Topoi

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-020-09699-x

1
Discursive Injustice: The Role of Uptake
2
Claudia Bianchi1

3
4
© Springer Nature B.V. 2020

F
5
Abstract

O
6
In recent times, phenomena of conversational asymmetry have become a lively object of study for linguists, philosophers of
Author Proof

7
language and moral philosophers—under various labels: illocutionary disablement and silencing (Langton in Philos Public

O
8
Affairs 22:293–330, 1993; Hornsby and Langton in Legal Theory 4:21–37, 1998), discursive injustice (Kukla in Hypatia
9
29(2):440–457, 2014; Lance and Kukla in Ethics 123:456–478, 2013), illocutionary distortion (Green in The Stanford
10

PR
encyclopedia of philosophy, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, 2014, Oxford handbooks online, Oxford University Press,
11
Oxford, 2017). The common idea is that members of underprivileged groups sometimes have trouble performing particular
12
speech acts that they are entitled to perform: in certain contexts, their performative potential is somehow undermined, and
13
their capacity to do things with words is distorted or even annulled. In this paper I will assess this idea, focusing on Rebecca
14
Kukla’s and Rae Langton’s accounts; in particular, I will criticize the role the notion of uptake plays in their accounts, and
D
15
claim that it may ultimately undermine the very idea of discursive injustice. While, according to Kukla and Langton, members
16
of disadvantaged groups are victims of a kind of uptake failure, leading to illocutionary disablement and even silencing, in
TE
17
the account I present they are victims of a kind of communicative (neither illocutionary nor perlocutionary) disablement. My
18
overall aim is to develop a notion of discursive injustice that is more plausible and more effective for our broader purposes
19
of criticising the structures of power and oppression.
EC

20
Keywords Discursive injustice · Silencing · Illocutionary distortion · Uptake · Speech acts · Refusal

21
1 Introduction applies for their favour; and that sometimes the refusal
R

34
is repeated a second, or even a third time. I am there-
22 35
1.1 Prologue: Jane Austen on Refusal fore by no means discouraged by what you have just
R

36
said, and shall hope to lead you to the altar ere long”.
23 37
In Chapter 19 of Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice, Eliza- Elizabeth: “Upon my word, sir… your hope is a rather
O

24 38
beth Bennet (the book’s protagonist), receives a proposal extraordinary one after my declaration. I do assure you
25 39
of marriage from her cousin, Mr. Collins. The following that I am not one of those young ladies (if such young
NC

26 40
dialogue takes place: ladies there are) who are so daring as to risk their hap-
41
27 piness on the chance of being asked a second time.
Elizabeth: “Accept my thanks for the compliment you 42
28 I am perfectly serious in my refusal. You could not
are paying me. I am very sensible of the honour of 43
29 make me happy, and I am convinced that I am the last
U

your proposals, but it is impossible for me to do other- 44

30 woman in the world who could make you so”.
wise than to decline them”. 45
31 Mr. Collins: “I know it to be the established custom of
Mr. Collins: “I am not now to learn… that it is usual 46
32 your sex to reject a man on the first application, and
with young ladies to reject the addresses of the man 47
33 perhaps you have even now said as much to encourage
whom they secretly mean to accept, when he first 48
my suit as would be consistent with the true delicacy
49
of the female character”.
50
A1 * Claudia Bianchi Elizabeth: “Really, Mr. Collins… you puzzle me
51
A2 claudia.bianchi@unisr.it exceedingly. If what I have hitherto said can appear to
A3 http://www.unisr.it/persona.asp?id=361 52
you in the form of encouragement, I know not how to
53
1
A4 Faculty of Philosophy, University Vita-Salute San Raffaele,
A5 Via Olgettina 58, 20132 Milan, Italy

13
Vol.:(0123456789)

Journal : Large 11245 Article No : 9699 Pages : 10 MS Code : 9699 Dispatch : 2-2-2020
 C. Bianchi

54 express my refusal in such a way as to convince you have trouble performing particular speech acts that they 100
55 of its being one”. are entitled to perform. In certain contexts, their performa- 101
56 Mr. Collins: “You must give me leave to flatter myself, tive potential is somehow undermined and their capacity to 102
57 my dear cousin, that your refusal of my addresses is do things with words is distorted or even annulled. In this 103
58 merely words of course… As I must therefore con- paper I will assess this idea, focusing on Rebecca Kukla’s 104
59 clude that you are not serious in your rejection of me, and Rae Langton’s accounts; in particular, I will criticize the 105
60 I shall choose to attribute it to your wish of increasing role the notion of uptake plays in their accounts, and claim 106
61 my love by suspense, according to the usual practice that it may ultimately undermine the very idea of discursive 107
62 of elegant females”. injustice. 108
63 Elizabeth: “I do assure you, sir, that I have no preten- The structure of my paper is as follows. 109
64 sions whatever to that kind of elegance which con- In § 2. I introduce the notions of discursive injustice and 110

F
65 sists in tormenting a respectable man. I would rather silencing. I will focus on three examples: the speech acts of 111
66 be paid the compliment of being believed sincere. I order, assertion, and refusal. 112

O
thank you again and again for the honour you have In § 3. I analyse the notion of uptake, and the role it plays
Author Proof

67 113
68 done me in your proposals, but to accept them is abso- in Kukla’s and Langton’s accounts. 114

O
69 lutely impossible. My feelings in every respect forbid In § 4. I introduce an alternative proposal: in my account 115
70 it. Can I speak plainer? Do not consider me now as the victim of discursive injustice (provided that everything 116

PR
71 an elegant female, intending to plague you, but as a else is in order) fails not to perform the speech act she 117
72 rational creature, speaking the truth from her heart”. intends to perform, but merely to communicate it. 118
73 Mr. Collins: “You are uniformly charming!… and I am While, according to Kukla and Langton, members of dis- 119
74 persuaded that when sanctioned by the express author- advantaged groups are victims of a kind of uptake failure, 120
75 ity of both your excellent parents, my proposals will leading to illocutionary disablement and even silencing, in
D 121
76 not fail of being acceptable”.1 the account I present they are victims of a kind of commu- 122
nicative (not illocutionary or perlocutionary) disablement. 123
TE
77 Elizabeth replies to Mr. Collin’s proposal with repeated
My overall aim is to develop a notion of discursive injustice 124
78 attempts to refuse or decline it. The attempts seem to fail—
that is more plausible and more effective for our broader 125
79 in ways that my paper will try to elucidate. In Jane Austen’s
purposes of criticizing the structures of power and oppres- 126
80 words, Mr. Collins considers Elizabeth’s “repeated refusals
sion: for victims of discursive injustice, it is of major moral,
EC

127
81 as flattering encouragement”; he interprets what Elizabeth
political and at times legal significance that they actually 128
82 is doing either as a way of showing “her bashful modesty
performed the speech acts (order, assertion or refusal) they 129
83 and the genuine delicacy of her character”, or as a way of
intended and were entitled to perform—even if they failed 130
84 increasing his “love by suspense, according to the usual
to communicate them for reasons connected to their social
R

131
85 practice of elegant females”, or even as trying “to encour-
identity. 132
86 age [his] suit as would be consistent with the true delicacy
R

87 of the female character”.

88 In John Austin’s words, Elizabeth seems to have trouble
2 What is Discursive Injustice? 133
O

89 performing the speech act of refusing.

Rebecca Kukla defines discursive injustice as follows: 134
NC

90 1.2 Outline
When members of any disadvantaged group face a sys- 135
91 Because of her gender, Elizabeth is victim of a pragmatic tematic inability to produce certain kinds of speech 136
92 phenomenon of conversational asymmetry that has become a acts that they ought, but for their social identity, to be 137
U

93 lively object of study for linguists, philosophers of language able to produce—and in particular when their attempts 138
94 and moral philosophers—under various labels: illocution- result in their actually producing a different kind of 139
95 ary disablement and silencing (Langton 1993; Hornsby and speech act that further weakens or problematizes their 140
96 Langton 1998), discursive injustice (Kukla 2014; Lance and social position—then we can say they suffer a discur- 141
97 Kukla 2013), illocutionary distortion (Green 2014, 2017), sive injustice (Kukla 2014, p. 441). 142
98 illocutionary frustration (Hesni 2018). The common idea
According to Kukla, sometimes, as a systematic effect of 143
99 is that members of underprivileged groups sometimes
having an underprivileged social position, a speaker cannot 144
perform certain speech acts that she ought to be able to per- 145
form. Two distinct phenomena may be identified: 146
1
1FL01 Austen (1813/2008, pp. 79–83) (I have slightly edited the passage).
1FL02 The exchange is analysed in Maitra (2004, pp. 190–191).

13
Journal : Large 11245 Article No : 9699 Pages : 10 MS Code : 9699 Dispatch : 2-2-2020
 Discursive Injustice: The Role of Uptake

147 A. in some circumstances, a speech act is precluded: the false beliefs may fail to recognize the illocutionary force of 179
148 speaker ends up performing, with her words, no speech the acts of refusal of sexual advances. 180
149 act at all (these are the silencing cases pointed out by Different kinds of failure may be identified.5 For the pur- 181
150 Langton); poses of this paper I will focus exclusively on instances of 182
151 B. in other circumstances, a speech act is distorted: the uptake failure where refusals become “unspeakable” (an 183
152 speaker ends up performing, with her words, a different Austinian misfire). In Langton’s words: 184
153 act from the one she intended to perform, and differ-
Consider the utterance ’no’. We all know how to do 185
154 ent from the one a member of a dominant group would
things with this word. We use it, typically, to disagree, 186
155 successfully perform using the same words in the same
to refuse, or to prohibit…. However, in sexual con- 187
156 context (these are Kukla’s cases).
texts … sometimes ’no’, when spoken by a woman, 188
does not count as the act of refusal. The hearer fails 189

F
157 Kukla takes illocutionary silencing (A.) as a limiting case
to recognize the utterance as a refusal; uptake is not 190
158 of discursive injustice (B.), where the act is transformed
secured…. Since illocutionary force depends, in part,

O
191
159 “into no speech act at all, rather than into one with a dif-
Author Proof

on uptake being secured, the woman fails to refuse… 192

160 ferent pragmatic structure” (Kukla 2014, p. 442).2 Let us
what she says misfires. Something about her, some- 193

O
161 examine cases A. and B.
thing about the role she occupies, prevents her from 194
voicing refusal. Refusal – in that context – has become 195
2.1 Silencing (A.): Langton

PR
162
unspeakable for her. In this case refusal is not sim- 196
ply frustrated but disabled (Langton 1993/2009, pp. 197
163 Much as in the example of Elizabeth, Langton’s silencing
53–54).6 198
164 cases are cases of failure to refuse—not as a reply to a mar-
165 riage proposal, but as a reply to sexual advances. Accord-
2.2 Distortion (B.): Kukla
D 199
166 ing to Langton (1993) and Langton and Hornsby (1998),
167 pornography silences women by interfering with their abil-
TE
While for Langton silencing is a form of uptake failure, 200
168 ity to perform a range of speech acts, most notably sexual
Kukla interprets discursive injustice in terms of uptake dis- 201
169 refusals. Pornography and other sexist materials (films,
tortion. Let us now analyse two of her examples: order and 202
170 TV shows, romance novels or advertising) may succeed in
assertion. We find cases of discursive injustice in male-dom- 203
171 silencing women by creating a communicative environment
EC

inated workplaces, when women in positions of authority 204

172 that deprives them of their illocutionary potential.3 Indeed,
may find it difficult to issue orders to male subordinates. In 205
173 pornographic materials help propagate false beliefs about
Kukla’s example, Celia is a floor manager at a factory where 206
174 women in sexual contexts, such as “women always want sex;
most of the workers are male. She tells her workers what to 207
they enjoy violent, abusive sex, they fantasize about rape;
R

175
do, but compliance is low: 208
176 rape is normal or legitimate. Hence the utterance of "no" and
similar locutions is not taken by a man to be a refusal but One possible explanation is that the workers are just
R

177 209
178 instead to be a part of the game”.4 Men imbued with such being blatantly sexist and insubordinate. They are 210
refusing to follow her orders, which is still a way of 211
O

2 taking them as orders. However, a subtler and more 212

2FL01 Note that some authors interpret Langton’s silencing cases as cases
2FL02 of distortion, where the speech act of refusal is transformed into a
NC

2FL03
2FL04
different speech act (the “no” becomes a “yes”; the refusal becomes
2FL05 a coy invitation) rather than into no speech act at all: see Wieland
2FL06 (2007); for criticism of Wieland (2007), see Maitra and McGowan Footnote 4 (continued)
2FL07 (2010). In this interpretation of Langton’s cases, cases A. and B. response to sexual overtures… they try not to appear promiscuous, or
2FL08
would collapse into one and my criticism of Kukla’s account would overly sexually forward”.
U

extend to Langton’s. 5
At least four different kinds of failure may be identified: uptake fail- 5FL01
3
3FL01 Langton (1993), Hornsby (1993), and Hornsby and Langton ure (or essential failure), authority failure, sincerity failure, serious- 5FL02
5FL03
3FL02 (1998). It is notoriously difficult to define pornography: the authors ness failure: see McGowan (2009), and (2017, pp. 45–50); Caponetto
3FL03 5FL04
3FL04
working on silencing usually refer to a subset of pornographic mate- (2016).
3FL05 rials that present, endorse and eroticize hierarchical sexual rela- 6
Two remarks are in order. First, the silencing occurs only if it is 6FL01
3FL06 tionships. Note that sources other than pornography may silence brought about in a systematic manner. Second, the literature on 6FL02
3FL07 women—for instance hate speech, and, more generally, all materials silencing seems to implicitly adopt a consent model of sexuality— 6FL03
3FL08
3FL09
relying on or reinforcing dangerous gender stereotypes, e.g. repre- according to which refusals concern permission to proceed: the
6FL04
6FL05
senting women as apparently declining sexual proposals when in fact model presupposes that the man is usually the initiator or proposer 6FL06
longing for them and meaning to accept them. of the sexual activity and the woman accepts or declines the pro- 6FL07
4 6FL08
4FL01 Bird (2002, p. 6); for a similar characterization, see Maitra (2004, posal. The model is more than problematic, but for the purposes of 6FL09
4FL02 p. 192): “women always want sex, but also… they tend to be coy in this paper I won’t challenge it. For criticisms of the consent model
see McGowan (2017, p. 44) and Kukla (2018, p. 78).

13
Journal : Large 11245 Article No : 9699 Pages : 10 MS Code : 9699 Dispatch : 2-2-2020
 C. Bianchi

213 interesting explanation is that even though Celia is actions are sexist, when members of the gay community 235
214 entitled to issue orders in this context, and however claim that a certain policy is homophobic, or when mem- 236
215 much she follows the conventions that typically would bers of ethnic minorities protest that a certain behaviour is 237
216 mark her speech acts as orders, because of her gender racist. As Kukla puts it: 238
217 her workers take her as issuing requests instead (Kukla
Somehow, membership in the group against which one 239
218 2014, pp. 445–446).
is claiming discrimination often demotes what would 240
219 Because of her gender, Celia’s orders are interpreted as normally be taken up as a claim about the world (call- 241
220 simple requests although she: ing for agreement, disagreement, challenge, deference, 242
and so forth) to some sort of personalized reaction cut 243
221 – has the intention of issuing an order; off from normal habitation within the space of reasons 244
222 – is endowed with the required authority; (Kukla 2014, p. 452).9 245

F
223 – deploys the conventions standardly associated to perfor-
Since discursive injustice is characterized as a kind of 246
mances of acts of ordering.

O
224
uptake failure (Langton) or uptake distortion (Kukla), we
Author Proof

247
must now examine the notion of uptake. 248
225 Her orders (namely speech acts meant to impose an obli-

O
226 gation on the audience) are in some sort downgraded to
227 requests (non-authoritative speech acts).7
3 When Things Go Wrong: The Role

PR
249
228 The same analysis can be applied to other speech acts,
of Uptake 250
229 such as assertions: assertions performed by members of
230 underprivileged groups are sometimes not interpreted as
3.1 Uptake 251
231 truth claims about the world, but rather as weaker illocutions
232
233
such as expressions of emotions or feelings, or irrational
manifestations of subjective states.8 This kind of distortion
D
According to Austin, “the performance of an illocution-
ary act involves the securing of uptake”—where uptake is
252
253
TE
234 may occur when women assert that certain comments or
defined as “the understanding of the meaning and of the 254
force of the locution” (Austin 1962, pp. 116–117). How 255
does a speaker secure uptake of the illocutionary force of 256
7
According to Kukla, orders and requests have two different prag- a particular speech act? How does a hearer understand or 257
EC

7FL01
7FL02 matic structures: “Both typically involve an attempt by a speaker to recognize which speech act has been performed (order or 258
7FL03
bring it about that the target… performs an action F… The output request, assertion or expression of distress, refusal or no
7FL04 259
7FL05 of a successful imperative is an obligation on the part of the person
7FL06 ordered to do what the speaker ordered her to do. The output of a suc- speech act at all)? If someone says. 260
R

7FL07 cessful request is that the target now has a specific sort of reason to
7FL08 (1) There is a bull in the field, 261
7FL09
do what was requested, but it is essential to the notion of a request
7FL010 that this reason is not an obligation” (Kukla 2014, pp. 445–446); how should we take (1)? As a description of the scenery
R

262
7FL011 and ibidem: “the pragmatically required response to a request being
7FL012 granted is always and distinctively gratitude… On the other hand, or as a warning?10 263
7FL013
gratitude is not only not called for but is in fact inappropriate when As is well known, in speech act theory a locution can be 264
O

7FL014
7FL015 someone obeys my order”; cf. Lance and Kukla (2013, pp. 460–461). used to perform a variety of different speech acts, such that 265
What is more, gratitude upon an order being fulfilled may prompt a the same locutionary act can count as having various illo- 266
NC

reinterpretation of what appeared to be an order, and a downgrading

of it to a request. cutionary forces in different occasions—as when someone 267

8FL01
8
Note that while two contradictory assertions cannot both be legiti- utters (1) to perform, in different contexts, an act of asserting 268
8FL02 mate, contradictory expressions of emotions or feelings can (cf. or an act of warning. In order to perform a particular speech 269
8FL03
Kukla 2014, p. 451). In the Austinian taxonomy, while truth claims
U

8FL04
8FL05 are Verdictives, expressions of emotions or feelings are Behabitives
8FL06 (Expressives, in the Searlian taxonomy). Behabitives “include the 9
8FL07 notion of reaction to other people’s behaviour and fortunes and of Cf. Kukla (2014, p. 452): “Here are two potential examples: A 9FL01
8FL08
attitudes and expressions of attitudes to someone else’s past conduct female employee claims that her boss is inappropriately flirtatious; a 9FL02
8FL09 9FL03
or imminent conduct”, p. 160). More precisely, Austin (1962) classi- female professor claims that her department members systematically 9FL04
8FL010
8FL011 fies assertions as Verdictives (“the delivering of a finding, official or devalue other female job candidates’ talks. In both cases, the speaker 9FL05
8FL012 unofficial, upon evidence or reasons as to value or fact”, p. 153) or as intends to make, and is in a position to make, a truth-claim… she is 9FL06
8FL013
Expositives (“used in acts of exposition involving the expounding of attempting to put forth a claim about objective events in the exter- 9FL07
8FL014 9FL08
views, the conducting of arguments, and the clarifying of usages and nal world, which seeks uptake in the form of agreement or rational 9FL09
8FL015
8FL016 of references”, p. 161); for an assessment of Austin’s taxonomy, cf. challenge from others. But often… these sorts of speech acts, when 9FL010
8FL017 Kissine (2013). In discussing silencing and muting, Green analyses women perform them, are taken as expressives rather than as claims 9FL011

how putative assertions performed by members of underprivileged about the world—more like ‘ouch’ or ‘congratulations’ than like a
groups get transformed into other members of the assertive family, truth-claim”.
10
such as conjectures or guesses: Green (2017, § VIII). The example is Austin’s: cf. Austin (1962, p. 33). 10FL01

13
Journal : Large 11245 Article No : 9699 Pages : 10 MS Code : 9699 Dispatch : 2-2-2020
 Discursive Injustice: The Role of Uptake

270 act, the speaker has to resort to a complex array of discursive Even if they interpret “securing uptake” in two different 292
271 conventions and contextual features.11 ways—Kukla as the securing of the recognition of the con- 293
272 In the literature that we are considering, “the understand- vention invoked by the speaker, and Langton as the securing 294
273 ing of the force of the locution” may be secured in two dif- of the understanding of the illocutionary intentions of the 295
274 ferent ways (the two notions are usually traced back, respec- speaker—Kukla and Langton seem to agree on one point: it 296
275 tively, to Austin 1962; Strawson 1964)12: is the uptake actually received that counts for the felicitous 297
performance of a speech act. Let us analyse this point in 298
276 1. securing the recognition of the convention invoked by detail. 299
277 the speaker;
278 2. securing the recognition of the illocutionary intentions 3.2 Achieving Actual Uptake 300
279 of the speaker.

F
Kukla holds that the actual occurrence of uptake seems to 301
280 With some qualifications, we may ascribe reading 1. to be a necessary condition for the successful performance of 302

O
281 Kukla and reading 2. to Langton. More precisely, Kukla an illocutionary act.16 In standard cases, if the speaker uses
Author Proof

303
282 favours reading 1., but offers an idiosyncratic theory of the right words, tone and gestures to produce a speech act 304

O
283 uptake—explicitly obliterating the distinction between illo- of type A in a certain context, and she is entitled to do so 305
284 cutionary act and perlocutionary act.13 Langton, by contrast, according to standard discursive and social conventions, 306
then she successfully performs a speech act of type A.17

PR
285 defines uptake as the addressee’s recognition of the speaker’s 307
286 intentions (reading 2.), but ascribes it to Austin.14 This is But sometimes, according to Kukla, something goes wrong. 308
287 incorrect, for Austin defines uptake as the recognition of the In examples of discursive injustice, the speaker might intend 309
288 procedure the speaker is invoking (reading 1.), and brings to perform a speech act of type A; she might have the enti- 310
289 intentions into the picture only as far as Γ conditions are tlement to perform it and use the appropriate words, tone 311
290
291
concerned, namely in cases of “insincerity and infractions
or breaches”, where “the performance is not void”.15
D
and gestures to perform it—yet, if the speaker belongs to an
underprivileged social group, her addressee may not take
312
313
TE
her as having performed a speech act of type A. The speaker 314
11 faces a form of uptake distortion: “its alternative uptake can 315
11FL01 Austin includes elements such as the explicit performative for-
11FL02 mula (such as “I promise to”); performative comments to the speech in fact constitute it as some other kind of speech act of type 316
11FL03
act (illocutionary glosses such as “This is an order”; “That’s a prom- B, with an unconventional output, given its input—a differ- 317
EC

11FL04
11FL05 ise”); the content of the locution; syntactic devices, such as mood; ent kind of act than a male would have produced using the 318
11FL06 prosodic devices, such as tone of voice, cadence, emphasis; adverbs
same words, in the same context, and with the same conven- 319
11FL07 (such as “probably”, “without fail”) or connecting phrases (such as
11FL08
“therefore”, “although”, “hereby”); gestures or ceremonial non-verbal tional entitlements to speak” (Kukla 2014, p. 445). 320
11FL09
actions (such as a bow); along with “the circumstances of the utter- Celia might intend to perform an order; she might have
R

321
ance” (Austin 1962, pp. 67–76). the entitlement to perform it and use the conventionally 322
12
12FL01 As will be seen in § 4.1, I do not agree with standard interpreta- appropriate words, tone and gestures to perform it, and yet,
R

323
12FL02 tions of Austin and Strawson on this point, but I leave the philological
12FL03 because of her gender, her performance may not receive 324
assessment of their accounts to another occasion.
uptake as an order. Its alternative uptake may in fact con- 325
O

13
13FL01 According to Kukla, the audience’s uptake includes understanding
13FL02 and response: "The uptake of the speech act is how it gets recognized stitute it as a request—a weaker kind of speech act than a 326
13FL03
and responded to in practice" (Kukla 2014, p. 453); "Speech acts call man would have performed using the same words, in the 327
NC

13FL04
13FL05 for uptake, and this uptake itself takes the form of a concrete social same context and with the same conventional entitlement. 328
response" (Lance and Kukla 2013, p. 465).
14
14FL01 Cf. Hornsby and Langton (1998, p. 80): “Conditions for perform-
14FL02 ing an illocution typically include a hearer’s recognition of a speak-
14FL03
er’s intention to perform an illocution”. The same interpretation is Footnote 15 (continued)
U

14FL04
14FL05 given by Maitra and McGowan: cf. Maitra (2009, p. 313n): “I gloss fact have those thoughts, feelings, or intentions, and the participants
14FL06 [Austin] as follows: uptake requires both understanding of the content must intend so to conduct themselves” (ibidem).
14FL07 expressed by the utterance, and recognition of the speaker’s illocu- 16
This seems in line with Austin: “Unless a certain effect is 16FL01
14FL08
14FL09
tionary intention(s)”; and McGowan (2017, p. 45): “Austin, Langton achieved, the illocutionary act will not have been happily, success- 16FL02
14FL010 and Hornsby regard uptake (i.e. the hearer’s recognition of the speak- fully performed […] I cannot be said to have warned an audience 16FL03
er’s illocutionary intention) to be a necessary condition for illocution unless it hears what I say and takes what I say in a certain sense
16FL04
16FL05
(Austin 1973, pp. 22, 116, 139)”. […] the performance of an illocutionary act involves the securing of 16FL06
15
15FL01 Austin (1962, p. 39). The first Γ condition is defined as follows: uptake” (Austin 1962, pp. 116–117). But see infra, § 4.1.
15FL02 “Γ. 1: where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons 17
And, Kukla maintains, “The audience members who witness her 17FL01
15FL03
15FL04
having certain thoughts, feelings, or intentions, or for the inaugura- performing the speech act will take it as an entitled speech act of type 17FL02
15FL05 tion of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, A and respond accordingly, and thereby help finish making it so, giv- 17FL03
then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in ing it an output that is conventionally matched to its input”: Kukla
17FL04
17FL05
(2014, p. 444) (emphasis mine); cf. Lance and Kukla (2013, p. 467).

13
Journal : Large 11245 Article No : 9699 Pages : 10 MS Code : 9699 Dispatch : 2-2-2020
 C. Bianchi

329 Similarly, a gay activist might intend to assert that some Moreover, it explicitly follows from Kukla’s framework, 370
330 behaviour was homophobic; he might have the entitlement that “There is no principled or sharp line between a speech 371
331 to perform that assertion, might use the conventionally act receiving mistaken uptake and a speech act being con- 372
332 appropriate words, tone and gestures to perform it, and yet, stituted, perhaps in unexpected ways, by its uptake” (Kukla 373
333 because of his membership in a low-status group, his perfor- 2014, p. 443). I claim that this impossibility of distinguish- 374
334 mance may not receive uptake as an assertion. Its alternative ing between a speech act receiving mistaken uptake and a 375
335 uptake may in fact constitute it as a mere subjective expres- speech act receiving an unexpected uptake makes it difficult 376
336 sion of feelings or manifestation of distress—a weaker kind to characterize the very notion of discursive injustice. It is 377
337 of speech act than a member of a privileged group would precisely because the speaker intends to perform a certain 378
338 have performed using the same words, in the same context speech act, has the entitlement to perform it and uses the 379
339 and with the same conventional entitlement. standard conventions to perform it in her current context— 380

F
340 In Celia’s case there is a “queering of the path between that her performance should receive uptake as that particular 381
341 performance and uptake”, as Kukla labels it (Kukla 2014, p. speech act. 382

O
342 444). In cases of silencing, the “queering” is so strong that, In Kukla’s framework, the order taken as a request is a
Author Proof

383
343 according to Langton, we cannot say that there is uptake at request, the protest taken as an expression of distress is an 384

O
344 all: the speech act has become unspeakable. The woman expression of distress, while in Langton’s framework the 385
345 intends to perform a refusal; she has the entitlement to per- refusal taken as a different act (or no illocution at all) is no 386

PR
346 form it and uses the conventionally appropriate device for illocution at all. Such proposals have the dangerous conse- 387
347 refusals (says ‘no’), and yet her performance may not receive quence that a speaker may fail to perform a speech act only 388
348 any appropriate uptake. Its failed uptake may in fact con- because her addressee is inattentive, incompetent or biased. 389
349 stitute it as no speech act at all. While a man would have In Daniel Jacobson’s words, they have the unwelcome con- 390
350 produced a successful refusal using the same words, in the sequence of holding the performance of an illocutionary
D 391
351 same context and with the same conventional entitlement, act “hostage to the perversity of one’s audience” (Jacobson 392
352 the woman fails to refuse. Her speech act is a misfire—null 1995, pp. 73–74)—a consequence of ethical, political and 393
TE
353 and void.18 legal import for women in their workplaces, activists testify- 394
354 In this perspective, no speaker has complete control over ing and protesting, and victims of sexual assaults. A different 395
355 her own illocutions, which are always constituted in part characterization of discursive injustice is needed. 396
356 by the uptake actually secured by the speaker.19 The uptake
EC

357 actually secured by Celia makes it the case that her locution
358 counts as a request, and not an order. The uptake actually 4 Communicative Failure 397
359 secured by the gay activist makes it the case that his locution
counts as a mere expression of distress, and not as a rational 4.1 Aiming to Achieve Uptake
R

360 398
361 denunciation of a homophobic behaviour. The uptake actu-
ally secured by the woman intending to refuse makes it the My overall aim is to develop a characterization of discur-
R

362 399
363 case that her locution counts as no speech act at all. We sive injustice that is more plausible and more effective for 400
364 must underline a difference between Kukla’s and Langton’s our political and social purposes: in other words, I would 401
O

365 claims: for Kukla, but not for Langton, the uptake actually like to develop what Sally Haslanger calls a revisionary or 402
366 secured by the speaker may be sufficient to turn a refusal into ameliorative analysis of discursive injustice and failure in 403
NC

367 a consent.20 Yet, for Langton the uptake actually secured by conversational contexts.21 In particular, we need a notion 404
368 the speaker may be sufficient to turn a refusal into nothing of failure allowing us to maintain that Celia has actually 405
369 at all. ordered, the gay activist actually protested, and the woman 406
actually refused—but that something went wrong nonethe- 407
U

less. In other words, we need an idea of failure preserv- 408

18
18FL01 Cf. Langton (1993/2009, p. 54). ing the very idea of discursive injustice. In all the cases 409
19
19FL01 Kukla (2014, p. 444): “She has become the victim of a kind of under scrutiny, the subjects have standing or authority in 410
19FL02 pragmatic breakdown, from her point of view. She cannot marshal the relevant domain and have mobilized standard linguistic
19FL03 411
19FL04
standard conventions in the standard way, in order to act autono-
mously as a discursive agent” (emphasis mine).
20
20FL01 Cf. Langton (2018, p. 151, fn. 44): “There are limits to what hear-
20FL02 ers can do, in my view. A hearer may weaken what would have been
20FL03 21
20FL04
an order into a mere request, if an order requires a certain hearer- Cf. Haslanger (2000, p. 35): “if our goal is to identify a concept 21FL01

20FL05 dependent felicity condition. But a hearer cannot e.g. twist sexual that serves our broader purposes, then the question of terminology 21FL02
21FL03
20FL06 refusal into sexual consent, since consent requires a certain speaker- is primarily a pragmatic and sometimes a political one: should we 21FL04
20FL07 dependent felicity condition—the speaker’s decision or intention to employ the terms of ordinary discourse to refer to our theoretical cat- 21FL05
consent”. egories, or instead make up new terms?”.

13
Journal : Large 11245 Article No : 9699 Pages : 10 MS Code : 9699 Dispatch : 2-2-2020
 Discursive Injustice: The Role of Uptake

412 devices and conventions for ordering, protesting or refus- where securing uptake is an effect brought about by a 441
413 ing.22 Therefore, they should receive the intended uptake: speaker.26 442
414 it is because they didn’t receive the intended uptake that
415 we can speak of discursive injustice. In the account I will 4.2 Weak Intentionalism 443
416 put forward, the order, the protest and the refusal have been
417 successfully performed. The failure takes place not at the Taking intentions into account, however, requires careful 444
418 illocutionary level (nor at the perlocutionary level23): it takes qualification. In particular, we must rule out a potential 445
419 place at a level that I call communicative. objection, similar to the one originally raised by Jacobson 446
420 To this end, I suggest adopting a different interpretation against Langton: while Langton’s and Kukla’s proposals 447
421 of “securing uptake”, drawing on a more accurate reading have the unwelcome consequence of holding the perfor- 448
422 of Strawson’s analysis. According to Kukla, “correct rec- mance of an illocutionary act hostage to the perversity of 449

F
423 ognition of speaker intentions is not typically a necessary one’s audience, a Strawsonian intentionalist account could 450
424 condition for proper uptake” (Kukla 2014, p. 453). I agree be seen as having the unwelcome consequence of holding 451

O
425 with her on this point, but I don’t think that this rules inten- the performance of an illocutionary act hostage to the per-
Author Proof

452
426 tions out of the picture. Following Strawson, I propose an versity of the speaker. In other words, in Kukla’s proposal, 453

O
427 intentionalist perspective where the actual recognition of the uptake actually secured by the speaker is enough to 454
428 the speaker’s intentions isn’t a necessary condition for the turn an order into a request, an act of protesting into a mere 455

PR
429 successful performance of an illocutionary act. Indeed, expression of discomfort, while in Langton’s proposal, the 456
430 Strawson suggests that it is the aim, not the achievement, uptake actually secured by the speaker is enough to turn 457
431 of securing uptake that is crucial for the performance of an a refusal into nothing at all. Conversely, an intentionalist 458
432 illocutionary act.24 The speaker’s illocutionary intentions perspective seems to allow speakers to use any locution they 459
433 need not actually be recognized by the audience, but merely choose to perform any speech act they want, only on the 460
434
435
made explicit and public; they must be overt, manifest and
“avowable”: “An essential feature of the intentions which
D
grounds that they intend to do so.27 It is therefore crucial
to distinguish my (weak) intentionalist proposal from other
461
462
TE
436 make up the illocutionary complex is their overtness. They (strong) intentionalist perspectives.28 463
437 have, one might say, essential avowability”.25 From a Strong Intentionalist Perspective, in order for a 464
438 More precisely, securing uptake isn’t dependent on the speaker to perform a speech act, all that is required is that 465
439 hearer, but rather something the speaker does. Note that my the speaker have a certain intention—even if it is agreed that 466
EC

440 reading is fully compatible with an Austinian framework, in most cases the hearer cannot recognize the illocutionary 467
force of the speech act in question. In this view, Celia could 468
issue an order to her workers by speaking with a soft voice 469
and saying ‘please’, and being grateful if her orders are com-
R

22 470
22FL01 On the notion of standing as opposed to authority, see Hesni
22FL02 (2018). plied with: the speaker’s intention determines the relevant 471
illocutionary force, even if no evidence of this intention is
R

23FL01
23
My account makes an additional distinction between communica- 472
23FL02 tive and perlocutionary failure. Indeed, while in most cases a com-
23FL03
municative failure brings about a perlocutionary one, in some cir-
O

23FL04
23FL05 cumstances, no perlocutionary failure may occur: Celia’s objectives
26
23FL06 (moving the boxes, having the workers take their break at 1 p.m.) may Cf. Sbisà (2007, 2009) and Sbisà (2013, pp. 31–32): “Austin 26FL01
23FL07 well be fulfilled as desired as perlocutionary effects of the illocution- claims that the securing of uptake is required in order for the illocu- 26FL02
NC

23FL08 26FL03
23FL09
ary act of request (the employees are fulfilling a perceived request, tionary act to have been actually performed. But he is not thoroughly 26FL04
23FL010 not an order). In a similar vein, the woman refusing may successfully clear about whether what is required includes actual uptake or just 26FL05
23FL011 perform the perlocutionary act of avoiding an unwanted sexual inter- the speaker’s reasonable effort to produce it… One position that may 26FL06
course: the man could stop his advances due to lack of consent (and plausibly be attributed to Austin is that uptake is secured when the 26FL07
26FL08
not as a consequence of a refusal). speaker manages to make it possible for the audience to understand.
U

26FL09
24FL01
24
Cf. Strawson (1964, p. 449): “the aim, if not the achievement, of This indeed is already an achievement, as implied by Austin in the 26FL010
24FL02 securing uptake is essentially a standard, if not an invariable, ele- case of warning, and therefore an effect brought about by the speaker 26FL011
24FL03
ment in the performance of the illocutionary act”. in issuing the utterance. But it does not follow from this that the audi- 26FL012
26FL013
25 ence actually pays attention nor that any actual interpretation, even
25FL01 Strawson (1964, p. 454). Cf. Strawson (1964, p. 451): “the [first- 26FL014
when it is indeed misinterpretation, should count as uptake and con-
25FL02 person performative] verb serves not exactly to ascribe an intention
25FL03 tribute to validating the corresponding illocutionary act as well as its
to the speaker but rather, in Austin’s phrase, to make explicit the type
25FL04 attribution to the speaker”.
25FL05 of communication intention with which the speaker speaks, the type 27
25FL06 of force which the utterance has”. According to Strawson, “the illocu- Cf. Donnellan (1968, p. 212): "if intentions were sufficient, then a 27FL01

25FL07 tionary force of an utterance is essentially something that is intended speaker could mean anything by any word at any time or refer to any- 27FL02
27FL03
25FL08
to be understood. And the understanding of the force of an utter- thing using any definite description at any time".
25FL09
28
25FL010 ance in all cases involves recognizing what may be called broadly The distinction between Weak and Strong Intentionalism was orig- 28FL01

an audience-directed intention and recognizing it as wholly overt, as inally drawn by Stokke (2010) as regards the semantic interpretation 28FL02
28FL03
intended to be recognized” (Strawson 1964, p. 459). of indexicals.

13
Journal : Large 11245 Article No : 9699 Pages : 10 MS Code : 9699 Dispatch : 2-2-2020
 C. Bianchi

473 made available to the hearer, leading to a communicative tion available to her addressee—that is if she doesn’t put 507
474 failure. her addressee in a position to recognise her intention.31 508
475 From a Weak Intentionalist Perspective, the illocutionary
476 intentions of the speaker need not actually be recognized by In my account, a speaker succeeds in performing a certain 509
477 the audience, but merely made available to the audience by speech act if she has arranged things in such a way that a 510
478 the speaker. In the typical case the speaker will deploy stand- competent, attentive, and unbiased audience can reasonably 511
479 ard procedures or conventions, but this perspective allows be expected to recognize her illocutionary intention. If for 512
480 for the use of less conventional procedures: conventions are some arbitrary reason (“the perversity of one’s audience”) 513
481 only means (although the most common and effective) to they do not, the speaker still counts as having performed 514
482 make communicative intentions overt, manifest and, hence, the speech act. What a competent, attentive and unbiased 515
483 available to the addressee. In my account, then, securing addressee would take as a refusal is a refusal. While the 516

F
484 uptake is a necessary condition for the felicitous perfor- Belief Constraint is the intentionalist component, the Avail- 517
485 mance of an illocutionary act.29 To successfully perform ability Constraint introduces a normative component into 518

O
486 an order, an assertion or a refusal, the speaker must secure my account, setting a standard for speaker and addressee.
Author Proof

519
487 uptake in this weaker sense, meaning that she must put her An intention—in order to be illocutionary relevant—must 520

O
488 audience in a position to recognize her illocutionary inten- be something that a (normal) addressee in normal circum- 521
489 tion (in a Strawsonian/Gricean framework) or the procedure stances is able to work out using conventional means and 522

PR
490 she is invoking (in an Austinian framework): to this end, contextual information. 523
491 the speaker can exploit any feature of the context of perfor- Two important qualifications are in order. First, my 524
492 mance, the content of the locution, syntactic and prosodic account does not require that the audience in fact recog- 525
493 devices, gestures, tone of voice and so on. nise the speaker’s communicative intentions—only that the 526
494 In my view, then, intentions—not only to be successfully speaker has fulfilled her communicative responsibilities
D 527
495 communicated, but to be illocutionary relevant—must sat- (that is that she has satisfied the Belief and the Availability 528
496 isfy two constraints: Constraints): having fulfilled her communicative responsi- 529
TE
bilities, however, isn’t a guarantee of successful communi- 530
497 1. Intentions must satisfy a Belief Constraint: they must be cation. Having a complex array of audience-oriented inten- 531
498 constrained by expectations and beliefs. A speaker can- tions, and making it public and available to the audience, the 532
499 not intend to perform a certain speech act using a certain speaker does secure uptake (hence illocutionary felicity) but
EC

533
500 locution in a given context if she doesn’t believe that her does not secure communication, for the addressee could be 534
501 addressee will be able to identify her intention—namely absent-minded, forgetful, lacking in the relevant knowledge, 535
502 if she doesn’t believe she can succeed in performing her uncooperative or even irrational.32 536
speech act by using that locution in the given context.30 Second, my account is compatible with the idea that the
R

503 537
504 2. Intentions must satisfy an Availability Constraint: the speaker’s communicative responsibilities depend partially on 538
speaker cannot perform a certain speech act using a who the addressee is (for instance, children or adults with
R

505 539
506 locution in a given context if she doesn’t make her inten- visual and auditory disabilities).33 However, the responsibil- 540
ity of the speaker in taking the addressee’s flaws into account 541
O

cannot extend beyond certain boundaries: for example, it 542

cannot result in actually self-denying agency or moral stand- 543
NC

29FL01
29
For a different opinion, cf. Bird (2002, p. 3): “(iv) uptake is not ing, or her own authority in the relevant domain.34 544
29FL02 necessary for illocution in general, nor (v) is it necessary for refusal
29FL03
29FL04
in particular”; Maitra (2009, p. 313n): “even if it is right, contra Aus-
29FL05 tin, that an illocutionary act can be performed without uptake, there
U

29FL06 is clearly a sense in which that act is less than fully successful—or 31
Dealing with demonstratives, Stokke (2010, p. 388) introduces a 31FL01
29FL07 happy”; and McGowan (2017, p. 45): “I do not regard uptake as nec-
similar Uptake Constraint. 31FL02
essary for illocution, but it is necessary for communication”. 32
30 Stokke (2010) and King (2014) hold similar views as far as refer- 32FL01
30FL01 The Belief Constraint is in line with Keith Donnellan’s approach
ence is concerned; see for example King (2014, p. 225): “If my hearer 32FL02
30FL02 to intentions and expectations. As is well known, Donnellan views 32FL03
30FL03 is inattentive, incompetent or simply ignoring me, that should not by
intentions as “essentially connected with expectations” (Donnellan 32FL04
30FL04 itself prevent me from securing a value for my demonstrative”.
30FL05 1968, p. 212), and more specifically as limited by reasonable expecta- 33
30FL06 tions. As he famously puts it, a subject in normal circumstances can- On this point, see King (2014, p. 228). Note that in my framework 33FL01

30FL07 not flap his arms with the intention of flying, nor he can say out of the it is essential to underline the distinction between “addressee” and 33FL02
33FL03
30FL08
blue “There’s glory for you” and mean “There’s a nice knock-down “competent hearer”: it is part of the speaker’s communicative respon- 33FL04
30FL09
argument for you” (as in Humpty Dumpty’s exchange with Alice). sibilities to put that particular addressee (and not just any competent 33FL05
30FL010
30FL011 Donnellan introduces this point for meaning and referring; I have hearer, such as a bystander) in a position to recognise her intentions.
34
extended this point to domains of quantification in Bianchi (2006) Thanks to Stefano Bacin for suggesting a requirement along these 34FL01
and to speech acts in Bianchi (2014). lines. 34FL02

13
Journal : Large 11245 Article No : 9699 Pages : 10 MS Code : 9699 Dispatch : 2-2-2020
 Discursive Injustice: The Role of Uptake

545 4.3 Blaming and Necessity This offers a solution to a potentially destructive objec- 577
tion which has been raised against Langton’s account.37 Her 578
546 In my view the acts of ordering, protesting or refusing under account has been seen as diminishing the man’s responsibil- 579
547 discussion have been felicitously performed: the failure lies ity in rape cases, for, according to Langton, no act of refusal 580
548 at the communicative level. More precisely, we may identify has actually been performed. In contrast, my perspective 581
549 two kinds of communicative failures: allows us to maintain not only that the woman has refused, 582
but also that the man is responsible for the communicative 583
550 – the Belief Constraint is satisfied but the Availability Con- failure. The failure to recognize the refusal is due to the sex- 584
551 straint is not: the speaker has the intention to perform ist, bigoted, misogynistic beliefs the man entertains—and we 585
552 speech act A but she doesn’t make her intention available. must be held responsible for the false (unjust, discrimina- 586
553 In this case the speaker is responsible not only for the tory, sexist) beliefs we entertain. 587

F
554 communicative, but also the illocutionary failure; In a similar vein, Celia has performed the illocutionary 588
555 – both the Belief and the Availability Constraints are satis- act of ordering, but failed to communicate it: there is no illo- 589

O
556 fied: the speaker has the intention to perform speech act cutionary failure, only communicative failure. Celia has ful-
Author Proof

590
557 A, and makes her intention available to the addressee, filled her communicative responsibilities: she has made her 591

O
558 but the addressee is inattentive, incompetent or biased. intentions available to her subordinates by using conventions 592
559 In this case there is no illocutionary failure, only a com- standardly associated with orders—and performed a speech 593

PR
560 municative failure, for which the addressee must be held act that any competent, attentive and unbiased addressee 594
561 responsible.35 would have taken as an order. The workers must be held 595
responsible for the communicative failure—due to the sexist, 596
562 In the silencing case, the woman has the intention to bigoted, misogynistic beliefs they entertain. 597
563 refuse and has made her intentions available to the man
564
565
by using conventions standardly associated with refusals:
in other words, the woman has fulfilled her communica-
D
5 Conclusion 598
TE
566 tive responsibilities. The woman’s success in performing
567 an illocutionary act depends on her securing uptake in this In my paper, I have argued for three main claims: 599
568 weaker sense—it doesn’t depend on actually obtaining the
569 recognition of her illocutionary intentions. The woman, a. securing uptake—understood in a weak intentionalist 600
EC

570 then, has performed the illocutionary act of refusing, but perspective—is a necessary condition for the successful 601
571 failed to communicate it: there is no illocutionary failure, performance of an illocutionary act; 602
572 only communicative failure, no illocutionary silencing, only b. in cases of discursive injustice, the illocutionary act (e.g. 603
communicative silencing. In this case, it is the man who must ordering, asserting or refusing) has been successfully
R

573 604
574 be held responsible for the communicative failure: what a performed; 605
competent, attentive, and unbiased addressee would take as c. in cases of discursive injustice, the failure lies at the
R

575 606
576 a refusal is a refusal—even if the man fails to recognize it.36 communicative level. 607
O

Each claim has wide-ranging theoretical and political 608

consequences: 609
NC

35
35FL01 There is a third case: the Belief Constraint is not satisfied, but the
35FL02 Availability Constraint is. This case may account for examples of a. my account delineates a notion of uptake compatible 610
35FL03
35FL04
unintentional speech acts—essentially conventional acts (namely rit- with both a Strawsonian (i.e. Gricean) and an Austin- 611
35FL05 ual or institutional) like the Strawsonian “Redouble”. Strawson allows ian perspective: this is a desirable outcome, since most 612
U

35FL06 for this possibility but deems such cases “essentially deviant or non-
35FL07 standard”: “I do not mean that such an act could never be performed authors working on silencing adopt Austin’s frame- 613
35FL08
unintentionally. A player might let slip the word "redouble" without work38; 614
35FL09
35FL010 meaning to redouble; but if the circumstances are appropriate and the
35FL011 play strict, then he has redoubled (or he may be held to have redou-
35FL012 bled). But a player who continually did this sort of thing would not be
35FL013
asked to play again, except by sharpers. Forms can take charge, in the
37
absence of appropriate intention; but when they do, the case is essen- Cf. for example Jacobson (1995, p. 74), Bird (2002, pp. 3–4), and 37FL01
tially deviant or nonstandard” (Strawson 1964, p. 457). Bauer (2015). Hornsby and Langton (1998) is a reply to Jacobson’s 37FL02
37FL03
36FL01
36
Cf. King (2012, p. 225): “the value of a use of a demonstrative criticism.
38
36FL02 in a context is that object o that meets the following two conditions: This point strongly differentiates my account from Maitra’s: 38FL01
36FL03
36FL04
(1) the speaker intends o to be the value; and (2) a competent, atten- Maitra (2009) develops an idea of silencing as “communicative disa- 38FL02
38FL03
36FL05 tive, reasonable hearer would take o to be the object that the speaker blement”, adopting a Gricean understanding of communication and 38FL04
intends to be the value”. radically departing from the Austinian framework.

13
Journal : Large 11245 Article No : 9699 Pages : 10 MS Code : 9699 Dispatch : 2-2-2020
 C. Bianchi

615 b. it follows from my account that the victim of discursive Bird A (2002) Illocutionary silencing. Pac Philos Q 83:1–15 663
injustice has performed the act she was entitled to per- Caponetto L (2016) Silencing speech with pornography. Phenomenol 664
616
Mind 11:182–191 665
617 form—avoiding the unwelcome result of denying her Donnellan K (1968) Putting humpty dumpty together again. Philos 666
618 agency or authority; Rev 77:203–205 667
619 c. it follows from my account that the responsibility for the Green M (2014) Speech acts. In: Zalta E (ed) The Stanford encyclope- 668
communicative failure is to be attributed to the biased, dia of philosophy. Stanford University Press, Palo Alto 669
620
Green, M (2017) Assertion. In: Pritchard D (ed) Oxford handbooks 670
621 bigoted, or sexist audience. online. Oxford University Press, New York 671
Haslanger S (2000) Gender and race: (what) are they? (What) do we 672
622 In my account, Elizabeth Bennett has performed the illo- want them to be? Noûs 34(1):31–55 673
cutionary act of refusing, and merely failed to communicate Hesni S (2018) Illocutionary frustration. Mind 127:508. https://doi. 674
623
org/10.1093/mind/fzy033 675
624 it: there is no illocutionary failure, only communicative fail- Hornsby J (1993) Speech acts and pornography. Women’s Philos Rev 676

F
AQ1
625 ure. Elizabeth has secured uptake and fulfilled her communi- 10:38–45 677
626 cative responsibilities—she has made the illocutionary force Hornsby J, Langton R (1998) Free speech and illocution. Legal Theory 678

O
of her speech act available to any competent, attentive, and 4:21–37 679
627
Author Proof

Jacobson D (1995) Freedom of speech acts? A response to langton. 680

628 unbiased audience, using standard conventions, syntactic Philos Public Aff 24:65–79 681

O
629 and prosodic devices, gestures and tone of voice. Mr. Collins King J (2014) Speaker intentions in context. Noûs 48(2):219–237 682
630 is responsible for the false (unjust, discriminatory, sexist) Kissine M (2013) Speech act classifications. In: Sbisà M, Turner K 683
(eds) Pragmatics of speech actions, handbooks of pragmatics, vol

PR
631 beliefs he entertains: therefore, he must be held responsible 684
2. Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin, pp 173–201 685
632 for the communicative failure. Elizabeth’s responsibility in Kukla R (2014) Performative force, convention, and discursive injus- 686
633 taking Mr. Collins’s bigot beliefs into account cannot extend tice. Hypatia 29(2):440–457 687
634 beyond certain limits, and ultimately result in self-denying Kukla R (2018) That’s what she said: the language of sexual negotia- 688
AQ2 her own autonomy and authority. Any reasonable, attentive, tion. Ethics 129:70–97 689
635 D
Lance M, Kukla R (2013) Leave the gun; take the cannoli! The prag- 690
636 competent and unbiased addressee would have recognized matic topography of second-person calls. Ethics 123:456–478 691
637 what Elizabeth was doing with her words: we do recognize Langton R (1993) Speech acts and unspeakable acts. Philos Public 692
TE
638 what she is doing with her words, and so did Jane Austen’s Affairs 22:293–330, now in Langton 2009, 25–63. 693
readers at the beginning of the nineteenth century. This is Langton R (2009) Sexual solipsism: philosophical essays on pornogra- 694
639
phy and objectification. Oxford University Press, Oxford 695
640 what makes of her exchange with Mr. Collins an instance Langton R (2018) Blocking as counter-speech. In: Fogal D, Harris DW, 696
641 of discursive injustice. And, of course, an instance of bitter, Moss M (eds) New work on speech acts. Oxford University Press,
EC

697
642 albeit delightful irony. Oxford, pp 144–164 698
MacKinnon C (1987) Feminism unmodified: discourses on life and law. 699
Acknowledgements Thanks to Stefano Bacin, Federica Berdini, Laura Harvard University Press, Cambridge 700
643
Caponetto, Bianca Cepollaro, Mitch Green, Rae Langton, Marina Maitra I (2004) Silence and responsibility. Philos Perspect 18:189–208 701
644
R

Sbisà, Achille Varzi and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments Maitra I (2009) Silencing speech. Can J Philos 39(2):309–338 702
645
and suggestions on previous versions of this article. Maitra I, McGowan MK (2010) On silencing, rape, and responsibility. 703
646
Australas J Philos 88(1):167–172 704
R

McGowan MK (2009) On silencing and sexual refusal. J Polit Philos 705

647 Funding Financial support for my work was provided by the PRIN, 17(4):487–494 706
648 Italian Government, Bando 2017, Prot. 2017P9E9NF. McGowan MK (2017) On multiple types of silencing. In: M. Mikkola
O

707
(ed) Beyond speech. Pornography and analytic feminist philoso- 708
649 Compliance with Ethical Standards phy. Oxford University Press, New York 709
NC

Sbisà M (2007) How to read Austin. Pragmatics 17(3):461–473 710

Conflict of interest I declare that I have no conflict of interest. Sbisà M (2009) Uptake and conventionality in illocution. Lodz Pap 711
650
Pragmat 5(1):33–52 712
Ethical Approval This article does not contain any studies with human Sbisà M (2013) Locution, illocution, perlocution. In: Sbisà M, Turner 713
651
participants or animals. K (eds) Pragmatics of speech actions, handbooks of pragmatics, 714
652
U

vol 2. Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin, pp 25–75 715

Stokke A (2010) Intention-sensitive semantics. Synthese 175:383–404 716
Strawson P (1964) Intention and convention in speech acts. Philos Rev 717
73:439–460 718
653 References Wieland N (2007) Linguistic authority and convention in a speech act 719
analysis of pornography. Australas J Philos 85(3):435–456 720
654 Austen J (1813) Pride and prejudice. Oxford University Press, Oxford
655 Austin JL (1962) How to do things with words. Oxford University Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to 721
656 Press, Oxford jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. 722
657 Bauer N (2015) How to do things with pornography. Harvard Univer-
658 sity Press, Cambridge
723
659 Bianchi C (2006) ‘Nobody loves me’: quantification and context. Philos
660 Stud 130(2):377–397
661 Bianchi C (2014) How to do things with (recorded) words. Philos Stud
662 167(2):485–495

13
Journal : Large 11245 Article No : 9699 Pages : 10 MS Code : 9699 Dispatch : 2-2-2020