Aristotle begins his study on ethics by asserting that there is some ultimate good which is both complete and
self-
sufficient, and defines this good as happiness.
There must be one final end of all human actions, because a human action by definition is one that is done on
purpose and for a definite goal. Note that there are some actions performed by human beings such as digestion or
respirationwhich are not human actions per se. A human action is the type of action that separates human beings
from animals, because it involves the use of reason and intelligence. An action may be performed for a limited goal,
but that goal is a means to larger goal which is a means to another even larger goal, and so on, until one reaches the
final goal which is desired for its own sake. All lesser goods, such as wealth, honor, fame, glory, pleasure, et cetera are
not desired for themselves but in order to attain happiness. That this supreme good is happiness has never really
been a cause of dispute, for according to Aristotle, "we may almost say that the great majority of mankind are agreed
about this; for both the multitude and persons of refinement speak of it as Happiness, and conceive the good life'
or doing well' to be the same thing as being happy." It is important to note that the Greek word "eudamonia" which
is usually translated as "happiness" has no fully accurate translation in English and is not a state of being but an action
of living well, and can also be translated as "blessedness" or "well-being."
The debate among philosophers, however, begins when considering what constitutes happiness. Aristotle holds that
the happiness of man can be defined by determining the function proper to man. This function cannot be one which
plants and animals also perform, because it must be particular to human beings. Therefore, man's function must be a
part of the practical life of the rational part of man, the term practical implying purposeful conduct, which is possible
only for rational beings. It follows, then, that happiness consists in the action of the rational part of man, the soul. The
ultimate good of man should naturally flow from performing his function well; therefore, as Aristotle theorizes, "the
Good of man [and, by extension, the definition of happiness] is the active exercise of his soul's faculties in conformity
with excellence or virtue, or if there be several human excellences or virtues, in conformity with the best and most
perfect among them." To constitute true happiness this action must persist with continuity throughout a lifetime.
This chapter also brings up several noteworthy features of Aristotle's thought in general. First of all, he insists on
seeking precision in an inquiry only within the limits set by the nature of the inquiry itself. Therefore while one should
expect perfect precision in a subject like mathematics, one should not expect ethics to be so exact, or doubt the
validity of conclusions about ethics because their precision is not at the level of mathematical precision.
Second, the idea that a person needs to be virtuous in order to understand ethics is an important feature in Aristotle's
argument. Studying ethics requires the use of practical reason and ought to result in actions that accord with ethical
principles. If a person does not live virtuously, his reason is not disposed to accept the logic of ethical arguments and
is even less disposed to put ethical principles into action, which is an imperative of practical reason. Practical
rationality, connected with the virtue of "phronesis," most commonly translated as prudence, is discussed in greater
depth in Chapter Six.
Finally, for those with an interest in the differences between Platonic and Aristotelian thought, section four is
particularly important. While Plato considers the only true Good to be the universal form which exists only in the
realm of ideas, Aristotle rejects Plato's characterization. Aristotle thinks that the good is the end of human action in
general and should therefore have practical ramifications for the way a person should act.
A final note on this chapter is to call attention to the classical conception of virtue in general, as it is quite at odds
with the modern conception. Aristotle, along with other classical (and also medeival) philosophers saw the need to act
in accordance with virtue not as the result of external societal or cultural constraints upon a person but rather as an
integral part of the person's nature. Acting virtuously is therefore simply acting as a human being is designed to act,
and will therefore result in that person's living well that is, happiness. A second feature of the classical conception of
virtue which is alluded to in the first chapter is the idea of the unity of the virtues. All of the virtues reinforce each
other and overlap in many ways, such that growth in one virtue is to some extent growth in all virtues and vice
versa. Justice (discussed more fully in Chapter 5) is the integration of all the virtues. Because the virtues are united,
there can never be a genuine conflict between them. Finally, virtue is considered to be the goal of politics in
Aristotle's philosophy. Aristotle's work, The Politics, is based upon this idea and is inseparable from his entire ethical
theory. To be fully understood, The Nicomachean Ethics and The Politics must be studied in reference to one another
because each depends on and completes the other.
Analysis:
Aristotle identifies ethical virtue as "a habit, disposed toward action by deliberate choice, being at the mean relative to
us, and defined by reason as a prudent man would define it" (1107a). A crucial distinction exists between being
virtuous and acting virtuously. To qualify as virtuous, one must not merely act virtuously, but also know he is acting
virtuously, intend to do what he does for its own sake, and act with certainty and firmness (1105b). Acting virtuously,
however, is the primary means to becoming virtuous. For, according to Aristotle, "virtues arise in us neither by nature
nor contrary to nature; but by our nature we can receive them and perfect them by habituation" (1103a).
The necessity of forming good habits in order to become virtuous leads Aristotle to consider law and education as
crucial means of making the citizens virtuous. While the details regarding law-making are reserved for The Politics, in
Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle provides an explanation of why good laws are necessary to form virtuous citizens. By
setting certain minimal standards of conduct, the law provides the requisite amount of coercion essential for inducing
a man to conquer his passions and to act virtuously. As Aristotle states, "It is difficult for one to be guided rightly
towards virtue from an early age unless he is brought up under such [i.e., right] laws; for a life of temperance and
endurance is not pleasant to most people, especially the young. For these reasons, the nurture and pursuits of the
young should be regulated by laws, for when they become habitual they are not painful" (11079b).
Through virtuous action, one will then realize the natural pleasure concomitant in virtue, and begin to become truly
virtuous. Therefore "we should be brought up from our early youth in such a way as to enjoy and be pained by the
things we should" (1104b). Yet laws are necessary not only for the young, but for all people. Aristotle points out
toward the end of the book that "laws would be needed for man's entire life, for most people obey necessity rather
than argument, and penalties rather than what is noble" (1179b).
One may argue that it is not the responsibility of the city to make laws encouraging citizens to act virtuously, but
rather that moral education belongs more properly to an individual household. Yet in Aristotle's view, "virtue must be
a care for every city," because "the city exists not only for the sake of living but rather primarily for the sake of living
well" (Politics 1280bl). In addition, virtuous citizens are necessary for the city's stability and security. Although Aristotle
does not deny the important role of parental guidance, he asserts that while "parental command possesses neither
strength nor necessity, . . . the law has compelling power" (1180a).
If one does not acquire the proper habits, the most eloquent attempts to persuade and exhort him to become
virtuous will simply fall on deaf ears. Aristotle implies this idea in his choice of a virtuous audience for the
Nicomachean Ethics. The philosopher states that "he who is to listen effectively to lectures concerning noble and just
things . . . should be brought up well in ethical habits." Without having experienced the natural pleasure of virtue, one
will simply not understand Aristotle's arguments. Law is therefore necessary because it forces one to act virtuously,
thereby making virtue's pleasantness apparent from experience and allowing one to understand the intrinsic
choiceworthiness of virtuous action.
Yet though law is necessary, it is inherently insufficient as a means of generating true virtuousness. After all, virtue
requires that one perform noble actions for their own sake with certainty and firmness, and be aware of the nobility of
the action. In addition, a truly virtuous person will take pleasure in acting virtuously. Obviously, law, in the specific
sense of the word, cannot go beyond merely forcing one to act virtuously. Expanding the meaning of law to include
the education which the regime provides, however, greatly broadens its efficacy. For once law has begun to habituate
a person to acting virtuously, education can provide a means to learn the reasons why moral actions are choiceworthy
in themselves. Law, then, prepares an audience to understand ethical teachings by assuring that they will have
experienced virtuous action, thereby opening their minds to the persuasion of reason.
Both laws and education fall short, however, in leading people to true virtue. For virtue "is a kind of moderation,
having the mean as its aim," yet "this is neither just one thing nor the same for everyone" (1106b). As an example,
Aristotle points out that in deciding proportions of food, the specific needs and circumstances of the individual must
be taken into account. An athlete, for instance, obviously needs to eat more than a sedentary man does. In deciding
what is virtuous, one must likewise find a mean specific to oneself, though for all this mean lies between the same two
extremes of vice. The deficiency of laws, then, lies in their universal nature. One simply cannot make laws which
specifically dictate the mean proper to each person; a law can only provide a broad and general guideline. Education,
though more informative than law, is similarly inadequate. While education can provide more detailed, particularized
instruction and can also refine the student's reason to aid him in choosing the correct mean, the individual can only
find the mean through trial and error in the experiences of his own life. The virtue which one must develop in order to
attain moral virtue and to find the correct mean in all of one's actions is prudence, which is discussed in further detail
in Chapter Six.
Analysis:
The premise of moral virtue is that human beings appear to be the cause of their own actions. It is in this light that we
need to look at Aristotle's lengthy discussion of volition and intention. For if human beings act only as a response to
external stimuli or even to internal stimuli such as desires, then there can be no such thing as virtue, nor can there be
any such thing as culpability. If a person cannot truly cause his own actions intentionally and with volition, then it
would make no more sense to reprimand a man for committing murder than to reprimand a bolder for falling from a
cliff and crushing someone when it lands. Because it is possible to act voluntarily, moral virtue exists and is attainable.
Aristotle's emphasis on volition is also significant in contrast to Plato. For Plato, vice is the result of ignorance, and no
one ever actually intends to do evil but only does so because he lacks knowledge of what is truly good. Aristotle,
however, believes that evil can be done by intention, not only by ignorance. If everyone had full knowledge of the
good, Plato thinks that everyone would act according to virtue. Yet knowledge is not a matter of volition or intention,
and having knowledge of the good is not a matter of virtue, but rather a matter of intelligence and proper education.
By positing that acting according to virtue concerns volition and intention rather than just knowledge, Aristotle makes
moral virtue possible.
The first two virtues which Aristotle examines bravery and temperance concern the desiring or spirited part of the
soul, for they deal with the natural aversion to pain and desire for pleasure. In both cases, the virtue lies in directing
those natural fears and desires according to right reason. Thus one needs to show courage in the face of mortal
danger in order for the sake of a noble end, such as defense of the city in battle. Likewise, one must moderate one's
desires for food or sensual pleasure so that they remain in accordance with right reason, being used for their proper
purposes. Animals also have these desires, but their desires are kept in order by instinct. Human beings, on the other
hand, have the ability to reason and are thus supposed to moderate their desires in accordance with reason. For
example, the purpose of the desire for food is proper nourishment and bodily health. This desire goes outside the
bounds of right reason when a person is gluttonous, eating excessively and possibly damaging the person's health.
Aristotle likens the desiring part of the soul to a child who needs to be guided and directed by a tutor or some other
adult. Thus just as a child needs to be subject to his parents for his own good, the desiring part of the soul needs to
be subject to reason for the good of the person.
Analysis:
In this chapter Aristotle catalogues and describes the remaining virtues, except for justice, which he leaves for a
separate discussion because of its special character. There is no particular order or system to Aristotle's discussion of
the virtues, except with respect to the two "peak" virtues, magnanimity and justice. The magnanimous man is one who
possesses all the virtues that were discusses previous to it bravery, temperance, generosity and magnificence.
Because of his virtues, this man claims and deserves great honors. While he is not vain about his virtue, he is
conscious of it and acts accordingly.
In the discussion of each of the virtues, it is clear that Aristotle is not at all attempting to write a code of moral
absolutes, but rather to describe what it would mean for a person to excel in virtue. Aristotle was not a proponent of
rule-based, deontological ethics like Kant. His ethical system can best be described as "casuistry," a sort of situational
ethics in which the specific right thing to do depends on a variety of circumstances. This casuistry is teleological, in
that, as was discussed at the beginning of The Ethics, virtue for human beings is acting in such a way as to fulfill the
telosend or purposeof human life. The virtues which Aristotle enumerates are guiding principles for which one
should aim when determining one's conduct. Virtue is not a matter of following rules but is a habit of acting
according to right reason. Thus we find in the description of each virtue that is important not only to do a certain
thing or act in a certain way, but do so at the right time, in the right manner, with the right people, with the right
intentions and even with the right feelings. For a virtuous man will not take pleasure in vice but will find virtuous
actions pleasant. The ability to decide in each specific situation how one should actually act is an intellectual virtue,
called prudence, which will be discussed in chapter 7.
It is interesting to note that in order to be magnanimous, which is one of the peaks of virtue, it is necessary for a
person to be wealthy. While the virtues are supposed to be both good in themselves and a means to a full and
blessed life, they are accessible only to an elite few. For Aristotle, this elitism is not at all problematic. A belief in the
equal dignity of all human beings was an outgrowth of Christian philosophy; inequality was taken for granted by the
Ancient Greeks and was considered to be part of the natural order. Christian morality is also significantly different
from Aristotle's ethics in that humility is considered to be a key virtue in the former while it is a vice in the latter.
Nietzsche, noticing precisely these differences between Christian morality and Aristotelian ethics, claimed that
society's acceptance of Christian ideals came about as a result of a "slave revolt" of morality in which the Jewish
people managed to turn poverty, humility and meekness into virtues in order to exalt their own low place society (The
Genealogy of Morals). The elitism which Nietzsche saw as a strength in Aristotelian morality was not, however, viewed
so positively by Aristotle himself. For in the end of the Ethics when Aristotle discusses the highest life the
contemplative lifehe bemoans the fact that this peak of human fulfillment is largely unattainable and perhaps even
impossible. More will be said on this subject in the analysis of Chapter 10.
Analysis:
This chapter on justice brings together many of the key elements in The Ethics and also has profound implications
for Aristotle's political theory. First, the discussion of justice as the whole of virtue implies the unity of the virtues. That
is, a person cannot really have one virtue in its entirety without having all of the virtues in their entirety. Further, since
the virtues are so united and interconnected, there can be no conflict between them. In certain situations it may seem
that the action required by a certain virtue conflicts with the action required by another virtue, yet they are only
superficially in conflict, since the virtues are ordered with relation to justice, which encompasses them all.
Another key aspect of this chapter is the distinction between natural justice and legal justice. Natural justice is the
same in all times and places. It is, in a sense, comprised by the laws that order the universe and that order beings
toward their ends. For human beings, that which is naturally just is that which is in accordance with right reason, that
which will lead a person to his natural end of happiness. This was discussed previously in Chapter 1. Aristotle does
admit that from observation it may difficult to see the existence of this natural justice. The reason is that governments
vary and no perfect regime exists; thus there seem to be different definitions of justice implied by the laws of each
regime. Legal justice is that which is just according to law; it ought to be in accordance with natural justice. These
distinctions in types of justice are similar to the distinctions made in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas
states that the positive lawthat is, the law as written by the state must be in accordance with the natural law, which is
universal and unchanging. Further, like Aristotle, Aquinas points out that the laws of the state cover only those parts
of the natural law which refer to the common good. Natural justice also protects human freedom and makes a person
capable of acting well when the rules don't apply.
In theory, then, there exists a universal standard of natural justice which is unchangeable, but in practice there must
always be a mix of natural justice and legal justice in the laws of the city. Therefore while the principles of natural
justice don't change, natural justice in action varies because in applying natural justice conventional justice needs to
be added.
The discussion about whether or not it is possible for a man to act unjustly to himself is highly revealing. Aristotle
believes that it is impossible for a man to act unjustly to himself because no one voluntary wishes for anything that is
not good. Implied in this belief is the idea that the human will is naturally directed toward the good, and that human
beings do not voluntary and knowingly choose something that is an absolute evil, but rather that they choose a lesser
good over a greater good. Thus the incontinent man who harms himself by allowing his passions to have free reign is
not seeking anything evil, but is seeking goods in a disordered way. Yet the incontinent man does not really wish to
do harm to himself; it is simply that in following his passions he is acting contrary to his own wishes by allowing the
nonrational part of the soul to rule rather than the rational part which is supposed to direct his actions in accordance
with right reason.
Underlying the commentary about laws in this chapter is the idea prominent in The Politics that laws have an
important role in forming virtuous citizens. For this reason, The Ethics and The Politics cannot be properly understood
in isolation from one another. Without knowledge of the virtues, and particularly of justice, it is impossible to know
what a good regime is, since the end of politics is to live virtuously. Yet politics is important for ethics because it is
only within the polis that a person learns how to live virtuously and can attain full virtue and happiness.
Analysis:
The virtue which one must develop in order to attain moral virtue and to find the correct mean in all of one's actions
is prudence. Prudence is the ability to deliberate well regarding human actions. Concerned with particulars of action,
prudence is absolutely necessary in order to find the mean, or in Aristotle's words, "to know what is good for oneself"
(1142a). The philosopher even goes so far as to say that "without prudence virtues cannot exist," but that where there
is prudence, "all the others are present" (1144b). Prudence and ethical virtue are in fact inseparable, much like two
sides of the same coin, "for while virtue makes the end in view right, prudence makes the means towards it right"
(1144a).
To acquire ethical virtue, several conditions are necessary: (1) the good must be known, (2) one must deliberate
properly to seek the means for it through reason, (3) one must intend to do the good for its own sake, (4) one must
desire to do what is good, and (5) virtuous action must be repeated to produce a habit.
It seems, however, that by connecting prudence and ethical virtue so closely, Aristotle has created a closed circle
which precludes one from becoming virtuous. Prudence concerns means, not ends. The correct end is presupposed.
But the ends themselves seem to require prudence. In stating that "a man cannot be good in the main sense without
prudence, nor can he be prudent without ethical virtue," Aristotle seems to present a "chicken and egg" paradox: one
cannot become prudent without the experiences of virtuous action, yet one cannot be virtuous without prudence.
Perhaps the answer to this paradox is that virtuous habits can be acquired little by little through proper education and
obedience to just laws. Those habits give rise to a certain amount of prudence which then allows the person to be
more virtuous and so on. Thus the relationship between ethical virtue and prudence can best be characterized as an
inward spiral which little by little reaches the center, which is a virtuous life.
Wisdom is connected to prudence as health is to medicine. Wisdom is the superior of the two, and prudence is a
means to wisdom as medicine is a means to health. The prudent man considers how wisdom is acquired and
prescribes his actions in order to acquire it.
Analysis:
In this chapter Aristotle has added some complications to the simple distinction between virtue and vice. Virtue and
vice require that a person act deliberately, yet there are many instances when people do not really act deliberately
because they act according to passion rather than according to reason. Virtue requires that a person not only do the
right thing but also that he act for the right reason and that his desire should also be correct. Incontinence is knowing
the better and not acting according but rather succumbing to one's passions. Thus it is not vice because the person
does not do what is wrong deliberately. With incontinence, a person has both the wrong desire and the wrong action
even though he has the right reason. A continent person acts according to virtue and does so for the right reason but
his desires are bad. Therefore he is not as good as the temperate person. If one were to rank them from best to worst,
temperance would be the best, then continence, then incontinence, and finally intemperance. Intemperance is the
worst because the person has both bad desires and bad reasoning. The reason for this lengthy discussion
distinguishing continence and incontinence from virtue and vice is that most people are somewhere between virtue
and vice, and these extra categories are necessary in order to make sure that all human actions are included in the
discussion, since they are all a part of ethics.
Aristotle is far from a hedonist, but he also does not consider pleasure to be a bad thing. In fact, Aristotle thinks that
one of the necessary conditions for a person to be virtuous is that he take pleasure in acting virtuously. A virtuous
person' s desires should be in line with right reason so that virtuous action is pleasant. Further, since acting in
accordance with right reasonthat is, virtuously is supposed to lead to happiness, it is fitting that that acting
virtuously should also be pleasant at least in some sense, even if not in the physical sense. Pleasure is not in itself the
highest good or even an end in itself, but it accompanies the highest good as well as most lesser goods.
Analysis:
This chapter is the first of two chapters on the nature and purpose of friendship. An in-depth analysis of Aristotle's view of
friendship will consequently be provided at the end of the next chapter. For now, the analysis will cover the points in this chapter
which are not directly connected with those discussed in the next chapter.
Aristotle classifies friendships into three different types according to the basis of the relationship. The first is friendship based on
usefulness. In speaking of this sort of friendship, Aristotle seems to have in mind primarily a sort of business or commercial
relationship. It is the lowest of the three types of friendship and is the least enduring. The friendship ends as soon as one of the
two parties is no longer useful to the other or no longer has anything useful to offer. The second type of friendship is that based
on pleasure. This friendship can have varying degrees of nobility and stability depending on the type of pleasure sought and the
character of the friends. Still, the aim of the relationship is primarily selfish, and the relationship ends as soon as it stops
producing pleasure for one of the friends. It is possible for wicked men to have these first two types of friendship. The only
genuine, friendship, however, is the friendship of good men, which is based on virtue. In this type of friendship, the each friend
wishes the genuine good for the other helps the other in the attainment of that good. This type of friendship is stable and is not
easily broken, since the basis of the friendshipa shared desire for what is genuinely goodis a perfectly stable one.
The relationship between friendship and justice is quite intriguing. For even though justice is, in the broad sense, the fullness and
unity of all the virtues, friendship goes beyond justice. Where there is friendship, justice is not necessary. Yet where there is
justice friendship is still necessary. This relationship could perhaps be explained by the previously mentioned point that a genuine
friendship presupposes that the people involved are already just men. Yet friendship can provides things which mere justice
cannot. While friendship is reciprocal, the principal virtue of a friend is to love rather than to be loved. While justice requires a
strict reciprocity according to merit, friendship can exist in an unequal relationship because the inequality is in some way bridged
by the love of the friends.
A further relationship between friendship and justice comes to light in Aristotle's discussion the types of government. There are
three good regimes, kingship, aristocracy, and timocracy. Their deviations are tyranny, oligarchy and mob rule, respectively. The
more just the regime is, the more friendship there will be among the people of that regime. This idea again reinforces the point
that justice is presupposed by friendship. Moreover, it provides insight into the idea developed in Aristotle's Politics that the city
(that is, the Greek polis) exists not merely for the sake of survival but for the sake of living well. A just regime is one in which
the laws lead the citizens be virtuous. Thus the groundwork is laid for genuine friendships, which are a necessity for a fulfilled
human life.
