LESSONS LEARNED FROM

THE WAR IN UKRAINE.

THE IMPACT OF DRONES

Mykhailo Samus
© 2024 New Strategy Center. All rights reserved.
Author: Mykhailo Samus, non-resident expert, New Strategy Center

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Mykhailo Samus is non-resident expert, New Strategy Center, Romania and Director of The New Geopolitics Research Network, Ukraine.
After 20 years in media as well as in security and defence analysis and consultancy, Mykhailo is an experienced researcher in the sphere of
international relations, national resilience and new generation warfare. Served 12 years in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, he gained his
Master’s Degree in International Journalism from the Institute of Journalism, Kyiv Shevchenko National University (2007). Having started his
career as a journalist at Defense Express, he became the Editor-in-Chief of the Export Control Newsletter magazine, and then the Deputy
Director of the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies. He was the founder (2009) of the EU CACDS office in Prague
(Czech Republic), and was responsible for the coordination of CACDS international activities, its regional sections, and projects with NATO
and the EU. Mykhailo also was the member of the editorial border of the CACDS Analytical Bulletin Challenges and Risks. Now Mykhailo is
a chief and one the drivers of new international project – The New Geopolitics Research Network which is an independent and nonpartisan
initiative to provide a think tank platform for researchers, academics, experts, journalists, intellectuals who aspire to shape a new facets of
geopolitics.

ABOUT NEW STRATEGY CENTER

New Strategy Center is a leading Romanian think tank specializing in security and foreign affairs. New Strategy Center is a non-partisan,
non-governmental organization that operates at three main levels: providing analytical inputs and expert advice to decision-makers; holding
regular debates, both in-house and public, on subjects of topical interest; and expanding external outreach through partnerships with similar
institutions or organizations all over the world. New Strategy Center has particular expertise in the Black Sea region and the Balkans.
Visit https://newstrategycenter.ro/eng/ for more information.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the view of the
New Strategy Center.

Cover: Drones (Sergei Supinsky/AFP via Getty Images), Explosion at Chilia (Facebook, Roata Florin / Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty),
Troops with drones (Tass), Ukrainian soldier with kamikaze FPV drones (Ukrinform)
 Lessons Learned from the War in Ukraine.
The Impact of Drones

Mykhailo Samus
Director, New Geopolitics Research Network, Ukraine
Non-Resident Senior Expert, New Strategy Center, Romania

Drone-Centric Warfare

Ukrainian soldier with kamikaze FPV drones, source: Ukrinform

Following Russia's initiation of a full-scale strategic operation against Ukraine, utilizing

a wide array of Soviet and post-Soviet weaponry, including ballistic and cruise missiles, the
initial outcomes of Ukraine's defense, grounded in the network-centric warfare approach, proved
highly successful. Employing drones for reconnaissance, target acquisition, and strikes, along
with efficient Command and Control, a combination of Western smart weapons such as Javelins,
NLAW, and Stinger, alongside the robust Soviet arsenal encompassing air defense, aviation,
artillery, tanks, and armored vehicles, and bolstered by the newly established extensive
Territorial Defense, created a remarkably effective mix. The implementation of this Ukrainian
strategy left the Russian army in shock, prompting their retreat to Belarus from Northern
Ukraine. The collapse of the initial phase of the Russian full-scale operation compelled Russian
commanders to shift their concept from Blitzkrieg to a conflict of attrition.
The core concept for the Ukrainians was to adopt an asymmetric approach in countering
the formidable Russian army, recognizing that the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) stood little
chance in a symmetrical battle against the might of the Russian Armed Forces. Consequently,
the UAF opted to construct a network-centric warfare model, drawing on Soviet weaponry but

3
integrating new command and control systems at all levels. This involved extensive use of
drones for reconnaissance, attacks, and kamikaze missions. In essence, the new model aimed to
modernize the post-Soviet army by incorporating UAVs and smart weapons seamlessly with
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber-Defense, Combat Systems,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. The goal was to create an asymmetric potential
within the UAF, allowing them to effectively combat the overwhelming might of the Russian
Army.
The integration of the network-centric warfare concept as a foundational element in the
contemporary doctrine of the UAF has experienced a substantial enhancement with the extensive
deployment of unmanned aerial systems. These include autonomous, unmanned, and robotic
systems designed for both land and sea operations. Essentially, UAVs have become a critical
component of the UAF's operational doctrine, epitomizing the essence of Drone-Centric
Warfare.
The UAF harness the capabilities of drones for a wide range of tasks, encompassing
reconnaissance, target acquisition, coordination of units and individual combat components, and
execution of strike functions. While these functionalities are commonplace in most advanced
armed forces, what distinguishes the UAF is the recent elevation of drones to a central role in
operations. The deployment of numerous drones throughout the battlefield transforms them into
a component seamlessly integrating battlefield information into a unified matrix with the
capability to neutralize the enemy. This occurs in real-time, marking a transformative shift in
the dynamics of modern warfare.

Drones in Ukrainian Armed Forces

Since 2014, when Russia occupied and annexed Crimea and attacked Donbas, the
Ukrainian Armed Forces have made a breakthrough in the development of unmanned systems.
At the time of Russia's attack in 2014, the Ukrainian army had virtually no drones in its
inventory, except for outdated Soviet reconnaissance UAVs that were no longer fit for purpose.
After the outbreak of the armed conflict with Russia, Ukrainian manufacturers actively
participated in the development of the Armed Forces' unmanned fleet. Most of the successful
projects that went into production and were delivered to the troops were implemented by private
companies. However, the process was rather slow, and the bureaucratic defence procurement
system did not allow for sufficient investment to scale up UAV production projects.
For example, the Ukrainian unmanned aerial reconnaissance system Furia, developed in
2014 by the Kyiv-based Athlon Avia, was immediately used by the Armed Forces, the National
Guard of Ukraine, and the Security Service of Ukraine at the battlefield1. However, it was only
in 2019-2020 that the Furia passed a full cycle of state tests and was officially adopted by the
Armed Forces of Ukraine. The situation was similar for other Ukrainian UAVs. For instance,
PD-1 UAV produced by Ukrspecsystems2 since 2014 took part in combat operations at the

1
https://athlonavia.com/en/furia/
2
https://ukrspecsystems.com/drones/pd-1-vtol

4
frontline, but received official clearance in 2018. Culver Aviation's Skif UAV was developed in
2016 and launched into mass production in 20213. The Leleka-100 UAV was developed in 2017
and was actively used at the frontline. However, the Leleka-100 was officially adopted by the
Armed Forces only in 20214. These examples characterise a general trend where, in fact, from
2014 to 2020, the process of developing and producing military drones in Ukraine, despite the
ongoing armed conflict with Russia, did not reach the required pace and scope. Their use in the
UAF was also more sporadic than planned, conceptual and doctrinal.

The A1-SM Furia UAV, source: Defence Express

An important step in understanding the importance of creating a powerful military

unmanned aerial vehicle fleet was Ukraine's acquisition of several Turkish medium-altitude
long-endurance unmanned combat aerial vehicles Bayraktar TB2 in 2018. The procurement of
the Bayraktar drones reflected the Ukrainian Armed Forces' leadership recognizing the
imperative to establish an unmanned element within their reconnaissance and strike capabilities
(comprising reconnaissance, command post, and weaponry). This move signifies a shift towards
embracing the network-centric warfare concept. The UAF deployed the initial Bayraktar drones
into active service as recently as the spring of 2021. The first engagement with Russian troops
occurred on October 26, 20215. It was this Bayraktar strike on the Russian artillery system that
violated the Minsk agreements and shelled the Ukrainian village of Hranitne that can be called
a turning point in the use of drones by the UAF.

3
https://itc.ua/ua/partnerskij-proekt/ukrayinskij-bezpilotnik-skif-dopomagaye-zbilshuvati-vrozhaj-ta-otsinyuvati-naslidki-
rosijskoyi-agresiyi-os-jogo-istoriya/
4
https://www.ukrmilitary.com/2021/05/100.html
5
https://novynarnia.com/2021/10/26/bajraktar-vpershe/

5
 Bayraktar ТВ2 UAV of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, source: armyinform.com.ua

Since the beginning of Russia's large-scale aggression against Ukraine, the development
of unmanned systems in the Armed Forces has gained a more focused and active momentum.
As of the end of 2023, according to representatives of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, the
UAF operated about 70 different types of unmanned aerial systems, as well as more than 20
types of ammunition for attack drones6. According to representatives of the Ministry of Strategic
Industry, there are currently about 200 drone manufacturers in Ukraine, most of which are
private companies7. As for the number, according to information from various sources, at the
end of 2023, up to 50 thousand different types of drones were being manufactured in Ukraine
monthly8. The majority of them are First Person View (FPV) drones, which have really changed
the nature of combat operations due to their low cost (500-700 USD) and efficiency.

6
https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-minoborony-vyrobnytstvo-bpla/32713183.html
7
https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-minstratehprom-vyrobnyky-droniv-v-ukraini/32689460.html
8
https://forbes.ua/innovations/ukrainski-inzheneri-pratsyuyut-u-boeing-ta-airbus-virobniki-droniv-strazhdayut-cherez-
defitsit-kadriv-yak-rozvyazati-tsyu-problemu-20112023-17379

6
 Ukrainian-made FPV KH-S7 drone, source: Ukrainian Armed Forces

The focus on drones and network-centric warfare in the doctrine of the UAF necessitated
integrated systems that would act as a framework to ensure swift control cycles. These cycles
include determining enemy target coordinates, transmitting targeting information to the
command post, and relaying this information to the means of destruction. The Armed Forces of
Ukraine have employed various systems to achieve this, with one notable example being the
Kropyva tactical command and control system9.
The inception and incorporation of Kropyva commenced as a volunteer initiative in 2014
when a group from Army SOS started providing tablets to the military. Since the onset of Russian
aggression, over 10,000 installations of the Kropyva app have been carried out. Additionally, a
technical support service has been established to continuously enhance the software product. In
2018, the developers at the Logika design bureau generously contributed Kropyva, along with
its source code and a license, to the Armed Forces. This system facilitates the automation of
various command and control tasks at different levels, such as battalion, company, platoon, and
individual vehicle. Essentially, it aids in amalgamating reconnaissance, control, and firepower
into a unified information field.

9
https://armyinform.com.ua/2020/07/06/dlya-chogo-kropyva-potribna-vijskovym/

7
 Kropyva tactical command and control system, source Defence Express

The Delta system10, which is actually a military cloud-based online service, operates on
a similar principle. The development of Delta's situational awareness system began in 2015 by
the Aerozvidka volunteer team. A year later, the system was handed over to the UAF, where the
Centre for Implementation and Support of Automated Operational (Combat) Control Systems
was established. Delta is an online system that provides real-time information about the tactical
and operational situation on the battlefield. Thanks to Delta, soldiers can see the battlefield
online with the location of enemy forces. Data from aerial reconnaissance, satellites, drones,
stationary cameras, radars, chats, etc. are pulled into the platform. Delta is currently an important
component of the Armed Forces' military operations planning11.

10
https://delta.mil.gov.ua/auth/login
11
https://www.slovoidilo.ua/2023/08/09/infografika/bezpeka/vijskova-platforma-delta-vidomo-pro-systemu-upravlinnya-
zsu

8
 The web-site of Delta system, source https://delta.mil.gov.ua/auth/login

At the same time, plans are being considered for further organizational adaptations of the
Ukrainian Armed Forces to the drone-centric doctrine. As of 2023, the first time in the history
of the armed forces, the UAF created special UAV strike companies as part of combat brigades
and as separate combat groups, bringing their total number to 60 units. This allows for the use
of various types of drones to destroy enemy targets under the Network Centric Warfare doctrine.
The creation of UAV strike companies was the beginning of the modernization of the
organizational and doctrinal principles of the UAF as part of its adaptation to new technological
realities on the battlefield. It is considered expedient, in addition to UAV strike companies in
brigades, to create separate units of attack (primarily FPV) drones at the level of battalions and
companies. Another possible option is to create UAV battalions in each brigade with further
distribution of their functionality to support the brigade's units.

9
 Recruiting leaflet to the UAV strike company of the 92 Assault Brigade

At the same time, the need to create a separate command of unmanned systems of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine and to create a separate branch of unmanned systems troops within
the Armed Forces of Ukraine is being analysed. At the beginning of 2024, the Central
Directorate of Unmanned Systems was established within the General Staff of the UAF12, which
will be responsible for developing doctrine and organisational structures for UAVs within the
Armed Forces, determining the needs of the Armed Forces and the specifics of UAV use. Thus,
there is a gradual evolution of the structure of the use of unmanned systems from often chaotic
bottom-up and horizontal efforts to a vertical management system with its own doctrine,
organisational structure and uniform rules. This should increase the effectiveness of not only the
use of UAVs in the Armed Forces, but also budgeting and production processes, and thus growth
and scaling.
Importantly, the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine has created a special structure - The
Innovation Development Accelerator - responsible for optimising the process of adopting new
weapons and military equipment into the service of the UAF13. As a direct outcome of the
Accelerator's initiatives, the process of integrating weapons and equipment into the service of
the Ukrainian Armed Forces has been streamlined to just 1.5 months, a substantial improvement
from the previous timeline of over 2 years. The Accelerator's influence has been especially
pronounced in the incorporation of new drone technologies, given the continuous emergence of

12

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YN20E3RCONs&list=PLCPC7CzMu8osNbClCElDqqOuqDq8Hz59o&t=1108s&ab_chann
el=Espreso.TV
13
https://mil-tech.gov.ua/en/about-accelerator

10
innovative developments from Ukrainian companies. There is an ongoing need to navigate the
approval process for deploying these new technologies to the front lines and integrating them
into combat units.
The Ministry of Digital Transformation also created Brave114, a cluster to promote the
development of defence technologies. The main task of Brave1 is to coordinate the activities of
government agencies - the Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Digital
Transformation, the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Strategic Industry, the National
Security and Defence Council - in the development of defence technologies and production.
Similarly, Brave1 is designed to create a strong community of Defense Tech foreign
stakeholders who benefit from exchanging expertise and opportunities. Brave1 offers to
international partners access to the Ukrainian Defense Innovations with a soft-landing procedure
for a foreign partners; partnership and cooperation between stakeholders from public and private
sectors; organizational support, access to pitches, hackathons, meetups, grants, and investments;
development and testing of Ukrainian and international advanced technologies; investments
opportunities in Ukrainian cutting-edge defense tech developments. Overall, the Accelerator
and Brave1 form a new ecosystem for the development, production and adoption of military
technologies.

The web-site of Brave1 system, source https://brave1.gov.ua/en/

A few words about the programs that have become the driving force behind the UAF's
drone activity. First of all, this is the Army of Drones project as part of the national crowdfunding

14
https://brave1.gov.ua/

11
campaign United 2415. Thousands of drones have been purchased and more than 10,000 drone
operators have been trained as part of the Army of Drones project16.
Also, as part of the United 24 campaign, the process of creating maritime drones was
launched, which later became a separate area of development of maritime platforms at the state
level. The launch of the Army of Robots project has also been announced, which will develop
the latest robotic systems in the interests of the UAF. In addition, the creation of the Army of
Electronic Warfare Systems has begun to give impetus to the mass production of electronic
warfare systems. As the Minister of Digital Transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov, said17, "The next
task is to scale the UAV experience to other areas of military innovation. To launch the Army of
Electronic Warfare Systems and the Army of Robots. Our team is ready to cooperate with anyone
who can help strengthen the frontline technologically." According to Fedorov, the government
of Ukraine will rely on a clear ideology in these projects: market opening, transparency and the
maximum opportunity to attract entrepreneurs who have already created various products and
are able to scale products.

Minister Fedorov and drones by the Army of Drones, source: https://t.me/zedigital/3347

For 2024, there are ambitious plans to further increase the production of drones. The state
budget of Ukraine for 2024 allocates Euro 1,1 billion for drones (both aviation and maritime

15
https://u24.gov.ua/
16

https://biz.censor.net/resonance/3448681/armiya_droniv_yak_pryvatni_vyrobnyky_bezpilotnykiv_osvoyuyut_oboronnyyi
_byudjet
17
https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-technology/3746884-mincifri-planue-stvoriti-armii-reb-ta-robotiv.html

12
systems)18. As per Minister of Strategic Industry Oleksandr Kamyshyn, Ukraine has set
ambitious production goals for 2024, aiming to manufacture 1 million FPV drones, over 10,000
medium-range strike drones, and more than 1,000 drones with a range of approximately 1,000
kilometers. The minister affirms that all the necessary production capacities to meet these
objectives are already in place19.
It's noteworthy that the latest trend in employing drones for military purposes involves
the utilization of artificial intelligence technologies. AI can automatically detect and classify
targets on the battlefield and issue ready-made decisions for the operator/commander to make
about defeating the enemy. Furthermore, artificial intelligence has the capability to guarantee
that the drone reaches its target through a "fire and forget" approach. Essentially, AI
implemented at the software level can transform an inexpensive strike drone into a high-
precision, state-of-the-art weapon.
AI can become the next step in improving the concept of network-centric warfare by
further reducing control cycles when finding enemy targets, determining their coordinates,
transmitting information about the coordinates to the commander, making a decision to destroy
the enemy and transmitting this decision to the means of destruction. In the context of modern
warfare, these cycles should be reduced as much as possible. The use of AI in the use of drones
can significantly speed up management cycles and ensure greater efficiency in the use of the
armed forces as an integrated reconnaissance and strike complex. The AFU have already adopted
the first AI-powered drone, called Saker Scout20. This drone independently recognizes and
records the coordinates of enemy vehicles (even camouflaged ones) and immediately transmits
the information to the command post for decision-making.

18
https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/verkhovna-rada-ukrainy-pryiniala-derzhbiudzhet-na-2024-rik
19
https://suspilne.media/643700-v-ukraini-planuut-vigotoviti-1-miljon-fpv-droniv/
20
https://en.defence-
ua.com/weapon_and_tech/ukrainian_forces_get_an_ai_powered_saker_scout_drone_and_its_algorithms_can_solve_an
_important_problem-7842.html

13
 AI-powered drone Saker Scout drone, source: Ministry of Defense of Ukraine

Furthermore, the integration of AI could enable the deployment of a group or swarm of

drones. In such a scenario, each drone would possess the capability to autonomously classify,
capture, and neutralize its designated target. Considering the swift advancements in military
technologies, AI has the potential to bring about a revolutionary transformation on the battlefield
in the imminent future.
In the area of maritime drones, Ukraine has made a technological breakthrough that has
created a rather unexpected situation for the Russian Black Sea Fleet. With Ukraine effectively
losing its traditional navy, the Russian Black Sea Fleet had to move to the eastern part of the
Black Sea and does not dare to approach the western areas because of the high threat of Ukraine's
use of maritime drones. Ukraine has created several types of maritime drones, funded initially
by volunteer funds, and later by the budgets of the Ministry of Defense and other security
agencies and intelligence services. At the moment, the Ukrainian defense forces are using
several maritime drones, both surface and underwater21. Their characteristics are constantly
being improved and their effectiveness is growing, causing damage to the Russian Black Sea
Fleet, basing sites and infrastructure, such as the Kerch Bridge. The Ukrainian drone Magura
V522, the main naval unmanned platform of the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine, sank two
landing boats in the Crimean village of Chornomorske on 10 November while one was loading
BTR-82, prompting the decision to move the Black Sea Fleet to Novorosiysk.

21
http://www.hisutton.com/Ukraine-Maritime-Drones.html
22
https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/articles/clew6ee5nx8o

14
 Magura V5 Naval Drone, source: https://mil.in.ua/

Sea Baby drone, developed by the SBU (Security Service of Ukraine), a multi-purpose
platform that can use various weapons, blew up the Crimean bridge on 17 July 2023 23. The
Kozak Mamai drone24 is a new development of the SBU. On 5 August, it hit the Olenegorsky
Gornyak large landing ship and the SIG military tanker of Black Sea Fleet, showing that Ukraine
can reach Novorosiysk.

Kozak Mamai sea drone, source: http://www.hisutton.com/Ukraine-USV-Mamai.html

In 2023, the first Ukrainian underwater maritime drone Marichka25 was presented. The
drone is specifically crafted to target ships, bridges, coastal fortifications, and submarines. If
needed, the drone can be adapted to carry military or civilian cargo in lieu of explosives and can
also serve a reconnaissance role. The commencement of large-scale production of underwater
drones has the potential to significantly alter the dynamics in the Black Sea. The Russian Black

23
https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=SBeRylGi_NA&ab_channel=%D0%A2%D0%A1%D0%9D
24
https://fakty.com.ua/ua/ukraine/20231224-kozak-mamaj-v-sbu-pokazaly-shhe-odyn-ukrayinskyj-morskyj-dron/
25
https://itc.ua/ua/novini/marichka-video-pershyh-vyprobuvan-pidvodnogo-dronu/

15
Sea Fleet may face challenges in detecting and countering these underwater drones, thereby
posing a considerable threat to Russian warships.

Marichka sea drone, source: http://www.hisutton.com/Ukraine-Marichka-AUV.html

Also, an advanced Toloka underwater drone of various modifications26 has been

developed. In particular, TLK 1000 with a range of 2000 kilometers can carry up to 5000 kg of
explosives. The guidance system includes passive sonar - identification and direction finding of
underwater and surface objects using a system of hydrophones. Ultrasonic sonars (active sonar)
are also included for close range detection, tracking and identification of objects by size.
Importantly, in terms of organizational and doctrinal changes, the Ukrainian Navy has
created a naval drone brigade, which is the first naval combat unit of this level to be armed with
naval drones. However, these naval drones are used not only by the Ukrainian Navy, but also by
the SBU and the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine in close coordination at the operational level.

Unmanned systems of the Russian Armed Forces

Russia has actively bolstered its drone capabilities within the armed forces since 2010-
2012, coinciding with a comprehensive reform of the Russian army. The Russian defence
industry sought Israeli technology, securing licenses for the production of the IAI Searcher drone
(manufactured by the Ural Civil Aviation Plant under the name Forpost) and the Bird Eye-400
(known in Russia as Zastava). Additionally, from 2010 to 2022, various Russian projects were
executed, with the Orlan-10 entering production and emerging as the principal UAV for artillery
units in the Russian Armed Forces27.
Information available before February 24, 2022, suggests that a significant portion of
Orlan-10 components originated from other countries, including the United States, Switzerland,

26
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/05/innovative-submarine-drone-is-ukraines-new-weapon-against-
russian-navy/
27
https://defence-
ua.com/weapon_and_tech/rozibrali_orlan_10_stalo_vidomo_jaka_krajina_nato_postachala_rf_teplovizijni_matritsi_dlja_
bpla-7413.html

16
Japan, and China28. Subsequent to the commencement of Russia's extensive aggression against
Ukraine, it was revealed that the thermal imaging camera matrix of the Orlan-10 was
manufactured in France29.

Orlan-10 UAV of Russian Armed Forces, source mil.ru

On the eve of February 2022, i.e., before the start of the large-scale aggression, the
unmanned aerial vehicles of the Russian Armed Forces had a well-established structure30. UAV
companies were already operating in brigades and divisions of the Russian Armed Forces, as
well as in some reconnaissance brigades. The fleet of these companies consisted of Orlan-10
systems (altitude up to 5000 m, radius up to 110 km) and short-range Granat-2 (altitude up to
600 m, radius up to 15 km), Eleron (altitude up to 3000 m, radius up to 25 km), and Takhion
(altitude up to 4000 m, radius up to 40 km). A UAVs company of a combined arms brigade
usually consists of 2 platoons - a middle-range platoon with Orlan-10 and Granat-4 systems
(altitude up to 2000 m, radius up to 100 km), and a short-range platoon with Granat-1/2/3 and
Zastava (altitude up to 2200 m, radius up to 10 km), Takhion, Eleron and other systems. UAV
companies of airborne divisions and brigades, as well as marine brigades and regiments, are
organised in the same way.

28
https://twitter.com/clashreport/status/1325844911476920320
29
https://defence-
ua.com/weapon_and_tech/rozibrali_orlan_10_stalo_vidomo_jaka_krajina_nato_postachala_rf_teplovizijni_matritsi_dlja_
bpla-7413.html
30
https://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2021-01-21/1_1125_aviation.html

17
 There are also UAV units in artillery, engineer, missile and even railway brigades. These
are mostly separate platoons of short-range UAVs. In addition to platoons with Orlan-10 UAVs,
artillery brigades have Orlan-30 UAVs (under brigade command, for guiding Krasnopol
precision-guided missiles) and platoons of Orlan-10-based artillery reconnaissance unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) (in artillery reconnaissance units). The Aerospace Forces have created
several squadrons of Forpost UAVs, as well as Orlan-10s. In 2023, the Russian Armed Forces
began to actively use SuperCam S350 reconnaissance drones31.
In 2021, the Russian company Zala Group (a subsidiary of Kalashnikov, which in turn
sits within Rostec) began production of the Kub-BLA and Lancet loitering munitions. These
strike drones were adopted by the Russian Armed Forces in 2022, after the start of the large-
scale aggression against Ukraine. Subsequently, they began to play an important role on the
battlefield, posing a significant threat to Ukrainian troops on the battlefield (often working in
tandem with SuperCam S350 reconnaissance drones to target)32. Recent reports indicate that
Zala Group is close to creating an improved version of the Lancet using artificial intelligence
by the end of 202333. AI will allow the use of so-called "swarms" of Lancets, which will
independently identify targets on the battlefield and destroy them.

Lancet loitering munition of Russian Armed Forces, source https://www.bbc.com

31
https://chas.news/current/supercam-scho-vidomo-pro-rosiiskii-dron-yakii-mav-dopomagati-stvoryuvati-karti-a-
pratsyue-na-viini
32
https://defence-
ua.com/weapon_and_tech/jak_rosijani_rozkrili_slabke_mistse_svogo_lantseta_i_na_scho_spravdi_treba_zvertati_uvagu-
12237.html
33
https://t.me/Tsaplienko/45746

18
 In addition, the Russian company Aeroscan (affiliated with ZALA Group) announced in
September 2023 the development of a new attack drone called Italmas34. It is reported that the
Italmas has better characteristics than the Lancet, including an increased warhead and a range
of up to 200 km. According to available data, the Italmas has similar qualities to Iran's Shahed-
136 drones, especially in terms of appearance and launch method. It is also reported that this
drone is equipped with optoelectronic targeting devices that can significantly improve the
accuracy of target destruction.

Italmas, loitering munition, source video from the presentation by the Aeroscan

There is another version of the improved Lancet drone produced by Vostok Design
Bureau called Scalpel35. It is claimed that the Scalpel can carry a payload of up to 5 kg. The
drone itself has a maximum take-off weight of up to 10.5 kg, a speed of up to 120 km and a
flight range of up to 40 km. The manufacturer claims that the Scalpel will be cheaper than the
Lancet, apparently due to the maximum use of civilian components of foreign origin that are not
subject to sanctions restrictions36.

34
https://defence-
ua.com/weapon_and_tech/rf_pokazala_novij_dron_kamikadze_na_200_km_nebezpechnishij_za_lantset-12915.html
35
https://defence-ua.com/news/u_rf_rozrobljajut_deshevshij_analog_lantseta_dron_kamikadze_skalpel-12812.html
36
https://defence-
ua.com/weapon_and_tech/u_rf_zajavili_scho_novi_droni_kamikadze_skalpel_na_fronti_j_rozkrili_temi_virobnitstva_ta_
vartist-13529.html

19
 Scalpel loitering munition, by Vostok Design Bureau, source Russian media

Similarly, Russia has reported that it has improved another attack drone, the Kub-BLA.
The Russian Armed Forces have taken delivery of an improved Kub-BLA loitering munition
equipped with a more powerful warhead, the president of the Kalashnikov Concern, Alan
Lushnikov, told Russia-24 25th of December 202337. It is not clear how the company has
changed the warhead to improve its lethality, however videos of its use in Ukraine indicate that
it is at times unable to damage a target unless it detonates in very close proximity.
Meanwhile, the most widely used drone of the Russian Armed Forces is the Iranian-made
Shahed-136/131 loitering munition. According to a report by the Ukrainian Air Force, since 24
February 2022, Russia has used 3,940 Shahed-136/131 strike UAVs against Ukraine, of which
3,095 Shahed drones were destroyed38. This illustrates the extent of Russia's production and
acquisition of Iranian drones for deployment against Ukraine. Essentially, Russia opted to invest
billions of dollars in the Iranian industry instead of establishing its own extensive production of
long-range strike drones. Iran has supplied the Russian Armed Forces with abundant quantities
of straightforward, cost-effective, yet perilous attack drones that continually overwhelm
Ukraine's air defense system.

37
https://www.edrmagazine.eu/russia-receives-improved-kub-bla-loitering-munition
38
https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3807393-sili-oboroni-za-cas-vijni-znisili-ponad-1700-rosijskih-raket-ta-majze-
3100-sahediv.html

20
 President Zelensky and downed Shahed in Kyiv, source: president.gov.ua

Furthermore, Russia has initiated efforts to localize the production of the Shahed, referred
to as the Geran-2, in Tatarstan, Russia. In December 2023, a Shahed-136, officially designated
as the Geran-K by Russia, was downed in Ukraine39. The Geran-K is produced in Russia and
distinguishes itself from the Iranian counterparts by featuring a non-standard warhead weighing
40 kg with high-explosive fragmentation equipment. Alongside the Geran-K, Russia employs
two other versions of the Shahed: the original drone from Iran with an Iranian warhead weighing
48.5 kg, labeled Geran-M, and the Geran-Ы drone, equipped with an Iranian warhead but a
Russian navigation system40. There is also information about developing a variant of the Shahed
with a jet engine, potentially significantly enhancing the speed of these drones, albeit at the
expense of reducing their range.

39
https://defence-
ua.com/weapon_and_tech/na_rashistskomu_bpla_geran_k_znajshli_bch_vid_tajemnichoji_raketi_foto-13778.html
40
https://defence-
ua.com/weapon_and_tech/informatsija_schodo_termobarichnih_shahed_iv_ne_pidtverdilas_ale_tse_dijsno_nova_bojov
a_chastina-13697.html

21
Shahed with jet engine (J238), source: Defence Express

According to various sources, Russia is going to produce even more Shaheds, reaching
the level of 6,000 drones per year41. The decline in Shahed production is an acute problem for
Ukraine and Western countries. According to RUSI42, up to 82% of Shahed components come
from the United States. Therefore, with strict restrictions on supplies to Russia, Iran and
countries traditionally used to circumvent sanctions, it is possible to significantly reduce the
capacity to produce Shahed drones.
In January 2024, information emerged about the appearance of a new Russian strike drone
called the Klin43. According to preliminary information, the Klin may be an attempt to improve
the Russian Kub UAV (ZALA Group), which did not satisfy the Russian military because of its
weak warhead and short flight time (30 minutes). It is possible that the Russians are trying to
use technologies from Iranian Shahed drones and create their own more powerful long-range
drone. So far, there have been no cases of combat use of the Klin UAV against Ukraine.
In June 2023, the Russian government unveiled the Unmanned Aviation Development
Strategy until 203044. According to this document, the baseline scenario for the development of
the drone industry envisages 330,000 employees in research and development, and 1 million in
production and operation of drones by 2026, and 1.5 million by 2030 and 2035. The number of
drones produced in Russia is planned to reach 52.1 thousand in 2023-2026 (an average annual
production rate of more than 13 thousand); 105.5 thousand in 2027-2030 (an average annual
production rate of more than 26 thousand) and 177.7 thousand in 2031-2035 (an average annual

41
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2023/08/17/russia-iran-drone-shahed-alabuga/
42
https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-iranian-made-uavs-technical-profile
43
https://tsn.ua/svit/rf-namagayetsya-stvoriti-analog-shahediv-ocinka-eksperta-2487112.html
44
http://government.ru/news/48875/

22
production rate of more than 35.5 thousand). The figures for the progressive scenario are even
higher: 450,000 employees in 2026 and 55.4 thousand drones produced in 2023-2026; 1.1
million employees in 2030 and 116.8 thousand drones produced in 2027-2030; and 1.6 million
employees in 2035 and almost 200 thousand drones produced in 2031-2035.
These numbers are likely quite approximate, and it's important to factor in the potential
impact of additional sanctions against Russia. Nevertheless, it's evident that the Russian
government is poised to inject more funds into the drone industry, with a growing involvement
of both public and private entities in drone research, development, and production. This is
expected to result in an uptick in both the number of UAV projects and the deployment of actual
drones on the front lines. Regrettably, due to the prevalence of grey imports, these companies
will still depend on imported components and industrial equipment. Simultaneously, Russia's
substantial profits from international oil and gas sales are anticipated to offer ample funding for
these initiatives.
Already, the Russians have initiated the production of ammunition designed for both FPV
drones and airdrops. Furthermore, reconnaissance and attack drones equipped with thermal
imagers have started emerging on the frontline, capable of operating during nighttime, thereby
presenting an even more formidable threat to Ukrainian troops. According to the most recent
data, in 2023, the Russian Ministry of Defence trained approximately 3,500 operators for FPV
drones. Additionally, the Russian MoD has provided training for around 1,700 specialists to
operate other types of drones45. This underscores the substantial resources that Russia is
channeling into the production and advancement of combat unmanned systems, indicating that
this sector will play a pivotal role on the battlefield in the future.
Russia is also taking steps to develop naval drones. On 11 February 2023, a report on the
conversation between the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valeriy
Zaluzhny and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair, General Mark Milley, stated46 that General
Zaluzhny "...shared concerns about Russia's use of maritime surface drones, which poses a threat
to civilian navigation in the Black Sea." At the time, there was no information in open sources
about Russia's mass production of maritime drones. Therefore, it can be assumed that the drones
mentioned by General Zaluzhny were either single prototypes or Russia could have received
them from its "ally" Iran47. In addition, it is also known that Tehran has already supplied
kamikaze boats for its satellites - the Yemeni Houthis - to destroy surface targets. Some of their
characteristics were described by OSINT analyst H I Sutton in his blog back in September
202248.
During the Army-202349 exhibition in August 2023, the Russian company Kingisepp
Machine-Building Plant50 demonstrated its own remotely operated boat GRK-700 Vizir.

45
https://defence-ua.com/news/u_rf_vidzvituvali_pro_pidgotovku_35_tisjach_operatoriv_fpv_droniv-14031.html
46
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=504781811817309&set=a.225687773060049&type=3&ref=embed_post
47
https://defence-
ua.com/minds_and_ideas/chi_mogla_rf_otrimati_kateri_kamikadze_vid_iranu_i_scho_v_nih_vzagali_z_morskimi_drona
mi-10615.html
48
http://www.hisutton.com/Ukraines-New-Explosive-USV.html
49
https://defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/rf_pokazala_vlasnij_morskij_dron_i_tse_duzhe_zagrozlivo-12824.html
50
https://kmz1.ru/

23
Officials state that this boat is designed for hydrographic tasks, i.e. exploring the bottom of water
areas and detecting sunken objects. However, the manufacturers add that the GRK-700 Vizyr
can also be used for military purposes, in particular as an attack boat or as a "hunter" for marine
drones. The Russian Ministry of Defence is already considering the possibility of producing
such naval drones for its navy. According to Russian sources, the hulls of these marine drones
are made of fibreglass, the payload can be up to 500 kg, the declared range can be up to 500 km
(but only if an electric drive is used), and the declared maximum speed is up to 43 knots. The
manufacturer claims that these maritime drones are assembled only from Russian components,
including echo sounder, side-scan sonar, control, communication and navigation systems. It is
also reported that the equipment of these "unmanned boats" includes an algorithm for
"independent return to base".

Russian navan drone GRK-700 Vizyr, source: Russian media

In December 2023, the Russian media published information about a new Russian
maritime drone, also produced by the Kingisepp Machine-Building Plant, called the
Oduvanchik51. Russian sources call it a "fast-moving unmanned carrier boat". It is claimed that
the Oduvanchik has a range of up to 200 kilometres, a maximum speed of up to 80 km/h, a
payload of up to 600 kilograms, a warhead with TNT or other "special cargo". "The Oduvanchik
may be the first version of a whole line of similar maritime drones ordered by the Russian
Ministry of Defence from the Kingisepp Machine-Building Plant. It is possible that Russian
engineers have tried to study Ukraine's experience in the production of naval drones and have

51
https://defence-
ua.com/weapon_and_tech/rf_pokazala_kater_kamikadze_oduvanchik_pid_600_kg_trotilu_na_200_km-13816.html

24
chosen to copy Ukrainian developments. In any case, the Oduvanchik looks similar to
Ukrainian-designed maritime drones.

Russian navan drone Oduvanchik, source: Russian media

According to recent reports, the Kingisepp Machine-Building Plant is going to test the
first batch of marine drones in the Black Sea in early 2024. Later, it will launch mass production
for the Russian Armed Forces52. It can be assumed that in the second half of 2024, Russian
maritime drones will begin to play an important role in the Black Sea maritime theatre. Among
other things, they can influence the functioning of the trade corridor from Ukrainian seaports,
as well as the implementation of Romania's offshore energy projects.

Key takeaways

The two years of Russia's large-scale aggression against Ukraine have demonstrated the
exceptional impact of unmanned and autonomous systems on the nature of combat, operations,
armed forces doctrine and organisational structure. In turn, the doctrine of Network Centric
Warfare, which envisages the integration of intelligence, command and control systems and
weapons, has become an ideal framework in which the technological breakthrough of unmanned
systems has become a natural stimulus for increasing the effectiveness of network-centric
models of employment of armed forces.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces leverage the prowess of unmanned aerial systems across a
diverse spectrum of operations, spanning reconnaissance, target identification, unit and combat
element coordination, and the execution of precision strike missions. The strategic deployment
of a multitude of unmanned aerial systems across the entirety of the battlefield metamorphoses

52
https://rg.ru/2023/11/27/glava-kmz-v-rossii-nachalos-proizvodstvo-pervyh-morskih-dronov-dlia-minoborony.html

25
them into an integral component seamlessly assimilating battlefield intelligence into a unified
matrix. This matrix possesses the unprecedented capability to swiftly and decisively neutralize
adversarial elements. Importantly, this process unfolds in real-time, heralding a revolutionary
transformation in the dynamics of contemporary warfare.
The number of drones produced in Ukraine and used by the Armed Forces is growing
exponentially. From the dozens of systems that were in service in early 2022, the Armed Forces
of Ukraine used 70 different types of unmanned aerial systems and more than 20 types of
ammunition for attack drones at the end of 2023. About 200 companies that manufacture drones
in Ukraine produce about 50,000 unmanned aerial systems per month. Plans for 2024 are even
more ambitious: to increase the production of FPV drones to 1 million units per year, medium-
range attack drones to 10,000 per year, and long-range attack drones to 1,000 units. This number
should ensure asymmetric parity with Russia, which is also trying to maximise drone production.
The drone-centric approach within the UAF matrix necessitates doctrinal and
organizational adjustments as well as transformation in the structure of drone utilization. This
evolution entails moving from a frequently chaotic, bottom-up initiatives to establishing a
vertically integrated command systems with its own doctrine, organizational framework, and
standardized protocols. In 2023, the Ukrainian Armed Forces implemented the creation of UAV
strike companies integrated within their brigade structures. Furthermore, a significant
development took place with the establishment of the Central Directorate of Unmanned Systems
under the General Staff of the UAF. This entity is tasked with formulating and advancing the
doctrine and organizational structures governing UAVs within the Armed Forces. Additionally,
it assumes responsibility for identifying the Armed Forces' requirements and intricacies
associated with UAV deployment.
The incorporation of artificial intelligence (AI) marks a promising trajectory in the
advancement of drones within military operations. AI has the capability to autonomously
identify and categorize targets on the battlefield, providing operators with pre-configured
solutions for enemy destruction. Its application not only enhances the overall efficacy of drone
utilization but also substantially shortens the management cycles from target detection to
destruction. Furthermore, the utilization of drone swarms has the potential to exert a
considerable impact on the battlefield dynamics as early as 2024. This signifies a shift in the
landscape, where coordinated groups of drones may reshape the configuration of the battlefield,
introducing a new dimension to strategic considerations.
The inception and deployment of naval drones represent a groundbreaking advancement
for the Ukrainian Armed Forces in contemporary warfare. A convergence of technological
prowess and doctrinal innovation, facilitated by naval drones, has empowered Ukraine to
achieve a strategic breakthrough in Black Sea. Despite the absence of a conventional naval fleet
in the Black Sea, Ukraine successfully compelled the Russian Black Sea Fleet to retreat to the
eastern part of the Black Sea. This achievement also secured the establishment of a vital
maritime trade corridor, linking Ukrainian ports to the Bosphorus. The trajectory of maritime
drone development is set to continue in 2024, with a dedicated emphasis on enhancing their
combat capabilities. The ongoing evolution of maritime drone technology holds the potential to

26
further undermine the activities of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, particularly with the prospective
integration of underwater drones into the operational theater.
Russia started its military drone programme earlier - in fact, immediately after the war
against Georgia in 2008, after realising the backwardness of the Russian army's intelligence
capabilities. By the time of the war with Ukraine in 2014, Russia had already established mass
production of military drones and an organisational structure for their use. At the same time, the
rapid asymmetric growth of Ukrainian drone capabilities came as a surprise to Russia.
To date, Russia has not been able to significantly change the model or approach to drone
production for the army. Russia's efforts are mainly aimed at improving and scaling up existing
projects (Orlan-10, Lancet, Kub-BLA) while introducing advanced technologies, including
artificial intelligence. At the same time, Russia has managed to attract large amounts of state
funding, as well as to create a system of sanctions circumvention at the level of special services
to obtain scarce components, including from Western manufacturers. Another worrisome factor
is Russia's proficiency in manufacturing FPV drones, a capability that could potentially surpass
Ukraine's, presenting a significant threat to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
In addition, the further scaling and improvement of Iran's Shahed kamikaze drone poses
strategic challenges for Ukraine's air defence in protecting civilians and civilian infrastructure,
as well as military and defence-industrial facilities. Plans to produce 6,000 Shaheds in 2024,
despite sanctions, could pose a significant threat to Ukraine. In the future, these capabilities of
Russia may become a direct threat to NATO countries. In this regard, the issue of strengthening
sanctions restrictions on the supply of microelectronics and other high-tech components for the
production of drones to Russia should become a strategic issue for the EU and NATO.
Also, information on Russia's capabilities in the production of naval drones requires
special attention. Although Russia is still lagging behind Ukraine in the development and
production of naval drones, recent information indicates that Russia is ready to invest significant
budgetary funds in their production. By 2024, Russian naval drones may indeed emerge as a
considerable factor shaping the dynamics in the Black Sea, potentially jeopardizing the maritime
trade routes originating from Ukrainian ports. Furthermore, these drones could pose a significant
disruptive threat to Romania's offshore energy projects. In this regard, it would be logical for
Ukraine and Romania to take coordinated steps to develop the necessary measures to counter
Russian naval drones in the Black Sea. NATO's involvement in this area would also be very
appropriate.

27
Follow us on social media:

NSC_Romania
newstrategycenter
office@newstrategycenter.ro
https://newstrategycenter.ro/en/home/