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Asia-PacificJournal on Human Rights and the Law 2: 1-27, 2003.
© 2004 Koninklike Brill NV. Printedin the Netherlands
1. Introduction
A recent survey on the role of the police and the lower judiciary reveals
that only less than two per cent of citizens are satisfied with the former,
and eight per cent with the latter.' The police indiscriminately arrest
innocent civilians merely on the basis of suspicion and without any
warrant primarily for receiving bribes.2 The arrestees who cannot afford to
pay bribes for a quick release are being put in remand where they may be
subjected to barbarous treatment resulting in death. It may also see them
The problem is now so serious and widespread that it has offended the
sense of propriety of civil society in Bangladesh. Members of the
incumbent government readily admit the abusive use of suspicious arrest
and subsequent tortures by the police. The Minister for State Affairs has
admitted that the police are out of control.8 The Law Minister himself has
acknowledged the practice of torture. 9 The Finance Minister has also
expressed his grave concern for police excesses on 23 June 2002. So have
the Chair of the Bangladesh Law Commission and a former Inspector
General of Police in a BBC interview on 20 June 2002.10 The magnitude of
3 Ain 0 Salish Kendro (ASK), Human Rights in Bangladesh 1998, Dhaka: The University
Press Limited, 1999, p. 60.
4 S K Dey, "Murder after arrest of innocents under s 54: Tortures exceed all records", The
Janakantha,, Dhaka, 23 May 2002, online.
5 The Ittefaq, , Dhaka, 13 June 2002, online; M A Rahman, "Frustrating joint special drive",
The Daily Star, 26 May 2002, online.
6 "Jamal died from physical torture: Human rights organisations", The Daily Star, 30 April
2002, online; S Kabir, "Jamal died in police custody and an unprecedented legal battle",
The Janakantha,7 May 2002, online.
"Restore confidence in cops, stop abuse of law", The Daily Star, 18 June 2002, online.
Z A Khan, "'Ministers say 'police out of control' but Home Ministry indifferent: The
criminal crackdown farce", The Holiday, Dhaka, 17 March 2002, online.
9 The Jugantor,, Dhaka, 25 May 2002, online.
10The Janakantha,23 June 2002, online.
M RAFIQUL AND SM SOLAIMAN
the situation has outgrown its domestic sphere and intruded into the
consciousness of various international and regional human rights
organisations."'
The protection to the life and personal liberty of individuals are inalienable
and universal human rights recognised in a growing body of international
human rights instruments of which Bangladesh is a party. Bangladesh is a
ratifying party of the 1966 InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. It is also a
signatory of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These
instruments unequivocally outlaw all kinds of torture, cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment without any derogation. The Universal
Declaration (Article 5), ICCPR (Articles 4.2 and 7) and the Torture
Convention may be relied upon to show that acts of torture under police
remand in Bangladesh constitute a gross violation of human rights
recognised in and protected by international law and the United Nations.
The Constitution of Bangladesh guarantees fundamental rights to life and
personal liberty (Article 32), equality before law (Article 27), protection of
law (Article 31), safeguards against arrest and detention (Article 33) and
freedom of movement (Article 36). Its protection in respect of trial and
punishment requires that "no person shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment" (Article 35.5).
These constitutional guarantees are not barely ornamental and declaratory,
but entail precise legal obligations. Articles 44 and 102 of the Constitution
provide judicial remedy against any violation of fundamental rights.
I Notably Amnesty International (Al) Reports on Bangladesh 2001 and 2002, the US State
Department Report, Transparency International (TI), the World Organisation Against
Torture, the Asian Human Rights Commission, American Association for the Advancement
of Science, Physicians for Human Rights, the South Asia Forum for Human Rights; The
Daily Star, 16 November 2001, 6 January 2002 and 26 May 2002, online; The
Janakaantha,26 May 2002, online.
TORTURE UNDER REMAND IN BANGLADESH
plea of maintaining law and order. The guilt of arrested persons cannot be
established by extracting confession through coercion.
The gravity of the situation calls for urgent remedial and reform measures
in order to avert an outright public confidence crisis in the administration
of the criminal justice system. In response to mounting pressures and
ongoing criticisms, a slow move towards reforming the law and procedures
of police remand is under way. This article is intended to underscore the
urgency of such reform, which is long overdue. To this end, the article
pursues a reformist approach and offers certain remedial measures to
combat the custodial violations of human rights after depicting the law and
practices concerning the arrest of crime suspects and subsequent remands.
The transparency and accountability of activities of the governmental
agencies involved in suspicious arrests and remand process are high on the
reform agenda. The ongoing culture of impunity for these illegal acts can
only cease by bringing their perpetrators to punitive justice under criminal
law and their victims to curative compensation under public law.
to the life, liberty, body, reputation or property" shall be taken beyond the
purview of law. Article 33 provides safeguards to the arrested persons in
that he/she must be (a) informed of the grounds for his/her arrest
immediately, (b) allowed to consult and be defended by a lawyer of his/her
choice, and (c) produced before the magistrate within a period of 24 hours.
This provision further requires that no one shall be detained in custody
without the authority of a competent magistrate beyond this period. The
CrPC contains specific measures under ss. 61, 324-331, 335, 339, 352, 355
and 358 protecting all persons from being subjected to torture.
Legal expressions are definite to the extent that they are uniformly
understood in content and procedures. The expression 'reasonable
suspicion' in s. 54, though not an unusual legal expression, has widened
the scope of its frequent misuses and made it a very frightful law. Wishful
arrests under the guise of 'reasonable suspicion' are rampant. The right of
the arrestee to consult lawyers is denied by disregarding the orders of the
High Court Division (HCD) of the Supreme Court. 12 A police remand is
granted under s. 167 of the CrPC, though the term 'remand' is not
mentioned there. The term finds expression in s. 344 of the CrPC, which
permits the courts to send an accused of a pending case on remand by
warrant for the period of its adjournment of hearing. Section 167 requires
the presentation of the arrested person before the nearest magistrate by the
arresting police, who finds that the investigation could not be completed
within 24 hours as prescribed in s. 61 of CrPC and that there are grounds
for believing that the accusation or information is well founded. In so
doing, the police officer is required to transmit a copy of the entries in the
diary concerning the arrest to the magistrate as well as to the arrested
person.
representations against the remand order. But they seldom record their
reasons with substance and clarity for allowing remands. 3 Thus, a culture
of police-magistrate joint collaboration has emerged in granting remand
under s. 167 in defiance of its overt legal requirements and restrictions.
Section 54 is more than a century old law made by the British in the
interest of its colonial administration in India. In England, a new section
has been inserted in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to the
effect that the power without warrant must be related to and limited by the
object to be served by the arrest. The object is to prevent the suspect from
destroying evidence, interfering with witnesses, warning accomplices who
have not yet been arrested, or where there is a good reason to suspect the
repetition of the offence and not to every case irrespective of the object
sought to be achieved. The new law has contributed to the minimisation of
custodial violence to a significant extent. 14 The legal limitations on the use
of police power to arrest without warrant are explained by the Supreme
Court of India in JoginderKumar v State of UP:
13 "The Daily Star Dialogue on arrest and police remand: Accent on check and balance in
legal system", The Daily Star, 11 April 2002, online. A H M Kabir, "Police remand and the
need for judicial activism", The Daily Star, 7 April 2002, online.
14Cited in D KBasu v State of West Bengal (1997) AIR 616.
"5(1994) 4 SCC 260.
MRAFIQUL AND S MSOLAIMAN
Section 167 empowers any first class magistrate to authorise the detention
of any person arrested by the police under s. 54. Magistrates, other than
first class, need to be specially empowered to be able to authorize such
detention. Under s. 167(5) of the CrPC, the competent magistrate may
continue the detention up to 120 days. A magistrate who lacks jurisdiction
to try the case in question is allowed to grant detention for 15 days (s.
167.2). If such a magistrate considers further detention necessary, he/she
may order the accused to be forwarded to the magistrate competent to try
the case.
The other purpose is for the police to collect bribes from the victims, who
are mostly innocent and destitute, as shown in a well-publicised recent
example. Kawser, a 14-year old minor who is now deceased, was arrested
on 4 February 2002 without any case against him, when he was playing
cricket. On the following day, his poor father was given two stark options
at the police station: either to pay Taka 20,000 (the local currency) for
Kawser's release or his son would be put under remand. His father failed
to pay off the police, and his son subsequently died on 14 February 2002.19
Both the magistracy and the police are known for their endemic corruption
and indiscipline. Studies and surveys carried out by the World Bank and
some NGOs, notably Transparency International, reveal that the law
enforcement agency is the "most corrupt" sector in Bangladesh. 20 The
Amnesty International report of 2001 on Bangladesh disclosed that
criminals were often not punished because of corruption of judges of lower
2 1
courts. The US State Department country report of 2002 on Bangladesh
unequivocally maintains that "the lower judiciary is subject to executive
influence and suffers from corruption".2 2
17 Justice M A Aziz, "Uses and abuses of section 54", The New Nation, 16 May 2002,
online.
18 The Daily Star Dialogue in supra note 13; N Islam, "Police and the prisons of
Bangladesh", The Jugnator,11 June 2002, online; The Janakantha, 13 May 2002, online.
19Odhikar Report, "From Playground to Morgue", Dhaka, 2002.
20 The April 2002 report of TI published in Newsweek, 29 April 2002, online; The Jugantor,
18 June 2002, online; also supra note 2; M Hasan, "Making Anti-Corruption Actions
Work" at http//:www.ti.bangladesh.org, 8 May 2002.
21 Al Report on Bangladesh, on-line index ASA 13/006/2001 of 1 December 2001; The
Daily Star, Dhaka, 16 November 2001 and 6 January 2002, online.
22 The US State Department Report, supra note 1.
M RAFIQUL AND S MSOLAIMAN
The recent widely publicised remand cases of three high profile persons
may exemplify the extent of violation of remand conditions. Shahriar
23 The judgment of 12 July 2001 on the validity of the Special Power Act, unreported case,
The New Nation, Dhaka, 13 July 2001, online, per M A Aziz J; also M A Islam,
"Governance and Judiciary" in H A Hye ed, Governance: South Asian Perspective,
University Press Ltd, Dhaka, 2000, p. 132.
TORTURE UNDER REMAND IN BANGLADESH
The fate of ordinary citizens in remand can easily be imagined when one
considers the treatment of high profile members of civil society. The legal
purpose and authorised place for remand are in practice easily violated
without any remedy. The abusive elements of s. 54 and s. 167 were
brought to the attention of the HCD of the Supreme Court, which issued a
27 Ibid, Ahsan.
28"High Court's directive to police to be cautious to arrest under s 54", The Janakantha,7
May 2002, online.
29 The BBC Radio interview with the Chair of the Law Commission reported in The Daily
One of the latest victims of such cruelty is Mrs Nipu Rani, who was
arrested following the murder of her husband's brother, an internationally
known priest of Buddhism. The priest was slaughtered allegedly by
individuals associated with the ruling party on 21 April 2002 at a place of
worship. 3 1 She was mercilessly beaten by the officer-in-charge of the
police station with electric shocks after having her hands and eyes tied.
Because of this torture, the police took her to doctors before producing her
to the court after two-day's in remand.32
The need for proper identification of the officials involved in dealing with
the detainees is paramount. The Supreme Court of India held in D K Basu
v State of West Bengal (hereafter the Basu Case) that police personnel
dealing with detainees should bear "accurate, visible and clear
identification and name tags with their designations. Their particulars must
be recorded in a register. At the time of arrest all injuries, if any, on the
body of the arrested person must be noted in a diary along with the time,
venue and date of arrest. The 'inspection memo' must be signed by the
arrestee and the police officer, and the latter must give a copy of it to the
former. In explaining custodial crimes, the Court further observed that
such crimes include not only the infliction of body pain, but also the
mental agony which a person undergoes within police lock-up.33 The same
Court in Nilabati Behera v State of Orissa pointed out that prisoners and
detainees are not denuded of their fundamental rights without lawful
restrictions.34
No medical help for the sick: The sick detainees are often denied medical
treatment and life saving drugs during remand. Dr Alamgir, who was a
diabetic and a patient with high blood pressure, was not allowed to take his
prescribed medicine despite repeated requests, which he told the Court
after the expiry of remand. The HCD of the Supreme Court took into
account the deteriorating medical condition of Bahauddin Nasim and
31The Prothom Alo,, Dhaka, 30 April 2002, online.
32 The Janakantha,12 June 2002, online.
13(1997) AIR, 615, 623.
34 (1993) 2 SCC 746.
M RAFIQUL AND SMSOLAIMAN
Lawyers and family are not allowed to meet detainees: Article 33 (1) of the
Constitution entitles a detainee to consult and be defended by a legal
practitioner of his/her choice. But many detainees are deprived of this
right. More often than not, the law enforcement agencies ignore court
orders to allow lawyers and close relatives to see the detainees, as
evidenced in the remand cases of the three high profile personalities
referred to. Notwithstanding the order of the HCD of the Supreme Court to
allow the lawyer and close relatives of Bahauddin Nasim to visit him, his
lawyer and close relatives were not allowed to see him for up to 12 days.
Even then, affluent and prominent persons under remand, who can afford
to bring their cases before the highest court and secure an order in their
favour, find it exceedingly difficult to enforce court orders and their rights.
The law enforcement agencies routinely violate these court orders with
impunity. The ordinary citizens, who cannot financially afford to obtain
such court orders, silently accept and endure the contravention of their
rights without any redress.
The Supreme Court of Bangladesh in State v Munir and Another held that
confessional statements can be the sole basis for conviction if the
confession is voluntary and true. 37 Article 35(4) of the Constitution forbids
any compulsion on a detainee to make a confession or to be a witness
against him/herself. The CrPC itself has provided safeguards against
involuntary confessions made by a detainee under coercion (s. 163).
Section 164 allows the detainees to refute the statements or confessions
given to the police during remand, and to give fresh statement to the
magistrate.
35 "Amnesty seeks neutral probe into 'torture' of Nasim and Alamgir", The Daily Star, 2
April 2002, online; also
6 11 see supra notes 25-26 and their accompanying texts.
36 Supra note 33, p. .
" (1996) 1 BLC 345.
TORTURE UNDER REMAND IN BANGLADESH
A great disparity exists between the sprit of s. 163 and s. 164 and the
practice under s. 167 by granting frequent remands with the knowledge
that they will be treated inhumanly or tortured. Prior to recording any
confession of the person sent on remand, s. 164 requires the magistrate to
make such a person aware of the fact that he/she is not bound to make any
confession and that his/her confession, if voluntarily given, may be used as
evidence against him/her. To make sure this information is communicated,
the magistrate is required to take a note to this effect at the foot of the
record.
Sections 163 and 164 strongly emphasise the wilful and voluntary nature
of confessions, which is conveniently ignored in favour of s. 167. The
helplessness and fearfulness of the victims confronting coercion enforced
under s. 167 become their immediate reality, which outweighs the distant -
and often illusory - benefits of exercising their rights under s. 163 and s.
164. It is all too common that a single person is remanded for more than
once without assigning any reasons whatsoever. The accused in remand
will often be threatened by police before being produced before the
magistrates, and warned that further remand will be sought if he/she
refutes the confession or informs the magistrate about torture or ill-
treatment, and that more severe treatment will be waiting during the next
round of remand. In such a dilemma, many remand victims prefer to
condone their false confessions and even accept imprisonment for life, or
any other term, as preferable to endless life-threatening torture and
inhuman treatment in successive remands. Thus injustice prevails 38over the
justice, and innocent individuals can be imprisoned for long terms.
The police can for example arrest a person under s. 54 and first look for
grounds of arrest under the CrPC. Failing this, they can justify the arrest
and preventive detention without trial under various special laws. There
are some occasions where the police have included the detainees in
criminal cases, even though their names were not recorded in the First
Information Report (FIR) filed with the police station. Thereafter they
were charged. The victims of such incidents revealed to the Odhikar
investigators that the police had asked for money from them or their
relatives for their release and that their failure to pay this bribe had kept
them in custody. The police threatened those who could not pay with being
included in pending criminal cases, and beat ruthlessly. 9
39 Supra note 2.
TORTURE UNDER REMAND IN BANGLADESH
40 Supra note 2.
M RAFIQUL AND SM SOLAIMAN
41 Editorial, "Prisons and prisoners", The New Nation, 23 May 2002, online; The Jugantor,
8 July 2002, online. Falu Mia was arrested on suspicion on 27 August 1972 and released on
24 November 1993 after nearly 22 year in jail without any charge. He was awarded a token
compensation on 6 July 2002 after almost nine years of his release till his death on 7 May
2001, The Daily Star, 23 June 2002, online; The Jugantor, 12 July 2002, editorial; other
cases of imprisonment for over ten years without trial and charges may be found in The
Prothom Alo, 3 February 2002, online and (1993) 45 Dhaka Law Report (DLR), 643.
TORTURE UNDER REMAND IN BANGLADESH
There are many instances where police personnel are punished through
departmental action for negligence to duty and corruption. But action is
hardly taken for the infringement of fundamental rights through torture
during remand, despite the fact that custodial violence by police is an
offence punishable with imprisonment under s. 29 of the 1861 Police Act
and s. 53 of the 1976 Dhaka Metropolitan Police Ordinance, both of
which are still in force. In recent years, there were only two instances
where police personnel have been punished, for custodial death and for
raping a woman in custody.4 2
Any external eyewitness, other than the police, for custodial deaths or
torture could not practically be expected. It is unlikely that a police officer
will testify that an arrestee was tortured to death by his/her colleague(s).
Reliance on post-mortem reports in determining the cause of death must be
made with utmost caution. The honesty and impartiality of government
nominated pathological surgeons are often in doubt because of cover-ups
and questionable in respect of forensic uses. For example, Nasim was
inhumanly tortured during police remand which included electric shocks to
his private parts, but the government-chosen medical board reported that
he had only mild injuries.
42 "Sensational Rubel murder case verdict", The New Nation, 18 June 2002, online.
M RAFIQUL AND S MSOLAIMAN
The credibility of the report was widely challenged by the press and
Amnesty International, and the government was urged to form an
independent and impartial medical body.4 3 Any reform proposal must
therefore embrace the principle of presumed guilt/fault propelled by the
factual situation. There should be conclusive proof that any death in
remand is caused by torture and the police officer, who sought for the
remand and has the custody, must be held liable for the death. In other
words, an act of death by torture is presumed unless proved otherwise, and
the onus of proof should be on the accused police officer(s), who are in a
better position to defend him/herself than the victim or his/her relatives.
Commendable judicial precedents and legislative reform proposals for the
creation of such a liability regime in Bangladesh are not too far to seek.
legally protected rights. This is not a unique situation but is quite common
in many other constitutions. In these countries, their highest courts,
through judicial activism, have evolved the principle of compensation in
case of violation of personal right to life or liberty.
The Supreme Court of India in the Basu case held (a) that the prosecution
of an offender is an obligation of the State in the case of every crime, (b)
that the victim needs to be compensated due to the breach of public duty
by the State for not protecting the fundamental rights of the citizen, and (c)
that the sovereign immunity of State as a defence is unavailable for the
tortious acts of public servants and for violations of the rights to life and
personal liberty.5 ° In NilabatiBahera v State of Orissa, Anand J observed
that "the Courts and the law are for the people.... The purpose of public
law is not only to civilise public power but also to assure the citizen that
they live under a legal system, which aims to protect their interests and
preserve the rights. ' '51 Pursuant to this principle of compensating the
victims, the Indian Supreme Court has granted compensation for violation
of the citizens' rights on several occasions.5 2
Like India and Bangladesh, the Constitution of Ireland does not contain
any express provision for monetary compensation. But the Irish judiciary
has developed remedies, which include award of damages against both the
individual officials directly responsible and the State in redressing the
injuries sustained as a result of the contravention of fundamental rights.
O'Dalaigh CJ has explained the rationale for such judicial activism in State
(At the prosecution of Quinn) v Ryan:
Similarly, in Byrne v Ireland, the Irish court held that: "where the right is
once guaranteed by the State, it is against the State that the remedy must be
sought if there has been a failure to discharge the constitutional obligation
imposed. 5 4
The paramount duty of any judiciary is to protect the legal rights of every
citizen, which has become an integral part of the judges' oath. With this
duty in mind, the higher judiciary is expected to develop some principles
for providing compensation to the victims of arbitrary arrest and
unjustified torturous remands through judicial activism. Custodial violence
can be reduced, if not eliminated, by a pro-active judiciary, the custodians
of people's rights. The Indian Supreme Court in State of M P v
Shyamsunder Trivedi held that death in police custody is one of the worst
kinds of crimes. It suggested that the judiciary must adopt a realistic rather
57 Of 19,000 custodial deaths, 321 cases were filed against the police and only three of them
reached the trial stage, supra note 3; also S Chowdhury, "So-called safe (?) custody:
criminality marches on", The Daily Star, 1 July 2001, online.
58 See supra note 42; also C C Halder and N Haq, "Rubel murder case: 13 get life term",
The Daily Star, 18 June 2002, online.
TORTURE UNDER REMAND IN BANGLADESH
The HCD of the Supreme Court has competence to pass orders, directing
all violators of constitutional rights to pay compensation. Yet the instances
of a court order for monetary compensation are rare in Bangladesh. In Md
Shahanewaz v Bangladesh, the HCD ordered the delinquent police officer
to pay Taka 20,000 (US$ 357 approximately) to the victim as
compensation for false arrest. 62 In The State v Md Moinul Haque and
others (2001), the HCD ruled that the victim of rape should be
compensated by half of the property of the rapist. 63 These decisions seem
to suggest that the Supreme Court of Bangladesh has started to grapple
with the idea of compensating the victim or his/her dependents as a
possible just remedy.
No such compensation order is however yet made against the State. The
powers of the HCD of the Supreme Court to compensate the victims of
custodial violence need to be exercised appropriately by recognising the
obligations of the State along with the police and the magistrates. Stories
of custodial violence are frequently and readily available in the media.
NGOs in pursuit of protection and promotion of human rights can take the
initiative by referring those stories to the attention of the Chief Justice,
who can trigger the jurisdiction of the HCD of the Supreme Court. In so
doing though, the real problem is the current subservient status of the
judiciary in Bangladesh. The separation of the judiciary and the magistracy
in particular from the Executive in accordance with the 12-point plan
suggested by the Supreme Court in Secretary Ministry of Finance v
Masdar Hossain64 must be implemented immediately. Otherwise the
Supreme Court will remain cautiously hesitant in playing its crucial
constitutional role of judicial activism against injustices perpetrated on
innocent citizens under remand in the name of law and order.
4. Conclusion
In Bangladesh, the worst atrocities often take place under police remand.
None of its laws admits involuntary confession in judicial proceedings. Yet
law enforcement agencies have been arbitrarily arresting thousands of
innocent citizens for decades, in most cases either for political end or for
getting bribes. The empowering magistrates have been ordering remands
indiscriminately for extracting confessions, where violence and torture are
endemic. In such a situation both the police and the lower judiciary are on
the verge of their doom by losing public confidence. The higher judiciary
is more cautiously restrained than pro-active as a custodian of the citizens'
constitutional guarantees. Incumbent governments are too preoccupied
with the well-being of their members and supporters than that of the
governed. They treat their political opponents like personal enemies and
utilise police powers as a handy tool to keep political opponents under
control. The situation has led to an unholy alliance between the police and
the politicians in power, which is mutually beneficial for them both in that
the former can obtain personal gains, favours and privileges, whilst the
latter can advance their political agenda. Thus police violence has become
a pervasive feature of politics in Bangladesh, in which nobody is
seemingly accountable to anybody for anything pertaining to custodial
violence.
65 Bangladesh ratified the ICCPR on 7 September 2000 and the Torture Convention on 5
October 2000, but has not yet ratified the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR and the
individual complaint system under the 1503 Procedures.
MRAFIQUL AND SMSOLAIMAN 27