for organization by general voting of permanent
organs of the Polish Government.
6. V. M. Molotoy, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr were entrusted
with the discussion of the question of enlarging the Provisional Polish Govern-
ment and submitting their proposals to the consideration of the three Govern-
ments.
After reading the proposals, Mr. Molotov said he would like to add that they
had attempted to reach the Poles in Poland by telephone but they had been
unable to do so and it was apparent that time would not permit the carrying out of
the President’s suggestion to summon the Poles to the Crimea. He said he felt
that the proposals he had just put forward went far toward meeting the Presi-
dent’s wishes.
The President replied that he must say he felt progress had been made in the
light of Mr. Molotov’s suggestions. He said there was just one word he did not
like and that was “émigré”. He said he did not see any necessity to go to
émigrés since you could find enough Poles in Poland for the purpose. He re-
peated what he had said yesterday, namely that he did not know any of the
Poles in the Poland government in London and he knew only Mr. Mikolajezyk.
He concluded by saying he would like to have an opportunity, with Mr. Stet-
tinius, to study Mr. Molotov’s proposals, to which Marshal Stalin agreed.1
The Prime Minister said he shared the President’s dislike of the word “émigré”.
The word had originated during the French revolution and meant in England a
person who had been driven out of a country by his own people. He said in the
case of the Poles this wasn’t true, since they had left their country as a result
of the brutal German attack. He therefore preferred in place of the word
“émigré” to refer to them as “Poles temporarily abroad”. He said in regard to
the second point of Mr. Molotow’s proposals he would always support the
movement of Polish frontiers to the west since he felt they should receive com-
pensation, but not more than they can handle. He said it would be a pity to
stuff the Polish goose so full of German food that it got indigestion. He said he
felt that there was a considerable body of British public opinion that would be
shocked if it were proposed to move large numbers of Germans, and although
he personally would not be shocked he knew that that view existed in England.
1 Mr. Stettinius reports that during this discussion he quickly jotted down the following
‘note as a warning to the President, because he thought things were moving too fast and
too far: “Have we the authority to deal with a boundary question of this kind, giving a
guarantee?” (Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, pp. 182-184.)
185
He said he felt if it were confined to East Prussia!, six million Germans probably
could be handled quite aside from moral grounds, but the addition of the line
west of the Neisse? would create quite a problem in this respect.
Marshal Stalin remarked that most Germans in those areas had already run
away from the Red Army.
The Prime Minister said this, of course, simplified the problem, and in regard
to the question of space in Germany for these deported persons he felt that the
fact that Germany had had six to seven million casualties in this war and would
probably have a million more would simplify that problem.?
Marshal Stalin replied that the Germans might well have one or possibly two
million more casualties.
The Prime Minister said that he wasn’t afraid of the problem of transfer of
populations provided that it was proportioned to the capacity of the Poles to
handle it and the capability of the Germans to receive them. He felt, however,
that it needs study, not only in principle but as a practical matter.4
The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 709, 716-717.
118
The US delegation opposes the Oder-Neisse Line
Mr. Roosevelt sent the two other delegations a counter-proposal regarding

the Polish question on the morning of February 8th before the plenary
meeting:
The proposals submitted by Mr. Molotov in regard to the Polish question in

reply to the President’s letter to Marshal Stalin dated February 6, 1945, have
been given careful study.
In regard to the frontier question, no objection is perceived to point One of
1 Probably the territory up to the Oder is meant. The statement of a population of about
6,000,000 would correspond to this.
2 Probably a misunderstanding. Presumably Churchill spoke of the territory up to the
Western Neisse which was in dispute during this discussion.
8 Byrnes (Speaking frankly, p. 30) reports: Mr. Churchill... estimated that the taking
of territory in East Prussia as far west as the Oder would necessitate the moving of six
million Germans.
Stalin protested that the number would be much smaller because “where our troops
come in, the Germans run away”.
Churchill reminded him that consideration must be given “to where those Germans are
that run away,” and asked, “will there be room for them in what is left of Germany?”
Privately, Churchill expressed to me the opinion that placing the line at the Neisse
River would mean the transferring of nearly nine million Germans. Such a number, he
asserted, could never be absorbed in what would remain of Germany.
4 In this connection Churchill himself remarks in his memoirs (The second world war,
vol. VI, p. 327): In these general discussions maps were not used, and the distinction
between the Eastern and Western Neisse did not emerge as clearly as it should have
done. This was however soon to be made clear.
186
the Soviet proposals, namely, that the eastern boundary of Poland should be
the Curzon Line with modifications in favor of Poland in some areas of from five
to eight kilometers.
In regard to point Two, while agreeing that compensation should be given to
Poland at the expense of Germany, including that portion of East Prussia south
of the KG6nigsberg line, Upper Silesia, and up to the line of the Oder, there
would appear to be little justification to the extension of the western boundary
of Poland up to the Western Neisse River.
In regard to the proposals of the Soviet Government concerning the future
Government of Poland, it is proposed that Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir
Archibald Clark Kerr be authorized on behalf of the three Governments to
invite to Moscow Mr. Bierut, Mr. Osdbka-Morawski, Bishop Sapieha, Mr. Vincent
Witos, Mr. Mikolajczyk and Mr. Grabski to form a Polish Government of Na-
tional Unity along the following lines:
1. There will be formed a Presidential Committee of three, possibly consisting
of Mr. Bierut, Mr. Grabski and Bishop Sapieha, to represent the Presidential
office of the Polish Republic.
2. This Presidential Committee will undertake the formation of a government
consisting of representative leaders from the present Polish Provisional Govern-
ment in Warsaw; from other democratic elements inside Poland; and from
Polish democratic leaders abroad.
3. This interim government, when formed, will pledge itself to the holding of
free elections in Poland as soon as conditions permit for a constituent assembly
to establish a new Polish constitution under which a permanent government
would be elected.
4. When a Polish Government of National Unity is formed, the three Govern-
ments will then proceed to accord it recognition as the Provisional Govern-
ment of Poland.
119
Churchill advocates the Oder Line and a resettlement
The British Prime Minister also submitted a new proposal concerning Poland
to the other two delegations before the plenary meeting on February 8th.
1. It was agreed that the Curzon Line should be the eastern frontier of Poland
with adjustments in some regions of 5 to 8 kilometers in favour of Poland.
2.It was decided that the territory of Poland in the west should include the
free city of Danzig, the regions of East Prussia west and south of K®onigsberg,
the administrative district of Oppeln1 in Silesia and the lands desired by
1 Obviously Upper Silesia is meant.
187
Poland to the east of the line of the Oder. It was understood that the Germans
in the said regions should be repatriated to Germany and that all Poles in
Germany should at their wish be repatriated to Poland.
3. Having regard to the recent liberation of western Poland by the Soviet armies
it was deemed desirable to facilitate the establishment of a fully representative
provisional Polish Government based upon all the democratic and anti-Fascist
forces in Poland and including democratic leaders from Poles abroad. That
Government should be so constituted as to command recognition by the three
‘Allied Governments.
4. It was agreed that the establishment of such a provisional Government was the
primary responsibility of the Polish people, and that, pending the possibility
of free elections, representative Polish leaders should consult together on the
composition of this provisional Government. V.M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman
and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr were entrusted with thé task of approaching such
leaders and submitting their proposals to the consideration of the three Allied
Governments.
5. It was deemed desirable that the Provisional Polish Government, thus estab-
lished, should as soon as possible hold free and unfettered elections on the
basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot, in which all democratic parties
should have the right to participate and to promote candidatures, in order
to ensure the establishment of a Government truly representative of the will
of the Polish people.
120
The frontier problem proves to be closely connected with the question of Polish
freedom
The Polish problem was again discussed in the plenary meeting on

February 8th.
The President then turned to the question of the proposals which he had sent
to the British and the Soviet Delegations this morning in regard to Poland. He
said he had noticed they were very close to those of Mr. Molotov but would like
to have his comments.
Mr. Molotov inquired whether the last point of the President’s proposal in
regard to the recognition of a Government of National Unity would mean that
the London Government would then disappear.
The Prime Minister replied that when we recognize the new government, we
would of course withdraw our recognition of the London Government.
188
Marshal Stalin replied that when we recognized the new government, what
would happen then to the property and resources of the London Government.
Would they remain in the. possession of Arciszewski?
The Prime Minister replied that he thought that the withdrawal of recognition
would take care of that and, [sic]
The President said that in his opinion the property would go to the new
government.
There was then declared a short recess.
The Prime Minister said that the British had put in a paper on Poland but
that he did not know whether it had been studied by the other Delegations. He
said that with some slight amendments, if a decision in principle was reached he
was prepared to accept the President’s proposals which have been under dis-
cussion,
Mr. Molotoy said he had some observations to make on the President’s pro-
posals. He said that their proposals made yesterday had been based on certain
realities existing in Poland. It was impossible to ignore the existence of the
present Polish Government and he said that the Soviet Government had felt that
it would be useful to have discussions on the basis of enlarging that government
with the addition of other democratic elements from within Poland and abroad.
He said that the Lublin, or Warsaw, Government stands at the head of the Polish
people and enjoys great prestige and popularity in the country. The Poles would
never agree to any solution which would greatly change the Provisional Govern-
ment...
Mr. Molotov said in regard to the question of frontiers he was glad to note the
complete agreement on the eastern boundary, namely the Curzon Line with
slight modifications, but he also noted that on the western boundary there was
no unanimity. He said that they knew that the Provisional Government stood
for the western frontier as outlined in the Soviet proposals. He added that they
will have to ask the Poles about this, but he was in no doubt that they would
categorically support this frontier.
The Prime Minister said that we were at the crucial point of this great con-
ference. He said we would be found wanting by the world should we separate
recognizing different Polish governments. This would be accepted by the world
as evidence of a breach between Great Britain and the United States on one hand
and the Soviet Union on the other hand, with lamentable consequences in the
future. It was stamping this conference with a seal of failure, and nothing else
we did here would overcome it. He admitted, on the other hand, that we take
different views of the same basic facts. According to the information of the
British Government, the Lublin, or Warsaw, Government does not commend
itself to the overwhelming masses of the Polish people, and it is certainly not
accepted abroad as representative of the people. If the British Government
brushed aside the London Government and went over to the Lublin Government
there would be an angry outcry in Great Britain. There was, in addition, the
189
problem of the Poles outside Poland. He reminded the conference that on the
Western and Italian fronts there was a Polish army of about 150000 men who
had fought steadily and very bravely for our cause. He did not believe that
this army would be reconciled to the transfer of the British Government’s sup-
port from the government with which it had dealt since the beginning of the
war. It would be regarded as an act of betrayal of Poland. As Marshal Stalin
and Mr. Molotov knew, he had no special feeling for the Polish Government in
London, which in his opinion had been foolish at every stage, but a formal act
of transfer of recognition would cause the very greatest consequences. He pointed
out that the group forming the new Provisional Government was only about one
year old.
The Prime Minister made it clear that, speaking only for Great Britain, it
would be said that the British Government had given away completely on the
frontiers, had accepted the Soviet view and had championed it. To break alto-
gether with the lawful government of Poland which had been recognized during
all these five years of war would be an act subject to the most severe criticism
in England. It would be said that we did not know what was going on in Poland
— that we could not even get anyone in there to find out what was going on and
that we had accepted in toto the view of the Lublin Government. Great Britain
would be charged with forsaking the cause of Poland and he was bound to say
that the debates in Parliament would be most painful and he might add most
dangerous to Allied unity. He added that all the above was on the supposition
that they might find it possible to agree to Mr. Molotov’s proposal. He said if
they were to give up the London Government it must be evident that a new
start had been made on both sides from equal terms. Before such transfer of
recognition His Majesty’s Government would have to be convinced that a new
government, representative of the Polish people, had been created, pledged to
an election on the basis of universal suffrage by secret ballot with the partici-
pation of all democratic parties and the right to put up their candidates. When
such elections were held in Poland, he said Great Britain would salute the govern-
ment which emerges without regard for the Polish Government in London. He
concluded with the statement that it is the interval before such elections that is
difficult and alarming.
Mr. Molotov suggested that perhaps the talks in Moscow might give some
result, but it was very difficult to discuss the Polish question without partici-
pation with the Poles.
The Prime Minister remarked it was frightfully important that agreement
should be reached on the question and that we should part over a signed agree-
ment.
The President said we were all agreed on the necessity of free elections and
that the only problem was how Poland was to be governed in the interval.
Marshal Stalin said... in regard to the popularity of the Provisional Govern-
ment he could assure the conference that the people running the government
were popular... For many years the Poles had hated the Russians and with
190
reason, since three times the Czarist Government had participated in the parti-
tioning of Poland. With the advance of the Soviet troops the liberation of Poland
had changed the attitude of the Polish people toward Russia and old resentments
had disappeared and good will had taken their place...
The President asked how long it would be, in the Marshal’s opinion, before
elections could be held in Poland.
Marshal Stalin replied it might be possible in a month provided no catastrophes
occurred on the front and the Germans began to beat them.
The Prime Minister said of course they would welcome free elections but would
not ask for anything that would hamper military operations.
The President proposed that the matter be referred to the Foreign Ministers
for study, and this was agreed to.
121
The Foreign Ministers negotiate about the future government of Poland
Next day, on February 9th, the Foreign Ministers dealt with the Polish
question.
Mr. Stettinius stated that he would like briefly to comment upon one impor-
tant point which had not been previously raised. There had been quite a struggle
in the United States on American participation in the World Organization. From
the standpoint of psychology and public opinion the Polish situation was of great
importance at this time to the United States. He hoped with all his heart that
the Polish question could be settled before the Crimean Conference broke up.
Mr. Stettinius then read out a declaration in connection with Mr. Molotov’s
last proposals. He proposed that the present Polish Provisional Government
be “reorganized” and that the following formula be considered for the
declaration:
“That the present Polish Provisional Government be reorganized into a fully

representative government based on all democratic forces in Poland and in-
cluding democratic leaders from Poland abroad, to be termed ‘The Provisional
Government of National Unity’; Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald
Clark Kerr to be authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with mem-
bers of the present Provisional Government and other democratic leaders from
within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present
government along the above lines. This ‘Government of National Unity’ would be
pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on
the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic parties
would have the right to participate and to put forward candidates.
When a ‘Provisional Government of National Unity’ is satisfactorily formed,
191
the three Governments will then proceed to accord its recognition. The Ambassa-
dors of the three powers in Warsaw following such recognition would be charged
with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective Govern-
ments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elec-
tions.”
Mr. Eden said that he had some preliminary remarks on Mr. Stettinius’ pro-
posal. He must tell his colleagues frankly of his difficulties in this matter. Many
people thought that the Poles had been harshly treated by the British readiness
to acquiesce in a frontier on the Curzon Line. He himself had been troubled for
some time because, quite apart from the merits of the case, it might become a
cause of difficulty between the Soviet Government and the British.
As regards the Lublin Provisional Government, it was possible that he might
be quite wrong but he thought it was a fact that hardly anyone in Great Britain
believed that the Lublin Government was representative of Poland. He should
have thought that that view was widely held in the rest of Europe and in the United
States of America. It was for that reason that the document which he had put
forward the previous day had avoided all mention of adding to the Lublin
Government and had stressed that a new start was necessary.
Mr. Molotov stated that while the American document was being translated he
wished to make some comments. Although he could not, of course, go farther
than what Marshal Stalin had said yesterday, he recalled that the President had
stated that the Polish situation was temporary and could not last for a long
time. In the Russian opinion the most important question was the holding as
soon as practical of general elections in Poland. These elections would give a
basis for a permanent government and do away with all the difficulties that
were facing the Allies at the present time. Marshal Stalin had referred to the
provisional period as lasting perhaps one month, whereas the Prime Minister had
mentioned two. In any event, it would be a short interval.
Mr. Eden said he entirely agreed with Mr. Molotov in respect to his remarks
on the importance of the Polish elections. However, he felt sure that British
opinion would agree that if the elections were controlled by the Lublin Govern-
ment they would not be free elections or represent the will of the Polish people.
Mr. Stettinius stated that he supported Mr. Eden’s views in full in this respect.
192
122
Agreement is reached with regard to the establishment of the Polish Govern-
ment
The discussion of the Polish question was continued in the plenary meeting
on the same day (February 9th).
Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation accepted as a basis of discussion
the proposal put forward this morning at the meeting by Mr. Stettinius.1 He
said the Soviet Delegation was very anxious to come to an agreement and he
believed that this could be done with certain amendments to Mr. Stettinius’
proposal. First, he offered an amendment which dealt with the first sentence of
the formula. He suggested that in place of the sentence in Mr. Stettinius’ draft
that the following be substituted:
“The present Provisional Government of Poland should be reorganized on a
wider democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland
itself and from those living abroad, and in this connection this government would
be called the National Provisional Government of Poland.”
He added that the next two sentences remained unchanged, but he had a slight
amendment to the last sentence, namely that the words “non-Fascist and anti-
Fascist” be added before the words “democratic parties”. He then said that he
felt the last sentence dealing with the responsibilities of the Ambassadors of the
three Governments in Warsaw to observe and report on the carrying out of the
free elections should be eliminated since he felt certain this would be offensive to
the Poles and would needlessly complicate the discussions. He said that it was the
first duty of Ambassadors anyway to observe and report, and therefore no such
statement is necessary. He concluded that with these slight amendments
Mr. Stettinius’ proposal made this morning was acceptable.
The Prime Minister ... said he was glad to see that an advance had been made
at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers and to hear Mr. Molotov’s proposal on the
urgent, immediate and painful problem of Poland. He said he wished to make
some general suggestions that he hoped would not affect the movements the
President had in mind. He said that here, in a general atmosphere of agreement,
we should not put our feet in the stirrups and ride off. He said that he felt it
would be a great mistake to hurry this question — it is better to take a few days of
latitude than to endanger bringing the ship into port. He said it was a great
mistake to take hurried decisions on these grave matters. He felt he must study
the Polish proposals before giving any opinion.
The President said that after studying Mr. Molotov’s amendment we were now
very near agreement and it was only a matter of drafting. He said that for those
governments which still recognized the London Government the use of the
1See No. 121, pp. 191-192.
193
words “Provisional Government” was somewhat difficult, and he felt that the
first words of Mr. Molotov’s amendment might read “The Government now
operating in Poland”. He said he felt it was very important for him in the United
States that there be some gesture made for the six million Poles there indicating
that the United States was in some way involved with the question of freedom
of elections, and he therefore felt that the last sentence concerning the reports of
the Ambassadors was important. He repeated that he felt, however, that it was
only a matter of words and details and the three Foreign Ministers might meet
tonight to discuss it.
The Prime Minister said he agreed with the President that progress had been
made, but he felt that the draft might be tied up by the Foreign Ministers this
afternoon.
123
The British War Cabinet raises objections telegraphically
In the evening of February 9th the Foreign Ministers met again.
The meeting was opened by Mr. Molotov announcing that we had come
together to discuss formulas with regard to Poland. Mr. Eden interrupted to say
that he had just had a strong cable from the War Cabinet indicating that the
earlier basis of discussion had not been satisfactory. He must, therefore, frankly
say if we cannot get something like his text of three days ago! there seems no
chance of the British Government approving a formula. He thereupon handed
the attached draft of a “revised formula” to Mr. Molotov. There was some lively
discussion as to whether this was in fact a new formula to which Mr. Molotov
objected, or whether it should be considered merely a modification of the Amer-
ican formula to which amendments could be added. This latter viewpoint was
finally accepted, Mr. Eden explaining that the first two sentences were merely a
reiteration of what the Prime Minister had said in the afternoon.
After a lengthy but amicable discussion, the following text was agreed to by all
three:
“A new situation has been created by the complete liberation of Poland by
the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a provisional Polish govern-
ment more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of
western Poland. The provisional government now functioning in Poland should
be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic
leaders from Poland itself and from those living abroad. This new government
will then be called the ‘Polish Provisional Government of National Unity’.
1 See the British proposal in No. 119, pp. 187-188, which, however, had been submitted
only the day before.
194
Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, are authorized to
consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present provisional
government and with other democratic leaders from within Poland and from
abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the
above lines. This ‘Polish Provisional Government of National Unity’ would be
pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on
the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic
and anti-Nazi parties would have the right to take part and to put forth candi-
dates.
When a ‘Polish Provisional Government of National Unity’ has been properly
formed in conformity with the above, the three governments will then accord it
recognition.”
The one important point on which considerable discussion failed to produce
agreement was with respect to the addition of a further sentence along the
following lines:
“The ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw, following such recognition,
would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their
respective governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and
unfettered elections.”
Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Eden emphasized the importance of the inclusion of
some such sentence if recognition is to be transferred from the London Govern-
ment because of its effect on public opinion in their respective countries. Mr. Mo-
lotov insisted that this was a point that could be discussed with the Poles by the
commission of three in Moscow but could not be included without such dis-
cussion as it would offend their sensibilities.
124
No final agreement is reached in respect of the frontier question
A new discussion on Poland ensued at the plenary meeting on February 10th.
The President said that he thought that Mr. Eden had a report to make on
the progress achieved at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers this morning.
Mr. Eden said that he had to report agreement on the future government of
Poland, that there had been two questions involved which he would refer to
later but in the meantime he would read the new formula. He read the new
formula with one correction which he admitted to have been made by Mr. Mo-
lotov.
Mr. Eden then read out the new formula, the first part of which was identical
with the text agreed upon on the evening of February 9th. The last sentence
dealing with the recognition was now formulated as follows:
1 Compare No. 123, pp. 194-195.
193
“When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly
formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the USSR, which
now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of
Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of
the USA will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional
Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports
the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in
Poland.”
The Prime Minister said that the document made no mention of frontiers. He
said we are all agreed on the Eastern frontier of Poland and he agreed that
Poland should receive compensation in the West, up to the line of the Oder if
the Poles so desired. He said that the British Government was very doubtful
about going any further or mentioning any such possibility at this stage, since he
did not believe that the War Cabinet would accept the line of the Western Neisse.
He said he felt, however, that some mention should be made of the territorial
settlement otherwise the whole world would wonder what had been decided on
this question. There would be some criticism, but nevertheless, it would be better
than no mention at all.
The President said that the Polish Government should be consulted before any
statement was made in regard to the Western frontier.
Marshal Stalin remarked that he thought that there should be some statement
on the Eastern frontier on which all present had agreed.
The Prime Minister concurred with this statement of Marshal Stalin and re-
peated the people would wish to know what we had decided on this question.
Mr. Molotov remarked that it would be a good thing if something definite could
be said about the Eastern frontier, since it would clarify and quiet the whole
situation insofar as the Poles were concerned. He said that it was certain that
there would be criticisms, but he felt it would in general be beneficial. He
suggested that the matter be referred to the three Foreign Ministers to draft some
statement on this point. He added that it was perhaps not necessary to be as
specific in regard to the Western frontier as in regard to the Eastern frontier.
The Prime Minister said that he had already gone on record to the effect that
Poland would receive a good slice of territory in the North and in the West but
that the opinion of the new Polish Government of National Unity would be
sought.
The President said he had no objection in principle to such a statement but he
thought the Prime Minister should draft it.
Mr. Molotoy suggested that it should form a last sentence of the Polish state-
ment.
The President then said he wished to propose some small amendments in the
paragraph regarding frontiers in the Polish statement. He said these amendments
were necessary for American Constitutional reasons. He suggested that instead of
the first words “The three powers” he would like to substitute “The three heads
196
of government” and that in the second sentence the word “feel” instead of
“agree” should be used.
These amendments were accepted by the conference, and the following text
approved:
“The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland
should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five
to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. It is recognized that Poland must receive
substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the
opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be
sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final
delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the
Peace Conference.”
Mr. Molotoy said he had one suggestion and that was to add to the second
sentence “with the return to Poland of her ancient frontiers in East Prussia and
on the Oder”.
The President inquired how long ago these lands had been Polish.
Mr. Molotov said very long ago, but they had in fact been Polish.
The President said this might lead the British to ask for the return of the
United States to Great Britain.
Marshal Stalin replied that the ocean prevented this. He added that at the
present the draft said nothing specific about frontiers, which he thought was very
important for the Poles.
The Prime Minister said he would prefer not to mention the frontier in the
west since he shared the same difficulties the President had spoken of.
Mr. Eden said that they had always said that they would accept any line up to
the Oder that the Poles desired.
The Prime Minister said that there was no stopping place between what we
proposed to do and the line of the Oder, and if the question is asked about
ancient territories there would be no answer. He said that he was not against the
line of the Oder in principle if the Poles so desired.
Mr. Molotoy said he thought it might be worthwhile considering this wording.
Marshal Stalin said he would withdraw the Soviet amendment and leave the
British draft as it had been.
The draft of the last paragraph regarding Polish frontiers was accepted.
125
The Big Three decide: Poland shall receive compensation “in the North and
West”
The result of the tedious arguments concerning the declaration on Poland
was contained in the following sentences in the final communiqué of the
Yalta Conference:
1 Compare in this connection the Soviet proposal in 117, pp. 184-185, Roosevelt’s proposal
197
A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liber-
ation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional
Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the
recent liberation of Western part of! Poland. The Provisional Government which
is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganised on a broad demo-
cratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from
Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional
Government of National Unity.
Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorised as a commis-
sion to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Pro-
visional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within
Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganisation of the present
Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of
National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections
as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these
elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part
and to put forward candidates.
When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly
formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the USSR, which now
maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of
Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of
the United States of America will establish diplomatic relations with the new
Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassa-
dors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about
the situation in Poland.
The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland
should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five
to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. They recognise that Poland must receive
sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final de-
limitation of the Western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace
Conference.
The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 938 and 980.
A decade of American foreign policy, pp. 30-31.
in 118, pp. 186-187, the British proposal in 119, pp. 187-188, the proposal of Stettinius
in 121, pp. 191-192, and the wording agreed upon by the three Foreign Ministers in 123,
pp. 194-195 and 124, p. 196. The parts of the communiqué which refer to Germany have
been published in three languages in the Supplement No. 1 to the Official Gazette of the
Allied Control Council for Germany. Curiously enough, it lacks the section “Poland”,
which contains the decisive sentences concerning the German eastern frontier.
1 The wording is “of Western Poland” in the other renderings.
198
Russian text
Hosoe nosoxenme cosqanocb B Ilompme B pesymprare mmoaHOrO

ocBobompenua ee Hpacnoit Apmeii. Oro rpeOyer cosqanun Bpemennoro
Uoascroro [Ipasurerpersa, KoTOpoe umes0 Snr Gonee mmpoKyto Oasy,
4eM STO ObIIO BOSMO*KHO paHbille, JO HeaBHero OCBOOOMPeHUA BanasHolt
zacru Ionpmm. Jleiicrsyiomee utine B [loxpme Bpemennoe IIpasuresbcrBo
OKHO OLITE OSTOMY peopraHMsoBaHo Ha Gosee mMpoKol FemoKparu-
aecKoli Oase c BKIIOYeHMeM JeMOKpaTMueckUX JeATesei m3 camoii Toupmm
MW NOJAKOB W3-3a rpanmubt. ITO HOBOe IIpaBuTeILCTBO OIVKHO 3aTeM
HasbiBaThcA [lombchum Bpemenunm IIpasutrenpctpom Hanmonaspuoro
Equuctsa.
B. M. Monxoros, r-n B. A. Tappuman u cap Apandanpg HK. Kepp ynoa-
HOMAaYMBaWTCA, KAK KOMMCCHA, UpoOKOHCyubTMupoBaTbcaA B Mockse B
HepBy!0 Ovepesb C UeHaMM TenepemmHero Bpemenuoro IIpapurenLcTBa u
C ApyruMu NOJbCKUMM JeMOKpPAaTMYeCKUMU JMyepaMuM Kak M3 caMmoli
Iloubmm, Tak WM W3-3a TpaHub, MMeA B BUY peopranusaruio Termepell-
Hero lUpaBMTebCTBAa Ha YKa3aHHbIX BbIe OCcHOBax. JTo [lompEcKoe
Bpemennoe IIpasureapcrno HaymonambyHoro Equucrsa 20JvKHO IpMHATh
oOOA3aTeIbCTBA MpOBecTu CBOOOAHEIe M HMYeM He BOCIIPeMATCTBOBAHHEIe
BBIOOPH, KAK MOMKHO CKOpee, Ha OCHOBAaX BCeOOero usb0upaTesbHOTO
mpaBa Up TaiinoM romocoBanun. B otux BElOopax BCe aHTMHAUCTCKMe
WM eMOKpaTwyeckue MapTUM OJKHEI UMCTb 1paBo UpMHUMaTL yuacTue U
BBICTABIATb CBOMX KaH]AUaTOB.
HKorga [loapcxoe Bpemenuoe IIpasurextctrso Hanmonanbuoro Equu-
cTBa OyfeT chOpMUpoOBaHO JOJKHEIM 06pas0M B COOTBETCTBUM C BBIMIeY-
KasaHHEIM, IIpasurenbcrBo CCCP, xoropoe nopyepuBaer B HacToAee
BpeMA AMMMOMaTHYeCKHe OTHOMIeHUA Cc HbIHeEWIHUM Bpemenueim IIpasu-
tembcTBom Iloabum, Ipasureaberso Coequnennoro HKoposescrpa mu
IlpasurenpetBo CIA ycraHoBaT JumIOMaTM4eCKMe OTHOMICHUA © HOBLIM
nmoabckum Bpemenusm IIpasutrenpcrsom Hawmonanbuoro Ejquucrsa u
OOMeHAIOTCA MOCTAaMM, NO AOKNAaLAaM KOTOPHIX COOTBETCTBYIOINMe WpaBu-
TebcTBa OyyT ocBeyqoMIeHEI 0 NONOMeHUM B Ilompme.
Tuapnl Tpex mpaBuTeibeTB cunraior, yo BocTOuHaA rpanuna Iompmm
OvKHAa UTTM BOA TuHuu Kepsona ¢ OTCTYMJIeHUeM OT Hee B HEKOTOPEIX
paiionax or 5 go 8 xm B nomp3y Monpum. Puapn tpex mpaBurebcTB
upusHair, aro Ilompma _owHKHAa NOWyIMTS CyuyecTBeHHOe Upupanjenne
TeppuTopuu Ha ceBepe M Ha B3amage. OnM cuMTaloT, YTO 110 BOMpocy 0
pasMepe 9TMX Upupalenuit B Hajmemamee BpemA OyyeT cupomreHo
MHeHMe HOBOrO IlompcKoro IlpasurenberBa HalmonambHoro Equnctsa
WM uTO, BCE, 3a TEM, OKOHUATEIbHOe ONpefemenue sallayqHow rpanulsl
Ilonpmu Gyfer orsomeHo 40 MupHO KOHpepentun.
Pravda, No. 38, February 13th, 1945.
199
126
The Big Three decide: Germany shall be dismembered
There was one decision taken at the Conference1, which was at first kept
secret. It read:
It was agreed that Article 12a of the Surrender Terms for Germany? should
be amended to read as follows:
“The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In
the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete
disarmament, demilitarisation and dismemberment of Germany as they deem
requisite for future peace and security.”
The study of the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany was referred
to a Committee, consisting of Mr. Eden (Chairman), Mr. Winant and Mr. Gousey.
This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French re-
presentative.
A decade of American foreign policy, pp. 29-30.
1 Contrary to other parts of the Yalta agreements, this decision was not published at
once. It was not made known until March 1947. The Russian text was not accessible.
2 Due to special circumstances this Article was not included later on in the surrender
terms. It nevertheless remains important because it shows the resolution of the Great
Powers at the Yalta Conference to split Germany up into several individual states.
200
XII
From Yalta to Potsdam

Le?
Bierut announces Polish administration of the German Eastern territories
Mr. Bierut, the President of the Polish National Council, made a declaration
concerning the German eastern territories already during the Yalta Con-
ference, on February Sth1. A newspaper report contains the following?:
Boleslaw Bierut disclosed tonight that the Polish provisional government ...
had already started incorporating pre-war German territory into Poland, carry-
ing out its program to extend Poland’s western frontiers to the Oder and Neisse
rivers.
“It is our feeling that on Polish soil there should be a Polish administration,
regardless of the opinions that may be expressed at the international con-
ference3,” Mr. Bierut said.4
The New York Times, February 6th, 1945.
128
The Lublin Government begins taking over the administration in East Prussia and
Silesia
The Economist, London, reported on February 10th:
The Lublin Government is busy extending its administrative authority to East

Prussia and Silesia. So far, no decision appears to have been taken on the future
administration of occupied Pomerania and Brandenburg, but the “Study Section”
of the Lublin Department for the Western Areas has now put out a plan claim-
ing a frontier 30 miles to the west of the Oder, so that the river may be a
waterway for Silesia. In any case, they add, all this territory is “old Slav land”.
The Economist, February 10th, 1945, p. 176.
1 It seems that this declaration did not come to the knowledge of the representatives of
the Western Powers at Yalta. Otherwise it ought to have caused a sensation.
2 Compare also the Reuter report reprinted in Keesings Archiv der Gegenwart (Keesing’s
Contemporary Archives, German ed.), 1945, p. 79. According to it Bierut announced
that “the ... Government would take over control of the civil administration of Silesia
and East Prussia without delay”.
3 Obviously the Yalta Conference is meant.
4 In the further course Bierut remarked that the partition of East Prussia was not yet
fixed in detail.
201
129
Churchill recommends compensation to the House of Commons
In the course of his report on the Yalta Conference Mr. Churchill also
discussed the Polish question in detail in the House of Commons on
February 27th, 1945.
I now come to the most difficult and agitating part of the statement which I
have to make to the House — the question of Poland. For more than a year past,
and since the tide of war has turned so strongly against Germany, the Polish
problem has been divided into two main issues — the frontiers of Poland and the
freedom of Poland.
The House is well aware from the speeches I have made to them that the
freedom, independence, integrity and sovereignty of Poland have always seemed
to His Majesty’s Government more important than the actual frontiers. To
establish a free Polish nation, with a good home to live in, has always far out-
weighed, in my mind, the actual tracing of the frontier line, or whether these
boundaries should be shifted on both sides of Poland further to the West. The
Russian claim, first advanced at Teheran in November, 1943, has always been
unchanged for the Curzon Line in the East, and the Russian offer has always
been that ample compensation should be gained for Poland at the expense of
Germany in the North and in the West. All these matters are tolerably well-
known now. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary explained in detail last
December the story of the Curzon Line. I have never concealed from the House
that, personally, I think the Russian claim is just and right. If I champion this
frontier for Russia, it is not because I bow to force. It is because I believe it is
the fairest division of territory that can in all the circumstances be made between
the two countries whose history has been so chequered and intermingled.
The Curzon Line was drawn in 1919 by an expert Commission, of which one of
our most distinguished foreign representatives of those days, Sir Eyre Crowe,
was a member. It was drawn at a time when Russia had few friends among the
Allies. In fact, I may say that she was extremely unpopular. One cannot feel that
either the circumstances or the personalities concerned would have given undue
favour to Soviet Russia. They just tried to find out what was the right and
proper line to draw. The British Government in those days approved this line
including, of course, the exclusion of Lvov from Poland!. Apart from all that has
happened since, I cannot conceive that we should not regard it as a well-informed
_ and fair proposal.
There are two things to be remembered in justice to our great Ally. I can look
back to August, 1914, when Germany first declared war against Russia under
the Tsar. In those days the Russian frontiers on the West were far more
spacious than those for which Russia is now asking after all her sufferings
1 Compare G. Rhode, Die Entstehung der Curzon-Linie (The Origin of the Curzon Line),
p. 81-92. In actual fact, the British delegation advocated the transfer of Lvov to the
Ukraine in 1919.
202
and victories. The Tsarist frontiers included all Finland and the whole of the
vast Warsaw salient stretching to within 60 miles of Breslau. Russia is, in
fact, accepting a frontier which over immense distances is 200 or 300 miles further
to the East than what was Russian territory and had been Russian territory for
many generations under the Tsarist regime. Marshal Stalin told me one day that
Lenin objected to the Curzon Line because Bialystok and the region round it
were taken from Russia. Marshal Stalin and the modern Soviet Government make
no such claim and freely agree with the view taken by the Allied Commission
of 1919 that the Bialystok region should go to Poland because of the Polish
population predominating there.
We speak of the Curzon Line. A line is not a frontier. A frontier has to be
surveyed and traced on the ground and not merely cut in on a map by a pencil
and ruler. When my right hon. Friend and I were at Moscow in October Marshal
Stalin made this point to me, and at that time he said that there might be
deviations of 8 to 10 kilometres in either direction in order to follow the courses
of streams and hills or the actual sites of particular villages. It seems to me that
this was an eminently sensible way of looking at the problem. However, when
we met at Yalta the Russian proposal was changed. It was made clear that all such
minor alterations would be at the expense of Russia and not at the expense of
Poland in order that the Poles might have their minds set at rest once and for all
and there would be no further discussion about that part of the business. We
welcomed this Soviet proposal.
One must regard these 30 years or more of strife, turmoil and suffering in
Europe as part of one story. I have lived through the whole story since 1911
when I was sent to the Admiralty to prepare the Fleet for an impending German
war. In its main essentials it seems to me to be one story of a 30 years’ war, or
more than a 30 years’ war, in which British, Russians, Americans and French have
struggled to their utmost to resist German aggression at a cost most grievous to
all of them, but to none more frightful than to the Russian people, whose
country has twice been ravaged! over vast areas and whose blood has been
poured out in tens of millions of lives in a common cause now reaching final
accomplishment.
There is a second reason which appeals to me apart from this sense of
continuity which I personally feel. But for the prodigious exertions and sacrifices
of Russia, Poland was doomed to utter destruction at the hands of the Germans.
Not only Poland as a State and as a nation, but the Poles as a race were doomed
by Hitler to be destroyed or reduced to a servile station. Three and a half
million Polish Jews are said to have been actually slaughtered. It is certain that
enormous numbers have perished in one of the most horrifying acts of cruelty,
probably the most horrifying act of cruelty, which has ever darkened the passage
of man on the earth. When the Germans had clearly avowed their intention of
1 The territory inhabited by the Russian people was not affected by hostilities during the
first World War. Only territory inhabited by Poles, Lithuanians, White Ruthenians and
Ukrainians was affected.
203
making the Poles a subject and lower grade race under the Herrenvolk, suddenly,
by a superb effort of military force and skill, the Russian Armies, in little more
than three weeks, since in fact we spoke on these matters here, have advanced
from the Vistula to the Oder, driving the Germans in ruin before them and free-
ing the whole of Poland from the awful cruelty and oppression under which
the Poles were writhing.
In supporting the Russian claim to the Curzon Line, I repudiate and repulse
any suggestion that we are making a questionable compromise or yielding to
force or fear, and I assert with the utmost conviction the broad justice of the
policy upon which, for the first time, all the three great Allies have now taken
their stand. Moreover, the three Powers have now agreed that Poland shall
receive substantial accessions of territory both in the North and in the West. In
the North she will certainly receive, in the place of a precarious Corridor, the
great city of Danzig, the greater part of East Prussia west and south of Koenigs-
berg and a long, wide sea front on the Baltic. In the West she will receive the
important industrial province of Upper Silesia and, in addition, such other terri-
tories to the East of the Oder as it may be decided at the peace settlement to
detach from Germany after the views of a broadly based Polish Government have
been ascertained.
Thus, it seems to me that this talk of cutting half of Poland off is very
misleading. In fact, the part which is to be East of the Curzon Line cannot in any
case be measured by its size. It includes the enormous, dismal region of the
Pripet Marshes, which Poland held between the two wars, and it exchanges for
that the far more fruitful and developed land in the West, from which a very
large portion of the German population has already departed. We need not fear
that the task of holding these new lines will be too heavy for Poland, or that it
will bring about another German revenge or that it will, to use a conventional
phrase, sow the seeds of future wars. We intend to take steps far more drastic
and effective than those which followed the last war, because we know much more
about this business, so as to render all offensive action by Germany utterly im-
possible for generations to come.
Finally, under the world organization all nations, great and small, victors and
vanquished will be secured against aggression by indisputable law and by over-
whelming international force. The published Crimea Agreement is not a ready-
made plan, imposed by the great Powers on the Polish people. It sets out the
agreed views of the three major Allies on the means whereby their common
desire to see established a strong, free, independent Poland may be fulfilled in
co-operation with the Poles themselves, and whereby a Polish Government which
all the United Nations can recognise, may be set up in Poland. This has become
for the first time a possibility now that practically the whole country has been
liberated by the Soviet Army. The fulfilment of the plan will depend upon
the willingness of all sections of democratic Polish opinion in Poland or abroad
to work together in giving it effect. The plan should be studied as a whole, and
with the main common objective always in view. The three Powers are agreed
204
that acceptance by the Poles of the provisions on the Eastern frontiers and, so
far as can now be ascertained, on the Western frontiers, is an essential condition
of the establishment and future welfare and security of a strong, independent,
homogeneous Polish State.
The proposals on frontiers are in complete accordance, as the House will
remember, with the views expressed by me in Parliament on behalf of His
Majesty’s Government many times during the past year. I ventured to make
pronouncements upon this subject at a time when a great measure of agreement
was not expressed by the other important parties to the affair. The Eastern
frontier must be settled now, if the new Polish administration is to be able to
carry on its work in its own territory, and to do this in amity with the Russians and
behind their fighting fronts. The Western frontiers, which will involve a sub-
stantial accession of German territory to Poland, cannot be fixed except as part
of the whole German settlement until after the Allies have occupied German
territory and after a fully representative Polish Government has been able to
make its wishes known. It would be a great mistake to press Poland to take a
larger portion of these lands than is considered by her and by her friends and
Allies to be within her compass to man, to develop, and, with the aid of the
Allies and the world organisation, to maintain.
I have now dealt with the frontiers of Poland. I must say I think it is a case
which I can outline with great confidence to the House. An impartial line traced
long ago by a British! commission in which Britain took a leading part; the
moderation with which the Russians have strictly confined themselves to that
line; the enormous sacrifices they have made and the sufferings they have under-
gone; the contributions they have made to our present victory; the great interest,
the vital interest, which Poland has in having complete agreement with her
powerful neighbour to the East — when you consider all those matters and the
way they have been put forward, the temperate, patient manner in which they
have been put forward and discussed, I say that I have rarely seen a case in this
House which I could commend with more confidence to the good sense of
Members of all sides.
But even more important than the frontiers of Poland, within the limits now
disclosed, is the freedom of Poland. The home of the Poles is settled. Are they
to be masters in their own house? Are they to be free, as we in Britain and
the United States or France are free? Are their sovereignty and their indepen-
dence to be untrammelled, or are they to become a mere projection of the Soviet
State, forced against their will by an armed minority, to adopt a Communist or
totalitarian system? Well, I am putting the case in all its bluntness. It is a
touchstone far more sensitive and vital than the drawing of frontier lines. Where
does Poland stand? Where do we all stand on this?
Most solemn declarations have been made by Marshal Stalin and the Soviet
Union that the sovereign independence of Poland is to be maintained, and this
decision is now joined in both by Great Britain and the United States. Here also,
1 Obviously a slip of the tongue. Surely, it should be: Allied.
205
the world organisation will in due course assume a measure of responsibility. The
Poles will have their future in their own hands, with the single limitation that
they must honestly follow, in harmony with their Allies, a policy friendly to
Russia. That is surely reasonable...
130
Differences of opinion arise in the House of Commons concerning the Polish

frontiers
A long debate followed Mr.Churchill’s report.in the House of Commons:
Mr. Arthur Greenwood! (Wakefield): ...I follow the arguments of my right

hon. Friend with regard to territorial readjustment.
I agree that what is far more important is the preservation of a free, indepen-
dent, sovereign Poland in the fullest sense of the term. As I have said, it is not
the size of the body, it is the quality of the body that matters, and that is so in
the case of Poland. I do not wish to exacerbate a situation which has already
become somewhat acute, but I would point out to the House, that it is foreign
to the principles of British justice that the fate of a nation should be decided in
its absence and behind its back. I do not regard the territorial problem as vital,
but the other problem is vital — that there should be in the East of Europe the
living beacon of Poland free and independent, as a warning note to any future
aggressive Germany.
Lord Dunglass? (Lanark): ... The position in post-war Europe will be a state
of great power and great weakness side by side, and that does not lead to
stability. One reason why there is world concern over the differences between
Russia and Poland, is because it is the first case, a test case, in the relationship
between a Great Power wielding great military might, and her smaller and weaker
neighbour.
This House is familiar with our obligations to Poland. What are the instruments
which govern our relationships to Russia? First, there is the Atlantic Charter,
which is not as ethereal as some people would have us believe. ... Certain
questions, therefore, ought to be posed and have to be answered to see whether
this agreement can, in fact, come within the framework of the Atlantic Charter.
What about territorial questions, and what about territorial settlements, the
question of the Curzon Line, and the strict limitation of modifications in
1 Labour.
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206
Poland’s favour? Does the treaty conform to that section of the Atlantic Charter
which reads:
“The High Contracting Parties desire to see no territorial changes that do
not conform with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned?”
I turn, therefore, to the second instrument which regulates our relations with
Russia, the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1942. If I might interpret the word “treaty” to
the Prime Minister it would be that a treaty “is a rule and not a guide”. Perhaps the
House will allow me to read Article 5:
“The High Contracting Parties agree to act according to the principles
of not seeking territorial aggrandizement for themselves, and of non-inter-
ference in the internal affairs of other States.”
Sir William Beveridge! (Berwick-upon-Tweed): ... If we accept the Curzon Line
now on the ground that it is really justice, it leaves no real ground for compen-
sation for the Poles on the West or elsewhere. In spite of that difficulty,
I, personally, would also support the proposal to make East Prussia and Danzig
Polish and to remove the German population from those regions. I support that
not on the ground of compensation for Poland for taking away from her some-
thing she should never have had, but on the practical ground of giving to Poland
a compact territory inhabited by Poles only, of giving her an adequate sea-board,
and of making room for those Poles who find themselves beyond the Eastern
boundary under Soviet rule and wish to move into Poland. They ought to be
able to do so on terms of ample compensation. The giving of Danzig and East
Prussia to the Poles and taking them away from Germany is also an act of politic
justice. Is it not the origin and occasion of war? After all, what was the German
objection to the Polish Corridor? It was the ridiculous objection that Germans
could not go to another part of Germany by sea and that therefore Poland must be
cut off from sea. For a country which was claiming Colonies to object that they
were required to travel by sea to East Prussia, was ridiculous. I suggest that they
should in future be saved from that necessity. By the cutting off of East Prussia
we could make the source of this quarrel into a monument and symbol of their
defeat.
It may be said that these territorial adjustments conflict with the Atlantic
Charter. I do not think that they really do. The Atlantic Charter implies that no
peoples should be required to live in a State, in which they do not wish to live.
We cannot say that the Atlantic Charter rules out the kind of territorial readjust-
ments, with transfer of population, which is proposed here. I am afraid that
I cannot accept all the arguments which the Prime Minister gave in support of his
proposals as to Poland. I need not emphasize the differences except to say that
the fact that Russia has liberated any part of Poland is not any reason why she
should have any part of it. Nor is the fact that in Tsarist times Russia possessed
1 Liberal.
207
Finland any reason for giving her all she wants now. We must base our decision
as to the Eastern boundary of Poland on the justice which we tried to do after the
last war but which we were not strong enough to do. I do not feel happy about
the suggestion that Poland should be encouraged to extend Westwards into
territories which are now German and which presumably will still be occupied
by Germans. It is not necessary for the purpose of giving the Poles a proper
homeland. The Prime Minister committed himself — I do not know whether he
meant to commit the House — to certain changes in Upper Silesia. They are not
in the White Paper. The Crimea Conference decided only that these things would
be settled at the peace conference. I hope that they will be left to the Peace
Conference and that there the dominant consideration will be that of making a
lasting peace.
Mr. Pritt! (Hammersmith, North):...I want to say a few words about the
speech of the hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir W. Beveridge). I hope
he will forgive me for saying that the view that he ought really to be a member
of the Labour Party rather than of the Liberal Party is shown by his speech to
have been quite wrong. That speech was unconsciously a very dangerous one. I do
not wish to embark on criticism of it in general. I wish merely to take a few
points in it. He said: “Do not let Poland expand Westwards into Germany.
Compensation is a wrong basis on which to deal with these matters, and it is not
just.” I rather agree — I do not think much of compensation as such, and never
did. But we must have a strong Poland, and a strong Poland is sufficiently near to
the bone, so to speak, to come within the category of things to which almost
anything must be sacrificed in order to secure the peace of Europe. If we asked
Poland to base the economy of the nation on anything like the population
between the old Western frontier and the new Eastern frontier there would not
really be a strong Poland, even giving her Lvoy.
What are the objections to her expansion Westwards? There will be an ethno-
logical objection. But a great deal of the population of the territory which is
proposed to be taken from Germany is at any rate very substantially Polish, and
for my part I regard the wholesale exchange of populations, if necessary, as
something infinitely less serious and grievous than the risk of Europe becoming
a battlefield again. I would say: “Most certainly move the German population,”
though, I think, as the Prime Minister pointed out, a good deal has already
moved out. East Prussia can strengthen Poland at the expense of Germany.
Mr. Price? (Forest of Dean):...I am glad that the Conference agreed to leave
the question of the Western frontiers of Poland to be decided in detail at a later
date. I think that is wise, because on that matter I am not altogether too happy.
It seems as if Russia is rather anxious to induce the Poles to accept a wide ex-
1 Society.
2 Labour.
208
tension of territory in the West. I think the Poles have the right to say those
famous words, Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes — “I fear the Greeks even when
they bring gifts” —
Mr. Silverman! (Nelson and Colne): Is my hon. Friend quiete satisfied that this
proposal for compensation really emanated from Russia?
Mr. Price: It is quite clear from the Russian Press that Russia is very much in
favour of this, but if my hon. Friend knows something else perhaps he will inform
the House if he is called in the Debate. In any case, it may be sowing dragons’
teeth to extend the Polish frontier to Pomerania and the Mark of Brandenburg.
It is about as unreal as claiming that the Polish frontier should be in what is
clearly non-Polish territory in the East.
Moreover, I do not see why Poland should be compensated for something which
she had no right to possess. There is no large or even small Slav population in
Pomerania or the Mark of Brandenburg. I know that in the Spreewald, near
Berlin, there are small colonies of people who once were called “Wends”,
originally Slavonic people. But the whole country is predominantly German miles
beyond the Oder, until you get to the neighbourhood of Posen. Therefore,
I am sure we should create fresh difficulties by expelling the population in what is
purely a German territory. I am glad that the Conference did not decide to fix
anything definite in that direction, but, on the other hand, I agree with those
who have expressed the view that East Prussia is an entirely different question.
First of all, there is a large Polish minority there. Moreover, East Prussia has
been regarded by Germany as a colony from which she drew unprocessed raw
material and to which she sent, in return, manufactured goods. Further, that
unprocessed raw material was produced in the main, not by German labour at
all, but by thousands of Polish natives who crossed the frontier and worked on
the Yunkers’ estates. The finances of East Prussia were entirely dependent upon
those of the Reich. The whole basis of East Prussia was thoroughly unsound
economically and even more so now that half the population as it is reported has
gone.
The second point was that not only was it an uneconomic colony, but it was
the military bastion which was built up as a dagger to strike at the heart of
Poland. While it might be thought very unwise to extend the frontiers of Poland
right away into the West, into what was German territory, that objection does
not apply in the case of East Prussia, and any decision taken by the Allies in this
connection was a right one. If the Powers continue to work along the lines fore-
shadowed at the Crimea Conference, I feel that all will be well.
Colonel Sir A. Lambert Ward? (Kingston-upon-Hull, North West): ...It

seems to me that the whole of East Prussia, including Kénigsberg, should be
transferred to Poland. If we want future peace it would be advisable to have,
1 Labour.
2 Conservative.
209
one might almost say wholesale transfers of population between Poland and
East Prussia.
Captain Thorneycroft! (Stafford):...The Government had two choices only.

They could have postponed this issue. ... They could have said, “No, we want
this submitted to arbitration. We cannot do anything without the consent of the
London Polish Government.” No one knows what would happen in those cir-
cumstances, but one can safely say that it is unlikely that there would in any
circumstances be a free, independent and democratic Poland. ...
The second course that they could adopt was to make the best settlement they
could and impose it deliberately on the Poles. They have done that. They have
bargained the Eastern frontier for the chance of a free Government of Poland
within the new frontier. ...It seems to me that our policy in the past was
mistaken. Up to date what we have done is this. We have encouraged the London
Polish Government to negotiate, and have criticized them because they did not
negotiate very well. We have told them they must make concessions, and then
we have blamed them because they did not make concessions. I do not regard
that as a sensible or an honourable course. I do not believe you can ask a Pole
to decide to hand over a half of his country. I do not think it is a fair thing to
ask any Pole to do. If they agreed to do that, they would divide Poland for a
generation, perhaps for all time, into those who thought they were patriots and
those who thought they were traitors. That is to perpetuate civil war. Nor could
you ask the Poles as an act of policy to take a large slice of their powerful neigh-
bouring State. It is a big decision to take from Germany the whole of East
Prussia or the land up to the Oder. It is like taking Wales from England. That is
a decision which must be taken by more powerful States. I do not believe that
you save your honour in this matter by imposing on others the obligation of
making a decision which you ought to make yourself.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Eden): ... I have explained
before, and I am not going over it again, the basis on which the Curzon Line
was delimited, but this at least can be accepted by everybody, whatever else we
dispute — that east of the Curzon Line there are no areas where the Poles are in
the majority except the two cities of Vilna and Lvoy, which, in their turn, are
surrounded by large non-Polish areas. ...I would put this to my hon. Friends.
Are they absolutely convinced that the structure of the Polish State is strengthen-
ed by the inclusion of large, or considerable, non-Polish elements in it? I wonder.
Mr. A. Bevan? (Ebby Vale): On the West, too?
Mr. Eden: The assumption in regard to the West is that the populations shall
be removed. That is the whole basis. In most cases, I can tell the hon. Gentleman,
they have gone already. But let me deal with this matter — I am sorry the hon.
1 Conservative.
2 Labour.
210
Gentleman has put me off my stroke — about the minorities in the Polish State.
I should have said that there were two weaknesses in the Polish State, as it
existed before the war. One was these very considerable minority elements, who
came frequently and made their complaints before the International Tribunal
at Geneva, and the other was the Corridor. ...
May I ask them this? Which Poland would be stronger — the Poland with Vilna
and the Corridor as it was, or a Poland without Vilna and without the Corridor?
I have not the slightest doubt, nor, I believe, has any student of international
affairs the slightest doubt, which Poland would be the stronger. I am going to
say a word or two about this Corridor business. I made one reference to it before,
but, if the House will allow me, I am going into it a little deeper, because I had
to handle this myself year after year at Geneva, when the unfortunate British
representative on the Council was Rapporteur for Danzig. I promise the House
that I never chose the job; I inherited it, and it was the most thankless task that
ever fell to the lot of man, because, at every single meeting, we were faced with
these issues, demands, charges and counter-charges between Poles and Germans.
I think the only other person who had this experience to the same extent is the
present Lord Chancellor. We were never able to obtain a solution of real value,
because no solution was possible as long as the Corridor existed.
I remember one occasion — it will probably be fresh in the minds of many hon,
Members — when the German representative had behaved in a particularly in-
sulting manner to the Council. After he had withdrawn, I thought it my duty to
say to the Council, in private, of course, the Press having withdrawn, that, in
view of his behaviour, we ought to know whether the Polish Government would
take action in the event of a German infraction by violence of the Free City,
for which we were responsible. I put that question, and the Polish answer was
“Yes”. I mention that only to show that it would be a cardinal sin on our part
to perpetuate that state of affairs. I have been engaged in these last years in this
Polish-Russian dispute, and, for what my own judgment is worth, I have come
to the decision that there are two alternatives. Either you must deprive Poland
of all outlet to the sea, or East Prussia must cease to be German and the Corridor
must go. Of these two alternatives, I unhesitatingly command the second to the
House; but do not let anybody say that that is not something of importance for
the Poland of the future, and do not let people merely say “You are taking half
Poland away” without putting into the balance what this means.
I turn to another aspect. It is not only the question of what the elimination
of the Corridor means. The House must also put into the balance the position of
Oppeln Silesia, which we are all agreed should go to Poland, and which is a
territory of great value industrially. Poland tried hard to get it after the last
peace settlement, but her claim was rejected. That must be put into the balance,
too. I believe that, when a settlement is finally reached — and here let me say
again that what we have expressed is our view of what a settlement should be
with our Ally, a settlement which we would wish to discuss with the new Polish
Government when it is created — I believe it may still be found — and I say this
211
with respect to some of my hon. Friends — that the new Poland when so con-
stituted, will be as strong as, or stronger than the Poland that existed in 1939.
That depends, of course, on how the agreement is carried out.
The Deputy Prime Minister (Mr. Attlee): . . You have to recognize fairly
and squarely that this terrible thing which has come upon Europe is the respon-
sibility of the German leaders and of the German people — and I am afraid that
there are a great many who accepted those ideals. They have broken down the
old barriers, and therefore I say that they cannot appeal to the old Europe. If
they have to yield, to make restitution, they are not entitled to appeal on the
basis of the moral laws that they have disregarded or the pity and mercy that
they have never extended to any others. I do not believe in treating them as
they have treated other people, but I cannot admit that they have a claim to
appeal to rights and moral principles which they have utterly disregarded.
Therefore, if it is necessary to take some German soil, to make it up to the
entirely innocent Dutch people who have seen their land destroyed, I shall not
complain; if it is found necessary to take certain areas in order to enable the
Polish people to lead a free, full life, I shall not complain — and I do not think
that the Germans have a right to complain. I shall judge all these changes, not
by whether they fit into past history or whether they are performing an act of
revenge, but entirely as to whether they will make a peaceful Europe in future.
The shifting of population at the present time may be very, very painful, but it
may be far better than a long drawn out sore of populations under peoples whom
they hate. It may be that a single adjustment wil! be better. It is therefore
precisely here that, I think, we can see the importance of the conclusions of the
Crimea Conference.
Mr. Rhys Davies? (Westhoughton): ... Let me now turn to the Western side
of Poland; this is the one thing that puzzles me in the Crimea Declaration. If it is
the policy of the Allied Powers to hand over Danzig and East Prussia and other
patches of Germany to Poland, to establih a new State by giving patches of Poland
to Russia on the other side, do they imagine for a moment that they are likely
to establish a durable peace in Europe? If they think that they cannot really be
called three big men, we might as well christen them three blind mice instead.
Does my right hon. Friend and his colleagues imagine for one moment that
millions of Germans will live in peace under the control of the Poles? My right
hon. Friend shakes his head. I know his answer, it is that the Germans have left
those territories already; have evacuated them. Supposing the people of Wales
and Scotland were compulsorily evacuated to England and left their schools,
institutions and the graves of their people behind them, does my right hon.
1 Labour.
2 Labour.
212
Friend imagine that they would be satisfied and would not desire to return to
their native country? That is human nature.
Mr. G. Strauss (Lambeth, North): ... According to the Prime Minister some
parts of Germany, certainly Upper Silesia, are to go to Poland. I hope the Govern-
ment will hesitate before it finally gives its approval to a proposal of this sort,
which can hold out no advantage to anybody but may be exceedingly harmful
to the general prospects of a lasting European peace. On what ground is such a
proposal put forward? That it is going to be some compensation to Poland. But
the whole justification for the Curzon Line is that it was agreed in 1919 at
Versailles. Not only was the Curzon Line, but also Poland’s Western boundary
was agreed at Versailles. If one is fair to Poland, so, presumably, is the other.
Finally, I put this: It is surely unworthy to put forward the argument which
the Prime Minister advanced, that we can uproot populations and carry out
punitive measures because Germany is to be rendered powerless for many genera-
tions, and therefore she will be powerless to revenge herself — in other words,
we are free to commit an injustice because we can do it with impunity. Any
realistic study of the problem will show that a policy of large-scale dismembering
or splitting up of Germany must have harmful, and possibly disastrous effects
on a lasting European peace settlement.
Mr. Pethik-Lawrence! (Edinburgh, East): ...It is essential to settle at the

Peace Conference not merely what seems just at the present time but what will
appear just 20 years hence, and this applies in particular to the frontiers of Ger-
many herself. For that reason I was very glad to read in the Yalta Agreement, and
to hear the remarks of the Prime Minister, about the Eastern frontier of Germany
towards the mouth of the Oder. I think it would have been disastrous if the
Eastern frontier of Germany had been fixed along the Oder all the way to the
sea in advance of the peace settlement. I do not think that could have promoted
the peace of the world and, as I understand it, it is not desired by the Poles. The
inclusion of great tracts of Pomerania in the Polish Republic would be fraught
with grave danger to the security of Poland and to the peace of Europe and the
world, and I do not think that the British people in 10 or 20 years’ time would
go to war in order to enforce that settlement.
1457-1458, 1500-1502, 1616-1660.
1 Labour.
131
Roosevelt describes the agreement on Poland as a fair compromise
President Roosevelt reporting to the US Congress on the Yalta Conference

on March 1st, 1945, said inter alia:
One outstanding example of joint action by the three major Allied Powers was
the solution reached on Poland. The whole Polish question was a potential source
of trouble in post-war Europe, and we came to the conference determined to find
a common ground for its solution. We did. We know everybody does not agree
with it — obviously.
Our objective was to help create a strong, independent, and prosperous nation
— that is the thing we must all remember — those words agreed to by Russia, by
Britain and by me. The objective of making Poland a strong, independent, and
prosperous nation with a government ultimately to be selected by the Polish
people themselves.
To achieve this objective, it was necessary to provide for the formation of a
new government much more representative than had been possible while Poland
was enslaved. There are, you know, two governments; one in London, one in
Lublin, practically in Russia.
Accordingly, steps were taken at Yalta to reorganize the existing provisional
government in Poland on a broader democratic basis, so as to include democratic
leaders now in Poland and those abroad. This new, reorganized government will
be recognized by all of us as the temporary government of Poland. Poland needs
a temporary government in the worst way — an interim government is another
way to put it. However, the new Polish Provisional Government of National
Unity will be pledged to holding a free election as soon as possible on the basis
of universal suffrage and a secret ballot.
Throughout history, Poland has been the corridor through which attacks on
Russia have been made. Twice in this generation, Germany has struck at Russia
through this corridor. To insure European security and world peace, a strong
and independent Poland is necessary to prevent that from happening again?.
The decisions with respect to the boundaries of Poland were frankly a com-
promise. I did not agree with all of it by any means. But we did not go as far as
Britain wanted in certain areas; we did not go as far as Russia wanted in certain
areas; and we did not go as far as I wanted in certain areas. It was a compromise.
While the decision is a compromise it is one, however, under which the Poles
will receive compensation in territory in the North and West in exchange for
what they lose by the Curzon Line in the East. The limits of the Western border
will be permanently fixed in the final Peace Conference. Roughly, this will include
in the new, strong Poland quite a large slice of what is now called Germany. It
* The “Lublin” Government had in fact been in Warsaw already since the end of January,
yet the name stuck to it.
® Roosevelt repeats Stalin’s argumentation in Yalta almost literally. In this connection see
p. 183 and note 2 there.
214
was agreed also that the new Poland will have a large long coast line and many
new harbors; also that East Prussia — most of it — will go to Poland. A corner of it
will go to Russia; also — what shall I call it — the anomaly of the Free State of
Danzig — I think Danzig would be a lot better if it were Polish.
It is well known that the people east of the Curzon Line — this is an example
of why it is a compromise — the people east of the Curzon Line are predominantly
White Russians and Ukrainians — a very great majority — not Polish; and the
people west of that line are predominantly Polish, except in that part of East
Prussia and Eastern Germany which would go to the new Poland. As far back
as 1919, representatives of the Allies agreed that the Curzon Line represented a
fair boundary between the two peoples. You must remember also that there was
no Poland or had not been any Polish Government before 1919 for a great many
generations.
I am convinced that this agreement on Poland, under the circumstances, is the
most hopeful agreement possible for a free, independent, and prosperous Polish
State.
Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 91, part 2, pp. 1621-1622.
131a
Roosevelt is seriously worried by the difficulties encountered in forming a new

Polish Government
The hopes of the Western Powers that the planned readjustment of the
Polish frontiers would induce the Soviet Government to dispense with a
communist régime in Poland were not fulfilled. The three-man commission
appointed at Yalta could not come to an agreement about the persons to
be invited to Moscow for discussions about the forming of a new Polish
Government. The incisive differences in the views taken regarding the
decisions of Yalta which manifested themselves in this connection led to
new disputes between the Heads of the Governments. Roosevelt therefore
sent a message to Stalin on the 29th March, as follows?:
I cannot conceal from you the concern with which I view the development of
mutual interest since our fruitful meeting at Yalta. The decisions we reached
there were good ones, and have for the most part been welcomed with enthusiasm
by the peoples of the world, who saw in your ability to find a common basis of
understanding the best pledge for a secure and peaceful world after this war.
Precisely because of the hopes and expectations that decisions raised, their
fulfilment is being followed with the closest attention. We have no right to let
them be disappointed. So far there has been a discouraging lack of progress made
in the carrying out, which the world expects, of the political decisions which we
reached at the Conference, particularly those relating to the Polish question.
1 Molotov, Harriman and Clark Kerr. See No. 125, p. 198. } bat
2 The Russian text of this message is contained in Perepiska Predsedatelja Soveta Ministrov
etc., vol. 2, No. 284, pp. 200-202.
215
f
‘
I am frankly puzzled as to why this should be, and must tell you that I do not
fully understand in many respects the apparent indifferent attitude of your
Government. Having understood each other so well at Yalta, I am convinced that
the three of us can and will clear away any obstacles which have developed since
then. I intend therefore in this message to lay before you with complete frankness
the problem as I see it.
However, the part of your agreement at Yalta which has aroused the greatest
popular interest and is the most urgent relates to the Polish question. You are
aware of course that the Commission which we set up has made no progress. I feel
this is due to the interpretation which your Government is placing upon the
Crimean decisions. In order that there shall be no misunderstanding I set forth
below my interpretation of the points of the agreement which are pertinent to the
difficulties encountered by the Commission in Moscow. *
In the discussions that have taken place so far your Government appears to take
the position that the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity which
we agreed should be formed should be little more than a continuation of the
present Warsaw Government. I cannot reconcile this either with our agreement
or our discussions. While it is true that the Lublin Government is to be re-
organised and its members play a prominent rdle, it is to be done in such a fashion
as to bring into being a new Government. This point is clearly brought out in
several places in the text of the agreement. I must make it quite plain to you that
any such solution which would result in a thinly disguised continuance of the
present Warsaw régime would be unacceptable and would cause the people of the
United States to regard the Yalta agreement as having failed. It is equally apparent
that for the same reason the Warsaw Government cannot under the agreement
claim the right to select or reject what Poles are to be brought to Moscow by the
Commission for consultation. Can we not agree that it is up to the Commission to
select the Polish leaders to come to Moscow to consult in the first instance and
invitations be sent out accordingly?
In the following part of his dispatch Roosevelt objected to the claims of the
Warsaw régime to select in fact alone the Polish leaders for the Moscow
Conference and made propositions to make the negotiations more fruitful.
Closing his letter he expressed once again his sorrows:
I wish I could convey to you how important it is for the successful development
of our programme of international collaboration that this Polish question be settled
fairly and speedily. If this is not done all of the difficulties and dangers to Allied
unity which we had so much in mind in reaching our decision at the Crimea will
face us in an even more acute form.
W. Churchill, The second world war, vol. VI, pp. 633-635, and Stalin’s correspondence,
etc., vol. 2, No. 284, pp. 201-204.
* Churchill, who was acquainted with the text of the letter, simultaneously despatched a
letter to Stalin, in which he dealt specifically with the details of the Moscow negotiations,
216
131b
Stalin insists on his point of view
Stalin replied to Roosevelt’s message on April 7 th, and laid all the blame
on the attitude taken by the British and American Ambassadors. In his
opinion the Warsaw régime was to be merely “reconstructed”. He wrote
inter alia’:
c) Cosetcroe IIpaswremberBo ucxopMT 43 TOPO, ITO 10 CMEICITY pemenuit

Kprimcrolt kondepeHuun Ha KOHCYJIbTANUM OIVKHEI IPUPTAWATeA TAakUe
TONbCKME JeATeIM, KOTOPHe, BO-IepBLIX, UpusHaroT pemenua HprmcKott
KOHMepenuuM, B TOM duce M pemlenue O WHHuM Kepsona, u, BO-BTOpEIX,
CTpeMATCA Ha J[ee YCTAHOBNT J[py*KeCTBeHHbIe OTHOIMeCHUA MeMRTYy
Iloupmeii u Coserckum Corosom. Cozercxoe IIpasutrenncrso HactamBaer
Ha 9TOM, TaK Kak OOMISHO NpOMMTAaA KPOBb COBeETCKUX BOMCK [WIA OCBO-
Sompenna Toupmm u ror paxt, yo B TeyeHMe MocseqHUx 30 ner Teppu-
Topud [loupmm Ona ABarKbI UCMOUb30BaHa BparoM JIA HalllecTBMA Ha
Poccuto, — Bce 9TO oba3nIBaet CosercrKoe IIpaspurempcrBo qoOuBaTBCA
TOrO, 4YTOOH OTHOMIeHUA Meryzy Coserckum Co1o3s0m um Ilompmeit Oni
Tpy?KeCTBeHHETe.
Tlocar sxe CHITA mw Aura B Mocxse He cuntaircs C 9TUM UM OOuBaIOTCA
TOPO, aTOOBL UpursmamarTb JA KOHCYILTAUMM MONECKUX jeATeTel
He3aBUCMMO OT MX OTHOMeHUA K pemleHuAM HpsimcKoi KOHdepeHuuM
uw K CospetcKomy Cory. ...
Uroont BETH u3 TyNuKa WM OOMTLCA CormacoBaHHOTO pelleHua,
HeOOXOQMMO, NOMOeMy, IpeAMpPMHATH csleqylomue warn:
1) YcranosuTb, aro pexonctpyKyuA Bpemennoro [lonmpcxoro IIpasn-
TeILCTBA O3HAGACT He CTO JIMKBUAlM10, A UMCHHO efO PCKOHCTPYKIMIO
IyTeM ero pactiMpeHuA, Upudem Aqpom Oygymero IlompcKoro IIpasu-
TembeTBa Hanmonanbyoro EquucrTsBa fomKHO O1ITh Bpemennoe [lompcKoe
IIpasuresEcTBo.
Perepiska Predsedatelja Soveta Ministrov, vol. 2, No. 289, pp. 209-211.
Translation?
(c) The Soviet Government is of the opinion that, in accordance with the spirit of
the Crimea decisions, such Polish politicians should be invited for consultation as,
primarily, recognize the decisions of the Crimea Conference, including the decision
regarding the Curzon Line, and, secondly, do in actual fact endeavour to create
friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government
insists on this because the blood of Soviet soldiers shed so abundantly for the
and among other things he regretted that the permission given to members of the British
Embassy to visit Poland had been withdrawn again. Perepiska etc., vol. 1, No. 416,
pp. 313-315, Stalin’s correspondence with Churchill etc., vol. 2, No. 416, pp. 309-310.
1 Churchill gives a summary of Stalin’s message in: “The second world war”, vol. 6,
p. 384.
2 cf. Stalin’s correspondence with Churchill etc., vol. 2, No. 289, pp. 211-213.
217
¢
ye
—
liberation of Poland, and the fact that Polish territory has been used twice within
the last 30 years by the enemy for invading Russia, oblige the Soviet Government
to ensure friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Poland.
The Ambassadors of the United States of America and Great Britain in Moscow,
however, do not take this into account, and want to invite Polish leaders for
consultation irrespective of their attitude to the Crimea decisions and the Soviet
Union.
In my opinion the following steps are necessary to break the deadlock and to
reach an agreed decision:
(1) It must be laid down that the reconstruction of the Provisional Polish Govern-
ment does not mean its liquidation, but merely its reconstruction by way of enlarge-
ment, and that the Provisional Government should form the core of the future
Polish Government of National Unity.
132
The United States refuse to be faced with accomplished facts in the matter of the
German-Polish border
At the beginning of April 1945 the State Department reacted for the first
time to the unauthorized actions of the Polish authorities in the German
Eastern territories. A. Bliss Lane, the American Ambassador, reports:
The Department of State, however, evidently felt that the Soviet Government
had exceeded its prerogatives. On April 8, 1945, it notified that government,
through the American Embassy in Moscow, that it had received several press
and radio reports, attributed to responsible officials of the Provisional Govern-
ment functioning in Warsaw, to the effect that certain Soviet-occupied territory,
including the Free City of Danzig, had been formally incorporated into Poland.
The Department requested to be informed regarding the actual status of the
territory in question.
The Soviet Government replied on April 17 that the departure of the German
population in the wake of retreating German troops had left behind only a Polish
population, for the government of which a Polish civil administration had been
set up locally. The note asserted however that this action had no relation to
the question of boundaries.
The reply of the United States Government, dated May 8th, expressed its failure
to understand the statement that the establishment of the Polish civil adminis-
trations set up in these territories had no relation to the question of the future
boundaries of Poland; the impression was created by this and other statements
made by the Soviet Government that the territories remained effectively under
Soviet military occupation, but that the local administration was set up only as a
matter of convenience to indigenous Polish officials who were in no way the
agents of, or responsible to, the Provisional Government functioning in Warsaw.
The United States Government added that it was unable to reconcile the Soviet
218
MEAT
TINNA IM PeaANN 2} AT Si ay 4 y Yel t 8
Government’s assertion with the numerous reports and public statements to the
effect that the Warsaw Government had formally decreed the incorporation into
the Polish state system of the territories in question, besides appointing Poles
from within Poland to govern such enemy territory as integral parts of Poland.
The note stated further that reports from Poland, ascribed to official sources
there, indicated that the Warsaw Government was (1) establishing its complete
state apparatus and enforcing its laws in those areas, (2) already engaging in a
large-scale transferof Poles from other areas to these enemy territories, and (3)
planning to extend the administration over additional enemy territory under
Soviet military occupation. The reports from Warsaw had declared that these
and similar acts attributed to the Polish Government then functioning in Warsaw
had been effected with the full knowledge and approval of the Soviet occupation
authorities.
The United States Government concluded, therefore, that changes such as those
mentioned in the status of occupied territories, based on unilateral action without
prior consultation and agreement among the United Nations concerned, disre-
garded the principles underlying the agreements for the control and occupation
of Germany. It emphasized that the territories in question and all other Soviet-
occupied enemy territory must remain under Soviet military occupation pending
agreement, after full and complete consultation and deliberation among the Allied
powers concerned. In delivering this note, our chargé d’affaires at Moscow, Mr.
George F. Kennan (in accordance with the instructions he had received from
Washington), stated to the Soviet Government that the United States Government
would recognize the western frontier of Poland when delimited in accordance
with the applicable decisions of the Yalta Conference, but that we insisted
meanwhile no transfer of any Soviet-occupied territory be made to the govern-
ment then functioning in Warsaw.
The Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Vishinsky, replied on May 16
only with respect to the establishment of a Polish civil administration at Danzig.
Mr. Vishinsky said that it was quite natural that the Polish civil administration,
acting under the direction of the Polish Provisional Government, was functioning
according to Polish law. He denied that this condition could be considered as
disregarding the principles on which were based the agreements for the control
and occupation of Germany. He added that as it was recognized by the Yalta
decision that Poland must receive substantial additional territory in the North
and West, the possibility of a Polish administration functioning in this territory
not only was not excluded but was presupposed. He emphasized as self-evident
that, as envisaged in the Yalta decision, the final determination of Poland’s
western boundary would be made at the peace settlement.
A. Bliss Lane, I saw Poland betrayed. New York 1948, pp. 256-258.
219
132a
No agreement is reached about the implementation of the Yalta decisions

Despite the accommodating attitude of Churchill and Truman, the further
exchange of Notes: between the Heads of the Governments did not lead to
any agreement and was broken off without result after the last reply of
Stalin on May 4th2. On April 29th Churchill had sent a detailed message
to Stalin, worded as follows:
_,.. Lhave been much distressed at the misunderstanding that has grown up be-
tween us on the Crimea agreement about Poland. I certainly went to Yalta with
the hope that both the London and Lublin Polish Governments would be swept
away and that a new government would be formed from among Poles of good-
will, among whom members of Mr. Bierut’s government would be prominent. But
you did not like this plan, and we and the Americans agreed therefore, that there
was to be no sweeping away of the Bierut Government, but that instead it should
become a “new” government...
2. The Commission then would have to set to work to select Poles who were to
come for the consultations. We tried in each case to find representative men, and
in this we were careful to exclude what we thought were extreme people un-
friendly to Russia. We did not select for our list anyone at present in the London
Polish Government, but the three good men, namely M. Mikolajezyk, M. Stanezyk
and M. Grabski, who went into opposition to the London Polish Government’,
because they did not like its attitude towards Russia, and in particular its refusal
to accept the eastern frontier which you and I agreed upon, now so long ago, and
which I was the first man outside the Soviet Government to proclaim to the
world as just and fair, together with compensation in the West and North.
3. Our names for these from inside and outside Poland were put forward in the
1 cf. Nos. 131a und 131b. Churchill answered Stalin’s Note of April 7th jointly with
President Truman (who had taken the place of the deceased President Roosevelt) on
April 17th, and in addition Truman sent a Note to Stalin on April 23rd. Stalin replied
to the Heads of the Governments on April 24th, to which Churchill replied on April 29th
in the letter of which excerpts are given above. See Perepiska etc., vol. 1, No. 430, pp.
328-330, No. 439, pp. 334-336, No. 450, pp. 343-349, No. 456, pp. 352-353, vol. 2, No.
293, pp. 213-214, No. 297, pp. 216-217, No. 298, pp. 217-218, No. 308, pp. 223-225,
Stalin’s correspondence etc., vol. 1, pp. 324-326, 330-331, 338-344, 346-348, vol. 2, pp.
215-217, 218-219, 219-220, 225-227. Compare also W. Churchill, The second world war,
vol. 6, pp. 379-385 and pp. 424-437. Also H. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 1, pp. 15, 38-39.
(The dates often vary by one day.)
2 It was only Harry Hopkins, confidant of Roosevelt, sent to Moscow as a Special Envoy
by President Truman, who finally succeeded in effecting a compromise on June 1st, 1945,
but this in fact represented a near approach to the Soviet point of view. The Government
of National Unity, formed on June 28th, contained 12 Ministers (out of 21 Ministers)
who already belonged to the Provisional Government, and three others who belonged to
the Communist PPR. Only three of the new Ministers came from London Exile, but one
of them did not take up office.
3 In reality none of the three were members of the London Government, which was headed
by Tomasz Arciszewski since November 29th, 1944. Churchill probably meant “belonged
to Government circles”.
220
same spirit of helpfulness by the Americans and ourselves. The first thing the
British complained of is that after nine weeks of discussion on the Commission at
- Moscow, and any amount of telegrams between our three Governments not the
least progress has been made, because M. Molotov has steadily refused in the
Commission to give an opinion about the Poles we have mentioned, so that not
one of them has been allowed to come even to a preliminary round table discussion.
4.In your paragraph 1 you speak of accepting “the Yugoslav precedent as a

model for Poland”. You have always wished that our private personal series of
telegrams should be frank and outspoken. I must say at once that the two cases are
completely different. In the case of Poland, the three Powers reached agreement
about how we should arrange the emergence of a new government. ... In the
case of Yugoslavia there was nothing of this kind. You seem now to be
proposing, after your representative on the Moscow Polish Commission has made
it impossible to start the conversations provided for in our agreement, that agreed
procedure should be abandoned. Thus we British feel that after all this time
absolutely no headway has been made towards forming a “new” and “reorganised”
government while on the contrary the Soviet Government had made a twenty
years’ treaty with the present Provisional Government under M. Bierut, although
it remains neither new nor reorganised. We have the feeling that it is we who have
been dictated to and brought up against a stone wall upon matters which we
sincerely believed were settled in a spirit of friendly comradeship in the Crimea’.
Stalin’s correspondence etc., vol. 1, No. 450, pp. 338-340,
133
The Soviet Union puts the new Poland under an obligation to itself
On April 21st, 1945, Stalin and Osdbka-Morawski signed an Agreement
concerning Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Collaboration after the
War between Poland and the Soviet Union in Moscow, the most important
articles of which read:
Artykul 2
Wysokie Uktadajace sie Strony, w prze$wiadczeniu, ze interesy bezpieczenstwa
i pomySlnego rozwoju narodéw polskiego i radzieckiego wymagaja zachowania
i wzmocnienia stalej i niezachwianej przyjazni w czasie wojny, jak i pozakonczeniu
wojny, beda umacnialy przyjazna wspdlprace pomiedzy obydwoma krajami w
my$l zasad wzajemnego poszanowania swej niezaleznosci i suwerennosci, jak
réwniez nie-ingerowania w sprawy wewnetrzne drugiego panstwa.
Artykut 4
Jezeli jedna z Wysokich Uktadajacych sie Stron w okresie powojennym zostanie
weiagnieta w dzialania wojenne przeciwko Niemcom, ktéreby wznowily swoja
1 Churchill reproduces only the second part of the very exhaustive letter in “The second
world war”, vol. 6, pp. 431-434. Incidentally, he gives April 29th as the date, and the
Correspondence April 28th.
221
t
iN , ) ‘
polityke agresji, albo przeciwko jakiemukolwiek innemu panstwu, ktére w takiej

wojnie sprzymierzytoby sie z Niemcami bezpoSrednio lub w jakiejkolwiek innej
formie, druga Wysoka Uktadajaca sie Strona bezzwlocznie udzieli Ukladajacej sie
Stronie wciagnietej w dzialania wojenne wojennej oraz innej pomocy i poparcia
wszystkimi Srodkami, bedacymi w jej rozporzadzeniu.
Artykul 5
Wysokie Uktadajace sie Strony zobowigqzuja sie nie zawiera¢ bez wzajemnej
zgody rozejmu lub pokoju ani z rzqadem hitlerowskim, ani z jakakolwiek inna
wiadza w Niemczech, zagrazajacq lub mogaca zagrozi¢ niepodlegtosci, caloéci
terytorjalnej lub bezpieczenstwu ktérejkolwiek z Wysokich Uktadajacych sie Stron.
Artykul 6
Kazda z Wysokich Ukladajacych sie Stron zobowiazuje sie nie zawiera¢ zadnego
sojuszu i nie braé udziatu w zadnej koalicji, skierowanej przeciwko drugiej Wyso-
kiej Uktadajacej sie Stronie. .
Russian text
Crarpa 2
Butcoxue JloropapuBarommeca CropoHsl, yBepeHHEIe B TOM, TO MHTepecEl
Oes0macHOCcTu M WpOMBeTaHUA NObCKOLO M COBeTCKOTO HapoOB TpeOyioT
cCOXpaHeHMA M yYCUeHMA B Mepuoy UM HOCIe OKOHYAHHA BOMHEI WpodHon uw
HOCTOAHHOM fpyOnl, OyqyT YyKpeNNATh Apyeckoe COTPyAHWYeCTBO
Mextty oO6eHMM cTpaHaMM B COOTBeETCTBHM C IpMHUMWaMa B3aMMHOrO
YBa7KeHUA K UX He3aBUCUMOCTH M CYBepeHUTEeTY, a TaK?Ke HEBMeIIAaTeIbCTBA
BO BHYTpeHHue Jlea Apyroro rocyfapcersBa.
Crarna 4
B cayyae, ecum ofHa u3 Brtcoxux JloropapuBaroumxca Cropou B
TIOCJICBOCHHHIM MepMoO] OKaKeTCAH BOBIeYeHHOHM B BOeHHEIe elicTBUA C
Tepmanueii, kKoTOpad BOsOOHOBUA ObI CBOIO ArpeCCMBHYIO NONMTHKY, HM
© KaKUM-sM00 A pyruM rocyfapcTBoM, KOTOpoe OObequHUTOCE On c Tep-
MaHMelt HellOcpefCTBeHHO WIM B Kakolimm00 WHOL PopMe B TaKOii BOitHe,
apyran Burconan JloropapuBarwmasnca CropoHa HemMefJIeHHO OKanKeT
JloropapuBaiomelica Cropoue, BoBMeYeHHO! B BOCHHETe JelicTBUA, BOCHHY10
MW Apyryl NOMOMb MU NOAepskkKY BCeEMU CpeCTBAaMM, HAXOANIMMMCA B ee
pachopssKeHuM.
Cratpa 5
Bricoxue JloropapuBarommeca Cropount oOasylorca He 3aKm0UaTD 6e3
B3aMMHOTO COrsmacwA WepeMMpuA MM MMpHOrTO ForoBopa HM C¢ ruT-
JIEpOBCKMM IpaBUTeIbCTBOM, HM C Kakolt-m00 Apyroii Baacrbio B Tep-
MaHMM, MocAraionlel MIM KOTOpad ocArasza Obl Ha HesaBUCMMOCTH,
TeppUTOPMaIbHY! TWeOCTHOCTh UM OesonacHocTh Kako us Brrconux
JloropapuBaromuxca Cropou.
Crarba 6
Ragan m3 Brtcoxux Jloropapmpaimmxca Cropon obOsasyercs He
BaKIOWaT KAKOTO-IM00 COI08a M He UPMHMMAaTh yyacTMA B KaAKOli-M00
7 abnniely HaUpaBIeHHIX MpOTMB Apyroit Burcoxoiit Jloropapusaimneltca
TOpOHBI.
222
Translation
Article 2
Believing that it is necessary, in the interests of the security and prosperity of
the Polish and Soviet peoples, to maintain and strengthen a firm and lasting
friendship both during and after the war, the High Contracting Parties will
strengthen friendly co-operation between both countries in accordance with the
principles of mutual respect for their independence and sovereignty and also of
non-intervention in the internal affairs of the other State.
Article 4
Should either of the High Contracting Parties during the post-war period be
involved in hostilities with a Germany, which had renewed her policy of aggres-
sion, or with any other State which had joined Germany in such a war either
directly or in any other way, the other High Contracting Party shall without
delay extend to the Contracting Party involved in hostilities military and other
assistance and support with all the means at its disposal.
Article 5
The High Contracting Parties agree not to conclude without each other’s
consent any armistice or peace treaty either with the Hitlerite Government or
with any other authority in Germany violating or likely to violate the inde-
pendence, territorial integrity or security of either High Contracting Party.
Article 6
The High Contracting Parties respectively agree not to enter into any alliance
or take part in any coalition directed against the other High Contracting Party.
United Nations Treaty series, vol. 12, pp. 391-403 (No. 70).
134
Osébka-Morawski announces the Polonization of the German Eastern

territories
On May 3rd, 1945, Mr. Osdbka-Morawski, the Polish Prime Minister, made
a speech before the National Council im Warsaw, in which he stated (accord-
ing to the Warsaw Ksiqzka Archives) among other things:
Polish culture should be restored in the old Polish Western territories which
have been regained, and the traces of their century-old Germanization should
disappear. The Germans have evacuated or exterminated the major part of the
local Polish population. Poles repatriated from the Ukraine, from White Ruthe-
nia and from Lithuania, as well as from the other territories ceded to the USSR!
1 It is not clear what “other territories ceded to the USSR” are meant here. The territories
ceded by Poland had been incorporated without exception into the Soviet Ukraine, Soviet
White Ruthenia (Belorussia) and Soviet Lithuania.
223
would have to be called upon to settle these districts, and also the surplus po-
pulation in Central Poland, and that of the overcrowded cities and the un-
propertied rural population.
Keesing’s Archiv der Gegenwart (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, German edition),
1945, pp. 212-213.
135
Churchill observes the Soviet advance with uneasiness
Mr. Churchill repeatedly expressed his uneasiness concerning the attitude of

the Soviet Union in the spring of 1945. His exposé of May 4th may serve
as an example:
I consider that the Polish deadlock can now probably only be resolved at a
conference between the three Heads of Governments. ...
2. The Polish problem may be easier to settle when set in relation to the now
numerous outstanding questions of the utmost gravity which require urgent
settlement with the Russians. I fear terrible things have happened during the
Russian advance through Germany to the Elbe. The proposed withdrawal of
the United States Army to the occupational lines which were arranged with the
Russians and Americans in Quebec, and which were marked in yellow on the
maps we studied there, would mean the tide of Russian domination sweeping
forward 120 miles on a front of 300 or 400 miles. This would be an event which,
if it occurred, would be one of the most melancholy in history. After it was over
and the territory occupied by the Russians Poland would be completely engulfed
and buried deep in Russian-occupied lands. What would in fact be the Russian
frontier would run from the North Cape in Norway, along the Finnish-Swedish
frontier, across the Baltic to a point just east of Liibeck, along the at present
agreed line of occupation and along the frontier between Bavaria to Czecho-
slovakia to the frontiers of Austria, which is nominally to be in quadruple occu-
pation, and half-way across that country to the Isonzo river, behind which Tito
and Russia will claim everything to the east. Thus the territories under Russian
control would include the Baltic provinces, all of Germany to the occupational
line, all Czechoslovakia, a large part of Austria, the whole of Yugoslavia, Hungary,
Roumania, Bulgaria, until Greece in her present tottering condition is reached.
It would include all the great capitals of Middle Europe, including Berlin, Vienna,
Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Sofia. The position of Turkey and Con-
stantinopel will certainly come immediately into discussion.
3. This constitutes an event in the history of Europe to which there has been
no parallel, and which has not been faced by the Allies in their long and hazardous
struggle. The Russian demands on Germany for reparations alone will be such as
to enable her to prolong the occupation almost indefinitely, at any rate for
many years, during which time Poland will sink with many other States into
the vast zone of Russian-controlled Europe, not necessarily economically So-
vietised, but police-governed.
224
ved: >
4. It is just about time that these formidable issues were examined between the
principal Powers as a whole. We have several powerful bargaining counters on
our side, the use of which might make for a peaceful agreement. First, the Allies
ought not to retreat from their present positions to the occupational line until
we are satisfied about Poland, and also about the temporary character of the
Russian occupation of Germany, and the conditions to be established in the
Russianised or Russian-controlled countries in the Danube valley, particularly
Austria and Czechoslovakia, and the Balkans. Secondly, we may be able to please
them about the exits from the Black Sea and the Baltic as part of a general state-
ment. All these matters can only be settled before the United States armies in
Europe are weakened. If they are not settled before the United States armies
withdraw from Europe and the Western world folds up its war machines there
are no prospects of a satisfactory solution and very little of preventing a third
World War. It is to this early and speedy show-down and settlement with Russia
that we must now turn our hopes. Meanwhile I am against weakening our claim
against Russia on behalf of Poland in any way. I think it should stand where it
was put in the telegrams from the President and me.
W. Churchill, The second world war, vol. V1, pp. 438-439.
136
Churchill speaks of the “Iron Curtain”
A cable sent by Mr. Churchill to President Truman, the new US President,

expressed his worries even more forcefully:
I am profoundly concerned about the European situation. I learn that half the
American Air Force in Europe has already begun to move to the Pacific theatre.
The newspapers are full of the great movements of the American armies out of
Europe. Our armies also are, under previous arrangements, likely to undergo a
marked reduction. The Canadian Army will certainly leave. The French are weak
and difficult to deal with. Anyone can see that in a very short space of time our
armed power on the Continent will have vanished, except for moderate forces
to hold down Germany.
2. Meanwhile what is to happen about Russia? I have always worked for
friendship with Russia, but, like you, I feel deep anxiety because of their
misinterpretation of the Yalta decisions, their attitude towards Poland, their
overwhelming influence in the Balkans, excepting Greece, the difficulties they
make about Vienna, the combination of Russian power and the territories under
their control or occupied, coupled with the Communist technique in so many
other countries, and above all their power to maintain very large armies in the
field for a long time. What will be the position in a year or two, when the British
and American Armies have melted and the French has not yet been formed on
any major scale, when we may have a handful of divisions, mostly French, and
when Russia may choose to keep two or three hundred on active service?
225
3. An iron curtain is drawn down upon their front. We do not know what is
going on behind. There seems little doubt that the whole of the regions east of
the line Liibeck—Trieste-Corfu will soon be completely in their hands. To this
must be added the further enormous area conquered by the American armies
between Eisenach and the Elbe, which will, I suppose, in a few weeks be occupied,
when the Americans retreat, by the Russian power. All kinds of arrangements
will have to be made by General Eisenhower to prevent another immense flight
of the German population westward as this enormous Muscovite advance into
the centre of Europe takes place. And then the curtain will descend again to a
very large extent, if not entirely. Thus a broad band of many hundreds of
miles of Russian-occupied territory will isolate us from Poland.
4. Meanwhile the attention of our peoples will be occupied in inflicting sever-
ities upon Germany, which is ruined and prostrate, and it would be open to the
Russians in a very short time to advance if they chose to the waters of the North
Sea and the Atlantic.
5. Surely it is vital now to come to an understanding with Russia, or see where
we are with her, before we weaken our armies mortally or retire to the zones
of occupation. This can only be done by a personal meeting. I should be most grate-
ful for your opinion and advice. Of course we may take the view that Russia
will behave impeccably, and no doubt that offers the most convenient solution.
To sum up, this issue of a settlement with Russia before our strength has gone
seems to me to dwarf all others.
W.Churchill, The second world war, vol. VI, pp. 498-499.
137
The four great Allied Powers subdivide Germany into four zones of occupation
within the 1937 frontiers
On June 5th, 1945, the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and
the Soviet Union published two “statements” on Germany, its future adminis-
tration and occupation. The text of one of these statements read as follows:
Germany, within her frontiers as they were on 31st December, 1937, will, for
the purposes of occupation, be divided into four zones, one to be allotted to each
Power as follows:
an eastern zone to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;
a north-western zone to the United Kingdom;
a south-western zone to the United States of America;
a western zone to France.
The occupying forces in each zone will be under a Commander-in-Chief
designated by the responsible Power. Each of the four Powers may, at its discretion,
include among the forces assigned to occupation duties under the command of its
Commander-in-Chief, auxiliary contingents from the forces of any other Allied
Power which has actively participated in military operations against Germany.
226
Russian text
Tepmanua B rpanuyax, cymecrBopanmmx Ha 31 gexadps 1937 roma,

OyHer pasfenena WIA Wemei OKKyNAMM Ha YeTHIPe BOHE, WO OHO U3
KOTOPHIX OyfeT OTBeEAeCHO Karol U3 GeTLIpéx epmas, a UMeHHO:
BocTrouHan 80Ha
— Cosy Copercxux Conmamucrmyeckux Peciry6smx,
ceBepo-sallaqHad 380Ha — Coequnénnomy Hopomsencrsy, roro-3anaquan
3oHa — Coequnénunm I[llraram Amepuku um sanayHad s0Ha — Dpan-
nyscKoli PecnyOamke. OkkynayMOHHEle CHILI B RaK{Oli 80He NOIMHAIOTCA
TIaBHOKOMAaHAylolleMy, HasHAaYeHHOMY cCOOTBeTCTByIONel epsanoit.
Hasan 3 averbipéx Jlep2kaB, 10 CBOeEMY YCMOTPeHMW, MOMKET BKIIOUATH B
WMCIO BOOPYIKEHHHIX CMJ, MpeHASHAYeEHHBIX JIA BEIMOIHeCHUA OKKYyIa-
IMOHHEIX OONBaHHOCTeli no, HomanyzoBaHuem cBoero ruaBHOKOMaH-
wytoujero, BcuoMoraTesbHEe HouTMHreHTE M3 aca BOOPY?KéHHEIX CHT
mo0oi jpyroii cowsHoli epsKaBL, KOTOpad UpMHuMasa akTMBHOe
yaacTwe B BOCHHHIX OMepaluax upoTus l'epmanun.
French text
L’Allemagne, 4 lintérieur de ses frontiéres telles qu’elles existaient le 31 dé-

cembre 1937, sera, aux fins d’occupation, divisée en quatre zones, dont une sera
attribuée 4 chacune des Puissances, comme suit:
Une zone Est 4 l'Union des Républiques Socialistes Soviétiques;
Une zone Nord-Ouest au Royaume-Uni;
Une zone Ouest a la République Frangaise;
Une zone Sud-Ouest aux Etats-Unis d’Amérique.
Dans chacune des zones, les forces d’occupation seront sous les ordres d’un
commandant en chef désigné par la Puissance interessée. Chacune des quatre
Puissances peut, a sa discrétion, inclure dans les forces d’occupation, sous le
commandement de son commandant en chef, des contingents auxiliaires des forces
de l’une quelconque des autres puissances alli¢es qui ont participé activement aux
opérations militaires contre Allemagne.
Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany, Supplement No. 1. Berlin 1946, p. 11.
138
The four Allied Powers reserve the right of fixing the boundaries of Germany
But the “Declaration regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption
of Supreme Authority with respect to Germany by the Governments of the
United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of the Soviet
Socialist Republics and the Provisional Government of the French Republic”,
which was published on the same day, says:
The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Provisional Government of the French
Republic, will hereafter determine the boundaries of Germany or any part thereof:
and the status of Germany or of any area at present being part of German territory.
L2G
Russian text
IIpasurenpersa Corsa Coserckux Commammoruyeckux Pecnydsur,

Coequnénnoro Koponescrsa u Coegunénusrx Ilrarop Amepuku u
Bpemenuoe IIpasureapcso Dpanyysckoi PecnyOumnu BuocieqcTBun
ycraHoBaT rpanuupt TepmManun wim mo000k yacTu eé, a TaKate ONpesesAT
cratyt Tepmanuu usm sio6oro paliova, KOTOpHit B HacTOAMee BpeMA
ABIIACTCA 4aCTbIO repMaHCKOM TeppuTOpuM.
French text
Le Gouvernement provisoire de la République Frangaise et les gouvernements des

Etats-Unis d’Amérique, du Royaume Uni et de l’Union des Républiques So-
cialistes Soviétiques détermineront ultérieurement les frontiéres de |’Allemagne,
en tout ou en partie, et le statut de l’Allemagne ou de toute région faisant actuel-
lement partie du territoire allemand.
Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany, Supplement No. 1. Berlin 1946, p.7.
139
The Western Powers move out of Central Germany
Mr. Churchill reports in his war memoirs from June 1945:
The main reason why I had been anxious to hasten the date of the meeting was
of course the impending retirement of the American Army from the line which
it had gained in the fighting to the zone prescribed in the occupation agreement.
...1 feared that any day a decision might be taken in Washington to yield up
this enormous area — 400 miles long and 120 at its greatest depth. It contained
many millions of Germans and Czechs. Its abandonment would place a broader
gulf of territory between us and Poland, and practically end our power to in-
fluence her fate. The changed demeanour of Russia towards us, the constant
breaches of the understandings reached at Yalta, the dart for Denmark, happily
frustrated by Montgomery’s timely action, the encroachments in Austria, Marshal
Tito’s menacing pressure at Trieste, all seemed to me and my advisers to create an
entirely different situation from that in which the zones of occupation had been
prescribed two years earlier. Surely all these issues should be considered as a
whole, and now was the time. Now, while the British and American Armies and
Air Forces were still a mighty armed power, and before they melted away under
demobilisation and the heavy claims of the Japanese war — now, at the very
latest, was the time for a general settlement.
A month earlier would have been better. But it was not yet too late. On the
other hand, to give up the whole centre and heart of Germany — nay, the centre
and key-stone of Europe — as an isolated act seemed to me to be a grave and
improvident decision. If it were done at all it could only be as part of a general
228
\
and lasting settlement. We should go to Potsdam with nothing to bargain with,

and all the prospects of the future peace of Europe might well go by default. The
matter however did not rest with me. Our own retirement to the occupation
frontier was inconsiderable. The American Army was three millions to our one.
All I could do was to plead, first, for advancing the date of the meeting of “the
Three”, and, secondly, when that failed, to postpone the withdrawal until we
could confront all our problems as a whole, together, face to face, and on equal
terms.
How stands the scene after eight years have passed? The Russian occupation
line in Europe runs from Liibeck to Linz. Czechoslovakia has been engulfed. The
Baltic States, Poland, Roumania, and Bulgaria have been reduced to satellite
States under totalitarian Communist rule. Austria is denied all settlement. Yugo-
slavia has broken loose. Greece alone is saved. Our armies are gone, and it will be
a long time before even sixty divisions can be once again assembled opposite
Russian forces, which in armour and man-power are in overwhelming strength.
This also takes no account of all that has happened in the Far East. Only the
atomic bomb stretches its sinister shield before us. The danger of a third World
War, under conditions at the outset of grave disadvantage except in this new,
terrible weapon, casts its lurid shadow over the free nations of the world. Thus
in the moment of victory was our best, and what might prove to have been our
last, chance of durable world peace allowed composedly to fade away. On June 4
I cabled to the President these words, which few would now dispute:
Prime Minister to President Truman 4 June 45

I am sure you understand the reason why I am anxious for an earlier date, say
the 3rd or 4th [of July]. I view with profound misgivings the retreat of the
American Army to our line of occupation in the central sector, thus bringing
Soviet power into the heart of Western Europe and the descent of an iron curtain
between us and everything to the eastward. I hoped that this retreat, if it has to
be made, would be accompanied by the settlement of many great things which
would be the true foundation of world peace. Nothing really important has been
settled yet, and you and I will have to bear great responsibility for the future.
I still hope therefore that the date will be advanced.
I reinforced this argument by referring to the high-handed behaviour of the
Russians in Vienna.
Prime Minister to President Truman 9 June 45

Our missions to Vienna have been ordered by Marshal Tolbukhin to leave by
10th or 11th June. They have not been allowed to see anything outside the strict
city limits, and only one airfield can be permitted for the Allies. Here is the
capital of Austria, which by agreement is to be divided, like the country itself,
into four zones; but no one has any power there except the Russians, and not
even ordinary diplomatic rights are allowed. If we give way in this matter we
must regard Austria as in the Sovietised half of Europe.
229
: -
2. On the other hand, the Russians demand the withdrawal of the American
and British forces in Germany to the occupation line, fixed so long ago in
circumstances so different, and Berlin of course is so far completely Sovietised.
3. Would it not be better to refuse to withdraw on the main European front
until a settlement has been reached about Austria? Surely at the very least the
whole agreement about zones should be carried out at the same time?
Two days later I minuted to the Foreign Office, which in Mr. Eden’s absence in
Washington I at this time directed:
11 June 45
I am still hoping that the retreat of the American centre to the occupation line
can be staved off till “the Three” meet, and I take the view that large movements
to enable France to assume her agreed part of her zone will stimulate the
Russian demand to occupy the heart of Germany. Of course at any moment the
Americans may give way to the Russian demand, and we shall have to conform.
That will be the moment for making this partial arrangement with the French
[about their zone], but not before, even if delay causes some inconvenience in
the re-deployments. We ought not to let ourselves be hurried into a decision
which touches issues so vast and fateful. There is no objection to the matter being
considered by the British Chiefs of Staff meanwhile.
On June 12 the President replied to my message of June 4. He said that the

tripartite agreement about the occupation of Germany, approved by President
Roosevelt after “long consideration and detailed discussion” with me, made it
impossible to delay the withdrawal of American troops from the Soviet Zone in
order to press the settlement of other problems. The Allied Control Council
could not begin to function until they left, and the military government exer-
cised by the Allied Supreme Commander should be terminated without delay
and divided between Eisenhower and Montgomery. He had been advised, he said,
that it would harm our relations with the Soviet to postpone action until our
meeting in July, and he accordingly proposed sending a message to Stalin.
On July 1 the United States and British Armies began their withdrawal to their
allotted zones, followed by masses of refugees. Soviet Russia was established in the
heart of Europe. This was a fateful milestone for mankind.
W.Churchill, The second world war, vol. VI, pp. 522-525, 528.
230
139a
The Polish Workers’ Party prepares Polish settlement of the German Eastern
territories
At the end of June, 1945, the Central Committee of the Polish Workers’ Party
(PPR) sent a circular letter to the voivodeship, district, and local committees
regarding the “operation settlement and resettlement in the Regained
Territories”. It contained the following:
Plenum Komitetu Centralnego PPR, omawiajac udziat naszej partii w akcji

przesiedlenczej i osadniczej na Ziemiach Odzyskanych, polecito wszystkim or-
ganizacjom partyjnym wziecie jak najaktywniejszego udzialu w tej akcji. Kazdy
ezlonek partii musi jasno zdawa¢ sobie sprawe z tego, ze od prawidtowego
rozwiazania kwestii przesiedlenia i sprawnej organizacji osiedlenia na Ziemiach
Odzyskanych zalezy potega naszego panstwa i przysztosé naszego narodu. Skupie-
nie wysilkow calego spoleczenstwa w celu szybkiego zaludnienia i zagospoda-
rowania Ziem Odzyskanych musi na réwni z odbudowg kraju sta¢ sie czolowym
hastem, cementujacym front jednogci narodowej.
Akcja ta odbywa sie w warunkach niezmiernie trudnych, a trudnoéci te nie
moga byé przelamane tylko przy pomocy aparatu panstwowego, lecz wymagaja
diugotrwalego i planowego wysiltku catego narodu, wszystkich organizacji de-
mokratycznych, a w pierwszym rzedzie wszystkich partii politycznych wchodza-
cych w sklad koalicji rzadowej. W ciagu br. musimy osiedli¢ na Ziemiach Od-
zyskanych 3 i 1/2 mln Polakéw, w tej liczbie 2 i 1/2 mln w okresie do zniw,...
Komitet Centralny poleca wszystkim organizacjom partyjnym, wszystkim
komitetom wojewédzkim, powiatowym i miejskim:
1. Natychmiast zglosi¢ swoje uczestnictwo do lokalnych komitetéw przesiedlen-
ezych. Tam gdzie komitety takie jeszcze nie powstaly, podja¢ inicjatywe na-
tychmiastowego powolania ich na podstawie porozumienia miedzy party jnego.
2.Komitety wojewédzkie, powiatowe i miejskie winny wydzieli¢ jednego z
sekretarzy w sklad komitetéw przesiedlenczych. Do akcji przesiedlenczej nalezy
zmobilizowa¢ wszystkich czlonkéw partii,...
3. Uchwata plenum KC partia nasza musi w terminie do 1. sierpnia przerzuci¢ na
Ziemie Odzyskane nie mniej niz 25 000 sprawdzonych czionkéw partii. ... Kazda
wyjezdzajaca z terenu grupa przesiedlehcéw winna mie¢ w swym skladzie
odpowiednia grupe czlonkéw partii, z wyznaczonym przez kom. pow. sekre-
tarzem tej grupy partyjnej, ktéry stanowi wladze partyjna do czasu przybycia
na miejsce i powiqzania sie z kom. wojew. na Ziemiach Odzyskanych.
5. Wszystkie organizacje partyjne winny rozwinaé szeroka dzialalnosé wydaw-

nicza, prasowa, agitacyjna. Spopularyzowa¢ istnienie komitetdw przesied-
leficzych i ich siedzibe, przyjmowaé aktywny udzial w wszelkich akcjach pro-
pagandowydh, inicjowanych przez komitety przesiedlencze.
231
~~
7. Nalezy wszechstronnie pomaga¢ transportom repatriantéw i osadnikéw, Scisle

wspoldziataé z PUR-em i Inspektorami Osadnictwa na punktach etapowych.
Niezwiocznie informowa¢ instancje partyjnq o niedomaganiach, ktére nie moga
by¢ usuniete miejscowymi silami.
W dziesigtq rocznice powstania Polskie} Partii Robotniczej; Materiaty i Dokumenty.

(On the Tenth Anniversary of the Foundation of the Polish Workers’ Party; Materials and
Documents.) Warsaw 1952, pp. 443-444.
Translation
In the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the PPR the part taken
by our Party in the operation settlement and resettlement in the Regained
Territories has been discussed, and all party organizations have been recom-
mended to take part in this operation as actively as may be possible. Every party
member must realize that the power of our state and the future of our nation
depend on the right solution of the question of resettlement, and on the efficient
organization of settlement in the Regained Territories. The concentration of the
efforts of the whole nation on a rapid settlement and exploitation of the Regained
Territories must, together with the recovery of the country, be the rallying cry
that cements the front of national unity.
This operation is being carried out under extraordinarily difficult conditions,
and these difficulties cannot be surmounted with the help of the state apparatus
alone, but demand a long-termed and planned effort on the part of the whole
nation, of all democratic organizations, and above all of all political parties which
form the government coalition. In the course of this year we must settle 3 1/2 million
Poles in the Regained Territories, 21/2 millions of them until harvest time...
The Central Committee recommends to all party organizations, to all voi-
vodeship, district, and local committees that:
1. Their participation in the local resettlement committees shall be announced
forthwith. Where such committees have not yet been set up, initiative shall be
taken at once to establish them on the basis of inter-party agreement.
2. The voivodeship, district, and local committees should send one of their
secretaries to the resettlement committees.
All party members must be mobilized for the resettlement operation, . .
3. According to a decision made in the plenary meeting of the Central Com-
mittee, our party must take no fewer than 25,000 vetted party members into
the Regained Territories by August 1st....
Every group of resettlers departing from home should include a sufficient group
of party members with a secretary appointed by the district committee, who shall
be the competent party authority until the arrival on the point of destination and
until a liaison has been established with the voivodeship committee in the
Regained Territories.
232
5. All party organizations should begin brisk press and propaganda activities and
publish pamphlets. The existence of the resettlement committees and their
location must be made known to the population, and all propaganda actions
of the resettlement committees must be actively supported.
7. Transports of repatriants and settlers must be aided in every respect, and

close co-operation must be maintained with the State Repatriation Office and
the Settlement Inspectors in the key offices. The party must be informed im-
mediately regarding all shortcomings which cannot be remedied locally.
140
The expulsion of the remaining Germans is prepared according to a plan
On June 26th, 1945, the Agency “Exchange” published an interview with

a competent Polish government official! who stated
that there were still about two and a half million Germans in the German terri-
tories occupied by Poles between the frontier of 1939 and the Oder-Neisse Line,
whose transfer the Polish Government would strive for with all its energy.
Simultaneously the Government would settle two million Polish nationals in the
territories to be vacated by the Germans and support them in Polonizing their
extended homeland. He added that military measures had had to be taken to
protect the Polish communities at present still living in isolation against serious
German encroachments. He pointed out with regret that certain foreign govern-
ments were still endeavouring to resist the settling of two million Poles in the
territories mentioned. It was certain that the Soviet Union would support
Poland’s claim to the Oder-Neisse frontier. Full sovereignty had been ceded to
Poland in Western Pomerania. All Germans had been placed under Polish law,
and Polish intentions regarding them would be carried out. It was a matter of
course that Hitler’s example would not be imitated, and that there would be
neither extermination in gas chambers nor executions. There were other solutions.
The Germans would undoubtedly have to leave Pomerania, and until then they
would work under strict Polish supervision. The fate of the Germans in East
Prussia had been settled. The new Polish province of Masuria, extending over
an area of 10550 square miles and therefore four fifths of East Prussia?, had been
Polonized satisfactorily.
1945, p. 297.
1 The report states the source to be “Ochab, Minister for the Regained Territories”. But no
such Ministry has yet existed at that time. It was not established until November 12th, 1945.
2 What is meant is probably four fifths of the Polish administrative area in East Prussia.
250
141
The Polish Government makes plans for the Polish settlement of the German
Eastern territories
On July 6th “Exchange” reported from Moscow on the plan of the Polish
Government
to settle a total of 7,2 million Poles in the territories taken from Germany, that
is to say,more than four millions in the towns and three millions in the country.
These new settlers are to be distributed over the various areas as follows: Silesia
4,2 millions, Western Pomerania 1,9 million and East Prussia 1,1 million.
1945, pp. 310-311.
142 ‘.
The Allies are faced wih the problem of the German population in the East
The occupation of the German Eastern territories by the Soviet Union and
Poland had created a new situation prior to the Potsdam Conference about
which Mr. Churchill writes:
...in July 1945 we faced a new situation. Russia had advanced her frontier
to the Curzon Line. This meant, as Roosevelt and I had realized, that the three
or four million Poles! who lived on the wrong side of the line would have to be
moved to the west. Now we were confronted with something much worse. The
Soviet-dominated Government of Poland had also pressed forward, not to the
Eastern Neisse, but to the Western. Much of this territory was inhabited by
Germans, and although several millions had fled many had stayed behind. What
was to be done with them? Moving three or four million Poles was bad enough.
Were we to move more than eight million Germans as well? Even if such a trans-
fer could be contemplated, there was not enough food for them in what was left
of Germany. Much of Germany’s grain came from the very land which the
Poles had seized, and if this was denied us the Western Allies would be left with
wrecked industrial zones and a starved and swollen population. For the future
peace of Europe here was a wrong beside which Alsace-Lorraine and the Danzig
Corridor were trifles. One day the Germans would want their territory back, and
the Poles would not be able to stop them.
W.Churchill, The second world war, vol. VI, p. 561.
! According to the Polish census of 1931, about 3.5 million Poles could in fact be reckoned
with for 1939 in the territories of eastern Poland which been had ceded to the Soviet Union.
Great numbers of them had admittedly left the country between 1939 and 1941 by fleeing
towards the west or to Roumania, and by deportation to the Soviet Union. Actually only
1,503,263 Poles came to Poland from the Soviet Union within the scope of Soviet-Polish
resettlement, of these 263,413 came from territories situated beyond the former Polish
frontiers (obviously deported persons). (Rocznik Statystyczny [Statistical Yearbook] 1949,
Warsaw 1950, page 26.) Only a small part of the difference is accounted for by the staying
behind of Polish people in the Polish eastern territories, the great majority has probably
perished in the places to which they had been deported, or they are still retained there.
About 132000 returned to Poland in 1955/1957. cf. p. 110, note 1.
234
XI
The Potsdam Conference

143
The question arises: What is Germany?
The Potsdam Conference of the Big Three began on July 17th, 1945. It
seems that the question of the German frontiers was mentioned for the first
time at this Conference during the second plenary meeting on July 18th
When the next subject, “Political Authority of the Control Council of Ger-
many”, was brought up, Churchill asked immediately, “What is Germany?” The
Prime Minister said he would be satisfied if it meant the pre-war area of Germany.
Stalin said the answer was, “What is left of Germany,” and he thought the fron-
tiers of Poland should be decided before accepting any area as Germany. After
considerable discussion, the recommendation made by Truman that the 1937
German boundaries be used as a basis for discussion was approved.
W.D.Leahy, I was there, p. 466.
144 /
Stalin admits having handed over German territory to Poland
It seems that this question was subsequently discussed in detail only at the
fifth plenary meeting on July 21st. A member of the American staff reports:
The Big Three finally, on this fifth meeting, took up the explosive issue of the
western frontier of Poland, and a long and unpromising discussion followed.
It developed that Stalin had given to the new Poland, from Russia’s agreed zone
of occupation, territory west of the Oder to the Neisse River. Churchill conten-
ded that this area contained one-third of the arable land in pre-war Germany
plus vast treasures of mineral wealth. In fact, Stalin, had concluded a treaty? with
the new régime on April 21, 1945, at the very time the commission set up at
Yalta was trying in Moscow to agree on the reorganization of the Polish Govern-
ment.
Both actions had been taken by Russia without consultation with the Allies.
Stalin tried to say that he had not exactly given Poland a zone of occupation, but
had permitted it to “assume the necessary functions of government therein.”
1 Compare W. Churchill, The second world war, vol. 6, p. 563.

2 See No. 133, pp. 221-223.
235
This actual transfer of German property had stopped effectively any use-
ful progress by the Tripartite Reparations Commission, which had merged
its sessions into those now taking place at Potsdam. This Soviet unilateral action
had precluded the possibility of the population of Germany subsisting on German
agricultural and industrial effort.
The Generalissimo made no admission of error in his assignment of this Ger-
man territory to Poland, although it had been repeated over and over again at
Yalta and agreed in the Crimea Protocol that Poland’s western borders would
be settled at the peace conference. The Soviet Leader just said flatly that the
arrangement he had made could not be changed.
The President made a strong statement that the territory in question must
remain a part of Germany for reparations and settlement of the whole German
problem, as had been agreed at Yalta. He would not recognize the Russian proposal
to fix Polish boundaries at Potsdam (and had not done so up to 1949, when this
was written).
It was my opinion that Russia would not take corrective action and that there
was nothing we or Britain could do about it. We would have had to be prepared
to take military action to overturn the Soviet fait accompli. As a counterirritant,
I hastily pencilled a note suggesting that we turn over the Rhineland to England,
at which Truman smiled. However, tempers were getting short and the argument
had been protracted for more than two hours, so the meeting ended at this point.
W.D.Leahy, I was there, p. 474.
145
Churchill and Truman enquire about the fate of the Germans
Mr. Churchill reports on this meeting more in detail:1
We did not recur to Poland till our fifth meeting, on July 21. The Soviet
delegation wanted Poland’s western frontier to run to the west of Swinemiinde,
as far as the Oder river, leaving Stettin on the Polish side, then up the river Oder
to the estuary of the Western Neisse, and from there along its course to Czecho-
slovakia.
Mr. Truman recalled that we had agreed to divide Germany into four zones of
occupation, based on her 1937 frontiers. The British and the Americans had
moved their troops back into their new zones, but apparently the Soviet Govern-
ment had given the Poles a zone of their own without consulting us. Unless this
zone counted as part of Germany how could we settle reparations and all the
other German questions?
Stalin denied giving the Poles a zone of their own. He declared that the Soviet
Government had not been able to stop them. The German population had retreated
‘ Compare H.S.Truman, Memoirs, vol. I: Year of decisions (1945). Garden City, N. Y.,
1955, pp. 366-370.
236
westwards with the German armies. Only the Poles remained.! The Soviet armies
needed someone to administer their rear areas. They were not accustomed to fight
and clear territory and set up their own administration at the same time. Why
not let the Poles do it?
“We ought to keep to the zones we agreed at Yalta,” said the President. “If
we don’t reparations and all sorts of other matters will be difficult to settle.”
“We are not worried about reparations,” said Stalin.
“The United States will get none anyhow,” answered Mr. Truman, “but they
will also try to avoid paying anything.”
“Nothing definite was fixed at Yalta about the Western frontier,’ said Stalin.
>
“None of us are bound.”

This was true. The President said he did not think we could settle the matter
now. It would have to wait for the Peace Conference.
“It will be still more difficult,” said Stalin, “to restore a German Adminis-
tration.”
“You can use a Polish one in your zone of occupation in Germany,” said the
President.
“That is all very well,” was Stalin’s answer, “but the Germans have fled and
the natural and indeed the only solution is to set up a friendly administration of
Poles. This does not commit us to any particular boundary, and if the Con-
ference cannot agree about one it can remain in suspense.”
“Can it?” I interrupted. “These are very important areas for feeding Ger-
many.”
“Who will produce the grain?” countered Stalin. “There is nobody left to
plough the land except Poles.”
“What has become of the Germans?” we both asked.
“They have fled.”
I had taken little part in these interchanges, but now I spoke.
How, I asked, were we to feed the Germans who had fled? A quarter of Ger-
many’s arable land would be lost. If the area suggested by Britain and America
was given to Poland about three or four million Poles would have to be moved
from east of the Curzon Line; but the Soviet plan would mean shifting more than
eight million Germans. Would there be room for them in what was left of Ger-
many? I was not even sure that Stalin was right that all the Germans had fled.
Some people thought that more than two millions were still there.
Stalin thereupon challenged my figures, saying that the Germans had called
1 This statement of Stalin’s was incorrect, for there were still more than five million Ger-
mans in the German Eastern territories and in Poland on capitulation day, and it is pro-
bable that their numbers had increased to 5,650,000 due to returnees by the summer of
1945. (Dokumentation der Vertreibung [Documentation of expulsion], vol.I, p.78E.)
Moreover, Stalin’s statement was given the lie by Molotov, his Foreign Minister, who
declared before the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Moscow on April 9th, 1947, that the
Polish Government had expelled 5,678,936 Germans up to January 1st, 1947, and that a
further 400,000 were still left behind. (Keesing’s Archiv der Gegenwart [Keesing’s Contem-
porary Archives], 1946/47, p. 1074, and V. M. Molotov, Fragen der Aufenpolitik [Que-
stions of Foreign Policy], Moscow 1949, p. 454-457.)
Doh
up many men from these regions. The rest had fled. Not a single German
remained! in the area which he proposed to give to the Poles. The Germans had
quitted their lands between the Oder and the Vistula. The Poles were cultivating
them, and they were not likely to let the Germans come back.
The President still wanted us to leave the western frontier to the Peace Con-
ference, but I persisted.
Poland, I said, deserved compensation for the land east of the Curzon Line
which she was going to lose to Russia, but she was now claiming more than she
had given up. If there were three or four million Poles east of the Curzon Line
then room should be made in the west. So considerable a movement of population
would shock the people of Great Britain, but a move of eight and a quarter mil-
lions would be more than I could defend. Compensation should bear some re-
lation to loss. It would do Poland no good to acquire so much extra territory. If
the Germans had run away from it they should be allowed to go back. The
Poles had no right to risk a catastrophe in feeding Germany. We did no want to
be left with a vast German population who were cut off from their sources of
food. The Ruhr was in our zone, and if enough food could not be found for the
inhabitants we should have conditions like the German concentration camps.
“Germany has always had to import food,” said Stalin. “Let her buy it from
Poland.” “His Majesty’s Government,” I answered, “can never admit that East
German territory overrun in the war has become Polish.” “But Poles inhabit it,”
said Stalin, “and cultivate the land. We can’t compel them to produce bread and
give it away to the Germans.” I protested that these were not normal times. The
Poles were apparently selling Silesian coal to Sweden while Great Britain was
having the worst fuel shortage of any time during the war. Food and fuel from
the Germany of the 1937 frontiers should be available for all Germans within
them, irrespective of the zone in which they lived. Stalin asked who was to
produce the coal. The Germans were not producing it, but the Poles were. The
German proprietors of the Silesian coalfield had fled. If they came back the Poles
would probably hang them. I reminded him of his remark at a previous meeting
about not allowing memories of injuries or feelings of retribution to govern our
policy, and I asked him to realize what we were faced with, namely, a large
number of Germans dumped in our zone who could only be fed from the area
which the Poles had occupied.
Stalin said that his remarks before did not apply to war criminals. “But not all
the eight and a quarter millions who have fled are war criminals,” I answered.
He then said he meant the German owners of the Silesian coal-mines. Russia
herself was short of coal and was buying it from Poland. Here Mr. Truman
supported me. It seemed, he said, to be an accomplished fact that East Germany
had been given to Poland, but it could not be treated separately when it came
to reparations and supplies. He was quite ready to discuss Poland’s western
* See the footnote on page 237. The Polish census of February 14th, 1946, still counted
1,239,309 Germans and only 690,886 Poles in the “voivodeship” of Breslau alone.
(Rocznik Statystyczny, 13th year, 1949, Warsaw 1950, p. 19.)
238
boundary, even though it could only be settled at the Peace Conference, but he
was not prepared to see sections of Germany given away piecemeal. Stalin
persisted that only the Poles could cultivate these areas. The Russians were short
of labour and there were no Germans. We could either stop all production or
let the Poles do it. The Poles had lost a valuable coal basin! to Russia, and had
taken the Silesian one in its place. I pointed out that Poles had always worked
in the Silesian mines, and I did not object to their doing so, as agents of the
Russian Government, but I did object to Silesia being treated as though it were
already part of Poland. Stalin persisted that it was impossible to upset the present
state of affairs. The Germans themselves had been short of labour. As the
Russians advanced into Germany they had found industries employing forcibly
deported Italians, Bulgarians?, and other nationalities, including Russians and
Ukrainians. When the Red Army arrived these foreign labourers had gone home.
Enormous numbers of men had been mobilized in Germany, and most of them
were either killed or captured. The vast German industries had had few German
workers, but depended on foreign labour, which had now melted away. They
must either be closed down or the Poles must be given a chance to run them.
What had happened was not the result of deliberate policy, but a spontaneous
course of event. And only the Germans were to blame for it. He agreed that the
Polish Government’s proposals would make difficulties for Germany. “And for
the British as well,” I interjected. But Stalin said he did not mind making diffi-
culties for the Germans. It was his policy, and it would stop them starting an-
other war. It was better to make difficulties for Germans than for Poles, and the
less industry in Germany the more markets for Britain.
146
Churchill objects to a final decision on the German boundary
The discussion was continued on July 22nd. Mr. Churchill® reports:
When we met next day, on Sunday, July 22, we were no nearer agreement. I
repeated and emphasized the more important reasons why His Majesty’s Govern-
ment could not accept the Polish demands, and I set them forth as follows:
1. The final decision on all boundary questions could only be reached at the Peace
Conference. (Stalin said he agreed with this.)
2.It would not be advantageous for the Polish nation to take over so large an
area as they were now asking for.
1 It is not clear what Stalin meant by this. In reality, there was not a single coal-mine
within the Polish territory east of the Curzon Line, It seems that Stalin, trusting that the
geographical knowledge of his discussion partners was slight, wanted to emphasize the idea
of compensation again.
2 There are no dates about deportation of Bulgarians into Germany.
3 Compare H. S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. I, pp. 372-373.
239
‘
3.It would rupture the economic unity of Germany, and throw too heavy a
burden on the Powers occupying the western zones, particularly as to food
and fuel.
4. The British had grave moral scruples about vast movements of population.
We could accept a transfer of Germans from Eastern Germany equal in number
to the Poles from Eastern Poland transferred from east of the Curzon Line —
say two or three millions!; but a transfer of eight or nine million Germans,
which was what the Polish request involved, was too many and would be en-
tirely wrong.
1S). The information about the number of Germans in the disputed areas was not
agreed. The Soviet Government said that they had all gone. The British Govern-
ment believed that great numbers, running into millions, were still there. We
of course had not been able to check these figures on the spot, but we must
accept them until they were shown to be wrong. *
Stalin still insisted that Germany could get enough fuel from the Ruhr and the
Rhineland and that there were no Germans left in the territory which the Poles
had occupied.
Considerable discussion followed about referring the whole matter to the
Council of Foreign Ministers. The President said he could not understand why
it was so urgent. It could not be finally settled till the Peace Conference. We
had had a most useful and helpful discussion, and the best course was to remit the
question to the Foreign Ministers. I protested that it was very urgent. Grievances
would remain unremedied. The Poles who had assigned to themselves or had been
assigned to this area would be digging themselves in and making themselves
masters. The Conference ought to make some sort of a decision, or at least we
should know where we stood. It was no use asking the Poles to a discussion with
the Council of Foreign Ministers in London if the three Powers could not agree
now. In the meantime the whole burden of fuel and food problems would remain,
and would fall particularly on the British, whose zone had poor food supplies
and the largest population.
Suppose the Council of Foreign Ministers, after hearing the Poles, could not
agree — and it appeared unlikely that they would — the winter would be coming
on with all its difficulties and it would be impossible to settle the matter without
another meeting of the heads of Governments. I was most anxious to tackle the
practical difficulties which Stalin had explained the day before, difficulties which
sprang from the movement of armies and the march of events. Why not have
a line which the Polish authorities could provisionally occupy as Poles, and agree
that west of that line any Poles would be working as the agents of the Soviet
Government?
We agreed that the new Poland should advance its western frontier to what
might be called the line of the Oder. The difference between Stalin and myself
was how far this extension should reach. The words “line of the Oder” had
' Compare in this connection the footnotes on pp. 48, 110, 234.
240
he
seamen}
been used at Teheran. This was not an exact expression, but the British delegation
had a line which could be considered in some detail by the Foreign Secretaries.
I pointed out that I only used the words “line of the Oder” as a general ex-
pression, and that it could not be properly explained without a map. But I begged
my colleagues to persevere. What would happen if the Foreign Secretaries met in
September and discussed Poland and again reached a deadlock just when the
winter was upon us? Berlin, for instance, used to get some of its fuel from Silesia.
“No, from Saxony,” said Stalin.
“About forty per cent of its hard coal came from Silesia,” I answered.
At this point Mr. Truman read us the crucial passage of the Yalta Declaration,
namely:
The three Heads of Governments consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland
should follow the Curzon Line, with digressions from it in some regions of five
to eight kilometers in favour of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive
sought in due course on the extent of these accessions, and that the final delimit-
ation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Con-
ference.
This, he said, was what President Roosevelt, Stalin, and I had decided, and he
himself was in complete accord with it. Five countries were now occupying
Germany instead of four. It would have been easy enough to have agreed upon
a zone for Poland, but he did not like the way the Poles had occupied this area
without consulting the “Big Three”. He understood Stalin’s difficulties, and he
understood mine. It was the way in which it had been done that mattered.
“Very well,” said Stalin. “We bound ourselves at Yalta to consult the Polish
Government. This has been done. We can either approve their proposals or
summon them to the Conference to hear what they have to say. We ought to
settle the matter here, but as we cannot agree then it had better go to the
Council of Foreign Ministers.”
At Teheran, he said, Roosevelt and I had wanted the frontier run along the
river Oder to where the Eastern Neisse joined it, while he had insisted on the
line of the Western Neisse. Moreover, Mr. Roosevelt and I had planned. to leave
Stettin and Breslau on the German side of the frontier. Were we to settle the
question or put it off?
“If the President,” he added, “thinks anyone is to blame, it is not so much the
Poles as the Russians and the circumstances.”
“I understand your point, and that is exactly what I meant,” answered Mr.
Truman.
Meanwhile I had pondered over these questions, and I now said that we should
invite the Poles to come to the Conference at once. Stalin and the President
agreed, and we resolved to send them an invitation.
241
147
The Heads of Governments confirm that Kénigsberg should fall to the Soviet
Union
At the seventh plenary meeting, on July 23rd, Stalin raised the problem of
Kénigsberg. Truman reports:
Stalin next brought up the question of the city of Koenigsberg, pointing out
that this question had been discussed at the Teheran conference. The Russians
complained that all their seaports in the Baltic froze over for a period each year
and that they felt it necessary to have at least one ice-free port at the expense of
Germany. Stalin added that the Russians had suffered so much at the hands of
Germany that they were anxious to have some piece of German territory as some
small satisfaction to tens of millions of Soviet citizens. This had been agreed to,
he said, by Roosevelt and Churchill at Teheran, and he was anxious to see this
agreement approved at this conference.
I said that I was ready to agree in principle, although it would be necessary to
study the population affected and other related questions. Churchill also agreed to
the concession of an ice-free port to Russia. The only question, he said, was that
of the legal occasion to transfer. The Soviet draft on this subject, he pointed out,
would require each of us to admit that East Prussia did not exist and also to
admit that the Koenigsberg area was not under the authority of the Allied
Control Council in Germany. The draft, he pointed out, would commit us to
the recognition of the incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union. He
pointed out that all these matters really belonged to the final peace settlement,
but he wished to assure the marshal of his continued support of the Russian
position in that part of the world. Stalin agreed that the matter would be settled
at the peace conference and added that Russia was satisfied that the British and
American Governments approved.
H. §. Truman, Memoirs, vol. I: Year of decisions (1945). Garden City, N. Y., 1955,
p. 378.
148
A Polish Government delegation defends the Oder-Neisse Line
During the Potsdam Conference a delegation of the new Polish Government

Was given an opportunity to express its views with regard to some questions.
Mr. Mikotajezyk, Deputy Prime Minister in the Government of National
Unity since June 28th, 1945, reported on this:
Bierut!, Foreign Minister Rzymowski? and I were chosen to express the Pro-
visional Government’s views on a variety of problems confronting the Big Three
* Since January 1st, 1944, President of the “National Council of the Country” (Krajowa
Rada Narodowa) which existed at first underground; since September 1944 practically
entrusted with the functions of the President of the Polish State.
* 'W. Rzymowski was at first Minister for Art and Culture in the “Provisional Govern-
242
at their Potsdam meeting. Professor Grabski was permitted to submit his views
in writing.
My position was extremely difficult. Acting directly on instructions from the
Kremlin, Bierut and Rzymowski set out to alienate the paternal interest of
President Truman, Churchill, and — after Churchill’s defeat in the British general
elections which came in the middle of the Big Three hearings — Prime Minister
Attlee.
By word and deed, the two Polish Communists made demands in the West
worded in a way calculated to stir the British and American to dissent. The
double-game was obvious: If the US and Great Britain refused to grant Poland
new Western lands, the Bierut government would then be able to announce
that the Yalta obligations were no longer valid. And Bierut’s physical and
spiritual leader, Stalin, could then say to the people of Poland, “Russia is your
only friend. The United States and Britain agreed to take the Eastern part of
your country from you and now do not wish to abide by their promise to
compensate you with land in the West.”
The Communists had another thought in mind, too. The Red Army controlled
that part of Germany which had been promised to Poland. If Poland’s demands
were rejected, the land would remain under the custody of Russia as long as the
period of occupation lasted.
I warned the American and British about the Communists’ hidden intention,
and urged them to couple an agreement on the frontier demands with an in-
sistence that the Provisional Government live up to its pledges concerning the
freedom of Poland’s people. My warning had to be made in private. When asked
to appear before Molotov, Eden and Byrnes for a more public expression of
my views, I outlined the following stand:
eee
The apportionment of land to Poland in the West would be a safeguard against

the resurrection of Germany as a military aggressor, I pointed out. Germany had
made war because it possessed the Ruhr and because that section of Eastern
Germany — now about to come to us — had supported war industries beyond the
reach of Allied bombing.
The Germans, I continued, had practically supported their war of aggression
by money wrung from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and. Yugoslavia! for
use of the waterways of the Oder and Elbe. I suggested that Poland now be given
control of the waters of the proposed new Western boundaries, and that we
control their gateway, Stettin, and make mutual agreements with those whose
trade moved through these channels.
ment” (Lublin Government), but became Foreign Minister on May 2nd, 1945, and also
kept this position in the “Government of National Unity” which was set up on June 28th,
1945.
1 Mikotajcezyk probably made this assertion only in order to substantiate the proposal he
was going to make immediately after this. It has no basis in actual fact.
243
I pointed out that more than 1,500,000 Poles! were living in new territories
and in East Prussia. There had been a mass exodus of Germans from those areas in
the pre-war years and the Reich had been forced frequently to seek Poles to work
the land and man the industry of the territory. Consequently, much of this land
bad been cultivated and its value enhanced by Polish labour.
Also, and more importantly, we needed that land for the millions of Poles
who would be moved out of the USSR and out of the Eastern section of Poland.?
To dump these people into the already overcrowded central area of what was
left of Poland would create economic chaos not only for them but for those
already living there.
My last argument before the Big Three’s Foreign Ministers was that even by
the addition of these lands in the West, Poland would still be twentytwo per
cent smaller than when it went to war against Germany. Germany, the aggressor,
would be only eigtheen per cent smaller . .3 :
The Foreign Ministers had announced, before my talk, that they planned to
make no comment at that time. But when I finished, Molotov spoke up, ap-
parently still hopeful that the British and Americans might reject at least part
of the proposition of compensation for Poland in the West.
He spoke briskly, in the manner of a man coming to the support of a friend
who was being put-upon by the other parties concerned. He finished, “Poland is
our closest friend among the nations. We must look out for her interests.”
But Byrnes and Eden were ready for him.
“Poland has enjoyed a long friendship with the United States,” Byrnes said,
“and we are determined that this will continue.”
Eden looked at Molotov for a time.
“You will perhaps remember that Britain went to war in 1939 in the interest
of our ally, Poland,” he said.
In the last days of the Big Three meeting I asked Truman and Attlee to agree
to the Western frontiers but to insist strongly that the Polish Provisional Govern-
ment give definite pledges to fulfill Yalta’s provision for a free and unfettered
election. I appealed to them also to bring about conditions in Poland which would
lend themselves to such an election.
Bevin had many conversations with Bierut and others in this matter. He was
1 Mikolajczyk mentions a vastly exaggerated figure here which was constantly repeated by
the Polish propaganda. According to the 1925 census there were actually only about
645,000 persons in Eastern Germany who had stated that “Polish” or “German and Polish”
was their mother tongue, and about 65,000 persons who had stated that it was “Masurian”
or “German and Masurian”. The mother tongue must not, however, be confused with the
avowal of nationality.
2 See footnote 1 on page 234.
3 Mikolajczyk’s data differ from the real facts. The territory of the Polish State of 1945,
including the German Eastern territories under Polish administration with about 120,460
square miles, is actually smaller by 19.6 per cent than the territory of the Polish State of
1939. The German Eastern territories under Polish and Soviet administration, on the other
hand, with an area of about 44,130 square miles, make up 24.3 per cent of the Reich terri-
tory of 1937. Thus exactly the opposite is true to what Mikotajczyk states.
244
promised that the Provisional Government would give full recognition to politi-
cal and religious freedoms. Bevin was assured that the election would be held
“within a year, if not earlier.”
The subsequent announcement of the Big Three gave the administration of
the territory East of the Oder and the Western Neisse rivers to the Polish State.
It also took note that the Polish Provisional Government had agreed to an early
holding of free and unfettered elections.
149
Churchill warns the Poles not to go too far
The British Prime Minister writes about a talk he had with the Polish dele-
gation on July 24th:
I began by reminding them that Great Britain had entered the war because
Poland had been invaded, and we had always taken the greatest interest in her,
but the frontiers which she had now been offered and apparently wished to take»
meant that Germany would lose one quarter of the arable land she possessed in
1937. Eight or nine million persons would have to be moved, and such great |
shiftings of population not only shocked the Western democracies, but also
imperilled the British Zone in Germany itself, where we had to support the
people who had sought refuge there. The result would be that the Poles and the
Russians had the food and the fuel, while we had the mouths and the hearths.
We would oppose such a division, and were convinced that it was just as
dangerous for the Poles to press too far to the west as they had once pressed
too far to the east.
I told them that there were other matters which troubled us. If British opinion
were to be reassured about Poland the elections should be genuinely free and
unfettered, and all the main democratic parties should have full opportunity to
participate and proclaim their programmes. What was the definiton of democratic
parties? I did not believe that only Communists were democrats. It was easy to
call everyone who was not a Communist a Fascist beast; but between these two
extremes there lay great and powerful forces which were neither one nor the
other, and had no intention of being one or the other. Poland should admit as
many as possible of these moderate elements into her political life instead of |
branding everyone who did not fit the preconceived definitions of the extremists.
In the present distracted state of Europe anyone with power could strike at
his opponents and condemn them, but the only result was to exclude the
moderate elements from political life. It took all sorts to make a nation. Could
Poland afford to divide herself? She should seek as broad a unity as possible
and join hands with the West as well as with her Russian friends. For example,
the Christian Democratic Party and all those of the National Democratic Party
245
f Vive A
¥
who had not actively collaborated with the enemy should take part in the i
elections. We should also expect full freedom for the Press, and for our Embassy,
to see and report what was happening before and during the poll. Only by
tolerance, and even on occasion mutual forgiveness, could Poland preserve the
regard and support of the Western democracies, and especially of Great Britain,
who had something to give and also something to withhold.
Bierut protested that it would be a terrible mistake if Great Britain, having
entered the war for Poland’s sake, now showed no understanding of her claims.
They were modest and took account of the need of peace in Europe. Poland asked
for no more than she had lost. Only a million and a half Germans would have
to be shifted (including those in East Prussia). These were all that remained.!
New land was needed to settle four million Poles from east of the Curzon Line?,
and about three millions who would return from abroad3, but even then Poland
would have less territory than before the war. She had lost rich agricultural land
round Vilna, valuable forests (she had always been poor in timber), and the
oil-fields of Galicia. Before the war about eight hundred thousand Polish farm-
hands used to go to Eastern Germany as seasonal workers.4 Most of the inhabit-
ants of the areas the Poles claimed, especially Silesia, were really Poles, though
attempts had been made to Germanise them. These territories were historically
Polish, and East Prussia still had a large Polish population in the Masurians.
I reminded Bierut that there was no dispute about giving Poland the portions
of East Prussia which were south and west of Kénigsberg, but he persisted that
Germany, who had lost the war, would lose only 18 per cent of her territory,
while Poland would still lose 20 per cent.’ Before the war Poland’s population
was so dense (about eighty-three per square kilometre) that many Poles had had
to emigrate. The Poles only asked for their claims to be closely examined. The
boundary they proposed was the shortest possible line between Poland and Ger-
many. It would give Poland just compensation for her losses and for her con-
1 Compare in this connection the footnote on p. 237.

2 Compare in this connection the footnotes on pp. 48, 110, 234.
3 Only 1,466,460 Poles have in fact returned from abroad between 1945 and 1948, but
prisoners of war, forced labour, and refugees made up the great majority of them. Only
105,287 real remigrants from abroad were counted since July 1946. During the preceding
months—when no difference was made between returning prisoners of war and remigrants—
their number may at the best have amounted to another 100,000. (Rocznik Statystyczny,
13th Year, 1949, Warsaw 1950, p. 25.)
4 This statement of Bierut’s is grossly exaggerated. The German Reich in reality stopped
the immigration of Polish seasonal workers already in 1932, so that altogether
only 35,400 persons had emigrated from Poland into the German Reich during
the five years from 1931 until 1935, about forty per cent of whom may have
been seasonal workers. (Rocznik polityczny i gospodarczy [Yearbook of politics and eco-
nomics] 1938, Warsaw, pp. 1088-1089.) There had been, therefore, practically no more
Polish seasonal workers in Eastern Germany since 1932. But during previous years
their number never reached the figure mentioned by Bierut; the figures of Polish seasonal
workers in agriculture working within the Reich territory were on the contrary: 1922:
127,711; 1923: 103,542; 1924: 96,948; 1925: 125,790; 1926: 112,611; 1927: 110,737; 1928:
116,969 (Rocznik Statystycezny 1928 [Statistical Yearbook], p. 26.)
5 See footnote 3 on p. 244,
246
pin) /
tribution to Allied victory, and she believed that the British would wish her
wrongs to be righted.
I reminded him that till now it had been impossible for us to find out for
ourselves what was going on in Poland, since it was a closed area. Could we not
send people into Poland with full freedom to move about and tell us what was
happening? I favoured ample compensation for his country, but I warned him
they were wrong to ask for so much.
W.Churchill, The second world war, vol. V1, pp. 573-575.
150
Churchill declares that Poland demands too much
Mr. Churchill had a second talk with Mr. Bierut on the morning of July 25th:
Bierut said his Government did not want to stop people expressing political
views, but they were anxious to avoid a lot of small parties. As many small
parties as wished could take part in the elections, but normally there would be
only a few large groups, probably not more than four or five. Such was the
present trend. Elections in Poland would be even more democratic than English 3
ones, and home politics would develop more and more harmoniously.
In reply I said there was no question of our standing in the way of Poland’s
future, but the frontier question was entangled with the problems of reparations
and supply. We had had a great mass of Germans thrown upon our hands, while
the Poles had the rich territories from which they had been fed. They were
asking too much. We and the Americans might pursue one policy and the Rus-
sians another. That would have serious consequences.
My appeal came to nothing. The world has yet to measure the “serious conse-
quences” which I forecast.
W. Churchill, The second world war, vol. VI, pp. 576-577.
151
Truman refers to the connection with the question of reparations
Byrnes wrote a more detailed report of the initial course which the con-
ference took, on the basis of his short-hand notes:
We had arrived in Potsdam to face what amounted to a fait accompli, so far as

the Polish-German frontier was concerned. Prior to Yalta, the three powers had
agreed to divide Germany into four zones of occupation, and they had made a
positive declaration in Section VI of the Yalta Protocol that the final delimitation
of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace conference. Although
the protocol would seem to permit no misunderstanding, we learned before
leaving the United States for Germany that, without any consultation either
247
with the United Kingdom or with the United States, the Soviets had transferred
all the German territory east of the Neisse River to Poland for administration.
Both President Truman! and Prime Minister Churchill promptly asked for an
explanation of this unilateral action in establishing, for all practical purposes,
another zone. Such a course, the President maintained, not only was contrary
to agreement but would make the settlement of problems such as reparations far
more difficult.
The Soviet defense was that the Germans had fled before the Russian armies,
and, since it was necessary to have some government in the area, they had per-
mitted Poland to take over its administration. Generalissimo Stalin agreed that
no one of the powers had the right to create a new zone, but said that the Soviet
government had to be assured of stable conditions in the rear of the Red Army.
He then admitted that Poland was actually removing from this area substantial
amounts of coal, which we contended certainly should be considered part of
reparations payment.
The President asked how the reparations issue could ever be settled “if part of
the German territory is gone before we reach agreement on what reparations
should be.”
Stalin remarked that everything the President said was irrelevant since “no
frontiers had been ceded at the Crimea Conference except for the provisions
that Poland would receive territory.”
“The Western frontier question is open,” Stalin said, “and the Soviet Union is
not bound.”
The President repeated: “You are not?”
“No,” Stalin replied.
We were concerned also by the huge displacement of population resulting from
this action of the Soviets. Although Stalin claimed “no single German remained
in the area to be given to Poland,” an area that had a prewar German population
of nearly nine millions, our information indicated that there were at least two
million Germans left there. Later, representatives of the Polish government ad-
mitted the presence of approximately a million and a half Germans, but contended
that many of them would leave voluntarily if the area were assigned to Poland.2
President Bierut of Poland argued his country’s claim to Eastern Germany at
a meeting of the Foreign Ministers on July 24. He pointed out that, if all the
area they asked were given them, Poland would still be smaller in total area than
before the war because, in accordance with the Crimea decision, 180,000 square
kilometers of territory in the east would be transferred to Russia. He asserted,
however, that the Eastern German area would give Poland a sounder economy
and a more homogeneous population.
Mr. Churchill had pointed out that this Soviet-supported plan would take
nearly one-fourth of the arable land within Germany’s 1937 frontiers. Not only
1 Gompsten in this connection the report on the fifth meeting on July 21 st in: H. S. Truman,
Memoirs, vol. I, pp. 366-370.
2 Compare the footnotes on pp. 237 and 238.
248
would the German food supply be cut, he stressed, but more than a million
Germans' would be forced into the western zones, “bringing their mouths with
them.” ne
Time after time, in discussing the claims of Poland and the question of recog-
nizing the existence of Polish administration of the area during the occupation,
the President repeated that there could be no transfer of territory until there
was a peace conference. In addition, we specifically refrained from promising to
support at the German Peace Conference any particular line as the western
frontier of Poland.
Our deliberate avoidance of a promise on the Polish border is emphasized by
the promise we did make in the protocol about the transfer of the city of
KG6nigsberg to the Soviet Union, when we said: “the President of the United
States and the British Prime Minister have declared that they will support the
proposal of this conference at the forthcoming peace settlement”.
To remove even an excuse for Poland or the Soviet Union to claim that the
line had been established or that there was any promise to support a particular
line, the Berlin Protocol declared: “The three heads of government reaffirm their
opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await
the peace settlement.”
In the light of this history, it is difficult to credit with good faith any person
who asserts that Poland’s western boundary was fixed by the conferees, or that
there was a promise that it would be established at some particular place.
We had recognized from the outset, however, that we would have to accept for
the time being the Polish administration of this part of the Soviet zone. It was
an accomplished fact and we could not force the Russians to resume the respon-
sibilities they had voluntarily resigned. However, no agreement even on the
temporary administration was reached until we came to grips with the issue of
reparations.
J. F. Byrnes, Speaking frankly. New York and London 1947, pp. 79-81.
152
Churchill: Poland wants to move too far West

A Polish observer has reported a significant detail from Potsdam:
During the Potsdam Conference Mr. Churchill, the Prime Minister, greeted the
Polish Delegation with the words:
“After the previous World War Poland moved too far East, now she wants to
move too far West.”?
St. Grabski, Na nowej drodze dziejowej (On new historic tracks), Warsaw 1946, p. 18.
Quoted in A. Klafkowski, Podstawy prawne granicy Odra-Nisa (The legal foundations
of the Oder-Neisse Line), p. 40.
1 In connection with this remarkable figure compare: W. Wagner, The Genesis of the
Oder-Neisse Line, pp. 142-143 (Germ. ed.: p. 150).
2 Compare No. 149, pp. 245-247.
249
153
Bevin shows little knowledge of the situation
During the Potsdam Conference there was a change of government in Great

Britain. A member of the American delegation writes about the meeting with
the new Prime Minister and his Foreign Secretary on July 28th:
Prime Minister Attlee and his newly appointed Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin,
arrived shortly after 9 p.m. and called on the President. Byrnes and I were present
and the conversation quickly centred on the possibility of settling the Polish
boundary question and reparations. Bevin was gruff and tough, and in some
ways not thoroughly informed. This became evident when he went to a map of
Poland that hung in Truman’s study to illustrate his ideas of what should be
done. I later told the President, and Truman agreed, that all it illustrated was
that Bevin did not know too much about Poland. ‘
W.D. Leahy, I was there, p. 490.
154
Molotov opposes any settlement other than the Oder-Neisse Line
On July 29th Mr. Stalin was indisposed. Mr. Truman received Mr. Molotov
in the presence of his Secretary of State. He himself reports on this:
Our meeting lasted about an hour. Molotov began by saying that he would
like to go over the problems that were proving difficult in the conference
discussions. Secretary Byrnes pointed out that there were two principal questions
which, in his opinion, remained outstanding and that if a decision could be
reached on these it would be possible to consider winding up the Big Three
conference. These were: the Polish western boundary and German reparations.
Secretary Byrnes then handed Molotov a copy of the United States proposal
for fixing the western boundary of Poland, which read in part as follows:
“The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination
of Poland’s western frontier, the former German territory east of a line running
from the Baltic Sea through Swinemiinde, to west of Stettin to the Oder and
thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the eastern Neisse River and
along the eastern Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of
East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and
including the area of the former free city of Danzig shall be under the adminis-
tration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as
part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.”
Molotov objected, saying that under the proposal the area between the Eastern
1 Compare also W. D. Leahy, I was there, p. 491.
250
and Western Neisse would not be included under Polish administration, and
stated that Marshall Stalin probably would not approve it for that reason.
I said that I thought this proposal would be agreeable to the Soviet delegation,
since in my opinion it represented a very large concession on our part, and that
I hoped Mr. Molotov would submit it to Marshal Stalin. He replied that he
would, of course, do so.
H.S.T ruman, Memoirs, vol. 1, pp. 400-401.
155
The decision is made in connection with questions of quite a different kind
The decision was made in the plenary meeting on July 31st.
As a result of three arduous day’s work with the Foreign Ministers, Secretary
Byrnes presented papers on reparations, Polish frontiers, and satellite states
which he said the United States was prepared to accept if the three papers were
approved together, each being dependent upon the others.
Byrnes proposed that for reparations 25 per cent of capital equipment in the
Ruhr not needed for Germany’s peace-time economy be exchanged with the
Soviet for material needed by the Western zones, and that 121/2 per cent be
transferred outright without exchange.
For a moment this appeared to be a satisfactory settlement, but uddenly Stalin
asked for more. He wanted, in addition to the above, 500 million Dollar, one-
third of the stock of German industry, one-third of Germany’s foreign assets,
and one-third of the gold captured by the Anglo-American armies. This was a
preposterous request, and it was quickly disapproved.
The final agreement on percentages of reparations to be taken from all western
zones for Russia war 15 per cent for exchange and 10 per cent without exchange.
Equipment to be removed was to be determined within six months.
The Big Three approved of France having a representative on the Reparations
Commission after some grumbling by the Generalissimo. He had voiced his
displeasure at the insistence of the United States on French representation when
he had talked to Hopkins in Moscow in June. He stated here at Potsdam that
France was the first failure on the western front, had done nothing helpful in
the war against Germany, and was entitled to little, if any, consideration.
The Polish paper provoked considerable discussion, but it was agreed that
Poland might continue an interim administration of the territory turned over
to her by the Soviet, which presumably referred to the Oder and to the Western
Neisse rivers. I was not clear whether Stettin was included, although later I
found out it was.
It was agreed also that the final Polish border would be fixed in the peace
treaty, but in view of the Russian attitude at Potsdam I was convinced that any
final settlement would sanction Poland’s land-grab. Soviet troops were to remain
in the area in “sufficient number” to guard the Russian supply lines to Germany.
251
Then came the long paper on the satellite states. In brief, it provided that the
Allied powers would at once study the matter of giving diplomatic recognition
to Hungary, Bulgaria, Roumania, and Finland. The paper as approved did not call
for recognition — it was some fancy verbiage to the effect that the “three govern-
ments agree to examine, each separately, in the near future, in the light of the
conditions prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations... etc.” There
also was a weakly worded assumption that the Balkan satellites would permit
freedom of Press to correspondents of all nations.
Eviction of Germans from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary threatened
to impose a severe burden on the occupation zones of Germany, particularly
since most of the refugees were entering the British and American areas. After
lengthy discussion, the governments of those three nations were asked to suspend
further expulsions until the respective Control Commission could study the
matter and make recommendations. ‘
W.D.Leahy, I was there, pp. 493-494.
156
Bevin: Eastern Germany must remain under Allied military control
President Truman reports on this meeting in his memoirs:
I announced that the next question on the agenda was the second of the three
proposals submitted in the United States paper — that of the western frontier of
Poland. Byrnes read the United States proposal, which provided that the Poles
were to have provisional administration of the area bounded by the Oder and
the Western Neisse.
Bevin stated that his instructions were to hold out for the Eastern Neisse. He
wanted to know if the zone would be handed over to the Poles entirely and if
Soviet troops would be completely withdrawn. Bevin added that, according to the
United States proposal, the territory would be under the Polish state and not
part of the Soviet zone of occupation or responsibility.
I interrupted to say that cession of territory was subject to the peace treaty
and that the American plan concerned only the temporary administration of this
area. Bevin said it was his understanding then that the area would still technically
remain under Allied military control. Otherwise, he said, we would be transferring
territory before the peace conference. If it were a question of outright transfer,
he said, he would first have to get the approval of the French. Stalin replied that
this concerned the Russian zone and that the French had nothing to do with it.
Bevin asked if the British could give away pieces of their zone without approval
from the other governments. Stalin replied that in the case of Poland it could
be done, because we were dealing with a state which had no western border. This
was the only such situation in the world, he asserted.
252
Bevin pointed out that the authority of the Control Council was to extend
over the whole of Germany with its 1937 boundaries. He questioned whether
any transfer could be made without consulting the Control Council.
Byrnes stated that we all understood that the cession of territory was left to
the peace conference. Here was a situation, he said, where Poland was adminis-
tering with Soviet consent a good part of this territory. Under the United States
proposal, he explained, the three powers would agree to the administration in
the interim by Poland in order that there would be no further dispute between
them in regard to the administration of the area by the Polish provisional govern-
ment. He added that it was not necessary that the Poles have a representative
on the Control Council.
After another exchange of views I declared that we were all agreed on the Polish
question. Stalin said, “Stettin is in the Polish territory.” Bevin said, “Yes, we
should inform the French.” And it was agreed to inform the French.
H.S.Truman, Memoirs, vol. I, pp. 405-406.
1ey/
The Potsdam decision is a compromise
Byrnes writes about this decisive day:
On July 31,1 told Mr. Molotov there were three outstanding issues: reparations,
Poland’s administration of a part of the Soviet zone, and our paper entitled
“Admission to the United Nations” dealing with Italy and the Balkan states. I
submitted a proposal containing the only concessions we were willing to make
and requested that Mr. Molotov present the three proposals to Generalissimo
Stalin so that they might be discussed at the afternoon session. I told him we
would agree to all three or none and that the President and I would leave for
the United States the next day.
When the conference opened that afternoon the President immediately sug-
gested that the three proposals be discussed and called on me to present them.
I did so, emphasizing that it was all one proposition.
Generalissimo Stalin expressed disapproval of “the tactic of Mr. Byrnes,” in
asking for consideration of the three proposals at one time. I replied that we had
been considering them one at a time for three weeks; that we were now making
concessions in one solely for the purpose of reaching a compromise on the three
in order to bring the conference to an end. Therefore, we insisted on this proce-
dure. The Generalissimo renewed his protest and then began to bargain. First,
he suggested a fantastic increase in reparations. Then, he proposed that the
amount of capital equipment to be removed from the western zone in return
for products such as food, coal, timber, and so on, be increased from 12 per cent
to 15 per cent. I said if he would withdraw his other demands and agree to the
253
other two proposals in dispute, we would agree to the 15 per cent. He agreed
and the conference ended shortly thereafter.
J. F. Byrnes, Speaking frankly, p. 85.
158
A last-hour discussion: What course shall the frontier take near Stettin?
The thirteenth and last meeting took place on the evening of August 1st.
Truman reports:
A protocol is a formal record of understandings reached by the parties to a

conference. At the Potsdam meeting there were no secrets. I had made up my
mind from the beginning that I would enter into no secret agreements, and there
was none.
In this final meeting much time was taken up by changes in wording and
minor amendments to the texts of both the protocol and the communiqué. For
instance, Molotov suggested an amendment to the text concerning the western
frontier of Poland. In the paragraph which stated that the line ran from the
Baltic Sea through Swinemiinde, he suggested the substitution of the words
“west of” instead of “through”.
“How far west?” I asked.
Stalin suggested the words “immediately west of,” and the change was approved.
Molotov then wished to make another change in the wording of the same
document. Instead of the words “subject to examination by experts” he suggested
the words “exact line on ground should be established by experts of the USSR
and Poland”.
Bevin stated that this was asking too much. The British could not cut them-
selves out of this, he added. Stalin observed that the question concerned the
frontiers of Russia and Poland, and Bevin admitted this fact, but he pointed out
that the line must be recognized by the United Nations. He went on to say that
the British and Americans had agreed to support this line at the peace settlement
but that we had not agreed to accept a line established by the Russians and Poles.
Stalin pointed out that the conditions for establishing the boundary were given
in the document, and all that remained was to establish the exact frontier. This
would mean only a variation of a kilometer or so, he remarked, “including a
village here or there”.
Attlee argued that the amendment proposed by Molotoy would anticipate the
work of the peace conference. He wished to have a commission of experts
appointed by the peace conference to lay out the frontier between Poland and
Russia.
Stalin replied that he just could not understand this attitude. He asked who it
was the British thought should be on the commission of experts — British, Ameri-
cans, or Australians? He agreed, however, to let the old wording stand, and
the Russian proposal was dropped.
254
_ Prolonged and petty bickering continued on the final wording of the protocol.
I was getting very impatient, as I had many times before in these sessions, with
all the repetition and beating around the bush, but I restrained myself because
I saw that we were very slowly making progress in the right direction. I did
not see why they could not come right to the point and get it over with instead
of doing so much talking.
H.S.Truman, Memoirs, vol. I, pp. 409-410.
159
Marshall: This settlement is not final
A remark by Mr. Marshall, the US Secretary of State, at the Moscow Con-

ference on April 9th, 1947, is informative regarding the course of the nego-
tiations at Potsdam. Mr. Marshall said with reference to Potsdam:
It was stated, according to our record, by Generalissimo Stalin that several

communications had been received from the American and British Govern-
ments to the effect that a Polish administration ought not to be established in
certain areas until the western frontiers [of Poland] had been finally fixed.
Generalissimo Stalin further stated, according to our record, that the Soviet
Union could not accept these suggestions, since the German population had
followed the German armies to the west and the Poles had remained, and the
Red Army had need of local administrators in this territory because it could
not do the fighting and clearing out of enemy agents at the same time.
In other words, there existed a situation which could not well be reversed at
that particular time — I repeat again, at that particular time. The President of
the United States agreed to the statement which to us, in plain English, means
that this matter was to be settled at the peace conference. In other words, Mr.
Truman had a clear understanding in his mind of the circumstances under which
the Potsdam agreement was reached and he also had a perfectly definite under-
standing — as have all of us who read the English language — a clear understanding
that this matter was not settled at that time and was left to the present and future.
months to be settled.
The New York Times, April 10th, 1947.
160
The German Eastern territories are transferred to Polish administration,

the inhabitants are expelled
Three sections of the Declaration! on the Potsdam Conference, signed by

Stalin, Truman and Attlee on August 2nd, 1945, refer to Eastern Germany:
1 Strictly speaking, there is no “Potsdam Agreement”, but only a Protocol, the major part
of which is identical with the “Declaration”. Section VI of the Declaration corresponds to
Section V of the Protocol, etc.
235
VI_ City of Koenigsberg and the adjacent area
The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government that pending

the final determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement, the section
of the western frontier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which is adjacent
to the Baltic Sea should pass from a point on the eastern shore of the Bay of
Danzig to the east, north of Braunsberg-Goldap, to the meeting point of the
frontiers of Lithuania, the Polish Republic and East Prussia.
- The Conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet Govern-_
ment concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the City of Koe-
nigsberg and the area adjacent to it as described above, subject to expert examina-
tion of the actual frontier.
The President of the United States and the British Prime Minister have declared
that they will support the proposal of the Conference,at the forthcoming peace
settlement. i
IX Poland
The Conference considered questions relating to the Polish Provisional Govern-

ment and the western boundary of Poland.
On the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity they defined their
attitude in the following statement:
(a) We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among repre-
sentative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation,
in accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish
Provisional Government of National Unity recognised by the three Powers. The
establishment by the British and United States Governments of diplomatic
relations with the Polish Provisional Government has resulted in the withdrawal
of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no
longer exists.
The British and United States Governments have taken measures to protect
the interest of the Polish Provisional Government as the recognised Government
of the Polish State in the property belonging to the Polish State located in their
territories and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be.
They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such
property. All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government
for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property
belonging to the Polish State which may have been wrongfully alienated.
The three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government in
facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who
wish to go, including members of the Polish Armed Forces and the Merchant
Marine. They expect that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal
and property rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens.
The three Powers note that the Polish Provisional Government in accordance
with the decisions of the Crimea Conference has agreed to the holding of free
256
and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and
secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right
to take part and to put forward candidates, and that representatives of the Allied
press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Poland
before and during the elections.
(b) The following agreement was reached on the western frontier of Poland:
In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimea Con-
ference the three Heads of Government have sought the opinion of the Polish
Provisional Government of National Unity in regard to the accession of
territory in the north and west which Poland should receive. The President of
the National Council of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional Govern-
ment of National Unity have been received at the Conference and have fully
presented their views. The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion
that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the
peace settlement.
The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination
of Poland’s western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running
from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinemiinde, and thence along the
Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the western
Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not
placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in
accordance with the understanding reached at this Conference and including the
area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the
Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet
Zone of occupation in Germany.
XIII Orderly transfers of German populations
The Conference reached the following agreement on the removal of Germans

from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary:
The three Governments, having considered the question in all its aspects,
recognise that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements
thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be
undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in
an orderly and humane manner.
Since the influx of a large number of Germans into Germany would increase
the burden already resting on the occupying authorities, they consider that the
Allied Control Council in Germany should in the first instance examine the
problem with special regard to the question of the equitable distribution of these
Germans among the several zones of occupation. They are accordingly instruct-
ing their respective representatives on the Control Council to report to their
Governments as soon as possible the extent to which such persons have already
entered Germany from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and to submit an
Jaey|
r :
i y
estimate of the time and rate at which further transfers could be carried out,
having regard to the present situation in Germany. i i
The Czechoslovak Government, the Polish Provisional Government and the
Control Council in Hungary are at the same time being informed of the above,
and are being requested meanwhile to suspend further expulsions pending the
examination by the Governments concerned of the report from their represen-
tatives on the Control Council.
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Balaquee CBMHeMIOH]e U OTTyfa 10 peke Opep Ao BrageHuA peru danaqnan
Heiice u no Sanaguom Heiice 70 4exoctoBauKou rpaHUbl, BKIOWaA Ty
uactb Bocrounot IIpyccum, xoropas B coorBercTBum ¢ pemenuem Bep-
smmucKon Kondepennum ne nocraBsiena nox yupaBmenue Corosa Copercrux
Coumanucruyeckux Pecny6umK, u BEKIIOUaA TeppuTopulo §ObIBUIero
cBobogzHoro ropopa Jlanuur, — OJUKHEI HAXOJUTLCAH NO, yupaBrenwem
1 The official version erroneously says: Bpema.
259
t
4
Iloapckoro rocyqapcTBa MH B 9TOM OTHOMeHMM OHM He AOJPKHBI pac-

CMaTPMBaTLCA KAaK YACTb COBETCKOM 30HBI OKKyNanuu B Tepmanun.
XIII Vnopsyouennoe nepememenue repMancKoro HacedeHuA

Houdepenma focrurma cuefyioulero cormalieHuA O BbICeeHMM
Hemyes us Honapmu, Uexocuopakuu u Benrpun:
Tpu Ipasureapcrpa, paccmoTpeB BOUpoc BO BCeX acleKTax, IpW3Haior,
4TO JlOJVKHO ONIT MpesUpMHATO MepemenjeHue B TepManuio HeMeIKOrO
HacesieHuA Wim uactu ero, ocrapiueroca B Ilonpme, UexocnoBaKuu u
Beurpuu. Ouw cormacHbl B TOM, 4TO st1060e MepememjeHue, KOTOpOe OyeT
MMeTb MCCTO, JOUKHO MpOM3BOAMTBCA OpraHW30BaHHBIM WM TryM@HHBbIM
cnoco6om. Tak Kak upuOniTue Oom_LIOTO KOMYeCTBa HemileB B epMaHuto
yBemmuuBaer OpemMA, yeKe Jemamjee HA OKKYNMpylUIMX BUAaCTAX, OHM
cuutaior, uro HKoutpompbuni Coset Bp TepManuu jouKeH B IepByt0
ouepefb M3yYMTL aTY UpoOsemy, OcobeHHO OOpaTuB BHUMAHMe Ha BOIpOC
cupaBeIMBOrO pactipeseeHMA STUX HEMIeEB 10 BCeEM 30HAM OKKYyAalun.
Oxuu faqyT “HCTpykUuM cBouM MpeyctaBuTeiamM B HoutposmbHoM Copere |
JONO7KUTb CBOMM UpaBMUTeIbCTBAM TAK CKOPO, KaK 9TO BO3MO?7KHO, O
KOJIMYCCTBE, B KAKOM yRa3aHHoe HaceseHue yrKe Ipuosi0 B LepManmio 3
Ilonpmu, UexocuoBaxuu u Benrpun, u arb UpeJioxeHuA O BpeMeHu UH
cKopocTu, Cc Kako flaubHelimlee MepemMeljeHwe HaceseHuA MOTsO OBI
IIpOM3BOMUTLCA, UPWMHMMaA BO BHUMAHMe CyMeCTBYIOMylo CUTyaluio B
Tepmanuu.
B ro #ke camMoe BpeMA YexXOCMOBAaNKOe MpaBUTeIbcBO, MOAbECKOe Bpe-
meHHoe IIpasurespcTBo u Com3sHaa Koutpombyaa Homuccua B Bexnrpuu
OyayT uHpopMMpoBaHE! O BEIeyKasaHHOM UM uM OypeT UpeymoReHO
BOSepMaTECA OT flallbHelillero BOABOPeHMA HeMeKOTO HaceJeHuA
BUpPeAb JO paCCMOTPeHUA COOTBETCTBYIONIMMM TpaBuTeIbcCTBaMM FOKMaya
Mx upeyctaputenei B KoutrpombHom Cosere.
French* text
VI Ville et hinterland de Koenigsberg
La Conférence a examiné une proposition du Gouvernement soviétique suivant

laquelle, en attendant la fixation définitive des problémes territoriaux par les
traités de paix, la section de la frontiére occidentale de l’U.R.S.S. adjacente a la
Baltique partirait d’un point situé sur la céte orientale de la baie de Dantzig pour
se diriger vers l’est au point de jonction des frontiéres de la Lithuanie, de la Répu-
blique polonaise et de la Prusse orientale, au nord de Braunsberg-Goldap.
La Conférence a accepté le principe de la proposition soviétique concernant le
transfert 4 l’U.R.S.S. de la ville de Koenigsberg et de la région adjacente, telle
quelle est décrite plus haut, sous réserve d’un examen de la frontiére actuelle par
des experts.
1 Since France did not take part in the Conference, the French text is not official. It was
included here all the same, as it has occasionally been referred to during legal controversies.
260
Le Président des Etats Unis et le Premier Ministre britannique ont déclaré
qwils appuieraient la proposition de la Conférence au moment du traité de paix. —
IX Pologne
La Conférence a examiné les questions relatives au gouvernement provisoire

polonais et a la frontiére occidentale de la Pologne:
a) A Pégard du gouvernement provisoire polonais d’unité nationale, les mem-
bres de la Conférence ont précisé leur attitude dans la déclaration suivante:
a
«Nous avons pris note avec plaisir de l’accord réalisé entre les Polonais re-
présentatifs, de Pologne et de l’étranger, lequel a rendu possible la formation,
conformément aux décisions de la Conférence de Crimée, d’un gouvernement
provisoire polonais d’unité nationale reconnu par les trois Puissances. L’établisse-
ment par les gouvernements britannique et américain de relations diplomatiques
avec le gouvernement provisoire polonais a eu pour conséquence le retrait de
leur reconnaissance du gouvernement polonais antérieur de Londres, qui a cessé
d’exister.
Les gouvernements britannique et américain ont pris des mesures pour pro-
téger les intéréts du gouvernement provisoire polonais en tant que gouvernement
reconnu de l’Etat polonais, dans tous les biens appartenant a l’Etat polonais qui
se trouvent sur leurs propres territoires et sous leur contréle, quelle que soit
la forme de ces biens. Ils ont, d’autre part, pris des mesures en vue d’empécher la
remise de ces biens a des tierces parties. Toute facilité sera donnée au gouverne-
ment provisoire polonais pour l’exercice des moyens légaux destinés 4 récupérer
tout bien appartenant a l’Etat polonais qui aurait pu étre aliéné.
Les trois Puissances sont désireuses d’aider le gouvernement provisoire po-
lonais en facilitant le retour en Pologne, dés que faire se pourra, de tous les
Polonais actuellement 4 l’étranger, et qui le désirent, y compris les membres des
forces armées et de la marine marchande polonaises. Elles esp¢rent que les Po-
lonais qui rentreront dans leur patrie jouiront des droits personnels sur la méme
base que tous les citoyens polonais.
Les trois Puissances notent que le gouvernement provisoire polonais, con-
formément aux décisions de la Conférence de Crimée, accepte que des élections
libres soient organisées dés que possible, sur la base du suffrage universel et secret,
suffrage auquel tous les parties démocratiques et antinazis auront le droit de
prendre part et de présenter des candidats, et que les représentants de la presse
alli¢e aient toute liberté de faire connaitre au monde les événements de Pologne
avant et pendant les élections.»
b) L’accord suivant a été conclu sur la frontiére occidentale de Pologne:
«Conformément 4 laccord de la Conférence de Crimée en ce qui concerne la
Pologne, les chefs des trois Gouvernements ont sollicité ’avis du gouvernement
provisoire polonais sur l’accroissement de territoire dont la Pologne doit profiter
au nord et 4 l’ouest.
Le président du Conseil national de Pologne et les membres du gouvernement
provisoire polonais ont été recus 4 la Conférence et ont présenté leur point de
261
‘ ; ! rl
4A
vue. Les chefs des trois Gouvernements réaffirment l’avis que la délimitation finale —
de la frontitre occidentale de la Pologne doit étre fait au moment du réglement.
de la paix. ©
Les chefs des trois Gouvernements sont d’accord sur le fait que, en attendant le
tracé définitif, les territoires ex-allemands 4 l’est d’une ligne partant de la Baltique
4 Pouest de Swinemunde, descendant le long de l’Oder jusqu’au confluent de la
Neisse occidentale, puis le long de celle-ci jusqu’a la frontiére tchécoslovaque com-
prenant la partie de la Prusse Orientale non placée sous l’administration soviéti-
que d’aprés ladite Conférence de Crimée!, et comprenant la région de l’ex-cité
libre de Dantzig, seront remis 4 |’administration de l’Etat polonais et a cette fin ae
ee
ne devront pas étre considérés comme partie de la zone soviétique d’occupation

de Allemagne.
XIII Transfert ordonné de populations allemandes
La Conférence est parvenue 4 l’accord suivant au sujet du transfert des Alle-

mands de Pologne, du Tchécoslovaquie et de Hongrie:
Les trois gouvernements, aprés avoir examiné la question sous tous les aspects,
reconnaissent que l’on devra procéder au transfert en Allemagne des populations
allemandes demeurées en Pologne, en Tchécoslovaquie et en Hongrie. ils sont
d’accord sur le fait que ces transferts doivent étre effectués de fagon ordonnée et
humaine, étant donné que I’arrivée d’un grand nombre d’Allemands déversés en
Allemagne accroitrait la charge qui pése déja sur les autorités d’occupation. Ils
estiment que le Comité de contréle doit d’abord étudier le probléme en tenant
particuli¢rement compte d’une équitable distribution des Allemands en question
entre les différentes zones d’occupation. En conséquence, ils donneront des in-
structions 4 leurs représentants respectifs 4 ce Comité de contrdle, afin que ceux-ci
‘fassent savoir 4 leurs gouvernements dés que possible, dans quelle mesure des
Allemands ont déja pénétré en Allemagne venant de Pologne, de Tchéchoslova-
quie et de Hongrie, et donnent une estimation du temps et de la cadence néces-
‘Saires aux transfers ultérieurs. Etant donné la situation actuelle en Allemagne,
le gouvernement tchécoslovaque, le gouvernement provisoire polonais et le Co-
mité de contréle en Hongrie sont informés de ce qui précéde et sont invités a
suspendre toute expulsion, pendant que les gouvernements intéressés examineront
les rapports de leurs représentants au Comité de contrdle.
Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany, Supplement No. 1. Berlin 1946.
1 The Potsdam Conference is named here in the other texts.
262
oe
ae
XIV
The Interpretation of Potsdam

161
Truman: The final settlement will be effected at the Peace Conference
President Truman reported to the American population in 4 broadcast speech

on the Conference on August 9th. In the course of this he said inter alia: ©
The question of Poland was a most difficult one. Certain compromises about
Poland had already been agreed upon at the Crimea Conference. They obviously
were binding us at Berlin.
By the time of the Berlin Conference, the Polish Provisional Government of
National Unity had already been formed; and it had been recognized by all of us.
The new Polish government had agreed to hold free and unfettered elections as
soon as possible, on the basis of universal suffrage and the secret ballot.
In accordance with the Crimea agreement, we did seek the opinion of the
Polish Provisional Government of National Unity with respect to its western ©
and northern boundaries.
They agreed, as did we all, that the final determination of the borders could
not be accomplished at Berlin, but must await the peace settlement. However, a
considerable portion of what was the Russian zone of occupation in Germany
was turned over to Poland at the Berlin Conference for administrative purposes
until the final determination of the peace settlement.
Nearly every international agreement has in it the element of compromise.
The agreement on Poland is no exception. No one nation can expect to get
everything that it wants. It is a question of give and take — of being willing to
meet your neighbor half-way.
In this instance there is much to justify the action taken. An agreement on some
line — even provisionally — was necessary to enable the new Poland to organize
itself, and to permit the speedier withdrawal of the armed forces which had
liberated her from the Germans. In the area east of the Curzon Line there are
over 3,000,000 Poles! who are to be returned to Poland. They need room to
settle. The new area in the West was formerly populated by Germans. But most
of them have already left in the face of the invading Soviet Army. We were
informed that there are only about a million and a half left?.
The territory the Poles are to administer will enable Poland better to support
its population. It will provide a short and more easily defensible frontier between
1 Compare in this connection the footnotes on pp. 48, 110, 234.

2 Compare in this connection the footnote on p. 237.
263
Poland and Germany. Settled by Poles, it will provide a more homogenous
nation. ‘
The Three Powers also agreed to bring about the earliest possible return to
Poland of all Poles who wish to return, including soldiers, with the assurance
that they would have all the rights of other Polish citizens.
The action taken at Berlin will help carry out the basic policy of the United
Nations toward Poland — to create a strong, independent and prosperous nation
with a government to be selected by the people themselves.
It was agreed to recommend that in the peace settlement a portion of East
Prussia should be turned over to Russia. That, too, was agreed upon at Yalta.
It will provide the Soviet Union, which did so much to bring about victory in
Europe, with an ice-free port at the expense of Germany.
Voices of history, 1945-46, edited by N. Ausubel. New York 1946, pp. 427-428.
.
162
The French Government objects to German central authorities
The decisions of the Potsdam Conference were communicated to the pro-

visional French Government; the French Foreign Minister commented in
detail on these decisions on August 7th, 1945, in six Notes sent to the
Ambassadors of the Powers holding the conference. The text of the second
Note was as follows:
Par lettre no. 669 du 31 juillet, vous avez bien voulu me communiquer, de la
part du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis et en accord avec les Gouvernements du
Royaume-Uni et de l’Union des Républiques Socialistes Soviétiques, le texte d’un
arrangement intervenu entre ces Gouvernements au sujet des ,,Principes politi-
ques qui devraient présider au traitement de |’Allemagne dans la période initiale
du contréle“. ...
Certaines des mesures préconisées semblent préjuger une évolution politique
future de l’Allemagne, dont il est, 4 ’heure actuelle, impossible d’apercevoir si
elle correspond aux intéréts de la paix européenne et aux vceux mémes des
populations intéressées.
Le Gouvernement frangais a particuliérement en vue, 4 cet égard, la recon-
stitution des partis politiques pour l’ensemble de |’Allemagne, la création de
Départements administratifs centraux qui seraient dirigés par des Secrétaires
d’Etat dont la juridiction s’*étendrait, semble-t-il, 4 l’ensemble du territoire alle-
mand, lequel n’est cependant pas encore délimité.
Le Gouvernement frangais estime, pour sa part, qu'il serait préférable, avant
de définir des conditions de cette nature, de tenir compte des expériences que les
quatre Puissances occupantes ne manqueront pas de recueillir pendant la phase
initiale de contrdle.
Documents frangais relatifs ad Allemagne; Aoiit 1945—Février 1947 (French Documents
referring to Germany; August 1945—February 1947). Paris 1947, pp. 8-9.
264
Translation
In your letter No. 669, dated July 31st, you were good enough to transmit to me
in the name of the Government of the United States of America, and in agreement
with the Governments of the United Kingdom and the USSR, the text of an
Agreement concluded between these Governments concerning the “Political
Principles on which the treatment of Germany is to be based during the first
stage of control”. ...
Certain of the measures contemplated would appear to anticipate a decision
regarding the future political development of Germany, and it cannot possibly
be ascertained at the present time whether this is in the interests of European
Peace, or even in conformity with the wishes of the population affected.
In this connection the French Government is concerned in particular with the
restoration of the political parties throughout the whole of Germany and with
the setting up of central administrative agencies under the direction of Secretaries
of State, whose competence is apparently to extend over the entire German
territory, the frontiers of which have not been fixed as yet.
The French Government, for its part, is of the opinion that it would be pre-
ferable, before laying down conditions of this kind, to attach value to the
experiences which the four Occupation Powers are sure to gather during the
first stage of control.
163
France raises no objections against the Polish administration
The fifth French Note, dated August 7th, was worded as follows:
Par lettre en date ler aoifit, vous avez bien voulu me transmettre, au nom de
votre Gouvernement, le texte d’un «Arrangement relatif aux frontiéres occi-
dentales de la Pologne» intervenu 4 Potsdam entre les Gouvernements soviétique,
britannique et américain.
Le Gouvernement frangais n’a pas d’objections de principe quant 4 la prise
en charge par l’administration polonaise des territoires situés 4 l’est de la ligne
indiquée, non plus qu’a V’installation de l’administration soviétique dans une
partie de la Prusse orientale.
Il estime cependant que le probléme des frontiéres de l’Allemagne forme un
tout et qu il ne saurait recevoir de solution qu’ aprés avoir été examiné en com-
mun par toutes les Puissances intéressées.
Documents francais relatifs a l Allemagne (French Documents referring to Germany),
pp. 10-11.
Translation
In your letter of August 1st you were good enough to transmit to me in the
name of your Government the text of an “Agreement on the Western frontier
265
of Poland”, which had eee asariuded® at Shiadaed between the Soviet, British
and American Governments.
The French Government raises no fundamental aipteieet to the Polish ad-
ministration’s taking over the territories to the east of the line indicated, and
to the setting up of a Soviet administration in a part of East Prussia.
It is, however, of the opinion, that the problem of Germany’s frontiers forms
part of a whole, and that it can be solved only after a joint investigation by all
the interested powers.
164
The French Government only takes note of the resettlement of the “German
minorities”
The sixth French Note, dated August 7th, 1945, was worded as follows:
En réponse 4 votre communication du ler aoit concernant les transferts en

Allemagne de populations minoritaires allemandes se trouvant en Pologne, en ~
Tchécoslovaquie et en Hongrie, j’ai l’honneur de vous faire connaitre que le
Gouvernement francais a pris acte de l’arrangement intervenu 4a ce sujet entre
les Gouvernements américain, britannique et soviétique et dont vous avez bien
voulu me communiquer le texte.
Le Gouvernement francais n’éléve pas d’objections contre le principe de ces
transferts. Il ne lui échappe pas d’autre part qu’un afflux considérable de popu-
lation dans les diverses zones peut, dans les circonstances présentes, rendre plus
difficile la tache des autorités de contrdle.
Etant donné la complexité du probléme, le Gouvernement frangais, A la
connaissance duquel les données materiélles n’ont pas encore été portées, n’est pas
actuellement en mesure de prendre 4 ce sujet une position définitivement arrétée.
Documents frangais relatifs a ?Allemagne (French documents referring to Germany), p. 11.
Translation
In reply to your communication of August 1st, concerning the resettlement of

German minorities from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary in Germany, I
have the honour to inform you that the French Government has taken note of
the Agreement concluded on this subject between the American, British and
Soviet Governments, the text of which you have been good enough to communi-
cate to me.
The French Government raises no objections against the principle of this resettle-
ment. On the other hand it has not failed to note that a considerable influx of
population into the various zones may, under the present circumstances, render
the task of the control authorities more difficult.
In view of the complexity of the problem, the French Government, which has
not yet been informed of the essential facts, is at present not in a position to
express a conclusive opinion on this subject.
266
Cae
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aa re,
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as ihSc a a 165
Poland and the Soviet Union fix the border line and divide East Prussia
On August 16th, 1945, Mr. Osdbka-Morawski and Mr. Molotov signed an

agreement in Moscow regarding the frontier between the Soviet Union and
Poland which contained the following:
~ Artykut 1
Zgodnie z decyzjqa Konferencji Krymskiej ustalié granice pahstwowa miedzy
Rzeczapospolita Polska i Zwiazkiem SRR wzdluz ,linii Curzona* z odchyleniami
od niej na rzecz Polski w niektérych rejonach od pieciu do ofmiu kilometréw,
_ zgodnie z zalaczona mapa, w skali 1 : 500000, ustepujac Polsce dodatkowo:
a) obszar polozony na wschdd od , linii Curzona* do rzeki Bug i rzeki Solokija, na

poludnie od miasta Kryléw z odchyleniem na rzecz Polski, nie przekraczajq~
a“
- eym trzydziestu kilometréw;
b) czesé obszaru Puszczy Bialowieskiej na odcinku Niemiréw-Jal6wka, lezacego
na wschdd od ,,linii Curzona“, facznie z Niemirowem, Hajnéwka, Bialowiezq
i Jatowka, z odchyleniem na rzecz Polski, nie przekraczajacym 17 kilometréw.
Artykul 3
Az do ostatecznego rozstrzygniecia zagadnien terytorialnych przy uregulowaniu
pokojowym, cze$é granicy Polsko-Radzieckiej, przylegajaca do morza Baltyckiego,
zgodnie z decyzja Konferencji Berlinskiej, bedzie przebiegala wzdluz linii od
punktu na wschodnim wybrzezu Zatoki Gdahskiej, oznaczonego na zalaczonej
mapie — ku wschodowi, na pdtnoc od miasta Braunsberg — Goldap do punktu,w
ktérym ta linia zbiega sie z liniq graniczna opisana w artykule drugim niniejszej
Umowy.
Russian text
Cratpa 1
YcranHosuTh cormacno pemenmio Kprmcroi Honhepenyuu rocysapcr-
BeHHYy!I0 rpanuny Mempy [oupcko PecnyOnunoit u Cowsom CCP syomp
«umuum Kepsona» ¢ orcrynseHuem oT Hee B nomp3sy Loup B HeROTOpHIX
paiionax OT NATH 0 BOChMM KUJIOMeTPOB, COrmacHo IpusaraemMol KapTe B
macuitade 1 :500.000, ycrynus Ilonbme fomomHuTeIbHO:
a) TeppuTopmi0, pactomoKeHHy!I0 K BOCTORY oT «mum Kepsona » 70°
' peru Sanaqunii Byr u pexu Conorna, k ory oT ropoza Hpsiios c orK0He-
HueM B HOUb8y IlombmM MakKcuMasbHO Ha 30 KMIOMeTPOB;
6) uactb Tepputopuu Benozemcnon Ilynj, na yaacrnxe Hemupos-
AlnopKa, pacnomomeHHow Ha BOCTOK oT «amHuu Hepsona», BRIOTaA
Hemupos, Taiinopny, Bbenonem u Anopry, ¢ oTKIOHeHMeM B TOUb3y
Tlonpmm MakcumanbHo Ha 17 KMIOMeTpOB.
eee
267
Crarba 3 rane teal Vining
Bupeab AO OKOHYATeEMLHOLO pelleHUA TeppUTOPMAaIbHBIX BOMPOCOB Upu
MUPHOM yperysupoBanum, upuueraiomad K Banruiicromy Mopio YacTh
TIOJIbCKO-COBCTCKOM TpaHvUb, B COOTBeTCTBUM ¢ pemieHuem bepsmucKol
Hondepenuuu, OyqeT UpOXO_MTh MO JMHUM OT IyYHKTa Ha BOCTOYHOM
Oepery Jlanuurcnoit OyxTsl, oOo3HayeHHOTO Ha MpWsaraeMOM KapTe, K
Bocroky —cesepHee Bpayncdepra—Toubgama fo UyHKTa, rye eta
JIMHUA BCTpeyaeTcA C NOrpanuyHolt WMHMel, OMMCAaHHOM B CTaTbe BTOpou
Hactosxmero J,oropopa.
Translation
Article 1
In conformity with the decision taken at the Crimea Conference, the state
frontier between the Polish Republic and the USSR*shall follow the “Curzon
Line”, with deviations of from five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland in certain
regions, in accordance with the enclosed map}, the scale of which is 1 : 500000.
The following additional territory shall be ceded to Poland:
(a) The territory east of the “Curzon Line” as far as the Western Bug and the
river Solokija, and south of the town of Krylov with a maximum deviation of
30 kilometres in favour of Poland?.
(b) Part of the territory of the Forest of Bieloviez, in the district of Niemirov-
Yalovka east of the “Curzon-Line”’, including Niemirov, Hajnovka, Bieloviez
and Yalovka, with a maximum deviation of 17 kilometres in favour of Poland.
T
eee
Article 3 4
Until such time as territorial questions have been finally decided by peaceful
settlement, the part of the Polish-Soviet frontier adjoining the Baltic Sea shall,
in accordance with the decision taken at the Berlin Conference, follow a line
starting from a point on the Eastern shore of the Gulf of Danzig, indicated on
the attached map, continuing in an easterly direction north of Braunsberg-
Goldap, to the point where that line meets the frontier line described in Article2
of the present Treaty. j
United Nations Treaty series, vol. 10, pp. 194-198 (No. 61).
! This map could not be added to this volume for technical reasons. It is accessible at the
place indicated in the Treaty series of the United Nations.
® This deviation from the Curzon Line was very largely cancelled again by an agreement
between the Soviet Union and Poland dated February 15th, 1951. By this agreement 185
square miles between the rivers Bug and Sotokija with the towns of Belz, Uhnéw and
Warez, which went to the Soviet Ukraine, were exchanged for 185 square miles east of the
upper San with the town of Ustrzyki Dolne, which were given to Poland. The population
on both sides was exchanged. Compare: G. Rhode: Polnisch-sowjetischer Gebietsaustausch
(Exchange of territories between Poland and the Soviet Union), in: Zeitschrift fiir Geo-
politik (Geopolitical Magazine), Year XXII, 1951, p. 443-444 with sketch.
268
| | | 166
Churchill: The Oder-Neisse Line is not agood augury for Europe
When rendering his last account in the House of Commons, which’ at the
same time was his first speech as Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Churchill
stated on August 16th, 1945:
It would be at once wrong and impossible to conceal the divergencies of view

which exist inevitably between the victors about the state of affairs in Eastern
and Middle Europe. I do not at all blame the Prime Minister or the new Foreign
Secretary, whose task it was to finish up the discussions which we had begun.
I am sure they did their best. We have to realise that no one of the three leading
Powers can impose its solutions upon others and that the only solutions possible
are those which are in the nature of compromise. We British have had very early _
_and increasingly to recognise the limitations of our own power and influence,
great though it be, in the gaunt world arising from the ruins of this hideous war.
It is not in the power of any British Government to bring home solutions which
would be regarded as perfect by the great majority of Members of this House,
wherever they may sit. I must put on record my own opinion that the provisional
Western frontier agreed upon for Poland, running from Stettin on the Baltic,
along the Oder and its tributary, the Western Neisse, comprising as it does one
quarter of the arable land of all Germany, is not a good augury for the future
map of Europe. We always had in the Coalition Government a desire that
Poland should receive ample compensation in the West for the territory ceded
to Russia East of the Curzon Line. But here I think a mistake has been made, in
which the Provisional Government of Poland have been an ardent partner, by
going far beyond what necessity or equity required. There are few virtues that
the Poles do not possess — and there are few mistakes they have ever avoided.
I am particularly concerned, at this moment, with the reports reaching us of
the conditions under which the expulsion and exodus of Germans from the new
Poland are being carried out. Between 8000000 and 9000000 persons dwelt in
those regions before the war. The Polish Government say that there are still
1500000 of these not yet expelled within their new frontiers!. Other millions
must have taken refuge behind the British and American lines, thus increasing
the food stringency in our sector. But enormous numbers are utterly unaccount-
ed for. Where are they gone, and what has been their fate? The same conditions
may reproduce themselves in a more modified form in the expulsion of great
numbers of Sudeten and other Germans from Czechoslovakia. Sparse and guarded
accounts of what has happened and is happening have filtered through, but it is
not impossible that tragedy on a prodigious scale is unfolding itself behind the
iron curtain which at the moment divides Europe in twain. I should welcome
any statement which the Prime Minister can make which would relieve or at
least inform us upon this very anxious and grievous matter.
1 Compare note 1 on page 237,
269
i 3 # i a ‘une i I wie
Bevin: There was a kind of vacuum which had to be filled i

; In the course of the first debate on foreign policy of the new House of Com- ;
mons, the Potsdam agreement was also discussed on August 20th, 1945.
: Mr. Bevin stated: ; ws
One of the great problems which still face us is that of Poland, and I know.
there is some feeling about the extent of the area which has been included in the
Polish zone. The question of the actual future area of Poland must be settled
at the peace table, and I admit personally, taking the view expressed by the
right hon. Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) with regard to the danger of
the Poles going too far West. Let me tell the House something of the situation
which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and I found at Potsdam. There
was a kind of vacuum from which the Germans had been driven, and the
administration of the zone was largely handed over to the Poles. I am referring
to the territory between the Eastern and the Western Neisse!. We came to the
conclusion at the end of our discussions with the Soviet, United States and Polish
Governments that there was no escaping the conclusion that the economy of
the region must be restored so that these territories could be able to make their
full contribution as soon as possible to the provisioning of devastated Europe.
The question of where the final delimitation of the frontier will rest will”
depend to a large extent on what the population is that returns to Poland.
From what was said by the right hon. Gentleman:the Member for Woodford,
the impression may have been given that the figure he quoted of 8000000 or
9000000 was the number of persons to be displaced as a result of the transfer
to the Polish zone of the territories between the Eastern and Western Neisse.
In actual fact, that figure represented the pre-war census of population contained
in the whole area of German territories now being administered by the Poles.
Mr. Churchill (Woodford): That is what I meant.
Mr. Bevin: It did not quite read that way. There had been agreement, at least
by the inference, that the Poles should go up to the Oder and the Eastern Neisse.
The population of the territories to the West of this latter river, even on a pre-
war basis, amounted to a little over 3,000,000, most of whom were said to be 2
already gone. No mines were working, nothing was happening there, and they
had just been driven out. On the other side, as I understand it, there are 4,000,000
Poles? in the territory that has been ceded to Russia. Will they return to Poland,
or will they remain in Russia? (Hon. Members: “No.”) It depends on what hap-
pens. When people are attached to their little bits of land, they do not always go.
You never know what will happen. They are allowed a certain period in which to
* It is not clear why Mr. Bevin here, and subsequently, spoke only of the territory between
the two rivers Neisse, and to the West of the Eastern Neisse respectively, instead of
speaking of the whole of Eastern Germany. Compare in this connection Nos. 145, 146, 148
and 168.
2 Compare the notes on pp. 48, 110, 234.
270
7
go into Poland, and we cannot tell whether they will transfer. It would notbe right
of the House to ask me to judge what is going to happen until I can see. Then
there are the Polish troops and civilians in Western Europe. Thousands of Poles
are outside Poland, either in the Services or working. The number of Poles in
Field-Marshal Montgomery’s zone alone to be repatriated is 550,000.
Right hon. Gentlemen opposite are aware, as a result of their discussions with
the Poles, how difficult it is to get a clear understanding as to the future Govern-
ment and administration of Poland. It was with this knowledge, and with these
considerations in mind, that the Prime Minister and I met the representatives of
the Polish Government on three occasions while at Potsdam. We pursued the |
question of Poles returning to settle in the new Poland, and we were assured that
all Poles returning, whether in the Services or as civilians, will be accorded per-
sonal rights and rights of property on the same basis as all Polish citizens. Then
we raised the question of the elections, and were assured that the elections would
be free, secret, and conducted in accordance with the 1921 Constitution, and
further that it was hoped to hold them as soon as possible, not later than early
1946. We asked about freedom of religion, and we were assured that it was free
in Poland and would remain so. We also asked for the right of entry for the Press
of the world, and for the sending out of uncensored news. That, too, was accep-
ted. Further, we came to an arrangement for the establishment of a reciprocal air
service between London and Warsaw, to serve British and Polish official needs,
and that service has now begun.
I indicated to the representatives of the Polish Government at Potsdam that
the British people desired friendship with the Polish people, and said that no-
thing would prevent friendly relations except failure to give effect to the assuran-
ces which the Polish representatives had given. We shall expect, in particular, that
the principal Polish democratic parties, such as the Peasant Party, the Christian
Labour Party, the Socialist Party equally with the Communist Party will be
allowed to take part in the elections with full liberty to make their own pro-
grammes and put up their own candidates, and that freedom of speech, freedom
of association and impartial justice shall be granted to all Polish citizens. Further
talks are going on both on commercial and economic matters, but here again
there are very great difficulties. Transport in Poland is in a parlous state, food is
short, much of the cattle has been killed. It will take time for the Poles to over-
come all these difficulties, but their task will be eased if they re-establish a really
independent Poland based on genuine liberty. Finally, I inquired from Marshal
Stalin whether the Soviet troops were to be withdrawn, and I was assured that
they would be, with the exception of a small number required to maintain the
communications necessary for the Soviet troops in Germany. That is not un-
reasonable. There is also the question of the presence of secret police in Poland.
That still needs clearing up, but, with these assurances, I would urge Poles over-
seas, both military and civilian, to go back to their country and assume their
responsibilities in building the new Poland. They will render a far greater service
there than they can do from outside.
ZF)
In the further course of the debate Mr. Eden, the former F oreign Secretary,
begged permission to speak:
I would like to say a word about the question of the Western frontiers of
Poland. It is an immensely tangled and difficult question. May I tell the House my
own feelings about it? I do not desire to commit anyone else, but this is a matter
on which everyone is allowed to have his own opinion. There was originally the
a
age-old problem of the Corridor. It was my conviction, and I stated it to the
House in the last Parliament, that it was impossible to continue with the policy
‘of the Corridor if there was to be enduring peace in Eastern Europe. Therefore,
either you had to say to Poland, “You cannot have access to the sea at all”, or the
Corridor had to go and East Prussia had to go to Poland, save the Kénigsberg
area, which goes, by agreement, to Russia. In addition to that, the Polish claim
to Oppeln Silesia is a strong one. I think Poland should have it, and also some
parts of the land of Eastern Pomerania. We were never really happy about the
Polish frontier going even up to the line of the Oder. When in Moscow we
discussed this matter and there was the question of Mr. Mikolajczyk going back
to Poland as Prime Minister, we agreed upon words which said “Land that
Poland may desire, up to the line of the Oder”. We thought it would be unwise
even to go to the line of the Oder or even along its frontier.
Now we have this further demand to go right through to the Western Neisse.
I think the population was about 11000000 in the whole area, but let us take
it as 8000000 or 9000000. I find it hard to believe that the Polish population
who would come out of Russia will be much more than 4000000. There you
have these agricultural areas of Germany, of immense importance to the feeding
of Europe and its industrial areas, and I cannot see how the Polish population
is going to be able to settle this problem, man these industries, look after that
agricultural land and produce, as they should, food for the other parts of
Europe. This question, I understand, will not be settled until the Peace Con-
ference. I would only say to our Polish friends that as, last time, they made a
mistake in insisting on going too far East, so, this time, I fear, they are making
a mistake in insisting in going too far West. I think it only fair to make that
statement to the House.1
When the debate was continued next day, another critical voice was heard.
Mr. S. N. Evans* stated as one of the war generation:
What we are concerned about is a peace that will endure. ... It is from that
view that I approach this problem.
_ What are the proposals as far as they are known? In the East it would appear
that East Prussia is being taken over by Russia, that the Polish frontier is being
pushed to within 40 miles of Berlin, the line of demarcation being the Oder, and
in the south even further east® than the river Neisse. Despite doodlebugs, rockets,
* Compare in this connection Nos. 149 and 152.

2 Labour.
5 What is obviously meant is: further west.
ele
air-borne armies and atomic bombs, we are still basing our hopes of peace on
some out-moded strategic conception that security can safely be based on a
river. It would appear that is the policy that is going to prevail, and once it has
been decided upon one of two things has to be done. Poland would have to face
up to the presence of a large and virile German minority or a policy of forcible
deportation on a very large scale has to be carried out. The second course seems
to have been followed and in consequence we learn from the assistant chief of
the Berlin department for evacuated persons, that at the present time 200000
old people, women and children are pouring into Berlin each week from the
east. They are homeless and possess nothing but that in which they stand up.
One woman brought six children in two perambulators 90 miles. Fifty camps
have been set up to deal with these people, and after they have been fed - a
bowl of soup and a quarter of a pound bread — they are sent on their way again,
where to, goodness only knows. I ask the House: Is this what those gallant
souls, who will not come back, those who will not grow old as we shall grow
old, fought and died for? I do not think so. Neither do I think that the future
peace of Europe is helped by such happenings. I go so far as to say that the
seeds of another war are being sown at this moment.
318-319, 743.
168
A misunderstanding allegedly led to the confusion of the two rivers Neisse
During a debate on Poland Professor Savory1, Member of Parliament for

Queen’s University, Belfast, once more raised the problem of the frontier
between Germany and Poland on August 24th, 1945:
The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs devoted
a large portion of his speech to dealing with the territory between the Western
Neisse, which I prefer to call by the name with which I am most familiar, the
Lusatian Neisse, and the Eastern Neisse, which we call the Silesian Neisse. If
I want enlightenment on any question, I take up the “Daily Herald”; and in
the “Daily Herald” of to-day there is a very interesting — I do not know
whether it is inspired or not — note upon this question:
“A misunderstanding about two rivers of the same name led to an additional
10000 square miles of former Germany territory, with 3000000 inhabitants,
being handed over to Polish administration. In his speech on 20th August, where
he dealt with Germany’s eastern frontiers, Mr. Bevin said there had been agree-
ment at least by inference that the Poles should go to the Oder and the eastern
Neisse. The inference to which Mr. Bevin referred apparently goes back to a
misunderstanding between Stalin on the one hand and Churchill and the late
1 Conservative.
273
President Roosevelt on the other at Teheran. There it was agreed that the Poles
should have former German territory up to the Oder and the Neisse. But there
are two rivers Neisse. Churchill and Roosevelt understood the arrangement to
mean the eastern Neisse; Stalin the western Neisse. The Russian view prevailed,
with the result shown on the accompanying map.”
That is the very interesting commentary given by the “Daily Herald” on this
most important question. ...
According to the Warsaw radio, the area now taken over by Poland in the
West has 8600000 inhabitants, but I feel that those figures are an exaggeration.
In making my calculations I can only find that the population amounts to
rather less probably than 8000000. ...
If we take this immense district, we find that the Polish-speaking population
is, in East Prussia, between 400000 and 700000, and in Silesia between 700000
and 800 000!; whereas with regard to Pomerania all ‘the claim that has ever
been made by the Poles is for the Eastern district. No Pole that I have ever
heard of, no Polish historian, no Polish statesman, has ever claimed a line
West of the town of Kolberg on the Baltic. If you strike a line between Kolberg
and Kreutz you find roughly on the East of that line the population claimed
by Poland.
All that the Poles in 1919 and now have ever claimed is that the genuine
Poles in these districts should be incorporated in Poland. This would mean,
then, the Southern half of East Prussia, the Eastern part of Eastern Pomerania,
which I have just described, and the whole of the Upper Silesia district. The
right hon. Gentleman the former Secretary of State said that the Poles were
going too far to the West. It is not the Poles who have put forward any such
claim whatsoever. The Poles have never asked that they should be given the
frontier of the Oder, much less the frontier of the Western or Lusatian Neisse.
It looks no doubt on the map a very clear frontier. You follow the line of the
Oder from the mouth at Swinemiinde up to Frankfurt and you come to a
sudden turn of the Oder to the East, and then you follow its confluent the
so-called Lusatian Neisse until it joins the Czechoslovakian frontier. It seems
on the map to be a very definite frontier, but it is infinitely in excess of any claim
made by the Poles. All that the Poles are demanding is that the purely Polish
population should be returned to them in these Polish districts which I have
enumerated, They are asking for the return to Poland of 1500000 Poles.
What has been put forward as the reason for this change of border towards
the West? It is that the Poles should be given compensation for the large genuine
Polish population amounting, in my calculation, to 5 0000002, which it is pro-
posed that they should lose on the Eastern side of the Curzon Line. You are,
therefore, only proposing to give them compensation — I am not speaking of
territory but of human souls — of 1500000 for the 5000000 which you are
determined to take away from them. ...
1 Compare the footnote 1 on p. 244.

2 Compare the footnotes on pp. 48, 110, 234.
274
\ j
I put a question last Session to the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs and asked on what ethnological and historical grounds
were they proposing to hand over K6nigsberg to Russia. Russia has never in all
history possessed it. The Russian population in KGnigsberg is infinitesimally
small and I can only assume — and it is a pure assumption on my part — that the
real reason is that K6nigsberg strategically commands the whole of the bay of
Danzig and that if you are going to hand over KGnigsberg to Russia it means
that you are also going to hand over to her the three independent Baltic States
of Latvia, Esthonia, and Lithuania.
169
Bierut calls attention to the connection between the Oder-Neisse Line and the
Curzon Line
Mr. B. Bierut, President of the Polish National Council and later on Presi-
dent of the State, said at a Press Conference in Warsaw on August 24th, 1945:
The problem of Poland’s Eastern frontier is closely linked with the problem
of her Western frontier. And more than this: though the question of the Eastern
frontiers was debated and discussed in principle during negotations between
representatives of Poland and the Soviet Union earlier on, already a year ago,
no formal settlement was possible so long as the question of the Western frontiers
had not been formally cleared up... The settlement of the frontier question
between Poland and the Soviet Union has altered the territorial holdings of
Poland. It has detached important territories from Poland in the East, and though
these territories were admittedly foreign — with the exception of a few Polish
enclaves — from the ethnic aspect, they were of considerable value from the
economic aspect. The diminution of Polish territory due to the settlement of
the frontier question in the East had to be compensated by a corresponding
adjustment of the Polish frontier in the West.
Incidentally, when the Soviet Union brought up the question for the first
time, the problem was already then dealt with in such a manner, that Poland
must receive adequate compensation in the West.
The same thing was acknowledged in principle by the Yalta Conference, but
a more concrete settlement of the matter was undertaken only during the
Berlin Conference.
K.Klafkowski, Podstawy prawne granicy Odra-Nisa (The legal foundations of the
Oder-Neisse Line), pp. 34-35.
275
170
France refers to the connection of the Oder-Neisse Line with the general question
of Germany’s frontiers
On September 14th, 1945, the French Government sent a Memorandum to
the Council of Foreign Ministers in London, which was worded as follows:
Le Gouvernement provisoire ... donne en effet, pour ce qui le concerne, son
plein accord au principe énoncé en téte du paragraphe IX de I’arrangement
relatif au traitement devant présider au contrdle de |’Allemagne et d’aprés lequel
«l’administration des affaires allemandes sera dirigée vers la décentralisation de
la structure politique et le développement de la responsabilité locale». Il considére
quwil est prématuré aujourd’hui et qu’il demeurera hasardeux pendant un certain
temps de préjuger les possibilités de dissociation politique de |’Allemagne; que
certaines formules de décentralisation sont susceptibles de produire des effets non
seulement administratifs, mais politiques; qu’une division de l’Allemagne en
plusieurs états, si elle était la conséquence d’une évolution naturelle et non une
solution imposée, serait favorable au maintien de la sécurité en Europe. Pour
ces raisons il regrette que ce méme paragraphe IX prévoie dés maintenant
Péventualité du rétablissement d’un gouvernement central allemand, la création
de départements administratifs centraux 4 direction allemande et la reconstitution
de partis politiques pour l’ensemble de |’Allemagne, toutes mesures propres
4 raviver les tendances unitaires allemandes et 4 favoriser le retour 4 une formule
d’état allemand centralisé. Il regretterait plus particuliérement que les autorités
alliées substituent dés 4 présent a leur propre contréle, qui ne préjuge rien, celui
d’administrations centrales allemandes installées 4 Berlin, qui apparaitraient
comme la premiére manifestation d’une renaissance du Reich.
En outre, le Gouvernement provisoire a noté le fait qu’aux termes du com-
muniqué de Potsdam les territoires situés 4 lest d’une ligne déterminée seront
remis 4 l’administration de l’Etat polonais «et 4 cette fin ne devront pas étre
considérés comme faisant partie de la zone soviétique d’occupation de |’Alle-
magne». De ce fait ces territoires sont dés maintenant soustraits 4 l’autorité du
commandant en chef soviétique en Allemagne et du contréle interallié de Berlin.
A plus forte raison échapperaient-ils la compétence des futures administrations
centrales allemandes et d’un éventuel gouvernement central allemand.
Le Gouvernement provisoire ne souléve pas a priori d’objections contre une
telle disposition. Il doit toutefois relever le fait que c’est la seule mesure prise a
ce jour qui traduise l’intention des Puissances alliées de modifier les fronti¢res de
P Allemagne telles qu’elles se présentaient en février 1938. Si dans le temps méme
ou cette décision est publiée, se trouve annoncée la création prochaine d’admini-
strations centrales allemandes ayant compétence pour l’ensemble du territoire
allemand subsistant aprés cette amputation, il parait certain que cette double
détermination sera interprétée comme confirmant le maintien sous la souveraineté
allemande de toutes les régions auxquelles cette compétence s’étendrait en effet.
nes frangais relatifs a P Allemagne (French Documents referring to Germany),
pp. 13-14.
276
Translation
The Provisional Government ... for its part is in full agreement with the
principle expressed at the beginning of Paragraph IX of the Agreement with
regard to the manner in which the control of Germany is to be handled, and
according to which “the administration of Germany is to be directed towards
the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local
government”. It is of the opinion that it would be premature today and will
continue to be dangerous for a certain length of time to try and decide in ad-
vance the possibilities of splitting up Germany politically. Furthermore, certain
formulae regarding decentralization are liable to have not only administrative
but also political consequences. A partition of Germany into several states would
be of advantage for the preservation of safety in Europe, if this partition were
the result of a natural development and not that of an enforced arrangement.
For these reasons it regrets that the same Paragraph IX already envisages the
possibilities of again setting up a German Central Government, of forming
central administrative agencies under German direction, and of restoring politi-
cal parties throughout Germany, since all these measures are liable to revive
German efforts for unification and favour the return to the formula of a central-
ized German State. It would particularly regret the setting up by allied authori-
ties in place of their own control — which in no way signifies an anticipation of a
decision — of those German central administration offices in Berlin which would
appear as if they were the first sign of a re-birth of the Reich.
The Provisional Government has also noted the fact that in accordance with
the Potsdam communiqué the territories east of a certain line will be handed
over to the administration of the Polish State, and that “they will not be regarded |
as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany in this respect’. Conse-
quently these territories have been removed already from the jurisdiction of the
Soviet Commander-in-Chief in Germany and the Interallied Control in Berlin.
A priori they would not be subject to the competence of the future German
central administration offices and a possible German central government.
The Provisional Government raises no objections a priori to such an arrange-
ment. It must, however, emphasize the fact, that to date this is the only measure
expressing the intention of the Allied Powers to change the German frontiers as
drawn in February 1938. If the publication of this decision is accompanied by the
proclamation of the impending establishment of central German administrative
agencies competent for the entire German territories remaining after this sepa-
ration, it would appear certain that this twofold settlement will be interpreted as
a confirmation that all the territories over which their jurisdiction would actually
extend will remain under German sovereignty.
2T7:
171
Truman: Potsdam was a “high-handed outrage”
In a secret letter to Secretary of State Byrnes President Truman reviewed

the Potsdam Conference once more on January Sth, 1946. He wrote inter alia:
At Potsdam we were faced with an accomplished fact and were by circum-

stances almost forced to agree to Russian occupation of Eastern Poland and the
occupation of that part of Germany east of the Oder River by Poland. It was a
high-handed outrage.
H.S.T ruman, Memoirs, vol. 1, p. 551.
278
es
tase
INDEX
Access to the sea, see Poland, access to the since Juli 27th, 1945, (Labour) 135, 136,
sea 244, 245, 250, 252, 253, 269, 270, 273, 275
Adams, Vyvyan, Major, MP (Conserva- Bialowieza, see Bieloviez
tive), 150 Bialystok, 72, 81, 92, 184, 203
Administration of Germany, see Germany, Bidault, George, French Foreign Minister
administration of since September 10th, 1944, 168, 170
Alexander, British Field Marshall Earl, 125 Bielorussia, see White Ruthenia
Allenstein, town in East Prussia, 175 Bieloviez, (Biatowieza), Forest of, 267, 268
Allied Control Council (Commission) for Bierut, Bolestaw, President of the Polish
Germany, 168, 230, 235, 242, 252, 253, National Council, 187, 201, 220, 221, 242,
257,260; 262 243, 244, 246, 247, 248, 275
Allied military control of Germany, 252 Black Sea, 225
Allied post-war policy in Germany, 105 Bohlen, Charles W., American expert on
Alsace-Lorraine, 140, 172, 234 Russia and interpreter, 179, 183
Anders, Wtadystaw, Polish General, 124, Bolestaw I., Chrobry (The Brave), King
1255/1350 of Poland, 992-1025, 28, 30, 33, 43,
Anglo-Russian Treaty 1942, 52, 207 Bolestaw III., Krzywousty (Wrymouth), ©
Antonov, Aleksej I., Soviet General, 181 King of Poland, 1102-1138, 27, 30, 43, 78,
Arciszewski, Tomasz, Prime Minister of the Te,
Polish Government-in-Exile since Nov. Boothby, Robert John Graham, MP (Con-
29th 1944, 147, 189, 220, servative),145, 152, 155, 156 ,
Armistice conference, 141 Boundaries of Germany, see Germany,
Atlantic Charter, 12, 18, 50, 87, 88, 105, 123, boundaries of
130, 142, 144, 153, 155, 157, 163, 206, 207 Boundaries of Poland, see Poland, boun-
Attlee, Clement, Prime Minister since July daries of
27th, 1945, 155, 212, 243, 244, 250, 254, Brandenburg, 201, 209
269 Braunsberg, 256, 258, 260, 267, 268
Austria, Austrians, 26, 62, 68, 141, 150, Breslau, 27, 29, 30, 31, 123, 124, 147, 169,
153, 168, 172, 224, 225, 228, 229, 230 175, 178, 203, 241
Austro-Hungarian Empire, 56, 70 British-Soviet Agreement 1942, 52, 207
British and US guarantee for Poland, 89,
Baden, 67, 167 90, 124, 134
Balkan countries, Balkan Federation, 56, Budapest, 141, 224
225, 253 Bucharest, 224
Baltic, 10, 11, 37, 39, 45, 46, 225, 250, 254, Biitow, 175
256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 262,267, 268, 269 Bug River, 27, 30, 121, 267, 268
Baltic countries, 57, 60, 229 Bulgaria, Bulgarians, 68, 77, 79, 224, 229,
Bavaria, Bavarians, 26, 56, 62, 67, 68, 156, 239 202.
167, 224 Bull, Bartle, MP (Conservative), 151, 152
Belgian-German frontier, 172 Byelorussia, s. White Ruthenia
Belgium, 182 Byrnes, James F., American Secretary of
Belgrade, 224 State since July 1945, 243, 244, 247, 249,
Bellenger, Frederick John, Capt., MP (La- ZOO W251 252209. 2/8
bour), 164
Belorussia, see White Ruthenia Cadogan, Sir Alexander, Under-Secretary
Betz, Polish town, 268 of State in the Foreign Office, 58, 84,
Bene’, Edward, Dr., President of Czecho- 13485 ZZ,
slovakia, 169 Cairo, 71
Berlin, 224, 230, 241, 264 Casablanca, 53
Berling, Zygmunt, Polish Colonel, Com- Central European Federation, 13, 14, 18,
mander i. C. of the Polish Forces in 36-42, 43, 44, 62, 67
USSR, 41 Chelm (Cholm), Polish town, 119
Bevan, Aneurin, MP (Labour), 156, 210 Chelwood, Viscount, Cecil of, MP (Conser-
Beveridge, Sir William, MP (Liberal) 207, vative), 160
208 Christian Democratic Party, see Polish
Bevin, Ernest, British Foreign Secretary Christian Democratic Party
279
\
Christian Labour Party, see Polish Christian Crowe, Sir Eyre, British diplomat, 202
Democratic Party Curzon, Lord George, 10, 137, 184
Churchill, Winston S. (Sir Winston), 26, 45, Curzon Line, 9, 10, 26, 48, 53, 60, 65, 66,
48, 50, 53, 56, 57, 62, 63, 64, 69, 71, 73, 84, CFF 2 13S Lg, O2s Od; Oye o> 89, 90,
85, 89, 95, 96, 98, 99, 103, 104, 105, 106, Jae 92, 93, 96, 97, 98, 100, 102, 104, ‘106,
LOZ SCA10; 14, 12458 1285612954130; 113.1, 107, 108, 1A ISD te 129 812426,
132, 137, 143, 147, 149, 155, 156, 157, 128, 129, 130, 19120132) 4133507143 ales,
163,164, 165% 167, 169, 175, 177,180, 150, 154, 155, 175, 178, 179, 182, 183,
181, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 184, 187, 189, 192, 197, 198, 199, 202,
LOOM e195 A965 97, 202520832205 203, 204, 206, 207, 210, 213, 214, 215,
DLA N22 ILOA ILSON 2975029Sot 2 Oy ath, 234, 237, 238, 240, 241, 246, 263, 267,
242, 243, 245, 248, 249, 269, 270, 2S 268, 269, 274, 275
Ehpisteke eon Broteeer, 76 Curzon Line A, 139
Giedanoweki. Jan, Polish Ambassador in Czechoslovak Government, 174, 258, 260,
Washington, 23, 47, 56, 57, 58, 117, 118, 262
Se gel) Czechoslovakia, 15, 16, 19, 26, 42, 43, 44,
Clark Kerr, Sir Archibald, British Ambas- 126, 158, 224, 225, 229, 243, 257, 259,
sador in Moscow, see Kerr 260, 262, 266, 269, 274
Clemenceau, Georges, 54, 184 Czechoslovakia, association (federation)
Committee of Americans of Polish Descent, with Poland, 71, see also Polish-Czecho-
84 slovak Federation
_ Compensation (idea of compensation), 17, Czechoslovakia, Government-in-Exile of,
BT. 63x64. 65... 66,171, 72, 2735 74, 75, 173
77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89,
90, 91, 93, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 114, Danubian Confederation, 56, 67, 68, 70
WLS Pl Sol 24 028.0192. 133% 136,043.93 Danzig (Dantzig), 28, 30, 37, 39, 41, 49,
141, 144, 145, 150, 151, 154, 155, 156, 55, 59, 76, 85, 86, 87, 88, 101, 103, 109,
157, 158, 170, 174, 175, 176, 184, 185, 121, 128, 139, 144, 146; 150) A173 3e187,
LSA Os 97 5019951 99,. 2029) 2042 205, 204), 207, 1214521255215, 218 219 a2oge
207, 208, 209, 211, 213, 214, 220, 238, 239, 2505 2563 257. 2584) 299, (26202674 cose
246, 263, 269, 274, 275 275
Compulsory resettlement, compulsory trans- Danzig Corridor, see Corridor
fer of Germans, 53, 54, 56, 59, 76, 110, Davies, Rhys, MP (Labour), 212
1275s; 173,174, 178% 180, 207;, 209, Denmark, 228
218, 240, 244, 248, 252, 257, 260, 262, Deportation of German population, 126,
269 273, see also compulsory resettlement
Compulsory resettlement of Polish popula- Diplomatic relations (USA with Polish Pro-
tion from Eastern Poland, 85, 90, 91, 110, visional Government of National Uni-
219 ty), 198, 199
Compulsory transfer of minorities, 110, Disarmament of Germany, see Germany,
137,141, 144, 148,.152, 157, 159, 177, disarmament of
178, 207, 210, 212, 237, 240, 263 Dismemberment of Germany, see Germany,
Concentration camps, 238 dismemberment of
Constantinople, 224 Displacement of population, see compul-
Control and occupation of Germany, see sory resettlement
Germany, occupation of Dmowski, Roman, Polish politician, 28, 30,
Control Commission, see Allied Control 31, 34, 35
Council »Drang nach Osten“ (urge to the East), 38,
Control Council for Germany, see Allied 40
Control Council Driberg, Thomas E. N., MP, 135, 136
Control Council in Hungary, 258, 260, 262 Drohobycz, town in Eastern Galicia, 117,
Corridor, 56, 57, 87, 88, 139, 145, 146, 152, 124
154, 164, 204, 207, 211, 272 Dunglass, Lord Alexander Frederick D. H.
Courland, Courland group, 141, 181 (Conservative), 206
Cracow, 76
Cranborne, Viscount Robert Arthur J. C., Eastern Central Europe, 12, 13, 14
MP (Conservative), 162 Eastern frontier of Poland, see Poland,
Crimea Agreement, see Yalta Conference Eastern frontier of
Crimea Conference, see Yalta Conference Eastern Neisse, see Neisse, Eastern
280
Eastern Barend, see Poland, Eastern terri- de Gaulle, Charles, General, 168, 169, 181
tories Gdynia, 173
East Galicia, 10, 66, 85 Geneva, 146, 211
East Pomerania, 175, 272 George VI., 147
East Prussia, 15; PGS8 272 6827.28.29, 30; German cruelties committed in Poland, 203
31, 37, 39, 41, 49, 53, 54, 55, 56,57, 58, German minority in Poland, 126, 158
59, 60, 69, 73, 76, 85, 86, 89, 90, 91, 93, German minorities, 163
98, TOO 1015102: 103, 10971169117, German political parties, 264, 265, 276, 277
118, 119, 120, 123, 124, 126, 128, IER German population in East Germany, 234,
139, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 149, 150, 240, 246, 263, 272
151,525. 156, 159,163,164. 165, 167; German reparations, 250
TOOT OTA 20 1750177, 179 181. 186 German Social Democracy, 154
187, 197, 201, 204, 207, 208, 209, 210, German-Soviet treaty, 3, 4, 6, 7
211,’ 212, 215, 233, 234, 244, 246, 250, Germany,
2048296; 22575) 2585259, 260-262, 264, administration of, 252, 263, 276, 277
265, 266, 267, 272, 274, 275 boundaries, see also Oder-Neisse Line, 9,
Eden, Anthony, British Foreign Minister, 167, 172, 227
BIN DO 27) ADS O55 0455515085559 cy 7-15 central authorities, 264
72, 73, 84, 104, 128, 129, 130, 131, 133, disarmament of, 149, 153
139, 142, 143, 146, 155, 156, 157, 163, 164, dismemberment of, 56, 57, 155, 181, 200
165, 176, 177, 178, 183, 192, 194, 195, Eastern territories, 47, 48, 63, 85, 117,
200, 202, 210, 230, 243, 244, 272, 274 DTS 62010 2185°255,9265
Eisenach, 226 feeding problem, 237, 238, 240, 245, 269,
Eisenhower, Dwight D., General, 141, 226, 272
230 frontiers of December 31st, 1937, 226,
Elbe, 224, 226, 243 227, 248
Elections in Poland, see Poland, elections in occupation of, 15, 16, 18, 19, 127, 219,
Ermeland (Varmia), 37, 39 225, 247, 252
Esthonia, 275 partition of, 54, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 67, 68,
Ethnographic problems, 89, 90, 151 69, 149, 152, 155, 167, 226, 276, 277
European peace, see peace in Europe post-war treatment, 26, 61, 67, 149, 152,
European security, see safety in Europe 163, 167, 182, 264, 265
Evans, S. N., MP (Labour), 272 production of grain in East Germany, 237,
Exchange of population, 100, 101, 102, 103, 238
127, 188, 208, 234, 244, see also com- zones of occupation, 226, 235, 236, 237,
pulsory resettlement 241
Execution of German officers, 180 Glatz Neisse, see Neisse, Eastern
Expellee problem, Expellees, 124, 273 Gleiwitz, town in Upper Silesia, 17
Expulsion of German population, 85, 86, Gorlitz, town in Silesia, 169
87, 88, 90, 91, 124, 126, 137, 140, 145, 146, Goldap, town in East Prussia, 256, 258, 260,
ISO. 156; 169, 1735718557 188,233, 267, 268
244, 255, 266, see also compulsory re- Gomutka, Whadystaw, Secretary of the Po-
settlement lish Workers’ Party, 77
Expulsion of Jews, 145 Gousev, Fedor T., Soviet Ambassador to
Expulsion of population, see also compul- Great Britain, 200
sory resettlement and exchange of popu- Grabski, Stanistaw, Polish politican, 10, 138,
lation, 141, 144, 213, 245, 270 187, 220, 243
Greece, Greeks, 54, 140 224, 225, 229
Falkenberg, town in Upper Silesia, 55 Greenwood, Arthur, MP (Labour), 206
Finland,
203, 208, 224, 252 Grottkau, town in Upper Silesia, 55
Fiume, 58 Griinfelde, see Grunwald
Flight of the German population, 184, 226, Grunwald, Battle of (1410), 37, 40, 120
230 Grzybowski, Polish Ambassador in Moscow,
Frankfurt/Oder, 181, 274 5
Free and unfettered: elections, see Poland, Guarantees for Poland, 87, 103, 135, 137,
elections 145, 147
French Government, 181, 182 Gulf of Gdynia, 144
French representative in the Reparations Gumbinnen, battle of (1914), 100, 102
Commission, 251 Gusev, see Gousev
281
Halifax, Lord Edward, 9,10 Krylov (Krylow) 267, 268
Hajnovka (Hajnéwka), 267, 268 Krysitski, A., Polish ethnographer, 48
Hamburg, 67 Kistrin, town in Brandenburg, 181
Hanover, 67
Harriman, Averell, United States’ Ambassa- Lane, Arthur Bliss, US-Ambassador to Po-
dor in Moscow, 82, 83, 94, 96, 128, 129, land, 218 ;
ISAT ISG ICI y S85 S74 18850 Ile LID) Lange, Oscar, Polish professor in United
1985 1995=2155, 217 States 118, 119 ‘
Hesse-Cassel, 67 Latvia, 275
Hesse-Darmstadt, 67 Lauenburg, town in Pomerania, 175
Holland, 182 Lausitz Neisse, see Neisse, Western
Hopkins, Harry, 53, 54, 55, 220, 251 League of Nations, 146, 152
Hore-Belisha, Leslie, Rt. Hon., former Se- Leipzig, 67
cretary of State for War (Independent),156 Lemberg, see Lvov
House of Commons, 45, 111, 112, 114, 143, Lenin, 184, 203
149, 151, 163, 202 Libau (Courland, Latvia), 141
House of Lords, 158 Linz (Danube), 229
Hull, Cordell, US Secretary of State, 47, Litvinov, Maxim M., Soviet Ambassador
57, 59, 60, 82, 148 in Washington, 55
Hungary, Hungarians, 29, 32, 62, 224, 243, Lithuania, Lithuanians, 9, 16, 17, 42, 43,
252, 257, 260, 262, 266 573; 420; 121, 223, 242, 256; 258502608 275
Hutchison, George J. C., Lieut.-Commander Lloyd George, Prime Minister, 10
(Conservative), 154 Lodz, 181
Lomza, town in Poland, 72
Interallied Control in Berlin, 276, 277 London Polisch Government, see Polish
International collaboration, 95, 96 Government-in-Exile
International Tribunal at Geneva, 211 Lower Silesia, 36, 38, 152
Tron Curtain, 225, 226, 269 Lublin, province of, 9
Irredentism, see also minority problem, 174 Lublin-Committee of National Liberation,
Italy, Italians, 131, 239, 253 1235 1253°426) 12859130133, e1S3.elo2
Jagiellonian traditions, 74, 75 169, 176, 177
Jaléwka (Eastern Poland), 267, 268 Lublin Provisional Government, 131, 174,
175, 177, 179, 183, 189, 190, 192, 201, 214,
Karpatho-Ruthenia, 72 220
Karski (Polish Underground), 56 Liibeck, 225, 226, 229
Kashubia, 37, 39 Lusatian Neisse, see Neisse, Western
Kattowitz, (Katowice), town in Upper Lutsk (Luck), town in Eastern Poland, 17
Silesia, 126 Lwéw, see Lvov
Katyn Affair, 83, 84, 92, 93 Lvov (Lemberg, Lviv, Lwéw), 17, 60, 65,
Kennan, George F., American Chargé d’ 66, 69, 71, 72, 81, 98, 100, 102, 106, 107,
Affaires in Moscow, 219 117,118, 124, 1325. 136531385 189s os
Kerr, Sir Archibald Clark, British Ambas- 176, 178, 179, 183, 184, 202, 208, 210
sador in Moscow, 108, 111, 113, 185, 187,
USS wg 95; £98, 19952155 217 Maisky, Ivan, Soviet Ambassador in Lon-
Kiel, 67 don, 20, 23, 58, 59
Kiersnowski, Tadeusz, Polish lawyer, 34 Malta (Conference), 172, 176, 177, 179
Kiev, 28, 30 Mander, Geoffrey L. M., MP (Labour), 144
King-Hall, Stephen, Commander, MP, Mansfield, Lord Mungo David M. M., MP
(Independent Nationalist), 159 (Conservative), 158, 159, 162, 163
Kisielewski, Jozef, Polish publicist, 78, 80 Marek, Andrzej, Polish writer, 36
Kénigsberg, 69, 71, 72, 89, 90, 91, 93, 98, Marienwerder, town in West Prussia, 175
HOOMMOM 102" 1031117. ise 12350124. Marne, battle on the (1914), 100, 102
DoD LAS eLOA OP, 169y 172179) 187, Marshall, George, US Secretary of State,
204, 209, 242, 246, 249, 256,258, 260, 272, 16, 17
275 Mass exodus, mass-expulsion, mass-transfer,
Kolberg, town in Pomerania, 274 see expulsion or compulsory resettlement
Kornejécuk, Aleksandr E., Ukrainian writer Masuria, 37, 39, 233, 246
and politician, 1943-44 deputy commis- Matthews, H. Freeman, head of the Euro-
sioner of Foreign Affairs of USSR, 41 pean Section of the US Department of
Kreutz (Kreuz), town in East Germany, 274 State, 177
282
: py S
-Matuszewski, Ignacy, Polish Minister of Occupation of Germany, see Germany,

Finance, later Polish publicist in the US, occupation of .
83, 84 Occupation of Poland by Allied troops, 86
McEwen, John H. F., Captain, MP (Na- Ochab, Edward, Polish Communist, 233
tional Unionist) 22 Oder river, 15, 16, 18, 19, 28, 30, 31, 34,
Memel (river) 37, 39, 141, 150 35, 36, 37, 40, 42, 44, 63, 64, 65, 69, 71,
Memel (town), 37, 39 73, 85, 86, 101, 103, 109, 117, 119, 120,
Mikolajezyk, Stanislaw, Polish Prime Mi- 12451126.) 1325) 134) 135,136; 1685169)
nister-in-Exile, later deputy U7 VOL LSesp LOZ 5 1975 DOL le20456 210s
Prime Minister in Poland, 20, 23, 48, 72, 2355) 23.85 24050 2455124555250; 2 5eeoes
83, 84, 85, 94, 95, 96, 99, 109, 116, 117, 257, 259, 262, 269, 270, 272, 278
AL Sra 235 02850129. 909 1, 91320133, Oder Line, 89, 90, 123, 131, 149, 172, 176,
134 1565197, 41385 139) 1698.176, 178; 187, 196, 241
179, 180, 183, 185, 187, 220, 242, 244, 272 Oder-Neisse Line, 72, 134, 175, 176
Minc, Hilary, later Polish Minister for in- Oil fields (Galicia), 175, 176, 179, 183, 246
dustry, 77 Oppeln, town in Upper Silesia, 17, 29, 31,
Minority problem, minority questions, 100, 55, 66, 693.710 72) 187
102, 110, 118, 140, 158, 161, 162, 169, Opole Silesia, Oppeln Silesia, see Upper
174, 210, 211, 244 Silesia
Modzelewski, Zygmunt, later Polish Fo- Osébka-Morawski, Edward Bolestaw, Chair-
reign Minister, 41 man of the Polish Committee of Natio-
Molotov, Vyacheslav M., 3, 5, 23, 26, 60, 61, nal Liberation, 121, 125, 126, 187, 221,
65, 66, 82, 93, 94, 96, 111, 113, 121, 128, 223, 266
Pee OD 0356 184501855186. 187,188, Overpopulation in Poland, 49, 78, 80, 224
POM oP O92 194-6195.0196) 197,
Me Samtso. 2tD 222243, 2445250502510 Pacification of Europe, 151
252, 254, 267 Palatinate, 67
Molotoy-Ribbentrop Line, 65, 92 Partition of Germany, see Germany, par-
Montgomery, Bernhard Law, Fieldmarshal, tition of
228, 230, 271 Partition of Poland, see Poland, partition of
Moore, Sir Thomas, Lieut.-Colonel, MP Patek, Stanistaw, Polish Foreign Minister, 10
(Conservative), 152 Peace Conference, 45, 89, 90, 108, 110, 111,
Morgenthau, Henry, US Secretary of the 125, 130, 131, 136, 140, 141, 155, 165,
Treasury, 167 198551995) 208302133) 214 219 23652376
Moscow, 41, 85, 128, 133, 138, 168, 169, 238, 239, 240, 242, 247, 249,251, 252, 253,
171, 178, 184, 190, 203, 267, 272 254, 255, 256, 258, 261, 263, 270, 272
Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers Peace of Europe, 87, 88, 130, 149, 150, 162,
(October 1943), 58, 59, 60, 94, 95, 96 164, 167, 213, 229, 246, 272, 273
Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers Peace in Eastern Europe, 272
(April 1947), 16 Perth, Lord Strath-Allan E.-D., MP (Con-
Moselle, 167 servative), 162
Movements of population, see compulsory Petherick, Maurice, MP (Conservative), 145
resettlement Pethick-Lawrence, Frederick William, Rt.
Hon., MP (Labour), 145, 157, 213
Narew river, 4
Nationality problems, see minority problem Pickthorn, Kenneth W. M., MP (Conserva-
Neisse river, 124, 126, 169, 178, 186, 201, tive), 153, 154
235, 25905 25/5299, 262, 273 Pillau (East Prussia), 143
Neisse, Eastern (Glatz), 66, 186, 234, 241, Pitsudski, Jézef, Polish statesman, 28, 30
DDO 202210; 2/0 Pinsk, Eastern Poland, 17
Neisse, Western (Lausitz, Lusatian Neisse) Ptowce, battle of (1331), 37, 40
15, 16, 19, 136, 182, 184, 186, 187, 196, Poland,
234,241, 245. 251, 252,269, 270, 272, access to the sea, 10, 11, 13, 14, 18, 36-42,
DIS 2/4 44,71, 76, 78, 79, 98, 118, 119, 120, 128,
Netherlands, 179 139, 145, 154, 173, 204, 211, 272
Netze river, 109 agreement with Great Britain, 1, 2
Neustadt (Upper Silesia), 55 coal production, 77, 79, 238
Niemirov (Niemiréw), Eastern Poland, 267, coast line, 10, 11, 173, 204, 207, 215
268 Commission of Three (Moscow) 195, 215,
Nowakowski, Zygmunt, Polish writer, 32 PME, PIV O24
283
Council of National Unity (Warsaw) 108 Polich Committee of mfional Liberation, —
Eastern frontier, 5, 6, 7, 8, 17, 20, 21, 22, SD O25I eae 123 wc
23, 24, 27, 28-32, 33, 34, 35, 36-42, 43, see nies Pablin Committee
53, 64, 65, 66, 71, 73, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, Polish Corridor, see Corridor
88, 91, 92, 99, 101, 104, 107, 108, 110, Polish-Czechoslovak Federation, 15, 16, 18,
11 AO dA ODOM N24 1225 2, 36-42, 43, 44, 71
IQA 196 A 37281133) /138,, 143% Polish democratic parties, 271
145, 147, 158, 175, 183, 184, 196, 197, Polish Government, establishment of, 174,
LOS 99 20512080210 12415) 279 180, 184, 187, 188, 190, 193, 204, 214,
Eastern territories, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 17, 20, 21, 216, 217, 220
22, 23, 24, 27, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36-42, 46, 48, Polish Government-in-Exile, 10, 12, 13, 14,
5515741160563; 110551005) Aly 745, 7) 15) O75 15, 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 40, 41, 44, 47, 49, 55,
9077100;:1023/109) 110; 117; 123,125,140; 64, 65, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85,
146, 147, 170, 174, 278 895 °92)s 935995599655.975098) 99a LOO, On,
elections, 176, 185, 188, 190, 191, 192, 193, 1025 -206;(1 095 10h) 12K eit ed2.
194, 195, 198, 199, 214, 244, 245, 247, 427, 128,133) 13559139,.447/:173,847:
257, 259, 261, 271 176,.1833; 188,.01899 190) 3d95 02 tO as
freedom of, 117, 202, 205 220, 256, 258, 261
freedom of religion, 271 Polish Home Army, 104, 124, 125
frontiers, 13, 109, 116, 148, 202, 208, 214, Polish Jews, 203
historic rights, 197 Polish National Council-in-Exile, 13, 14, 20
idea of compensation, see compensation Polish National Council (Warsaw), 201,
independence, 1, 2, 14, 15, 49, 90, 91, 94, 275
96, 101, 103, 104, 116, 121, 129, 133, Polish National Democratic Party, 44, 246
134, 135, 137, 143, 148, 154, 205, 221, Polish partisans, 95, 96
DLL MELONI Polish Peasant Party, 44, 271
industrialization, 77, 79 Polish political parties, 245, 247
land-reform, 74, 75, 78, 80 Polish population in East Germany, 274
national minorities, see also minority pro- Polish population in Polish Eastern terri-
blem, 12, 74, 75 tories, 234
Northern frontier, 44 Polish Presidency Council (Committee), 183,
187
overpopulation, 49, 78, 80, 224
partition of, 4, 6, 7, 8, 45, 46, 130, 191 Polish property abroad, 256, 258, 261
security, 12, 13, 14, 15, 36-42, 45-47, 49, Polish Provisional Government (Lublin,
76;/89, 90, 109,.120, 143, 151, 204, 205, later Warsaw), 180, 185, 187, 189, 191,
DON 22; 22IVLAD 4 27.5 193, 1955 198; A997 216, 2172 seeker
shift to the West, 78, 79, 80 221,245, 256, 258,. 260; (261, 262,269
sovereignty, 3, 10, 11, 22, 45-47, 92, 94, see also Lublin Provisional Government
101, 103, 104, 133, 205, 206, 221, 222, Polish Provisional Government of National
223 Unity, 191, 194, 196, 197, 198, 199, 216,
territorial integrity, 3, 86, 101, 103 217,218; 24402575) 259.2615, 203
transplantation of population, see also Polish resistance movement, 44, 45
compulsory resettlement, 12 Polish settlement of the German Eastern
western frontier, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 34, 35, territories, 231, 234
44) 73, 82, 86,/124, 147, 158, 177, 196, Polish Socialist Party, 44, 271
DAZ OD 2155p 2098235 .423725 2A Se 250, Polish-Soviet Agreement of 1941, 21, 22
252 Polish-Soviet Agreement to be concluded,
western territories 87, 88 99, 123
Polesie marshes, 124 Polish-Soviet Agreement of 1944, 121-123
Polish-Soviet Agreement of 1945, 267-268
Polish Armed Forces-in-Exile, 190, 256,
Polish-Soviet co-operation, 24, 25, 27-32,
258, 261
36-42, 43, 44, 45-47, 104, 122, 123, 127
Polish Army in Soviet Union, 24, 25, 41-44, Polish-Soviet-Czechoslovak understanding,
SIU Set 20s 121122. 193 119, 120
Polish Christian Democratic Party (Chri- Polish-Soviet frontier, see Poland, Eastern
stian Labour Party), 44, 246, 271 frontier
Polish Committee in Moscow, see Union of Polish-Soviet relations, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87,
Polish Patriots 88, 97, 98, 106, 122, 136, 138, 147, 217
Polish Communist Party, 45, 271 Polish Underground, V2. FICO: "115, 139
284
ie fee Underground Army, see Polish Home Riga frontier, 27, 53, 99, 101
rm : Riga, Peace of, Treaty of, 13, 14, 20, 27, 30,
Polish Workers’ Party, 45, 47, 231, 232 34, 35, 42, 43, 81, 83, 84, 87, 88, 91, 93,
Polish workers in Germany, 209, 244, 246 97, 109
Polonization of the German Eastern terri- Robertson, Sir Malcolm, MP (Conserva-
tories, 223 tive), 156
Pomerania, 15, 16, 17, 29, 30, 109, 119, 120, Romer, Tadeusz, Polish Foreign Minister-
TAZ VEZ Os AZSsp 7 Os a h7 e179 201. 209) in-Exile, 84, 85, 99, 134, 135, 138
213, 233, 274 Roosevelt, Franklin D., President of United
Poplawski, Jan Ludwik, Polish politician, States, 17, 26, 48, 50, 53, 54, 56, 59, 62, 64,
28, 30, 31 67, 68, 94, 96, 109, 110, 111, 113, 116,
Population transfer questions, 176, 242 117 We RS 2A O lL Osek Tice lyizgnlyos
Posen (Poznan), 28, 30, 181, 209 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 188, 189,
Post-War-Programs Committee, 165 TOO LON 93 en95,0 LIGs Ova? thud Loe
Potsdam, Potsdam Conference, 17, 136, 201, 217, 236, 241, 274
B29 2SD ne42, 249522515 2545 255.5264; Roumania, Roumanians, 29, 32, 68, 77, 79,
265, 266, 270, 271, 275, 278 131, 224, 229, 234, 252
Price, Morgan Philips, MP (Labour), 208 Rovno (Réwno), (Volhynia), 17
Pripet Marshes, 140, 204 Riigen, 15, 16
Pritt, Dennis Nowell, MP (Society), 208 Ruhr area, Ruhr River, 67, 149, 167, 168,
Problems of reparations, 247 182, 238, 240, 243, 251
Prussia, Prussians, 26, 54, 56, 60, 62, 63, 67, Russia, see Soviet Union
68, 70, 74, 75, 149, 155, 168 Russians, 44, 82, 239
Prussian militarism, 145 Ruthenians, 48
Pruszynski, Ksawery, Polish writer, 27, 32, Rzymowski, W., Polish Foreign Minister,
33, 34, 35 242, 243
Przemysl, town in Eastern Poland, 65, 92
Saar area, Saar River, 67, 150, 167, 168, 182
Quebec, Quebec Conference, August 1943, Safety in Europe see security in Europe
57, 58, 59 San River, 4, 27, 30, 92
Quebec Conference, September 1944, 167, Sapieha, Polish Archbishop, 187
224 Savory, Douglas Lloyd, Prof., MP (Con-
servative), 273
Raczynski, Count Edward, Polish Foreign Saxony, 67, 155, 168, 241
Minister-in-Fxile, 12, 72 Schneidemiihl, town in East Germany, 181
Raikes, Henry Victor A. M., MP (Conser- Security of Poland, see Poland, security
vative) 143 Security in Europe, 147, 150, 214, 276, 277
Rathbone, Eleanor, MP (Independent), 150 Security organization, 170, 174, 175
Red Army, 5, 6, 23, 24, 25, 41 43, 71, 72, Settlement of Polish population in East
73; 76, 81, 84, °86, 95) 96, 995.102; 104, Germany, 233, 238
at aS el 6S 1D) 12050121122, Seyda, Marian, Polish Minister -in- Exile
755 426,01 2865 1389 1139591425.1475, 181, for Congressional Affairs, 13, 14, 18
S25 186) 83" 191, 194, 198,199: 1204; Shifting of population, see compulsory
D375 259,245, 248, LoL, 2995, 27 1 transfer of minorities
Removal of German population, see com- Sikorski, Wtadystaw, General, Polish Prime
pulsory resettlement Minister-in-Exile 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18,
Reparations, 236, 249, 251, 253 20, 22, 23, 24, 41, 73, 83, 84, 93, 138
Repatriation of Poles from Soviet Union, Silesia, 15, 16, 28, 30, 36, 38, 39, 76, 77, 7%
127 116), 117, 111857126, )128, 31675169; 170,
Retirement of the American Army, 228, 177, 187, 201, 234, 239, 241, 246, 274
229,230 see also Lower Silesia and Upper Silesia
Return of Poles from abroad, 256, 258, 261, Silverman, Samuel Sydney, MP (Labour),
264, 271 209
Rhine River, 19, 67, 141, 167, 168, 181 Skrzeszewski, St., Polish Foreign Minister,
Rhineland, 26, 156, 168, 170, 182, 236, 240 41
Rhineland- Westphalia, 170 Slovaks, 29, 32
Ribbentrop, Joachim v., Reich Foreign Mi- Solokija River, 267, 268
nister, 3, 23 Southby, Sir Archibald, Commander, MP
Ribbentrop-Molotoy Line, 65, 92 (Conservative), 149, 164
285
~
Sosnkowski, Kazimierz, Polish General, 92, Sztachelski, Jerzy, Minister of Health of

Deh Dla es the Polish People’s Democracy, 41
Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty, 81
Soviet-Polish frontier, 20, 45, 80, 91, 92, Tannenberg, battle of, (1410), 40, 120
97, 98, 121, 202 Tannenberg, battle of (1914), 100, 102
Soviet occupation of Germany, Soviet Zone, Tarnopol (Galicia), 117
HSDi 22RD DLN SMD OD 5027 OsaD7, Teheran, Teheran Conference Novy.-Dec.
Soviet occupation of Poland, 86 1943, 48, 62-70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 84, 86,
Soviet-Polish co-operation, see also Polish- Sa URE ss Caly oko 103, 113; 113, 116,
Soviet co-operation, 99, 102, 105, 106, 115, 126, 129, 130, 132, 141, 149, 163, 164, 165,
221 182, 183, 202, 241, 242, 274
Soviet-Polish relations, see also Polish-So- Teschen, town on the Polish-Czechoslovak
viet relations, 81, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 107,
frontier, 17
TO Seaninl Olan ee cetSs 4 ate7eal395
Thomas, Ivor, MP (Labour), 154
170; 174, 190, 191, 203, 205, 206, 221,
Thorn, Vistula, 181
Pyjagd, Japs)
Soviet Union, access to the sea, 242 Thuringia, 168
Boundary and Friendship Treaty, 6, 7 Tolbukhin, Fedor L., Soviet Marshal, 229
expansion of, 224 Tito, Josif, 224, 228
ice-free port, 242, 264 Tranquillity in Eastern Europe, 173, 175
Non-Aggression Pact, 3, 4 Transfers, see compulsory transfer
security of, 94, 95, 104, 183 Transfer of the Greeks and Turks, 163
spheres of influence, 4 Transfer of German property, 236
Spa, Inter-Allied Conference, 10 Transport problems, 159
Spreewald, Brandenburg, 209 Trieste, 58, 228
Stalin, Josef V., 17, 23, 24, 26, 40, 51, 53, Tripartite Control of Germany, 182
57, 59, 62, 63, 64, 67, 68, 72, 73, 85, 89, 93, Truman, Harry S., President of the United
94, 95, 96, 99, 103, 104, 106, 107, 110, 111, States since April 12th, 1945, 220, 236, 237
HG eliteb Sed Oso 128. 29s 30; 238; 240; 24102435 244, 2435249) 200.2 ies
WS S299 30501506, 157.0168, 253,254, 255,263; 278
1695177, 180; 181, 182, 1837189, 190, Turkey, 140, 224
POLO 6 M19 710203)5) 205; 721.5; 024/55 220,
DIA e230)7 235512415) 243," 248, 250), 251;
DOD LOS NLD 45 25955 2/7 1273
Uhnéw, East Polish town, 268
Ukraine, Ukrainians, 5, 6, 42, 43, 44, 45,
Stanczyk, Jan, Polish politician, 220
46, 47, 48, 74, 75, 79, 80, 81, 82, 87, 88,
Stanistaw August Poniatowski, last King of
1185-119)" 1205127051295" 1805 21S sees
Poland, 28, 30
239
Stanistawéw (Galicia), 117
Unconditional Surrender, 53, 105, 182
Stettin, 27, 30, 117, 118, 123, 124, 126, 131, Union of Polish Patriots, 36, 41, 43, 73, 77,
132, 134, 135, 147, 169, 175, 178, 184, 81, 119, 123, 126, 152, 174
241, 243, 250, 251, 253, 254, 269
United Nations, 18, 67, 70, 85, 100, 102,
Stettin Haff, 15, 16
Stettinius, Edward R., later US Secretary of 138)°139, 1435950) 153515455155." 1626
State, 116, 148, 172, 176, 177, 178, 179, 163, 166, 253, 254
TSO eel ljd 92, 19350 195, Upper Silesia, 17, 36, 39, 41, 49, 55, 66, 69,
Stokes, Richard R., MP (Labour), 154, 155, 73,°85; 86, 101, 103, 109, 4495 120,51 47-
157, 163, 164, 165 152, 173, 175, 177,178, 1795181:187.,2045
Stolpmiinde, town in Pomerania,17 208, 211, 213, 238, 272, 274
Strabolgi, Lord Joseph M. K., Lt. Comdr., Ustrzyki Dolne (Galicia), 268
MP (Labour), 157, 162
Strauss, George R., MP (Labour), 151, 152, Versailles, Treaty of, 29, 31, 54, 55, 62,
153, 154, 156, 164, 213 213
Studnicki, Wtadystaw, Polish politician, 28, Vienna, 56, 224, 225, 229
30 Vilna, 17, 28, 30, 66, 98, 100, 102, 104, 106,
Sudeten area, Sudeten Germans, 26, 55, 150, 107,, 117,132, 210,211, 246
158, 173, 269, Vistula (Weichsel), 4, 37, 39, 77, 79, 109,
Suworin, Russian publicist, 34, 35 141, 204, 238
Swinemiinde, town in Pomerania, 126, 250, Vyshinsky, Andrej J., deputy Soviet Fo-
294) 29/5 209,262,274 reign Minister, 17, 219
286
War criminals, 238 Wielhorski, Wladystaw, Polish historian, 32
Ward, Sir A. Lambert, Colonel, MP (Con- Withdrawal of the American and British
servative) 209 forces in Germany, 228, 229, 230
Warez, town in Eastern Poland, 268 Witos, Vincent, Polish politician, 187
Warsaw, 5, 124, 125, 203, 275 Wladyslaw Jagietlo, King of Poland, 40
Warsaw, province of, 9 Wladystaw Lokietek, King of Poland, 40, 43.
Warsaw uprising, 125 Wolna Polska, Newspaper of the Union of
Warsaw Government, see Polish Provisio- Polish Patriots, 36, 73, 76, 77
nal Government Woolley, William E., Major, MP (Liberal),
Warthe, 109 153
Wasilewska, Wanda, leader of the Polish World Organization, see also security or-
emigrés in the Soviet Union, 27, 30, 41 ganization, 148, 191, 204, 206
Welles, Sumner, American Under-Secretary World War I, 100, 102, 202
of State, 22 Wroclaw, see Breslau
Western Neisse, see Neisse, Western Wiirttemberg, 67, 159, 167
Western Byelorussia, 81, $2
Western Pomerania, 234
Yalovka (Jal6wka), 267, 268
Western Ukraine, 81, 82 Yalta, Yalta Conference, 136, 172, 176, 185,
West Prussia, 76
LOD 2012031208 2096 212s 2a
White Ruthenia, White Ruthenians (White DLS U21G se2a 7.921992 2050 22122 es
Russians), 5, 6, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47,
237, 241, 243,244, 247, 248, 256, 257,
AO MODE, TAR ONT 5.795 OL, O25 119) 120;
258, 259, 261, 263, 264, 267, 268, 275
Peet 2a" 215, 223
Yugoslavia, 221, 224, 229, 243
Wilno, see Vilna
Wilson, T. Woodrow, President of United
States, 13, 105 Zawadzki, Aleksander, Polish politician, 41
Winant, John, Ambassador of the United Zhukov, Grigorij, Soviet General, 73
States in London, 59, 200 Zones of occupation, see Germany, zones
Winiewicz, J. M., Polish journalist, 16 of occupation
287
Mi if ts
ey,
NY 1
iN
“ait
a ay”
get)
ee
POLAND’s "REMOVAL TO THE WEST’
LOSSES IN THE EAST —- COMPENSATION IN THE WEST
Bug
é
Warsaw &.
Q Siedice
°
Lublin
°
East German Territories

under Polish Administration
East Polish Territories

annexed by the Soviet Union
J. G. Herder-Institut, Marburg/L
ea

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Sources and Documents

Sources and Documents

SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS

COMPILED ANDZEDITED iBY.

GOTTHOLD RHODE AND WOLFGANG WAGNER

by Siiddeutscher Zeitungsdienst Stuttgart/Aalen Wiirttemberg

Detailed table of documents XI

Chapter I The Polish Fate in 1939 . 1

Maps 1, Germany — Poland: Proposed territorial changes .

Our collection of sources is intended to enable the reader to acquaint himself at

The present collection is in the main an English edition of a collection which

Mainz and Bonn, February 1959 Gotthold Rhode Wolfgang Wagner

‘Detailed fablevot Gneuthents

2 The Soviet Union and Germany agree on Supplementary Das nationalsozialist.

Poland to be restored after the war to Report of Prime Monitor Polski, 10

II. Polish territorial claims up to 1942

No. Heading Contents Taken from ‘ Page. ban

III. The Soviet Union and Poland in 1941

IV. The Idea of Compensation

ix Stalin pronounces in favour of a strong Interview given by The New York 40

30 Pro-Soviet Poles demand East Prussia, Declaration of a Wolna Polska, 41

33 Poland distrusts the Soviet proposal to an- Report on a talk: J. Ciechanowski, 47

34 Mikotajczyk warns: German Eastern terri- Memorandum of St. Mikolajczyk, 48

V. Allied plans regarding Germany up to 1943

Roosevelt wishes to aid German separatists See No. 39 See No. 39 54 a

VI. The Teheran Conference

Stalin proposes the Oder as frontier between Sherwood’s report R. E. Sherwood, 64

No. Heading Contents Taken from

54 A ,formula* is put forward: Poland ex- See No. 52 See No. 52

55 Churchill: This tragedy »cannot last“ Churchill’s reflexions See No. 52 69

VII. Negotiation about Poland at the beginning of 1944

57 Mikolajczyk resists compensation Mikolajcezyk’s report St. Mikolajezyk, The 72

59 The Soviet Government publicly supports Declaration of the Documents on Americ- 80

60 Churchill urges the Poles to agree to the Report on Churchill’s J. Ciechanowski, 84

Curzon Line Stalin’s answer of

VIII. Negotiations about Poland in the middle of 1944

1X. Negotiations about Poland towards the end of 1944

83 Stalin presents uncompromising demands Mikolajezyk’s report See! No. 82. .

87 Mikolajczyk seeks to obtain assurances Mikotajczyk’s report St. Mikolajezyk,

No! Heading ; Contents Taken from

X. Allied Plans concerning Germany in 1944

Churchill refers to the Peace Conference Question-hour in the Parliamentary 165

No. Heading ¢0 ) Contents

XI. The Yalta Conference

XII. From Yalta to Potsdam

No. Heading Contents Taken from

129 Churchill recommends compensation to the Churchill’s speech in Parliamentary

XIII. The Potsdam Conference

157 The Potsdam decision is a compromise Byrnes’ report on J. F. Byrnes, 253

XIV. The Interpretation of Potsdam

171 Truman: Potsdam was a »high-handed Extract from H. S. Truman, 278

Anders, W., An army in exile. London 1949. 79 pa

Bér-Komorowski, Tadeusz, Armia Podziemna (The Underground Army). §

Carroll, M. J., see Documents.

Decade, A, of American foreign policy. Basic documents 1941—1949.

Hansard see Parliamentary Debates

Journal officiel. Paris, vol. 1944. 106

Keesing’s Archiv der Gegenwart (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, Ger-

Nationalsozialistische Deutschland, Das, und die Sowjetunion 1939 bis

Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany, Suppl. No. 1,

of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945; vol, =

Reichsgesetzblatt (Reich Law Gazette), 1940, vol. II. 4 :